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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10592  OF 2014 (Arising Out of SLP (C) No. 16780 of 2011)

  S. BHASKAR REDDY & ANR.       …APPELLANTS

Vs.

SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE & ANR.  …RESPONDENTS

     J U D G M E N T                 

V.GOPALA GOWDA, J.

Leave granted.  

2. Aggrieved  by  the  impugned  judgment  and  order  

dated 07.02.2011 passed in W.P. No. 28464 of 2008, by  

the then High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad,  

the  appellants  have  filed  this  appeal,  framing  

certain  questions  of  law,  urging  various  legal  

grounds in support of the same and praying to set  

aside the impugned order and restore the order dated  

27.11.2008  of  the  Andhra  Pradesh  Administrative  

Tribunal  at  Hyderabad  (in  short  “the  Tribunal”)

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passed in OA No. 2767 of 2007.

3. Brief facts of the case are stated hereunder for  

the purpose of examining the rival legal contentions  

urged  on  behalf  of  the  parties  and  to  find  out  

whether the impugned judgment warrants interference  

by  this  Court  in  exercise  of  its  appellate  

jurisdiction.   

4. The  appellants  herein  were  appointed  as  Armed  

Reserve Constables by the Superintendent of Police  

Chittoor, Andhra Pradesh. They were transferred on  

deputation basis to the Office of the Superintendent  

of  Police,  Railways,  Guntakal,  to  discharge  their  

duties  in  that  establishment.  While  they  were  on  

deputation with the Railway Police, it is alleged  

that they were implicated in a murder case and the  

charge memo was issued to them on 11.09.2004. The  

Deputy Superintendent of Railway Police was appointed  

as an Enquiry Officer to enquire into the charges  

against  them.  On  13.06.2005,  the  Enquiry  Officer  

after  affording  an  opportunity  to  the  appellants  

submitted his enquiry report. Subsequently, they were  

repatriated  to  their  parent  department.  On

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27.03.2007,  the  borrowing  department-the  first  

respondent herein passed the orders of dismissal of  

both the appellants from the services of the police  

department.  

5. The  appellants,  aggrieved  by  the  orders  of  

dismissal passed against them by the first respondent  

filed original application before the Tribunal urging  

various legal grounds. The case of the appellants  

before the Tribunal was that the order of dismissal  

passed  against  them  by  the  first  respondent  is  a  

major penalty, as enumerated under Rule 9 (ix) of the  

Andhra  Pradesh  Civil  Services  (Classification,  

Control & Appeal) Rules, 1991 (in short ‘the Rules’)  

and that the first respondent being the borrowing  

authority  has  no  competence  to  pass  orders  of  

dismissal  against  the  appellants.  Only  the  second  

respondent, who is the lending authority, has got the  

competence under Rule 30 of the Rules.

6. The Tribunal after considering the factual and  

rival legal contentions and appreciating the material  

evidence on record set aside the orders of dismissal  

passed against the appellants.

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7. Aggrieved  by  the  order,  the  Superintendent  of  

Police, Railways, challenged the correctness of the  

judgment and order passed by the Tribunal before the  

then High Court of Andhra Pradesh by filing a Writ  

Petition  under  Articles  226  and  227  of  the  

Constitution of India urging certain legal grounds.  

8. The High Court allowed the writ petition after  

interpreting  the  first  proviso  to  Rule  16  of  the  

Rules  stating  that  the  first  respondent  is  the  

competent authority to pass the order of dismissal  

against the appellants as they were working in the  

Railway Police wing at Aanthapur District at the time  

of occurrence of the said criminal acts. Hence, this  

appeal by the appellants.

9. Ms. S. Janani, the learned counsel on behalf of  

the appellants has contended that the appellants were  

appointed  in  the  Office  of  the  Superintendent  of  

Police, Chittoor, which is entirely a separate unit  

of appointment and they were sent on deputation to  

the Office of the Superintendent of Police, Railways,  

which  is  a  separate  legal  entity  altogether.  The  

transfer as referred to in the first proviso to Rule

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16  of  the  Rules  is  not  applicable  to  the  fact  

situation for the reason that the words “transfer on  

deputation”  does  not  mean  to  say  that  they  were  

transferred  to  the  Railway  unit  of  the  police  

department,  which  is  the  Central  Government  

Department as the Railway Police wing is required to  

be manned by the Andhra Pradesh Police. Hence, the  

first  proviso  to  Rule  16  of  the  Rules  is  not  

applicable and Rule 30 of the Rules should have been  

applied to the case of the appellants as the first  

respondent  being  the  borrowing  authority  has  

conducted  enquiry  through  its  enquiry  officer.  

