REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.10664 OF 2010 (arising out of S.L.P.(C) No. 21199 of 2007)

Safiya Bee  …. Appellant

v.

Mohd. Vajahath Hussain alias  Fasi                  ….Respondent

J U D G M E N T

CYRIAC JOSEPH, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. According to the appellant Safiya Bee, vide a registered Sale  

Deed  dated  5th February,  1969,  she  had  purchased  from  one  

Mohd. Hussain houses bearing Nos. 2-5-254, 2-5-255 and 2-5-

256 along with the  appurtenant  lands.   The respondent  Mohd.  

Vajahath Hussain  alias Fasi forcibly occupied the house bearing  

No. 2-5-256 (re-numbered as 4-3-65).  The building has a plinth  

area of 1114 sq.ft. and the appurtenant vacant land has an area of  

9341 sq.ft.  Alleging that the respondent is a `land grabber’, the  

appellant filed L.G.O.P. No. 5 of 1990 under Section 7-A of the  

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Andhra  Pradesh  Land  Grabbing  (Prohibition)  Act,  1982  

(hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) before the Special Tribunal,  

Adilabad seeking possession of  the  house  and the appurtenant  

land  from  the respondent.  The respondent contested L.G.O.P.  

No. 5 of 1990 and contended that he was not a land grabber, that  

he, his mother and his brothers were in possession of the disputed  

property  in their  own rights  under  law and that  they  were  the  

owners of the disputed property.  He also disputed the claim of the  

appellant that she had purchased the property as per registered  

Sale Deed dated 5th February, 1969.  He alleged that the registered  

Sale Deed was a fabricated and concocted document and that late  

Mohd. Hussain was not in a position to sell the property as he was  

not  of  sound  mind  at  the  relevant  time.   According  to  the  

respondent, the appellant did not have the financial capacity to  

purchase the house and there was no need for Mohd. Hussain to  

sell the house.   

3. After considering the pleadings in the case and the evidence  

adduced,  the  Special  Tribunal  allowed  the  application  on  13th  

June, 1997 and directed the respondent to deliver the property to  

the  appellant.   In  its  order  dated  13th June,  1997  passed  in  

L.G.O.P. No. 5 of 1990, the Special Tribunal held that:

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(a)  Mohd.  Hussain  executed  the  registered  Sale  Deed dated  5th  

February, 1969 in respect of the disputed property in favour of the  

appellant after receiving the consideration;  

(b) The appellant is the owner of the disputed property;  

(c) Mohd. Hussain was in sound state of mind till his death;  

(d) The respondent could not establish that Mohd. Hussain had  

gifted the northern portion of the house to his younger son Mohd.  

Zafar Hussain and the southern portion with its open land to his  

elder son Shaukat Hussain;  

(e) The respondent has grabbed the disputed property and being a  

‘land grabber’ he is liable to be evicted from the disputed land; and  

(f)  The  mother  and  the  brothers  of  the  respondent  are  not  in  

possession of the disputed property and the respondent alone has  

been in possession of the property after grabbing it.

4. Aggrieved by the order dated 13th June, 1997 of the Special  

Tribunal in L.G.O.P. No. 5 of 1990, the respondent filed an appeal  

being L.G.A. No. 30 of 1997 in the Special Court constituted under  

the Act.  By its judgment dated 30th October, 1998, the Special  

Court  allowed  the  appeal  holding  that  the  application  was  not  

maintainable before the Special Tribunal.  Accordingly, the Special  

Court set aside the order of the Special Tribunal in L.G.O.P. No. 5  

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of 1990 and directed the Special Tribunal to return the application  

to the appellant  herein for  presentation to a proper  court if  so  

advised.  In the judgment dated 30th October, 1998, the Special  

Court  held  that  since  the  application  of  the  appellant  was  in  

respect  of  a  house  property  which  was  alleged  to  have  been  

grabbed by the  respondent,  it  was not  maintainable  before  the  

Special Tribunal.  According to the Special Court, if  an existing  

building  itself  is  grabbed,  the  same  will  not  fall  within  the  

jurisdiction of the Special Tribunal or the Special Court and if land  

is grabbed and thereafter structures are raised, it may fall within  

the jurisdiction of the Special Tribunal or the Special Court.  It  

was  also  made  clear  by  the  Special  Court  that  in  view  of  its  

decision that L.G.O.P. No. 5 of 1990 was not maintainable before  

the Special Tribunal, it was not going into the merits of the case.

