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REPORTABLE     

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA    

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION    

CIVIL APPEAL NO.2424 OF 2019  (arising out of SLP(C) No.3551 of 2018)  

 S. SREESANTH           .... APPELLANT(S)  

VERSUS  

THE BOARD OF CONTROL FOR  CRICKET IN INDIA & ORS     .... RESPONDENT(S)  

J U D G M E N T  

ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.  

The sports occupy a prominent place in life of a  

man/woman and also in the life of a nation. It not only  

gives physical or moral strength to a personality but  

spread the message of goodwill and friendship. In the  

21st Century the countries have come closer and nearer  

to each other and sports have become a medium of bonds.  

United Nations Educational and Cultural Organisation  

adopted in the General Conference at the twentieth  

session, Paris, 21st November, 1978 an International  

Charter of physical education and sports. The Charter

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contains following:  

 “…….    

Convinced that to preserve and develop the physical. intellectual and  moral powers of the human being improves the quality of life at the national  and the international levels,     

Believing that physical education and sport should make a more  effective contribution to the inculcation of fundamental human values  underlying the full development of peoples,   

  Stressing accordingly that physical education and sport should seek to  

promote closer communion between peoples and between individuals.  together with disinterested emulation, solidarity and fraternity, mutual respect  and understanding, and full respect for the integrity and dignity of human  beings, ………”  

2. Article 10 of the Charter recognizes the importance  

of National institutions in sports. Article 10 states:  

“Article 10. National institutions play a major role in physical education  and sport    10.1. It is essential that public authorities at all levels and specialized non- governmental bodies encourage those physical education and sport activities  whose educational value is most evident. Their action shall consist in  enforcing legislation and regulations, providing material assistance and  adopting all other measures of encouragement. stimulation and control. The  public authorities will also ensure that such fiscal measures are adopted as  may encourage these activities.     10.2. It is incumbent on all institutions responsible for physical education .and  sport to promote a consistent, overall and decentralized plan of action in the  framework of lifelong education so as to allow for continuity and co- ordination between compulsory physical activities and those practised freely  and spontaneously.”      

3. Cricket, it is said, is a synonym for  

gentlemanliness which means discipline, fair play,  

modest and high standard of morality.  The ever  

increasing interest in the game of Cricket in our

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country has raised issues of its regulation, control  

and management. In our country the Board of Control for  

Cricket in India (BCCI), a registered Society under the  

Societies Registration Act, 1860, exercises sufficient  

control on all aspects of game of Cricket and has framed  

various Code of Conduct for all who are associated with  

it. Highlighting the importance of BCCI, Justice T.S.  

Thakur, as he then was, in Board of Control for Cricket  

in India vs. Cricket Association of Bihar and others,  

(2015) 3 SCC 251, stated following:  

“103. BCCI is a very important institution  that discharges important public functions.  Demands of institutional integrity are,  therefore, heavy and need to be met suitably  in larger public interest. Individuals are  birds of passage while institutions are  forever. The expectations of the millions of  cricket lovers in particular and public at  large in general, have lowered considerably  the threshold of tolerance for any mischief,  wrongdoing or corrupt practices which ought  to be weeded out of the system.”  

4. The present is an appeal filed by an acclaimed  

cricketer of India against whom proceedings were drawn  

by BCCI and a life ban was imposed on the appellant by  

the BCCI which was unsuccessfully challenged before  

the Kerala High Court and aggrieved by the Division

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Bench judgment of the High Court the appellant has  

filed this appeal.   

 5. Background facts giving rise to this appeal need  

to be noted now:  

The appellant, a registered player with Kerala  

Cricket Association affiliated to BCCI   participated  

in an IPL match held at Mohali, Punjab on 09.05.2013.  

The appellant represented Rajasthan Royals against  

Kings XI Punjab. The case Crime No.20 of 2013 dated  

09.05.2013 was registered in the Special Cell of Delhi  

Police on a suo moto information provided by an  

Inspector of Special Cell. Information was received by  

the Police regarding involvement of various persons in  

some sort of fixing in the on going Cricket matches of  

IPL with active participation of un-identified  

conduits based in Delhi. The appellant was arrested by  

Delhi Police on allegation of spot fixing on  

16.05.2013. By order dated 17.05.2013 BCCI suspended  

the appellant. In the Writ Petition (C) No.318 of 2013  

Sulaxsha Awasthi vs. Union of India, this Court  

directed the oneman Commission constituted by the BCCI  

to submit its report to the Board within a period of

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15 days indicated about the irregularities that is  

noticed during the IPL matches. Oneman inquiry  

Commission submitted Preliminary Report dated  

05.06.2013 on the basis of video clipping and  

recordings of telephone conversation opining that  

there are sufficient evidence against the appellant to  

prove him guilty of various articles of Anti-

corruption Code. Preliminary Report further stated  

that the Commissioner had no access to the appellant  

who was in police custody. It opined that there are  

sufficient evidence available to proceed with the  

disciplinary proceedings against the suspended  

players. The appellant after being released from the  

custody appeared before oneman Commission and gave his  

statement dated 24.06.2013. He denied any spot fixing  

done by his friend Jiju, if at all, and he reiterated  

that he did not under perform the game. In his  

statement he further stated that he confessed certain  

things before the Delhi Police which was due to  

continuous torture and pressure. After receiving the  

statement dated 24.06.2013, Supplementary Report dated  

08.07.2013 was submitted by oneman Commission. The

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Supplementary Report relied on the audio conversations  

between Sreesanth and Jiju Janardhan recorded on  

06.05.2013 at 1740 hrs. and 2032 hrs. and on the basis  

of audio tapes and transcripts oneman Commission  

concluded that the appellant was part of the spot  

fixing and earlier findings given by the Preliminary  

Report are confirmed. After receipt of the report  

disciplinary proceedings were initiated by the  

disciplinary committee of BCCI against the appellant.  

Show-cause notice dated 04.09.2013 was given to the  

appellant. Following allegations in show-cause notice  

were made against the appellant in paragraphs 3, 4 and  

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”3. On the morning of 16th May, 2013, it came  to be widely reported in the media that  the Delhi Police, Special Cell had  arrested you along with other fellow  players on suspicion of having indulged  in spot fixing during certain matches of  Rajasthan Royals with whom you are  contracted to play for in the IPL.  Reportedly at the time of your arrest,  you were allegedly in the company of one  Mr. Jiju Janardhan who according to Delhi  Police is ad bookie.   

 4. It also came to be reported that the Delhi  

Police had also arrested a number of  bookies on the same day, who were  allegedly involved in conspiring with you  and the other players to fix spots for

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personal financial gain.    5. Acting on the information that was  

provided by the police authorities to the  media which was in turn reported across  the country, the BCCI on 17th May, 2013,  suspended you from all cricketing  activities pending an inquiry into your  actions by the BCCI. The BCCI appointed a  Commissioner, Mr. Ravi Sawani, the head  of the BCCI Anti-Corruption Unit, to  conduct a preliminary inquiry and submit  a report to the BCCI as to his findings.”  

6. The appellant was accused of offences under  

Articles 2.1.1, 2.1.2 and 2.1.3, 2.2.3, 2.4.1. and  

2.4.2 of Anti-Corruption Code of BCCI. The appellant  

was asked to show-cause as to why action should not be  

taken against him under the Rules. Date, 13.09.2013  

was fixed for hearing and appellant was asked to submit  

his written statement within a week. Reply to show-

cause notice was submitted by the appellant on  

11.09.2013. In his reply the appellant denied his  

involvement in spot fixing. In his reply apart from  

stating other facts following was stated:  

i) Fixing – There is absolutely no reliable  material even to find out a charge of  fixing against me. What is relied upon  is the alleged conversation between my  friend Shri Jiju Janardhan a follow  cricketer and some others. Shri Jiju  Janardhan is very much familiar with my

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mannerism and habit in the cricket field  as he knows me from the age of 18. It is  not uncommon to use a towel in afternoon  matches particularly in a place like  Mohali in the month of April-May. Enough  photographs are there to show that in  many of the earlier matches I played,  white colour towel had been used by me.  In fact even other well known cricketers  use white towel as a matter of habit.  Even in the very same match towels were  used by other players. Apart from a sheer  coincidence nothing culpable can be  attributed to me by reason of using a  towel. The allegation that in the first  over no towel was used cannot be correct.  

 ii) What is alleged as warming up against me  

is not really warming up but a manner of  play which I did in other plays also.  

 iii) As regards conceding of 14 runs I may  

respectfully point out there was no  guarantee that the Captain will ask me  to bowl in a particular over and if so,  depending on the field, the pitch,  batsman etc. the bowler will have to  bowl. It may be stated here that my  bowling is considered pace bowling  estimated at an average of 135 kms. per  hour and there is no guarantee for a  bowler regarding the runs he is likely  to concede unless deliberately either a  no ball or wide is bowled. Conceding runs  therefore, cannot be manipulated as  alleged. There is no allegation that in  the concerned second over any wide or no  ball was bowled.   

 iv) As regards seeking, accepting, offering  

or agreeing to accept any bribe there is  no trace of evidence pointing out to any  such incident at all.  

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v) There had been no failure or refusal on  my part to perform my abilities in the  Matches as all the balls bowled by me  will show that I have done my best in  bowling on that day also.”  

7. The appellant appeared on 13.09.2013 and was  

heard, the disciplinary committee communicated its  

decision dated 13.09.2013 vide letter dated  

03.10.2013, with regard to appellant in paragraph 9 to  

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“9. We have considered the inquiry Report of  the Commissioner, his written statement  before the Inquiry Commissioner, his  written reply to the Show Cause Notice  and his oral defence before us.   

