REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

SUO MOTU WRIT PETITION (CRL.) NO. 122 OF 2011

IN RE: RAMLILA MAIDAN INCIDENT DT.4/5.06.2011

v.

HOME SECRETARY, UNION OF INDIA & ORS.

J  U D G M E N T

Swatanter Kumar, J.

1. At the very outset, I would prefer to examine the principles of  

law that can render assistance in weighing the merit or otherwise of  

the  contentious  disputations  asserted  before  the  Court  by  the  

parties in the present suo moto petition.  Besides restating the law  

governing Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(b) of the Constitution of India  

and the parallel restrictions contemplated under Articles 19(2) and  

19(3)  respectively,  I  would  also  gauge  the  dimensions  of  legal  

provisions  in  relation  to  the  exercise  of  jurisdiction  by  the

empowered officer in passing an order under Section 144 of  the  

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short ‘Cr.P.C.’).

2. It appears justified here to mention the First Amendment to  

the United States (US) Constitution, a bellwether in the pursuit of  

expanding the horizon of civil liberties.  This Amendment provides  

for the freedom of speech of press in the American Bill of Rights.  

This Amendment added new dimensions to this right to freedom  

and purportedly, without any limitations.  The expressions used in  

wording the Amendment have a wide magnitude and are capable of  

liberal construction.  It reads as under :

“Congress  shall  make  no  law  respecting  an  establishment  of  religion,  or  prohibiting  the  free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom  of speech, or of the press; or the right of the  people peaceably to assemble, and to petition  the Government for a redress of grievances.”

3. The effect of use of these expressions, in particular, was that  

the freedom of speech of press was considered absolute and free  

from any restrictions whatsoever.  Shortly thereafter, as a result of  

widening of  the  power of  judicial  review, the  US Supreme Court  

preferred to test each case on the touchstone of the rule of ‘clear-

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and-present-danger’.  However, application of this rule was unable  

to withstand the pace of development of law and, therefore, through  

its  judicial  pronouncements,  the  US Supreme  Court  applied  the  

doctrine of ‘balancing of interests’.  The cases relating to speech did  

not simply involve the rights of the offending speaker but typically  

they  presented  a  clash  of  several  rights  or  a  conflict  between  

individual  rights  and  necessary  functions  of  the  Government.  

Justice  Frankfurter  often applied the above-mentioned Balancing  

Formula and concluded that “while the court has emphasized the  

importance of ‘free speech’, it has recognized that free speech is not  

in itself a touchstone.  The Constitution is not unmindful of other  

important interests, such as public order, if free expression of ideas  

is not found to be the overbalancing considerations.”   

4. The ‘balancing of interests’ approach is basically derived from  

Roscoe Pound’s theories of social engineering.  Pound had insisted  

that his structure of public, social and individual interests are all,  

in fact, individual interests looked at from different points of view  

for the purpose of clarity.  Therefore, in order to make the system  

work properly, it is essential that when interests are balanced, all  

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claims  must  be  translated  into  the  same  level  and  carefully  

labelled.   Thus,  a  social  interest  may  not  be  balanced  against  

individual interest, but only against another social  interest.  The  

author  points  out  that  throughout  the  heyday  of  the  clear-and-

present-danger  and preferred position  doctrines,  the  language  of  

balancing, weighing or accommodating interests was employed as  

an integral part of the libertarian position.  [Freedom of Speech: The  

Supreme Court and Judicial Review, by Martin Shapiro, 1966]

5. Even  in  the  United  States  there  is  a  recurring  debate  in  

modern  First  Amendment  Jurisprudence  as  to  whether  First  

Amendment rights are ‘absolute’ in the sense that the Government  

may  not  abridge  them  at  all  or  whether  the  First  Amendment  

requires the ‘balancing of competing interests’ in the sense that free  

speech values and the Government’s competing justification must  

be  isolated  and  weighted  in  each  case.   Although  the  First  

Amendment to the American Constitution provides that Congress  

shall  make  no  law  abridging  the  freedom  of  speech,  press  or  

assembly,  it  has  long  been  established  that  those  freedoms  

themselves  are  dependent  upon  the  power  of  the  constitutional  

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Government to survive.  If it is to survive, it must have power to  

protect  itself  against  unlawful  conduct  and  under  some  

circumstances  against  incitements  to  commit  unlawful  acts.  

Freedom of speech, thus, does not comprehend the right to speak  

on any subject at any time.  In the case of Schenck v. United States  

[63 L ed 1173], the Court held :

“The character of every act depends upon the  circumstances in which it is done.  The most  stringent protection of free speech would not  protect  a  man  in  falsely  shouting  fire  in  a  theatre and causing a panic.  It does not even  protect  a  man  from  an  injunction  against  uttering  words  that  have  all  the  effect  of  force….the question in every case is whether  the  words  used  are  used  in  such  circumstances and are of such a nature as to  create  a  clear  and  present  danger  that  they  will  bring  about  the  substantive  evils  that  Congress has a right to prevent.”

[Constitution of India, (2nd Edn.), Volume 1 by Dr. L.M. Singhvi]

6. In contradistinction to the above approach of the US Supreme  

Court,  the Indian Constitution spells  out  the right to freedom of  

speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a).  It also provides the  

right to assemble peacefully and without arms to every citizen of  

the country under Article 19(1)(b).  However, these rights are not  

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free from any restrictions and are not absolute in their terms and  

application.   Articles  19(2)  and  19(3),  respectively,  control  the  

freedoms available to a citizen.  Article 19(2) empowers the State to  

impose reasonable restrictions on exercise of the right to freedom of  

speech and expression in the interest of the factors stated in the  

said clause.  Similarly, Article 19(3) enables the State to make any  

law imposing reasonable  restrictions on the exercise  of  the  right  

conferred, again in the interest of the factors stated therein.   

7. In face of this constitutional mandate, the American doctrine  

adumbrated  in  Schenck’s case  (supra)  cannot  be  imported  and  

applied.  Under our Constitution, this right is not an absolute right  

but is subject to the above-noticed restrictions.  Thus, the position  

under our Constitution is different.   

8. In ‘Constitutional Law of India’ by H.M. Seervai (Fourth Edn.),  

Vol.1,  the  author  has  noticed  that  the  provisions  of  the  two  

Constitutions  as  to  freedom  of  speech  and  expression  are  

essentially  different.   The  difference  being  accentuated  by  the  

provisions of the Indian Constitution for preventive detention which  

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have no counterpart in the US Constitution.  Reasonable restriction  

contemplated under the Indian Constitution brings the matter in  

the  domain  of  the  court  as  the  question  of  reasonableness  is  a  

question primarily for the Court to decide.  {Babulal Parate v. State  

of Maharashtra [(1961) 3 SCR 423]}.

9. The  fundamental  right  enshrined  in  the  Constitution  itself  

being made subject to reasonable restrictions, the laws so enacted  

to specify certain restrictions on the right to freedom of speech and  

expression  have  to  be  construed  meaningfully  and  with  the  

constitutional object in mind.  For instance, the right to freedom of  

speech and expression is not violated by a law which requires that  

name of the printer and publisher and the place of printing and  

publication should be printed legibly on every book or paper.   

10. Thus, there is a marked distinction in the language of law, its  

possible  interpretation and application under the Indian and the  

US laws.  It is significant to note that the freedom of speech is the  

bulwark of democratic Government. This freedom is essential  for  

proper  functioning  of  the  democratic  process.  The  freedom  of  

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speech and expression is regarded as the first condition of liberty. It  

occupies  a  preferred position in the  hierarchy of  liberties,  giving  

succour and protection to all other liberties. It has been truly said  

that it is the mother of all other liberties. Freedom of speech plays a  

crucial role in the formation of public opinion on social,  political  

and economic matters.  It has been described as a “basic human  

right”, “a natural right” and the like.  With the development of law  

in India, the right to freedom of speech and expression has taken  

within its ambit the right to receive information as well as the right  

of press.

11. In order to effectively consider the rival contentions raised and  

in the backdrop of the factual matrix, it will be of some concern for  

this Court to examine the constitutional scheme and the historical  

background of the relevant Articles relating to the right to freedom  

of speech and expression in India. The framers of our Constitution,  

in unambiguous terms, granted the right to freedom of speech and  

expression and the right to assemble peaceably and without arms.  

This gave to the citizens of this country a very valuable right, which  

is  the  essence  of  any  democratic  system.   There  could  be  no  8

expression without these rights. Liberty of thought enables liberty  

of  expression.  Belief  occupies  a  place  higher  than  thought  and  

expression.  Belief  of  people  rests  on  liberty  of  thought  and  

expression.  Placed as the three angles of a triangle, thought and  

expression  would  occupy  the  two  corner  angles  on  the  baseline  

while  belief  would  have  to  be  placed  at  the  upper  angle.  

Attainment of the preambled liberties is eternally connected to the  

liberty of expression.  (Ref. Preamble, The Spirit and Backbone of the   

Constitution  of  India,  by  Justice  R.C.  Lahoti).  These  valuable  

fundamental rights are subject to restrictions contemplated under  

Articles 19(2) and 19(3), respectively.  Article 19(1) was subjected to  

just  one  amendment,  by the  Constitution (44th Amendment)  Act,  

1979,  vide  which  Article  19(1)(f) was  repealed.    Since  the  

Parliament  felt  the  need  of  amending  Article  19(2)  of  the  

Constitution,  it  was  substituted  by  the  Constitution  (First  

Amendment) Act, 1951 with retrospective effect.   Article 19(2) was  

subjected  to  another  amendment  and  vide  the  Constitution  

(Sixteenth Amendment) Act, 1963, the expression “sovereignty and  

integrity  of  India”  was  added.   The  pre-amendment  Article  had  

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empowered the State to make laws imposing reasonable restrictions  

in  exercise  of  the  rights  conferred  under  Article  19(1)(a)  in  the  

interest of the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign  

states, public order, decency or morality or in relation to contempt  

of court, defamation or incitement of an offence.   To introduce a  

more definite dimension with regard to the sovereignty and integrity  

of  India,  this  Amendment  was  made.    It  provided  the  right  

spectrum in relation to which the State could enact a law to place  

reasonable restrictions upon the freedom of speech and expression.

12. This shows that the State has a duty to protect itself against  

certain  unlawful  actions  and,  therefore,  may  enact  laws  which  

would ensure such protection.   The right that springs from Article  

19(1)(a)  is  not  absolute  and  unchecked.    There  cannot  be  any  

liberty absolute in nature and uncontrolled in operation so as to  

confer a right wholly free from any restraint.   Had there been no  

restraint, the rights and freedoms may become synonymous with  

anarchy and disorder.  {Ref.: State of West Bengal Vs. Subodh Gopal   

Bose [AIR 1954 SC 92]}.

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13. I consider it appropriate to examine the term ‘liberty’, which is  

subject  to  reasonable  restrictions,  with  reference  to  the  other  

constitutional  rights.  Article  21  is  the  foundation  of  the  

constitutional scheme.   It grants to every person the right to life  

and personal liberty.   This Article prescribes a negative mandate  

that no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except  

according  to  the  procedure  established  by  law.   The  procedure  

established by law for deprivation of rights conferred by this Article  

must be fair, just and reasonable.   The rules of justice and fair  

play require that State action should neither be unjust nor unfair,  

lest it attracts the vice of unreasonableness, thereby vitiating the  

law which prescribed that procedure and, consequently, the action  

taken thereunder.

14. Any action taken by a public authority which is entrusted with  

the statutory power has, therefore, to be tested by the application of  

two standards - first, the action must be within the scope of the  

authority conferred by law and, second, it must be reasonable.   If  

any action, within the scope of the authority conferred by law is  

found to be unreasonable, it means that the procedure established  11

under  which  that  action  is  taken  is  itself  unreasonable.  The  

concept  of  ‘procedure  established  by  law’  changed  its  character  

after the judgment of this Court in the case of  Maneka Gandhi  v.  

UOI [AIR 1978 SC 597], where this Court took the view as under :

“The  principle  of  reasonableness,  which  legally  as  well  as  philosophically  is  an  essential  element  of  equality  or  non  arbitrariness  pervades  Article  14  like  a  brooding  omnipresence  and  the  procedure  contemplated by Article 21 must answer the  test of reasonableness in order to be right and  just  and  fair  and  not  arbitrary  fanciful  or  oppressive otherwise it would be no procedure  at all and the requirement of Article 21 would  not be satisfied.”

This  was  also  noted  in  the  case  of  Madhav  Hayawadanrao  

Hoskot v.  State of Maharashtra (1978) 3 SCC 544 where this Court  

took the following view:

“Procedure  established  by  law  are  words  of  deep  meaning  for  all  lovers  of  liberty  and  judicial sentinels.”   

15. What emerges from the above principles, which has also been  

followed in a catena of judgments of this Court, is that the law itself  

has to be reasonable and furthermore, the action under that law  12

has  to  be  in  accordance  with  the  law  so  established.   Non-

observance of either of this can vitiate the action, but if the former  

is invalid, the latter cannot withstand.

16. Article  13  is  a  protective  provision  and  an  index  of  the  

importance  and  preference  that  the  framers  of  the  Constitution  

gave to Part III.   In terms of Article 13(1), the laws in force before  

the  commencement  of  the  Constitution,  in  so  far  as  they  were  

inconsistent with the provisions of that Part were, to the extent of  

such inconsistency, void.    It also fettered the right of the State in  

making laws.   The State is not to make any law which takes away  

or abridges the rights conferred by this Part and if such law is made  

then to the extent of conflict, it would be void.   In other words,  

except for the limitations stated in the Articles contained in Part III  

itself  and  Article  13(4)  of  the  Constitution,  this  Article  is  the  

reservoir  of  the  fundamental  protections  available  to  any  

person/citizen.   

17. While these are the guaranteed fundamental rights, Article 38,  

under the Directive Principles of State Policy contained in Part IV of  

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the Constitution, places a constitutional obligation upon the State  

to  strive  to  promote  the  welfare  of  the  people  by  securing  and  

protecting, as effectively as it may, a social order in which justice -  

social, economic and political - shall inform all the institutions of  

the national life.  Article 37 makes the Directive Principles of State  

Policy fundamental in governance of the country and provides that  

it shall be the duty of the State to apply these principles in making  

laws.    

18. With  the  development  of  law,  even  certain  matters  covered  

under this Part relating to Directive Principles have been uplifted to  

the  status  of  fundamental  rights,  for  instance,  the  right  to  

education.  Though this right forms part of the Directive Principles  

of State Policy, compulsory and primary education has been treated  

as a part of Article 21 of the Constitution of India by the courts,  

which consequently led to the enactment of the Right of Children to  

Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2010.   

19. Article 51A deals with the fundamental duties of the citizens.  

It,  inter alia, postulates that it shall be the duty of every citizen of  

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India to abide by the Constitution,  to promote harmony and the  

spirit of common brotherhood, to safeguard public property and to  

abjure violence.  

20. Thus, a common thread runs through Parts III, IV and IVA of  

the Constitution of India.  One Part enumerates the fundamental  

rights,  the  second  declares  the  fundamental  principles  of  

governance and the third lays down the fundamental duties of the  

citizens.   While interpreting any of these provisions, it shall always  

be  advisable  to  examine  the  scope  and  impact  of  such  

interpretation on all the three constitutional aspects emerging from  

these parts.  It is necessary to be clear about the meaning of the  

word “fundamental” as used in the expression “fundamental in the  

governance of the State” to describe the directive principles which  

have  not  legally  been  made  enforceable.   Thus,  the  word  

“fundamental”  has  been used  in two different  senses  under  our  

Constitution.   The essential character of the fundamental rights is  

secured by limiting the legislative power and by providing that any  

transgression  of  the  limitation  would  render  the  offending  law  

pretendo  void.   The word “fundamental” in Article 37 also means  15

basic or essential, but it is used in the normative sense of setting,  

before the State, goals which it should try to achieve. As already  

noticed, the significance of the fundamental principles stated in the  

directive  principles  has  attained  greater  significance  through  

judicial pronouncements.  

21. As difficult as it is to anticipate the right to any freedom or  

liberty without any reasonable restriction, equally difficult it is to  

imagine the existence of a right not coupled with a duty.  The duty  

may be a direct or indirect consequence of a fair assertion of the  

right.  Part III of the Constitution of India although confers rights,  

still duties and restrictions are inherent thereunder.  These rights  

are basic in nature and are recognized and guaranteed as natural  

rights, inherent in the status of a citizen of a free country, but are  

not absolute in nature and uncontrolled in operation.  Each one of  

these rights is to be controlled, curtailed and regulated, to a certain  

extent, by laws made by the Parliament or the State Legislature.  In  

spite  of  there  being  a  general  presumption  in  favour  of  the  

constitutionality of a legislation under challenge alleging violation of  

the right to freedom guaranteed by clause (1) of Article 19 of the  16

Constitution,  on a  prima facie case of  such violation being made  

out,  the  onus shifts upon the  State  to  show that  the  legislation  

comes within the permissible restrictions set out in clauses (2) to  

(6) of Article 19 and that the particular restriction is reasonable.  It  

is for the State to place on record appropriate material justifying  

the restriction and its reasonability.  Reasonability of restriction is a  

matter which squarely falls within the power of judicial review of  

the Courts.  Such limitations, therefore, indicate two purposes; one  

that  the  freedom  is  not  absolute  and  is  subject  to  regulatory  

measures  and  the  second  that  there  is  also  a  limitation  on  the  

power of the legislature to restrict these freedoms.  The legislature  

has to exercise these powers within the ambit of Article 19(2) of the  

Constitution.   

22. Further, there is a direct and not merely implied responsibility  

upon the  Government  to  function openly  and in public  interest.  

The Right to Information itself emerges from the right to freedom of  

speech and expression.   Unlike  an individual,  the  State  owns  a  

multi-dimensional  responsibility.   It  has to maintain and ensure  

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security of the State as well as the social and public order. It has to  

give utmost regard to the right to freedom of speech and expression  

which a citizen or a group of citizens may assert.  The State also  

has a duty to provide security and protection to the persons who  

wish to attend such assembly at the invitation of the person who is  

exercising his right to freedom of speech or otherwise.  In the case  

of  S. Rangarajan v.  Jagjivan Ram [(1989) 2 SCC 574], this Court  

noticed as under :

“45. The  problem  of  defining  the  area  of  freedom  of  expression  when  it  appears  to  conflict  with  the  various  social  interests  enumerated under Article 19(2) may briefly be  touched upon here. There does indeed have to  be  a  compromise  between  the  interest  of  freedom  of  expression  and  special  interests.  But  we  cannot  simply  balance  the  two  interests  as  if  they are  of  equal  weight.  Our  commitment  of  freedom  of  expression  demands that it cannot be suppressed unless  the situations created by allowing the freedom  are  pressing  and  the  community  interest  is  endangered.  The  anticipated  danger  should  not  be  remote,  conjectural  or  far-fetched.  It  should have proximate and direct nexus with  the  expression.  The  expression  of  thought  should be intrinsically dangerous to the public  interest. In other words, the expression should  be  inseparably  locked  up  with  the  action  

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contemplated like the equivalent of a “spark in  a power keg”.”

23. Where  the  Court  applies  the  test  of  ‘proximate  and  direct  

nexus with the expression’, the Court also has to keep in mind that  

the  restriction  should  be  founded  on  the  principle  of  least  

invasiveness i.e. the restriction should be imposed in a manner and  

to the extent which is unavoidable in a given situation.  The Court  

would also take into consideration whether the anticipated event  

would or would not be intrinsically dangerous to public interest.

24. Now, I would examine the various tests that have been applied  

over the period of time to examine the validity and/or reasonability  

of the restrictions imposed upon the rights.

Upon the Rights Enshrined in the Constitution

25. No person can be divested of his fundamental rights.  They are  

incapable of being taken away or abridged.  All that the State can  

do, by exercise of its legislative power, is to regulate these rights by  

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imposition of reasonable restrictions on them.   Upon an analysis of  

the law, the following tests emerge:-

a)  The  restriction  can  be  imposed  only  by  or  under  the  

authority  of  law.   It  cannot  be  imposed  by  exercise  of  

executive power without any law to back it up.

b) Each restriction must be reasonable.

c) A restriction must be related to the purpose mentioned in  

Article 19(2).

26. The  questions  before  the  Court,  thus,  are  whether  the  

restriction  imposed  was  reasonable  and  whether  the  purported  

purpose  of  the  same  squarely  fell  within  the  relevant  clauses  

discussed above. The legislative determination of what restriction to  

impose on a freedom is final and conclusive, as it is not open to  

judicial review.   The judgments of this Court have been consistent  

in taking the view that it is difficult to define or explain the word  

“reasonable” with any precision.   It will always be dependent on  

the facts of a given case with reference to the law which has been  

enacted to create a restriction on the right.   It is neither possible  20

nor advisable to state any abstract standard or general pattern of  

reasonableness as applicable uniformly to all cases.   This Court in  

the case of State of Madras v. V.G. Row  [AIR 1952 SC 196] held :-

“It is important in this context to bear in mind  that  the  test  of  reasonableness,  whereever  prescribed, should be applied to each individual  statute  impugned, and no abstract standard or  general  pattern  of  reasonableness,  can  be  laid  down as applicable to all cases.”  

27. For adjudging the reasonableness of a restriction, factors such  

as the duration and extent of the restrictions, the circumstances  

under which and the manner in which that imposition has been  

authorized,  the  nature  of  the  right  infringed,  the  underlining  

purpose of  the restrictions imposed, the extent and urgency of the  

evil  sought  to  be  remedied  thereby,  the  disproportion  of  the  

imposition, the prevailing conditions at the time, amongst others,  

enter into the judicial verdict.  [See: Chintamanrao & Anr. v. State of   

Madhya Pradesh (AIR 1951 SC 118)].

28. The courts must bear a clear distinction in mind with regard  

to ‘restriction’ and ‘prohibition’.  They are expressions which cannot  

21

be used inter-changeably as they have different connotations and  

consequences in law.  Wherever a ‘prohibition’ is imposed, besides  

satisfying  all  the  tests  of  a  reasonable  ‘restriction’,  it  must  also  

satisfy  the  requirement  that  any  lesser  alternative  would  be  

inadequate.   Furthermore, whether a restriction, in effect, amounts  

to a total prohibition or not, is a question of fact which has to be  

determined with regard to facts and circumstances of  each case.  

This Court in the case of  State of Gujarat v. Mirzapur Moti Kureshi   

Kassab Jamat and Others [(2005) 8 SCC 534] held as under:-

“75.  Three  propositions  are  well  settled:  (i)  'restriction' includes cases of 'prohibition'; (ii) the  standard for  judging  reasonability  of  restriction  or  restriction amounting to prohibition remains  the same, excepting that a total prohibition must  also  satisfy  the  test  that  a  lesser  alternative  would  be  inadequate;  and  (iii)  whether  a  restriction in effect amounts to a total prohibition  is  a  question  of  fact  which  shall  have  to  be  determined  with  regard  to  the  facts  and  circumstances  of  each  case,  the  ambit  of  the  right  and the  effect  of  the  restriction upon the  exercise of that right…..”

29. The obvious result of the above discussion is that a restriction  

imposed in any form has to be reasonable and to that extent, it  

22

must stand the scrutiny of judicial review.  It cannot be arbitrary or  

excessive.  It must possess a direct and proximate nexus with the  

object  sought  to  be  achieved.  Whenever  and  wherever  any  

restriction  is  imposed  upon  the  right  to  freedom of  speech  and  

expression, it must be within the framework of the prescribed law,  

as subscribed by Article 19(2) of the Constitution.