5. Challenging  the judgment  dated  30th October,  1998 of  the  

Special Court, the appellant herein filed W.P. No. 35561 of 1998 in  

the  High Court  of  Andhra Pradesh.   By its  judgment  dated 4th  

July, 2000, the High Court allowed the writ petition, set aside the  

judgment of the Special Court and remitted the matter back to the  

Special  Court  for  fresh  hearing  and  disposal  as  to  whether  

property has been grabbed by the respondent and whether he is  

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liable  to  be evicted delivering possession of  the  property  to  the  

appellant.  To hold that L.G.O.P. No. 5 of 1990 was maintainable  

before the Special Tribunal, the High Court relied on Section 2(c)  

of the Act which states that land includes rights in or over land,  

benefits to arise out of land and buildings, structures and other  

things attached to the earth or permanently fastened to anything  

attached to the earth.   The High Court also pointed out that the  

word `land’,  as defined in other statutes and as decided by the  

High Court and the Supreme Court in similar matters, includes  

super-structure, building etc. unless they are excluded from the  

definition of `land’ by a Special Act.  The High Court accepted the  

contention of the appellant that the Act applies not only to lands  

but also to lands with building.

6. The above judgment in W.P. No. 35561 of 1998 was accepted  

by the  respondent  as it  was not  challenged by  him before  any  

higher forum.  Thus, the said judgment became final and binding  

on the respondent.

7. On the basis of the remand of the matter by the High Court,  

L.G.A. No. 30 of  1997 was again heard and disposed of by the  

Special Court on 16th November, 2000.  As per the judgment dated  

16th November, 2000, the appeal was dismissed, the order of the  

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Special  Tribunal  was  upheld  and  the  respondent  herein  was  

directed to deliver possession of the petition schedule property to  

the  appellant  herein  within  a  period  of  two  months.   While  

dismissing the appeal, the Special Court held that the Sale Deed  

dated 5th February, 1969 relied upon by the appellant was true  

and valid and was binding on the respondent.  The Special Court  

also rejected the contention of the respondent that there was an  

oral  gift  of  the property in the year 1954.  Though the learned  

counsel for the respondent tried to contend that the respondent  

had perfected his title by adverse possession, the said contention  

was not entertained by the Special Court on the ground that the  

respondent had not raised any plea or led any evidence in that  

regard  and  such  a  point  was  not  argued  before  the  Special  

Tribunal and no finding was recorded by the Special Tribunal.  

8. Thereupon the respondent herein filed W.P. No. 304 of 2001  

in the High Court of  Andhra Pradesh challenging the judgment  

dated 16th November, 2000 of the Special Court in L.G.A. No. 30 of  

1997.  When the writ petition was heard by the High Court, the  

main  question  raised  related  to  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Special  

Tribunal to consider the application in L.G.O.P. No. 5 of 1990 filed  

by the appellant herein as it was in respect of a house property  

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with its appurtenant land.  It was contended on behalf of the writ  

petitioner  that  the  Special  Tribunal  had no jurisdiction  to  deal  

with the house property and, therefore, the impugned orders were  

without jurisdiction.  It was also contended that the remand order  

passed by the High Court in the earlier W.P. No. 35561 of 1998  

was  in  the  nature  of  an  interlocutory  order  and  was  passed  

without considering the relevant provisions of the Act and hence  

the order was without jurisdiction, a nullity and would not operate  

as a bar.  However, on behalf of the respondent in the writ petition  

(appellant herein), it was contended that the remand order which  

had become final and binding would operate as  res judicata and  

that the buildings and structures existing on the land would be  

covered by the definition of `land’ in Section 2(c) of the Act.  It was  

also pointed out that the extent of the open land was much more  

than the extent of the area covered by the building.   After noticing  

the  contentions  of  the  parties,  the  High  Court  proceeded  to  

consider the following questions :  

(i)  Whether  the  property  in  question  is  a  building  or  

land? and  

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(ii)  Whether  the  Special  Tribunal  has  jurisdiction  to  

entertain an application in respect of a house property  

with its appurtenant open land?   

