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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL No. 1966    OF 2015 (Arising out of SLP © No. 31615 of 2014)

ROXANN SHARMA               .….. APPELLANT

Vs.

ARUN SHARMA                         .…..RESPONDENT

WITH

  CIVIL APPEAL No. 1967   OF 2015   (Arising out of SLP © No. 32581 of 2014)

J U D G M E N T

VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.

1 Leave granted in both the Special Leave Petitions.

2 Civil Appeal of 2015 arising out of SLP(C) No.31615 of 2014 assails the  

Judgment dated 2nd August, 2014 passed by the High Court of  Bombay at Goa  

in  Writ  Petition  No.79  of  2014,  which  in  turn  questioned  the  Order  dated  

31.1.2014 passed by the IInd Additional Civil Judge, Senior Division at Margao,  

Goa (hereafter also referred to as the Civil Judge) in Matrimonial Petition No.

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15/2013/II filed on 18.5.2013 before us, by the Respondent, Shri Arun Sharma  

(hereafter referred to as ‘Father’) under Section 6 of the Hindu Minority and  

Guardianship Act, 1956.   In this petition the Father has prayed inter alia that (a)  

the custody of the minor child, Thalbir Sharma be retained by him and that (b)  

by way of temporary injunction, the Appellant before us (hereinafter referred to  

as the Mother) be restrained from taking forcible possession of the minor child  

Thalbir from the custody of the Applicant. These proceedings were initiated and  

are pending in Goa at the instance of the father; at  that time when all three  

persons were residents of Goa.   After a detailed discussion of facts, as well as  

of law, the IInd Additional Civil Judge, Senior Division Margao, Goa ordered  

that “pending final disposal of the petition on merits, the respondent, Roxann  

Sharma  is  granted  interim  custody  of  minor  child  Thalbir  Sharma.    The  

applicant shall have visitation rights to the child.   He shall inform about his  

visit  to  the  child  in  advance  to  the  respondent  upon which  she  shall  allow  

applicant to visit the child”.  A reading of this order discloses that the learned  

Civil Judge favoured the opinion that the custody of Thalbir, a child of tender  

years should remain with the Mother and thereby the child’s paramount interests  

would be subserved and safeguarded; that the Mother holds a Master of Arts  

degree from Howard University,  Washington D.C.  and is  a  Tenured College  

Professor in Los Angeles Mission College, California;  that the allegation of her  

suffering from Bi-polar disorder had not been persuasively proved and in any  

event,  did  not  disqualify  her  to  the  custody  of  her  son;  that  the  Father  is

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allegedly an alcoholic and a drug-addict who had joined a drug rehabilitation  

clinic, and was also a member of  Narcotics Anonymous (N.A); that Father had  

been  previously  married;  and  that  he  was  not  gainfully  employed.    The  

Impugned Order is also a detailed one in which the facts have been noted and  

the statutory laws as well as precedents, have been discussed.   

3. However, in sharp divergence to the conclusion arrived at by the learned  

Civil Judge, the learned Single Judge of the High Court of Bombay at Goa has  

opined that  “it  cannot be disputed that  for  upbringing the child,  love of  the  

petitioner as well as the respondent who is the mother is very much essential for  

the healthy growth of such child.   In such circumstances, though the custody  

would  continue  with  the  petitioner  nevertheless,  the  respondent  being  the  

mother  would  definitely  have  frequent  visitation  rights  of  the  minor  child.  

Such visitation rights shall tentatively be for at least 3 days in a week.   The  

parties  are  at  liberty to  fix  such days  before  the learned Judge at  a  mutual  

agreeable place preferably within the jurisdiction of the Court”.   The Court, we  

must  immediately underscore is  located in Goa and not in  Mumbai.   These  

directions have attained finality against the Father; the Mother would have been  

entitled to visitation rights for  at least three days and equally importantly in  

Goa.

