Page 1

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREMECOURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 2133-2134 OF 2004

Rohitash Kumar & Ors. … Appellants

Versus

Om Prakash Sharma & Ors. … Respondents

J U D G M E N T

Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.:

1. These  appeals  have  been  preferred  against  the  impugned  

judgment  and order  dated 22.7.2001,  passed  by the High Court  of  

Jammu  &  Kashmir  at  Jammu  in  SWP  No.  1393  of  1999,  and  

judgment and order dated 1.8.2002 passed in LPA No. 275 of 2002.  

2. The facts  and circumstances  giving rise  to  these  appeals  are  

mentioned as under :

A. The  appellants  and  contestant  respondents  are  Assistant  

Commandants in the Border Security Force (hereinafter referred to as,

Page 2

`BSF’).   The  appellants  and  respondent  nos.  4  and  5  are  direct  

recruits, while respondent no.1 has been promoted against the quota of  

10 per cent posts, that are  reserved for Ministerial Cadre posts.   

B. The Union of India – respondent no.2, issued a seniority list  

dated 18.7.1995, placing respondent no. 1 at Serial No. 1863, below  

all the officers of Batch No.17 and thereafter, a final seniority list of  

Assistant Commandants was published on 5.7.1996.   

C. Respondent no.1 challenged   the said seniority list in which he  

was ranked below the officers of Batch No. 17, by filing Writ Petition  

No. 1393 of 1999, on the ground that with effect from 15.3.1993, he  

stood  promoted  as  Assistant  Commandant,  and  that  he  had  also  

completed all requisite training for the same at the B.S.F. Academy,  

Tekanpur,  which  had  commenced  on  1.2.1993.  There  was  another  

batch that undertook training on 2.7.1993.  However, the said officers  

of the second batch, who had joined such training on 2.7.1993, could  

not be ranked higher than him, in the seniority list.   

D. The said writ petition filed by respondent no.1, was contested  

by the Union of  India.   The learned single  judge allowed the writ  

petition vide impugned judgment and order dated 27.7.2001, wherein  

it  was  held  that  respondent  no.1/petitioner  therein,  was,  in  fact,  

2

Page 3

entitled to be ranked in seniority above the officers of Batch No.17,  

and below the officers of Batch No.16.  

E. The Union of India challenged the aforementioned impugned  

judgment and order dated 27.7.2001, by filing a Letters Patent Appeal  

which  was  dismissed  vide  impugned  judgment  and  order  dated  

1.8.2002.   

F. The  appellants,  though  had  not  been  impleaded  as  parties  

before  the  High  Court,  sought  permission  to  file  special  leave  

petitions with respect to the said matter, and the same was granted by  

this Court.  Hence, these appeals.   

3.  Shri R. Venkataramani, learned senior counsel  appearing on  

behalf of the appellants, has submitted that officers that are selected in  

response to a single  advertisement,  and through the same selection  

process,  if  have  been  given  training  in  two  separate  batches,  for  

administrative  reasons  i.e.  police  verification,  medical  examination  

etc., cannot be accorded different seniority by bifurcating them into  

two or more separate batches.  The High Court therefore, committed  

an error by allowing the claim of respondent no.1, which opposed the  

seniority of the officers, for the reason that, if  Batch Nos. 16 and 17  

are taken together, the officers who, in terms of seniority, were placed  

3

Page 4

at Serial No.5, would be moved to Serial No. 60,  if treated separately.  

For instance, the person placed at Serial No. 8 had moved to Serial  

No. 62, and the one placed at Serial No. 11 had moved to Serial No.  

64. Thus, such an act has materially adversely affected the seniority of  

officers even though they were duly selected in the same batch.  The  

provisions  of  Rule  3  of  the  Border  Security  Force  (Seniority,  

Promotion and Superannuation of Officers) Rules, 1978 (hereinafter  

referred to as the, `Rules 1978’), have been wrongly interpreted.  The  

Statutory authorities have previously, always fixed seniority without  

taking  note  of  the  fact  that  training  of  officers  was  conducted  in  

different batches. Thus, appeals deserve to be allowed.     

