NON­REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 473­474 OF 2019 [Arising out of SLP (Crl.) Nos. 2453­2454 of 2016]  

Sachin Kumar Singhraha .....Appellant

Versus

State of Madhya Pradesh        .....Respondent

J U D G M E N T

MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR, J.

Leave granted.

2. The First Additional Sessions Judge, Maihar, District

Satna, Madhya Pradesh in Special Sessions Trial No. 41 of 2015

vide judgment dated 06.08.2015 convicted the accused/appellant

for the offences punishable under Sections 363, 376(A), 302 and

201(II) of the Indian Penal Code (in short “the IPC”) and Section

5(i)(m) read  with  Section 6  of the  Protection  of  Children from

1

Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (in short “the POCSO Act”) and

sentenced him to death.

3. The judgment of the Trial Court was confirmed by the High

Court of  Madhya  Pradesh  at Jabalpur vide its judgment and

order dated 03.03.2016 in Criminal Reference No. 5 of 2015 and

in Criminal Appeal No. 2203 of 2015, except  in respect of  the

offence  under  Section 363  IPC which means  the  accused was

acquitted under Section 363 IPC by the High Court.

These appeals are presented by the convicted accused.

4. The case of the prosecution in brief is that on 23.02.2015,

PW4 (the elder brother of the victim’s father) came over from his

village to  drop the  victim child to  school in  a  vehicle  bearing

Registration No. MP 19 T 2374, owned and driven by the

accused/appellant. PW4, on the assurance of the

accused/appellant that he would go along with the victim child to

her school, as he had to pay his own daughter’s fees, alighted

from the vehicle near the Sabzi Mandi.  The child went along with

the accused/appellant towards her school in the vehicle, but did

not return home that day. Despite a frantic search by her

parents, relatives and the villagers, the victim child could not be

2

traced. The father of the deceased suspected that the

accused/appellant had left his daughter somewhere else,

however, the first information report (Ext. P1) came to be lodged

against an  unknown  offender and the  accused/appellant  was

apprehended after two days.  After the trial, as mentioned supra,

the accused/appellant was convicted by the Trial Court and the

order of conviction was confirmed by the High Court.   

5. Shri Mrigandra Singh, learned senior Advocate appearing on

behalf of the accused/appellant, took us through the material on

record, and submitted that the case of the prosecution mainly

rests on the last seen circumstance, but the said circumstance

has not been duly proved. This is because grave suspicion arises

against PW4 also, having regard to the evidence of PW5 Ramji

Shukla. He also submits that the evidence that led to the

recovery of the dead body based on the confession of the

accused/appellant is liable to be rejected on the ground that the

panchnama was drawn at the police station and not on the spot

of recovery of the dead body; and that the Investigating Officer

deliberately tried to conceal  the main offender and framed the

accused/appellant, and such lapse in the course of investigation

would tilt the balance of justice in favour of the

3

accused/appellant.   In the alternative, he submits that the case

on hand does not fall under the definition of the rarest of rare

cases and, therefore, the accused/appellant may not be punished

with death.

Per contra, learned counsel for the State argued in support

of the judgments of the Courts.

6. The instant case rests on circumstantial evidence, the

prosecution relying mainly on the following circumstances:­

a) PW4 (uncle of the deceased) and the deceased child travelled

from their native place Itma to Maihar in the vehicle owned

and driven by the accused/appellant.

b) PW4 gave the custody of the child to the accused/appellant

upon the assurance of the accused/appellant that he would

take the child to school safely.

c) The deceased was last seen with the accused/appellant by

PW4 and PW5.

d) The school  bag  and  the  dead body of the  deceased were

recovered at the instance of the accused/appellant

pursuant to the disclosure statement.

e) The accused/appellant came out with a false explanation in

his statement recorded under Section 313, CrPC.