30. As  already  noticed,  rights,  restrictions  and  duties  co-exist.  

As, on the one hand, it is necessary to maintain and preserve the  

freedom of speech and expression in a democracy, there, on the  

other, it  is also necessary to place reins on this freedom for the  

maintenance of social order.   The term ‘social order’ has a very  

wide ambit.   It includes ‘law and order’, ‘public order’ as well as  

‘the security of the State’.    The security of the State is the core  

subject and public order as well as law and order follow the same.  

In the case of Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras [1950 SCR 594],  

this Court took the view that local breaches of public order were no  

grounds for  restricting the  freedom of  speech guaranteed  by the  

Constitution.    This  led  to  the  Constitutional  (First  Amendment)  

Act,  1951  and  consequently,  this  Court  in  the  case  of  Dr.  Ram  23

Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar  [AIR 1966 SC 740] stated that an  

activity  which  affects  ‘law  and  order’  may  not  necessarily  affect  

‘public order’ and an activity which might be prejudicial to ‘public  

order’ may not necessarily affect ‘security of the State’.  Absence of  

‘public order’ is an aggravated form of disturbance of public peace  

which  affects  the  general  current  of  public  life.   Any  act  which  

merely affects the security of others may not constitute a breach of  

‘public order’.

31. The expression ‘in the interest of’ has given a wide amplitude  

to the permissible law which can be enacted to impose reasonable  

restrictions  on  the  rights  guaranteed  by  Article  19(1)  of  the  

Constitution.

32. There  has  to  be  a  balance  and proportionality  between the  

right and restriction on the one hand, and the right and duty, on  

the other.   It will create an imbalance, if undue or disproportionate  

emphasis is placed upon the right of a citizen without considering  

the  significance  of  the  duty.    The  true  source  of  right  is  duty.  

When the courts are called upon to examine the reasonableness of  

24

a legislative restriction on exercise of a freedom, the fundamental  

duties enunciated under Article 51A are of relevant consideration.  

Article 51A requires an individual to abide by the law, to safeguard  

public  property  and  to  abjure  violence.  It  also  requires  the  

individual to uphold and protect the sovereignty, unity and integrity  

of the country.    All these duties are not insignificant.   Part IV of  

the  Constitution  relates  to  the  Directive  Principles  of  the  State  

Policy.   Article  38  was  introduced  in  the  Constitution  as  an  

obligation upon the State to maintain social order for promotion of  

welfare  of  the  people.  By  the  Constitution  (Forty-Second  

Amendment) Act, 1976, Article 51A was added to comprehensively  

state  the  fundamental  duties  of  the  citizens  to  compliment  the  

obligations of the State.  Thus, all these duties are of constitutional  

significance.   It is obvious that the Parliament realized the need for  

inserting  the  fundamental  duties  as  a  part  of  the  Indian  

Constitution and required every citizen of India to adhere to those  

duties.    Thus, it will be difficult for any Court to exclude from its  

consideration  any  of  the  above-mentioned  Articles  of  the  

Constitution  while  examining  the  validity  or  otherwise  of  any  

25

restriction relating to the right to freedom of speech and expression  

available to a citizen under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution.   The  

restriction  placed  on  a  fundamental  right  would  have  to  be  

examined with reference to the concept of fundamental duties and  

non-interference with liberty of others.  Therefore, a restriction on  

the right to assemble and raise protest has also to be examined on  

similar parameters and values.  In other words, when you assert  

your  right,  you  must  respect  the  freedom  of  others.   Besides  

imposition of a restriction by the State, the non-interference with  

liberties of others is an essential condition for assertion of the right  

to  freedom of  speech  and  expression.    In  the  case  of  Dr.  D.C.  

Saxena v. Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India [(1996) 5 SCC 216], this  

Court held:

“31.  If  maintenance  of  democracy  is  the  foundation  for  free  speech,  society  equally  is  entitled  to  regulate  freedom  of  speech  or  expression  by  democratic  action.  The  reason  is  obvious, viz., that society accepts free speech and  expression and also puts limits on the right of the  majority. Interest of the people involved in the acts  of  expression should be looked at not only from  the perspective of the speaker but also the place at  which he speaks, the scenario, the audience, the  

26

reaction  of  the  publication,  the  purpose  of  the  speech and the place and the forum in which the  citizen  exercises  his  freedom  of  speech  and  expression.  The  State  has  legitimate  interest,  therefore,  to  regulate  the freedom of  speech and  expression  which liberty  represents  the  limits  of  the duty of restraint on speech or expression not  to  utter  defamatory  or  libellous  speech  or  expression.  There  is  a  correlative  duty  not  to  interfere with the liberty of others. Each is entitled  to dignity of person and of reputation. Nobody has  a  right  to  denigrate  others'  right  to  person  or  reputation.  Therefore,  freedom  of  speech  and  expression  is  tolerated  so  long  as  it  is  not  malicious or libellous, so that all attempts to foster  and ensure orderly and peaceful public discussion  or public good should result from free speech in  the  market-place.  If  such  speech  or  expression  was  untrue  and so  reckless  as  to  its  truth,  the  speaker or the author does not get protection of  the constitutional right.”

33. Every  right  has  a  corresponding  duty.   Part  III  of  the  

Constitution  of  India  although  confers  rights  and  duties,  

restrictions are inherent thereunder.  Reasonable regulations have  

been  found  to  be  contained  in  the  provisions  of  Part  III  of  the  

Constitution of India, apart from clauses (2) to (4) and (6) of Article  

19 of the Constitution {See Union of India v. Naveen Jindal and Anr.  

[(2004) 2 SCC 510]}.  

27

34. As I have already discussed, the restriction must be provided  

by law in a manner somewhat distinct to the term ‘due process of  

law’ as contained in Article 21 of the Constitution.  If the orders  

passed by the Executive are backed by a valid and effective law, the  

restriction  imposed  thereby  is  likely  to  withstand  the  test  of  

reasonableness, which requires it to be free of arbitrariness, to have  

a direct nexus to the object and to be proportionate to the right  

restricted as well as the requirement of the society, for example, an  

order passed under Section 144 Cr.P.C.    This order is passed on  

the strength of a valid law enacted by the Parliament.  The order is  

passed by an executive authority declaring that at a given place or  

area, more than five persons cannot assemble and hold a public  

meeting.  There is a complete channel provided for examining the  

correctness  or otherwise  of  such an order  passed under  Section  

144 Cr.P.C.  and,  therefore,  it  has  been held  by  this  Court  in  a  

catena of decisions that such order falls within the framework of  

reasonable restriction.

35. The distinction between ‘public order’ and ‘law and order’ is a  

fine one, but nevertheless clear.  A restriction imposed with ‘law  28

and order’  in mind would be least intruding into the guaranteed  

freedom while  ‘public  order’  may  qualify  for  a  greater  degree  of  

restriction  since  public  order  is  a  matter  of  even  greater  social  

concern.  Out of all expressions used in this regard, as discussed in  

the  earlier  part  of  this  judgment,  ‘security  of  the  state’  is  the  

paramount  and  the  State  can  impose  restrictions  upon  the  

freedom, which may comparatively  be  more stringent than those  

imposed in relation to maintenance of ‘public order’ and ‘law and  

order’.   However  stringent  may  these  restrictions  be,  they  must  

stand the test of ‘reasonability’.  The State would have to satisfy the  

Court  that the  imposition of  such restrictions  is  not  only  in the  

interest of the security of the State but is also within the framework  

of Articles 19(2) and 19(3) of the Constitution.   

36. It is keeping this distinction in mind, the Legislature, under  

Section 144 Cr.P.C., has empowered the District Magistrate, Sub-

Divisional Magistrate or any other Executive Magistrate, specially  

empowered  in  this  behalf,  to  direct  any  person  to  abstain  from  

doing a certain act or to take action as directed, where sufficient  

ground  for  proceeding  under  this  Section  exists  and  immediate  29

prevention and/or speedy remedy is desirable.  By virtue of Section  

144A Cr.P.C., which itself was introduced by Act 25 of 2005, the  

District  Magistrate  has  been  empowered  to  pass  an  order  

prohibiting, in any area within the local limits of his jurisdiction,  

the carrying of arms in any procession or the organizing or holding  

of any mass drill or mass training with arms in any public place,  

where it is necessary for him to do so for the preservation of public  

peace, public safety or maintenance of the public order.  Section  

144 Cr.P.C, therefore, empowers an executive authority, backed by  

these  provisions,  to  impose  reasonable  restrictions  vis-à-vis the  

fundamental rights.  The provisions of Section 144 Cr.P.C. provide  

for  a  complete  mechanism  to  be  followed  by  the  Magistrate  

concerned and also specify the limitation of time till when such an  

order may remain in force.  It  also prescribes the circumstances  

that  are  required  to  be  taken  into  consideration  by  the  said  

authority while passing an order under Section 144 Cr.P.C.

37. In  Babu Lal  Parate  (supra)  where this Court was concerned  

with the contention raised on behalf of the union of workers that  

the order passed in anticipation by the Magistrate under Section  30

144 Cr.P.C.  was an encroachment  on their  rights under Articles  

19(1)(a) and 19(1)(b), it was held that the provisions of the Section,  

which commit the power in this regard to a Magistrate belonging to  

any  of  the  classes  referred  to  therein  cannot  be  regarded  as  

unreasonable.   While  examining  the  law  in  force  in  the  United  

States,  the  Court  further held  that  an anticipatory  action of  the  

kind permissible  under Section 144 Cr.P.C.  is  not  impermissible  

within the ambit of clauses (2) and (3) of Article 19.  Public order  

has to be maintained at all times, particularly prior to any event  

and,  therefore,  it  is  competent  for  the  legislature  to  pass  a  law  

permitting the appropriate authority to take anticipatory action or  

to place anticipatory restrictions upon particular kind of acts in an  

emergency for the purpose of maintaining public order.

38. In the case of Madhu Limaye  v.  Sub Divisional Magistrate and   

Ors. [AIR 1971 SC 2481], a Constitution Bench of this Court took  

the following view:

“24.  The  procedure  to  be  followed  is  next  stated. Under Sub-section (2) if time does not  permit or the order cannot be served, it can be  made  ex  parte.  Under  Sub-section  (3)  the  

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order  may  be  directed  to  a  particular  individual  or  to  the  public  generally  when  frequenting  or  visiting  a  particular  place.  Under  sub-section  (4)  the  Magistrate  may  either  suo  motu or  on  an  application  by  an  aggrieved  person,  rescind  or  alter  the  order  whether  his  own  or  by  a  Magistrate  subordinate  to  him  or  made  by  his  predecessor  in  Office.  Under  Sub-section  (5)  where  the  magistrate  is  moved  by  a  person  aggrieved he must hear him so that  he may  show  cause  against  the  order  and  if  the  Magistrate  rejects  wholly  or  in  part  the  application,  he  must  record  his  reasons  in  writing.  This  sub-section  is  mandatory.  An  order  by  the  Magistrate  does  not  remain  in  force  after  two  months  from  the  making  thereof  but  the  State  Government  may,  however, extend the period by a notification in  the  Gazette  but,  only  in  cases  of  danger  to  human life, health or safety or where there is a  likelihood of a riot or an affray. But the second  portion  of  the  sub-section  was  declared  violative of Article  19 in State of Bihar v. K.K.  Misra [1969] S.C.R. 337. It may be pointed out  here  that  disobedience  of  an  order  lawfully  promulgated is made an offence by Section 188  of the Indian Penal Code, if such disobedience  causes  obstruction,  annoyance  or  injury  to  persons  lawfully  employed.  It  is  punishable  with  simple  imprisonment  for  one  month  or  fine of Rs. 200 or both.

25. The gist of action under Section 144 is the  urgency  of  the  situation,  its  efficacy  in  the  likelihood  of  being  able  to  prevent  some  harmful  occurrences.  As it  is  possible  to act  

32

absolutely and even ex parte it is obvious that  the  emergency  must  be  sudden  and  the  consequences sufficiently grave. Without it the  exercise of power would have no justification.  It  is  not  an  ordinary  power  flowing  from  administration but a power used in a judicial  manner and which can stand further judicial  scrutiny  in  the  need  for  the  exercise  of  the  power, in its efficacy and in the extent of its  application.  There  is  no  general  proposition  that  an  order  under  Section  144,  Criminal  Procedure  Code  cannot  be  passed  without  taking evidence : see Mst. Jagrupa Kumari v.  Chotay  Narain  Singh  (1936)  37  Cri.L.J.  95  (Pat) which in our opinion is correct in laying  down  this  proposition.  These  fundamental  facts  emerge  from the  way the  occasions for  the  exercise  of  the  power  are  mentioned.  Disturbances  of  public  tranquility,  riots  and  affray lead to subversion of public order unless  they  are  prevented  in  time.  Nuisances  dangerous to human life, health or safety have  no doubt to be abated and prevented. We are,  however, not concerned with this part of  the  section and the validity of this part need not  be decided here. In so far as the other parts of  the section are concerned the key-note of the  power is to free society from menace of serious  disturbances of a grave character. The section  is  directed  against  those  who  attempt  to  prevent the exercise of legal rights by others or  imperil the public safety and health. If that be  so the matter must fall within the restrictions  which  the  Constitution  itself  visualises  as  permissible in the interest of public order, or  in the interest of the general public. We may  say,  however,  that  annoyance  must  assume  

33

sufficiently  grave  proportions  to  bring  the  matter within interests of public order.

26. The criticism, however, is that the section  suffers from over broadness and the words of  the  section  are  wide  enough  to  give  an  absolute power which may be exercised in an  unjustifiable case and then there would be no  remedy except to ask the Magistrate to cancel  the  order  which  he  may  not  do.  Revision  against  his  determination  to  the  High  Court  may  prove  illusory  because  before  the  High  Court can intervene the mischief will be done.  Therefore,  it  is  submitted  that  an  inquiry  should  precede  the  making  of  the  order.  In  other words, the burden should not be placed  upon the person affected to clear his position.  Further  the  order  may  be  so  general  as  to  affect not only a particular party but persons  who are innocent, as for example when there  is  an  order  banning  meetings,  processions,  playing of music etc.

27. The  effect  of  the  order  being  in  the  interest of public order and the interests of the  general public, occasions may arise when it is  not  possible  to  distinguish  between  those  whose conduct must be controlled and those  whose conduct is clear. As was pointed out in  Babulal  Parate  case  where  two  rival  trade  unions  clashed  and  it  was  difficult  to  say  whether  a  person  belonged  to  one  of  the  unions  or  to  the  general  public,  an  order  restricting the activities of the general public  in the particular area was justified.

34

tranquility’  and  ‘orderliness’  in  a  locality  or  a  local  area  and  

perhaps some other matters of public concern too.  ‘Public order’ is  

something distinct from order or orderliness in a local area.  Public  

order,  if  disturbed,  must  lead  to  public  disorder  whereas  every  

breach  of  peace  may not  always  lead  to  public  disorder.    This  

concept came to be illustratively explained in the judgment of this  

Court in the case of Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia (supra) wherein it was  

held that when two drunkards quarrel and fight, there is ‘disorder’  

but not ‘public disorder’.  They can be dealt with under the powers  

to maintain ‘law and order’ but cannot be detained on the ground  

that they were disturbing ‘public order’.  However, where the two  

persons fighting were of rival communities and one of them tried to  

raise communal passions, the problem is still one of ‘law and order’  

but  it  raises  the  apprehension  of  public  disorder.  The  main  

distinction is that where it affects the community or public at large,  

it will be an issue relatable to ‘public order’.  Section 144 Cr.P.C.  

empowers  passing  of  such  order  in  the  interest  of  public  order  

equitable to public safety and tranquility.  The provisions of Section  

144 Cr.P.C. empowering the authorities to pass orders to tend to or  

37

to prevent the disturbances of public tranquility is not  ultra vires  

the Constitution.  

41. In the case of State of Karnataka v. Dr. Praveen Bhai Thogadia,  

[(2004) 4 SCC 684], this Court, while observing that each person,  

whatever be  his  religion,  must get the  assurance from the State  

that  he  has  the  protection of  law freely  to  profess,  practice  and  

propagate  his  religion and the  freedom of  conscience,  held  more  

emphatically  that  the  courts  should  not  normally  interfere  with  

matters relating to law and order which is primarily the domain of  

the concerned administrative authorities.  They are by and large the  

best  to  assess  and  handle  the  situation  depending  upon  the  

peculiar needs and necessities within their special knowledge.   

42. The scope of Section 144 Cr.P.C. enumerates the principles  

and declares the situations where exercise of rights recognized by  

law, by one or few, may conflict with other rights of the public or  

tend  to  endanger  the  public  peace,  tranquility  and/or  harmony.  

The  orders  passed  under  Section  144  Cr.P.C.  are  attempted  to  

serve larger public interest and purpose.  As already noticed, under  

38

the  provisions  of  the  Cr.P.C.  complete  procedural  mechanism is  

provided  for  examining  the  need  and merits  of  an order  passed  

under Section 144 Cr.P.C.  If one reads the provisions of Section  

144  Cr.P.C.  along  with  other  constitutional  provisions  and  the  

judicial  pronouncements  of  this  Court,  it  can  undisputedly  be  

stated that Section 144 Cr.P.C. is a power to be exercised by the  

specified  authority  to  prevent  disturbance  of  public  order,  

tranquility  and  harmony  by  taking  immediate  steps  and  when  

desirable, to take such preventive measures. Further, when there  

exists  freedom  of  rights  which  are  subject  to  reasonable  

restrictions,  there  are  contemporaneous  duties  cast  upon  the  

citizens  too.   The  duty  to  maintain  law  and  order  lies  on  the  

concerned authority  and, thus,  there is  nothing unreasonable  in  

making it the initial judge of the emergency.  All  this is coupled  

with  a  fundamental  duty  upon  the  citizens  to  obey  such  lawful  

orders as well  as to extend their  full  cooperation in maintaining  

public order and tranquility.   

43. The concept of orderly conduct leads to a balance for assertion  

of a right to freedom.  In the case of Feiner v.  New York (1951) 340   39

U.S. 315, the Supreme Court of the United States of America dealt  

with the matter where a person had been convicted for an offence of  

disorderly  conduct  for  making  derogatory  remarks  concerning  

various  persons including  the  President,  political  dignitaries  and  

other local political officials during his speech, despite warning by  

the Police officers to stop the said speech.  The Court, noticing the  

condition of the crowd as well as the refusal by the petitioner to  

obey the Police requests, found that the conduct of the convict was  

in violation of  public  peace  and order and the authority did not  

exceed the bounds of proper state Police action, held as under:

“It is one thing to say that the Police cannot be  used as an instrument for the suppression of  unpopular  views,  and  another  to  say  that,  when as here the speaker passes the bounds  of  arguments  or  persuasion  and  undertakes  incitement  to  riot,  they  are  powerless  to  prevent a breach of the peace.  Nor in this case  can we condemn the considered judgment of  three  New York  courts  approving  the  means  which the Police, faced with a crisis, used in  the  exercise  of  their  power  and  duty  to  preserve peace and order.  The findings of the  state  courts  as  to  the  existing  situation  and  the imminence of greater disorder couples with  petitioner’s  deliberate  defiance  of  the  Police  officers convince us that we should not reverse  this conviction in the name of free speech.”

40

44. Another  important  precept  of  exercise  of  power  in  terms of  

Section 144 Cr.P.C.  is  that  the  right  to  hold  meetings  in public  

places is subject to control of the appropriate authority regarding  

the time and place of the meeting.  Orders, temporary in nature,  

can be passed to prohibit the meeting or to prevent an imminent  

breach  of  peace.   Such  orders  constitute  reasonable  restriction  

upon the freedom of speech and expression.  This view has been  

followed consistently by this Court.  To put it with greater clarity, it  

can  be  stated  that  the  content  is  not  the  only  concern  of  the  

controlling authority but the time and place of the meeting is also  

well within its jurisdiction.  If the authority anticipates an imminent  

threat to public order or public tranquility, it would be free to pass  

desirable  directions  within  the  parameters  of  reasonable  

restrictions on the freedom of an individual.  However, it must be  

borne  in  mind  that  the  provisions  of  Section  144  Cr.P.C.  are  

attracted only in emergent situations.  The emergent power is to be  

exercised  for  the  purposes  of  maintaining  public  order.   It  was  

stated by this Court in Romesh Thapar (supra) that the Constitution  

41

requires  a  line  to  be  drawn  in  the  field  of  public  order  and  

tranquility,  marking  off,  may  be  roughly,  the  boundary  between  

those serious and aggravated forms of public  disorder which are  

calculated to endanger the security of the State and the relatively  

minor breaches of peace of a purely local significance, treating for  

this purpose differences in degree as if they were different in kind.  

The  significance  of  factors  such  as  security  of  State  and  

maintenance of public order is demonstrated by the mere fact that  

the framers of the Constitution provided these as distinct topics of  

legislation in Entry III of the Concurrent List of Seventh Schedule to  

the Constitution.   

45. Moreover, an order under Section 144 Cr.P.C. being an order  

which has a direct consequence of placing a restriction on the right  

to  freedom  of  speech  and  expression  and  right  to  assemble  

peaceably, should be an order in writing and based upon material  

facts of the case.  This would be the requirement of law for more  

than one reason.  Firstly, it is an order placing a restriction upon  

the fundamental rights of a citizen and, thus, may adversely affect  

the interests of the parties, and secondly, under the provisions of  42

the Cr.P.C., such an order is revisable  and is subject to judicial  

review.  Therefore, it will be appropriate that it must be an order in  

writing, referring to the facts and stating the reasons for imposition  

of  such  restriction.   In  the  case  of  Dr.  Praveen  Bhai  Thogadia  

(supra), this Court took the view that the Court, while dealing with  

such  orders,  does  not  act  like  an  appellate  authority  over  the  

decision of the official concerned.  It would interfere only where the  

order  is  patently  illegal  and without  jurisdiction  or  with ulterior  

motive and on extraneous consideration of political victimization by  

those in power.  Normally, interference should be the exception and  

not the rule.   

46. A bare reading of Section 144 Cr.P.C. shows that :

(1) It is an executive power vested in the officer so empowered;

(2) There must exist sufficient ground for proceeding;

(3) Immediate prevention or speedy remedy is desirable; and

(4) An order,  in writing,  should  be  passed  stating the  material  

facts and be served the same upon the concerned person.

43

47. These are the basic requirements for passing an order under  

Section  144  Cr.P.C.   Such  an  order  can  be  passed  against  an  

individual or persons residing in a particular place or area or even  

against the public in general.  Such an order can remain in force,  

not in excess of two months.  The Government has the power to  

revoke  such  an  order  and  wherever  any  person  moves  the  

Government for revoking such an order, the State Government is  

empowered to pass an appropriate order, after hearing the person  

in accordance with Sub-section (3) of Section 144 Cr.P.C.  Out of  

the  aforestated  requirements,  the  requirements  of  existence  of  

sufficient  ground  and  need  for  immediate  prevention  or  speedy  

remedy is of prime significance.  In this context, the perception of  

the officer recording the desired/contemplated satisfaction has to  

be reasonable, least invasive and bona fide.  The restraint has to be  

reasonable and further must be minimal.  Such restraint should  

not be allowed to exceed the constraints of the particular situation  

either in nature or in duration.  The most onerous duty that is cast  

upon the empowered officer by the legislature is that the perception  

of  threat to public  peace  and tranquility  should be real  and not  

44

quandary, imaginary or a mere likely possibility.  This Court in the  

case of Babulal Parate (supra) had clearly stated the following view :  

“the  language  of  Section  144  is  somewhat  different.  The test laid down in the Section is  not  merely  ‘likelihood’  or  ‘tendency’.   The  section  says  that  the  magistrate  must  be  satisfied  that  immediate  prevention  of  particular  acts  is  necessary  to  counteract  danger  to  public  safety  etc.  The  power  conferred by the section is exercisable not only  where present danger exists but is exercisable  also when there is an apprehension of danger.”  

