03 January 2011
Supreme Court
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S. GANESAN Vs RAMA RAGHURAMAN .

Bench: P. SATHASIVAM,B.S. CHAUHAN, , ,
Case number: Crl.A. No.-000989-000989 / 2003
Diary number: 9264 / 2003
Advocates: B. BALAJI Vs


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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 989 of 2003

S. Ganesan                                                              …Appellant

Versus

Rama Raghuraman & Ors.              …Respondents

J U D G M E N T

Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.

1. This appeal has been preferred by the complainant, father of the  

deceased, against the judgment and order dated 13.2.2003 in Criminal  

Appeal  No.  1088  of  2002  passed  by  the  High  Court  of  Andhra  

Pradesh at Hyderabad acquitting the respondents of the charges under  

Sections  302  read  with  120-B  of  Indian  Penal  Code  (hereinafter  

referred to as “IPC”) for committing the murder of G. Arulmozhi by  

hitting him with a hammer on his head.  

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2. Facts and circumstances giving rise to this appeal are as under:  

(A) Rama Raghuraman (Accused 1)(hereinafter  referred to as `A-

1’) made a statement to Mr. V. Narasaiah,  Sub-Inspector of Police  

(PW.1) that on 29.4.1997 at about 9.00 A.M., when she tried to wake  

up deceased, G. Arulmozhi, who was sleeping in the other room of the  

flat,  he  misbehaved  with  her  and thus  A-1  tried  to  get  out  of  his  

clutches  in  order  to  save herself.  As she could not  succeed in  her  

attempt, she got the hammer lying in the room and hit  him on his  

head.  On hearing her cries, her husband Raghuraman (A.2) came at  

the spot and also hit deceased several times on his head with the same  

hammer  and  thus,  the  deceased  suffered  grievous  injuries.  

Immediately,  Rama Raghuraman (A.1) went  to the  nearby hospital  

and informed Dr. U. Srinivas (PW.3) that her brother was seriously  

injured on the head and she brought him to examine the deceased.  Dr.  

U. Srinivas (PW.3) came to her flat and after examining the injured,  

he advised that he should be taken to the hospital immediately.  An  

ambulance  was  called  and  with  the  help  of  two  attendants,  Rama  

Raghuraman  (A.1)  and  Raghuraman  (A.2)  took  the  injured  to  the  

hospital.  He  was  examined  there  by  the  doctors.  The  doctor  also  

informed the police,  on which Mr.  V.  Narasaiah,  Sub Inspector  of  

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Police  (PW.1)  reached  the  hospital  and  recorded  the  statement  of  

Rama  Raghuraman  (A.1)  and  lodged  a  complaint  to  Mr.  K.  

Chakrapani, Station House Officer,  (PW.16).   

(B) On receiving such information, Crime No. 235 of 1997 under  

Section 307 IPC was registered against  Rama Raghuraman (A.1) and  

Raghuraman (A.2). However, when the police came to the hospital to  

record the statement of the injured, he was found to be unconscious.  

Thereafter,  Mr.  K.  Chakrapani  (PW.16)  proceeded  to  the  place  of  

occurrence and made a rough sketch of the site in the presence of  

witnesses Mr.  Kamal Bukhada (PW.6) and Mr.  Premchand (PW.7)  

and also seized M.Os. 2 to 12 from the place of occurrence.  Mr. K.  

Chakrapani  (PW.16) also examined PWs 2 to 5 and recorded their  

statements.   

(C) On the  next  day  i.e.  30.4.1997 at  about  11.45 P.M.,  Mr.  K.  

Chakrapani (PW.16) received the information that G. Arulmozhi had  

died  and,  therefore,  he  altered  the  case  from Section  307  IPC  to  

Section  302 IPC.   He conducted  the  inquest  over  the  body of  the  

deceased  in  presence  of  two witnesses.  Dr.  Ramachander  Rao,  the  

Medical Officer in NIMS Hospital (PW.9) examined the deceased and  

found four injuries on the person of the deceased.  After the death of  

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the  deceased,  Dr.  M.  Ravinder  Reddy,  the  professor  in  Forensic  

Medicine,  Gandhi Medical  College, Hyderabad (PW.18), conducted  

an autopsy of the dead body of the deceased.  