4

7. There cannot be any dispute as to the well settled

proposition that the circumstances from which the conclusion of

guilt is to be drawn must or “should be” and not merely “may be”

fully established. The facts so established should be consistent

only with the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not

be explicable through any other hypothesis except that the

accused was guilty. Moreover, the circumstances should be

conclusive in nature. There  must be a chain of evidence so

complete so as to not leave any reasonable ground for a

conclusion  consistent  with the innocence  of the  accused,  and

must show that in all human probability, the offence was

committed by the accused.           

8. The records reveal that the distance between Itma (the

village of the deceased) and Maihar (the town where her school

was situated) was approximately 9 km. The deceased was

studying at New Horizon Public School, Maihar in L.K.G. and was

aged about five years and two months at the time of occurrence

of the offence. The accused/appellant was the registered owner of

the vehicle in which he was last seen with the victim, and was

driving the vehicle on the day of the incident. His daughter was

also a student of the same school as the deceased. All the

5

aforementioned facts are not in dispute.  It is also practically not

disputed before us by the counsel for the defence that it is a clear

case of rape and murder of the child.  However, according to the

defence, the accused/appellant is not responsible for the crime.

9. PW1 is the father of the deceased.  PW4 is the elder brother

of PW1.  Since PW4 was working in Maihar town as an electrician

in an electrical shop, PW1 sent his child (the deceased) with PW4

to drop her to school at Maihar.   At about 10.00 a.m., PW4 left

with the deceased from home in the vehicle of the

accused/appellant and went to Maihar.

PW4 has deposed that he was told by the accused/appellant

that he had to go to the victim’s school to deposit his own

daughter’s fees, and believing his words, PW4 requested the

accused/appellant to take the victim child to school. The

accused/appellant assured PW4 that he would drop the victim

child to school.  Hence, PW4 got off the vehicle, leaving the victim

child in the custody of the accused/appellant.  Thus, PW4 is the

main witness to depose about the last seen circumstance. PW4

also withstood his lengthy cross­examination and no major

variations were brought out in his evidence through the same.

6

10. However, learned senior Counsel for the defence contended

that the needle of suspicion also tilts towards PW4, inasmuch as

PW5 has deposed that he saw the accused/appellant, the

deceased and PW4 together in the vehicle of the

accused/appellant, at a point near the Sabzi Mandi.   According

to the learned counsel, if PW4 had really alighted from the vehicle

at the Sabzi Mandi, he could not have been seen by PW5 at the

said point. On the said basis, he submits that the evidence of

PW4 cannot  be believed,  since  his  statement  before the Court

was only meant to shield himself.  

We  have carefully gone through the evidence of PW5 in

order to satisfy our conscience, and find that the Trial Court and

the High Court have on an evaluation of PW5’s evidence, rightly

concluded that it supported the prosecution’s version.  Thus, the

contention as raised above cannot be accepted.