 10. The evidence against Sreesanth in  

relation to the charge comprises to two  audio recordings which are recorded by  the Delhi Police. The first of these audio  recordings is a conversation between Jiju  Janardhan, his close friend, and a bookie  called CP (Chandresh Patel). Both have  been arrested by the Delhi Police. In the  said conversation Jiju Janardhan is said  to be promising that in the second over  to be bowled by Sreesanth 14 or more runs  would be conceded by him. The  consideration to be paid for such fixing  would be Rs.10 Lacs.   

 11. In his written reply before us Sreesanth  

has admitted the factum of the alleged  conversation with Jiju Janardhan. The  Delhi Police along with the charge sheet  has given him a copy of the recorded  transcripts. He states that he is a

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superstitious person and the use of the  towel is due to the same. He, however,  could not officer and explanation with  regard to the content of the conversation  which deals with conceding of 14 runs for  a consideration. On the contrary, he  argues that how many runs would be  conceded would depend upon a large number  of variable factors and not merely on the  desire or the will of the bowler.   

 12. Even if Sreesanth wants to distance  

himself from the said audio recording  which he was not privy, there is a cross  reference to this conversation on record  at 17.40 hours on 6.5.2013 between Jiju  Janardhan and Sreesanth. In the said  conversation, Jiju Janardhan admits being  in possession of Sreesanth’s money Jiju  Janardhan is head referring to receipt of  Rs. 10 Lacs of which he would give 7 lacs  to Sreesanth and retain 3 lacs for  himself. Jiju Janardhan further proposes  to use some money of Sreesanth for  purchase of mobile phones. The  circumstantial evidence clearly indicates  that this Rs. 10 Lacs is part of the  amount deposited with Jiju Janardhan for  influencing Sreesanth for underperforming  in the second over of the match.  

 13. The third piece of evidence is the actual  

conduct during the match itself where  Sreesanth conceded 13 runs. The two tape  recordings reveal facts which reasonably  match with the actual developments in the  second over on the field. The number of  runs conceded is only one less than  promised. The sum of Rs.10 Lacs being  promised as a part of the transaction  fixed by Jiju Janardhan is confirmed in  the second audio recording. On being  asked to explain about this Rs.10 Lacs  lying with Jiju Janardhan as mentioned in

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the second audio recording, Sreesanth  gave a vague explanation stating that  this may be reference by way of a charity  to an orphanage which he intended to be  visiting. We are not inclined to accept  the said explanation.   

 14. In view of the above, we are of the  

opinion that Sreesanth is guilty of  corruption under Article 2.1.1, 2.1.2 and  2.1.3 of the Code. We also find him guilty  under Article 2.2.3 for betting and  Article 2.3.1 and Article 2.4.2 of the  Code for bringing disrepute to the game  of Cricket and failure to disclose to the  ACU BCCI full details of any approaches  or invitations to engage in conduct that  would amount to breach of the Code. We  also hold him guilty of misconduct under  Article 32, of the BCCI Memorandum Rules  and Regulations.”   

8. On quantum of punishment following was directed:  

“Sh. Shreesanth – In view of the allegations  of match fixing and non-reporting of the  offences, he is banned from playing or  representing for life. He shall during this  period not be entitled to be associated with  any activities of the BCCI or its  affiliates.”    

9. In the criminal case chargesheet against the  

appellant and the other accused was submitted. The  

appellant filed an application for discharge. The  

application for discharge was heard and by order dated  

25.07.2015, the appellant was discharged from the

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offences. Against the order of discharge an appeal has  

been filed which is pending, at present, before the  

Delhi High Court. After passing of the order of  

discharge, appellant made a request before the  

disciplinary committee of BCCI to review its order. On  

18.10.2015 disciplinary committee refused to review  

its earlier decision. The appellant through Kerala  

Cricket Association addressed an e-mail to BCCI  

requesting to issue No Objection Certificate to him to  

enable him to participate in the Scotland Premier  

League. The BCCI by the communication dated 12.01.2017  

refused to issue No Object Certificate. Another e-mail  

was sent by the appellant on 11.02.2017 praying to  

revoke the ban imposed on him and issue No Objection  

Certificate to him to participate in the Scotland  

Premier League. The BCCI reiterated its earlier stand.   

 10. An Advocate’s notice was given by the appellant  

on 16.02.2017 to BCCI and thereafter a Writ Petition  

No. 6925 of 2017 was filed before the Kerala High  

Court. In the writ petition, the petitioner has prayed  

for quashing the proceedings of the disciplinary  

committee communicated by letter dated 03.10.2013 and

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also prayed for a mandamus or other writ or order  

commanding the BCCI and its Chairman to lift the ban  

imposed by the BCCI Committee by order dated 03.10.2013  

so as to enable the appellant to participate in the  

Cricket matches both in national and international  

level. The appellant has also sought declaration that  

reports are illegal and they were prepared without due  

compliance of law.   

 11. The BCCI filed a counter-affidavit in the writ  

petition. The writ petition was heard and the learned  

Single Judge by order dated 07.08.2017 allowed the  

writ petition quashing the life ban and other  

punishment imposed on the appellant pursuant to the  

disciplinary committee proceedings. Learned Single  

Judge had observed that the appellant has suffered ban  

almost for four years and nothing more is required in  

the matter. Aggrieved by the judgment of the learned  

Single Judge a writ appeal was filed before the  

Division Bench by the BCCI. The Division Bench of the  

High Court vide judgment dated 17.10.2017 allowed the  

writ appeal of the BCCI. The Division Bench held that  

the High Court under Article 226 exercises the

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jurisdiction of judicial review and does not sit in  

appellate jurisdiction. It is held that there cannot  

be reappraisal of the evidence. Learned Single Judge  

being of the opinion that the appellant was guilty,  

the appellant cannot escape the punishment and it is  

not open for the High Court to substitute its own  

notion of justice. Aggrieved by the Division Bench  

judgment the appellant has filed this appeal in this  

Court.  

 12. We have heard Shri Salman Khurshid, learned senior  

counsel, appearing for the appellant. Shri Parag P.  

Tripathi, learned senior counsel has appeared for the  

BCCI.   

13. Shri Salman Khurshid submits that in the  

disciplinary enquiry held against the appellant  

principles of natural justice have been breached. It  

is submitted that the disciplinary committee never  

confronted the appellant with the telephone  

conversation relied by it for proving the charge. The  

appellant never agreed and was not part of spot fixing  

nor ever received amount of Rs.10 lakh as alleged. In  

the match played on 09.05.2013, the appellant played

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his normal game. There were no loose bowls which is  

clear from cricket commentary broadcasted on that day.  

It was alleged against the appellant that he fixed for  

conceding 14 runs in the second over, which never  

happened. There are no evidence to prove against the  

appellant something which never happened. In the event  

any money was received by the appellant there has to  

be some evidence of asking to return the money.  The  

Preliminary Report was prepared ex parte which ought  

not to have been relied. Copies of the transcripts  

relied in the Supplementary Report as well as by the  

disciplinary committee were never made available to  

the appellant nor he at any stage was confronted with  

the aforesaid transcripts so as to give his version.  

The burden of proof was wrongly placed on the appellant  

where as per Article 3.1. of the Anti-Corruption Code,  

the burden of proof shall be on the designated Anti-

Corruption Official and for serious offences proof  

beyond reasonable doubt was required. The allegation  

that the appellant conceded 14 runs in the second over  

having not been proved the entire charge has to fall.  

The bowler cannot always control the runs which can be

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taken by a batsman more so when batsman of a calibre,  

Gilchrist was playing. The telephone conversation of  

06.05.2013 at 1740 hrs. and 2032 hrs with Jiju does  

not indicate that the appellant was part of any spot  

fixing. Shri Khurshid has also challenged the  

constitution of disciplinary committee. It is  

submitted that Shri Srinivasan had stepped down as the  

President of the BCCI on 13.06.2013 and thereafter  

Shri Jagmohan Dalmia took as the President. The  

disciplinary committee not being properly constituted,  

the entire proceeding is vitiated.   

 14. Shri Parag P. Tripathi, learned senior counsel  

appearing for the BCCI submits that the appellant was  

given full opportunity by disciplinary committee.  

Show-cause notice contained the detail of charges and  

the appellant was asked to reply. The allegations which  

were made against the appellant that he was part of  

the spot fixing, that in second over, the appellant  

was to concede 14 runs and under the deal he shall  

tuck white towel in his visible pocket which actually  

he did in his second over is ample proof of his  

complicity. The conversation dated 06.05.2013 which is

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brought by the appellant between Jiju Janardhan and  

Chandresh Patel @ Chand clearly proves that deal was  

made for spot fixing which was fixed. The appellant in  

his reply to show-cause has not explained the amount  

of Rs. 10 lakh as referred to conversation dated  

06.05.2013 at 1740 hrs between himself and Jiju  

Janardhan.  

  15. When the specific allegation was made against the  

appellant it was his duty to speak and he having not  

satisfactorily explained the allegations, disciplinary  

authority was fully entitled to confirm the  

proceedings. No proper answer has been given with  

regard to the tucking of towel in the second over. His  

answer that he is superstitious was not there in  

original reply. Answer relating to amount of Rs.10  

lakh to charity is not a complete answer to dispel the  

charge. The disciplinary proceedings are in the nature  

of departmental inquiry against a public servant. The  

decision of disciplinary authority on proof of charge  

is not to be interfered in exercise of judicial review  

by the constitutional courts. The judicial review of  

the disciplinary proceedings is not an appellate

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jurisdiction so as to enable the Court to substitute  

its opinion.  The para meters of judicial review are  

well settled. The interference with the disciplinary  

proceedings by the High Court under Article 226 and  

this Court under Article 32 cannot be on the basis of  

reappreciation of evidence. The Court cannot go on the  

sufficiency and reliability of the evidence. The Court  

shall not interfere if there are some legal findings.  