4. Per contra,  Shri  P.P.  Malhotra,  learned ASG and Dr.  Rajeev  

Dhavan,  learned  senior  counsel  appearing on  behalf  of  respondent  

nos. 4 and 5, have vehemently opposed the appeals, contending that  

the said Rule is not ambiguous in any manner and thus, the same must  

be given a literal  interpretation and that  if,  as  a result  of  this,  any  

hardship is caused to anyone, the same cannot be a valid ground for  

interpreting the statutory rule in a different manner. The said rules are  

not under challenge. The rule of  contemporanea expositio does not  

apply in contravention of statutory provisions.  The proviso to Rule 3  

4

Page 5

provides for the bifurcation of officers of the same batch in the event  

of a contingency which is exactly what has taken place in the instant  

case.  The High Court has only applied the said provisions.  Thus, no  

interference  is  called  for  and  the  present  appeals  are  liable  to  be  

rejected.    

5. We have considered the rival submissions made by the learned  

counsel for the parties and perused the record.  

6.   The relevant Rule 3 of the Rules, 1978, reads as under:  

“(3) Subject to the provisions of Sub-Rule (2) inter - se  

seniority amongst officers holding the same rank shall be  

as follows namely:  

(i) Seniority of Officers promoted on the same day shall  

be determined in the order in which they are selected for  

promotion to that rank.  

(ii)  Seniority  of  direct  entrants  shall  be  determined  in  

accordance with the aggregate marks obtained by them  

before  the  Selection  Board  and  at  the  passing  out  

examination  conducted  at  the  Border  Security  Force  

Academy.  

(iii)  Seniority  of  temporary  officers  subject  to  the  

provisions of clauses (i) and (ii) shall be determined on  

the  basis  of  the  order  of  merit  at  the  time  of  their  

5

Page 6

selection and officers selected on an earlier batch will be  

senior to officers selected in subsequent batches.  

(iv)  Seniority  of  officers  subject  to  the  provisions  of  

clauses (i) (ii) and (iii) shall be determined according to  

the date of their continuous appointment in that rank.  

Provided  that  in  case  of  direct  entrants  the  date  of  

appointment  shall  be the  date of  commencement  of  

their  training  course at  the  Border  Security  Force  

Academy."                                       (Emphasis added)

Rule of Contemporanea Expositio:

7. This Court applied the rule of contemporanea expositio, as the  

Court  found  that  the  same  is  a  well  established  rule  of  the  

interpretation of a statute, with reference to the exposition that it has  

received from contemporary authorities. However, while doing so, the  

Court added words of caution to the effect that such a rule must give  

way,  where the language of  the statute  is  plain and unambiguous.,

This  Court  applied  the  said  rule  of  interpretation  by  holding  that  

contemporanea expositio as expounded by administrative authorities,  

is  a  very  useful  and  relevant  guide  to  the  interpretation  of  the  

expressions  used  in  a  statutory  instrument.  The  words  used  in  a  

statutory provision must be understood in the same way, in which they  

6

Page 7

are usually understood, in ordinary common parlance with respect to  

the  area in  which,  the  said  law is  in  force  or,  by  the people  who  

ordinarily  deal  with  them.  (Vide:  K.P.  Varghese  v.  Income-tax  

Officer,  Ernakulam & Anr.,  AIR 1981 SC 1922;  Indian Metals  

and Ferro  Alloys  Ltd.,  Cuttack  v.  Collector  of  Central  Excise,  

Bhubaneshwar,  AIR 1991 SC 1028; and  Y.P. Chawla & Ors.  v.  

M.P. Tiwari & Anr., AIR 1992 SC 1360).

8. In N. Suresh Nathan & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors., 1992  

Supp (1) SCC 584; and M.B. Joshi & Ors. v. Satish Kumar Pandey  

&  Ors.,  1993  Supp  (2)  SCC  419, this  Court  observed  that  such  

construction,  which  is   in  consonance  with  long-standing  practice  

prevailing in the concerned department in relation to which the law  

has been made, should be preferred.