PW5 has deposed that at about 9.30 a.m., he saw the

accused/appellant sitting in the driver’s seat in the vehicle, and

the victim  by his side, in her school  uniform.   There  was a

contradiction (Ext. D4) in the evidence of PW5 with respect to the

deceased  being seated in the front seat of the vehicle,  which

according to us is not material.   Unfortunately, the Trial Court,

7

instead of marking a specific portion of the statement of PW5,

where he has contradicted his earlier version relating to the

aforesaid version, has marked the entire statement recorded by

the police under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure

(in short “the CrPC”).   Be that as it may, the contradiction thus

marked is to be seen only with regard to the child sitting next to

the seat of the accused/appellant. This contradiction has been

explained by the Trial  Court and the High Court by observing

that it may be due to loss of memory, and that it is in any case

not a  material contradiction. PW5  has deposed in his cross­

examination that  he  saw  the  accused/appellant, the  deceased

and PW4 together in the vehicle of the accused/appellant.   The

defence counsel based on this deposition of PW5 vehemently

argues that PW5 fully contradicts the evidence of PW4 as he has

deposed  to  seeing  PW4 at  a  point inconsistent  with  where  he

claimed to have got down from the vehicle of the

accused/appellant.  However, we do not find any confusion in the

evidence of PW5, inasmuch as he has consistently deposed that

he saw the accused/appellant, deceased and PW4 in the vehicle

of the accused/appellant in the region of the Sabzi Mandi. This

does not  conflict  with  the case of the prosecution that  all the

8

aforementioned three persons left the village Itma in the vehicle

of the accused/appellant and dropped PW4 near the Sabzi

Mandi.  The  Court  will  have to  evaluate the  evidence  before it

keeping in  mind the rustic nature of the depositions of the

villagers, who may not depose about exact geographical locations

with mathematical precision. Discrepancies of this nature which

do not go to the root of the matter do not obliterate otherwise

acceptable evidence.  It need not be stated that it is by now well

settled that minor variations should not be taken into

consideration while assessing the reliability of witness testimony

and the consistency of the prosecution version as a whole.   In

this view of the matter, in our considered opinion, the evidence of

PW5  fully supports the evidence  of PW4 and the case of the

prosecution.

11. The case of the prosecution is further supported by PW6,

who is also a resident of village Itma.  At about 11.00 a.m., while

he was sitting in his  paan  shop, he saw the deceased with the

accused/appellant in a vehicle going towards Katni Road.    

12. PW2 and PW3 have deposed about the recovery of the dead

body as well as the school bag of the child based on the

disclosure statement made by the accused/appellant.   Needless

9

to say, only so much of the statement as has led to the recovery

of the dead body and the school bag is admissible in evidence

under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act. Both these

witnesses have deposed that after the disclosure statement of the

accused/appellant was recorded, he led the police and the

witnesses (PW2 and PW3) to the spot where the school bag and

the dead body had been disposed of.  The dead body was found in

a well situated alongside Paraswara Canal.  At this time, only an

underwear was present on the dead body.   The police took out

the  dead  body  of the  deceased from  the  well,  and  after such

recovery, recorded the recovery  memo Ext. P7 and took the

signatures  of the  witnesses.  Thereafter, the  accused/appellant

led the police and the witnesses to the school at Dubehi, on the

rooftop of  which  he  had  hidden the victim’s school bag. The

recovery memo of the school bag (Ext. P8) was prepared at the

spot  and  the  signatures  of the  witnesses  were taken.  Though

certain suggestions were made to PW2, the same were denied.

The evidence of PW2, in our considered opinion, has remained

unshaken.  The evidence of PW3 is almost similar to the evidence

of  PW2. In  his cross­examination,  PW3 has  deposed that the

police had prepared the police papers at several places, such as

10

village Paraswara, and at the police station.   It is also admitted

by PW3 that the inquest panchnama was prepared at the police

station. However, these admissions of PW3 will not take away the

effect of Ext. P7 and Ext. P8, which are the recovery memos duly

signed by the witnesses.  It is clear from the evidence of PW2 and

PW3 that immediately after the dead body was taken out from the

well and after the recovery of the school bag from the rooftop of

the school at Dubehi, the recovery memos Ext. P7 and Ext. P8

were prepared on the spot and the signatures of the witnesses

were taken. As mentioned supra, PW3 has also deposed in his

cross­examination that certain police papers were prepared at the

village Paraswara as well as at the police station and that the

inquest panchnama  was prepared subsequently at the police

station. However, on this basis, the entire case of the prosecution

cannot be doubted, inasmuch as neither the death of the

deceased nor the place of death is disputed. The evidence relating

to the recovery is relevant to show  that certain incriminating

material has been recovered at the instance of the

accused/appellant, and that the accused/appellant knew about

the place of throwing the dead body and the school bag after the

crime.  We find that the evidence of PW2 and PW3 is compatible

11

with the prosecution version. Hence, we cannot reject the

evidence merely based on the fault of the Investigating Officer in

not preparing the inquest panchnama on the spot, particularly

keeping in mind Ext. P7 and Ext. P8 which were prepared on the

spot.   