48. The  above-stated  view  of  the  Constitution  Bench  is  the  

unaltered  state  of  law in our  country.   However,  it  needs  to  be  

specifically  mentioned that  the  ‘apprehension of  danger’  is  again  

what can inevitably be gathered only from the circumstances of a  

given case.

49. Once  an  order  under  Section  144  Cr.P.C.  is  passed,  it  is  

expected of all concerned to implement the said order unless it has  

been rescinded or modified by a forum of competent jurisdiction.  

Its enforcement has legal consequences. One of such consequences  

would  be  the  dispersement  of  an  unlawful  assembly  and,  if  

45

necessitated, by using permissible force. An assembly which might  

have lawfully assembled would be termed as an ‘unlawful assembly’  

upon the passing and implementation of such a preventive order.  

The empowered officer is also vested with adequate powers to direct  

the dispersement of such assembly.  In this direction, he may even  

take the assistance of concerned officers and armed forces for the  

purposes of dispersing such an assembly.  Furthermore, the said  

officer  has  even  been  vested  with  the  powers  of  arresting  and  

confining  the  persons  and,  if  necessary,  punishing  them  in  

accordance  with  law in  terms  of  Section  129  Cr.P.C.   An  order  

under Section 144 Cr.P.C. would have an application to an ‘actual’  

unlawful assembly as well as a ‘potential’ unlawful assembly.  This  

is precisely the scope of application and enforcement of an order  

passed under Section 144 Cr.P.C.

50. Having  noticed  the  legal  precepts  applicable  to  the  present  

case,  it  will  be  appropriate  to  notice,  at  this  stage,  the  factual  

matrix  advanced  by  each  of  the  parties  to  the  case  before  this  

Court.

46

Version put forward by learned   Amicus Curiae   

51. In 2008, Baba Ramdev was the first person to raise the issue  

of black money publically.   The black money outside the country  

was estimated at total of Rs.400 lakh crore or nearly nine trillion  

US Dollar. On 27th February, 2011, an Anti-Corruption Rally was  

held  at  Ramlila  Maidan,  New  Delhi  where  more  than  one  lakh  

persons are said to have participated.   The persons present at the  

rally  included  Baba  Ramdev,  Acharya  Balakrishna,  Ram  

Jethmalani, Anna Hazare and many others.   On 20th April, 2011,  

the President of Bharat Swabhiman Trust, Delhi Pardesh submitted  

an application to the MCD proposing to take Ramlila Maidan on  

rent, subject to the general terms and conditions, for holding a yoga  

training camp for 4 to 5 thousand people between 1st June, 2011 to  

20th June,  2011.   He  had  also  submitted  an  application  to  the  

Deputy  Commissioner  of  Police  (Central  District)  seeking  

permission for holding the Yoga Training Camp which permission  

was granted by the DCP (Central District) vide his letter dated 25 th  

April,  2011.   This  permission  was  subject  to  the  terms  and  

47

conditions stated therein.  Permission letter dated 25th April, 2011  

reads as under:-

“With  reference  to  your  letter  No.  Nil,  dated 20.04.2011, on the subject cited above,  I am directed to inform you that your request  for  permission  to  organize  Yoga  Training  Session at Ramlila Ground from 01.06.2011 to  20.06.2011 by Bharat Swabhiman Trust Delhi  Pradesh has been considered and permission  is  granted  for  the  same  subject  to  the  conditions  that  there  should  not  be  any  obstruction to  the  normal  flow of  traffic  and  permission  from  land  owing  agency  is  obtained.   Besides  this,  you  will  deploy  sufficient numbers of volunteers at the venue  of the function.  Further, you are requested to  comply with all the instructions given by Police  authorities  time  to  time  failing  which  this  permission can be revoked at any time.”

52. Continuing with his agitation for the return of black money to  

the country, Baba Ramdev wrote a letter to the Prime Minister on  

4th May, 2011 stating his intention to go on a fast to protest against  

the Government’s inaction in that regard.  The Government made  

attempts to negotiate with Baba Ramdev and to tackle the problem  

on  the  terms,  as  may  be  commonly  arrived  at  between  the  

Government and Baba Ramdev.   This process started with effect  

48

from 19th May, 2011 when the Prime Minister wrote a letter to Baba  

Ramdev asking him to renounce his fast.   The Finance Minister  

also  wrote  a  letter  to  Baba  Ramdev  informing  him  about  the  

progress in the matter.

53. On 23rd May, 2011, Baba Ramdev submitted an application for  

holding  a  dharna  at  Jantar  Mantar,  which  permission  was  also  

granted to him vide letter dated 24th May, 2011, which reads as  

follows:-

“With  reference  to  your  letter  dated  23.05.2011, on the subject mentioned above. I  have been directed to inform you that you are  permitted dharna/satyagrah at Jantar Mantar  on  04.06.2011  from 0800  hrs.  to  1800  hrs.  with a very limited gathering.”

54. In furtherance to the aforesaid permission, it was clarified vide  

letter  dated  26th May,  2011  informing  the  organisers  that  the  

number of persons accompanying Baba Ramdev should not exceed  

two hundred.

55. On 27th May, 2011, the DCP (Central District), on receiving the  

media  reports  about  Baba Ramdev’s  intention to  organize  a  fast  

49

unto death at the Yoga Training Camp, made further enquiries from  

Acharya  Virendra  Vikram  requiring  him  to  clarify  the  actual  

purpose for such huge gathering.  His response to this, vide letter  

dated 28th May, 2011, was that there would be no other programme  

at all, except residential yoga camp.  However, the Special Branch,  

Delhi  Police  also  issued  a  special  report  indicating  that  Baba  

Ramdev  intended  to  hold  indefinite  hunger  strike  along  with  

30,000-35,000  supporters  and  that  the  organizers  were  further  

claiming that the gathering would exceed one lakh.   

56. According to Dr. Dhavan, the learned  amicus curiae, there is  

still  another  angle  to  this  whole  episode.   When  Baba  Ramdev  

arrived at Delhi Airport on 1st June, 2011, four senior ministers of  

the UPA Government met him at the Airport and tried to persuade  

him not to pursue the said fast unto death since the Government  

had already taken initiative on the issue of corruption.   

57. In the meanwhile, large number of followers of Baba Ramdev  

had gathered at Ramlila Maidan by the afternoon of 4th June, 2011.  

In the evening of that very day, one of the Ministers who had met  

Baba Ramdev at the Airport, Mr. Kapil Sibal, made public a letter  50

from Baba Ramdev’s camp calling off their agitation.  This was not  

appreciated  by  Baba  Ramdev,  as,  according  to  him,  the  

Government had not stood by its commitments and, therefore, he  

hardened his position by declaring not to take back his satyagraha  

until a proper Government Ordinance was announced in place of  

forming  a  Committee.  The  ministers  talked  to  Baba  Ramdev  in  

great detail but of no avail.  It is stated that even the Prime Minister  

had gone the extra mile to urge Baba Ramdev not to go ahead with  

the  hunger  strike,  promising  him  to  find  a  “pragmatic  and  

practical”  solution  to  tackle  the  issue  of  corruption.   Various  

attempts were made at different levels of the Government to resolve  

this issue amicably.  Even a meeting of  the ministers with Baba  

Ramdev  was  held  at  Hotel  Claridges.   It  was  reported  by  the  

Press/Media  that  many  others  supported  the  stand  of  Baba  

Ramdev.  It was widely reported that Mr. Sibal had said: “we hope  

he  honours  his  commitment  and  honours  his  fast.   This  

Government has always reached out but can also rein in.”   The  

Press reported the statement of the Chief Minister, Delhi as stated  

by the officials including Police officers in the words: “action would  

51

be taken if Baba Ramdev’s Yoga Shivir turns into an agitation field  

and three-tier security arrangements have been made for the Shivir  

which  is  supported  to  turn  into  a  massive  satyagraha”.   Even  

Anna’s  campaign  endorsed  Baba  Ramdev’s  step.   In  this  

background,  on  4th June,  2011,  Baba  Ramdev’s  hunger  strike  

began with the  motto  of  ‘bhrashtachar  mitao satyagraha,  the  key  

demands being the same as were stated on 27th February, 2011.   

58. As  already  noticed,  Baba  Ramdev  had  been  granted  

permission to hold satyagraha at Jantar Mantar, of course, with a  

very limited number of persons.    Despite the assurance given by  

Acharya Virendra Vikram, as noted above, the event was converted  

into an  Anshan and the crowd at the Ramlila Maidan swelled to  

more than fifty thousand.  No yoga training was held for the entire  

day.  At about 1.00 p.m., Baba Ramdev decided to march to Jantar  

Mantar  for  holding  a  dharna along  with  the  entire  gathering.  

Keeping in view the fact that Jantar Mantar could not accommodate  

such  a  large  crowd,  the  permission  dated  24/26th May,  2011  

granted for holding the  dharna was withdrawn by the authorities.  

Certain negotiations took place between Baba Ramdev and some of  

52

the ministers on telephone, but, Baba Ramdev revived his earlier  

condition of time-bound action, an ordinance to bring black money  

back and the items missing on his initial list of demands.  At about  

11.15  p.m.,  it  is  stated  that  Centre’s  emissary  reached  Baba  

Ramdev at Ramlila Maidan with the letter assuring a law to declare  

black money hoarded abroad as a national asset. The messenger  

kept his mobile on so the Government negotiators could listen to  

Baba Ramdev and his aides. The conversation with Baba Ramdev  

convinced the Government that Baba Ramdev will not wind up his  

protest.  At about 11.30 p.m., a team of Police,  led by the Joint  

Commissioner of Police, met Baba Ramdev and informed him that  

the permission to hold the camp had been withdrawn and that he  

would be detained.  At about 12.30 a.m., a large number of CRPF,  

Delhi  Police  force  and  Rapid  Action  Force  personnel,  totaling  

approximately  to  5000  (as  stated  in  the  notes  of  the  Amicus.  

However,  from  the  record  it  appears  to  be  1200),  reached  the  

Ramlila  Maidan.   At  this  time,  the  protestors  were  peacefully  

sleeping.   Thereafter,  at  about 1.10 a.m.,  the  Police  reached the  

dais/platform to take Baba Ramdev out, which action was resisted  

53

by his supporters.   At 1.25 a.m., Baba Ramdev jumped into the  

crowd from the stage and disappeared amongst his supporters. He,  

thereafter,  climbed  on  the  shoulders  of  one  of  his  supporters,  

exhorting  women  to  form  a  barricade  around  him.   A  scuffle  

between the security forces and the supporters  of  Baba Ramdev  

took place and eight rounds of teargas shells were fired.  By 2.10  

a.m., almost all the supporters had been driven out of the Ramlila  

Maidan.   The  Police  sent  them  towards  the  New  Delhi  Railway  

Station.  Baba Ramdev, who had disappeared from the dais earlier,  

was apprehended by the Police near Ranjit Singh Flyover at about  

3.40 a.m.  At that time, he was dressed in  salwar-kameez with a  

dupatta over his beard.  He was taken to the Airport guest-house.  

It was planned by the Government to fly Baba Ramdev in a chopper  

from  Safdarjung  Airport.  However,  at  about  9.50  a.m.  the  

Government shelved this plan and put him in an Indian Air Force  

helicopter  and  flew  him  out  of  the  Indira  Gandhi  International  

Airport.

54

59. Learned amicus curiae has made two-fold submissions.  One  

on ‘facts and pleadings’ and the other on ‘law’.  I may now refer to  

some of the submissions made on facts and pleadings.

60. The  Ramlila  Maidan provided an accurate  barometer  of  the  

country’s political mood in 1960s and 1970s which can be gauged  

from an article dated 18th August, 2011 in the Times of India, which  

stated as under:

“It  was  in  Ramlila  Ground  that  Jai  Prakash  Narain  along  with  prominent  Opposition  leaders, addressed a mammoth rally on June  25, 1975, where he urged the armed forces to  revolt  against  Indira  Gandhi’s  government.  Quoting  Ramdhari  Singh  Dinkar,  JP  thundered,  “Singhasan  khali  karo,  ki  janta  aati hai (Vacate the throne, for the people are  here  to  claim  it)”.   That  very  midnight,  Emergency was declared in the country. Less than two years later, the ground was the  venue for another Opposition rally that many  political  commentators  describe  as  epoch- changing.   In  February  1977,  more  than  a  month  before  Emergency  was  lifted,  Opposition leaders led by Jagjivan Ram – his  first  public  appearance  after  quitting  the  Congress  –  Morarji  Desai,  Atal  Bihari  Vajpayee,  Charan Singh and Chandrashekar,  held a joint rally. That the Ramlila Ground provided an accurate  barometer  of  the  country’s  political  mood  in  the  1960s  and  70s  can be  gauged  from the  

55

fact  that  in  1972,  just   around  three  years  before the JP rally, Indira Gandhi addressed a  huge  rally  here  following  India’s  victory  over  Pakistan  in  the  Bangladesh  war.   In  1965,  again at a time when the country was at war  with  Pakistan,  it  was  from  here  that  then  Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri  gave the  slogan ‘Jai Jawan Jai Kisan’. According  to  Delhi  historian,  Ronald  Vivian  Smith, the Maidan was originally a pond which  was filled  up in the  early  1930s so that  the  annual Ramlila could be shifted here from the  flood  plains  behind  Red  Fort.   It  quickly  became a popular  site  for  political  meetings,  with Gandhiji, Nehru, Sardar Patel and other  top nationalist leaders addressing rallies here. According  to  one  account,  as  Jinnah  was  holding a Muslim League rally here in 1945,  he heard someone in the crowd address him  as  ‘Maulana’.   He  reacted  angrily  saying  he  was a political leader and that honorific should  never be used for him. In the 1980s and 90s, the Boat Club became  the preferred site for shows of strength.  But  after the Narasimha Rao government banned  all  meetings  there  during  the  tumultuous  Ayodhya  movement,  the  political  spotlight  returned  to  the  site  where  it  originally  belonged – the Ramlila Ground.”

61. Amongst other things, it is a place of protests.  In the Standing  

Order  309  issued  by  the  Police,  it  has  been  stated  that  “any  

gathering of over 50,000 should not be permitted at Ramlila Maidan  

but  should  be  offered  the  Burari  grounds  as  an  alternative.  If,  

56

however, the organizers select a park or an open area elsewhere in  

Delhi, the same can be examined on merits.”   

62. Pointing out certain ambiguities and contradictions in various  

affidavits filed on behalf of various officers of the Government and  

the Police, learned amicus curiae pointed out certain factors by way  

of conclusions:

“It may be concluded that  (i) the  ground  became  a  major  protest  

area  after  the  government  abolished  rallies at the Boat Club.

(ii) The  police’s  capacity  for  Ramlila  is  50,000  but  it  limited  Baba  Ramdev’s  meet to 5000.

(iii) The  ground  appears  to  be  accommodative  but  with  only  one  major exit and entrance.

(iv) There are aspects of the material that  show  considerable  mobilization.   But  the  figure  of  5000  inside  the  tent  is  exaggerated.

(v) The numbers of people in the tent has  varied  but  seems,  according  to  the  Police 20,000 or so at the time of the  incident.

But  the  Home  Secretary  suggests  60,000  which is an exaggeration. (vi) The  logs  etc  supplied  seem  a  little  

haphazard,  but  some  logs  reflect  contemporary  evidence  which  shows  things to the courts notice especially.

57

63. However,  it  may  be  noticed  by  this  Court  that  as  per  the  

version of the police, point no. (ii) ought to be read as under:

“The  capacity  for  Ramlila  Maidan  is  50,000  but it limited Baba Ramdev’s meet to 5000.”   

64. After noticing certain detailed facts in relation to the ‘threat  

perception of  Police’  and the ‘Trust’s  perception’,  learned  Amicus  

curiae has  framed certain  questions  and has  given record-based  

information as follows:

“(i) Crowd Peaceful and sleeping 6.1 The  crowd  entered  the  Ramlila  Ground  from one entrance without any hassle and co- operatively [see CD marked CD003163” of 23  minutes @ 17 minutes]   Police was screening  each  and  every  individual  entering  the  premises.  On 04th June 2011 many TV new  (sic)  channel  live  coverage  shows  about  two  kilometer long queue to enter the Maidan not  even a single was armed, lathi or baseball bats  etc. (pg.8 Vol.2) 6.2 The  crowd  is  already  slept  by  10.00- 10.30 pm shown in newspaper  photogrtaphs  of 05.06.2011 (see pg.9 Vol.1 and Annexure R- 9  Pg.  37-38,  Vol.2)   People  requesting  the  Police  with folded handed (Annexure  R-9 Pg.  39 Vol.2) also recorded in CCTV camera’s and  in  CD  004026  (marked  is  Item  19  pg.  39  Vol.10) (ii)  Did the Police enter abruptly to rescind  order and remove Baba Ramdev.

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6.3 The  CD  marked  CD  003163”  of  23  minutes  on Police  entry  and Baba Ramdev’s  reaction @ 10 minutes Baba requests that he  should  be  arrested  in  the  morning  with  a  warrant; (iii) Did  Baba  Ramdev  make  an  incitory  speech ? 6.4 In  general  Baba Ramdev’s  speech carry  aggressive issues but on 04.06.2011, • no provocation was made by Baba Ramdev  

in any manner • says he is read (sic – ready) to get arrested  

but his followers should not be harmed; • asks  his  women  supporters  to  form  a  

security ring around him. • also  request  participants  not  to  fight  with  

Police and be calm. • also requests  Police  not  to manhandle  his  

supports.  [CDs handed by Trust in Court,  the CD marked “CD003163” of 23 minutes  @ 10 minute.]

(iv) Was  the  lathi  charged  (sic-  charged)  ordered?  Were lathis used? 6.5 The  Police  itself  admits  use  of  water  cannon  and  tear  gas  but  denies  lathicharge  “No  lathi  charge  even  ordered  on  public,  no  organized lathi  charge  by  Policeman @ Vol.3  Pg.8  pr.  30  and  33  at  pg.8-9;  but  evidence  shows that lathi being used see Police beating  people  with  Lathi’s  (vol.2  photographs  at  pg.44-45) also in CD004026 marked item 19  pg. 39 Vol. 10 @ 47 minute shows lathicharge (v) Bricks 6.6 The  CD  marked  R4-TIMEWISE-‘B’  -  @1hr.11  min  Police  entering  from the  back  area and throwing bricks on the crowd inside  the pandal; (vi) Water cannon and Teargas

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6.7 Initially  Water  cannon  used  after  it  proved ineffective tear gas fired towards right  side of the stage resulting a small fire  Pr.33  pg. 9 Vol.III

(vii) Injuries 6.8 On injuries  the  figures are  not  clear as  per  Commissioner  of  Police,  Delhi  Affidavit  only  two persons  required hospitalization for  surgery. (Annexure S colly pg. 49-142 Vol.III) Injured Numbers Released  

on  first  day

Released  on  second  day

Treatment

Public  persons

48 41 05 Diagnosis/ First aid

Policemen 38

• Injury-sheets  pre-dominantly  indicate  injuries  received during the minor stampede in one part of  the enclosure

6.9 Newspaper the TOI gives the figure of 62  person  injured  and  29  of  the  injured  were  discharged  during  the  day  in  LNJP hospital.  What about those who were in other hospitals.  Even there are many who failed to get recorded  in the list of injured or to approach hospital for  the  medical  aid.   Only  62  injured  that  too  without lathi charge. 6.9 It will also be (sic) demonstrate that  (i)  The crowd does not appear to be armed  

in anway – not even with ‘baseball’ bats. (ii) The Police (sic - personnel) were throwing  

bricks. (iii) Baba Ramdev was abruptly woken up. (iv) The crowd was asleep. (v) The Police used lathis.

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(vi) The crowd also threw bricks. (vii) The  Police  used  tear  gas  around  that  time.

It is not clear what occurred first. (viii) Water  cannon  was  also  used  by  the  Police. VII. Speech. 7.1 From the Videos of Zee News and ANI, it  appears that Baba Ramdev (i) exhorted people not to fight with Police. (ii) arrest me in the morning with a warrant. (iii) requesting  first  the  women  then  young  boys  and  then  the  old  to  make  a  protective  Kavach around him.”

65. On these facts, it is the submission of learned  amicus curiae  

that neither the withdrawal of permissions for Ramlila Maidan and  

Jantar Mantar nor the imposition of restriction by passing an order  

under Section 144 Cr.P.C. was for valid and good cause/reason.  

On the contrary, it was for political and  mala fide reasons.  The  

purpose  was  to  somehow  not  permit  the  continuation  of  the  

peaceful agitation at any of these places and for that reason, there  

was undue force used by the Government.  The entire exercise was  

violative  of  the  rights  of  an  individual.  A  mere  change  in  the  

number of persons present and an apprehension of the Police could  

not be a reasonable ground for using teargas and lathi charge and  

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thereby unduly disturbing the people who were sleeping peacefully  

upto 1.00 a.m. on the night of 4/5th June, 2011 at Ramlila Maidan.  

Referring  to  the  affidavits  of  the  Home  Secretary,  the  Chief  

Secretary,  the  Police  officers  and  the  documents  on  record,  the  

contention is that in these affidavits, the deponents do not speak  

what is true.  The imposition of  restriction,  passing of  the order  

under  Section  144  and  the  force  and  brutality  with  which  the  

persons present at the Ramlila Maidan were dispersed is nothing  

but a show of power of the State as opposed to a citizen’s right.  

Even the test of ‘in terrorum’  requires to act in a manner and use  

such force which is least invasive and is in due regard to the right  

to  assemble  and  hold  peaceful  demonstration.   The  threat  

perception of the authorities is more of a created circumstance to  

achieve the ultimate goal of rendering the agitation and the anshan  

unsuccessful by colourable exercise of State power.  

66. It  is  also  the  contention  of  learned  amicus  that  there  are  

contradictions  in  the  affidavits  filed  by  the  Home  Secretary,  

respondent no.1 and the Commissioner of Police, respondent No. 3.  

The  affidavit  of  the  Chief  Secretary,  respondent  no.2,  cannot  be  

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relied upon as he pleads ignorance in relation to the entire episode  

at  the  Ramlila  Maidan.    According  to  the  Home  Secretary,  the  

Ministry of Home Affairs was routinely monitoring the situation and  

it is not the practice of the Ministry to confirm the grant of such  

permission.    He  also  states  that  60,000  persons  came  to  the  

ground  as  against  the  estimated  entry  of  4000  to  5000  people.  

While according to the affidavit of the Police Commissioner,  as a  

matter of practice, Delhi Police keeps the Ministry of Home Affairs  

duly  informed in such matters  as  the  said Ministry,  for  obvious  

reasons, is concerned about the preservation of law and order in  

the capital and carefully monitors all situations dealing with public  

order and tranquility.   From the affidavit of the Commissioner of  

Police, it is also clear that he was continuously in touch with the  

senior functionaries  of  the Ministry of  Home Affairs and he kept  

them  informed  of  the  decisions  taken  by  the  ACP  and  DCP  to  

revoke the permission and promulgate the prohibitory orders under  

Section 144 Cr.P.C.