(D) Mr. T.V. Raja Gopal, Investigating Officer, (PW.17), took over  

further investigation and recorded the statements of a large number of  

witnesses and submitted the chargesheet.  The Magistrate committed  

the matter to the Sessions Court, wherein the respondents pleaded not  

guilty and claimed trial.  After concluding the trial and appreciating  

the  evidence,  oral  as  well  as  documentary,  the  trial  court  vide  

judgment and order dated 9.9.2002 in Sessions Case No. 40 of 1999  

convicted both the respondents for offences punishable under Section  

302 r/w Section 120-B IPC and awarded life imprisonment with a fine  

of  Rs.5,000/-  each  and  in  default  of  payment  of  fine,  they  were  

directed to undergo further three months simple imprisonment.  

3. Being  aggrieved,  the  respondents  preferred  Criminal  Appeal  

No.  1088  of  2002  before  the  High  Court  of  Andhra  Pradesh  at  

Hyderabad, which has been allowed by impugned judgment and order  

dated 13.2.2003. Hence, this appeal.  

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4. Shri   R. Balasubramanian, learned senior counsel, duly assisted  

by Shri B. Balaji,  for the appellant, has submitted that the High Court  

committed an error by reversing the well reasoned judgment and order  

of  the  trial  court,  wherein,  in  absence  of  any  eye-witness  to  the  

incident, both the respondents had been convicted for committing the  

murder  of G. Arulmozhi;  the chain of circumstances was complete  

and  each  circumstance  pointed  out  towards  the  guilt  of  the  

respondents.  The deceased was in the flat which has been taken by  

the respondents on rent.  None of them denied their presence at the  

relevant point of time, rather they had taken a false plea that Mr. N.  

Velayudham, brother-in-law of deceased,  (PW.8),  had come on the  

same day by air at Hyderabad and had tried to convince the deceased  

not to live with the respondents, instead to get married with the girl of  

the choice of his father, as his family members were under the belief  

that  he  had  developed  illicit  relationship  with  the  accused  Rama  

Raghuraman (A.1). The defence taken by the accused was contrary to  

their own case pleaded in the bail application that the deceased tried to  

molest Rama Raghuraman (A.1) and, therefore, she became wild and  

lost all control and picked up a hammer lying in the room and caused  

injuries to the deceased. Even if the defence version is believed to be  

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true, it was a clear cut case of exceeding the right of self defence.  The  

hammer  which  was  recovered  on  the  disclosure  of  the  Rama  

Raghuraman (A.1) from the place of occurrence is not generally used  

in the household. Before calling Dr. U. Srinivas (PW.3), the accused  

had cleaned the blood stained floor. Doors and windows were found  

closed  and there  was  darkness  inside  the  flat  at  9  O’Clock  in  the  

morning.   The  High  Court  did  not  consider  each  and  every  

circumstance considered by the trial court pointing out to the guilt of  

the  accused.   Rather  the  High Court  took a  sympathetic  view and  

passed a cryptic order without giving sufficient reasons for acquittal.  

Hence, the appeal deserves to be allowed.  