At this juncture, we would like to recall that it is well­settled

that criminal justice should not become a casualty because of the

minor mistakes committed by the Investigating Officer.   We may

hasten to add here itself that if the Investigation Officer

suppresses the real incident by creating certain records to make

a new case altogether, the Court would definitely strongly come

against such action of the Investigation Officer.  There cannot be

any dispute that the benefit of doubt arising out of major flaws in

the investigation would create suspicion in the mind of the Court

and consequently such inefficient investigation would accrue to

the benefit of the accused.  As observed by this Court in the case

of State of H.P. v. Lekh Raj, (2000) (1) SCC 247, a criminal trial

cannot be equated with a mock scene from a stunt film. Such

trial is conducted to ascertain the guilt or innocence of the

accused arraigned and in arriving at a conclusion about the

truth, the courts are required to adopt a rational approach and

12

judge the evidence by its intrinsic worth and the animus of the

witnesses. The courts are not obliged to make efforts either to

give  latitude  to the prosecution or  loosely  construe the  law  in

favour of the accused. The traditional dogmatic hypertechnical

approach has to be replaced by a rational, realistic and genuine

approach for administering justice in a criminal trial.  

In this view of the matter, we find no error in the reliance

placed by  the Courts  upon the  circumstance of the recoveries

effected at the instance of the accused/appellant.

13. Looking at the evidence of the doctors, PW10 and PW11, it

is clear that the victim was sexually assaulted.   Learned senior

Advocate for the defence, fairly,  did not  argue contrary  to the

evidence of the doctors.   

14. The last circumstance, which is actually an additional

circumstance in the chain of circumstances, is that the

accused/appellant has assigned a false explanation about leaving

the company of the victim. The explanation offered by the

accused/appellant is that  he  parted  with the company  of the

child by leaving her at school  and hence does not know what

happened subsequently. This explanation offered by the

accused/appellant is false, having regard to the evidence of

13

Prahlad Patel, PW8, the Manager and teacher of the school and

the records (attendance register) produced by him as Ext. P/15

for the month of February, 2015, which reveal clearly that the

child did not come to school on the day of the incident.  Since the

accused/appellant has offered a false explanation regarding the

events of that day, more particularly about the last seen

circumstance,  an adverse  inference needs to be drawn against

him.    

15. Though the defence has also led the evidence of DW1, his

evidence  may not be relevant to discard the evidence of the

prosecution witnesses as far as the incident of murder and rape

is concerned, as it mainly pertains to the date and aftermath of

arrest of the accused/appellant. As rightly observed by the

Courts, the evidence of DW1 does not create any sort of doubt in

the mind of the Court and is not relevant to the commission of

the offence in question.   

16. Having regard to the totality of the facts and circumstances

of the case, in our considered opinion, the Trial Court as well as

the High Court have rightly concluded that the prosecution has

proved its case  beyond reasonable  doubt for the offence  with

which the accused/appellant  was charged. In our considered

14

opinion, all the circumstances relied upon by the prosecution are

proved beyond reasonable doubt and consequently the chain of

circumstances is so complete so as to not leave any doubt in the

mind of the Court that it is the accused and accused alone who

committed  the  offence in  question. It is  worth  reiterating that

though certain discrepancies in the evidence and procedural

lapses have been brought on record, the same would not warrant

giving the benefit of doubt to the accused/appellant. It must be

remembered that justice cannot be made sterile by exaggerated

adherence to the rule of proof, inasmuch as the benefit of doubt

given to an accused must always be reasonable, and not fanciful.

17. However, in  our  considered  opinion, the  Courts  may  not

have been justified in imposing the death sentence on the

accused/appellant.   