9. In its judgment dated 18th April, 2007, the High Court found  

that the conclusions reached by the Special  Tribunal  were well  

founded  upon  the  oral  and  documentary  evidence,  that  the  

Special Court too, on re-appraisal of the evidence, concurred with  

the conclusions reached by the Special  Tribunal and that there  

were concurrent findings of the Special Tribunal and the Special  

Court  on  the  contentious  issues  between  the  parties.   After  

considering  the  particulars  furnished  by  the  appellant  in  the  

different  columns  of  the  application  filed  before  the  Special  

Tribunal,  the  High Court  observed that  the property  in dispute  

was the house bearing Municipal No. 4-3-65 with its appurtenant  

open land.  Even though the question of jurisdiction of the Special  

Tribunal to consider and decide the application in L.G.O.P. No. 5  

of 1990 had already been considered and decided in the earlier  

W.P.  No.  35561  of  1998,  the  High  Court  proceeded  to  again  

consider  the  question  of  maintainability  of  the  said  application  

before  the  Special  Tribunal.   By  way  of  justification  for  such  

consideration,  the  High Court  has  stated  in  the  judgment  that  

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“since the decision of the court while remitting the matter to the  

Special Court for fresh disposal was mainly dependant upon the  

interpretation of a provision of the Act, which is a pure question of  

law involving the interpretation process, such a decision will not  

operate  as  res  judicata”.   The  High  Court  has  held  that  “if  an  

application is filed seeking possession of building along with its  

appurtenant land because the building in question is in existence  

on the land and is surrounded by the vacant land, it cannot be  

said that it is a case of grabbing of land, but it is certainly a case  

of occupation of a building”.   According to the High Court, the Act  

applies to the lands but not to the buildings and when it is alleged  

that the land is grabbed, the land along with the existing super-

structure or building thereon can together reflect as property in  

dispute and in such a case the Special  Tribunal  or the Special  

Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate.  But if the application is for  

seeking possession of  building along with its appurtenant land,  

the Special  Tribunal or the Special Court has no jurisdiction to  

adjudicate the dispute.  The High Court has drawn a distinction  

between “building with its appurtenant land” and “land along with  

building”.  Based on such reasoning, the High Court has held that  

since the dispute in the case was in respect of a building with its  

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appurtenant land, the matter would not come squarely within the  

jurisdiction  of  the  Special  Tribunal.   The  High  Court  has  also  

observed that even though the applicant seemed to have a good  

case  on  the  factual  aspect,  unfortunately  the  applicant  

approached  a  wrong  forum  which  had  no  jurisdiction  to  

adjudicate.  As per the judgment dated 18th April 2007, the High  

Court allowed the writ petition and set aside the judgment dated  

16th November,  2000 of  the  Special  Court  as well  as  the  order  

dated 13th June, 1997 of the Special Tribunal.

10. The appellant has filed this appeal against the said judgment  

dated 18th April, 2007 of the High Court in W.P. No. 304 of 2001.  

We  have  heard  the  learned  counsel  for  the  parties  and  have  

considered the materials placed on record.

11. The  basic  question  to  be  considered  is  whether  the  High  

Court was correct in holding that the appellant’s application under  

Section 7-A of  the Act was not maintainable  before  the Special  

Tribunal  “as  the  property  in  dispute  was  a  building  with  its  

appurtenant  land”.   The  Andhra  Pradesh  Land  Grabbing  

(Prohibition) Act, 1982 was enacted to prohibit the activity of land  

grabbing  in  the  State  of  Andhra  Pradesh  and  to  provide  for  

matters connected therewith.  As per Section 1(3), the Act applies  

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to all lands situated within the limits of urban agglomeration as  

defined in Clause (n) of Section 2 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and  

Regulation) Act, 1976 and a Municipality.  As per Section 1(3-A),  

the Act applies also to any other lands situated in such areas as  

the Government may, by notification, specify.  Section 2(e) defines  

‘land grabbing’ as hereunder:

“  ‘land grabbing’  means every activity  of  grabbing of  any  land  (whether  belonging  to  the  Government,  a  local authority, a religious or charitable institution or  endowment,  including  a  wakf,  or  any  other  private  person) by a person or group of persons, without any  lawful entitlement and with a view to illegally taking  possession of such lands, or enter into or create illegal  tenancies  or  lease  and  licences  agreements  or  any  other illegal agreements in respect of such lands, or to  construct unauthorised structures thereon for sale or  hire,  or  give  such lands to  any person on rental  or  lease and licence basis for  construction,  or use and  occupation, of unauthorized structures; and the term  ‘to grab land’ shall be construed accordingly.”