9. In  Senior  Electric  Inspector  &  Ors.  v.  Laxminarayan  

Chopra & Anr., AIR 1962 SC 159; and M/s. J.K. Cotton Spinning  

& Weaving Mills Ltd. & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1988  

SC 191, it was held that while a maxim was applicable with respect to  

construing an ancient statute, the same could not be used to interpret  

Acts which are comparatively modern, and in relation to such Acts,  

7

Page 8

interpretation should be given to the words used therein, in the context  

of new facts and the present situation, if the said words are in fact,  

capable of comprehending them.  

10. In  Desh  Bandhu  Gupta  and  Co.  &  Ors.  v.  Delhi  Stock  

Exchange Association Ltd., AIR 1979 SC 1049, this Court observed  

that  the  principle  of  contemporenea  expositio,  i.e.  interpreting  a  

document with reference to the exposition that it has received from  

the Competent Authority, can be invoked though the same will not  

always  be  decisive  with  respect  to  questions  of  construction.  

Administrative construction,  i.e.,  contemporaneous construction that  

is  provided  by  administrative  or  executive  officers  who  are  

responsible for the execution of the Act/Rules etc., should generally  

be  clearly  erroneous,  before  the  same  is  over-turned.  Such  a  

construction, commonly referred to as practical construction although  

not  controlling,  is  nevertheless  entitled  to  be  given  considerable  

weightage  and  is  also,  highly  persuasive.  It  may  however,  be  

disregarded for certain cogent reasons.  In a clear case of error,  the  

Court should, without hesitation, refuse to follow such a construction  

for the reason that, “wrong practice does not make the law.” (Vide :  

8

Page 9

Municipal Corporation for City of Pune & Anr. v. Bharat Forge  

Co. Ltd. & Ors., AIR 1996 SC 2856). (See also: State of Rajasthan  

& Ors. v. Dev Ganga Enterprises,  (2010) 1 SCC 505; and  Shiba  

Shankar Mohapatra v.  State  of  Orissa  & Ors., (2010)  12 SCC  

471).  

In D. Stephen Joseph v. Union of India & Ors., (1997) 4 SCC  

753, the Court held that, “past practice should not be upset provided  

such practice conforms to the rules” but must be ignored if it is found  

to be de hors the rules.

11. However, in  Laxminarayan R. Bhattad & Ors.  v. State of  

Maharashtra & Anr., AIR 2003 SC 3502, this Court held that, “the  

manner in which a statutory authority understands the application of a  

statute, would not confer any legal right upon a party unless the same  

finds favour with the Court of law, dealing with the matter”.

12. This principle has also been applied in judicial decisions, as it  

has been held consistently, that long standing settled practice of the  

Competent  Authority  should  not  normally  be  disturbed,  unless  the  

same  is  found  to  be  manifestly  wrong,  ‘unfair’.  (Vide:  Thamma  

Venkata  Subbamma  (dead)  by  LR.  v.  Thamma  Rattamma  &  

9

Page 10

Ors.,  AIR  1987  SC  1775; Assistant  District  Registrar,  Co-

operative  Housing  Society  Ltd.  v.  Vikrambhai  Ratilal  Dalal  &  

Ors.,  1987  (Supp)  SCC  27; Ajitsinh  C.  Gaekwad  &  Ors.  v.  

Dileepsinh D. Gaekwad & Ors., 1987 (Supp) SCC 439; Collector of  

Central  Excise,  Madras  v.  M/s.  Standard Motor  Products  etc.,  

AIR 1989 SC 1298; Kattite Valappil Pathumma & Ors. v. Taluk  

Land Board & Ors., AIR 1997 SC 1115;  and Hemalatha Gargya v.  

Commissioner of Income-tax, A.P. & Anr., (2003) 9 SCC 510).

13. The  rules  of  administrative  interpretation/executive  

construction, may be applied, either where a representation is made by  

the maker of a legislation, at the time of the introduction of the Bill  

itself, or if construction thereupon, is provided for by the executive,  

upon  its  coming  into  force,  then  also,  the  same  carries  great  

weightage. (Vide :  Mahalakshmi Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. & Anr. v.  