Therefore,  the  borrowing  authority  is  not  the  

competent Disciplinary Authority to impose the major  

penalty of dismissal on the appellants as provided  

under Rule 9 clauses (vi) to (ix) of the Rules. The  

enquiry records should have been transmitted to the  

parent  department,  which  is  the  Disciplinary  

Authority to consider the enquiry report and pass  

appropriate orders as provided under Rules 9 and 10  

of the Rules.   

10. Alternatively,  the  counsel  for  the  appellants

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has contended that neither the Tribunal nor the High  

Court has examined the legal aspect in relation to  

the order of honourable acquittal passed by the First  

Additional  District  Judge,  Ananthapur,  in  the  

Sessions Case No. 326 of 2005 by its judgement dated  

25.06.2007 after regular trial was conducted against  

them.  In  support  of  this  contention  the  learned  

counsel has placed strong reliance upon the judgments  

of this Court in the cases of  Capt.M. Paul Anthony  

v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. & Anr.1 and  G.M. Tank  v.  

State  of  Gujarat  and  Ors.2  in  support  of  the  

proposition of law on honourable acquittal of the  

delinquent employees against such order of dismissal.  

11.  The  said  legal  contention  has  been  strongly  

rebutted by Mr. Guntur Prabhakar, the learned counsel  

on behalf of the respondents placing strong reliance  

upon the interpretation made by the High Court on the  

first proviso to Rule 16 of the Rules stating that  

Rule 30 of the Rules is not applicable to the fact  

situation  by  placing  reliance  upon  the  counter  

affidavit filed by the Principal Secretary of the  

1    (1999) 3 SCC 679   2     (2006) 5 SCC 446

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Home  Department,  Government  of  Andhra  Pradesh,  

Hyderabad, wherein he has sworn in to the fact that  

the  appellants  were  originally  appointed  as  Armed  

Reserve Constables in Chittoor District by the second  

respondent and subsequently transferred on deputation  

to  Railway  Police  Guntakal,  Anantapur  on  tenure  

basis.  Though,  the  second  respondent  is  the  

appointing authority of the appellants but the first  

respondent  of  the  Railway  Police  is  also  the  

disciplinary  authority  along  with  the  second  

respondent.

12. It  is  further  contended  that  the  first  

respondent  has  conducted  enquiry  on  the  charges  

levelled  against  the  appellants  after  they  were  

suspended from service, after following Rule 8 (1)  

(c) of the Rules. The appellants were repatriated to  

their parent unit under order of suspension issued by  

the Additional Director General of Police, Railways.

13.  The  first  respondent  after  following  the  due  

procedure  under  the  Rules,  in  exercise  of  the  

statutory power conferred upon him under the first  

proviso of Rule 16 of the Rules, vide G.O.Ms. No. 284

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dated 07.07.1997 issued the final orders of dismissal  

of the appellants from their service vide proceedings  

C.No.123/OE-PR/2004 dated 05.03.2007 and the copies  

of final orders sent to the Superintendent of Police,  

Chittoor vide C.No.123/OE-PR/2004, dated 17.03.2007,  

for service on the appellants. Therefore, the High  

Court has rightly held that the first respondent is  

the competent Disciplinary Authority to impose any  

one of the major penalties on the Police personnel on  

the proved charges of misconduct under Rule 9 clauses  

(vi) to (ix) of the Rules.

14. With reference to the above legal contentions  

urged on behalf of the parties, we have examined the  

findings  and  records  recorded  in  the  impugned  

judgment by the High Court to answer as to whether  

the first respondent is the competent Disciplinary  

Authority to pass an order of dismissal against the  

appellants  or  not  and  for  what  relief  they  are  

entitled in their proceedings.   