5. On  the  contrary  Ms.  V.  Mohana,  learned  amicus  curiae,  

appearing  for  the  respondents-accused,  has  submitted  that  accused  

persons were highly qualified as both of them passed their engineering  

course from IIT, Bombay. They developed love and affection and got  

married. They had two children at the time of incident.  Their son was  

five years old and the girl was 2-1/2 years old. The deceased himself  

was  a  computer  engineer  and  an  MBA  from  Indian  Institute  of  

Management,  Ahmedabad.  He  had  opened  a  company  alongwith  

accused persons  and had the  accused had any intention  to  kill  the  

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deceased,  they  would  not  have  called  Dr.  U.  Srinivas  (PW.3)  and  

further  taken him to  the  hospital  for treatment.  The accused Rama  

Raghuraman (A.1) herself  had informed the father  of  the  deceased  

(the present complainant) about his health condition.  There could be  

no motive for the respondents to harm the deceased.  Investigation has  

not proceeded in accordance with law.  There was nothing for them to  

hide.  In  absence  of  any  evidence  of  conspiracy  between  the  two  

accused, the High Court has rightly quashed their conviction under  

Section 120-B IPC. In such a fact-situation, if it cannot be determined  

as which of the accused had caused the injuries, conviction of either  

of them is not sustainable. If the prosecution case is taken to be true,  

the  respondents  had  acted  in  self  defence  and  are  entitled  to  the  

benefit of the provisions of Section 100 and Exception II to Section  

300 IPC. The High Court after taking into consideration all the facts  

and circumstances, reached the correct conclusion of acquittal of the  

accused.   Hence,  no  interference  is  required  with  the  impugned  

judgment and order of the High Court.   

6. We have considered the rival submissions made by the learned  

counsel for the parties and perused the record.  

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7. Admitted  facts  available  on  the  record  are  that  Rama  

Raghuraman  (A.1)  and  Raghuraman  (A.2)  had  passed  out  their  

engineering course from IIT, Bombay and got married on 10.9.1989.  

Out of this  wedlock they had two children at the time of incident.  

They were not having good relations, as is evident from the averments  

contained in the divorce petition filed by Rama Raghuraman (A.1)  

against her husband Raghuraman (A.2) in the Family Court at Madras.  

The deceased had been employed in the Indian Oil Corporation as an  

Executive Assistant to the Executive Director.  The deceased came in  

contact with Raghuraman (A.2) who had his own organization known  

as  Pixel  Graphics  Multimedia  at  Madras.   As  the  business  of  

Raghuraman  (A.2)  was  in  trouble,  the  deceased  helped  him  

financially.   The  deceased  resigned  from  his  job  and  floated  a  

company,  namely,  Indian  Creations  dealing  in  the  Multimedia  

presentation field alongwith Rama Raghuraman (A.1).   The deceased  

shifted  his  residence  from  the  Chennai  to  Hyderabad  and  started  

earning by way of contracts.  In the meantime, Raghuraman (A.2) also  

joined Rama Raghuraman (A.1), patching  up the differences with her.  

Admittedly, the incident occurred at the place of occurrence i.e. flat of  

the respondents and at the time alleged herein. The defence pleaded  

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that Mr. N. Velayudham, (PW.8), had come there and as he quarreled  

with the deceased, he had hit him on the head. In fact the accused had  

furnished the same explanation to the staff at the Nizam’s Institute of  

Medical Sciences, Hyderabad on the date of incident i.e. 29.4.1997  

(Ex.P-6).  This  theory  had  been  rejected  by  the  trial  court  giving  

sufficient and cogent reasons and we do not see any reason to disturb  

the said finding of fact.     Had it been so, the accused could have  

informed  the  police  and  also  tried  to  save  the  deceased  or  to  

apprehend Mr. N. Velayudham, (PW.8)

8. The inconsistent pleas taken by the accused are apparent from  

the  FIR  that  states  that  the  deceased  tried  to  molest  Rama  

Raghuraman (A.1) when she went to wake him up.  She got wild and  

beat him with a hammer.  After hearing the hue and cry, Raghuraman  

(A.2) came there and also caused injuries to him.  The same plea had  

been taken by Rama Raghuraman (A.1) in her bail application dated  

8.5.1997.  The  contents  of  the  bail  application  reveal  that  she  was  

having some marital  problems with her husband Raghuraman (A.2)  

which was in the knowledge of the deceased and, thus, he was hopeful  

of getting married to Rama Raghuraman (A.1) as and when she got  

separated from her husband, as the divorce petition was pending on  

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the  date  of  incident.   The  deceased  was  not  merely  the  business  

partner but also a very close friend of Rama Raghuraman (A.1) and  

had fantasies about marrying her.  However, she further pleaded that  

after  causing  injuries  to  the  deceased,  they  realised  what  had  

happened and had suffered from utter shock. She immediately went  

and called a doctor from the nearby hospital and on his advice, shifted  

the deceased to the hospital. The accused gave their own blood to him  

to save his life.  Paragraph 11 of the bail application reads as under :  