16. Shri Parag Tripathi further submitted that the  

Discharge Order has no bearing on the disciplinary  

proceedings which are subject matter of the present  

petition. It is trite law that proceedings by a  

disciplinary committee must be treated differently  

from a trial in a criminal case. It is submitted that  

there is vast distinction in the scope of inquiry  

between a criminal proceeding and a departmental  

inquiry. The question before the Sessions Court was  

whether appellant is guilty of offences under the  

aforementioned criminal statutes. On appreciation of  

the evidence, it may have been open for the Sessions  

Court to discharge the appellant under those specific

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statutes. The Sessions Court, however, did not deal  

with the question whether the appellant is guilty of  

violating the BCCI Code. In contrast, the scope of  

inquiry in the disciplinary proceedings initiated by  

respondent No.1 against the petitioner was entirely  

different as it was restricted to an examination of  

whether the appellant had breached the BCCI Code. The  

clauses which the appellant breached under the BCCI  

Code are entirely different from the offences under  

which the appellant had been charged before the  

Sessions Court. The ingredients required to establish  

a breach of the BCCI Code are also distinct and  

separate from the ingredients required to prove  

offences under the aforementioned penal statutes.  

Furthermore, in a criminal case, a defendant has a  

right to remain silent. However, on issuance of the  

SCN, the appellant had a duty to appear before the  

disciplinary committee and answer all relevant  

questions, to the satisfaction of the disciplinary  

committee.  

 17. Respondent No.1 further submits that the standard  

of proof in recording a finding of conviction in a

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criminal proceeding is distinct and different from a  

departmental proceeding.   

 18. It is submitted that the appellant has raised the  

issue of jurisdiction of the disciplinary committee  

alleging that Shri Srinivasan could not be a member of  

the disciplinary committee at the relevant time. AT  

the outset, it is submitted that this argument a being  

raised for the very first time before this Court at  

the stage of the appellant filing a rejoinder to  

respondent No.1’s counter affidavit and the same ought  

not be allowed by this Court. The appellant had the  

option of challenging the constitution of the  

disciplinary committee before the disciplinary  

committee itself, or at the least at the stage of  

filing the writ petition/writ appeal or even at the  

stage of filing SLP. However, the fact that the said  

argument is being raised for the first time at such a  

belated stage of the proceedings only goes to prove  

that the argument is a mere afterthought.   

19. Without prejudice to the aforesaid, it is  

submitted that the minutes of the Emergent Working

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Committee meeting held on July 28, 2013 clearly record  

that the probe committee had submitted its report and  

Shri Srinivasan could resume charge as the President  

of respondent No.1. Further, the minutes of the  

Emergent Working Committee meeting held September 01,  

2013 prove that Shri Srinivasan attended the said  

meeting as the President of respondent No.1.  

20. It is submitted that even the orders dated  

September 27, 2013 and October 8, 2013 placed on record  

and relied upon by the appellant do not suggest that  

this Court removed Shri Srinivasan from the post of  

President of respondent No.1. By the order dated  

September 27, 2013, this Court only ordered that the  

AGM of respondent No.1 scheduled on September 29, 2013  

and the scheduled election can proceed. With respect  

to Shri Srinivasan, this Court held that if he is  

elected as President (in the election to be conducted)  

he will not take charge until further orders. The same  

was reiterated in the order dated October 8, 2013  

passed by this Court. Both these orders were admittedly  

passed after the disciplinary committee passed its

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order on September 13, 2013 and, therefore, contrary  

to the appellant’s submissions the composition of the  

disciplinary committee was in accordance with the BCCI  

Code.   

 21. Shri Salman Khurshid, learned senior counsel for  

the appellant in his rejoinder submits that till  

29.09.2013, Shri Srinivasan was not the President and  

he could not function as President. Replying the  

submission of Shri Tripathi that charge has been proved  

against the appellant it is submitted that BCCI placed  

wrong burden of proof on the appellant. The appellant  

has answered the allegations and burden was on the  

BCCI to prove the charges. In any view of the matter,  

at best, the appellant could have been charged with  

not disclosing to the BCCI of any information. Shri  

Khurshid submits that punishment of life ban was  

excessive and maximum, the punishment which could have  

been imposed on the appellant was upto five years. The  

appellant has always given due respect and regard to  

the BCCI and always obeyed its instructions and  

commands. The appellant has been acclaimed cricket  

player, whose bright career has been cut short. The

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present is not the case where life ban ought to have  

been imposed. This Court may exercise its equitable  

jurisdiction in interfering with the punishment  

awarded to the appellant.   

22. From the submissions made by the learned counsel  

for the parties and the materials on records following  

issues arise for consideration in this appeal:  

(1)  Whether the disciplinary committee of the BCCI  

in passing the order dated 13.09.2013 violated  

the principles of natural justice in not  

providing the transcripts of telephone  

conversation relied by it and further in not  

confronting the appellant with transcript of  

the telephone conversations relied on by it?  

(2)  Whether the disciplinary committee was right  

in its conclusion that there are sufficient  

materials on the record to hold the appellant  

guilty of offences of corruption under  

Articles 2.1.1, 2.1.2, 2.1.3 of betting, under  

Article 2.2.3 and Article 2.4.1, 2.4.2 of the

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Anti-Corruption Code for bringing disrepute to  

the game and failure to disclose to the ACU  

BCCI full details of any approaches and  

invitations to engage in conduct that would  

amount to breach of the Code?  

 (3)  Whether there were sufficient grounds for the  

High Court while exercising judicial review  

jurisdiction under Article 226 to hold that  

charges against the appellant were established  

and proved on the basis of materials on record?   

 (4)  Whether the disciplinary committee has rightly  

placed burden of proof on the appellant whereas  

according to Anti-Corruption Code under  

Article 3.1. the burden of proof was on the  

designated Anti-Corruption Official and by  

wrongly placing the burden of proof the  

disciplinary committee has erred in recording  

its conclusion?  

(5)  Whether the discharge order dated 25.07.2015  

has any effect on the disciplinary proceeding

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of BCCI under Anti-Corruption Code culminating  

in order dated 13.09.2013?  

 (6)  Whether the constitution of disciplinary  

committee was vitiated by including Shri  

Srinivasan as President who had already  

stepped down on 02.06.2013 resulting in  

vitiation of entire proceedings?  

 (7) Whether disciplinary committee while imposing  

sanction under Article 6 has considered the  

relevant para meters as laid down in paragraphs  

6.1.1. and 6.1.2?  

 (8)  Whether the disciplinary committee erred in  

imposing maximum sanction of life time ban on  

charges under Article 2.1.1 to 2.1.4 of the  

Anti-Corruption Code?  

 (9) The relief to which, if any, the appellant may  

be entitled.   

 ISSUE NO.1  

23. The Supplementary Report dated 08.07.2013  

submitted by Commissioner of Inquiry, BCCI refers to

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two audio conversations between Sreesanth and Jiju  

Janardhan recorded on 06.05.2017 at 1740 hrs. and 2032  

hrs. The Commissioner in his Report has referred to  

transcripts of two audio conversations received from  

Delhi Police copy of which was annexed to the Report.  

along with the show-cause notice both Preliminary as  

well as Supplementary Reports were enclosed. As noted  

above, the Supplementary Report has referred to two  

conversations between Sreesanth and Jiju Janardhan  

dated 06.05.2013. Reference of telephonic conversation  

between Jiju and Chandresh Patel was also made in  

paragraph 8(1) of the show-cause notice. Reply to the  

said show-cause notice was submitted by the appellant  

on 11.09.2013. It is relevant to note that in the reply  

appellant did not complaint of not providing copy of  

transcripts of telephone conversations. Violation of  

principles of natural justice by the Commissioner while  

submitting the Preliminary Report was alleged on behalf  

of the appellant. The Commissioner in the Preliminary  

Inquiry Report has clearly mentioned that he has not  

been able to question the appellant since he was in the  

Police Custody and when the appellant was released from

27    

the Police Custody his statement was taken by the  

Commissioner on 24.06.2013 and after considering the  

statement of the appellant, Supplementary Report was  

submitted by the Commissioner on 08.07.2013. Before us  

additional documents have been filed by the appellant  

as Annexure A1 by which the transcripts of telephone  

conversation between Sreesanth and Jiju dated  

06.05.2013 at 1740 hrs. and 2032 hrs. has been brought  

on the record. Another conversation dated 09.05.2013  

at 12.30 p.m. with Jiju Janardhan and Chandresh Patel  

has also been taken on the record. The appellant does  

not deny that the above transcripts of the telephone  

conversations were given to the appellant by the Police  

when chargesheet was submitted in the criminal case in  

FIR No.20 of 2013. The present is not a case where  

telephone conversations have been referred without they  

not being available to the appellant. The transcripts  

of telephone conversations were received by the  

appellant from the Police much before issuance of the  

show-cause notice issued by the disciplinary committee.  

The appellant in his reply has not made any complaint  

of non-receipt of transcripts.  

28    

24. Learned Single Judge in paragraphs 3 and 24 of his  

judgment has made following observations:  

“3. The decision of BCCI was rendered  after affording an opportunity of hearing to  Sreesanth by a disciplinary committee  constituted to enter into the allegations……”  

 “24……However, Sreesanth cannot pretend  

ignorance to the contents of the telephonic  conversation, as the contents of it have been  exhaustively considered in a discharge  application filed by him before the Patiala  House Courts, New Delhi (MCOCO  court)…………”  

 25. The submission of Preliminary Report without  

taking statement of the appellant was in the  

circumstances that the appellant was in the Police  

custody and under the order of this Court the  

Commissioner had to submit report within 15 days. The  

Commissioner himself has noted that he has not  

confronted the appellant because of the above fact.  

When the appellant was released from the custody, his  

statement was taken and after considering his statement  

further Supplementary Report was submitted. In the    

show-cause notice with respect to the material relied  

by the disciplinary committee, the appellant was given  

full opportunity to have his say. We are not in

29    

agreement with the submission of the appellant that  

there was any violation of principles of natural  

justice by the disciplinary committee of the BCCI.  

 ISSUE NOS. 2 AND 3  

26. Both the issues being inter-related, are taken  

together.  