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67. Besides these contradictions, another very material fact is that  

the  Home  Minister,  Shri  P.  Chidambaram  had  made  a  press  

statement on 8th June, 2011, relevant part of which reads :-

“A decision was taken that Shri Baba Ramdev  would not be allowed to organise any protest  or  undertake  any  fast–unto-death at  Ramlila  ground and that if he persisted in his efforts to  do so he would be directed to remove himself  from Delhi.”

68. Reference is also made to the statement of Minister of HRD  

Shri Kapil Sibal, who had stated that the Government can rein in if  

persuasion fails.

69. Further, the contention is that these averments/reports have  

not been denied specifically in any of the affidavits filed on behalf of  

the  Government  and  Delhi  Police.  The  above  statements  and  

contradictions  in  the  affidavits  filed  by  these  highly  placed  

Government officers should lead to a reasonable  conclusion that  

the  Police  had  only  carried  out  the  decision,  which was  already  

taken by the Government.   In these circumstances, even if there  

was no direct evidence, the Court can deduce, as a reasonable and  

inescapable inference from the facts proved, that exercise of power  

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was in bad faith.    Reliance is placed upon the case of  S. Pratap  

Singh v. The State of Punjab [(1964) 4 SCR 733].

70. The affidavits filed on behalf of the Police and the Ministry of  

Home Affairs are  at some variance.    The variance  is  not  of  the  

nature that could persuade this Court to hold that these affidavits  

are false or entirely incorrect.  This Court cannot lose sight of a very  

material fact that maintenance of law and order in a city like Delhi  

is  not  an  easy  task.   Some  important  and  significant  decisions  

which  may  invite  certain  criticism,  have  to  be  taken  by  the  

competent authorities for valid reasons and within the framework of  

law.   The satisfaction of the authority in such decisions may be  

subjective, but even this subjective satisfaction has to be arrived at  

objectively and by taking into consideration the relevant factors as  

are  contemplated  under  the  provisions  of  Section  144  Cr.P.C.  

Some  freedom  or  leverage  has  to  be  provided  to  the  authority  

making  such  decisions.    The  courts  are  normally  reluctant  to  

interfere  in  exercise  of  such  power  unless  the  decision  making  

process  is  ex  facie arbitrary  or  is  not  in  conformity  with  the  

parameters stated under Section 144 Cr.P.C. itself.

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71. From  the  record,  it  can  reasonably  be  inferred  that  the  

Ministry  of  Home  Affairs  and  Delhi  Police  were  working  in  co-

ordination  and  the  Police  was  keeping  the  Ministry  informed  of  

every development.   There is some element of nexus between the  

Government’s stand on the demands of Baba Ramdev, its decision  

in  that  regard  and  the  passing  of  an  order  under  Section  144,  

Cr.P.C.  but,  this by itself  would  not  render the  decision as that  

taken  in  bad  faith.    The  decision  of  the  Ministry  or  the  Police  

authorities may not be correct, but that  ipso facto  would not be a  

ground for  the  Court  to  believe  that  it  was a colourable  and/or  

mala fide exercise of power.

Version of Respondent No.4 :

72. Now, I may refer to the case put forward by respondent No.4,  

the President of Bharat Swabhiman Trust, Delhi Area who has filed  

affidavits on behalf of that party.  At the outset, it is stated in the  

affidavits filed that Baba Ramdev, the Trust and his followers are  

law abiding citizens of the country and never had any intention to  

disturb  the  law and order,  in  any manner  whatsoever.   Various  

camps and meetings have been held by the Trust in various parts  

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of  the  country  and  all  such  meetings  have  been  peaceful  and  

successful as well.  Baba Ramdev had been travelling the length  

and  breadth  of  the  country  explaining  the  magnitude  of  the  

problem  of  corruption  and  black  money  and  failure  of  the  

Government to take effective steps.  The anti-corruption movement  

had been at the forefront of the meetings held by Baba Ramdev at  

different places.  Baba Ramdev is stated to have participated in a  

meeting  against  corruption  at  Jantar  Mantar  on  14th November,  

2010 where  more  than 10,000 people  had participated.   Similar  

meetings were organized at Ramlila Maidan on 30th January, 2011  

and 27th February, 2011, which also included a march to Jantar  

Mantar.  None of these events were perceived by the Government as  

any threat to law and order and, in fact, they were peaceful and  

conveyed their theme of anti-corruption.  On 4th May, 2011, Baba  

Ramdev  had  written  a  letter  to  the  Prime  Minister  stating  his  

intention to go on fast to protest against the Government’s inaction  

against bringing back the black money.  This was responded to by  

the  Prime  Minister  on  19th May,  2011  assuring  him  that  the  

Government was determined to fight with the problem of corruption  

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and black money in the economy and illegal deposits in the foreign  

countries and asking him to drop the idea of  going on a hunger  

strike till death.  On 20th May, 2011, the Trust had written a letter  

to the Police seeking permission to hold a fast unto death at Jantar  

Mantar  protesting  against  the  Government’s  inaction  against  

corruption.  The Finance Minister had also written a letter to Baba  

Ramdev on 20th May, 2011 regarding the same issue.  The dates of  

applying for permission to hold Yoga camp and to hold  dharna at  

Jantar Mantar and dates of granting of such permissions are not in  

dispute.  The above-noticed dates of applying for permission and to  

hold dharna at Jantar Mantar and their consequential approval are  

not disputed by this respondent.  According to this respondent, the  

Police  had attempted to make  a huge  issue  that  the  permission  

granted to  the  Trust  was to  hold  a  yoga camp of  approximately  

5,000 persons and not a fast with thousands of persons attending.  

It is submitted by this respondent that Police was concerned with  

the maintenance of law and order, free flow of traffic, etc.  The use  

of land was the concern of the owner of the land, in the present  

case,  the  Municipal  Corporation of  Delhi  (MCD).   The Trust  had  

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applied  to  the  MCD  requesting  it  for  giving  on  rent/lease  the  

Ramlila Maidan for the period commencing from 1st June, 2011 to  

20th June,  2011.   Before  grant  of  its  permission,  the  MCD had  

written  to  the  Trust  that  they  should  obtain  NOC  from  the  

Commissioner of Police, Delhi which was duly applied for and, as  

already  noticed,  obtained  by  the  Trust.   Of  course,  it  was  a  

conditional  NOC  and  the  conditions  stated  therein  had  been  

adhered to, whereafter, the MCD had given the Ramlila maidan on  

lease to the Trust.  The permission was revoked by the Police and  

not by the MCD and the MCD never asked the Trust to vacate the  

premises, i.e., Ramlila Maidan.

73. Before  the  fateful  night  i.e.  4th/5th June,  2011,  it  has been  

stated that Baba Ramdev had reached New Delhi and was received  

at  the  Airport  by  the  Ministers.   There,  at  the  Airport  itself,  an  

attempt was made to persuade Baba Ramdev to call off his fast.  

Thereafter, a meeting was held at Hotel Claridges on 3rd June, 2011  

wherein  Baba  Ramdev  was  assured  that  the  Government  would  

take concrete steps to bring back the black money from abroad and  

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they would also issue an Ordinance, whereupon he should call off  

his fast.

74. On 4th June, 2011, from 5.00 a.m., the yoga camp was started  

at the Ramlila Maidan.  This was also telecasted live on Astha TV  

and other channels.  During the yoga camp, Baba Ramdev stated  

that he will request the Government to follow the path of Satya and  

Ahinsa aparigriha and  he  would  make  efforts  to  eradicate  

corruption  from  the  country.   He  also  informed  that  the  black  

money should be brought back and he would perform Tapas for the  

nation in that  Shivir.   Thousands of  people  had gathered at the  

venue.  The Police was present there all this time and the number  

of persons was already much in excess of 5,000.  It is emphasized,  

in the affidavit of this respondent, that as per the directions of the  

Police, only one entry and one exit gate were being kept open and  

this gate was manned by the Police personnel themselves, who were  

screening each and every person who entered the premises.  There  

was no disturbance or altercation, whatsoever, and the followers of  

Baba Ramdev were peacefully waiting in queues that stretched for  

over two kilo meters. If  the Police wanted to limit the number to  

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5,000, it  could  have  easily  stopped the  people  at the gate  itself.  

However, no such attempt was made.  

75. This  conduct  of  the  Police  goes  to  indicate  that  the  Police  

action resulted from instructions from the Government and their  

current stand regarding the number of persons present is nothing  

but  an afterthought.   This  respondent  further asserts that  there  

was no impediment to the free flow of traffic at any time on the day  

of the incident.   

76. In the afternoon of 4th June, 2011, when the preparations for  

starting the fast at Jantar Mantar began, senior officers of  Delhi  

Police requested the officials of the Trust not to proceed to Jantar  

Mantar.  In obedience of this order, the fast was begun at Ramlila  

Maidan  itself.   During  the  course  of  negotiations  with  the  

Government,  Baba  Ramdev  was  assured  that  their  demands  in  

relation to black money and corruption would be met.  This led to a  

festive  atmosphere  at  Ramlila  Maidan  at  around  7.00  p.m.  

However, later on, the Government representatives took the stand  

that no such assurances were given by them.   Consequently,  Baba  

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Ramdev issued a statement that he will  discuss the matter only  

with  the  Finance  Minister  or  any  other  responsible  person.   At  

around  10.00  p.m.,  Shanti  Paath was  performed  and  everybody  

went to sleep as Ashtang Yoga training was scheduled for 5.00 a.m.  

next morning.  At around 11.00 p.m., the Personal Assistant of Shri  

Sibal delivered a letter to Acharya Balkrishna as Baba Ramdev was  

asleep at that time, stating as follows :

“This  is  to  clarify  that  the  government  is  committed to build a legal structure through  which wealth generated illegally is declared as  a  national  asset  and  that  such  assets  nare  (sic) subject to confiscation.  Laws also provide  for  exemplary  punishment  for  those  who  perpetrate  ill-gotten  wealth.   This  clearly  declares the intention of the Government. You  have  already  publicly  stated  that  upon  receiving  this  letter,  you  will  end  your  tapa.  We  hope  that  you  will  honour  this  public  commitment forthwith.”

77. This  letter,  it  is  stated,  was  found  to  be  vague  and  non-

committal as it was not mentioned in this letter as to what concrete  

steps the Government would take to tackle this national economic  

and moral crises.   At nearly midnight, by way of an unprecedented  

action,  an order  under  Section 144 Cr.P.C.  along  with an order  

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cancelling the permission granted earlier by the Police, was issued,  

illegally, without any justification and without adequate warning.  It  

is specifically denied that this order was served on any officer of the  

Trust.  Around 12.30 a.m., more than 5000 Policemen (as stated in  

the notes of the Amicus.  However, from the record it appears to be  

1200  police  personnel)  had  surrounded  the  tent  while  everyone  

inside it was sleeping.    When asked by Baba Ramdev to furnish  

the  arrest  warrant,  the  Police  refused  to  do  so.   Baba  Ramdev  

requested all the sadhakas to maintain peace and ahinsa.   

78. This  respondent  also  alleges  that  the  Police  disabled  the  

public address  system.  Consequently,  Baba Ramdev got  off  the  

stage  and  exhorted  his  followers  to  maintain  peace  and  calm.  

There was an apprehension that the Police intended to kill  Baba  

Ramdev  and  therefore,  protective  cordons  were  formed  around  

Baba Ramdev.   In order to gain access to Baba Ramdev, Police  

launched brutal  attack on the  crowd,  including  women.   Use  of  

teargas shells was also resorted to, causing a part of the stage to  

catch fire which could potentially have caused serious casualties.  

Policemen were  also  engaged  in stone  pelting  and looting.   This  

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event  lasted  till  4.00  a.m.   As  a  result  several  people  including  

women received injuries.  Spinal cord of a woman named Rajbala  

was broken that left her paralyzed.  Respondent No.4 contends that  

the  media  footage  publically  available  substantiates  these  

contentions.

79. While leaving the Ramlila Maidan, the Police allegedly sealed  

access to the Help Camp at Bangla Saheb Gurudwara.  The press  

release and interview given by the Minister of Home Affairs on 8th  

June, 2011 stresses that the order of externment of Baba Ramdev  

from Delhi after cancellation of permission for the fast/protest was  

determined  in  advance  and  was  to  be  enforced  in  the  event  he  

“persisted” in his efforts to protest.  The requirements for an order  

of externment under Section 47 of Delhi Police Act, 1978 (for short,  

‘the DP Act’) had, therefore, not been satisfied at the time of such  

decision and such order was not served on Baba Ramdev at any  

point.  They also failed to make Baba Ramdev aware of any alleged  

threat to his life.   

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80. It is stated that the Police have failed to register FIRs on the  

basis of complaints of 50 to 60 people including that given by one  

Sri Jagmal Singh dated 10th June, 2011.

81. On these facts, it is the submission of respondent No.4 that it  

is  ironic  that  persons  fasting  against  failure  of  the  Central  

Government to tackle the issue of corruption and black money have  

been  portrayed  as  threats  to  law  and  order.   Citizens  have  a  

fundamental right to assembly and peaceful protest which cannot  

be taken away by an arbitrary executive or legislative action.  The  

law prescribes no requirements for taking of permission to go on a  

fast.  The respondent No.4 suggests that in order to establish the  

truth  of  the  incident,  an  independent  Commission  should  be  

constituted, based on whose report, legal action to be taken in such  

situations should be determined.   

82. With  reference  to  the  above  factual  averments  made  by  

respondent no.4, the argument advanced by Mr. Ram Jethmalani,  

Senior Advocate, is that, in the earlier meetings, both at the Ramlila  

Maidan and Jantar  Mantar,  no untoward incident had occurred,  

which could, by any standard, cause an apprehension in the mind  

75

of  the  Police  that  there  could  occur  an  incident,  communal  or  

otherwise, leading to public disorder, in any way.  The revocation of  

permissions as well as the brutality with which the gathering at the  

Ramlila Maidan was dispersed is impermissible and, in any case,  

contrary to law.  The Ground belongs to the Municipal Corporation  

of  Delhi  and the  permission had duly  been granted by the  said  

Corporation  for  the  entire  relevant  period.   This  permission had  

never been revoked by the Corporation and as such the Police had  

no power to evict the public from the premises of Ramlila Maidan.  

The Police had also granted a ‘No Objection Certificate’ (NOC) for  

holding the meeting and the withdrawal of the NOC is without any  

basis and justification.  The purpose for granting of permission by  

the Police was primarily for the reason that:

a.  The  Corporation  had  required  such  permission  to  be  

obtained;

b. There should be no obstruction to the traffic flow;  and  

c. There  should  be  proper  deployment  of  volunteers  in  

adequate number.

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83. None of the stated conditions, admittedly, had been violated  

and  as  such  there  was  no  cause  for  the  Police  authorities  to  

withdraw the said permission.  In fact, it is the contention on behalf  

of this respondent that there was no requirement or need for taking  

the permission of the Police for holding such a function.  Reliance  

in this regard is placed upon the judgment of this Court in the case  

of  Destruction  of  Public  and  Private  Properties,  In  Re  v.   State  of   

Andhra Pradesh and Ors. [(2009) 5 SCC 212].

84. Even if for the sake of arguments, it is assumed that there was  

a requirement for seeking permission from the Police and the Police  

had the authority to refuse such a permission and such authority  

was exercised in accordance with law, then also this respondent  

and the public at large were entitled to a clear and sufficient notice  

before the Police could use force to disperse the persons present at  

the site.

85. Imposition of an order under Section 144 Cr.P.C. was neither  

called  for  nor  could  have  been  passed  in  the  facts  and  

circumstances of the present case.  It is contended that Police itself  

was an unlawful assembly.  It had attacked the sleeping persons,  

77

after midnight, by trespassing into the property, which had been  

leased to the respondent-Trust.  The use of teargas,  lathi charge,  

brick-batting  and chasing  the  people  out  of  the  Ramlila  Maidan  

were unjustifiable and brutal acts on the part of the Police.  It was  

completely disproportionate not only to the exercise of the rights to  

freedom of speech and expression and peaceful gathering, but also  

to  the  requirement  for  the  execution  of  a  lawful  order.     The  

restriction  imposed,  being  unreasonable,  its  disproportionate  

execution renders the action of the Police unlawful.  This brutality  

of the State resulted in injuries to a large number of persons and  

even in death of one of the victims.  There has also been loss and  

damage to the property.   

86. Another aspect  that has been emphasized on behalf  of  this  

respondent is that there was only one gate for ‘Entry’ and one for  

‘Exit’, besides the VIP Entry near the stage.  This was done as per  

the directive of the Police.  The entry gate was completely manned  

by the Police and each entrant was frisked by the Police to ensure  

security.  Thus, the Police could have easily controlled the number  

and manner of entry to the Ramlila Maidan as they desired.  At no  

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point of time there were more than 50,000 people present at the  

premises.  On the contrary, in the midnight, when the Police used  

force  to  evict  the  gathering,  there  were  not  even  20,000  people  

sleeping in the tent.  Lastly, it is also contended that the people at  

Ramlila Maidan were sleeping at the time of the occurrence.  They  

were woken up by the Police, beaten and physically thrown out of  

the tents.  In that process, some of the persons lost their belongings  

and  even  suffered  damage  to  their  person  as  well  as  property.  

Neither  was there  any threat to public  tranquility  nor any other  

material  fact  existed  which  could  provide  adequate  basis  or  

material to the authorities on the basis of which they could take  

such  immediate  preventive  steps,  including  imposition  of  the  

prohibitory order under Section 144 Cr.P.C.  In fact, the order was  

passed in a pre-planned manner and with the only object of  not  

letting Baba Ramdev to continue his fast at the relevant date and  

time.   All  this  happened  despite  the  full  cooperation  by  Baba  

Ramdev.   He had voluntarily accepted the request of the Police not  

to visit Jantar Mantar along with his followers on 4th June, 2011  

itself.   Everything in the Ramlila Maidan was going on peacefully  

79

and  without  giving  rise  to  any  reasonable  apprehension  of  

disturbance  of  public  order/public  tranquility.    These  orders  

passed and executed by the executive and the Police did not satisfy  

any of  the  essential  conditions  as postulated under  Section 144  

Cr.P.C.

Police Version

87. The Commissioner of Police, Delhi has filed various affidavits  

to explain the stand of the Police in the present case.   I may notice  

that  there is  not  much variation in the  dates on which and the  

purpose for which the permissions were granted by the competent  

authority as well as the fact that Ramlila Maidan was given by the  

MCD to respondent No. 4.

88. According to the Police also, the Trust, respondent No. 4, had  

sought permission to hold  yoga camp for 4,000 to 5,000 people  

from 1st June, 2011 to 20th June, 2011 and the same was granted  

subject to the conditions stated above.   Baba Ramdev had made a  

statement  in the  media  indicating  his  intention to  hold  Anshan.  

Upon seeking clarification by the DCP, Central District vide letter  

dated 27th May, 2011, the Acharya by their letter dated 28th May,  

80

2011 had re-affirmed their stand that a yoga camp was to be held.  

It  is  the  case  of  the  respondent  No.3  that  on  30th May,  2011,  

Special Branch, Delhi Police had issued a special report that Baba  

Ramdev would proceed on an indefinite hunger strike with 30,000-

35,000 persons and,  in fact,  the  organizers  of  respondent  No.  4  

were  claiming  that  the  gathering  may  exceed  even  one  lakh  in  

number.

89. The  permission  to  hold  the  yoga camp was  granted  to  the  

respondent No. 4.   Citing certain inputs, the DCP issued a warning  

to respondent No.4 expressing their concern about the variance of  

the purpose as well  as that there should be a limited gathering,  

otherwise  the  authorities  would  be  compelled  to  review  the  

permission.   The DCP issued law and order arrangements detailing  

the requirement of Force for dealing with such a large gathering.    

90. Further,  inputs given on 3rd June,  2011 had indicated that  

Baba  Ramdev  was  being  targeted  by  certain  elements  so  as  to  

disrupt communal harmony between Hindus and Muslims.  Advice  

was made for review and strengthening of security arrangements.  

As a result thereto, security of Baba Ramdev was upgraded to Z+  

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category vide order dated 3rd June, 2011 and a contingency plan  

was also drawn.   On 4th June, 2011, despite assurances, the yoga  

training was converted into Anshan at  about  1300 hrs.  and Baba  

Ramdev decided to march to Jantar Mantar for ‘Dharna’  with the  

entire gathering, the permission for which was limited to only 200  

people.  Therefore, in view of the huge mass of people likely to come  

to Jantar Mantar, the said permission was withdrawn on 4th June,  

2011.

91. Baba  Ramdev  refused  to  accept  the  order  and,  in  fact,  

exhorted his followers to stay back in Delhi  and called for  more  

people to assemble at Ramlila Maidan, which was already full.   The  

verbal  inputs  received  by  the  Joint  Commissioner  of  Police  

indicated the possibility of further mobilisation of large number of  

people  by the next morning.   Ramlila Maidan is surrounded by  

communally hyper-sensitive localities.    Late at night, crowd had  

thinned down to a little over 20,000. Since a large number of people  

were  expected  to  gather  on  the  morning  of  5th June,  2011,  the  

permission  granted  to  the  Trust  was  also  withdrawn  and  

prohibitory orders under Section 144 Cr.P.C. were issued.   

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92. In  view of  the  above,  the  DCP considered  it  appropriate  to  

immediately serve the order on Baba Ramdev requiring him and the  

people present to vacate the Ramlila Maidan.   

93. According to these affidavits, Force was deployed to assist the  

public in vacating the Ramlila Maidan.   Buses were deployed at  

gates and ambulances, fire tenders, PCR vans were also called for.  

Baba Ramdev refused to comply with the orders.  On the contrary,  

he  jumped into  the crowd,  asked women and elderly persons to  

form  a  cordon  around  him  in  order  to  prevent  the  Police  from  

reaching him.   No hearing was claimed by Baba Ramdev or any of  

his  associates.    This  sudden reaction  of  Baba  Ramdev  created  

commotion  and resulted  in  melee.    Baba Ramdev  exhorted  his  

followers not to leave the Ramlila Maidan. Baba Ramdev, later on  

along with his followers, went on to climb the stage which is stated  

to have collapsed.   The supporters of respondent No. 4 had stocked  

the  bricks  behind  the  stage  and  were  armed  with  sticks  and  

baseball  bats.    The  crowd  started  brick-batting  and  throwing  

security  gadgets,  flower  pots  etc.  at  the  Police  from  the  stage  

resulting in injuries to Policemen and a minor stampede in public  83

in a part of the enclosure.   Baba Ramdev vanished from the stage  

with his female followers.   Few members of public jumped from the  

stage and got injured.   Police  exercised maximum restraint and  

used minimum force.   To disperse the crowd, they initially used  

water canons, which when proved ineffective, teargas shells, only  

on right side of the stage, were used in a controlled manner.

94. It is stated that this situation continued for around two hours  

and the Police did not have any intention to forcibly evacuate the  

public from Ramlila Maidan.   As Baba Ramdev decided to evade  

the Police, the situation at Ramlila Maidan became volatile.   The  

print media have given reports on the basis of  incorrect facts or  

hearsay.

95. It is also stated in this affidavit that total 38 Policemen and 48  

public persons were injured and according to the medical reports,  

public persons sustained injuries during the minor stampede which  

occurred in one part of the enclosure.   Most of these persons were  

discharged on the same date.   The press clipping/reports do not  

present a complete picture of the incident and contained articles  

based on incorrect facts.   The incident was unfortunate but was  84

avoidable,  had  the  organizers  acted  as  law abiding  citizens  and  

accepted the lawful directions of the Police.