15. To  answer  the  above  contentions  raised  before  

us, it would be necessary for us to refer to the  

first proviso to Rule 16 of the Rules which reads

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thus:

“16.Disciplinary  authority  in  case  of  promotion  or  transfer  of  a  member  of  a  service  and  on  reversion  or  reduction  therefrom:-

(1) Where, on promotion or transfer, a  member of a service in a class, category  or grade is holding an appointment in  another class, category or grade thereof  or  in  another  service,  State  or  Subordinate, no penalty shall be imposed  upon  him  in  respect  of  his  work  or  conduct  before  such  promotion  or  transfer except by authority competent  to impose the penalty upon a member of  the  service  in  the  latter  class,  category, grade or service, as the case  may be. This provision shall apply also  to cases of transfer or promotion of a  person  from  a  post  under  the  jurisdiction of one authority to that of  another authority within the same class,  category or grade;

Provided that the authority which  may impose any of the penalties on a  member  of  the  Andhra  Pradesh  Police  Subordinate  Service  or  the  Andhra  Pradesh Special Armed Police Service or  the Deputy Superintendent of Police or  Assistant  Commissioner  of  Police  in  category 2 and the Inspector of Police  in  category  4  of  the  Andhra  Pradesh  Police  Service  in  cases  not  involving  promotion  or  appointment  by  transfer,  shall be the competent authority having  jurisdiction  over  such  member  at  the  time  of  commission  of  such  act  or  omission,  as  the  case  may  be  or  any  authority to which it is subordinate;

Provided further that in case of a  member  of  the  Andhra  Pradesh  Police  Subordinate  Service  or  the  Andhra  Pradesh Special Armed Police Service, an

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Officer  superior  to  the  competent  authority  may,  for  reasons  to  be  recorded In writing, transfer a record  of enquiry in a disciplinary case from  the competent   authority to any other  authority  holding  the  same  rank  for  disposal.”

  Further,  the  G.O.M  Nos.  676  and  487  dated  

09.11.1990 and 14.09.1992 respectively, issued by the  

Section Officer, Home Department, A.P. Secretariat,  

Government of Andhra Pradesh and Appendix IV on Rule  

14 (2) and Rule 34 (1) III in the amendment to the  

Andhra  Pradesh  Civil  Services  (Classification,  

Control  &  Appeal)  Rules,  1991  attached  therewith,  

considers  the  first  respondent  as  the  competent  

Disciplinary Authority to pass an order of dismissal  

against the appellants.  

16. The  respondents  have  made  available  the  

appointment  orders  of  the  appellants  in  

D.O.No.1122/92  (A1/1250/276/91)  in  July,  1992,  

wherein  it  is  specifically  stated  that  they  were  

required  to  give  an  undertaking  to  the  second  

respondent  to  serve  in  the  Railway  Police  for  a  

period  of  5  years  and  were  required  to  undergo  

necessary  training  at  APSP  Battalions  and  were

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further required to report before the RIAR, Chittoor  

for  duty  on  22.07.1992.  The  transfer  order  

D.O.No.1102/2003  (C/1/8552/495/02)  and  D.O.No.444/  

2003 (A1/8552/495/02) were issued to the appellant  

Nos.  1  &  2  dated  16.07.2003  and  25.03.2003  

respectively; as per the undertaking given to the  

Police Department to serve the Railway Police for a  

period of five years.

17. The alleged mis-conduct was said to have been  

committed  by  the  appellants  while  they  had  been  

working  in  the  Railway  Police  at  Anantapur  

Department.  The  disciplinary  proceedings  were  

initiated against them by the first respondent by  

appointing  the  Enquiry  Officer  as  he  was  the  

competent officer to pass an order to initiate the  

disciplinary  proceedings against  the appellants  as  

per the G.O.Ms No.284 dated 07.07.1997 and Appendix  

IV, referred to supra. Therefore, merely because the  

word  “deputation”  is  used  in  the  transfer  order  

issued to the appellants by the second respondent, it  

cannot be said that first proviso to Rule 16 of the  

Rules is not applicable to the case on hand. In this

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regard categorical statement of fact is sworn to in  

the affidavit filed by the Principal Secretary to the  

Home Department of Andhra Pradesh, it is stated that  

the  Railway  Police,  CID,  Intelligence  and  Police,  

Training Colleges are the specialised branches of the  

Police Department, they are part and parcel of the  

Police Department. This statement of fact sworn by  

the Principal Secretary of the Home Department has to  

be accepted in view of the fact that the appellants  

and similarly placed police constables have given an  

undertaking to the second respondent that they would  

serve in Railway Police for a period of five years  

during  their  tenure  of  service  in  the  police  

department. Therefore, it is not open for them to  

contend that the Railway Police is not a part of the  

Police department of the State of Andhra Pradesh but  

the  department  of  Central  Government.  No  doubt,  

Railways is the department of the Central Government,  

but the appellants were posted to work as Railway  

Police  by  way  of  transfer  order  to  give  police  

protection to the Railway property and commuters and  

look after other incidental matters. Therefore, the

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finding of the High Court in its judgment, on the  

contentious  issue  regarding  the  competency  of  the  

first  respondent  by  placing  reliance  upon  first  

proviso to Rule 16 of the Rules is correct in law.  