4 Before us, it has been narrated  by the Mother that consequent upon her  

frantic searches for her son, Thalbir, she had came to learn in August, 2013, that

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the Father along with Thalbir was in Mumbai.   She filed Criminal Writ Petition  

No.87 of 2013 which had been disposed of by Orders dated 26.8.2013 noticing  

that proceedings under the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 (HMG  

Act) were pending in Goa and directing that the Mother should have access to  

Thalbir in Mumbai at a place near the residence of the Father.   Thereafter, as  

already mentioned above on 31.1.2014, the Order by which the arrangement  

was reversed in the Impugned Order, came to be passed by the learned Civil  

Judge, Senior Division, Margao granting custody to the Mother and visitation to  

the Father in Goa.    

5 We  shall  consider  the  import  and  amplitude  of  the  legal  concept  of  

Guardianship on first principles.  Black Law Dictionary 5th Edition contains a  

definition of Guardianship which commends itself to us.  It states that – “A  

person lawfully invested with the power, and charged with the duty, of taking  

care of the person and managing the property and rights of another person, who,  

for  defect  of  age,  understanding,  or  self  control,  is  considered incapable  of  

administering his own affairs.  One who legally has the care and management of  

the person, or the estate or both, of a child during its minority”.  Thereafter there  

are as many twelve classifications of a guardian but we shall reproduce only one  

of them, which reads – “ a  general   guardian is one who has the general care  

and control of the person and estate of his ward; while a special guardian is one  

who has special or limited powers and duties with respect to his ward, e.g., a

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guardian who has the custody of the estate but not of the person, or vice versa,  

or a guardian ad litem”.   Black’s Law Dictionary also defines ‘Custody’ as the  

care  and control  of  a  thing or  person.   The keeping,  guarding,  care,  watch,  

inspection, preservation or security of a thing, carrying with it the idea of the  

thing being within the immediate personal care and control of the person to  

whose custody it is subjected.  Immediate charge and control, and not the final,  

absolute control of  ownership,  implying responsibility for the protection and  

preservation of the thing in custody.   In terms of Black’s Law Dictionary, Tenth  

Edition, ‘Visitation’ means a non-custodial parent’s period of access to a child.  

Visitation right means a non-custodial parent’s or grandparent’s Court ordered  

privilege of spending time with a child or grandchild who is living with another  

person,  usually  the  custodial  parent.    A visitation  order  means  an  order  

establishing  the  visiting  times  for  a  non-custodial  parent  with  his  or  her  

children.  Although the non-custodial parent is responsible for the care of the  

child during visits, visitation differs from custody because non-custodial parent  

and child do not live together as a family unit.  In our opinion, visitation rights  

have been ascribed this meaning – In a dissolution or custody suit, permission  

granted to a parent to visit children. In domestic relations matters, the right of  

one parent to visit children of the marriage under order of the court.   

6 Several other statutes also contain definitions of ‘guardian’ such as The  

Juvenile Justice (Care & Protection) Act, 2000 which in Section 2(j) states that -

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“ “guardian”, in relation to a child, means his natural guardian or any other  

person having the actual charge or control over the child and recognized by the  

competent  authority  as  a  guardian  in  course  of  proceedings  before  that  

authority.”  Since the Juvenile Act is principally concerned with the welfare of  

the juvenile the accent understandably and correctly is on the “person” rather  

than the estate. The Tamil Nadu Elementary Education Act, 1994 defines the  

term guardian as - “any person to whom the care, nurture or custody of any  

child  falls  by  law  or  by  natural  right  or  by  recognized  usage,  or  who  has  

accepted or assumed the care, nurture or custody of any child or to whom the  

care,  nurture  or  custody  of  any  child  has  been  entrusted  by  any  lawful  

authority”.    