“The  petitioner  respectfully  submits  that  even  going by the prosecution case, she comes within  the  scope  of  Sec.  100(3)  IPC  wherein  she  exercised her right of self defence to ward off the  attempts  of  the  deceased to  sexually  assault  her  and rape her.   The  petitioner  submits  that  what   happened was sad and a great tragedy and neither   she nor her husband had any idea that such a sort   of thing would happen.  They realised only after  the incident happened.”                                                      (Emphasis added)  

9. The trial court rejected the evidence of Dr. Ramachander Rao  

(PW.9) for giving two different versions with regard to the weapons.  

However,  the  court  considered  the  following  incriminating  

circumstances against the accused :

I)  The deceased was with the accused in their flat on  

the fateful day.  

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II) The deceased  received fatal  injuries  in  the  same  

flat which ultimately led to his death.  

III) Rama  Raghuraman  (A.1)  approached  Dr.  

U.Srinivas  (PW.3)  immediately  after  the  incident  and  

brought  him  to  the  flat  and  Dr.  U.Srinivas  (PW.3)  

deposed that the deceased was lying in a pool of blood  

and the doors and windows were closed and there was  

complete  darkness  inside  at  9  O’Clock  in  the  

morning.  Unless  the  accused  had  some  guilty  

conscience, there was no need to close all the doors and  

windows at 9 A.M.    

IV) The weapon i.e.  MO. 1 seized at the instance of  

Rama Raghuraman (A.1), though such a hammer is not  

generally found in the household.

V) The  seizure  of  MOs.  2  to  12  i.e.  blood  stained  

articles which consist of sarees, pants of the deceased and  

other items which had been used for mopping/cleaning  

the place of occurrence.

VI) The panchnama and the evidence of Dr. U.Srinivas  

(PW.3) made it clear that there were the circumstances of  

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cleaning of the blood of the deceased before the arrival of  

Dr. U.Srinivas (PW.3) and as none other than the accused  

were  living in that  flat  and as no other  person had an  

opportunity to clean the flat and had the accused not had  

a  guilty  conscience,  they  would  not  have  hurriedly  

cleaned the floor to ensure the disappearance of the blood  

stains.   

VII) It was fully established that the injuries suffered by  

the deceased could not be caused by a fall.

10. On the basis of the aforesaid incriminating circumstances, the  

trial  court  found  the  chain  of  circumstances  complete  and  the  

circumstances pointing out towards the guilt of the accused and thus  

convicted them accordingly.  

11. The High Court dealt with the case having sympathetic attitude  

towards  the  respondents  and  decided  the  appeal  in  a  very  cryptic  

manner.   After  making  reference  to  statements  of  some  of  the  

prosecution witnesses, the High Court reached the conclusion that as  

none of the witnesses had stated anything regarding the conspiracy  

being hatched between Rama Raghuraman (A.1)  and  Raghuraman  

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(A.2) to do away with the life of the deceased, the question of their  

conviction  under  Section  120-B IPC could  not  arise;   inconsistent  

pleas taken by the accused may not come as a help of the prosecution  

case as the prosecution has to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt  

by  leading  evidence  in  support  of  its  case.   The  High  Court  was  

swayed  by  the  fact  that  after  the  deceased  suffered  injuries,  the  

accused had taken him to the hospital and Rama Raghuraman (A.1)  

informed the father of the deceased about his health condition.  