Section 2(c) defines ‘land’ as hereunder:

“ ‘land’ includes rights in or over land, benefits to arise  out of land and buildings, structures and other things  attached  to  the  earth  or  permanently  fastened  to  anything attached to the earth”   

The above definition of ‘land’ makes it clear that the expression  

‘land’ includes “buildings, structures and other things attached to  

the earth”.  In view of such inclusive definition of `land’, grabbing  

a building attached to the earth amounts to land grabbing for the  

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purposes of this Act.  Hence, the High Court erred in holding that  

the Act applies to the land but not to the buildings.  The High  

Court was clearly wrong in holding that “if an application is filed  

seeking possession of  building along with its appurtenant land,  

because the building in question is in existence on the land and is  

surrounded by the vacant land, it cannot be said that it is a case  

of grabbing of land”.  In our view, if a building along with the land  

on which it stands is the subject matter of the application under  

Section 7-A of the Act, such application is maintainable before the  

Special  Tribunal.  The  distinction  drawn  by  the  High  Court  

between “building with appurtenant land” and “land along with  

building” is artificial and hyper-technical and it defeats the very  

purpose of the legislation.  In the light of the definition of `land’  

under  Section  2(c)  of  the  Act,  both  the  above  descriptions  

practically mean the same thing vis-à-vis `land grabbing’ and there  

is no logic or justification for drawing a distinction between them.  

Hence, the High Court erred in holding that the application filed  

by the appellant was not maintainable before the Special Tribunal.

12. It  is  to  be  noted  that  in  Column  10  of  the  application  

submitted  by  the  appellant,  Survey  Number  and  Sub-Division  

Number of the land were given as:

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“House  No.4-3-65,  2-5-256  (old)  and  open  land  comprising of 9341 square feet.”   

In Column 11, the extent of land was stated as:

“Open land 9341 square feet, Plinth area of the house  1114 square feet. ”

Against Column 14 relating to summary of claim made and the  

provision  of  law  under  which  it  is  preferred,  the  entry  was  as  

follows:

“The house  and  appurtenant  land i.e.  house bearing  No.4-3-65 corresponding to old No.2-5-256 belongs to  the  petitioner.   The  petitioner  purchased  the  said  house under registered sale deed dated 5.2.1969.  The  respondent forcibly occupied the house and since then  he is in the occupation of the said house and open land.  The registered sale deed was attested by the following  two witnesses:

1. Syed  Afzal,  s/o  Syed  Shabbir  Hussain,  r/o  Adilabad

2. Late  Shaikh  Ahmed  s/o  Shaikh  Abdulla  r/o  Adilabad.

Late Ameerulla Khan was the scribe to the document.”

It  is  also  to  be  noted that  the registered Sale  Deed referred to  

above  was  in  respect  of  not  only  the  building  but  also  the  

courtyard and backyard.  From the above-mentioned entries in the  

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application  filed  by  the  appellant,  it  is  clear  that  the  subject  

matter of the dispute was not only the building having plinth area  

of 1114 sq.ft. but also the open land comprising an area of 9341  

sq.ft.  In the summary of claim, the appellant’s application had  

raised the claim specifically in respect of “house and appurtenant  

land”.   It  was  specifically  alleged  that  the  respondent  forcibly  

occupied the house and since then he is in the occupation of the  

said house and open land.  In such circumstances, it cannot be  

said that the subject matter of the dispute was only the building.  

The  subject  matter  of  the  dispute  was  the  building  and  the  

appurtenant open land.

13. The High Court also erred in holding that only occupation of  

the  open  land  and  construction  of  a  building  thereon  can  be  

treated as land grabbing and that occupation of a building along  

with open land cannot be treated as land grabbing under the Act.  

When  the  land  along  with  the  building  existing  thereon  is  

occupied, it will amount to land grabbing.   

14. In  the  light  of  the  above  discussion,  we  hold  that  the  

application  filed  by  the  appellant  under  Section  7-A of  the  Act  

before the Special Tribunal was maintainable and that the Special  

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Tribunal  had  necessary  jurisdiction  to  adjudicate  the  dispute  

raised therein.