27. In the show-cause notice the charge which was  

levelled on the appellant of spot fixing and other  

allegations have been noticed. The allegations made  

against the appellant as contained in paragraph 8 has  

already been extracted above. In the substance, the  

allegation was that in the match played on 09.05.2013  

between Rajasthan Royals and Kings XI Punjab at Mohali  

in exchange of sum of Rs.10 lakh, the appellant agreed  

to concede 14 or more runs in the second over of bowling  

spell and in order to confirm the fix, appellant was  

required to place a hand towel in his visible pocket  

while ensuring there was no such towel during the first  

over. In support of this, audio conversation between  

Jiju Janardhan and Chandresh Patel was referred to in  

the Preliminary and Supplementary Reports. It is on the

30    

basis of the conversations between Jiju Janardhan and  

Sreesanth dated 06.05.2013 at 1740 hrs. and 2032 hrs.,  

the allegation of charge of receipt of Rs. 10 lakh was  

sought to be proved. The conversation between Sreesanth  

and Jiju which took place on 06.05.2013 where Jiju on  

telephone informed that Rs.10 lakh was available out  

of which Rs.7 lakh will be given to the appellant, has  

not been satisfactorily explained by the appellant  

before the disciplinary committee. The disciplinary  

committee in its order has relied on the telephone  

conversation between Jiju Janardhan and Sreesanth dated  

06.05.2013. It was also noted that Delhi Police along  

with the charges had given copy of the transcripts to  

the appellant. In paragraph 12 of the order the  

disciplinary committee has come to the following  

conclusion:  

“12. Even if Sreesanth wants to distance  himself from the said audio recording  which he was not privy, there is a cross  reference to this conversation on record  at 17.40 hours on 6.5.2013 between Jiju  Janardhan and Sreesanth. In the said  conversation, Jiju Janardhan admits  being in possession of Sreesanth’s money  Jiju Janardhan is head referring to  receipt of Rs. 10 Lacs of which he would  give 7 lacs to Sreesanth and retain 3  lacs for himself. Jiju Janardhan further

31    

proposes to use some money of Sreesanth  for purchase of mobile phones. The  circumstantial evidence clearly  indicates that this Rs. 10 Lacs is part  of the amount deposited with Jiju  Janardhan for influencing Sreesanth for  underperforming in the second over of  the match.”  

28. The explanation given by the appellant with regard  

to Rs. 10 lakh laying with Jiju Janardhan was found to  

be vague and was not acceptable. The disciplinary  

committee on the basis of the evidence available before  

it was entitled to draw its own conclusion.   

29. The disciplinary committee, under the relevant  

Anti-Corruption Code, is primarily entrusted with the  

duty, after considering the reply of show-cause notice  

and hearing the appellant was entitled to give a  

decision on various allegations made against the  

appellant.  

30. The disciplinary inquiry conducted by disciplinary  

committee of BCCI is akin to disciplinary inquiry  

conducted against a public servant under the relevant  

statutory rules except few distinctions which we shall

32    

notice later. This Court has time and again considered  

the scope of judicial review in reference to  

departmental inquiry conducted against the public  

servant. This Court in State of Andhra Pradesh vs.  

Chitra Venkata Rao, (1975) 2 SCC 557, had laid down the  

para meters of judicial review. In paragraph 21  

following has been laid down:  

“21. The scope of Article 226 in dealing with  departmental inquiries has come up before  this Court. Two propositions were laid down  by this Court in State of A.P. v. S. Sree  Rama Rao. First, there is no warrant for the  view that in considering whether a public  officer is guilty of misconduct charged  against him, the rule followed in criminal  trials that an offence is not established  unless proved by evidence beyond reasonable  doubt to the satisfaction of the Court must  be applied. If that rule be not applied by a  domestic tribunal of inquiry the High Court  in a petition under Article 226 of the  Constitution is not competent to declare the  order of the authorities holding a  departmental enquiry invalid. The High Court  is not a court of appeal under Article 226  over the decision of the authorities holding  a departmental enquiry against a public  servant. The Court is concerned to determine  whether the enquiry is held by an authority  competent in that behalf and according to the  procedure prescribed in that behalf, and  whether the rules of natural justice are not  violated. Second, where there is some  evidence which the authority entrusted with  the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and  which evidence may reasonably support the  conclusion that the delinquent officer is

33    

guilty of the charge, it is not the function  of the High Court to review the evidence and  to arrive at an independent finding on the  evidence. The High Court may interfere where  the departmental authorities have held the  proceedings against the delinquent in a  manner inconsistent with the rules of natural  justice or in violation of the statutory  rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or  where the authorities have disabled  themselves from reaching a fair decision by  some considerations extraneous to the  evidence and the merits of the case or by  allowing themselves to be influenced by  irrelevant considerations or where the  conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly  arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable  person could ever have arrived at that  conclusion. The departmental authorities  are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly  held, the sole judges of facts and if there  is some legal evidence on which their  findings can be based, the adequacy or  reliability of that evidence is not a matter  which can be permitted to be canvassed before  the High Court in a proceeding for a writ  under Article 226.”  

31. This Court further held that jurisdiction of the  

High Court under Article 226 is a supervisory  

jurisdiction and the High Court does not exercise a  

jurisdiction of an appellate court. The findings of the  

fact reached by a tribunal as result of the  

appreciation of the evidence cannot be questioned in  

the writ proceedings. In paragraph 23 of the judgment  

following has been laid down:

34    

“23. The jurisdiction to issue a writ of  certiorari under Article 226 is a supervisory  jurisdiction. The Court exercises it not as  an appellate court. The findings of fact  reached by an inferior court or tribunal as  a result of the appreciation of evidence are  not reopened or questioned in writ  proceedings. An error of law which is  apparent on the face of the record can be  corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact,  however grave it may appear to be. In regard  to a finding of fact recorded by a tribunal,  a writ can be issued if it is shown that in  recording the said finding, the tribunal had  erroneously refused to admit admissible and  material evidence, or had erroneously  admitted inadmissible evidence which has  influenced the impugned finding. Again if a  finding of fact is based on no evidence, that  would be regarded as an error of law which  can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. A  finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal  cannot be challenged on the ground that the  relevant and material evidence adduced before  the Tribunal is insufficient or inadequate  to sustain a finding. The adequacy or  sufficiency of evidence led on a point and  the inference of fact to be drawn from the  said finding are within the exclusive  jurisdiction of the Tribunal. See Syed Yakoob  v. K.S. Radhakrishnan.”  

32. This Court again in Union of India and others vs.  

P. Gunasekaran, (2015) 2 SCC 610, reiterated the same  

principles regarding judicial review of disciplinary  

proceedings. In paragraphs 12 and 13 following has been  

laid down:

35    

“12. Despite the well-settled position, it  is painfully disturbing to note that the High  Court has acted as an appellate authority in  the disciplinary proceedings, reappreciating  even the evidence before the enquiry officer.  The finding on Charge I was accepted by the  disciplinary authority and was also endorsed  by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In  disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is  not and cannot act as a second court of first  appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its  powers under Articles 226/227 of the  Constitution of India, shall not venture into  reappreciation of the evidence. The High  Court can only see whether:      

(a) the enquiry is held by a competent  authority;    

(b) the enquiry is held according to the  procedure prescribed in that behalf;    

(c) there is violation of the principles  of natural justice in conducting the  proceedings;    

(d) the authorities have disabled  themselves from reaching a fair  conclusion by some considerations  extraneous to the evidence and merits  of the case;  

 (e) the authorities have allowed  

themselves to be influenced by  irrelevant or extraneous  considerations;  

 (f) the conclusion, on the very face of  

it, is so wholly arbitrary and  capricious that no reasonable person  could ever have arrived at such  conclusion;

36    

 (g) the disciplinary authority had  

erroneously failed to admit the  admissible and material evidence;  

 (h) the disciplinary authority had  

erroneously admitted inadmissible  evidence which influenced the finding;  

 (i) the finding of fact is based on no  

evidence.    

13. Under Articles 226/227 of the  Constitution of India, the High Court shall  not:  

 (i) reappreciate the evidence;    (ii)  interfere with the conclusions in  

the enquiry, in case the same has  been conducted in accordance with  law;  

 (iii) go into the adequacy of the  

evidence;    (iv)  go into the reliability of the  

evidence;    (v)  interfere, if there be some legal  

evidence on which findings can be  based.  

 (vi)  correct the error of fact however  

grave it may appear to be;    (vii) go into the proportionality of  

punishment unless it shocks its  conscience.”  

33. To the same effect is the decision of this Court  

reported in Central Industrial Security Force and

37    

others vs. Abrar Ali, (2017) 4 SCC 507. In paragraphs  

13 and 14 following has been laid down:  

“13. Contrary to findings of the disciplinary  authority, the High Court accepted the  version of the respondent that he fell ill  and was being treated by a local doctor  without assigning any reasons. It was held  by the disciplinary authority that the unit  had better medical facilities which could  have been availed by the respondent if he was  really suffering from illness. It was further  held that the delinquent did not produce any  evidence of treatment by a local doctor. The  High Court should not have entered into the  arena of facts which tantamounts to  reappreciation of evidence. It is settled law  that reappreciation of evidence is not  permissible in the exercise of jurisdiction  under Article 226 of the Constitution of  India.  

 14. In State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur v. Nemi  Chand Nalwaya, this Court held as follows:  (SCC p. 587, para 7)  

 “7. It is now well settled that the  courts will not act as an appellate  court and reassess the evidence led in  the domestic enquiry, nor interfere on  the ground that another view is  possible on the material on record. If  the enquiry has been fairly and  properly held and the findings are  based on evidence, the question of  adequacy of the evidence or the  reliable nature of the evidence will  not be grounds for interfering with  the findings in departmental  enquiries. Therefore, courts will not  interfere with findings of fact  recorded in departmental enquiries,  except where such findings are based

38    

on no evidence or where they are  clearly perverse. The test to find out  perversity is to see whether a  tribunal acting reasonably could have  arrived at such conclusion or finding,  on the material on record. The courts  will however interfere with the  findings in disciplinary matters, if  principles of natural justice or  statutory regulations have been  violated or if the order is found to  be arbitrary, capricious, mala fide or  based on extraneous considerations.  (Vide B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of  India, Union of India v. G.  Ganayutham, Bank of India v. Degala  Suryanarayana and High Court of  Judicature at Bombay v. Shashikant S.  Patil.)””  