7 The Guardianship postulates control over both the person as well as the  

assets of a minor or of one and not the other.  This is obvious from a reading of  

the definitions contained in Section 4 (2) of the Guardians & Wards Act, 1890  

(G&W Act) and Section 4(b) of the HMG Act which clarifies that  “Guardian”  

means a person having the care of the person of a minor or of his property or of  

both  his  person  and  property.    Section  9  contemplates  the  filing  of  an  

application in respect of the guardianship of the person of the minor and Section  

10 specifies the form of that application.  Section 12 deals with the power to  

make interlocutory order for protection of the minor and interim protection of  

his person and property.  Section 14 is of importance as its tenor indicates that

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these controversies be decided by one court, on the lines of Section 10 of the  

CPC which imparts preference of jurisdiction to the first court.  Section 17 gives  

primacy to the welfare of the minor.  Sub section 2 thereof enjoins the court to  

give due consideration to the age, sex and religion of the minor, the character  

and capacity of the proposed guardian and his nearness of kin to the minor.  

Since Thalbir is of a very tender age, the advisability of determining his wishes  

is not relevant at the present stage; he is not old enough to form an intelligent  

reference.  Section 25 covers the custody of a ward being removed from the  

custody of the guardian of his person, and adumbrates that if the Court is of the  

opinion that it will be for the welfare of the ward to return to the custody of his   

guardian shall make an order of his return.  

8 Section 26 is of special significance in that it casts an omnibus embargo  

even  on  a  guardian  of  a  person  appointed  or  declared  by  the  Court  from  

removing the ward from the limits of its jurisdiction.   This is because when a  

dispute  arises  between the  parents  of  a  minor,  the  court  steps  in  as  parens  

patriae and  accordingly  appropriates  or  confiscates  to  itself  the  discretion  

earlier reposed in the natural parents of the minor.   This provision appears to  

have been violated by the Father.   These provisions continue to apply in view  

of the explicit explanation contained in Section 2 of the HMG Act.

9 Section 3 of the HMG Act clarifies that it applies to any person who is a  

Hindu by religion and to any person domiciled in India who is not a Muslim,

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Christian, Parsi or Jew unless it is proved that any such person would not have  

been governed by Hindu Law.  In the present case, the Mother is a Christian but  

inasmuch as she has not raised any objection to the applicability of the HMG  

Act, we shall presume that  Thalbir is governed by Hindu Law.  Even in the  

proceedings before us it has not been contested by the learned Senior Advocate  

that the HMG Act does not operate between the parties.  Section 6 of the HMG  

Act is of seminal importance.  It reiterates Section 4(b) and again clarifies that  

guardianship covers both the person as well as the property of the minor; and  

then controversially states that the father and after him the mother shall be the  

natural guardian of a Hindu. Having said so, it immediately provides that the  

custody of a minor who has not completed the age of 5 years shall ordinarily be  

with the mother.  The significance and amplitude of the proviso has been fully  

clarified by decisions of this Court and very briefly stated, a proviso is in the  

nature of an exception to what has earlier been generally prescribed.  The use of  

the word “ordinarily” cannot be over-emphasised.  It  ordains a presumption,  

albeit  a  rebuttable  one,  in  favour  of  the  mother.   The  learned Single  Judge  

appears to have lost sight of the significance of the use of word “ordinarily”  

inasmuch as he has observed in paragraph 13 of the Impugned Order that the  

Mother  has  not  established  her  suitability  to  be  granted  interim  custody  of  

Thalbir who at that point in time was an infant.  The proviso places the onus on  

the father to prove that it is not in the welfare of the infant child to be placed in   

the custody of his/her mother.  The wisdom of the Parliament or the Legislature

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should not be trifled away by a curial interpretation which virtually nullifies the  

spirit of the enactment.  

10 We shall now consider the relevance of the precedents cited before us by  

the learned Senior Counsel for the Father.   In Sarita Sharma vs. Sushil Sharma  

(2000) 3 SCC 14, in defiance of the orders passed by the Jurisdictional Court in  

the U.S., the mother, Sarita, had returned to India with two children from their  

matrimonial relationship.   The High Court viewed that the divorce decree and  

custodial  directions having emanated  from a competent  Court  deserve  to  be  

honoured, and accordingly allowed the Habeas Corpus Petition and directed the  

mother to return the custody of the children to the father, Sushil.  This Court  

was not persuaded that further consideration by Courts in India as to whether  

the interests of the children, which were paramount, stood foreclosed and could  

not be cogitated upon again.  As regards Section 6 of the HMG Act, it opined  

that although it constitutes the Father as a natural guardian of a minor son it  

could not be considered as superseding its paramount consideration as to what is  

conducive to the welfare of the minor.  These observations were reiterated and  

this Court reversed the decision of the High Court holding that the interests and  

welfare of the children dictated that the custody should be with their mother.  