15. In  view  of  our  finding  that  the  application  filed  by  the  

appellant before the Special Tribunal was maintainable and that  

the  Special  Tribunal  had  jurisdiction  to  adjudicate  the  dispute  

raised therein, the impugned order of the High Court is liable to be  

set aside and the order of the Special Tribunal and judgment of  

the Special Court are liable to be restored. Therefore, we consider  

it  unnecessary to examine the correctness of  the finding of  the  

High Court that the decision of the High Court in the earlier W.P.  

No. 35561 of 1998 did not operate as res judicata for considering  

the maintainability of the application and the jurisdiction of the  

Special Tribunal in the later W.P. No. 304 of 2001.

16. However, even assuming that the decision in W.P. No. 35561  

of  1998 did  not  operate  as  res  judicata,  we  are  constrained  to  

observe that even if the learned Judges who decided W.P. No. 304  

of 2001 did not agree with the view taken by a Co-ordinate Bench  

of equal strength in the earlier W.P. No. 35561 of 1998 regarding  

the interpretation of Section 2(c) of the Act and its application to  

the  petition  schedule  property,  judicial  discipline  and  practice  

required them to refer the issue to a larger Bench.  The learned  

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Judges were not right in over-ruling the statement of the law by a  

Co-ordinate Bench of  equal strength.  It  is  an accepted rule or  

principle that the statement of the law by a Bench is considered  

binding on a Bench of the same or lesser number of Judges.  In  

case of doubt or disagreement about the decision of  the earlier  

Bench, the well accepted and desirable practice is that the later  

Bench would refer the case to a larger Bench.

17. In Union of India and Anr. v. Raghubir Singh (Dead)  

by  LRs.  Etc. [(1989)  2  SCC  754], (paras  27  and  28),  a  

Constitution Bench of this Court held:

“27. What then should be the position in regard to the  effect of the law pronounced by a Division Bench in  relation  to  a  case  realising  the  same  point  subsequently  before  a  Division  Bench  of  a  smaller  number  of  Judges?   There  is  no  constitutional  or  statutory prescription in the matter, and the point is  governed entirely by the practice in India of the courts  sanctified  by  repeated  affirmation  over  a  century  of  time.  It cannot be doubted that in order to promote  consistency and certainty in the law laid down by a  superior Court, the ideal condition would be that the  entire Court should sit in all cases to decide questions  of law, and for that reason the Supreme Court of the  United  States  does  so.   But  having  regard  to  the  volume of work demanding the attention of the Court,  it has been found necessary in India as a general rule  of practice and convenience that the Court should sit  in Divisions, each Division being constituted of Judges  whose number may be determined by the exigencies of  judicial need, by the nature of the case including any  

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statutory mandate relative thereto, and by such other  considerations which the Chief Justice, in whom such  authority  devolves  by  convention,  may  find  most  appropriate.   It  is  in  order  to  guard  against  the  possibility of inconsistent decisions on points of law by  different   Division  Benches  that  the  rule  has  been  evolved, in order to promote consistency and certainty  in the  development of  the law and its contemporary  status,  that the statement  of  the  law by a Division  Bench  is  considered binding on a Division Bench of  the same or lesser number  of Judges. This principle  has been followed in India by several generations of  Judges.  We may refer to a few of the recent cases on  the  point.   In  John  Martin v.  State  of  West  Bengal,  (1975) 3 SCC 836, a Division Bench of three Judges  found it right to follow the law declared in  Haradhan  Saha v.  State  of  West  Bengal, (1975)  3  SCC  198,  decided  by  a  Division  Bench  of  five  Judges,  in  preference to Bhut Nath Mate v.  State of West Bengal,  (1974) 1 SCC 645 decided by a Division Bench of two  Judges.  Again in  Indira Nehru Gandhi v.  Raj Narain,  1975 Supp. SCC 1, Beg J held that the Constitution  Bench of five Judges was bound by the Constitution  Bench of thirteen Judges in  Kesavananda Bharati v.  State  of  Kerala,  (1973)  4  SCC  225.   In  Ganapati   Sitaram Balvalkar v.  Waman Shripad Mage,  (1981) 4  SCC 143,  this  Court  expressly  stated  that  the  view  taken on a point of law by a Division Bench of four  Judges of this Court was binding on a Division Bench  of three Judges of the Court.  And in Mattulal v. Radhe  Lal, (1974) 2 SCC 365, this Court specifically observed  that where the view expressed by two different Division  Benches  of  this  Court  could  not  be  reconciled,  the  pronouncement of a Division Bench of a larger number  of Judges had to be preferred over the decision of a  Division Bench of a smaller number of Judges.  This  Court  also  laid  down  in  Acharya  Maharajshri   Narandraprasadji  Anandprasadji  Maharaj v.  State  of   Gujarat, (1975) 1 SCC 11 that even where the strength  of two differing Division Benches consisted of the same  number  of  Judges,  it  was  not  open  to  one  Division  

