ROBIN THAPA Vs ROHIT DORA
Bench: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K.M. JOSEPH
Judgment by: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K.M. JOSEPH
Case number: C.A. No.-004507-004507 / 2019
Diary number: 38044 / 2017
Advocates: RAM NARESH YADAV Vs
1
Non-Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.4507 OF 2019
(@ S.L.P.(C) No.35428 of 2017)
ROBIN THAPA … APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
ROHIT DORA … RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
K.M. JOSEPH, J.
1. The appeal by Special Leave is directed against the Order passed
by the High Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital allowing the Revision
Petition filed by the respondent under Section 115 of The Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Code’ for short) and
setting aside the Order passed by the Trial Court under Order 9 Rule
13 of the Code by which the ex parte decree obtained by the
respondent in this appeal, has been set aside.
2. The respondent, who is hereafter referred to as the plaintiff, filed
the Suit O.S. No. 490 of 2013 seeking specific relief and mandatory
injunction. By Judgment dated 09.10.2014, Civil Judge Senior Division,
Dehradun decreed the Suit.
2
3. The petitioner, who is defendant in the Suit, filed an application
dated 02.12.2015 supported by an application for condonation of delay.
The respondent filed the objections, and as noticed, overruling the
objections of the respondents, the Trial Court allowed the application
filed by the petitioner under Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code, which has
been set aside by the High Court.
4. The learned Counsel for the petitioner would submit that the
original summons was served on 17.12.2013 on the mother of the
petitioner. The Trial Court itself issued further summons on 23.04.2014.
On 02.07.2014, the petitioner filed an application. Thereafter, the Suit
came to be transferred to another Court, and thereafter, without any
notice to the petitioner, the Suit came to be decreed.
5. Counsel for the appellant would submit that the property is the
residential property. It is much more valuable than the amount shown
in the agreement. The transaction was essentially a loan transaction
and opportunity must be given to contest the matter on merits.
6. Per contra, the learned Counsel for the decree holder would
submit that ample opportunity was given to the appellant, and in spite
of the same, he has not contested the matter. Appellant has another
residential building. The building in question was let out on rent.
7. Most importantly, the learned Counsel submits that after levying
execution of the decree, the property has been conveyed to the
respondent by the orders of the Court. In other words, sale deed has
3
already been executed in her favour. It is respondent’s case that
appellant was served notice by the executing court. There is no scope
for interfering with the matter by this Court.
8. Ordinarily, a litigation is based on adjudication on the merits of
the contentions of the parties. Litigation should not be terminated by
default, either of the plaintiff or the defendant. The cause of justice does
require that as far as possible, adjudication be done on merits.
9. The disputed agreement is dated 18.04.2012. Summons was
issued and it was received but according to the appellant, by his
mother. The Trial Court has apparently accepted the case of the
appellant that the mother did not bring the receipt of the summons to
the notice of the appellant and that it was sometime in June, 2014 that
the appellant can be credited with knowledge of the Suit. The Order
dated 02.07.2014 reads as follows:
“On behalf of the plaintiff ex-parte evidence
by way of affidavit (20A2) is filed.
The ex-parte proceeding against the
defendant is allowed.
The application is submitted to engage an
advocate by the defendant. However, the suit is
declared ex-parte evidence, therefore, the same is
rejected. Now the matter is fixed for ex-parte
argument on dated 08.08.2014.”
10. Order further appears to reveal that the plaintiff was present in
person. The plaintiff has filed his proof affidavit. It was decided to
proceed against the appellant ex parte. There is, however, a reference
4
to the application to engage an advocate by the appellant. The case
stood posted for ex parte argument on 08.08.2014. As parties were not
present on the said day, the case was posted to 15.09.2014. However,
on 12.09.2014, the case stood transferred to another Court. No
intimation was given under Rule 89A to the appellant.
11. The further case of the appellant is that he came to know from the
plaintiff that the case was fixed for judgement on 17.11.2015. He has
alleged that he contacted his counsel but he did not get a satisfactory
reply. He also has a case that he appeared on 17.11.2015 in court, and
then, he only came to know that judgement was rendered on
09.10.2014. A new counsel was engaged on 26.11.2015. Thereafter, the
application was filed.
12. One fact stands out and that is, that the appellant came to be
served notice of the execution proceedings through said messenger
on 27.03.2015. Thus, the case of the appellant that appellant came to
know about the passing of the decree only on 17.11.2015, cannot be
acted upon. This is besides noticing that in execution of the decree,
the sale deed has been executed in favour of the respondent and it is
only thereafter that despite receipt of the notice dated 27.03.2015, the
appellant has set up the case that he came to know of the passing of the
decree only several months thereafter.
5
13. The matter arises from a suit for specific performance. It may be
true that there is a case for the respondent that the appellant has
actually let out the building on rent. The appellant’s case is that this is
the appellant’s residential house and the matter is a loan transaction.
Specific relief is undoubtedly a discretionary relief. Appellant has
submitted that the appellant is prepared to deposit the entire amount
spent by the respondent towards getting sale deed executed. We
would think that the interest of justice demands that subject to putting
the appellant on terms, an opportunity should be given to the appellant
to contest the case and the case must be directed to be disposed of
within the time limit. Accordingly, we allow the appeal and set aside
the impugned order subject to the following conditions:
(a) The appellant will deposit a sum of Rs.67,400/- (Rs.57,400/-
towards stamp duty paid by the respondent + Rs.10,000/-
towards registration expenses etc.) within a period of one
month from today in the Execution Court.
(b) The appellant will further deposit a sum of Rs.50,000/- as costs
to be paid to the respondents. This amount will also be
deposited in the Execution Court within a period of one month
from today.
Upon depositing the aforesaid amounts, it will be open to the
respondent to withdraw the same and the sale deed will stand
set aside. The respondent can also withdraw the amount of
6
Rs.92,000/- deposited by him towards balance sale
consideration. In case the amounts as aforesaid are not
deposited within the stipulated period, the appeal will stand
dismissed and the impugned order will stand confirmed.
(c) We further direct that if the appellant complies with the
conditions as aforesaid, the trial Court will take up the suit and
dispose of the same as expeditiously as possible but at any
rate within a period of six months from the date on which the
respondent brings the fulfilment of the aforesaid conditions to
the notice of the trial Court.
…….......................J.
(ASHOK BHUSHAN)
...........................J.
(K.M. JOSEPH)
New Delhi,
July 08, 2019.