This case, therefore, militates against the legal and factual position which the  

Father seeks to essay before us.   It is also important to underscore the fact that  

both the children were over the age of five,  a fortiori,  the custody should not

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have been reversed in the case in hand  by the High Court from the Mother to  

the Father since Thalbir was then around one year old and is presently still less  

than three  years old.

11 Learned Senior Counsel has next drawn our attention to Mausami Moitra  

Ganguli vs. Jayant Ganguli, (2008) 7 SCC 673.  In this case also, this Court was  

confronted with the custody conflict over 10 year male child.  We must be quick  

to point out that the Court did not consider Section 6 of the HMG Act after  

detailing the factors which were indicative of the position that the welfare of the  

child lies with continuing the custody with the father, this Court dismissed the  

mother’s appeal.  The facts are totally distinguishable.  The ratio continues to be  

that it is the welfare of a minor which has paramount importance.

12 The HMG Act postulates that the custody of an infant or a tender aged  

child  should  be  given  to  his/her  mother  unless  the  father  discloses  cogent  

reasons that  are  indicative  of  and presage  the livelihood of  the welfare  and  

interest of the child being undermined or jeopardised if the custody retained by  

the mother.   Section 6(a)  of  HMG Act,  therefore,  preserves the right  of  the  

father to be the guardian of the property of the minor child but not the guardian  

of  his  person whilst  the child  is  less  than five years  old.   It  carves out  the  

exception  of  interim custody,  in  contradistinction  of  guardianship,  and  then  

specifies that custody should be given to the mother so long as the child is  

below five years in age.  We must immediately clarify that this Section or for

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that matter any other provision including those contained in the G&W Act, does  

not disqualify the mother to custody of the child even after the latter’s crossing  

the age of five years.

13 We must not lose sight of the fact that our reflections must be restricted to  

aspects that are relevant for the granting of interim custody of an infant.  The  

Trial  is  still  pending.   The learned Single Judge in the Impugned Order has  

rightly taken note of the fact that the Mother was holding a Tenured College  

Professorship,  was  a  post-graduate  from  the  renowned  Haward  University,  

receiving a regular salary.  Whether she had a Bi-polar personality which made  

her  unsuitable  for  interim  custody  of  her  infant  son  Thalbir  had  not  been  

sufficiently proved.  In the course of present proceedings it has been disclosed  

that the Father has only passed High School and is not even a graduate. It has  

also  not  been  denied  or  disputed  before  us  that  he  had  undergone  drug  

rehabilitation and that he was the member of Narcotics Anonymous.  This is  

compounded by the fact that he is not in regular employment or has independent  

income.  As on date he is not an Income tax assessee although he has claimed to  

have earned Rupees 40,000 to 50,000 per month in the past three years.  We  

must again clarify that the father’s suitability to custody is not relevant where  

the child whose custody is in dispute is below five years since the mother is per  

se best suited to care for the infant during his tender age. It is for the Father to  

plead and prove the Mother’s unsuitability since Thalbir is below five years of

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age.   In these considerations the father’s character and background will  also  

become  relevant  but  only  once  the  Court  strongly  and  firmly  doubts  the  

mother’s  suitability;  only  then  and  even  then  would  the  comparative  

characteristic  of  the  parents  come  into  play.   This  approach  has  not  been  

adopted by the learned Single Judge, whereas it has been properly pursued by  

the learned Civil Judge.