Union of India & Ors., AIR 2009 SC 792).

14. In  view  of  the  above,  one  may  reach  the  conclusion  that  

administrative  interpretation  may  often  provide  the  guidelines  for  

interpreting a particular Rule or executive instruction, and the same  

10

Page 11

may be accepted unless, of course, it is found to be in violation of the  

Rule itself.

Interpretation of the proviso:

15. The normal function of a proviso is generally, to provide for an  

exception i.e. exception of something that is outside the ambit of the  

usual  intention  of  the  enactment,  or  to  qualify  something  enacted  

therein, which, but for the proviso would be within the purview of  

such enactment.   Thus,  its  purpose is  to  exclude  something which  

would otherwise fall squarely within the general language of the main  

enactment.  Usually, a proviso cannot be interpreted as a general rule  

that has been provided for.  Nor it can be interpreted in a manner that  

would nullify the enactment, or take away in entirety, a right that has  

been conferred by the statute.    In case, the language of the main  

enactment  is  clear  and  unambiguous,  a  proviso  can  have  no  

repercussion  on the  interpretation  of  the  main  enactment,  so  as  to  

exclude by implication, what clearly falls within its expressed terms.  

If,  upon plain  and fair  construction,  the  main  provision is  clear,  a  

proviso  cannot  expand  or  limit  its  ambit  and  scope.  (Vide:  CIT,  

Mysore etc. v. Indo Mercantile Bank Ltd., AIR 1959 SC 713; Kush  

Sahgal & Ors. v. M.C. Mitter & Ors., AIR 2000 SC 1390; Haryana  

11

Page 12

State Cooperative Land Development Bank Ltd. v. Haryana State  

Cooperative Land Development Bank Employees Union & Anr.,  

(2004)  1  SCC 574;  Nagar  Palika  Nigam v.  Krishi  Upaj  Mandi  

Samiti & Ors., AIR 2009 SC 187; and State of Kerala & Anr. v B.  

Six Holiday Resorts  Private Limited & Ors., (2010) 5 SCC 186).

16. The proviso to a particular provision of a statute, only embraces  

the field which is covered by the main provision, by carving out an  

exception to the said main provision.  (Vide: Ram Narain Sons Ltd.  

& Ors. v. Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax & Ors., AIR 1955  

SC 765; and A.N. Sehgal & Ors. v. Rajeram Sheoram & Ors.,  AIR  

1991 SC 1406).   

17. In  a  normal  course,  proviso  can  be  extinguished  from  an  

exception  for  the  reason  that  exception  is  intended  to  restrain  the  

enacting clause to a particular class of cases while the proviso is used  

to remove special cases from the general enactment provided for them  

specially.   

12

Page 13

Hardship of an individual:

18. There  may  be  a  statutory  provision,  which  causes  great  

hardship  or  inconvenience  to  either  the  party  concerned,  or  to  an  

individual, but the Court has no choice but to enforce it in full rigor.

It is a well settled principle of interpretation that hardship or  

inconvenience caused, cannot be used as a basis to alter the meaning  

of the language employed by the legislature, if such meaning is clear  

upon a bare perusal of the Statute.  If the language is plain and hence  

allows only one meaning, the same has to be given effect to, even if it  

causes  hardship  or  possible  injustice.  (Vide:  Commissioner  of  

Agricultural  Income  Tax,  West  Bengal  v.  Keshab  Chandra  

Mandal, AIR 1950 SC 265; and  D. D. Joshi & Ors. v. Union of  

India & Ors., AIR 1983 SC 420).