As has been well  settled,  life  imprisonment  is the rule to

which  the  death penalty is the  exception.  The death sentence

must be imposed only when life imprisonment appears to be an

altogether inappropriate punishment, having regard to the

relevant facts and circumstances of the crime. As held by this

Court in the case of  Santosh Kumar Singh v. State through

C.B.I., (2010) 9 SCC 747, sentencing is a difficult task and often

15

vexes the mind of the Court, but where the option is between life

imprisonment and a death sentence, if the Court itself feels some

difficulty in awarding one or the other, it is only appropriate that

the lesser punishment be awarded.  

18. We have considered the aggravating and mitigating

circumstances for the imposition of the death sentence on the

accused/appellant.  He has committed a heinous offence in a

premeditated manner, as is indicated by the false pretext given to

PW4 to gain custody of the victim.  He not only abused the faith

reposed in him by the PW4, but also exploited the innocence and

helplessness of a child as young as five years of age. At the same

time, we are not convinced that the probability of reform of the

accused/appellant is low, in the absence of prior offending

history and keeping in mind his overall conduct.  

19.   Therefore, with regard to the totality of the facts and

circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion that the crime in

question may not fall under the category of cases where the death

sentence is necessarily to be imposed. However, keeping in mind

the aggravating circumstances of the crime as recounted above,

we feel that the sentence of life imprisonment simpliciter would be

grossly inadequate in the instant case. In this respect, we would

16

like to refer to our observations in the recent  decision  dated

19.02.2019 in Parsuram v. State of M.P. (Criminal Appeal Nos.

314­315 of 2013) on the aspect of non­remissible sentencing:

“13. As laid down by this Court in  Swamy Shraddananda (2) v. State of Karnataka, (2008) 13 SCC 767, and subsequently affirmed by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Union of India v. V. Sriharan, (2016) 7 SCC 1, this Court may validly substitute the death penalty by imprisonment for a term exceeding 14 years, and put such sentence beyond remission.  Such sentences have been awarded by this Court on several occasions, and we may fruitfully refer to  some  of these  decisions  by  way  of illustrations.   In  Sebastian alias Chevithiyan v. State of Kerala, (2010) 1 SCC 58, a case concerning the rape and murder  of  a  2­year­old girl, this  Court modified the sentence of death to imprisonment for the rest of the appellant’s life.   In Raj Kumar v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2014) 5 SCC 353, a case concerning the rape and murder of a 14­year­old girl, this  Court directed the appellant therein to serve a minimum of  35 years in jail  without remission.   In Selvam v. State, (2014) 12 SCC 274, this Court imposed a sentence of 30 years in jail without remission, in a case concerning the rape of a 9­year­old girl.   In  Tattu Lodhi v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2016) 9 SCC 675, where the accused was found guilty of committing the murder of a minor girl aged 7 years, the  Court imposed the  sentence  of imprisonment for life  with a  direction not to release the accused  from prison till he completed the period of 25 years of imprisonment.”

20. In the matter on hand as well, we deem it proper to impose a

sentence of life imprisonment with a  minimum of 25 years’

17

imprisonment  (without remission).  The imprisonment of about

four years as already undergone by the accused/appellant shall

be set  off.  We have arrived at this  conclusion after  giving due

consideration to the age of the accused/appellant, which is

currently around 38 to 40 years.  

21. Accordingly, the following order is made:

The judgment  and order  of the  High Court  affirming  the

conviction of the accused/appellant for the offences punishable

under  Sections  376(A),  302  and  201(II) of the IPC and under

Section  5(i)(m) read  with  Section  6  of the  POCSO Act stands

confirmed. However, the sentence is modified. The

accused/appellant is hereby directed to undergo a sentence of 25

years’ imprisonment (without remission).   The sentence already

undergone shall be set off.   The appeals are disposed of

accordingly.     

...........................................J. (N.V. Ramana)

............................................J. (Mohan M. Shantanagoudar)

……………………………………..J. (Indira Banerjee)

New Delhi; March 12, 2019.                  

18

19