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Bench to  decide  the  correctness  or  otherwise  of  the  views of  the  other.   The  principle  was reaffirmed in  Union of  India v. Godfrey Philips India Ltd.,  (1985) 4  SCC 369 which noted that  a Division Bench of  two  Judges of this Court in Jit Ram Shiv Kumar v. State of   Haryana, (1981) 1 SCC 11 had differed from the view  taken by an earlier Division Bench of two Judges in  Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills v. State of U.P., (1979) 2  SCC  409  on  the  point  whether  the  doctrine  of  promissory estoppel could be defeated by invoking the  defence of executive necessity, and holding that to do  so was wholly unacceptable reference was made to the  well accepted and desirable practice of the later bench  referring the case to a larger Bench when the learned  Judges  found  that  the  situation  called  for  such  reference.

28. We are of opinion that a pronouncement of law  by  a  Division  Bench  of  this  Court  is  binding  on  a  Division Bench of  the same or a smaller  number of  Judges, and in order that such decision be binding, it  is not necessary that it should be a decision rendered  by   the  Full  Court  or  a  Constitution  Bench  of  the  Court. …..”

In  Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community and Anr. v.  

State of Maharashtra and Anr. [(2005) 2 SCC 673], (para 12), a  

Constitution Bench of this Court summed up the legal position in  

the following terms :  

“(1) The  law  laid  down  by  this  Court  in  a  decision  delivered  by  a  Bench  of  larger  strength  is  binding on any subsequent Bench of lesser or co-equal  strength.

(2) A Bench of lesser quorum cannot disagree  or dissent from the view of the law taken by a Bench of  

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larger quorum.  In case of doubt all that the Bench of  lesser quorum can do is to invite the attention of the  Chief Justice and request for the matter being placed  for hearing before a Bench of larger quorum than the  Bench whose decision has come up for consideration.  It will be open only for a Bench of co-equal strength to  express  an  opinion  doubting  the  correctness  of  the  view taken by the earlier Bench of co-equal strength,  whereupon  the  matter  may  be  placed  for  hearing  before a Bench consisting  of a quorum larger than the  one which pronounced the decision laying down the  law the correctness of which is doubted.

(3) The  above  rules  are  subject  to  two  exceptions :  

(i) The  abovesaid  rules  do  not  bind  the  discretion of the Chief Justice in whom vests the  power of framing the roster and who can direct  any  particular  matter  to  be  placed  for  hearing  before any particular Bench of any strength; and  

(ii) In spite of the rules laid down hereinabove,  if  the  matter  has  already  come  up  for  hearing  before a Bench of larger quorum and that Bench  itself  feels  that  the  view of  the law taken by a  Bench of lesser quorum, which view is in doubt,  needs correction or reconsideration then by way  of exception (and not as a rule) and for reasons  given by it, it may proceed to hear the case and  examine the correctness of the previous decision  in question dispensing with the need of a specific  reference  or  the  order  of  Chief  Justice  constituting the Bench and such listing.”

The  above  principles  and  norms  stated  with  reference  to  the  

Supreme Court  are  equally relevant and applicable  to the High  

Court also.

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18. For the reasons stated above, we allow the appeal and set  

aside the impugned judgment dated 18th April, 2007 in W.P. No.  

304  of  2001.   The  order  dated  13th June,  1997 of  the  Special  

Tribunal in L.G.O.P. No. 5 of 1990 and the judgment dated 16th  

November, 2000 of the Special Court in L.G.A. No. 30 of 1997 are  

upheld.  The respondent is directed to deliver the petition schedule  

property  to  the  appellant  within  a  period  of  two  months  from  

today,  failing  which,  the  Revenue  Divisional  Officer  concerned  

shall deliver the petition schedule property to the appellant within  

a period of two months after the expiry of the period of two months  

mentioned above.  

          …………………………..J.  (V.S. Sirpurkar)

 …………………………..J.  (Cyriac Joseph)

New Delhi; December 16, 2010.  

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