19. In Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar & Ors., AIR  

1955 SC 661 it was observed by a Constitution Bench of this Court  

that, if there is any hardship, it is for the legislature to amend the law,  

and that the Court cannot be called upon, to discard the cardinal rule  

of interpretation for the purpose of mitigating such hardship. If the  

language of an Act is sufficiently clear, the Court has to give effect to  

13

Page 14

it, however, inequitable or unjust the result may be. The words, ‘dura  

lex sed lex’ which mean “the law is hard but it is the law.” may be  

used to sum up the situation. Therefore, even if a statutory provision  

causes hardship to some people, it is not for the Court to amend the  

law.  A legal  enactment  must  be  interpreted  in  its  plain and literal  

sense, as that is the first principle of interpretation.

20. In  Mysore  State  Electricity  Board  v.  Bangalore  Woolen,  

Cotton & Silk Mills Ltd. & Ors., AIR 1963 SC 1128 a Constitution  

Bench of this Court held that, “inconvenience is not” a decisive factor  

to be considered while interpreting a statute.  

21. In  Martin Burn Ltd. v. The Corporation of Calcutta, AIR  

1966 SC 529, this Court, while dealing with the same issue observed  

as under:–

“A result flowing from a statutory provision is   never an evil. A Court has no power to ignore   that  provision  to  relieve  what  it  considers  a   distress resulting from its operation. A statute   must  of  course  be  given  effect  to  whether  a   Court likes the result or not.”

(See  also:  The  Commissioner  of  Income  Tax,  West  Bengal  I,  

Calcutta v. M/s Vegetables Products Ltd.,  AIR 1973 SC 927; and  

14

Page 15

Tata Power Company Ltd. v. Reliance Energy Limited & Ors.,  

(2009) 16 SCC 659).

Therefore,  it  is  evident  that  the  hardship  caused  to  an  

individual,  cannot  be  a  ground  for  not  giving  effective  and  

grammatical meaning to every word of the provision, if the language  

used therein, is unequivocal.

Addition and Subtraction of words:

22. The Court has to keep in mind the fact that, while interpreting  

the provisions of  a  Statute,  it  can neither  add,  nor  subtract  even a  

single word. The legal maxim “A Verbis Legis Non Est Recedendum”  

means,  “From  the  words  of  law,  there  must  be  no  departure”.  A  

section is to be interpreted by reading all of its parts together, and it is  

not permissible, to omit any part thereof. The Court cannot proceed  

with the assumption that the legislature, while enacting the Statute has  

committed  a  mistake;  it  must  proceed  on  the  footing  that  the  

legislature intended what it has said; even if there is some defect in  

the phraseology used by it in framing the statute, and it is not open to  

the court  to  add and amend, or  by construction,  make up for  the  

deficiencies, which have been left in the Act. The Court can only iron  

15

Page 16

out  the creases  but  while  doing so,  it  must  not  alter  the fabric,  of  

which  an  Act  is  woven.  The  Court,  while  interpreting  statutory  

provisions,  cannot  add words to a Statute,  or  read words into it  

which are not part of it, especially when a literal reading of the same,  

produces an intelligible result. (Vide: Nalinakhya Bysack v. Shyam  

Sunder Haldar & Ors., AIR 1953 SC 148;  Sri Ram Ram Narain  

Medhi v. State of Bombay, AIR 1959 SC 459; M. Pentiah & Ors. v.  

Muddala  Veeramallappa  &  Ors., AIR  1961  SC  1107;   The  

Balasinor Nagrik Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. Babubhai Shankerlal  

Pandya  &  Ors., AIR  1987  SC  849;  and  Dadi  Jagannadham  v.  

Jammulu Ramulu & Ors., (2001) 7 SCC 71).

23. The Statute is not to be construed in light of certain notions that  

the  legislature  might  have  had  in  mind,  or  what  the  legislature  is  

expected to have said,  or  what the legislature might have done,  or  

what the duty of the legislature to have said or done was. The Courts  

have to administer the law as they find it, and it is not permissible for  

the Court to twist  the clear  language of  the enactment,  in order to  

avoid any real, or imaginary hardship which such literal interpretation  

may cause.  

16

Page 17

24. In view of the above, it becomes crystal clear that, under the  

garb of interpreting the provision, the Court does not have the power  

to  add or  subtract  even  a  single  word,  as  it  would  not  amount  to  

interpretation, but legislation.