34. There being specific allegations made against the  

appellant in the show-cause notice as noticed above it  

was incumbent on the appellant to have explained the  

evidence and circumstances which were sought to be  

relied against the appellant. In the disciplinary  

proceedings a delinquent has to explain circumstances  

and evidence relied against him. It is true that the  

charges have to be proved by the BCCI for taking any  

action under the Anti-Corruption Code. The disciplinary  

committee of the BCCI had jurisdiction to form its own  

opinion after considering the evidence on record  

including the telephone conversation between Sreesanth

39    

and Jiju Janardhan and other evidence on the record.  

The conclusion drawn by the disciplinary committee on  

the basis of the material which is recorded in  

paragraphs 12 and 13 as noted above cannot be said to  

be suffering from any infirmity which may warrant  

judicial review by the constitutional courts. The  

learned Single Judge held that “If the evidence as a  

whole is appreciated, it can easily be concluded that  

Sreesanth had no direct link in spot fixing or  

betting”. Further, learned Single Judge held that  

“Assuming that Sreesanth had knowledge of such betting,  

this Court is of the view that the punishment already  

suffered by him of 4 years of the ban from all format  

of the cricket, nationally and internationally, is  

sufficient to meet ends of justice”. As noted above  

constitutional court in exercise of jurisdiction of  

judicial review of disciplinary proceedings conducted  

under the Code of Conduct framed by the BCCI will  

interfere only when conclusions of the disciplinary  

committee are perverse or based on no evidence. On  

appreciation of evidence, it is not open for the High  

Court or this Court to substitute its own opinion based

40    

on the appreciation of material on record on the  

charges proved.   

35. We, thus, are of the opinion that for the decision  

of the disciplinary committee holding charges under  

Articles 2.1.1., 2.1.2, 2.1.3 and 2.2.3 and Article  

2.4.1. and 2.4.2 proved, there are no grounds for this  

Court to take a different view. Issue Nos. 2 and 3 are  

answered accordingly.  

ISSUE NO. 4  

36. One of the submissions which has been made by the  

learned counsel for the appellant is that the  

disciplinary committee has wrongly placed the burden  

of proof on the appellant. Learned counsel for the  

appellant has relied on Article 3.1 in this context.  

Article 3.1 is as follows:  

“STANDARD OF PROOF AND EVIDENCE   3.1 Unless otherwise described herein the  Designated Anti-Corruption Official(or  his/her designee) and the standard of proof  in all cases brought under this Anti- corruption Code shall be whether the BCCI  Disciplinary Committee is comfortably  satisfied, bearing in mind the seriousness  of the allegation that is being made, that  the alleged offence has been committed. This

41    

standard of proof in all cases shall be  determined on a sliding scale from, at a  minimum, a mere balance of probability (for  the least serious offences) up to proof  beyond a reasonable doubt (for the most  serious offences).”  

37. Article 3.1 deals with burden of proof and standard  

of proof. The initial burden of proof shall be on the  

Designated Anti-Corruption Official i.e. disciplinary  

committee which has to form its opinion about the  

commission of Designated Offences by the delinquent.  

Before taking the decision when show-cause notice is  

served on the appellant making allegations and  

referring to relevant materials in support of the said  

allegation, it was incumbent on the appellant to have  

satisfactorily explained each and every circumstances  

or evidence referred to and relied. When the  

explanation submitted by the appellant was not found  

satisfactory, he having not been able to satisfactorily  

explain the allegations which were noticed from the  

telephone conversation between the appellant and Jiju  

Janardhan, it cannot be said that the burden of proof  

has wrongly been placed on the appellant. Initial  

burden as referred to in Article 3.1 shall stand

42    

discharged when the allegation referring to materials  

and evidence are communicated to delinquent. Standard  

of proof as referred to in Article 3.1 is that the BCCI  

disciplinary committee is to be comfortably satisfied,  

bearing in mind the seriousness of the allegation that  

is being made, that the alleged offence has been  

committed. Of course, on mere doubt the disciplinary  

committee cannot hold offences proved there has to be  

a positive evidence and finding regarding the proof of  

offences. We are, thus, not persuaded to accept the  

submission of the learned counsel for the appellant  

that burden of proof was wrongly placed on the  

appellant.  

 ISSUE NO.5    38. There is a vast distinction in the scope of inquiry  

between a criminal trial on one hand and disciplinary  

inquiry against a public servant or disciplinary  

inquiry under Anti-Corruption Code of BCCI on other  

hand. We find substance in the submission of Shri Parag  

P. Tripathi that question before the Sessions Court was  

whether the appellant is guilty of offences under the  

criminal statutes and on appreciation of evidence, it

43    

may have been open for the Sessions Court to discharge  

the appellant under the specific statutes. The Sessions  

Court had not to deal with the question whether the  

appellant is guilty of violating Anti-Corruption Code  

of BCCI. The clauses which the appellant breached under  

the Anti-Corruption Code of BCCI are entirely different  

from the offences under which the appellant had been  

charged before the Sessions Court. The ingredients  

required to establish a breach of the BCCI Code are  

also distinct and separate from the ingredients  

required to prove offences under the penal statutes in  

question. We record our agreement to the abovenoted  

submissions.   

39. The standard of proof in a disciplinary inquiry  

and in a trial of a criminal case are entirely  

different. In a criminal case it is essential to prove  

a charge beyond all reasonable doubt wherein in  

departmental inquiry preponderance of probability is  

to serve the purpose. This Court in Commissioner of  

Police, New Delhi vs. Narender Singh, (2006) 4 SCC 265,  

following has been stated in paragraph 12:

44    

“12. It is not in dispute that the standard  of proof required in recording a finding of  conviction in a criminal case and in a  departmental proceeding are distinct and  different. Whereas in a criminal case, it is  essential to prove a charge beyond all  reasonable doubt, in a departmental  proceeding preponderance of probability  would serve the purpose. (See Kamaladevi  Agarwal v. State of W.B., 2002 (1) SCC 555.)”  

40. A caveat needs to be put to whatever has been said  

above. We have upheld the decision of disciplinary  

committee of the BCCI on proof of charges which  

upholding of the decision of the disciplinary committee  

shall have no effect in the criminal appeal which is  

pending against the appellant against the discharge  

order. The conclusions and observations as recorded in  

the disciplinary proceedings under Anti-Corruption  

Code are entirely different from proof of criminal  

charges which are on higher yardstick to prove. It is  

a well settled principle that criminal charge must be  

proved beyond reasonable doubt which is not applicable  

in disciplinary proceedings initiated by the  

disciplinary committee of the BCCI. We, thus, clarify  

that any observation in this judgment shall have no  

effect on the criminal appeal which is pending against

45    

the appellant pertaining to discharge order.  

ISSUE NO. 6  

 41. The argument pertaining to proper constitution of  

disciplinary committee was not raised before the High  

Court by the appellant at any stage neither in his  

reply to show-cause nor before the High Court any  

ground was taken that disciplinary committee was  

illegally constituted. In this context, we, however,  

have noted submission made by the appellant regarding  

Constitution of the disciplinary committee and reply  

given by the learned counsel for the BCCI regarding  

constitution of disciplinary committee. The  

appellant’s case is that on 02.06.2013, Shri Srinivasan  

stepped down from the office of President, BCCI and one  

Shri Jag Mohan Dalmia took over as the Acting  

President. Shri Parag Tripathi replying his submission  

submitted that although Shri Srinivasan stepped down  

on 02.06.2013 but the working committee meeting held  

on 28.07.2013 clearly record that the probe committee  

has submitted its report that Shri Srinivasan could  

resume charge as the President of BCCI, Shri Srinivasan

46    

was again re-elected on 29.09.2013 as President. We are  

satisfied that there was no legal impediment in Shri  

Srinivasan participating in the disciplinary committee  

in the meeting of 13.09.2013 as President. The  

appellant having not taken this ground even in the  

grounds of this appeal, he cannot be allowed to  

question the constitution of disciplinary committee at  

this stage. Issue No.5 is answered accordingly.  

ISSUE NOS.7,8 AND 9  

42. All these issues are being taken together.    

Article 2(Offences Under this Anti-Corruption Code),  

of the Anti-Corruption Code provides for different  

offences which are as follows:-  

“ARTICLE 2   OFFENCES UNDER THIS ANTI-CORRUPTION CODE  The conduct described in Articles 2.1 – 2.4,  if committed by a Participant, shall amount  to an offence by such Participant under this  Anti-Corruption Code:     2.1 CORRUPTION:    2.1.1 Fixing or contriving in any way or  

otherwise influencing improperly, or  being a party to any effort to fix or  contrive in any way or otherwise  influence improperly, the result,  progress, conduct or any other aspect  of any Match or Event.

47    

 2.1.2 Seeking, accepting, offering or  

agreeing to accept any bribe or other  Reward to fix or to contrive in any  way or otherwise to influence  improperly the result, progress,  conduct or any other aspect of any  Match or Event.  

 2.1.3 Failing or refusing, for Reward, to  

perform to one’s abilities in a Match.    2.1.4 Soliciting, inducing, enticing,  

instructing, persuading, encouraging  or facilitating (a) any Participant to  commit an offence under any of the  foregoing provisions of this Article  2.1 and/or (b) any other person to do  any act that would be an offence if  that person were a Participant.   