Further,  Rule  30  of  the  Rules  upon  which  strong  

reliance has been placed by the appellants’ counsel  

has  no  application  to  the  fact  situation  for  the  

reason that the appellants were not transferred to  

the Railway department, which belongs to the Central  

Government  but  worked  in  the  Railway  Police  wing  

which is one of the specialised wing of the Police  

Department of the State of Andhra Pradesh as stated  

in the affidavit by the Principal Secretary of the  

Home  department.  The  appellants  were  required  to  

function under the Railways as per their undertaking  

given  to  the  department  and  therefore  they  were  

transferred to the Railway Police, which is one of  

the specialised wing and hence it cannot be contended  

by them that the Railway wing is under the control of  

the Central Government.  The High Court in view of  

the facts as stated above with reference to the first  

proviso to Rule 16 of the Rules has rightly set aside

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the findings recorded by the Tribunal in its judgment  

by  correctly  interpreting  Rules  16  and  30  of  the  

Rules. In view of the foregoing reasons, the same  

does not call for our interference in this appeal as  

we are of the view that the police personnel of the  

Police Department of Andhra Pradesh are required to  

serve in the Railway Police. Accordingly, we hold  

that the legal contentions urged on behalf of the  

appellants  that  the  second  respondent  is  the  

competent Disciplinary Authority and not the first  

respondent  by  placing  reliance  on  Rule  30  of  the  

Rules is rejected as the same is erroneous in law.

18.  Now,  we  have  to  examine  the  alternative  plea  

urged on behalf of the appellants that the orders of  

dismissal passed against them are liable to be set  

aside in view of the judgment and order passed by the  

Criminal Court after the trial in which proceeding  

the appellants were honourably acquitted, when the  

charges in both the proceedings are almost similar.  

The decisions of this Court referred to supra, upon  

which  strong  reliance  is  placed  by  the  learned  

counsel for the appellants are aptly applicable to

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the case on hand.  

19. It is an undisputed fact that the charges in the  

criminal  case  and  the  Disciplinary  proceedings  

conducted  against  the  appellants  by  the  first  

respondent are similar. The appellants have faced the  

criminal trial before the Sessions Judge, Chittoor on  

the charge of murder and other offences of IPC and  

SC/ST (POA) Act. Our attention was drawn to the said  

judgment which is produced at Exh. P-7, to evidence  

the fact that the charges in both the proceedings of  

the criminal case and the Disciplinary proceeding are  

similar. From perusal of the charge sheet issued in  

the disciplinary proceedings and the enquiry report  

submitted by the Enquiry Officer and the judgment in  

the criminal case, it is clear that they are almost  

similar and one and the same. In the criminal trial,  

the  appellants  have  been  acquitted  honourably  for  

want  of  evidence  on  record.  The  trial  judge  has  

categorically recorded the finding of fact on proper  

appreciation and evaluation of evidence on record and  

held that the charges framed in the criminal case are  

not proved against the appellants and therefore they

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have  been  honourably  acquitted  for  the  offences  

punishable under 3 (1) (x) of SC/ST (POA) Act and  

under Sections 307 and 302 read with Section 34 of  

the IPC. The law declared by this Court with regard  

to honourable acquittal of an accused for criminal  

offences means that they are acquitted for want of  

evidence to prove the charges.  The meaning of the  

expression  “honourable acquittal”  was discussed  by  

this Court in detail in the case of Deputy Inspector  

General  of  Police  &  Anr.  v. S.  Samuthiram3,  the  

relevant para from the said case reads as under :-

“24. The  meaning  of  the  expression  “honourable  acquittal”  came  up  for  consideration before this Court in  RBI v.  Bhopal Singh Panchal. In that case, this  Court  has  considered  the  impact  of  Regulation  46(4)  dealing  with  honourable  acquittal  by  a  criminal  court  on  the  disciplinary proceedings. In that context,  this  Court  held  that  the  mere  acquittal  does  not  entitle  an  employee  to  reinstatement  in  service,  the  acquittal,  it  was  held,  has  to  be  honourable.  The  expressions  “honourable  acquittal”,  “acquitted  of  blame”,  “fully  exonerated”  are  unknown  to  the  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure  or  the  Penal  Code,  which  are  coined by judicial pronouncements. It is  difficult  to  define  precisely  what  is  meant  by  the  expression  “honourably  acquitted”.  When the accused is acquitted  