14 In the course of the hearings before us temporary visitation rights were  

granted to the Mother under the provision of a social worker who had been  

appointed by the Maharashtra State Legal Service Authority.  We have had the  

advantage  of  perusing  her  very  diligent  and  detailed  Reports  which  vividly  

recount the initial reluctance and antipathy of Thalbir to his Mother, which very  

quickly came to be naturalised because of the maternal affection of the Mother.  

The Reports  of  the Social  Worker  lucidly indicate  that  at  present  Thalbir  is  

extremely comfortable and happy in the company of his Mother but becomes  

agitated at the sight of his Father when he has to return to him.  The Social  

Worker has also fervently pleaded that her Reports should be kept sealed for  

fear of the Father.  This is extremely disturbing to us just as we expect it should  

be to the Father also.  

CIVIL APPEAL No.  1967    OF 2015 (Arising out of SLP © No. 32581 of 2014)

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15 After the passing the Impugned Order in WP 79 of 2014, the Mother filed  

an application dated 20.08.2014, for grant of visitation rights.   Her suggestion  

was that she should have custody of Thalbir from Monday to Friday at Dona  

Paula,  Goa,  to  be  returned  to  the  Father  on  Fridays  at  5.00  pm;  thereafter,  

custody of Thalbir be restored to the Mother at 10.00 A.M. on Monday morning  

in the Trial Court.  The Father resisted the application by stating that he had no  

objection to the Mother visiting the child on three continuous days in each week  

between 4.00 p.m. and 5.00 p.m.  However, he pleaded that since June, 2013, he  

along with Thalbir were residing in Flat No.2, Aashirvad Building, Sidhi Sadan  

Colony, Borivali  West,  Mumbai.   By Orders dated 6.9.2014, the Trial  Court  

ordered that Thalbir should be brought to the Court every Saturday at 9.30 A.M.  

to be handed over to the Mother who would in turn produce the child in the  

Court  at  5.00  p.m.  on the  following Monday.    It  is  this  Order  which was  

challenged in W.P.No. 576 of 2014.    The second learned Single Judge has  

undertaken a discussion on meaning of ‘frequent’, concluding that it cannot be  

continuous; that the previous Order could not have meant that Thalbir would  

remain exclusively with his Mother for three days.   On this dialectic the second  

learned Single Judge found error in the Trial Court’s Orders dated 6.9.2014.  

The  Impugned  Order  goes  on  to  note  that  the  Mother  has  no  permanent  

residence in India and that she had not disclosed any fixed address in Goa and  

the Mother  was suffering from Bi-polar  disorder.    Inexplicably,  the  second  

learned Single Judge found fault with the Order granting weekend visitation to

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the Mother,  ignoring the reality  that  Trial  Court  was only implementing the  

directions given by the previous learned Single Judge.    It seems plain to us that  

it  was not  open to  the Trial  Court  to  venture afresh on the question of  the  

welfare of Thalbir when the matter stood concluded against the Father who had  

not filed any Appeal against the Order of the previous learned Single Judge.  

All that the Trial Court was expected to do was to allocate three days custody  

for the Mother.   In effect the second learned Single Judge has given his own  

understanding and meaning to the previous Order of a coordinate Bench of the  

High  Court,  which  we  find  to  be  diametrically  opposite  to  what  stood  

articulated by the High Court in the previous writ proceedings.   In paraphrasing  

the Order, the learned Single Judge in the Impugned Order has added the word  

“preferably” within the jurisdiction of the Court, but the word “preferably” has  

not been used in the previous Order.  The Impugned Order also appears to lose  

sight of the fact that all three persons were residing in the United States and  

have only recently shifted to Goa which was, therefore, at that time, the only  

abode of the parties.  It has also not given due weightage to the asseverations of  

the Mother that she had invested her savings in purchasing property in Goa, as  

well as in Mumbai in the joint names.   Keeping in view the fact that Father has  

not been able to satisfactorily show that he had any income, prima facie, the  

Mother’s statement has credibility.    Most importantly, it was the Father who  

initiated proceedings in Goa, which jurisdiction has not been opposed by the  

Mother and, therefore, to hold against the Mother at the initial stages is neither

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just nor proper.   Given the protracted litigation which has already transpired  

between the parties it  seems to us that the second learned Single Judge was  

derelict in not deciding the issues and instead merely setting aside the Order  

dated 6.9.2014 assailed before him for an adjudication de novo.   The directions  

previously passed by a coordinate Bench have been nullified and miscarriage of  

justice has resulted.        