25. The matter requires to be considered in the light of the aforesaid  

settled legal propositions.  

The Service Selection Board (CPOs) 91, selected 154 persons  

to be appointed as Assistant  Commandant (Direct  Entry),  and they  

were  then sent  for  training in  two separate  batches.   Batch  No.16  

consisted of 67 officers who joined the training on 1.2.1993, while  

Batch  No.17  consisted  of  87  officers  who  joined  the  training  on  

2.7.1993.   They could  not  be  sent  for  training in  one  batch,  even  

though  they  had  been  selected  through  the  same  competitive  

examination, due to administrative reasons i.e., character verification  

etc.   Respondent  no.1,  who was promoted from the feeding cadre,  

joined his post on 15.3.1993.  Thus, it is evident that he was placed in  

the promotional cadre, prior to the commencement of the training of  

Batch No.17 on 2.7.1993.

17

Page 18

26. The learned Single  Judge dealt  with  the  statutory  provisions  

contained in Rule 3 and held as under:

“A perusal of the above makes it apparent that in  the case of the officers who have been promoted  their seniority is to be determined on the basis of  continuous appointment on a day in which they are  selected for promoted to that rank. In case of direct  entrants their inter–se seniority is to be determined  on the basis of aggregate marks obtained by them.  Inter-se seniority of the officers mentioned at serial  No.(l) (ii) and (iii) is to be determined according to  the  date  of  their  continuous  appointment  in  the  rank. Proviso to the rule is clear. It is specifically  mentioned that in the case of direct  entrants,  the  date  of  appointment  shall  be  the  date  of  commencement  of  their  training  course  at  the  Border Security Force Academy.”

In  light  of  the  above,  relief  had  been granted  to  respondent  

no.1.  The Division Bench concurred with the said interpretation.

27. If  we  apply  the  settled  legal  propositions  referred  to  

hereinabove, no other interpretation is permissible.  The language of  

the said rule is crystal clear.  There is no ambiguity with respect to it.  

The  validity  of  the  rule  is  not  under  challenge.   In  such  a  fact-

situation,  it  is  not  permissible  for  the  court  to  interpret  the  rule  

otherwise.   The  said  proviso  will  have  application  only  in  a  case  

where  officers  who  have  been  selected  in  pursuance  of  the  same  

18

Page 19

selection process are split into separate batches.  Interpreting the rule  

otherwise, would amount to adding words to the proviso, which the  

law does not permit.   

28. If the contention of the appellants is accepted, it would amount  

to fixing their seniority from a date prior, to their birth in the cadre.  

Admittedly,  the appellants  (17th batch),  joined training on 2.7.1993  

and their claim is to fix their seniority from the Ist of February, 1993  

i.e. the date on which, the 16th batch joined training.  Such a course is  

not permissible in law.  

The  facts  and  circumstances  of  the  case  neither  require  any  

interpretation, nor reading down of the rule.

29. Shri  R.  Venkataramani,  learned  Senior  counsel  for  the  

appellants, has placed very heavy reliance upon the judgment of the  

Delhi High Court (Dinesh Kumar v. UOI & Ors.) dated 14.2.2011  

wherein, certain relief was granted to the petitioner therein, in view of  

the fact that there was some delay in joining training, in relation to  

passing the fitness test set by the Review Medical Board.  The court  

granted  relief,  in  light  of  the  facts  and circumstances  of  the  case,  

without  interpreting  Rule  3  of  the  Rules  1978.   Thus,  the  said  

19

Page 20

judgment, in fact, does not lay down any law.  The case at hand is  

easily  distinguishable  from  the  above,  as  that  was  a  case  where  

seniority and promotion had been granted on a notional basis,  with  

retrospective effect and it was held that the person to whom the same  

had been granted, was entitled to all consequential benefits.

30. Thus,  in  view  of  the  above,  the  appeals  lack  merit  and  

therefore, are accordingly dismissed.  

    ………………………………..……………………..J.

 (Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN)

    ……………………………….……………………..J.                      (FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA)

New Delhi,  November 6, 2012  

20