3  (2013) 1 SCC 598

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after  full  consideration  of  prosecution  evidence  and  that  the  prosecution  had  miserably  failed  to  prove  the  charges  levelled  against  the  accused,  it  can  possibly  be  said  that  the  accused  was  honourably acquitted.”

 (Emphasis laid by this Court)    

   After examining the principles laid down in the  

above  said  case,  the  same  was  reiterated  by  this  

Court in a recent decision in the case of  Joginder  

Singh  v. Union  Territory  of  Chandigarh  &  Ors. in  

Civil Appeal No. 2325 Of 2009 (decided on November  

11, 2014.

  Further, in Capt. M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold  

Mines Ltd. & Anr. (supra)  this Court has held as  

under:-

“34. There  is  yet  another  reason  for  discarding the whole of the case of the  respondents. As pointed out earlier, the  criminal case as also the departmental  proceedings were based on identical set  of facts, namely, “the raid conducted at  the appellant’s residence and recovery  of incriminating articles there from”.  The findings recorded by the enquiry  officer, a copy of which has been placed  before  us,  indicate  that  the  charges  framed against the appellant were sought  to  be  proved  by  police  officers  and  panch  witnesses,  who  had  raided  the  house of the appellant and had effected  recovery. They were the only witnesses  examined by the enquiry officer and the  enquiry  officer,  relying  upon  their

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statements, came to the conclusion that  the charges were established against the  appellant.  The  same  witnesses  were  examined in the criminal case but the  Court, on a consideration of the entire  evidence, came to the conclusion that no  search  was  conducted  nor  was  any  recovery made from the residence of the  appellant.  The  whole  case  of  the  prosecution  was  thrown  out  and  the  appellant  was  acquitted.  In  this  situation,  therefore,  where  the  appellant  is  acquitted  by  a  judicial  pronouncement with the finding that the  “raid and recovery” at the residence of  the appellant were not proved, it would  be unjust, unfair and rather oppressive  to allow the findings recorded at the ex  parte departmental proceedings to stand. 35. Since the facts and the evidence in  both  the  proceedings,  namely,  the  departmental  proceedings  and  the  criminal  case  were  the  same  without  there being any iota of difference, the  distinction, which is usually drawn as  between the departmental proceedings and  the  criminal  case  on  the  basis  of  approach and burden of proof, would not  be applicable to the instant case.”

(emphasis laid by this Court)

  Further, in the case of  G.M. Tank  v. State of  

Gujarat and Ors.(supra) this Court held as under:-

“20.………Likewise,  the  criminal  proceedings were initiated against the  appellant  for  the  alleged  charges  punishable under the provisions of the  PC  Act  on  the  same  set  of  facts  and  evidence.  It  was  submitted  that  the  departmental  proceedings  and  the  criminal case are based on identical and  similar  (verbatim)  set  of  facts  and

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evidence.  The  appellant  has  been  honourably  acquitted  by  the  competent  court on the same set of facts, evidence  and  witness  and,  therefore,  the  dismissal order based on the same set of  facts and evidence on the departmental  side is liable to be set aside in the  interest of justice. 30. The  judgments  relied  on  by  the  learned  counsel  appearing  for  the  respondents  are  distinguishable  on  facts and on law………It is true that the  nature  of  charge  in  the  departmental  proceedings and in the criminal case is  grave. The nature of the case launched  against the appellant on the basis of  evidence and material collected against  him  during  enquiry  and  investigation  and as reflected in the charge-sheet,  factors mentioned are one and the same.  In  other  words,  charges,  evidence,  witnesses and circumstances are one and  the same. In the present case, criminal  and  departmental  proceedings  have  already noticed or granted on the same  set of facts, namely, raid conducted at  the appellant’s residence, recovery of  articles  therefrom.  The  Investigating  Officer  Mr  V.B.  Raval  and  other  departmental  witnesses  were  the  only  witnesses  examined  by  the  enquiry  officer  who  by  relying  upon  their  statement came to the conclusion that  the  charges  were  established  against  the appellant. The same witnesses were  examined in the criminal case and the  criminal court on the examination came  to the conclusion that the prosecution  has  not  proved  the  guilt  alleged  against  the  appellant  beyond  any  reasonable  doubt  and  acquitted  the  appellant by its judicial pronouncement  with  the finding  that the  charge has  not  been  proved.  It  is  also  to  be