 2.2 BETTING:     2.2.1  Placing, accepting, laying or  

otherwise entering into any Bet with  any other party (whether individual,  company or otherwise) in relation to  the result, progress, conduct or any  other aspect of any Match or Event.  

 2.2.2 Soliciting, inducing, enticing,  

instructing, persuading, encouraging,  facilitating or authorising any other  party to enter into a Bet for the  direct or indirect benefit of the  Participant in relation to the result,  progress, conduct or any other aspect  of any Match or Event.   

 2.2.3  Ensuring the occurrence of a  

particular incident in a Match or  Event, which occurrence is to the  Participant’s knowledge the subject of  a Bet and for which he/she expects to

48    

receive or has received any Reward.     2.3 MISUSE OF INSIDE INFORMATION:    2.3.1  Using, for Betting purposes, any  

Inside Information.     2.3.2  Disclosing Inside Information to any  

person (with or without Reward) before  or during any Match or Event where the  Participant might reasonably be  expected to know that disclosure of  such information in such circumstances  could be used in relation to Betting.  

 NOTE: Any potential offence under this  

Article will be considered on its own  set of facts and the particular  circumstances surrounding any  relevant disclosure. For Example, it  may be an offence under this clause to  disclose inside information. (a) to  journalists or other members of the  media; and/or (b) on social networking  websites where the Participant might  reasonably be expected to know that  disclosure of such information in such  circumstances could be used in  relation to Betting. However, nothing  in this Article is intended to  prohibit any such disclosure made  within a personal relationship (such  as a member of the Participant’s  family) where it is reasonable for the  Participant to expect that such  information can be disclosed in  confidence without being subsequently  used for Betting.  

 2.3.3 Soliciting, inducing, enticing,  

persuading, encouraging or  facilitating (a) any Participant to  commit an offence under any of the  foregoing provisions of this Article

49    

2.3 and/or (b) any other person to do  any act that would be an offence if  that person were a Participant.    

 2.4 GENERAL:    2.4.1 Providing or receiving any gift,  

payment or other benefit (whether of  a monetary value or otherwise) in  circumstances that the Participant  might reasonably have expected could  bring him/her or the sport of cricket  into disrepute.    

NOTE:  This Article is only intended to catch  ‘disrepute’ that when considered in  all relevant circumstances, relates  (directly or indirectly) to any of the  underlying imperatives of and conduct  prohibited by this Anti-Corruption  Code (including as described in  Article 1.1)   

 Where any substantial gift payment or  

other benefit is received by any Participant  from an unknown person or organization and/or  for no apparent reason, such Participant is  advised to report such receipt to the  Designated Anti-Corruption Official (or  his/her designee). Where such Participant  does not make such a report, then it is likely  to constitute strong evidence of the  commission of this offence.    2.4.2  Failing or refusing to disclose to the  

ACU BCCI (without undue delay) full  details of any approaches or  invitations received by the  Participant to engage in conduct that  would amount to a breach of this Anti- Corruption Code.  

 2.4.3  Failing or refusing to disclose to the

50    

ACU BCCI (without undue delay) full  details of any incident, fact, or  matter that comes to the attention of  a Participant that may evidence an  offence under this Anti-Corruption  Code by a third party, including  (without limitation) approaches or  invitations that have been received by  any other party to engage in conduct  that would amount to a breach of this  Anti-Corruption Code.  

 NOTE: All Participants shall have a  

continuing obligation to report any  new incident fact, or matter that may  evidence an offence under this Anti- Corruption Code to the ACU BCCI even  if the Participants’ prior knowledge  has already been reported.   

 2.4.4  Failing or refusing, without  

compelling justification, to  cooperate with any reasonable  investigation carried out by the  Designated Anti-Corruption Official  (or his/her designee) in relation to  possible offences under this Anti- Corruption Code, including failure to  provide any information and/or  documentation requested by the  Designated Anti-Corruption Official  (or his/her designee) (whether as part  of a formal Demand pursuant to Article  4.3 or otherwise) that may be relevant  to such investigation.”  

43. The Anti-Corruption Code uses the word “offences”  

and offences are enumerated under the Code for which  

sanction is provided in Article 6. Sanction under  

Article 6 is nothing but punishment on commission of

51    

the offences and akin to sentencing in the criminal  

jurisprudence. The principles of sentencing as  

applicable in offence under Indian Penal Code may not  

be strictly applicable to one of punishment/sanction  

under the Anti-Corruption Code but principles of  

sentencing as applicable in the criminal jurisprudence  

may be relevant for imposing sanction in Anti-

Corruption Code. In the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973,  

there are no structured sentencing guidelines. In  

March, 2003, the Committee on Reforms of Criminal  

Justice System (the Malimath Committee), a body  

established by the Ministry of Home Affairs, issued a  

report that emphasized the need to introduce sentencing  

guidelines in order to minimise uncertainty in awarding  

sentences.  The Indian Penal Code prescribe offences  

and punishments for the same. For many offences only  

the maximum punishment is prescribed and for some  

offences the minimum punishment is also prescribed.  

Various jurists and writers have tried to enumerate  

circumstances which may mitigate the gravity of  

offences. The Constitution Bench of this Court in  

Jagmohan Singh vs. The State of U.P., (1973) 1 SCC 20

52    

held that law gives very wide discretion in the matter  

of punishment to the Judge. In paragraph 24 following  

has been laid down:  

“24. The policy of the law in giving a very  wide discretion in the matter of punishment  to the Judge has its origin in the  impossibility of laying down standards. Take,  for example, the offence of Criminal Breach  of Trust punishable under Section 409 of the  Indian Penal Code. The maximum punishment  prescribed for the offence is imprisonment  for life. The minimum could be as low as one  day’s imprisonment and fine. It is obvious  that if any standards were to be laid down  with regard to several kinds of breaches of  trust by the persons referred in that  section, that would be an impossible task.  All that could be reasonably done by the  Legislature is to tell the Judges that  between the maximum and minimum prescribed  for an offence, they should, on balancing the  aggravating and mitigating circumstances as  disclosed in the case, judicially decide what  would be the appropriate sentence. Take the  other case of the offence of causing hurt.  Broadly, that offence is divided into two  categories—simple hurt and grievous hurt.  Simple hurt is again sub-divided—simple hurt  caused by a lethal weapon is made punishable  by a higher maximum sentence—Section 324.  Where grievous hurt is caused by a lethal  weapon, it is punishable under Section 326  and is a more aggravating form of causing  grievous hurt than the one punishable under  Section 325. Under Section 326 the maximum  punishment is imprisonment for life and the  minimum can be one day’s imprisonment and  fine. Where a person by a lethal weapon  causes a slight fracture of one of the un- important bones of the human body, he would  be as much punishable under Section 326 of

53    

the Indian Penal Code as a person who with a  knife scoops out the eyes of his victim. It  will be absurd to say that both of them,  because they are liable under the same  section should be given the same  punishment………”  

44. On principles of sentencing Constitution Bench  

judgment of this Court in Bachan Singh vs. State of  

Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 684, is a locus classicus. The  

Constitution Bench speaking through Sarkaria, J. in  

paragraph 163 laid down following:  

“163………The present legislative policy  discernible from Section 235(2) read with  Section 354(3) is that in fixing the degree  of punishment or making the choice of  sentence for various offences, including one  under Section 302 of the Penal Code, the  court should not confine its consideration  “principally” or merely to the circumstances  connected with the particular crime, but also  give due consideration to the circumstances  of the criminal.”  

45. Further the Constitution Bench in Bachan Singh has  

emphasized that the sentencing principle may not only  

confine to the nature of the crime but may also focus  

on the criminal. In paragraph 201 following was laid  

down:  

“201………As we read Sections 354(3) and 235(2)  and other related provisions of the Code of

54    

1973, it is quite clear to us that for making  the choice of punishment or for ascertaining  the existence or absence of “special reasons”  in that context, the court must pay due  regard both to the crime and the criminal.  What is the relative weight to be given to  the aggravating and mitigating factors,  depends on the facts and circumstances of the  particular case. More often than not, these  two aspects are so intertwined that it is  difficult to give a separate treatment to  each of them. This is so because ‘style is  the man’………”  

46. Before the Constitution Bench various mitigating  

factors were suggested. After noticing the various  

mitigating factors suggested by the counsel the  

Constitution Bench laid down following in paragraphs  

207 and 209:   

“207. We will do no more than to say that  these are undoubtedly relevant circumstances  and must be given great weight in the  determination of sentence. Some of these  factors like extreme youth can instead be of  compelling importance. In several States of  India, there are in force special enactments,  according to which a “child”, that is, “a  person who at the date of murder was less  than 16 years of age”, cannot be tried,  convicted and sentenced to death or  imprisonment for life for murder, nor dealt  with according to the same criminal procedure  as an adult. The special Acts provide for a  reformatory procedure for such juvenile  offenders or children.  

 209. There are numerous other circumstances  justifying the passing of the lighter

55    

sentence; as there are countervailing  circumstances of aggravation. “We cannot  obviously feed into a judicial computer all  such situations since they are astrological  imponderables in an imperfect and undulating  society.” Nonetheless, it cannot be over- emphasised that the scope and concept of  mitigating factors in the area of death  penalty must receive a liberal and expansive  construction by the courts in accord with the  sentencing policy writ large in Section  354(3)…………”     

47. Justice Arijit Pasayat speaking for this Court in  

Shailesh Jasvantbhai and another vs. State of Gujarat  

and others, (2006) 2 SCC 359, held that the practice  

of punishing all serious crimes with equal severity is  

now unknown in civilized societies. This Court further  

held that disproportionate punishment has some very  

undesirable practical consequences. In paragraph 10  

following has been laid down:  

“10. Proportion between crime and punishment  is a goal respected in principle, and in spite  of errant notions, it remains a strong  influence in the determination of sentences.  The practice of punishing all serious crimes  with equal severity is now unknown in  civilised societies, but such a radical  departure from the principle of  proportionality has disappeared from the law  only in recent times. Even now for a single  grave infraction, drastic sentences are  imposed. Anything less than a penalty of  greatest severity for any serious crime is  thought then to be a measure of toleration

56    

that is unwarranted and unwise. But in fact,  quite apart from those considerations that  make punishment unjustifiable when it is out  of proportion to the crime, uniformly  disproportionate punishment has some very  undesirable practical consequences.”  