16 The learned Single Judge in Writ Petition 79 of 2014 has categorically  

ordered that whilst the custody of Thalbir shall continue with the Father, the  

Mother shall  get “visitation rights” which he temporarily fixed at least three  

days in a week “at a mutual agreeable place preferably within the jurisdiction of  

the Court,” situate in Goa; the Trial is continuing in Goa.  We fail to locate or  

appreciate any reason or justification for the intervention of the High Court in  

Writ Petition 576 of 2014 which is the subject matter of Civil Appeal of 2015  

arising out of SLP (C) 32581 of 2014 by a different learned Single Judge.  We  

have  already  noticed  the  intendment  of  Section  14 of  the  G&W Act which  

acknowledges  the  salutary  necessity  of  only  one  court  in  dealing  with  the  

guardianship  or  custody  disputes  pertaining  to  the  minor.   This  petition  

challenged the proprietary of the Order dated 6.9.2014 passed by the learned  

Civil Judge which in turn was in compliance with the Order dated 2.8.2014,  

which it may be recalled granted visitation rights to the Mother for at least three  

days in a week within the jurisdiction of the Court.  The annals of the turbulent

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marriage of the parties, the IVF conception of Thalbir etc., have been duly noted  

by the first  learned Single Judge and the learned Civil  Judge.   The learned  

Single Judge has then questioned the very applicability of HGM Act as well as  

G&W Act in the State of Goa, an aspect which had not been agitated by either  

the Mother or the Father in any of the earlier proceedings.  There can be no  

cavil that when a Court is confronted by conflicting claims of custody there are  

no rights of the parents which have to be enforced; the child is not a chattel or a  

ball that is bounced to and fro the parents.  It is only the child’s welfare which is  

the focal point for consideration.  Parliament rightly thinks that the custody of a  

child less than five years of age should ordinarily be with the Mother and this  

expectation can be deviated from only for strong reasons.  The need to have a  

continuity in adjudication ought to have persuaded the second learned Single  

Judge to have recused himself in preference to his learned Brother who decided  

the previous Writ Petition.  

17  We also take serious note of the Father, without notifying or taking the  

permission of the Civil Judge, leaving its jurisdiction along with Thalbir.  Prima  

facie this undermines the authority of the Court and it may even tantamount to  

contempt of court. Section 26 of the G&W Act has been violated and that too by  

a person who has not been appointed as the guardian. Relocation is now a well  

known legal concept.  Since movement of persons from one place to another or  

one State to another State of the Country or even from one Country to another

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Country of the Globe is no longer a rarity.  Very often it becomes necessary  

because  the  parent  having  custody  of  the  child  finds  a  more  suitable  

employment somewhere else.  The entitlement of the left behind spouse has,  

therefore, to be jurally investigated.  The Mother may want to relocate to the  

United States where she can be very gainfully employed as against the Father  

who has not been able to disclose any income or sources of regular income.  But  

this is not the case or stage before us.  Here, the Father ought not to have left the  

jurisdiction of Court in Goa which was discharging its duties as parens patirae.  

This seems to have been completely lost sight of and instead the learned Single  

Judge  has  given premium to  the  unauthorised  relocation.   We have  already  

mentioned the Criminal Petition 87/2013 which was disposed of by permitting  

the Mother to meet Thalbir; but keeping in view the pendency of proceedings in  

Goa, the Court rightly did not interfere with or alter or modify any of the Orders  

passed by the Court in Goa. Forum shopping or Court shopping requires to be  

firmly dealt with.  The second learned Single Judge ought to have kept in mind  

that it was the Father who has started proceedings in Goa where the Mother was  

then  also  residing  having,  prima  facie,  been  constrained  to  give  up  her  

employment in the Calfornia, U.S to be in a position to look after her infant son  

Thalbir.  Co-ordinate Benches must respect prior orders.   