12. In  fact,  the  High  Court  had  not  dealt  with  any  of  the  

aforementioned  incriminating  circumstances  pointed  out  by  the  

prosecution before the trial court. The court failed to appreciate the  

grievous injuries suffered by the deceased.  Dr. M. Ravinder Reddy,  

Professor in Forensic Medicine, Gandhi Medical College, Hyderabad  

(PW.18),   conducted autopsy over the dead body of the deceased.  On  

examination,  he  noticed  the  following ante-mortem injuries  on  the  

person of the deceased :

1) Sutured wound 3 cms long obliquely placed over  

the left frontal region.

2) Sutured wound 1-1/2”  cms long over  right  front  

parietal region.  

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3) Sutured wound 10 cms long over the right  front  

parietal region.  

4) Sutured  wound  with  surrounding  abraded  

laceration  4  x  2-1/2  cms  with  two  sutured  over  left  

parietal region.  

5) Sutured  wound  4  cms  long  over  posterior  left  

parietal region.

6) Sutured  wound  5  cms  long  over  the  occipital  

region.  

7) Three sutured wounds 2 cms 8 cms and 4 cms over  

occipital region.

8) Abrasion  15  x  ¼  cms  over  outer  aspect  of  left  

upper arm.

9) Contusion scalp over right frontal right parietal left  

parietal  left  frontal  and  occipital  areas  with  parietal  

haemotoma.  

Dr. M. Ravinder Reddy (PW.18) opined that the deceased died  

due to head injuries and those injuries could be caused by a weapon  

like  M.O.1  hammer.   He  has  further  stated  that  all  the  injuries  

mentioned  in  the  above  post  mortem  report  are  sufficient  in  the  

ordinary course of nature to cause the death of the deceased.  

13.  This Court in Dr. Sunil Kumar Sambhudayal Gupta & Ors. v.  

State  of  Maharashtra,  JT  2010  (12)  SC  287,  considered  various  

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aspects of dealing with a case of acquittal and after placing reliance  

upon earlier  judgments of this Court particularly in  Balak Ram &  

Anr.  v. State of U.P., AIR 1974 SC 2165;  Budh Singh & Ors. v.  

State of  U.P.,  AIR 2006 SC 2500;  S. Rama Krishna v.  S. Rami  

Reddy (D) by his LRs. & Ors., AIR 2008 SC 2066; Arulvelu & Anr.  

v. State, (2009) 10 SCC 206; and Babu v. State of Kerala, (2010) 9  

SCC 189, held that :

“22.     It is a well-established principle of law,   consistently re-iterated and followed by this Court   is that while dealing with a judgment of acquittal,   an  appellate  court  must  consider  the  entire  evidence on record, so as to arrive at a finding as  to  whether  the  views  of  the  trial  Court  were   perverse  or  otherwise  unsustainable.  Even  though the appellate court is entitled to consider,   whether in arriving at a finding of fact, the trial   Court had placed the burden of proof incorrectly   or failed to take into consideration any admissible   evidence  and/or  had  taken  into  consideration  evidence brought on record contrary to law; the  appellate court should not ordinarily set aside a  judgment of acquittal in a case where two views  are  possible,  though  the  view  of  the  appellate   court  may  be  the  more  probable  one.  The  trial   court  which  has  the  benefit  of  watching  the  demeanor of the witnesses is the best judge of the   credibility of the witnesses.  

23. Every accused is  presumed to be innocent   unless  his  guilt  is  proved.  The  presumption  of   innocence  is  a  human  right.  Subject  to  the  statutory exceptions, the said principle forms the   basis  of  criminal  jurisprudence  in  India.  The  

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nature of the offence, its seriousness and gravity   has to be taken into consideration.  

The appellate court should bear in mind the  presumption  of  innocence  of  the  accused,  and  further, that the trial court’s acquittal bolsters the   presumption  of  his  innocence.  Interference  with   the  decision  of  the  Trial  Court  in  a  casual  or   cavalier manner where the other view is possible   should be avoided, unless there are good reasons  for such interference.  