96. Having stated that the teargas shelling and the other force was  

used as a response to the  brick-batting and misbehavior  by the  

gathering,  it  is  also  averred  that  the  affidavit  filed  on  behalf  of  

respondent no.4 could not be relied upon as the person swearing it  

was admittedly not present at the venue after 10.30 p.m. on 4 th  

June, 2011.  All these actions are stated to have been taken by the  

Force in consultation with the senior officers and no instructions  

are stated to have been received from the Ministry of Home Affairs,  

although the said Ministry was kept informed and apprised of the  

development from time to time.  All this was done in the interest of  

public order, larger security concern and preservation of law and  

order.   

97. Permission of Delhi Police is required by anyone planning to  

hold public functions at public places.  Delhi Police, having granted  

such permission, was fully competent to revoke it as well as to pass  

orders under Section 144 Cr.P.C. The  organizers  of  Respondent  

no.4  had  misled  the  Police  and  the  Special  Branch  report  had  

85

clarified the situation on 30th May, 2011 that the intention was to  

hold indefinite hunger strike.  It is stated that by the evening of 3rd  

June, 2011, only 5000 persons had arrived.  It is the case of the  

Police that they had persuaded Baba Ramdev not to go to Jantar  

Mantar  with  his  followers  and,  therefore,  the  dharna at  Jantar  

Mantar was cancelled.  It was the apprehension of the Police that  

the gathering would increase several folds by the next morning and  

that could raise a major law and order problem and there was a  

possible  imminent threat to public safety.  Thus,  the permission  

was withdrawn and order under Section 144 Cr.P.C. was passed.  

Delhi Police confirms that it had been communicating information  

at the level of the Secretary to the Ministry of Home affairs and any  

discussion or communication beyond that level is a matter in the  

domain of that Ministry itself.  It was only in consequence of the  

violent retaliation by the crowd that use of teargas, water cannons  

and finally  lathi charge was taken recourse to by the Police.  The  

video footage shows that a group of supporters of respondent no.4  

standing on one side of the stage started throwing bricks and flower  

pots,  etc.   The  Police  also  found  the  bricks  stacked  behind  the  

86

stage.  It was the brick-batting and the atmosphere created by the  

crowd that resulted in a minor stampede.  Further, it is stated that  

the pandal was open on all sides, ceiling was high and there were  

enough escape routes and the use of teargas in such a situation is  

not prohibited.  Eight teargas shells were used to prevent the Police  

from being  targeted  or  letting  the  situation  turn  violent  and  all  

precautions  were  taken  before  such  use.   No  Police  Officer  was  

found to be hitting any person.  Respondent no.4 had been asked  

to install sufficient CCTV cameras and M/s. Sai Wireless removed  

the  cameras  and  DVRs  installed  by  them immediately  after  the  

incident  on  5th June,  2011.   The  proprietor  had  even  lodged  a  

complaint at Police Station, Kamla Market and a case of theft under  

FIR No. 49 of 2011 was registered.  The said concern, upon being  

called for the same by a notice under Section 91 Cr.P.C., produced  

10  DVRs  containing  more  than  190  hours  of  video.   The  

investigation of that case revealed that out of 48 cameras ordered  

by the organizers, only 44 were installed, 42 were made operational  

out  of  which two remained  non-functional  and  recording  of  one  

could not be retrieved due to technical problems. Recording of eight  

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cameras  and  two  DVRs  were  not  available  as  these  equipments  

were reportedly stolen, as noted above.   Thus, the recordings from  

only 41 cameras/DVRs were available.

98. The primary aim of MCD is to earn revenue from commercial  

use of land and it is for the Police to take care of the law and order  

situation  and  to  regulate  demonstrations,  protests,  marches  etc.  

No  eviction  order  was  passed  except  that  the  permissions  were  

cancelled and order under Section 144 Cr.P.C. was made.

99. On  25th July,  2011,  another  affidavit  was  filed  by  the  

Commissioner  of  Police  stating  that  nearly  155  complaints  in  

writing and/or through e-mail were received by the Police Station  

Kamla  Market  alleging  beating  by  the  Police,  theft  and  loss  of  

property i.e. belongings of the complainants, 13 out of them were  

duplicate,  11  anonymous  and  35  e-mails  were  in  the  nature  of  

comments.   On investigation, only four persons responded to the  

notice under Section 91 Cr.P.C, but stated facts different from what  

had been noticed in the complaints.   Some complaints were also  

being investigated in case FIR No. 45 of 2011 registered at the same  

Police station.   

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100. It  is  further  the  case,  as  projected  during  hearing,  that  

probably  one  Smt.  Rajbala,  who  was  on  the  stage  with  Baba  

Ramdev, had fallen from the stage and became unconscious.   This  

complaint was also received at the Police Station Kamla Market and  

was entered at para No. 26A dated 6th June, 2011.

101. Still, in another affidavit dated 20th September, 2011 filed on  

behalf  of  respondent  No.  3,  it  was  specifically  denied  that  any  

footages had been tampered with.   The Police had climbed to the  

stage,  firstly,  to  serve  the  order  and,  thereafter,  only  when  the  

entire incident was over and it was denied that Rajbala was beaten  

by the Police.

102. It is stated that the respondents, including respondent No. 4,  

have  isolated  a  segment  of  footage  wherein  few  Policemen  are  

throwing bricks on tents near  the  stage.    It  is  stated to be  an  

isolated incident and was a reaction of few Policemen to a spate of  

bricks by Baba Ramdev’s supporters. With regard to the injuries  

and cause of  death of  Smt. Rajbala who died subsequent to the  

issuance of notice by this Court, it is averred that she was given  

medical aid and was admitted to the ICU.   There was no external  

89

injury on her body.   It is also stated that she was offered medical  

help of Rupees two lakh which was not accepted.  She was a case of  

“gross  osteoporosis”,  that  too,  to  the  extent  that  she  was  being  

managed by  “endrocrinologist”  during  her  treatment.   As  stated,  

according  to  the  medical  literature,  osteoporosis  of  this  degree  

could make her bones brittle  and prone to fracture even by low  

intensity impact.

103. While  relying  upon  the  above  averments  made  in  different  

affidavits,  the  submission on behalf  of  respondent  No.  3  is  that  

there being no challenge to the Standing Order 309, provisions of  

the DP Act and the Punjab Police Rules and even the order passed  

under  Section  144  Cr.P.C.,  the  action  of  Delhi  Police  has  to  be  

treated  as  a  reasonable  and  proper  exercise  of  power.    The  

organizers of respondent No.4 had misrepresented the Government  

and the Police authorities with regard to holding of the yoga camp.  

The Trust is guilty of seeking permission on incorrect pretext.   The  

effort  on behalf  of  the  Police  was  that  of  carefully  watching  the  

development rather than taking any rash decisions and cancelling  

the permission earlier than when it was actually cancelled.

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104. The right to freedom in a democracy has to be exercised in  

terms of Article 19(1)(a) subject to public order.   Public order and  

public  tranquility  is  a  function  of  the  State  which  duty  is  

discharged by the State in the larger public interest.   The private  

right is to be waived against public interest.  The action of the State  

and the Police was in conformity with law.  As a large number of  

persons were to assemble on the morning of 5th June, 2011 and  

considering the other attendant circumstances seen in light of the  

inputs received from the intelligence agencies, the permission was  

revoked and the  persons attending  the  camp at  Ramlila  Maidan  

were dispersed.

105. Even if for the sake of argument, it is taken that there were  

some stray incidents of Police excessiveness, the act best can be  

attributable to individual actions and cannot be treated or termed  

as an organizational brutality or default.  

106. Individual responsibility is different from responsibility of the  

Force.   Abuse by one may not necessarily be an abuse of exercise  

of power by the Force as a whole.    The Police had waited for a  

considerable  time  inasmuch  as  the  order  withdrawing  the  

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permission was passed at about 9.30 p.m. and was brought to the  

notice  of  the representatives  of  Respondent No.4  at about  10.30  

p.m. and no action was taken by the Police till approximately 1 a.m.  

This  was  for  the  fact  that  the  persons  were  sleeping  and Police  

wanted them to disperse in a peaceful manner, but it was the stone  

pelting,  the  panic  created by the  organisers  and the  consequent  

stampede  that  resulted  in  injuries  to  some  persons.    The  

contention is also that the organizers are responsible for creating  

the unpleasant incident on midnight of 4th/5th June, 2011 and they  

cannot  absolve  themselves  of  the  responsibilities  and  liabilities  

arising therefrom.   The Police had acted in good faith and  bona  

fide.  Therefore,  the  action  of  the  Police  cannot  be  termed  as  

arbitrary, mala fide or violative of the basic rule of law.

107. Lastly, Mr. Harish Salve, learned senior counsel appearing for  

respondent  No.3,  contended  that  there  are  certain  issues  which  

this Court need not dwell upon and decide as they do not directly  

arise  for  determination  in  the  facts  and  circumstances  of  the  

present case:

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a) Whether it was necessary for MCD to direct and for organizers  

to take permission from Delhi Police?

b) Cancellation of permission for holding of  Dharna/agitation at  

Jantar Mantar.

c) Validity of the orders passed by the State including the order  

passed under Section 144 Cr.P.C.

108. I  have  noticed,  in  some  detail,  the  version  of  each  of  the  

parties before the Court in response to the suo moto notice.   Before  

analyzing  the  respective  versions  put  before  the  Court  by  the  

parties and recording the possible true version of what happened  

which made the unfortunate incident occur, I would like to notice  

that I am not prepared to fully accept the last contention raised by  

Mr. Harish Salve, in its entirety.  Of course, it may not be necessary  

for this Court to examine the effect of the cancellation of permission  

for  Jantar  Mantar  and  validity  of  the  orders  passed  by  the  

Government, but this Court is certainly called upon to deal with the  

question whether it was obligatory for the organizers, respondent  

No.4, to seek the permission of the Police for holding such a large  

public demonstration.   Therefore, I would be touching the various  

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aspects of this issue and would deal with the orders of the State to  

the extent it is necessary to examine the main issue in regard to the  

excessive  use  of  force  and  brutality  and  absolute  organizational  

default by the Police, if any.

Findings on Incident of Midnight of 4  th  /5  th   June, 2011 and the    Role of Police and Members/followers of Respondent No.4

109. All  National  and  Delhi  Edition  newspapers  dated  5th June,  

2011 as well  as the media reports had reported the unfortunate  

incident  that  occurred  on the  midnight  of  4th/5th June,  2011 at  

Ramlila Maidan in Delhi.  On the night of 4th June, 2011, all the  

men and women, belonging to different age groups, who had come  

to Ramlila Maidan to participate in the Yoga Training Camp called  

as ‘Nishulk Yoga Vigyan Shivir’,  were comfortably  sleeping at the  

Ramlila Maidan, when suddenly at about midnight, the people were  

woken up.  The Joint Commissioner of Police sought to serve the  

order revoking the permission granted to hold the said yoga camp  

and  imposing  Section  144  Cr.P.C.,  purportedly  to  curb  any  

agitation  at  the  Ramlila  Maidan.   There  was  commotion  at  the  

Ramlila Maidan.   Persons who had suddenly woken up from sleep  

could not know where and how to go.  It appears that Baba Ramdev  94

did not receive the orders.  However, some of the officials of the  

Bharat  Swabhiman  Trust  were  made  aware  of  the  orders.  

Thereafter, the Police made an attempt to disperse the gathering at  

about and after 1.00 a.m. on 4th/5th June, 2011.   

110. They are stated to have resorted to use of teargas and  lathi  

charge in order to disperse the crowd as they were unable to do so  

in the normal course.  Since there was protest by the people and  

some violence could result, the Police used teargas and lathi charge  

to ensure dispersement of the assembly which had, by that time,  

been declared unlawful.  As a result of this action by the Police, a  

number of men and women were injured, some seriously.  This also  

finally resulted into the death of one Smt. Rajbala.   

111. This action of the Police was termed as brutal and uncalled for  

by the  Press.   Headlines  in  the  various  newspapers  termed this  

unfortunate incident as follows:

Times of India dated 6th June, 2011 :

95

‘Why Centre went from licking to kicking’,  

‘Ramleela Ground never saw so much drama’,  

‘She may be paralyzed for life’.  

‘Women not spared, we were blinded by smoke’

‘Cops claim terror alert to justify midnight raid’

‘Swoop Not Sudden, cops trailed Ramdev for 3 days’

‘After eviction they chant and squat on road’

‘Protestors Armed with bricks, baseball bats Cops’

Indian Express dated 6th June, 2011 :

‘Baba Gives UPA a Sleepless Summer’

‘Week Ago, Home, Delhi Police told Govt : look at plan the   

show’

‘Getting Ramdev Out’

‘Yielding and bungling – Cong (Weak) Core Group’

112. This  event  was  described  with  great  details  in  these  news  

items and articles, along with photographs.   Besides the fact that  

large number of persons were injured and some of them seriously,  

there was also damage to the property.  The question raised before  

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this Court,  inter alia, included the loss and damage to the person  

and  property  that  resulted  from  such  unreasonable  restriction  

imposed, its execution and invasion of fundamental right to speech  

and  expression  and  the  right  to  assembly,  as  protected  under  

Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(b).   It is contended that the order was  

unreasonable,  restriction  imposed  was  contrary  to  law  and  the  

entire  exercise  by the Police  and the authorities  was an indirect  

infringement of the rights and protections available to the persons  

present there, including Article 21 of the Constitution.      

113. These  events  and  the  prima  facie facts  stated  above,  

persuaded this Court to issue a suo moto notice vide its order dated  

6th June, 2011.   This notice was issued to the Home Secretary,  

Union of India, the Chief Secretary, Delhi Administration and the  

Police Commissioner of Delhi to show cause and file their personal  

affidavits explaining the conduct of the Police authorities and the  

circumstances  which  led  to  the  use  of  such  brutal  force and  

atrocities against the large number of people gathered at Ramlila  

Maidan.  In reply to the above notice, different affidavits have been  

filed on behalf of these authorities justifying their action. A notice  97

was issued to Bharat Swabhiman Trust vide order dated 20th June,  

2011.  The application for intervention on behalf of Rajbala (now  

deceased) was allowed vide order dated 29th August, 2011.  They  

filed their  own affidavit.   In  order  to ensure  proper  independent  

assistance to the Court, the Court also appointed an amicus curiae   

and Dr. Dhavan accepted the request of the Court to perform this  

onerous job.

114. Having  taken  into  consideration  the  version  of  each  party  

before  this  Court,  I  would  now  proceed  to  limn  the  facts  and  

circumstances emerging from the record before the Court that led  

to the unfortunate incident of  the midnight of  4/5th June, 2011.  

Without any reservation, I must notice that in my considered view,  

this  unfortunate  incident  could  have  been  avoided  by  proper  

patience  and with mutual  deliberations,  taken objectively  in  the  

interest of the large gathering present at Ramlila Maidan.  Since  

this unfortunate incident has occurred, I have to state with clarity  

what emerges from the record and the consequences thereof.

98

115. As already noticed, the yoga camp at the Ramlila Maidan had  

begun  with  effect  from  1st June,  2011  and  was  continuing  its  

normal functioning with permission from the Police as well as with  

due grant of licence by the MCD.  Undoubtedly, respondent No.4  

had the permission to also hold a dharna at Jantar Mantar on 4th  

June, 2011 to raise a protest in relation to various issues that had  

been raised by Baba Ramdev in his letters to the Government and  

in  his  address  to  his  followers.   These  permissions  had  been  

granted much in advance.  As a response to the pamphlets issued  

and  the  inputs  of  the  intelligence  agencies,  the  DCP  (Central  

District) Delhi had expressed certain doubts vide his letter dated  

27th May, 2011 asking for clarification as to the actual number of  

persons and the real purpose for which Ramlila Maidan would be  

used from 1st June, 2011.  To this, respondent No.4 had promptly  

replied  stating  that  there  will  be  no  other  event  except  the  

residential yoga camp.  However, keeping in view the information  

received, the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Central District, vide  

his  letter  dated 1st June,  2011 had issued further directions for  

being implemented by respondent No.4 and reiterated his earlier  

99

requirements,  including  that  number  of  the  gathering  should  

remain  within  the  limits  conveyed.   In  this  letter,  it  was  also  

indicated that the authorities may review the position, if necessary.  

However,  on  3rd June,  2011,  it  had  been  noticed  that  a  huge  

gathering was expected in the programme and also that the inputs  

had been received that Baba Ramdev would sit  on an indefinite  

hunger  strike  with  effect  from 4th June,  2011  in relation to  the  

issues  already  raised  publically  by  him.   After  noticing  various  

aspects,  including  that  various  terrorist  groups  may  try  to  do  

something spectacular to hog publicity,  respondent  no.3  made  a  

very  objective assessment  of  the  entire  situation  and  issued  a  

detailed  plan  of  action  to  ensure  smooth  functioning  of  the  

agitation/yoga  camp  at  Ramlila  Maidan  without  any  public  

disturbance.  The objectives stated in this planned programme have  

duly been noticed by me above.   

116. All this shows that the authorities had applied their mind to  

all  aspects  of  the matter  on 2nd June,  2011 and had decided to  

permit Baba Ramdev to go on with his activities.  In furtherance to  

it,  the  Deputy  Commissioner  of  Police,  Central  District  had  also  100

issued a restricted circular as contingency plan.  It is obvious from  

various letters exchanged between the parties that as on 3rd June,  

2011, there had been a clear indication on behalf of the authorities  

concerned that Baba Ramdev could go on with his plans and, in  

fact, proper plans had been made to ensure security and regulation  

of traffic and emergency measures were also put in place.  As I have  

already  indicated,  there  is  nothing  on  record  to  show,  if  any  

information  of  some  untoward  incident  or  any  other  intelligence  

input  was  received  by  the  authorities  which  compelled  them to  

invoke  the  provisions  of  Section  144  Cr.P.C.,  that  too,  as  an  

emergency  case  without  any  intimation  to  the  organizers  and  

without providing them an opportunity of hearing.  The expression  

‘emergency’ even if understood in its common parlance would mean  

an exigent situation (See Black’s Law Dictionary – Twentieth Edn.);  

A serious, unexpected and potential dangerous situation requiring  

immediate  action  (See  Concise  Oxford  English  Dictionary  –  

Eleventh Edn.).  Such an emergent case must exist for the purpose  

of passing a protective or preventive order.  This may be termed as  

an ‘emergency protective order’ or an ‘emergency preventive order’.  

101

In  either  of  these  cases,  the  emergency  must  exist  and  that  

emergent situation must be reflected from the records which were  

before  the  authority  concerned  which  passed  the  order  under  

Section 144 Cr.P.C.  There are hardly any factual averments in the  

affidavit of the Commissioner of Police which would show any such  

emergent event happening between 3rd and 4th June, 2011.

117. Similarly,  nothing  appears  to  have  happened  on  4th June,  

2011 except that the permission to hold a dharna at Jantar Mantar  

granted  to  respondent  no.4  was  withdrawn  and  the  Police  had  

requested Baba Ramdev not to proceed to Jantar Mantar with the  

large number of supporters, which request was acceded to by Baba  

Ramdev.  He, in fact, did not proceed to Jantar Mantar at all and  

stayed at Ramlila Maidan.

118. It is also noteworthy that after his arrival on 1st June, 2011 at  

the  Airport,  Baba  Ramdev  met  few  senior  ministers  of  the  

Government in power.  He also had a meeting with some ministers  

at Hotel Claridges on 3rd June, 2011.  The issues raised by Baba  

Ramdev  were  considered  and  efforts  were  admittedly  made  to  

102

dissuade Baba Ramdev from holding Satyagraha at Jantar Mantar  

or  an  indefinite  fast  at  Ramlila  Maidan.   However,  these  

negotiations failed.  According to the reports, the Government failed  

to keep its commitments, while according to the Government, Baba  

Ramdev failed to keep up his promise and acted contrary even to  

the letter that was given by him to the ministers with whom he had  

negotiated  at  Hotel  Claridges.   Thus,  there  was  a  deadlock  of  

negotiations for an amicable resolution of the problems.

119. This is the only event that appears to have happened on 3rd  

and 4th June, 2011.  On the morning of 4th June, 2011, the  yoga  

camp  was  held  at  the  Ramlila  Maidan  peacefully  and  without  

disturbing  public  order  or  public  tranquility.   After  the  day’s  

proceedings, the large number of people who were staying at the  

Ramlila  Maidan,  went to sleep in the  Shamiana itself  where due  

arrangements  had  already  been  made  for  their  stay.  Beds  were  

supplied to them, temporary toilets were provided and water tanks  

and arrangements of food had also been made.   The footages of the  

CCTV cameras, videos and the photographs, collectively annexed as  

Annexure-9 to the affidavit of respondent No.4, establish this fact  103

beyond  any  doubt  that  all  persons,  at  the  relevant  time,  were  

peacefully sleeping.   

120. According to the Police, on 4th June, 2011, Baba Ramdev had  

delivered  a  speech  requesting  people  from  various  parts  of  the  

country to come in large number and join him for the  Satyagrah.  

The order withdrawing the permission for holding a  yoga shivir at  

the Ramlila Maidan was passed at 9.30 p.m.   The Police reached  

the  Ramlila  Maidan  in  order  to  inform  the  representatives  of  

respondent No.4 about the passing of the said order, after 10.30  

p.m.   At  about  11.30  p.m.,  on  the  same  date,  the  executive  

authority  passed  an order  under  Section 144 Cr.P.C.  The  Police  

officers  came  to  serve  this  order  upon  the  representatives  of  

respondent  No.4  much  thereafter.   The  footages  of  the  CCTV  

Camera Nos. 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 12, 15, 17, 18 and 32 show that even  

at about 1.00 a.m. in the night of 4th/5th June, 2011, people were  

sleeping peacefully.  The Police arrived there and tried to serve the  

said order upon the representatives of respondent No.4 as well as  

asked for Baba Ramdev, who was stated to be taking rest in his rest  

room.  However,  the action of  the Police  officers of  going on the  104

stage  and  of  some  of  them  moving  where  people  were  sleeping  

obviously caused worry, fear and threat in the minds of the large  

number of persons sleeping in the tent.  It is the conceded position  

before  this  Court  that  nearly  15,000  to  20,000  persons  were  

present in the tent at the relevant time.

121. The CCTV footages clearly show the Police officers talking to  

Baba Ramdev and probably they wanted to serve the said orders  

upon him.  However, Baba Ramdev withdrew from the deliberations  

and jumped from the stage amidst the crowd.  By this time, a large  

number of persons had gathered around the stage.  After climbing  

on to the shoulders of one of his followers, Baba Ramdev addressed  

his followers.  He exhorted them to form a cordon around him in  

the  manner  that  the  women forming the  first  circle,  followed by  

youth and lastly by rest of his supporters.  This circle is visible in  

the evidence placed before the Court.  I do not consider it necessary  

to refer to the speech of Baba Ramdev to the crowd in any greater  

detail.  Suffice it to note that while addressing the gathering, Baba  

Ramdev referred to his conversations with the Government, urged  

the crowd to chant Gayatri Mantra, maintain Shanti and not to take  105

any confrontation with the Police.  He further stated that he would  

not advise the path of  hinsa, but at the same time, he also stated  

about his talks with the Government and reiterated that he will not  

leave, unless the people so desired and it was the wish of God.   He  

also chanted the Gayatri Mantra, and wished all the people around  

him.  At the same time, it is also clear from the evidence of CCTV  

Camera’s  footage  and  the  photographs,  that  Baba  Ramdev  had  

referred to the failure  of  his  talks with the  Government  and his  

desire  to continue  his  Anshan.   He also,  in no uncertain terms,  

stated ‘Babaji will go only if people wanted and the God desires it.’  