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noticed that the judicial pronouncement  was made after a regular trial and on  hot contest. Under these circumstances,  it  would  be  unjust  and  unfair  and  rather oppressive to allow the findings  recorded  in  the  departmental  proceedings to stand.

31. In  our  opinion,  such  facts  and  evidence in the departmental as well as  criminal  proceedings  were  the  same  without  there  being  any  iota  of   difference,  the  appellant  should  succeed.  The  distinction  which  is  usually proved between the departmental  and criminal proceedings on the basis  of  the  approach  and  burden  of  proof  would not be applicable in the instant  case.  Though  the  finding  recorded  in  the  domestic enquiry  was found  to be  valid by the courts below, when there  was  an  honourable  acquittal  of  the  employee  during  the  pendency  of  the  proceedings challenging the dismissal,  the same requires to be taken note of  and the decision in  Paul Anthony case  will  apply.  We,  therefore,  hold  that  the  appeal  filed  by  the  appellant  deserves to be allowed.”

(emphasis laid by this Court)

20. The High Court has not considered and examined  

this legal aspect of the matter while setting aside  

the impugned judgment and order of the Tribunal. The  

Tribunal has also not considered the same. We have  

examined this important factual and legal aspect of  

the case which was brought to our notice in these

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proceedings and we hold that both the High Court and  

Tribunal have erred in not considering this important  

undisputed fact regarding honourable acquittal of the  

appellants on the charges in the criminal case which  

are similar in the disciplinary proceedings.  

21. We have answered the alternative legal contention  

urged on behalf of the appellants by accepting the  

judgment and order of the Sessions Judge, in which  

case they have been acquitted honourably from the  

charges which are more or less similar to the charges  

levelled against the appellants in the Disciplinary  

proceedings by applying the decisions of this Court  

referred to supra. Therefore, we have to set aside  

the orders of dismissal passed against the appellants  

by  accepting  the  alternative  legal  plea  as  urged  

above having regard to the facts and circumstances of  

the case.

22. Since we are of the view that the appellants are  

entitled  to  alternative  relief,  it  would  be  

appropriate for us in this case to pass an order of  

Compulsory Retirement for them from their service as  

provided  under  Rule  9  clause  (vii)  of  the  Rules

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taking  their  service  from  the  date  of  their  

appointment. The said benefit should be extended to  

them from the date they are entitled under the Rules  

by  taking  into  consideration  the  period  spent  in  

these  litigation  from  the  date  of  their  order  of  

dismissal till this date and pay all the monetary  

pensionary  benefits  including  arrears  of  the  same  

treating  them  as  compulsorily  retired  from  their  

service with effect from the date of judgment and  

order dated 25.06.2007 passed by the learned First  

Additional  District  and  Sessions  Judge,  in  the  

Sessions Case No. 326 of 2005.

23. This appeal is partly allowed in the following  

terms:-

(i) The appeal against the impugned judgment  

and order of the High Court in so far as the  

competency  of  the  first  respondent  

Disciplinary  Authority  is  concerned,  is  

accepted  as  the  same  is  legal  and  valid.  

Accordingly, the issue is answered in favour  

of the respondents.

(ii)  The  orders  of  dismissal  passed  against  

the appellants are set aside, but they are not  

required  to  be  reinstated  in  their  service  

along  with  the  consequential  benefits

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including  back  wages.  But  in  its  place,  we  

pass an order of compulsory retirement against  

them and pay the pensionary benefits including  

the  arrears,  treating  them  as  compulsorily  

retired  from  their  service  with  effect  from  

the date of judgment and order passed by the  

learned First Additional District and Sessions  

Judge, i.e. with effect from 25.06.2007.

This  order  shall  be  given  effect  by  the  

respondents within six weeks from the date of receipt  

of a copy of this Judgment and order.

…………………………………………………J.  [V. GOPALA GOWDA]

                          …………………………………………………J.                             [C. NAGAPPAN]

New Delhi,      November 28, 2014