REVANSIDDAYAYYA Vs GANGAMMA @ SHASHIKALA .
Bench: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE R.K. AGRAWAL, HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE
Judgment by: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE
Case number: C.A. No.-005039-005039 / 2009
Diary number: 33524 / 2006
Advocates: ANJANA CHANDRASHEKAR Vs
RAJESH MAHALE
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL No.5039 OF 2009
Revanasiddayya ….Appellant(s)
VERSUS
Gangamma @ Shashikala & Anr. …Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.
1. This appeal is filed by defendant No.1 against
the final judgment and order dated 25.10.2006
passed by the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore
in Regular First Appeal No.242 of 2004 whereby the
High Court allowed the first appeal filed by
respondent No.1(plaintiff) and modified the
judgment/decree of the Trial Court dated
09.02.2000 passed by the IIIrd Additional Civil
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Judge, Dharwad in O.S. No. 151 of 1993 and
accordingly passed a decree for possession of the
suit land against the appellant in relation to the suit
land.
2. In order to appreciate the issue involved in the
appeal, which lie in a narrow compass, few relevant
facts need mention herein below.
3. The appellant is defendant No.1 whereas
respondent No.1 is the plaintiff and respondent
No.2 is defendant No.2 in a suit out of which this
appeal arises. Plaintiff and defendant No.2 are the
legal representatives of Veerabasayya, who was the
original owner of the suit land.
4. The dispute in this appeal relates to the land
bearing R.S. No. 177/3A+3B admeasuring 7 acres
37 guntas, R.S. No.161/2A admeasuring 12 acres
36 guntas. Situated at Shirol Village, R.S. No.24/5,
admeasuring 5 acres 02 guntas situated at
Kallapur, R.S. No.35/1, admeasuring 1 acre 22
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guntas and R.S. No.35/2 admeasuring 3 acres 10
guntas situated at Budihal (hereinafter referred to
as "suit land”).
5. The respondents’ father - Veerabasayya was
the original owner of the suit land. He entered into
an agreement (Ex-P-1) on 06.11.1986 to sell the suit
land to the appellant for a total consideration of
Rs.1,75,000/-. In terms of the agreement, the
appellant paid a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- to
Veerbasayya towards earnest money and was,
accordingly, placed in possession of the suit land by
him. The sale deed of the suit land was to be
executed within 3 months. In the meantime,
Veerbasayya died on 06.08.1988. The respondents
being his legal representatives inherited the suit
land and became its owners.
6. On 14.09.1993, the respondents herein filed a
suit against the appellant(defendant No.1) being
O.S. No.151/1993 in the Court of IIIrd Additional
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Civil Judge, Dharwad for a declaration and
possession in relation to the suit land.
7. According to the respondents, they, being the
owner of the suit land by virtue of inheritance, are
entitled to claim possession of the suit land from
the appellant(defendant No.1). It was alleged that
the agreement dated 06.11.1986 executed between
the parties in relation to the suit land for its sale by
the respondents’ late father to the appellant expired
long back by efflux of time inasmuch as the
appellant too never took any steps to enforce the
agreement while it was enforceable in law and
continued to remain in possession of the suit land
and enjoyed its usufructs to the detriment of the
respondents’ interest in the suit land. It is
essentially on these averments, the respondents
claimed declaration of their title over the suit land
and possession from the appellant.
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8. The appellant contested the suit by filing the
written statement. According to the appellant
(defendant No.1), he was in lawful possession of the
suit land pursuant to the agreement dated
06.11.1986 and hence the respondents are not
entitled to claim a relief of declaration of their title
over the suit land or even possession of the suit
land from the appellant.
9. Parties adduced evidence. The Trial Court, by
judgment/decree 09.02.2000, dismissed the suit
insofar as the relief of possession was concerned
but decreed the suit by granting a declaratory
decree in respondents’ favour of their ownership
over the suit land. In other words, the Trial Court
held that the respondents are the owners of the suit
land but are not entitled to claim possession of the
suit land.
10. After the disposal of the respondents’ suit, the
appellant, in the year 2000, filed a suit against the
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respondents being O.S. No. 153/2000 seeking
specific performance of the agreement dated
06.11.1986(Ex-P-1) from the respondents in relation
to the suit land. The appellant's suit for specific
performance was dismissed in 2009 and the appeal
filed by the appellant against the dismissal of his
suit was also dismissed by the District & Sessions
Judge, Gagad in R.A. No.31 of 2009 on 16.04.2012.
Thereafter, it was not pursued by the appellant.
11. The respondents, felt aggrieved of the
judgment/decree of the Trial Court dated
09.02.2000, filed first appeal being RFA No.
242/2004 in the High Court of Karnataka. So far as
the appellant is concerned, he did not file any cross
appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as “the
Code”) nor filed any cross objection under Order 41
Rule 22 of the Code in respondents’ first appeal to
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challenge the finding of ownership of the
respondents, which was against the appellant.