Another significant part of Baba Ramdev’s speech at that crucial  

time was that he urged the people not to have any confrontation  

with the Police  and that he had no intention/mind to follow the  

path of  hinsa or to instigate quarrel with the authorities.  By this  

time, all  persons present in the tent had already woken up and  

were listening to Baba Ramdev interacting with the Police.  Some  

people left while a large number of people were still present in the  

shamiana.  According to the Police, brick batting started from one  

corner of the stage and it was only in response thereto, they had  

106

fired  the  teargas  shells  on  and  around  the  stage.   In  all,  eight  

teargas  shells  were  fired.   According  to  the  Police,  they  did  not  

resort to any  lathi charge and, in fact, they had first used water  

cannons.  According to respondent No.4, the Police had first fired  

teargas shells,  then  lathi  charged the persons present and never  

used  water  cannons.   According  to  them,  the  Police  even threw  

bricks from behind the stage at the people and the control room  

and it was in response thereto that some people might have thrown  

bricks upon the Police.

122. What is undisputable before this Court is that the Police as  

well as the followers of Baba Ramdev indulged into brick batting.  

Teargas shells were fired at the crowd by the Police and, to a limited  

extent, the Police resorted to lathi charge.  After a large number of  

Police personnel, who are stated to be more than a thousand, had  

entered the Ramlila Maidan and woken up the persons sleeping,  

there  was  commotion,  confusion  and  fear  amongst  the  people.  

Besides that, it had been reported in the Press that there was lathi  

charge.  Men and women of different age groups were present at the  

Ramlila Maidan.  The photographs also show that a large number  107

of Police personnel were carrying lathis and had actually beaten the  

persons, including those sitting on the ground or hiding behind the  

tin shed, with the same.  CCTV Camera No. 5 shows that the Police  

personnel were also throwing bricks.  The same camera also shows  

that  even  the  followers  of  Baba  Ramdev  had  used  the  fire  

extinguishing  gas  to  create  a  curtain  in  front,  when  they  were  

throwing bricks at the Police  and towards the stage.  The CCTV  

cameras also show the Police pushing the persons and compelling  

them to go out.  The Police personnel can also be seen breaking the  

barriers between the stage and the ground where the people were  

sitting during the yoga sessions.  The photographs also show some  

Police personnel lifting a participant from his legs and hands and  

trying to throw him out.   The photographs also show an elderly  

sick person being attended to and carried by the volunteers and not  

by the Police.

123. The  documents  on  record  show  that  some  of  the  Police  

personnel certainly abused their authority, were unduly harsh and  

violent towards the people present at the Ramlila Maidan, whereas  

some others were, in fact, talking to the members of the gathering  108

as  well  as  had  adopted  a  helpful  attitude.   The  brick  batting  

resorted to by both sides cannot be justified in any circumstances  

whatsoever.   Even  if  the  followers  of  respondent  No.4  acted  in  

retaliation to the firing of teargas, still they had no cause or right in  

law to throw bricks towards the stage, in particular, towards the  

Police and it is a hard fact that some Police personnel were injured  

in the process.  Similarly, the use of teargas shells and use of lathi  

charge by the Police, though limited, can hardly be justified.  In no  

case, brick batting by the Police can be condoned.  They are the  

protectors  of  the  society  and,  therefore,  cannot  take  recourse  to  

such illegal  methods of  controlling  the  crowd.   There  is  also  no  

doubt that large number of persons were injured in the action of  

the Police and had to be hospitalized.  Element of indiscipline on  

behalf of the Police can be seen in the footage of the CCTV cameras  

as well as in the log book entries of the Police.   

124. At this stage, it will be useful to examine the Police records in  

this respect.  Police arrangements had been made in furtherance to  

the arrangements planned by the Central District of Police, Delhi  

dated 2nd June,  2011.   Copies  of  the  Police  log  book  have  been  109

placed on the  file.   As on 5th June,  2011 at about  1.28 a.m., a  

message was flashed that the whole staff of the concerned Police  

stations shall report to Police Station Kamla Market immediately.  

Then,  an  attempt  was  made  to  arrest  Baba  Ramdev  and  an  

apprehension was expressed that there could be some deaths.  I  

may reproduce here the relevant messages from the Police log book  

to avoid any ambiguity :

“District Net

Date Start Time Duratio n

Call Detail

05.06.11 03:22:53 00:00:33 R.L.  Ground  Kamla  market police men are  beating  the  peoples  Ph.971147860  W/Ct.  Sheetal No.8174/PCR

TRANSCRIPTION OF DM Net Dated 04.06.2011 from 200 hrs. to 000 hrs.

INFORM C-28, C-31, C-35, C-32 & C-4 AND C-5 THAT  THEY WOULD MEET ME AFTER 30  MIN  AND THE 4  SHOs WILL BRING ABOUT 20 PERSONNEL EACH FROM  THEIR PS.

Transcript of DM Net

110

Extract  of  Tetra  DM  Net  of  Central  District.  Dated  05/06/11 from 0100 Hrs. to 0500 Hrs. (Taken from the  Tetra Recording)

218

C 50 C 2 The  force  which  is  standing  outside  at  Turkman  gate  and  Gurunanak  Chowk  having  gas  gun  will  come  inside  through  VIP gate instantly

225

12D

C 50

C 50

C50

12D

C2

Understood

The  operator  of  gas  gun which is send has  not  reported  yet  only  driver  is  sitting  operator is to be send  quickly.

225 C Q C 50 The  officer  who  has  

send the  gas gun will  send  the  operator,  is  driver to operate it.

226 12D C 50 Operator of gas gun is  

to be send only driver  has reached there with  gas gun.

227

227

C 50

C 50

12 D

C 50

C 2

I don’t have gas gun.

SHOs  has  already  reached  inside  with  staff.

How  many  water  canons are there.

111

227 C 2 C 50 Madam water canon is  outside  at  VIP  gate  where i have informed  earlier.

305 C 50 C 24 This  is  informed  that  the force guard 88 Bn.  CRPF  is  neither  obeying  any  instruction  and  nor  ready  to  come  at  any  cost.

WIRELESS LOG & DIARY Dt.5-6-2011 (Shift Duty 9 AM  to 9 PM       T - 52

Time Call Detail 2:25 AM 01-T-

52 One  injured  namely  Jagat  Muni s/o Unknown R/o VIII- Pllana (Rohtak) Haryana. Age  about 55-60 yrs admitted in  JPN Hospital in unconscious  condition.

WIRELESS LOG & DIARY Dt.4/5-6-2011 Time Call Detail

2:20 AM L-100 0-1 PCR  Call:-  that  some  casualities  happened  at  RL  Ground.  Direct  the  ambulance.

0-1 L-100 Noted position at RL Ground 2:28 AM 0-1 L-100 Injured  not  Traceable.  Cats  

ambulance  also  searching  injured person.

WIRELESS LOG & DIARY Dt.4/5-6-2011        L-100

Time Call Detail 8 AM Charge of O-33 taken by ASI  

Ved Prakash 5150/PCR

112

0-33 0-1 Note down that in RL Ground  Police  is  beating  the  public  persons.

0-1 0-33 Road  is  blocked  through  barricades  at  Ajmeri  Gate.  We  can’t  leave  the  vehicle  without staff.

WIRELESS  LOG  &  DIARY  Dt.4/5-6-2011  (Shift  Night  Duty 8 PM  to 8 AM)       0 - 60

Time Call Detail 1:58 0-60 0-1 Police  is  misbehaving  with  

Baba Ramdev.

WIRELESS LOG & DIARY  Dt./4/5-6-2011  (Shift  Night  Duty 8 PM to 8 AM)      0 – 10

Time Call Detail 8 PM Shift  Change  and  charge  

taken  by  HC  Umed  Singh  No.899/PCR

2 am 0-1 0-10 From  0-10  SI  Jaspal  PS  Mangol  Puri  &  Ct.  Tarun  3036/DAP  sustained  injury  and  we  are  taking  them  to  JPN Hospital.

2.10 0-1 0-10 0-10 told that both SI Jaspal  and  Ct  Tarun  admitted  in  JPN  Hospital  through  Duty  Ct. Ajay 1195/C.

WIRELESS  LOG  &  DIARY  Dt.4/5-6-2011  (Shift  Night  Duty 8 PM to 8AM)      B - 11

Time Call Detail

113

2.30 AM Two injured persons taken to  JPN  Hospital  namely  Raj  Bala  w/o  Jalbeer  R/o  Gurgaon,  Age-54,  Jagdish  s/o Asha Nand, Age-54 yrs.

207 C50 C12D Both  of  vehicles  is  to  be  send,  water  canon  is  only  one

207 C12D C50 Right now only one is asked  about so send only one.

207 C12D C50 Send  one.   Send  one  instantly.   If  other  will  be  required it will be informed.

125. The above entries of the Police log book clearly show that a  

number of  persons were injured, including Police  personnel,  and  

some of them even seriously.  The water cannons were not available  

inside the tent and the same were asked to come towards the VIP  

gate.  They  were  only  two  in  number  and  were  asked  to  be  

positioned at the VIP entrance.  In fact, as recorded in one of the  

above  entries,  there  was only  one  water  cannon available which  

was positioned at the VIP entry gate and the version of the Police  

that it had first used water cannons for dispersing the crowd before  

resorting to the use of teargas, does not appear to be correct.  The  

teargas shells were fired at about 2.20 a.m. as per the footages of  

114

the  CCTV  cameras  and  around  the  same  time,  the  bricks  were  

thrown by the followers of respondent No.4 upon the Police.  This  

aggravated the situation beyond control and, thereafter, the Police  

acted  with greater  force  and fired  more  teargas  shells  and even  

used lathis to disperse the crowd.

126. Another aspect reflecting the lacuna in planning of the Police  

authorities for executing such an order at such odd hour is also  

shown in the log book of the Police where at about 2.39 a.m., a  

conversation between two police officers has been recorded.   As per  

this conversation, it was informed “You call at cellphone and inform  

24B that he will also talk and that gate towards JLN Marg which  

was to be opened is not open yet”.   Another conversation recorded  

at the same time was “Then public will go at its own”.

127. When the Police had decided to carry out such a big operation  

of evicting such a large gathering suddenly, it was expected of it to  

make  better  arrangements,  to  cogitate  over  the  matter  more  

seriously and provide better arrangements.

115

128. From the  entries  made  in the  Police  log  book,  certain  acts  

come to  surface.   Firstly,  that  there  were  inadequate  number of  

water  cannons,  as  admittedly,  there  were  more  than  15,000  

persons  present  at  the  Ramlila  Maidan  and  secondly,  that  the  

Police had started beating the people.  Even the 88th Bn. of CRPF  

was  not  carrying  out  the  orders  and  there  was  chaos  at  the  

premises.  Even if all the documents filed by the Police, the Police  

log book and the affidavits on behalf of the Police are taken into  

consideration, it reflects lack of readiness on the part of the Police  

and also that it had not prepared any action plan for enforcing the  

order of the executive authority passed under Section 144 Cr.P.C.  

It  was  expected  of  the  Police  to  make  elaborate,  adequate  and  

precise arrangements to ensure safe eviction of such large number  

of persons, that too, at midnight.   

129. Having dealt with this aspect, now I would proceed to discuss  

the  injuries  suffered and the medical  evidence  placed before  the  

Court.  As per the affidavit of the Police dated 17 th June, 2011, total  

38 Policemen were injured, some of them because of brick batting  

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by the supporters of Baba Ramdev.  48 persons from public were  

also injured, 41 of them were discharged on the same date and 5  

on the  next  day.   Only  2 persons,  including 1 woman,  required  

hospitalization for medical  treatment and surgery.  On the other  

hand,  according  to  respondent  no.4,  hundreds  of  persons  were  

injured.  However, they have placed on record a list of the injured  

persons as Annexure R -13 wherein names of 55 persons have been  

given.   Most  of  the  injured  persons  were  taken  to  Lok  Nayak  

Hospital,  New  Delhi.   Copies  of  their  medico  legal  enquiry  

register/reports have been placed on record.  Some of these injured  

persons were taken to the hospital by the Police while some of them  

went on their own.  In the medico legal enquiry register relating to  

Rajbala,  it  has  been  stated  that  she  suffered  cervical  vertebral  

fracture and associated spinal  cord damage.  She was unable  to  

move both limbs, upper and lower, and complained of pain in the  

neck.  She was treated in that hospital and subsequently shifted to  

the ICU where she ultimately died.  As per the postmortem report,  

the cause of death as opined by the doctor was stated as “Death in  

this  case  occurred  as  a  Septicemia,  following  cervical  vertebral  

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fracture  and  associated  spinal  cord  damage”.   In  some  of  the  

reports, it is stated that the patient had informed of having suffered  

injury due to stampede at Ramlila Maidan.  The person who claims  

to have brought Rajbala to the hospital, Joginder Singh Bandral,  

has  also  filed  an  affidavit  stating  that  the  Police  had  suddenly  

attacked from the stage side and she had suffered injuries and fell  

unconscious.  

130. It is undisputed that Rajbala suffered injuries in this incident.  

The injuries as described in the medical records are as follows:-

“Local Examination: 1. Reddish  bluish  discolouration  below  and  

behind  

Left  ear  &  another  reddish  blue  discolouration

In  Lateral  middle  of  neck  on  (L)  Side  present.

2. Reddish  Bluish  Colouration  seen  below  &  behind (R) ear C

3. Large  bluish  discolouration  present  over  Left buttock

4. Abrasion over Medical aspects of Left ankle.

5. Reddish  discolouration  over  the  flexor  aspect of middle of Left forearm”

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131. In  addition,  the  medico  legal  case  sheet  of  one  Deepak  

recorded,  “alleged c/o assault  while  on hunger strike  at  Ramlila  

Maidan”.  He was vomiting, bleeding and had suffered injuries and  

was complaining of pain at cervical region and right thigh.  Similar  

was the noting with regard to one Ajay.  Both of them had gone to  

Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia Hospital and were not accompanied by the  

Police.   A  number  of  such  medico  legal  case  sheets  have  been  

placed  on  record  with  similar  notings.   I  do  not  consider  it  

necessary to discuss each and every medico legal enquiry sheet or  

medico  legal  report.   It  is  clear  from the  bare  reading  of  these  

reports that most of the persons who were taken to the hospital had  

suffered  injuries  on  their  hands,  back,  thighs  etc.  and  were  

complaining of pain and tenderness which was duly noticed by the  

doctors in these reports.

132. Constable Satpal had also gone to the hospital.  According to  

him, he had suffered injury ‘a contusion’ as a result of stone pelting  

at the Ramlila Maidan.  Copies of medico legal enquiry register in  

relation to other Police  officers have  also been placed on record.  

Some  Police  personnel  had  also  reported  to  Aruna  Asif  Ali  

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Government Hospital, Rajpura, Civil Lines, Delhi and had given the  

history of being beaten by the crowd at Ramlila Maidan.  

133. From these evidence placed on record, it is clear that both, the  

members of the public as well as the Police personnel, had suffered  

injuries.  It is obvious from various affidavits, that a large number  

of  followers  of  Baba  Ramdev  got  injured.   The  number  of  these  

persons was much higher in comparison to that of the Police.  I  

may also notice that in the affidavit filed by the Commissioner of  

Police, it has been stated that the Police officers suffered injuries  

because  of  brick  batting  by  some  members  of  the  gathering  at  

Ramlila  Maidan.   However,  the  affidavit  of  the  Commissioner  of  

Police is totally silent as to how such a large number of persons  

suffered injuries, including plain injuries, cuts, open injuries and  

serious cases like those of Rajbala and Jagat Muni.  According to  

respondent No.4, at least five persons had suffered serious injuries  

including head injury, fracture of  hand, leg and backbone.   This  

included  Dharamveer,  Madanlal  Arya,  Jagdish,  Behen  Rajbala,  

Swami Agnivesh and Jagat Muni, etc.   

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134. If  this  medico  legal  evidence  is  examined  in  light  of  the  

photographs placed on record and the CCTV camera footages,  it  

becomes clear that these injuries could have been caused by lathi  

charge and throwing of stone by the Police as well as the members  

of the gathering.  It cannot be doubted that some members of the  

Police force had taken recourse to  lathi charge and in the normal  

course, a blow from such lathis could cause the injuries, which the  

members of the public had suffered.  

135. I have no hesitation in rejecting the submission on behalf of  

the Police that none of the police personnel lathi charged the people  

present at Ramlila Maidan.   The factum of lathi charge by some of  

the police personnel is demonstrated in the photographs, footages  

of CCTV cameras as well as from the medical evidence on record.  

One Dr. Jasbir has filed an affidavit stating that he had made a call  

from his Cell Phone No. 9818765641 to No. 100 informing them of  

Police assaulting the persons present and the fact that he suffered  

injury as a result of lathi blows on his body.   He had gone to Lok  

Nayak Hospital where he was medically examined.    This medical  

record shows that he was assaulted by the Police in Baba Ramdev’s  121

rally where he sustained injuries.   The injuries were described as  

contusion injuries,  one  of  which,  on the  lumber region and was  

advised x-ray.   Even in some of the other medical records produced  

before this Court, it has been recorded that injuries were caused by  

blunt objects.   This will go to show that they were not the injuries  

caused merely by fall  or simply stampede.    The veracity of  this  

affidavit  was  challenged  on  the  ground  that  it  has  been  filed  

belatedly  and it  was not  supported by any other  record.    Both  

these aspects lose their significance because in the Police log book  

filed on record, call from this number has been shown, secondly,  

the medical record of Dr. Jasbir has been placed on record.  Also,  

the injuries received by the members of the Police force are of the  

kind which could be caused by brick batting.  It is further possible  

that because of commotion, confusion and fear that prevailed at the  

stage during midnight and particularly when people were sleeping,  

the  injuries  could  also  have  been  suffered  due  to  stampede.  

According to the Police, Rajbala probably had suffered the fracture  

of the cervical as she fell from the stage and fell unconscious.  This  

version does not find support from the CCTV footages inasmuch as  

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that no elderly lady at all  is seen on the stage during the entire  

episode shown to the Court.  But, the fact of the matter is that she  

suffered serious injuries which ultimately resulted in her death.  It  

could be that she received injury during use of lathis by the Police  

or when the crowd rushed as a result of firing of teargas shells, etc.

136. The Police do not appear to have carried her on the stretcher  

or helped her in providing transportation to the hospital.   Precisely  

who is to be blamed entirely and what compensation, if any, she is  

entitled to receive and from whom, will have to be examined by the  

court  of  competent  jurisdiction  before  whom  the  proceedings,  if  

any, are taken by the persons entitled to do so and in accordance  

with law.  Certain disputed questions of fact arise in this regard  

and they cannot be decided by the court finally without granting  

opportunity to the appropriate parties to lead oral and documentary  

evidence, as the case may be.   For the purposes of  the present  

petition, it is sufficient for me to note that,  prima facie, it was the  

negligence and a limited abuse of power by the police that resulted  

in injuries and subsequent death of  Smt. Rajbala.   Thus,  in my  

considered  view,  at  least  some  ad  hoc  compensation  should  be  

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awarded to the heirs of the deceased and other injured persons as  

well.

137. At this juncture, I would take note of the affidavits filed by the  

parties.   In  the  affidavit  dated  6th July,  2011  filed  on  behalf  of  

Respondent No. 4, it has been specifically stated in paragraph 17:

“It must be noted that as per the directions of  the Police, only one entry/exit gate was being  kept open and this gate was manned by the  police  themselves,  who  were  screening  each  and every person who entered the  premises.  There  was  no  disturbance  or  altercation  whatsoever  and  followers  of  Baba  Ramdevji  were  peacefully  waiting  in  queues  that  stretched for over two kilometers.  If the Police  wanted to limit the number of participants to  5000 or to any other number, they could easily  have done so at the gate itself.  However, they  made no attempt to either curtail the entry of  persons  or  to  prevent  the  fast  from  proceeding.”

138. Though an affidavit subsequent to this date has been filed on  

behalf  of  the  Police,  there  is  no  specific  denial  or  any  counter  

version stated therein in this regard.  This averment made in the  

affidavit of the Respondent No.4 appears to be correct inasmuch as  

vide its letter dated 2nd June, 2011, while granting the permission  124

for  holding  the  rally  at  Ramlila  Maidan,  a  condition  had  been  

imposed that all  persons entering the Ramlila Maidan should be  

subjected to frisking and personal  search.  Furthermore, map of  

layout of  the Ramlila  Maidan filed by the learned  amicus clearly  

shows  that  there  was  one  public  entry  gate/public  check-in,  in  

addition to the two gates for the VIP check-in, which were towards  

the stage.  The public entry was towards the Sharbia Road.  From  

this,  it  is  clear  and  goes  in  line  with  the  situation  at  the  site,  

exhibited  by  the  photographs  or  the  CCTV  Cameras  at  least  

partially, that there was only one main entry for the public which  

was being managed by the Police.

139. Even according to the Police, it was a huge enclosure of nearly  

2.5 lakh sq. feet and it had various exits which, of course, were  

kept closed and there was a ceiling all over. A tent of this size with  

the ceiling thereon, was an enclosure, where such large number of  

persons  had  gathered  to  participate  in  the  yoga  camp  and  

thereafter, in the Anshan.   

140. It  is  the  version  of  the  Police  that  they  had  issued  prior  

warning, then used water cannons and only thereafter, used the  125

teargas shells in response to the brick-batting by the members of  

the gathering present behind the stage.  This stand of the Police  

does not inspire confidence.  Firstly, it has nowhere been recorded  

in the CCTV footages that they made any public announcement of  

the revocation of the permissions and the passing of order under  

Section 144 Cr.P.C. and requested the people present to leave the  

Ramlila Maidan.  Of course, it is clear from the record before this  

Court that effort was made by the Police officers, who had a talk  

with the representatives of respondent no. 4 as well, for service of  

order on Baba Ramdev, who did not accept the order and jumped  

into the crowd in order to avoid the service of order as well as his  

exit from the Ramlila Maidan.  The stand taken by the Police in  

para 24 of its affidavit is that they apprehended a backlash if they  

made  the  announcements  themselves  and,  therefore,  they  

approached the organizers to inform the public over the PA system.  

This itself is not in accordance with the Guidelines framed by the  

Police  for  execution  of  such  orders.   The  Standing  Order  309  

contemplates  that  there  should  be  display  of  banner  indicating  

promulgation  of  Section  144  Cr.P.C.,  repeated  use  of  Public  

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Address  system  by  a  responsible  officer-appealing/advising  the  

leaders and demonstrators to remain peaceful and come forward for  

memorandum, their deputation etc. or court arrest peacefully and  

requires  such  announcement  to  be  videographed.   It  further  

contemplates that if the crowd does not follow the appeal and turns  

violent, then the assembly should be declared as unlawful on the  

PA System and the same should be videographed.  Warning on PA  

system prior to use of any kind of force is to be ensured and also  

videographed.  I find that there is hardly any compliance to these  

terms of this Standing Order.   

141. Use of water cannons by the Police is again a myth.  As I have  

already noticed from the Police logbook there was only one water  

cannon  available  which  was  positioned  at  the  VIP  entrance.  