18 We shall abjure for making any further observations as the Trial is still  

pending.     Keeping  in  mind the  facts  and  circumstances  which have  been

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disclosed before us, we set aside the impugned Order dated 18.09.2014.  It is  

not in consonance with the previous order of a co-ordinate Bench and in fact  

severely nullifies its salient directions.  We set aside the impugned Order dated  

2nd August, 2014 inter alia for the reason that it incorrectly shifts the burden on  

the Mother to show her suitability for temporary custody of the infant  Thalbir  

and,  therefore,  runs  counter  to  the  provisions  contained in  Section  6  of  the  

HMG Act.   We clarify that nothing presented by the Father, or placed on the  

record discloses that  the Mother is so unfit  to care for  the infant Thalbir  as  

justifies the departure from the statutory postulation in Section 6 of the HMG  

Act.  Visitation rights  succinctly  stated  are  distinct  from custody  or  interim  

custody orders.  Essentially they enable the parent who does not have interim  

custody to be able to meet the child without removing him/her from the custody  

of the other parent.  If a child is allowed to spend several hours, or even days  

away from the parent who has been granted custody by the Court, temporary  

custody of the child stands temporarily transferred.    

19 We also have taken due note of the Reports filed by the Social Worker  

and  have  heard  the  Counsel  for  the  parties  in  this  regard.   We  record  our  

appreciation for the diligence with which she has performed her duties.  In the  

event  that  her  fees/  expenses  have  not  been  defrayed  by  the  Father,  the  

remainder shall be paid by the Maharashtra State Legal Services Authority.

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20 We transfer  the temporary custody of  Thalbir  to the Appellant/Mother  

with the direction that both of them  shall reside in the address given by her, viz,  

House No.80, Magnolia, Ground Floor, Bin Waddo, Betalbatim, Goa and will  

not leave that territorial jurisdiction of the Trial Court without prior leave.  We  

further direct that the Respondent/Father shall  have visitation rights between  

2.30 p.m. and 6.00 p.m. on every Tuesday and Thursday, and from 2.30 p.m. to  

9.00 p.m. on Saturdays.  These Orders are purely temporary in nature.  The  

Civil  Judge  should  decide  the  Petition/application  pending  before  him  with  

expedition,  as  directed by the High Court,  without  being influenced by any  

observations made by us hereinabove.  

21 After carefully reading the Reports of the Social Worker, Mrs. Deepali  

Ajay Satpute, we find it necessary to direct Mr. Arun Sharma, Father to neither  

directly  nor  indirectly  through  any  member  of  his  family  or  his  friends,  to  

communicate in any manner or to meet the Social Worker, Mrs. Deepali Ajay  

Satpute.   This  is  in  deference  to  the  apprehensions  that  she  has  felt  and  

expressed to the Court as a consequence of conversations of the Respondent and  

his Mother with her pertaining to her as well as the safety of her own son.  In  

the event of the Social Worker seeking Police Protection to her and family, the  

Station House Officer of the concerned Police Station shall immediately provide  

the same and we direct so.   

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22  The Appeals  are  allowed  in  these  terms.  The  parties  shall  bear  their  

respective costs.

………………………J [VIKRAMAJIT SEN]

………………………J [C. NAGAPPAN]

New Delhi; February 17, 2015.

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21   After the pronouncement of this Judgment it has been  

pointed out to us that the passports of both the parties have been  deposited in this Court.  The Thalbir's passport is with the Trial  Court in Goa.   These  will  not  be released to any of the parties  without the explicit leave of the Court.  It also transpires that  House No.80, Magnolia, Ground Floor, Bin Waddo, Betalbatim, Goa has  been sold by the Father-Respondent.  The Petitioner- Mother will,  therefore,  stay  in  Goa,  as  already  indicated,  until  explicitly  permitted by the Competent Court. The  said  address  will  be  mentioned to the Civil Court.