12. Therefore, the only question, which arose
before the High Court, was as to whether the Trial
Court was justified in dismissing the suit insofar as
it relates to claim for possession of the suit land.
13. By Judgment/decree dated 25.10.2006, the
High Court allowed the respondents’ first appeal,
modified the judgment/decree of the Trial Court and
passed a decree for possession of the suit land
against the appellant in relation to the suit land. It
was held that the respondents are entitled to claim
possession of the suit land from the appellant. In
this way, the respondents’ entire suit stood decreed
by the High Court.
14. Felt aggrieved of the impugned
judgment/decree passed by the High Court, the
appellant(defendant No.1) has filed the present
appeal by way of special leave in this Court.
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15. Heard Mr. Trideep Pais, learned counsel for the
appellant and Mr. Ankolekar Gurudatta and Mr.
Shantha Kumar Mahale, learned counsel for the
respondents.
16. Having heard the learned counsel for the
parties and on perusal of the record of the case, we
are inclined to uphold the findings of the High Court
but, at the same time, modify the impugned
judgment and issue directions for ensuring its
compliance by the parties to this appeal as
indicated below.
17. In our considered opinion, one of the effects of
the dismissal of appellant's suit/appeal, which was
filed for specific performance of the agreement, was
that the appellant was not entitled to retain
possession of the suit land. In other words, the
possession of the appellant on the suit land, after
the dismissal of his suit for specific performance,
became unauthorized and illegal thereby entitling
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the respondents to claim back the same from the
appellant on the strength of their ownership.
18. The appellant was, however, entitled to defend
his possession over the suit land by taking recourse
to the provisions of Section 53-A of the Transfer of
Property Act, 1882 (hereinafter referred to as “T.P.
Act”) but once his suit for specific performance
stood dismissed, the protection available under
Section 53-A of the T.P. Act was no longer available
to him.
19. So far as the present appeal is concerned, it
does not arise out of the suit filed by the appellant
against the respondents but arises out of a suit filed
by the respondents against the appellant. We
cannot, therefore, examine the legality and
correctness of judgment/decree passed in
appellant's suit/appeal but can certainly examine
its effect while examining the legality and
correctness of the impugned judgment.
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20. In our considered opinion, the Trial Court as
also the High Court were justified in declaring the
respondents as owners of the suit land and were
also justified in passing a decree for possession
against the appellant.
21. It is for the reasons that firstly, the appellant
never disputed the respondents’ ownership over the
suit land and indeed rightly. Secondly, since the
respondents’ late father had placed the appellant in
possession of the suit land pursuant to part
performance of the agreement in question (EX-P-1),
the appellant could defend his possession against
the true owner (respondents) on the strength of
such agreement subject to his proving the
requirements of Section 53-A of the T.P. Act.
22. Since the appellant's suit/appeal for specific
performance was dismissed, his possession over the
suit land became unauthorized. It is for these two
reasons, the High Court was justified in passing a
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decree for possession against the appellant in
relation to the suit land. We, therefore, find no
justification to set aside the findings of the High
Court. It is in conformity with the legal principles
applicable to the fact of this case.
23. This leaves us to examine only one question,
which, in our opinion, arises in the case but does
not appear to have been dealt with in two suits filed
by the parties against each other. In the interest of
justice, we consider it necessary to deal with the
question with a view to give quietus to the litigation
which is pending between the parties for the last 3
decades.
24. As mentioned above, it is not in dispute that
the appellant had paid a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- to
the respondents’ late father by way of earnest
money for purchasing the suit land. It is also not in
dispute that the respondents’ late father had placed
the appellant in possession of the suit land in 1986.
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It is also not in dispute that since then the
appellant continued to remain in possession of the
suit land though, in the meantime, suffered
impugned decree for dis-possession.
25. In our opinion, in the light of such factual
undisputed scenario emerging in the case, the
appellant is held entitled to claim refund of earnest
money of Rs.1,00,000/- from the respondents. One
cannot dispute the legal position that once the
bargain to sale/purchase of any land fails, the
unsuccessful buyer becomes entitled in law to claim
refund of earnest money from the seller under
Section 22 of the Indian Specific relief Act.
Similarly, the appellant is also, in turn, liable to
restore the possession of the suit land pursuant to
the impugned judgment/decree suffered by him and
which we have upheld.
26. It is for these reasons and with a view to do
complete justice between the parties, we invoke our
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power under Article 142 of the Constitution and,
accordingly, direct the respondents to refund a sum
of Rs.1,00,000/- to the appellant within 3 months
from today. Failure to refund Rs.1,00,000/- to the
appellant within 3 months will carry interest at the
rate of 6% p.a. on the said sum till payment.
27. We further direct the appellant to restore back
the vacant possession of the suit land to the
respondents in terms of the impugned
judgment/decree within 3 months from the date of
this judgment.
28. With these directions, the appeal stands finally
disposed of.
………...................................J. [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]
…...……..................................J. [NAVIN SINHA]
New Delhi; December 05, 2017
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