Furthermore, even the CCTV camera footages or the photographs  

do not show any use of water cannons.  I  see no reason for the  

Police for not making preferential use of water cannons to disperse  

the crowd even if they had come to the conclusion that it was an  

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unlawful assembly and it was not possible to disperse the crowd  

without use of permissible force in the prescribed manner.

142. There  is  a serious dispute  as to whether the teargas shells  

were fired in response to the brick-batting by the members of the  

assembly  from behind  the  stage  or  was  it  in  the  reverse  order.  

The photographs show that there was a temporary structure behind  

the stage where bricks were lying and the same were collected and  

thrown from there.  The CCTV Camera No.  5 clearly shows that  

some  members  of  the  assembly  (followers  of  Baba  Ramdev)  

collected the bricks and then threw the bricks at the Police towards  

the stage.  The first teargas shell was fired at about 2.20 a.m. The  

first  brick  probably  was  thrown from behind  the  stage  by  Baba  

Ramdev’s followers approximately at 2.12 a.m.  The teargas shells  

were also fired during this time.  Before that, some members of the  

Police force had used sticks or lathi charged on the people to move  

them out of the Ramlila Maidan.  Some photographs clearly show  

the  Police  personnel  hitting  the  members  of  the  assembly  with  

sticks.  The exact  time of  these  incidents  is  not  available  on the  

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photographs.   The  firing  of  teargas  shells  created  greater  

commotion and fear in the minds of the members of the gathering.  

The violence on the part of the Police increased with the passage of  

time and the Police retaliated to the bricks hurled at them by the  

members  of  the  assembly  with  greater  anger  and  force.   This  

resulted in injuries to both sides and serious injuries to some of the  

people and resultant death of one of the members of the public.   

143. The persons at the realm of affairs of the Police force have to  

take a decision backed by their wisdom and experience whether to  

use force or exercise greater control and restraint while dispersing  

an assembly.  They are expected and should have some freedom of  

objectively assessing the situation at the site.  But in all events, this  

would be a crucial decision by the concerned authorities.  In the  

present case,  the temptation to use  force has prevailed over the  

decision to  exercise  restraint.    Rule  14.56 of  the  Punjab Police  

Rules  (which  are  applicable  to  Delhi)  provides  that  the  main  

principle to be observed is that the degree of force employed shall  

be  regulated  according  to  the  circumstances  of  each case.   The  

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object  of  the  use  of  force  should  be  to  quell the disturbance  of  

peace  or  to  disperse  the  assembly  which  threatens  such  

disturbance  and  has  either  refused  to  disperse  or  shows  a  

determination  not  to  disperse.   Standing  Order  152  deals  

particularly  with the  use  of  tear  smoke  in dispersal  of  unlawful  

assemblies and processions.   This Standing Order concerns with  

various  aspects  prior  as  well  as  steps  which are  required  to  be  

taken at the time of use of tear smoke.  It requires that before tear  

smoke action is commenced, a suitable position should be selected  

for the squad, if circumstances permit, forty yards away from the  

crowd.   A regular warning by the  officer  should  be  issued while  

firing the tear smoke shells, the speed of wind, area occupied by the  

crowd  and the  temper  of  the  crowd,  amongst  others,  should  be  

taken into consideration.  It states that apparently the object of use  

of force should be to prevent disturbance of peace or to disperse an  

unlawful assembly which threatens such disturbance.   

144. Normally, it is not advisable to use tear smoke shells in an  

enclosure.  They should be fired away from the crowd rather than  

into the crowd.  Unfortunately, the guidelines and even matters of  130

common prudence  have  not  been taken into  consideration while  

firing  the  teargas  shells.  The  Police  Force  and,  at  least,  some  

members of the Police Force, have failed to execute the orders in  

accordance with the standing orders and have failed to take various  

steps  that  were  required to  be  taken including use  of  minimum  

force, videography of the event, display of banner, announcement  

into the PA system etc.    Similarly,  some members of  the Force  

when  incited  by  provocation  or  injury,  used  excessive  force,  

including use of teargas.  It is also clear from the photographs and  

the  CCTV  Cameras  that  some  members  of  the  Force  inflicted  

injuries by indulging in uncalled for  lathi charge and by throwing  

stones on the public.  It is evident that  lathi  charge against those  

persons  was  not  called  for.   For  example,  in  one  of  the  CCTV  

Cameras, one individual is surrounded by four-five members of the  

Force  and  then  a  Police  personnel  used  canning  against  that  

individual.

145. I  will  proceed on the basis that teargas shells  were fired in  

retaliation to the brick-batting by the crowd.  Even in that event,  

the  Police  should  have  made  proper  announcements.  The  Police  131

had  sufficient  preparedness  to  protect  itself  against  such  attack  

and they should have fired the teargas shells to the site from where  

the bricks were coming rather than in front and on the stage.  Once  

the teargas shells were fired into the tent where large number of  

people were present, it was bound to result in injuries and harm to  

the public at large.  If  the authorities had taken the decision to  

disperse  the  crowd  by  use  of  teargas,  then  they  should  have  

implemented that decision with due care and precautions that they  

are required to take under the relevant guidelines and Rules.  It  

was primarily the firing of the teargas shells and use of cane sticks  

against the crowd that resulted in stampede and injuries to a large  

number of people.  

146. Admittedly, when the Police had entered the tent, the entire  

assembly was sleeping.   It  is not reflected in the affidavit  of  the  

Police  as  to  what  conditions  existed  at  that  time compelling  the  

authorities to use force.  This, in the opinion of the Court, was a  

crucial juncture and the possibility of requiring the members of the  

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assembly to disperse peacefully in the morning hours was available  

with the authorities.

147. This certainly does not mean that throwing of bricks upon the  

Police  by  the  members  of  the  assembly  can  be  justified  on  any  

ground.  The few persons who were behind the stage and threw the  

bricks, either from the corner of the stage or from behind the stage,  

are guilty of the offence that they have committed. Nothing absolves  

them of the criminal liability that entails their actions.  Even if tear  

smoke shells were fired by the Police first, still the crowd had no  

justification to throw bricks at the Police and cause hurt to some of  

the Policemen. The Police had a duty to keep a watch on the people  

from the point of view of maintaining the law and order. It appears  

that  firing  of  teargas  shells  in  the  direction  of  the  crowd  was  

contrary  to  the  guidelines  and  it  led  to  some  people  getting  

breathless  and  two  of  them  falling  unconscious.   This  also  

prevented the people  present there from reaching the exit  gates.  

Similarly, some of the followers of respondent no.4 became unruly  

and used smoke to create a curtain in front of themselves, before  

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they started throwing bricks at  the  Police.   In  the  process,  they  

injured their fellow participants as well as the Police personnel. The  

teargas shells also caused fire on the stage, as is demonstrated in  

CCTV camera No. 31 at about 2.22 a.m., and confirmed by various  

news  report  footages.    It  shows  that  there  was  lack  of  fire  

extinguishing systems.  The teargas shells also caused fire in an  

enclosure  with  cloth  material  which  could  have  caught  fire  that  

might  have  spread  widely  causing  serious  bodily  injuries  to  the  

people present.  Undoubtedly, large Police force was present on the  

site and even if it had become necessary, it could have dispersed  

the crowd with exercise of greater restraint and patience.

148. The Police Force has failed to act in accordance with the Rules  

and Standing Orders.  Primarily, negligence is attributable to some  

members of the force.  The Police, in breach of their duty, acted  

with uncontrolled force.   The orders were passed arbitrarily by the  

concerned authorities and, thus, they are to be held responsible for  

the  consequences  in  law.  As  discussed  in  this  judgment,  

respondent  No.  4,  its  members  and  Baba  Ramdev  committed  

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breach  of  their  legal  and  moral  duty  and  acted  with  negligence  

contributing  to  the  unfortunate  incident  rendering  themselves  

liable for legal consequences resulting therefrom.

149. I may further notice that the conduct of the representatives of  

Respondent No.4, as well as of Baba Ramdev in jumping from the  

stage  into  the  crowd,  while  declining  to  accept  the  orders  and  

implement them, is contrary to the basic rule of law as well as the  

legal and moral duty that they were expected to adhere to.  Thus,  

they have to be held guilty of breach of these legal and moral duties  

as Injuria non excusat injuriam.  

150. Now,  I  may have  a  look  at  the  genuineness/validity  of  the  

‘threat perception’ which formed the basis for passing of the said  

orders by the State/Police.  I have referred to this aspect in some  

detail above and suffice it to note here that till 3rd June, 2011, none  

of  the  authorities  had  considered  it  appropriate  to  revoke  the  

permission and pass an order under Section 144 Cr.P.C.  On the  

contrary, the authorities had required the organizers to take more  

stringent  measures  for  proper  security.   They  had also  drawn a  135

proper  deployment  plan.   It  appears  that  failure  of  negotiations  

between the Government and Baba Ramdev at Hotel Claridges on  

3rd June, 2011, left its shadow on the decision-making power of the  

Police.  This proved to be the turning point of the entire episode.  If  

the  Police  had  apprehended  that  large  number  of  persons  may  

assemble at the Ramlila Maidan, this could have been foreseen as a  

security threat.  Therefore, the proper method for the authorities  

would  have  been  to  withdraw the  permissions  well  in  time  and  

enforce them peacefully.  It has been left to the imagination of the  

Court  as to  what  were  the  circumstances  that  led to passing  of  

orders revoking permission and particularly when even the MCD  

had  not  cancelled  or  revoked  its  permission  in  favour  of  

Respondent No.4 to continue with its activity till 20th June, 2011.  

Great emphasis was placed, on behalf of the Police, upon the fact  

that  the  representatives  of  Respondent  No.4  had  not  given  the  

correct information to the Police.  This again does not describe the  

correct  state  of  affairs.   The  Intelligence  Agencies  had  given  all  

requisite information to Delhi Police and after taking the same into  

consideration, Delhi Police had passed orders on 2nd and 3rd June,  

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2011 requiring the organizers to take certain precautionary steps.  

Another interesting fact, that I must notice, is that as early as on  

20th May, 2011, representatives of Respondent No. 4 had written to  

the Additional Commissioner of Police vide Annexure R3 informing  

them that Baba Ramdev is going on a hunger strike till death from  

4th June,  2011 against the issue of  corruption and other related  

serious  issues.   Hundreds  of  satyagrahis were  providing  their  

support  to  him  in  this  hunger-strike  and  consent  for  that  was  

asked.  The letter written by Baba Ramdev to the Prime Minister of  

the  country  had also  been attached  along  with this  letter.   The  

Police  was aware of  the number of  persons who might assemble  

and the activity that was likely to be carried on at Ramlila Maidan  

as well as Jantar Mantar.  Still, after the receipt of the letter, the  

Police took no steps to cancel the permission specifically and the  

permissions granted continued to be in force.  It was for the police  

authorities or the administration to place on record the material to  

show  that  there  was  a  genuine  threat  or  reasonable  bias  of  

communal  disharmony,  social  disorder  and  public  tranquility  or  

harmony on the night of 4th June, 2011.  However, no such material  

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has  been  placed  before  this  Court.  Right  from  Babulal  Parate  

(supra), this Court has taken a consistent view that the provisions  

of Section 144 Cr.P.C. cannot be resorted to merely on imaginary or  

likely possibility or likelihood or tendency of a threat.  It has not to  

be  a  mere  tentative  perception  of  threat  but  a  definite  and  

substantiated  one.   I  have  already  recorded  that  none  of  the  

concerned  authorities,  in  their  wisdom,  had  stated  that  they  

anticipated such disturbance to public tranquility and social order  

that  there  was  any  need  for  cancellation  of  the  permissions  or  

imposition of a restriction under Section 144 Cr.P.C. as late as till  

10.40  p.m.  on  4th June,  2011,  which  then  was  sought  to  be  

executed forthwith.   

151. There  is a direct as well  as implied responsibility  upon the  

Government to function openly and in public interest.  Each citizen  

of India is entitled to enforce his fundamental  rights against the  

Government,  of  course,  subject  to any reasonable  restrictions as  

may be imposed under law.  The Government can, in larger public  

interest,  take  a  decision  to  restrict  the  enforcement  of  freedom,  

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however, only for a valid,  proper and justifiable  reason.  Such a  

decision cannot be arbitrary or capricious.   

152. Another important facet of exercise of such power is that such  

restriction has to be enforced with least invasion.  I am unable to  

understand and, in fact, there is nothing on record which explains  

the  extra-ordinary  emergency that  existed  on midnight  of  4th/5th  

June, 2011 which led the police  to resort to waking up sleeping  

persons,  throwing  them  out  of  the  tents  and  forcing  them  to  

disperse using force, cane sticks, teargas shells and brick-batting.  

I am also unable to understand as to why this enforcement could  

not even wait till early next morning i.e. 5th June, 2011.  This is a  

very crucial factor and the onus to justify this was upon the State  

and the Police and I have no hesitation in noticing that they have  

failed to discharge this onus.  This decision, whether taken by the  

Police itself or, as suggested by the learned  amicus, taken at the  

behest of the people in power and the Ministry of Home Affairs, was  

certainly  amiss  and  a  decision  which  is  arbitrary  and  

unsustainable,  would  remain  so,  irrespective  of  the  number  of  

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persons or the hierarchy of  the persons in the  Government who  

have passed the said decision.  I find no error with the Police, to  

working  in  tandem  or  cooperation  with  the  Ministry  of  Home  

Affairs, which itself is responsible for maintaining the law and order  

in the country.  I also have to notice that as per the stand taken by  

all  the  parties  before  this  Court,  it  remains  a  fact  that  no  

announcement was made on the midnight of 4th/5th June, 2011 to  

the huge gathering sleeping to disperse peacefully from the Ramlila  

Maidan.   It  was  an  obligation  of  the  Police  to  make  repeated  

announcements  and  help  the  people  to  disperse.   The  Police,  

admittedly,  did  not  make  any  such  announcements  because  it  

anticipated a backlash.  Baba Ramdev and other representatives of  

Respondent No. 4 also did not make such an announcement, but  

Baba Ramdev asserted that he would leave only if the people and  

the followers wanted him to leave.  I am unable to appreciate this  

kind  of  attitude  from both  sides.   It  was  primarily  an  error  of  

performance of duty by both sides and the ultimate sufferer was the  

public at large.   

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153. It  is  true  and,  without  hesitation,  I  notice  that  the  CCTV  

cameras  and  other  documents  do  show that  some  of  the  Police  

personnel  had  behaved  with  courtesy  and  kindness  with  the  

members of the gathering and had even helped them to disperse  

and leave the Ramlila Maidan.  At the same time, some others had  

misbehaved, beaten the people with brutality and caused injuries  

to the public present at the Ramlila Maidan.  Thus, I cannot blame  

the entire Police Force in this regard.   

154. The  learned  amicus raised  another  issue  that  the  Home  

Secretary, Union of India and the Chief Secretary, Delhi had not  

filed proper affidavits in relation to the incident.  In fact, the Home  

Secretary did not file any affidavit till this was raised as an issue by  

the learned counsel appearing for Respondent No.4.  Factually, it is  

correct.  The affidavits filed by the Chief Secretary, Delhi as well as  

the Home Secretary are not proper in their form and content.  The  

Home Secretary, on the one hand stated that he had taken charge  

of  the post with effect from 21st July, 2011, while,  on the other,  

admitted  that  he  had  received  the  report  from  the  Special  

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Commissioner of Police.  He further stated that it is not the practice  

of  the  Ministry  to  confirm the  grant  of  such  permission.   His  

affidavit is at variance with the affidavit of the Police Commissioner.  

According to him, the entry of  large number of  persons posed a  

threat  to  the  gathering,  such  as,  likely  stampede  and  entry  of  

unruly  elements  into  the  crowd.   Both  these  circumstances,  as  

noticed above, do not stand even remotely to reason. Further, I am  

somewhat surprised at the insensitivity reflected in the following  

lines  stated  in  the  affidavit  of  the  Home  Secretary,  ‘I  state  and  

submit  that  the  facts  suggest  that  the  injuries  to  a  few (out  of  

thousands gathered as per report)  are said to have been caused  

due  to  minor  stampede  and  that  there  was  no  manhandling  of  

women, elderly persons or children.  There were 03 women Police  

officers of the rank of Deputy Commissioner of Police on duty’.  I  

have no hesitation in observing that it is the duty of the State to  

ensure  that  each  and  every  citizen  of  the  country  is  protected.  

Safety of his person and property is the obligation of the State and  

his right.  In view of the affidavit filed by the Police Commissioner,  

where he has owned the entire responsibility for the entire Police  

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hierarchy,  I  do  not  propose  to  attach  much  significance  to  this  

contention.  According  to  the  Commissioner,  he  informed  the  

Additional  Secretary  in  the  Ministry  of  Home  Affairs  of  the  

developments  and  the  latter  might  have  informed  the  higher  

authorities in the said Ministry.  I also find no need to enter into  

this controversy because there is no legal impediment or infirmity  

in Delhi Police working in coordination and consultation with the  

Ministry of Home Affairs as none of them can absolve themselves of  

the  liability  of  maintaining  social  order,  public  tranquility  and  

harmony.    

155. Mr.  P.H.  Parekh,  learned  senior  advocate  appearing  for  the  

Government of  NCT Delhi,  submitted that the power to issue an  

order  under  Section  144  Cr.P.C.  is  vested  in  the  Assistant  

Commissioner of Police in terms of notification dated 9th September,  

2010 issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India  

under sub-section(1)(a) of Section 17 of the DP Act.  It is further  

submitted  that  in  terms  of  Article  239AA(3)(a),  the  Legislative  

Assembly of the NCT Delhi has legislative competence to enact laws  

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on  any  matter  as  applicable  to  the  Union  Territory  except  in  

relation  to  fields  stated  at  Entries  1,  2  and 18  of  List  II  of  the  

Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India.  Thus, the matters  

relating  to  Police,  land  and  public  order  do  not  fall  within  the  

legislative  and  administrative  power  of  the  Government  of  NCT  

Delhi.  The Home Secretary, in his affidavit, on the other hand, has  

stated  that  the  Ministry  of  Home  Affairs  neither  directed  nor  is  

consulted by Delhi Police in such Police measures which are to be  

taken  with  a  view  to  keep  the  law  and  order  situation  under  

control.  He also stated that it is not the practice of the Ministry to  

confirm the matters of grant of such permissions.  I am unable to  

see  any merit  in  these  submissions  or  for  that  matter  even  the  

purpose of such submissions.  The Ministry of Home Affairs, Delhi  

Government and the Police are not at cross purposes in relation to  

the  questions  of  social  order  and  law  and  order.   It  is  their  

cumulative responsibility.  The lists in the Seventh Schedule to the  

Constitution are fields of  legislation.  They are unconnected with  

the  executive  action of  the present kind.   The Ministry of  Home  

Affairs, Union of India is not only responsible for maintaining the  

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law and order but is also the supervisory and controlling authority  

of the entire Indian Police Services.  It is the duty of the Union to  

keep  its  citizens  secure  and  protected.   Thus,  I  consider  it  

unnecessary to express any view on this argument advanced by Mr.  

P.H. Parekh.

The  scope  of  an  order  made  under  Section  144 Cr.P.C.,  its  implications and infirmities with reference to the facts of the  case in hand  

156. By reference to various judgments of  this Court at the very  

outset  of  this  judgment,  I  have  noticed  that  an order  passed in  

anticipation  by  the  Magistrate  empowered  under  Section  144  

Cr.P.C.  is  not  an  encroachment  of  the  freedom  granted  under  

Articles  19(1)(a)  and  19(1)(b)  of  the  Constitution  and  it  is  not  

regarded as an unreasonable restriction.  It is an executive order,  

open  to  judicial  review.   In  exercise  of  its  executive  power  the  

executive  authority,  by a written order and upon giving material  

facts, may pass an order issuing a direction requiring a person to  

abstain from doing certain acts or take certain actions/orders with  

respect  to  certain  properties  in  his  possession,  if  the  officer  

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considers that such an order is likely to prevent or tends to prevent  

obstruction, annoyance or injury to any other person.  On the bare  

reading of the language of Section 144 Cr.P.C., it is clear that the  

entire basis of an action under this Section is the ‘urgency of the  

situation’  and  the  power  therein  is  intended  to  be  availed  for  

preventing  ‘disorder,  obstruction and annoyance’,  with a view to  

secure the public weal by maintaining public peace and tranquility.  

In the case of Gulam Abbas v. State of Uttar Pradesh [AIR 1981 SC  

2198],  the  Court  clearly stated that preservation of  public  peace  

and tranquility is the primary function of the Government and the  

aforesaid power is conferred on the executive.  In a given situation,  

a private right must give in to public interest.

157. The  Constitution  mandates  and  every  Government  is  

constitutionally committed to the idea of socialism, secularism and  

public tranquility.   The regulatory mechanism contemplated under  

different laws is intended to further the cause of this constitutional  

obligation.   An order under Section 144 Cr.P.C., though primarily  

empowers the executive authorities to pass prohibitory orders vis-

à-vis  a  particular  facet,  but  is  intended  to  serve  larger  public  146

interest.   Restricted dimensions of the provisions are to serve the  

larger interest, which at the relevant time, has an imminent threat  

of  being  disturbed.    The  order  can  be  passed  when immediate  

prevention or speedy remedy is desirable.   The legislative intention  

to  preserve  public  peace  and  tranquility  without  lapse  of  time,  

acting urgently, if warranted, giving thereby paramount importance  

to the social needs by even overriding temporarily, private rights,  

keeping  in  view  the  public  interest,  is  patently  inbuilt  in  the  

provisions under Section 144 Cr.P.C.  

158. Primarily, the MCD owns the Ramlila Maidan and, therefore,  

is holding this property as a public trustee.   The MCD had given  

permission to use the Ramlila Maidan for holding  yoga shivir and  

allied activities with effect from 1st June, 2011 to 20th June, 2011.  

The  Police  had  also  granted  permission  to  organize  the  yoga  

training  session  at  Ramlila  Maidan for  the  same  period  vide  its  

letter dated 25th April, 2011.   The permission was granted subject  

to the conditions that there should not be any obstruction to the  

normal  flow of  traffic,  sufficient  number of  volunteers should  be  

deployed at the venue of the training camp, permission should be  147

sought from the land owning agency and all other instructions that  

may  be  given  by  the  Police  from  time  to  time  should  be  

implemented.   Lastly, that such permission could be revoked at  

any time.

159. Vide letter dated 27th May, 2011, the Deputy Commissioner of  

Police, Central District, had sought clarification from the President  

of respondent No. 4 that the permission had been granted only for  

holding a  yoga training camp for 4000 to 5000 persons, but the  

posters and pamphlets circulated by the said respondent indicated  

that  they  intended  to  mobilize  25,000  persons  to  support  Baba  

Ram Dev’s indefinite fast at Ramlila Maidan, which was contrary to  

the permission sought for.  Respondent No. 4, vide letter dated 28 th  

May, 2011, reiterated and re-affirmed its earlier letter dated 20 th  

April, 2011 and stated that there would be no programme at all,  

except the residential  yoga camp.   Keeping in view the facts and  

the attendant circumstances,  the Deputy Commissioner of  Police  

(Central District) vide his letter dated 1st June, 2011, informed the  

office  bearers  of  respondent  No.  4  that  in  view  of  the  current  

scenario  and  the  law  and  order  situation  prevailing,  they  were  148

required to make adequate  arrangements for screening of  people  

visiting  the  Ramlila  Maidan for  yoga  shivir  and  directed  further  

arrangements to be made as per the instructions contained in that  

letter.   It was noticed in the letter of the DCP that a specialized tent  

of an area of 2,50,000 sq. ft. was to be erected, a dais was to be  

constructed and structures erected were to be duly certified from  

the  authorized  agency.  It  was  also,  inter  alia,  stated  that  no  

provocative speech or shouting of slogan should be allowed and no  

fire arms,  lathis or swords should be allowed in the function and  

CCTV cameras should also be installed.  It was further stated that  

the Trust was to abide by all  the directions issued by the SHO.  