48. This Court in Gopal Singh vs. State of Uttarakhand,  

(2013) 7 SCC 545, laid down that principle of just  

punishment is the bedrock of sentencing in respect of  

a criminal offence. In paragraph 18 following was laid  

down:  

“18. Just punishment is the collective cry  of the society. While the collective cry has  to be kept uppermost in the mind,  simultaneously the principle of  proportionality between the crime and  punishment cannot be totally brushed aside.  The principle of just punishment is the  bedrock of sentencing in respect of a  criminal offence. A punishment should not be  disproportionately excessive. The concept of  proportionality allows a significant  discretion to the Judge but the same has to  be guided by certain principles. In certain  cases, the nature of culpability, the  antecedents of the accused, the factum of  age, the potentiality of the convict to  become a criminal in future, capability of  his reformation and to lead an acceptable  life in the prevalent milieu, the effect —  propensity to become a social threat or  nuisance, and sometimes lapse of time in the  commission of the crime and his conduct in  the interregnum bearing in mind the nature  of the offence, the relationship between the  parties and attractability of the doctrine

57    

of bringing the convict to the value-based  social mainstream may be the guiding factors.  Needless to emphasise, these are certain  illustrative aspects put forth in a condensed  manner. We may hasten to add that there can  neither be a straitjacket formula nor a  solvable theory in mathematical exactitude.  It would be dependent on the facts of the  case and rationalised judicial discretion.  Neither the personal perception of a Judge  nor self-adhered moralistic vision nor  hypothetical apprehensions should be allowed  to have any play. For every offence, a  drastic measure cannot be thought of.  Similarly, an offender cannot be allowed to  be treated with leniency solely on the ground  of discretion vested in a court. The real  requisite is to weigh the circumstances in  which the crime has been committed and other  concomitant factors which we have indicated  hereinbefore and also have been stated in a  number of pronouncements by this Court. On  such touchstone, the sentences are to be  imposed. The discretion should not be in the  realm of fancy. It should be embedded in the  conceptual essence of just punishment.”  

49. A three-Judge Bench in Mukesh and another vs. State  

(NCT of Delhi)and others, (2017) 6 SCC 1, to which one  

of us, (Ashok Bhushan, J.) was also a member, has  

reviewed the principle of sentencing as was noticed and  

elaborated in different judgments of this Court.  

Justice Dipak Misra, as he then was, speaking for the  

Bench referred to the aggravating circumstances and  

mitigating circumstances as noted by the Constitution

58    

Bench in Bachan Singh (supra). Referring to Bachan  

Singh following was held in paragraph 343:  

“343. In Bachan Singh case, the Court has  also held thus: (SCC p. 751, para 209)  

 “209. … It is, therefore, imperative  to voice the concern that courts,  aided by the broad illustrative  guidelines indicated by us, will  discharge the onerous function with  evermore scrupulous care and humane  concern, directed along the highroad  of legislative policy outlined in  Section 354(3) viz. that for persons  convicted of murder, life imprisonment  is the rule and death sentence an  exception. A real and abiding concern  for the dignity of human life  postulates resistance to taking a life  through law’s instrumentality. That  ought not to be done save in the rarest  of rare cases when the alternative  option is unquestionably  foreclosed.””  

50. Justice R. Banumathi delivering her concurring  

opinion in paragraph 486 has laid down following:  

“486. Question of awarding sentence is a  matter of discretion and has to be exercised  on consideration of circumstances  aggravating or mitigating in the individual  cases. The courts are consistently faced with  the situation where they are required to  answer the new challenges and mould the  sentence to meet those challenges. Protection  of society and deterring the criminal is the  avowed object of law. It is expected of the  courts to operate the sentencing system as

59    

to impose such sentence which reflects the  social conscience of the society. While  determining sentence in heinous crimes,  Judges ought to weigh its impact on the  society and impose adequate sentence  considering the collective conscience or  society’s cry for justice. While considering  the imposition of appropriate punishment,  courts should not only keep in view the  rights of the criminal but also the rights  of the victim and the society at large.”  

51. In the above noted cases this Court has laid down  

that awarding sentence is a matter of discretion of the  

Judge which has to be exercised on consideration of  

circumstances aggravating or mitigating in the  

individual cases. As observed above, the principle of  

sentencing as applicable in the criminal cases may not  

be strictly applicable for considering the issue of  

punishment/sanction under the Anti-Corruption Code but  

the principles noticed pertaining to sentencing serve  

a safe guideline for exercise on jurisdiction under  

Article 6 of the Anti-Corruption Code.   

52. We may notice that this Court in Board of Control  

for Cricket in India(BCCI) (supra) has held that a zero  

tolerance towards any wrong-doing alone can satisfy the

60    

cry of clinching the Cricket. The Division Bench of the  

Kerala High Court while allowing the writ petition  

filed by the BCCI has also observed that Anti-

Corruption Code of BCCI clearly envisaged zero  

tolerance to corruption. There cannot be any quarrel  

to the proposition as laid down by this Court as noted  

above. What was meant by the zero tolerance is that any  

offence committed within the meaning of Anti-Corruption  

Code cannot be ignored or to be leniently dealt with.  

Zero tolerance emphasis taking cognizance of such  

offences and awarding suitable punishment. However,  

zero tolerance approach cannot dilute consideration of  

relevant factors while imposing sanction under    

Article 6. In Board of Control for Cricket in  

India(BCCI) (supra) this Court has laid down that the  

quantum of sanction/punishment can vary depending upon  

the gravity of the misconduct of the persons committing  

the same. In paragraph 116 following has been laid  

down:  

“116…………We have also while answering those  questions held that the misconduct against  these two individuals is actionable as per  the relevant rules to which we have referred  in detail. Not only that, we have held that  action under the Rules can also be taken

61    

against the franchisees concerned. We have  noticed that the quantum of  sanction/punishment can vary depending upon  the gravity of the misconduct of the persons  committing the same.”  

53. Further, in paragraph 63 this Court has clearly  

laid down that disciplinary committee of the BCCI is  

empowered to impose an appropriate sanction in terms  

of Article 6 of the Code upon consideration of relevant  

factors. Paragraph 63 of the judgment is as follows:  

 “63. In terms of Article 6 of the Code, upon  consideration of relevant factors the  Disciplinary Committee of BCCI is empowered  to impose an appropriate sanction upon the  delinquent having regard to the provisions  of Article 6.2 and the Table appearing  thereunder. There is, therefore, no manner  of doubt that even under the Anti-Corruption  Code for Participants, any act like betting  can attract sanctions not only for the person  who indulges in such conduct but also for all  those who authorise, cause, knowingly assist,  encourage, aid, abet, cover up or are  otherwise complicit in any act of omission  or commission relating to such activity.”  

54. We, thus, have to look into Article 6 to find out  

the manner and procedure for imposing  

punishment/sanction by disciplinary committee of the  

BCCI. We have noticed that various mitigating and

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aggravating circumstances have been noticed by this  

Court in different judgments while considering the  

sentencing policy under criminal jurisprudence. If we  

look into Article 6, Article itself enumerates  

aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Article 6  

contains a heading ‘Sanctions’. Para 6.1 provides that  

in order to determine the appropriate sanction that is  

to be imposed in each case, the disciplinary committee  

must first determine the relative seriousness of the  

offence, including identifying all relevant factors  

that it deems to. Article 6.1 is as follows:  

“6.1 Where it is determined that an offence  under this Anti-Corruption Code has been  committed, the BCCI Disciplinary Committee  will be required to impose an appropriate  sanction upon the participant from the range  of permissible sanctions described in Article  6.2. In order to determine the appropriate  sanction that is to be imposed in each case,  the BCCI Disciplinary Committee must first  determine the relative seriousness of the  offence, including identifying all relevant  factors that it deems to:  

 6.1.1 aggravate the nature of the offence  under this Anti-Corruption Code, namely    6.1.1.1  a lack of remorse on the part of  the Participant;   

 6.1.1.2 whether the Participant has  previously been found guilty of any similar  offence under this Anti-Corruption Code

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and/or any predecessor regulations of the  BCCI and/or the ICC Anti-Corruption Code  and/or anti-corruption rules of other  National Cricket Federation;  

 6.1.1.3 where the amount of any profits,  winnings or other Reward, directly or  indirectly received by the Participant as a  result of the offence(s), is substantial  and/or where the sums of money otherwise  involved in the offence(s) are substantial;  

 6.1.1.4 where the offence substantially  damaged (or had the potential to damage  substantially) the commercial value and/or  the public interest in the relevant match(es)  or event(s);  

 6.1.1.5 where the offence affected (or had  the potential to affect) the result of the  relevant match(es) or event(s);  

 6.1.1.6 where the welfare of a participant  or any other person has been endangered as a  result of the offence;    6.1.1.7 where the offence involved more than  one participant or other persons; and/or    6.1.1.8 any other aggravating factor(s) that  the BCCI Disciplinary Committee considers  relevant and appropriate.”  