24. In  exceptional  cases  where  there  are  compelling circumstances, and the judgment under  appeal is found to be perverse, the appellate court   can  interfere  with  the  order  of  acquittal.  The   findings of fact recorded by a court can be held to   be perverse if the findings have been arrived at by  ignoring  or  excluding  relevant  material  or  by   taking  into  consideration  irrelevant/inadmissible   material. A finding may also be said to be perverse  if  it is ‘against the weight of evidence’, or if the   finding  so  outrageously  defies  logic  as  to  suffer   from the vice of irrationality.”    

Thus,  unless  there  are  substantial  and  compelling  

circumstances, the order of acquittal is not required to be reversed in  

appeal.

14.  So far as the issue of setting aside the conviction under Section  

120-B IPC against both the respondents and not framing the charge  

under any other penal provision is concerned - it has to be considered,  

as  to  whether  conviction  under  any  other  provision  for  which  the  

charge has not been framed, is sustainable in law.  The issue is no  

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longer res integra and has been considered by the Court from time to  

time.  The accused must be aware as to what is the case against them  

and what defence they could lead. Unless the parties satisfy the Court  

that there has been a failure of justice from non framing of charge  

under  a  particular  penal  provision,  and  some  prejudice  has  been  

caused to them, conviction under such provision of law is sustainable.  

(Vide: Amar Singh v. State of Haryana,  AIR 1973 SC 2221)

15. This Court in Sanichar Sahni v. State of Bihar, AIR 2010 SC  

3786,  while  considering  the  issue  placed  reliance  upon  various  

judgments  of  this  Court  particularly  in  Topandas  v.  State  of  

Bombay,  AIR  1956  SC  33;  Willie  (William)  Slaney  v.  State  of  

M.P., AIR 1956 SC 116; Fakhruddin v. State of Madhya Pradesh,  

AIR 1967 SC 1326; State of A.P. v. Thakkidiram Reddy, AIR 1998  

SC 2702;  Ramji Singh v. State of Bihar, AIR 2001 SC 3853; and  

Gurpreet Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 2006 SC 191, and came to  

the following conclusion :  

“17. Therefore,……………… unless the convict is   able to establish that defect in framing the charges  has caused real prejudice to him and that he was  not informed as to what was the real case against   him and that he could not defend himself properly,   no interference is required on mere technicalities.   

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Conviction  order  in  fact  is  to  be  tested  on  the   touchstone of prejudice theory.”

16. The  case  is  required  to  be  considered  in  the  light  of  the  

aforesaid settled legal propositions.  

In the instant case, the prosecution did not establish any motive  

to  commit  the  crime.   There  is  nothing  on  record  to  show  as  to  

whether  Rama  Raghuraman  (A.1)  had  indulged  in  any  physical  

intimacy  with  the  deceased.   The  evidence  of  the  doctor  who  

examined  the  deceased,  remained  far  from  satisfactory  and  as  he  

changed his version, he has been declared hostile. If the case of the  

prosecution is taken to be true, we have to examine as to whether the  

case  of  the  respondents  falls  within  the  ambit  of  Section  100 and  

Exception II to Section 300 IPC and as to whether the High Court has  

dealt with the same taking into consideration all these incriminating  

circumstances considered by the trial court.  

Admittedly,  the  High  Court  did  not  deal  with  any  of  the  

incriminating  circumstances  considered  by  the  trial  court  for  the  

purpose of conviction of the respondent and did not address itself to  

the relevant issues involved in the appeal.  Therefore, the judgment  

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and order of the High Court cannot be held to be sustainable in law  

and it suffers from perversity.