55. Further, Article 6.1.2 enumerates the mitigating  

circumstances. Articles 6.1.2, 6.1.2.1 to 6.1.2.9 are  

as follows:  

“6.1.2 mitigate the nature of the offence  under the Anti-Corruption Code, namely:    6.1.2.1 any admission of guilt (the

64    

mitigating value of which may depend upon its  timing);  

 6.1.2.2 the participant’s good previous  disciplinary record;  

 6.1.2.3 the young age and/or lack of  experience of the participant;  

 6.1.2.4 where the participant has cooperated  with the Designated Anti-Corruption Official  (or his/her designee) and any investigation  or demand carried out by him/her;  

 6.1.2.5 where the offence did not  substantially damage (or have the potential  to substantially damage) the commercial value  and/or the public interest in the relevant  match(es) or event(s);  

 6.1.2.6 where the offence did not affect (or  have the potential to affect) the result of  the relevant match(es) or event(s);  

 6.1.2.7 where the Participant provides  Substantial Assistance to the Designated  Anti-Corruption Official (or his/her  designee), that result in the Designated  Anti-Corruption Official (or his/her  designee) discovering or establishing an  offence under this Anti-Corruption Code by  another Participant or another cricket  Participant bound by such regulations or that  results in a criminal or disciplinary body  discovering or establishing a criminal  offence or the breach of professional rules  by another Participant or other third party;    6.1.2.8 where the participant has already  suffered penalties under other laws and/or  regulations for the same offence; and/or  

 6.1.2.9 any other mitigating factor(s) that  the BCCI Disciplinary Committee considers

65    

relevant and appropriate.”    

56. The Anti-Corruption Code which has articles  

containing mitigating and aggravating circumstances  

are necessarily to be taken into consideration while  

imposing punishment/sanction under Article 6. Article  

6.2 contains table in three columns, (i) Anti-

Corruption Code of Offence; (ii) Range of permissible  

period or ineligibility and (iii) additional discretion  

to impose a fine. It is useful to extract entire Article  

6.2 to the following effect:  

6.2 Having considered all of the factors  described in Articles 6.1.1 and 6.1.2, the  BCCI Disciplinary Committee shall then  determine, in accordance with the following  table, what the appropriate sanction(s)  should be:  

 ANTI- CORRUPTION  CODE OF  OFFENCE  

RANGE OF  PERMISSIBLE  PERIOD OF  INELIGIBILITY   

ADDITIONAL  DISCRETION  TO IMPOSE A  FINE  

Articles  2.1.1, 2.1.2,  2.1.3 and  2.1.4  (Corruption)  

A minimum of  five (5)  years and  maximum of a  life time  

 AND, IN ALL  CASES:    the BCCI  Disciplinary   Committee  shall have  the  discretion  to  Impose a  fine on the  

Articles  2.2.1, 2.2.2  and 2.2.3  (Betting)  

A minimum of  two (2) years  and a maximum  of five (5)  years  

Articles 2.3.1  and 2.3.3 (as  it relates to  

A minimum of  two(2) years  and a maximum

66    

an offence  under Article  2.3.1) Misuse  of inside  information)  

of five(5)  years  

Participant  upto a  maximum of  the value of  any Reward   Received by  the  Participant  directly or  indirectly,  out of or in  relation  to the  offence  committed  under this  Anti- Corruption  Code.  

Articles 2.3.2  and 2.3.3 (as  it relates to  an offence  under Article  2.3.2) (Misuse  of inside  information)  

A minimum of  six (6)  months and a  maximum of  five (5)  years  

Articles 2.4.1  and 2.4.2  (General)  

A minimum of  one (1) year  and a maximum  of five (5)  years  

Articles 2.4.3  and 2.4.4  (General)  

A minimum of  six (6)  months and a  maximum of  two (2) years  

57. In the present case life ban has been imposed on  

the appellant on offences under Article 2.1.1., 2.1.2,  

2.1.3 and 2.14(corruption), for which as per second  

column a minimum of five years and maximum of life time  

ineligibility is provided for. Whether in case where  

offence under Article 2.1.1, 2.1.2, 2.1.3 and 2.1.4 is  

proved, the disciplinary committee is obliged to award  

a life time ban. The answer has to be that life ban  

cannot be imposed in all cases where such offences are

67    

proved. When range of ineligibility which is minimum  

five years, maximum life ban is provided for, the  

discretion to choose either minimum or maximum or in  

between has to be exercised on relevant factors and  

circumstances.   

58. The disciplinary committee’s order dated  

13.09.2013 does not advert to the aggravating and  

mitigating factors as enumerated in Article 6.1.1. and  

6.1.2. Without considering the relevant provisions of  

Anti-Corruption Code the disciplinary committee has  

imposed life time ban which sanction cannot be held to  

be in accordance with the Anti-Corruption Code itself.  

The disciplinary committee had not even adverted to  

Article 6.1.1 and 6.1.2 which enumerates the  

aggravating and mitigating circumstances. When the  

Anti-Corruption Code itself mandates consideration of  

relevant factors and this Court in Board of Control for  

Cricket in India (supra) had laid down that the  

disciplinary committee of the BCCI is empowered to  

impose appropriate sanction in terms of Article 6 of  

the Code upon consideration of relevant factors,

68    

without considering the relevant factors imposition of  

maximum punishment cannot be sustained. Apart from  

factors as noted above the subsequent conduct of the  

appellant also shows obedience to BCCI. Initially when  

the life time ban was imposed on 13.09.2013, appellant  

has not even challenged the said order, it was only  

after the appellant was discharged from the criminal  

case on 25.07.2015 and when the appellant got  

opportunity to play and participate in the Scotland  

Premier League on e-mail was sent through Kerala  

Cricket Association on 11.01.2017. It was only  

thereafter when No Objection Certificate was not  

granted to the appellant and the BCCI refused to modify  

the ban, writ petition was filed in February 28, 2017  

in the Kerala High Court.   

59.  In so far as charges proved under Article 2.2.3,  

2.4.1 and 2.4.2 the maximum sanction is of 5 years, the  

award of punishment of five years shall also satisfy  

the requirement under Code, which need no separate  

consideration for the purposes of this case. As per  

Article 6.3.2 all sanction imposed on appellant shall

69    

run concurrently. As on date the period of 5 years  

sanction has come to an end.   

60. In view of the foregoing discussion we arrive on  

the following conclusions:  

(1) In the disciplinary proceedings held against  

the appellant under the Anti-Corruption Code  

of BCCI the principles of natural justice  

were not violated.   

(2) The conclusions drawn by the disciplinary  

committee of the BCCI on the basis of  

materials as referred to in paragraphs 12 and  

13 of the order cannot be said to be  

suffering from any infirmity which may  

warrant judicial review by the  

constitutional courts. The constitutional  

courts in exercise of jurisdiction of  

judicial review will interfere only when  

conclusions of the disciplinary committee  

are perverse or based on no evidence. It is

70    

not open for the High Court or this Court to  

substitute its own opinion based on the  

materials on record on the proof of charges.   

(3) The standard of proof in a disciplinary  

inquiry and in a trial of a criminal case are  

entirely different. In a criminal case it is  

essential to prove a charge beyond all  

reasonable doubt wherein in disciplinary  

inquiry under Anti-Corruption Code of BCCI  

the preponderance of probability is to serve  

the purpose.  

(4) We although have upheld the decision of the  

disciplinary committee of the BCCI on proof  

of charges, which upholding of the decision  

of the disciplinary committee shall have no  

effect on the criminal appeal which is  

pending against the appellant against the  

discharge order. The conclusions and  

observations as recorded in the disciplinary  

committee under Anti-Corruption Code are

71    

entirely different from proof of criminal  

charges which require higher yardstick to  

prove.   

(5) There was no legal impediment in Shri  

Srinivasan participating in the disciplinary  

committee proceedings dated 13.09.2013 as  

President. The appellant having not  

questioned the constitution of disciplinary  

committee even in the grounds of this appeal  

he cannot be allowed to challenge the  

constitution of disciplinary committee at  

this stage.  

(6) Sanction under Article 6 of Anti-Corruption  

Code of BCCI is nothing but punishment on  

commission of the offences and akin to  

sentencing in criminal jurisprudence. The  

principles of sentencing as applicable in  

offence under the Indian Penal Code may not  

be strictly applicable to one of  

punishment/sanction under the Anti-

Corruption Code but principles of sentencing

72    

as applicable in the criminal jurisprudence  

may be relevant for imposing sanction under  

the Anti-Corruption Code.  

(7) In cases where offences under Article 2.1.1,  

2.1.2, 2.1.3 and 2.1.4 are proved, the  

disciplinary committee is not obliged to  

award a life time ban in all cases where such  

offences are proved. When range of  

ineligibility which is minimum five years,  

maximum life time ban is provided for, the  

discretion to which, either minimum or  

maximum or in between has to be exercised on  

relevant facts and circumstances.   

(8) The disciplinary committee order dated  

13.09.2013 does not advert to the aggravating  

and mitigating factors as enumerated in  

Articles 6.1.1 and 6.1.2. Without  

considering the relevant provisions of Anti-

Corruption Code, the disciplinary committee  

has imposed a life time ban on the appellant

73    

which sanction cannot be held to be in  

accordance with the Anti-Corruption Code  

itself.  

(9)  Due to subsequent events also, we are of the  

view that the disciplinary committee of BCCI  

should revisit the quantum of  

punishment/sanction to be imposed on the  

appellant.  

61. In view of the foregoing discussion, we partly  

allow the appeal in the following manner:  

(i) The order dated 13.09.2013 of the  

disciplinary committee only to the extent  

of imposing sanction of life time ban is set  

aside.    

(ii)  The disciplinary committee of the BCCI may  

reconsider the quantum of  

punishment/sanction which may be imposed on  

the appellant as per Article 6 of the Anti-

74    

Corruption Code. The appellant may be given  

one opportunity to have his say on the  

question of quantum of punishment/sanction.   

(iii)  The disciplinary committee may take  

decision as indicated above on the quantum  

of punishment/sanction at an early date  

preferably within a period of three months  

from today.  

(iv) Appellant shall await the decision of the  

disciplinary committee and future course of  

action shall be in accordance with the  

decision of the disciplinary committee so  

taken. Parties shall bear their own costs.  

...............................J.      ( ASHOK BHUSHAN )  

...............................J.      ( K.M.JOSEPH)  

NEW DELHI,  MARCH 15, 2019.