17. In  Shivaji  Sahebrao  Bobade  &  Anr.  v.  State  of  

Maharashtra, AIR 1973 SC 2622,  this court held :

“…Thus too frequent acquittals of the guilty   may  lead  to  a  ferocious  penal  law,  eventually   eroding the judicial protection of the guiltless. For   all  these reasons it  is  true to say, with Viscount   Simon,  that  "a  miscarriage  of  justice  may  arise   from the acquittal of the guilty no less than from  the  conviction  of  the  innocent  ..."  In  short  our  jurisprudential  enthusiasm  for  presumed  innocence  must  be  moderated  by  the  pragmatic   need to make criminal justice potent and realistic.   A  balance  has  to  be  struck  between  chasing  chance  possibilities  as  good  enough  to  set  the  delinquent  free  and  chopping  the  logic  of   preponderant  probability  to  punish  marginal   innocents.  We  have  adopted  these  cautions  in   analysing  the  evidence  and  appraising  the   soundness of the contrary conclusions reached by  the  courts  below.  Certainly,  in  the  last  analysis   reasonable doubts must operate to the advantage   of the appellant…”  

We  are  of  the  considered  view  that  the  High  Court  

unnecessarily shown misplaced sympathy in a case where conviction  

was eminent.

In the facts and circumstances of the case, the respondents are  

the only persons who could explain as under what circumstances the  

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deceased suffered the grievous injuries on the vital parts of his body.  

The court has to draw its own inference considering the totality of the  

circumstances.   

18. In State of U.P. v. Ram Swarup & Anr., AIR 1974 SC 1570,  

this Court held:

“……. the Civil Law rule of pleadings does  not govern the rights of an accused in a criminal   trial.   Unlike  in  a  civil  case,  it  is  open  to  a  criminal court to find in favour of an accused on a  plea  not  taken  up  by  him  and  by  so  doing  the   Court does not invite the charge that it has made   out a new case for the accused. The accused may  not plead that he acted in self-defence and yet the   Court may find from the evidence of the witnesses   examined  by  the  prosecution  and  the  circumstances of the case either that what would  otherwise  be  an  offence  is  not  one  because  the   accused has acted within the strict confines of his   right  of  private  defence  or  that  the  offence  is   mitigated because the right of private defence has  been exceeded…..”

19. Though the accused did not plead, if we go by the case of the  

prosecution the nature and number of injuries found on the body of  

the  deceased  itself  established  that  Rama  Raghuraman  (A.1)  and  

Raghuraman (A.2) had exceeded their right of self defence. However,  

admitted facts remained that the respondents No.1 personally went to  

the nearby hospital and on the advice of Dr. U. Srinivas (PW.3),  had  

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taken the deceased to the hospital. They not only got him admitted in  

the  hospital,  rather  donated  their  own  blood  to  save  his  life.  

Respondent No.1, Rama Raghuraman informed father of the deceased  

about  his  health  conditions.  Thus,  these  are  the  mitigating  

circumstances in the case in favour of the respondents to show that in  

spite  of  the  fact  that  they had committed  the  offence they did  not  

intend to kill the deceased.  Thus, they are liable to be convicted under  

Section 304 Part-II IPC read with Section 34 IPC.

20. In view of above,  appeal  succeeds and is  allowed. Judgment  

and  order  dated  13.2.2003  passed  by  the  High  Court  of  Andhra  

Pradesh at Hyderabad in Criminal Appeal No. 1088 of 2002 is hereby  

set aside and the judgment and order dated 9.9.2002 in Sessions Case  

No. 40 of 1999 passed by the trial court is modified to the extent that  

respondents are held guilty for the offence punishable under Section  

304 Part-II r/w Section 34 IPC and sentenced to five years rigorous  

imprisonment each.  There is nothing on record to show as to whether  

the respondents have served any period during the trial or during the  

pendency of their appeal before the High Court.  In case, they have  

served some period, it shall be set-off in accordance with law.  

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Before parting with the case, we record our appreciation for the  

efforts made by Ms. V. Mohana, learned advocate, for rendering full  

assistance to the Court on being appointed as amicus curiae.  

………………………………J.  (P. SATHASIVAM)

                      ..……………………………J.                             (Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN)

New Delhi; January 3, 2011     

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