Again,  on  2nd June,  2011,  a  letter  was  written  by  the  Deputy  

Commissioner  of  Police  noticing  certain  drawbacks  in  the  

arrangements  made  by  the  Trust  and  reiterating  the  directions  

passed vide letter dated 1st June, 2011.  It was required that the  

Trust should keep the gathering within the permissible limits and  

make necessary arrangements for checking/frisking of participants  

and placing of volunteers in requisite areas.  It was also indicated  

that if the compliance is not made, permission shall be subject to  

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review.   Certain inputs given by the Special Branch of Delhi Police  

on  30th May,  2011  stated  that  Baba  Ramdev  planned  to  hold  

indefinite  hunger  strike  along  with 30,000 to  35,000 supporters  

with effect from 4th June, 2011, the birth anniversary of Maharana  

Pratap, at the Ramlila Maidan.    As per that report, the protest was  

on the following issues:

“1. To bring the black money worth Rs. for 400  lakhs crores, which is national property.

2.  To demand the legislation of strong Lokpal  Bill to remove corruption completely.

3.  Removal  of  foreign  governing  system  in  independent  India  so  that  everyone  can  get  social and economic justice.”  

160. It was further stated that the gathering may exceed 1 lakh.  

The  letter  also  indicated  that  some  of  the  workers  would  

straightaway reach Jantar  Mantar  on 4th June,  2011 and would  

submit memorandum to the President and the Prime Minister of  

India.    Expressing  the  apprehensions  on these  outputs,  it  was  

indicated in the Report as under:-

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“The volunteers of  the said organizations are  well dedicated, tech savvy and using Laptops  in their routine working, with sound financial  status of the organization, the possibility of the  gathering of about 1 lakh, as claimed by the  organizers, cannot be ruled out.

Any minor incident at the venue not only may  affect  law  and  order  situation  but  also  may  affect  peace  in  the  city  creating  serious  law  and order problems.   Local Police, therefore,  will have to be extra vigilant.   The possibility  of  some  agent  provocation  or  subversive  elements  attempting  to  cause  disturbance/sabotage  by  merging  with  the  crowds would also need to be kept in mind.   It  should  also  be  noted  that  as  per  reliable  inputs, large congregations continue to remain  the top targets of terrorists.”

161. The  Special  Branch,  thus,  suggested  taking  of  some  

precautions like making of adequate security arrangements by the  

local Police, deployment of quick response teams, ambulances, fire  

tenders,  etc. and to  deploy  sufficient  number  of  traffic  Police  

personnel  to ensure  smooth flow of  traffic  around Raj Ghat Red  

Light, Ramlila Maidan etc. and concluded as under:-

“Therefore,  a  sharp  vigil,  adequate  arrangements  by  local  police,  PCR,  Traffic  Police  are  suggested  at  and  near  Ramlila  Ground, R.S. Fly-over, enroute, Jantar Mantar  

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to  avoid  any  untoward  incident.   Further,  Delhi-UP/Haryana  Borders  need  to  be  sensitized.”

162. As is obvious from the above letters and the reports, nobody  

had suggested cancellation of the permission granted by the land  

owning authority or the Police  for continuation of the activity by  

respondent No. 4, though they were aware of all the facts.   The  

Central District of Delhi Police, on 2nd June, 2011 itself, noticed all  

the  factors  and  made  a  report  with  regard  to  the  Police  

arrangements at the Ramlila Maidan.    Amongst others, it stated  

the following objectives:-

“1.All  the  persons  will  gain  entry  through  DFMDs.

2.  Every  person  will  be  searched/frisked  thoroughly  to  ensure  the  security  of  VIPs/high  dignitaries,  Govt.  property  and  general public etc.

3.   To ensure clear passage to VIPs and their  vehicles with the assistance of traffic police.

4.   To  ensure  that  the  function  is  held  without interruption.

5.   To  keep  an  eye  on  persons  moving  in  suspicious circumstances.

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6.   Brief-cases,  lighters,  matches,  bags,  umbrellas,  tiffin-boxes  etc.  be  prohibited  to  be taken by the audience inside the ground.  Special  attention  will  be  paid  on  minor  crackers, inside the ground.

7.    The  area  of  responsibility  will  be  thoroughly  checked  by  the  Zonal/Sector  officers.

8.   To  maintain  law  and  order  during  the  function.”

163. In  this  report  itself,  it  had  worked  out  the  details  of  

deployment, patrolling, timing of duties, supervision and assembly  

points etc.   In other words, on 2nd June, 2011, the Police, after  

assessing the entire situation, had neither considered it appropriate  

to cancel the permissions nor to pass an order under Section 144  

Cr.P.C.    On  the  basis  of  the  input  reports,  the  Joint  Deputy  

Director, Criminare, had asked for proper security arrangements to  

be made for Baba Ramdev in furtherance to which the security of  

Baba Ramdev was upgraded.   

164. In furtherance to the permission granted, the yoga shivir was  

held and a large number of persons participated therein. All went  

well till 3rd June, 2011 and it is nobody’s case before the Court that  

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any conditions were violated or there was any threat, much less  

imminent threat, to public peace and tranquility.   The yoga camp  

carried its activities for those days.

165. As  already  noticed,  Baba  Ramdev  had  also  been  granted  

permission to hold a hunger strike/Satyagrah at the Jantar Mantar  

on 4th June, 2011.   The restriction placed was that it should be  

with a very limited gathering.   Further, vide letter dated 26 th May,  

2011,  the  Police  had  reiterated  that  the  number  of  persons  

accompanying Baba Ramdev should not exceed 200.  However, vide  

letter dated 4th June, 2011, the permission granted in relation to  

holding of  dharna at  Jantar  Mantar  was revoked,  in view of  the  

security,  law  and  order  reasons  and  due  to  the  large  gathering  

exceeding the number mentioned in the permission given.   Later,  

on 4th June, 2011, the permission to organize yoga training camp at  

the Ramlila Maidan was also cancelled.    

166. It  was  stated  that  the  activity  being  in  variation  to  the  

permission  granted  and  in  view  of  the  security  scenario  of  the  

capital  city,  it  may be  difficult  for  the  Police  to  maintain  public  

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order and safety.    The organisers were further directed that no  

follower/participant should assemble at the venue or should hold  

hoardings  etc.,  on  that  very  date,  an  order  under  Section  144  

Cr.P.C. was passed.   The order recited that an information had  

been received that some people, groups of people may indulge in  

unlawful activities to disturb the peace and tranquility in the area  

of Sub-Division Kamla Market, Delhi and it was necessary to take  

speedy measures in this regard to save human life, public  order  

safety and tranquility.    This  order was to remain in force for  a  

period of 60 days from the date of its passing.

167. During the course of hearing, it was pointed out before this  

Court  that  the  order  withdrawing  the  permission  was  passed  at  

9.30  p.m.   At  10.30  p.m.,  the  Police  went  to  inform  the  

representatives  of  respondent  No.  4  about  the  withdrawal  of  

permission and subsequently an order under Section 144 Cr.P.C.  

was passed at about 11.30 p.m.  The Police force arrived at the site  

at about 1.00 a.m. and the operation to disperse the crowd started  

at 1.10 a.m. on the midnight of 4th/5th June, 2011.

155

168. It was contended by Mr. Harish Salve, learned senior counsel,  

that  the  decision  to  withdraw  permission  is  an  administrative  

decision taken with political influence.   The Police is to work in co-

ordination with the Government, including the concerned Ministry  

and the Union.    The order,  being an executive  order,  has been  

passed bona fide and keeping in view the larger public interest and  

it is open to respondent No. 4 or the affected parties to challenge  

the said order in accordance with law.  It was also urged that this  

Court may not deal with the merits of the said order, as there is no  

challenge to these orders.   There is no specific challenge raised by  

respondent No. 4 and for that matter by any affected party to the  

orders of withdrawal of  permission and imposition of restrictions  

under Section 144 Cr.P.C.   In this view of the matter, it may not be  

necessary for this Court to examine these orders from that point of  

view.  But the circumstances leading to passing of these orders and  

the necessity of passing such orders with reference to the facts of  

the present case is a matter which has to be examined in order to  

arrive at a final conclusion, as it is the imposition of these orders  

that  has  led  to  the  unfortunate  occurrence  of  4th June,  2011.  

156

Therefore,  while  leaving  the  parties  to  challenge  these  orders  in  

accordance  with  law,  if  they  so  desire,  I  would  primarily  

concentrate on the facts leading to these orders and their relevancy  

for the purposes of passing necessary orders and directions.

169. Though the MCD is the owner of the property in question, but  

still it has no role to play as far as maintenance of law and order is  

concerned.   The constitutional protection available to the citizens  

of  India  for  exercising  their  fundamental  rights  has  a  great  

significance  in our  Constitution.    Article  13  is  indicative  of  the  

significance that the framers of the Constitution intended to attach  

to the fundamental rights of the citizens.   Even a law in derogation  

of the fundamental rights, to that extent, has been declared to be  

void, subject to the provisions of the Constitution.   Thus, wherever  

the State proposes to impose a restriction on the exercise  of  the  

fundamental rights, such restriction has to be reasonable and free  

from  arbitrariness.    It  is  for  the  Court  to  examine  whether  

circumstances existed at the relevant time were of such imminent  

and urgent nature  that it  required passing of  a preventive  order  

within the scope of Section 144 Cr.P.C., on the one hand, and on  

157

the other, of imposing a restriction on exercise of a fundamental  

right  by  respondent  No.4  and  persons  present  therein  by  

withdrawing the permissions granted and enforcing dispersal of the  

gathering at the Ramlila Maidan at such odd hour.   At this stage, it  

will be useful for me to notice another aspect of this case.   Baba  

Ramdev is stated to have arrived in Delhi on 1st June, 2011 and  

four senior ministers of the UPA Government met him at the Airport  

and attempted to persuade him to give up his Anshan in view of the  

Government’s  initiative  on the  issue that he had raised.   Efforts  

were  made  to  dissuade  him  from going  ahead  with  his  hunger  

strike  on  the  ground  that  the  Government  was  trying  to  find  

pragmatic  and  practical  solution  to  tackle  the  agitated  issue.  

Thereafter, as already noticed, a meeting of the ministers and Baba  

Ramdev was held at Hotel Claridges.  However, this meeting was  

not  successful  and  certain  differences  remained  unresolved  

between the representatives of the Government and Baba Ramdev.  

Consequently,  Baba Ramdev decided to continue with his public  

meeting and hunger strike.   Emphasis has been laid on a Press  

Release from the Ministry of Home Affairs stating that a decision  

158

was taken that Baba Ramdev should not be allowed to organize any  

protest and, if persisted, he should be directed to be removed from  

Delhi.

170. These circumstances have to be examined in conjunction with  

the stages of  passing of  the orders under Section 144 Cr.P.C. in  

relation  to  the  withdrawal  of  permission.   Without  commenting  

upon the Intelligence reports relied upon by the Police, the Court  

cannot lose sight of the fact that even the intelligence agency, the  

appropriate quarters in the Government, as well as the Police itself,  

had neither recommended nor taken any decision to withdraw the  

permission granted or to pass an order under Section 144 Cr.P.C.,  

even  till  3rd June,  2011.   On  the  contrary,  after  taking  into  

consideration various factors, it had upgraded the security of Baba  

Ramdev and had required the organizers, respondent No.4, to take  

various other measures to ensure proper security and public order  

at Ramlila Maidan.    

171. It  is  nobody’s  case  that  the  directions  issued  by  the  

appropriate authority as well as the Police had not been carried out  

by the  organisers.    It  is  also nobody’s  case  that  the conditions  159

imposed in the letters granting permission were breached by the  

organisers at any relevant point of time.   Even on 3rd June, 2011,  

the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Central District, who was the  

officer directly concerned with the area in question, had issued a  

restricted  circular  containing  details  of  the  arrangements,  the  

objectives and the requirements which the deployed forces should  

take for smooth organization of the camp at Ramlila Maidan.    The  

threat of  going on a hunger strike extended by Baba Ramdev to  

personify  his  stand  on  the  issues  raised,  cannot  be  termed  as  

unconstitutional or barred under any law.   It is a form of protest  

which  has  been  accepted,  both  historically  and  legally  in  our  

constitutional jurisprudence.   The order passed under Section 144  

Cr.P.C.  does  not  give  any  material  facts  or  such  compelling  

circumstances that would justify the passing of such an order at  

11.30 p.m. on 4th June, 2011.   There should have existed some  

exceptional  circumstances which reflected a clear and prominent  

threat to public order and public tranquility for the authorities to  

pass orders of withdrawal of permission at 9.30 p.m. on 4 th June,  

2011.    What  weighed  so  heavily  with  the  authorities  so  as  to  

160

compel them to exercise such drastic powers in the late hours of  

the night and disperse the sleeping persons with the use of force,  

remains a matter of  guess.   Whatever circumstances have been  

detailed in the affidavit are, what had already been considered by  

the authorities concerned right from 25th May, 2011 to 3rd June,  

2011 and directions in that behalf had been issued.   Exercise of  

such  power,  declining  the  permission  has  to  be  in  rare  and  

exceptional  circumstances,  as  in  the  normal  course,  the  State  

would aid the exercise of fundamental rights rather than frustrating  

them.    

172. Another argument advanced on behalf of respondent No. 4 by  

Mr. Ram Jethmalani is that the Order under Section 144, Cr.P.C. is  

a fraud upon law as it is nothing but abdication of its authority by  

Police at the command of the Home Minister, Mr. P. Chidambaram,  

as  is  evident from his  above-referred statements.    According  to  

him, the Order under Section 144 Cr.P.C., on the one hand, does  

not contain material facts while on the other, issues no directions  

as contemplated under that provision.   Further it is contended that  

the Intelligence inputs as communicated to the Police authorities  161

vide letter dated 3rd June, 2011 had not even been received by the  

ACP.

173. There  is  some  substance  in  this  submission  of  Mr.  Ram  

Jethmalani.   It is clear from Annexure ‘J’ annexed to the affidavit  

of  the  Police  Commissioner  that  the  letter  of  the  Joint  Deputy  

Director dated 3rd June, 2011 referring to threat on Baba Ramdev  

and  asking  the  police  to  review  and  strengthen  the  security  

arrangements, was actually received on 6th June, 2011 in the Office  

of the Commissioner of Police and on 7th June, 2011 in the Office of  

the Joint Commissioner of Police.

174. Thus, it could be reasonably inferred that this input was not  

within the knowledge of the officer concerned.   I do not rule out the  

possibility  of  the  Intelligence  sources  having  communicated  this  

input to the Police  authorities  otherwise  than in writing as well.  

But that would not make much of a difference for the reason that  

as  already  held,  the  Order  under  Section  144  Cr.PC  does  not  

contain material facts and it is also evident from the bare reading of  

the Order that it did not direct Baba Ramdev or respondent No. 4 to  

take certain actions or not take certain actions which is not only  162

the  purpose  but  is  also  the  object  of  passing  an  Order  under  

Section 144, Cr.P.C.

175. Mr. Harish Salve, learned senior counsel, also contended that  

the police had neither abdicated its functions nor acted mala fide.  

The  Police  had  taken  its  decisions  on  proper  assessment  of  the  

situation and bona fide.  Two further affidavits dated 9th January,  

2012 and 10th January,  2012 were  filed on behalf  of  the  Police.  

They were filed by the Additional Deputy Commissioner of Police,  

Central  District  and  Special  Commissioner  of  Police,  Law  and  

Order, Delhi.  These affidavits were filed primarily with an effort to  

clarify the details of the log book, the position of water cannons,  

entries and exit of the tent and number of PCR vans, ambulances  

arranged for evacuation of the gathering.   For example, in the log  

book  dated  5th June,  2011  at  2.14  am,  details  have  been  

mentioned, ‘Police is arresting to Baba Ramdev in which death can  

be caused’.  It is stated that this was not the conversation between  

two Police officers as such but one Vipen Batra, who possessed the  

telephone  8130868526  had  rung  up.   The  PCR  of  the  Police  

informed them of the above fact.  This, in turn, was communicated  

163

by Constable No.8276 of the PCR to the Police Station.  Similarly,  

on  5th June,  2011  at  3:22:53,  another  call  was  received  by  

Constable  Sheetal  No.8174  PCR  from  the  phone  of  one  Shri  

Chander  Mohan  stating  that  policemen  were  beating  people  in  

Ramlila Ground.  These explanations may show that it  were the  

messages received by the PCR vans from private people who had  

left Ramlila Ground but there is nothing on record to show that  

these messages or reports to the PCRs were false.  In fact, such  

calls go to substantiate what has been urged by the learned amicus.  

The affidavits do not improve the case of the Police any further.  As  

far as the question of mala fides is concerned, I have held that this  

action or order was not mala fide.

176. Another important aspect which had been pointed out during  

the course of hearing is that even the map annexed to this affidavit  

of the Police supports what has been stated on behalf of respondent  

No.4 that there was only one main entry and exit for the public.  

The  VIP  entrance  and  VVIP  entrance  cannot  be  construed  as  

entrance  for  the  common  man.   The  other  exits  were  not  

operational owing to commotion, goods lying, fire of tear gas shells  

164

and standing of vehicles outside which were not permitted to move.  

This itself is a factor that goes to show that preparedness on the  

part of the Police was not complete in all respects and also that it  

was  not  the  appropriate  time  to  evict  people  from  the  Ramlila  

Ground.

177. In the affidavit filed by the Police, it has been stated that as a  

large number of persons were expected to gather on the morning of  

5th June, 2011, it was inevitable for the authorities of the State to  

enforce the execution of the order under Section 144 Cr.P.C. and  

the  withdrawal  of  permission  at  the  midnight  itself.   It  is  also  

averred that respondent No. 4 had made certain misrepresentations  

to  the  authorities.   Despite  query  from the  authority,  they  had  

incorrectly  informed  that  only  a  yoga camp  will  be  held  at  the  

premises of Ramlila Maidan, though Baba Ramdev had planned to  

commence his hunger strike from 4th June, 2011 at that place in  

presence of large gathering.    

178. This argument, in my view, does not advance the case of the  

Police any further as Baba Ramdev had already started his fast and  

he, as well as all his followers, were peacefully sleeping when these  165

orders were passed and were sought to be enforced against them.  

The Trust might not have given the exact and correct information to  

the Police but the Police already had inputs from the Intelligence  

Agencies as well as knowledge on its own that a hunger strike, in  

presence  of  large  number of  people,  was to  start  from 4 th June,  

2011, which, in fact, did start.  

179. From the record before this Court, it is not clear as to why the  

State did not expect obedience and cooperation from Baba Ramdev  

in regard to execution of its lawful orders, particularly when after  

withdrawal of the permission for holding dharna at Jantar Mantar,  

Baba Ramdev had accepted the request of the Police not to go to  

Jantar  Mantar  with  his  followers.   The  attendant  circumstances  

appearing  on  record  as  on  3rd June,  2011  did  not  show  any  

intention on their part to flout the orders of the authorities or to  

cause any social disorder or show threat to public tranquility by  

their action.   The doubts reflected in the affidavits  were matters  

which  could  have  been  resolved  or  clarified  by  mutual  

deliberations, as it was done in the past.  The directions issued to  

respondent No.4 on 1st June, 2011 were to ensure proper security  166

of all concerned.  Material facts, imminent threat and requirement  

for  immediate  preventive  steps  should  exist  simultaneously  for  

passing any order under Section 144 Cr.P.C.  The mere change in  

the  purpose  or  in  the  number  of  persons to  be  gathered at  the  

Ramlila  Maidan simplicitor  could  hardly  be  the  cause  of  such a  

grave  concern  for  the  authorities  to  pass  the  orders  late  in  the  

night.  In the Standing Order issued by the Police itself, it has been  

clarified that wherever the gathering is more than 50,000, the same  

may not be permitted at the Ramlila Maidan, but they should be  

offered Burari ground as an alternative.  This itself shows that the  

attempt  on  the  part  of  the  authorities  concerned  should  be  to  

permit such public gathering by allotting them alternative site and  

not  to  cancel  such  meetings.   This,  however,  does  not  seem to  

further the case of the State at all inasmuch as, admittedly, when  

the order was passed and the Police came to the Ramlila Maidan to  

serve the said order, not even 15,000 to 20,000 people were stated  

to  be  present  in  the  shamiana/tent.   In  these  circumstances,  it  

appears  to  me  that  it  was  not  necessary  for  the  executive  

authorities and the Police to pass orders under Section 144 Cr.P.C.  

167

and withdraw the permissions.  The matter could be resolved by  

mutual  deliberation  and  intervention  by  the  appropriate  

authorities.

180. In  view  of  the  affidavits  having  been  filed  on  behalf  of  

Respondent No.3, a person of the rank of Commissioner of Police,  

Delhi, wherein he has owned the responsibility for the events that  

have occurred from 1st June, 2011 to 4th/5th June, 2011, there is no  

reason for this Court to attribute any motive to the said officer that  

he had worked and carried out the will of the people in power.  

181. At the very commencement of hearing of the case, I had made  

it clear to the learned counsel appearing for the parties that the  

scope  of  the  present  petition  is  a  very  limited  one.   This  Court  

would only examine the circumstances that led to the unfortunate  

incident  on  4th June,  2011,  its  consequences  as  well  as  the  

directions that this Court is  called upon to pass in the peculiar  

facts and circumstances of the case.  Therefore, it is not necessary  

for this Court to examine certain contentions raised or sought to be  

raised by the parties as the same may more appropriately be raised  

168

in an independent challenge  to such orders or claim such other  

reliefs  as  they  may  like  to  claim  by  initiating  appropriate  legal  

proceedings.

182. This takes me to an ancillary but pertinent question in context  

of the said ‘discretion’, that is exercisable with regard to the ‘threat  

perception’, for the purposes of passing an order under Section 144  

of  the  Cr.P.C.   The  activities  which,  though  unintended  have  a  

tendency  to  create  disorder  or  disturbance  of  public  peace  by  

resorting  to  violence,  should  invite  the  appropriate  authority  to  

pass orders taking preventive measures.  The intent or the expected  

threat should be imminent.  Some element of certainty, therefore,  

should be traceable in the material facts recorded and the necessity  

for taking such preventive measures.  There has to be an objective  

application of mind to ensure that the constitutional rights are not  

defeated  by  subjective  and arbitrary  exercise  of  power.    Threat  

perception is one of the most relevant considerations and may differ  

as  per  the  perspective  of  different  parties.   In  the  facts  of  the  

present case, the Police have its own threat perception while the  

Trust has its own point of view in that behalf.  As already noticed,  169

according to the Police, Baba Ramev wanted to do Anshan, after the  

negotiations with the Government had failed,  which was not  the  

purpose for which the permission had been granted.  There was a  

possibility of the number of persons swelling upto 50,000 or more.  

There could also be possibility of communal tension as well as a  

threat to Baba Ramdev’s life.  These apprehensions are sought to  

be  dispelled  by  learned  Amicus  curiae stating  that  this  

protest/dharna/anshan is  a  right  covered  under  the  freedom  of  

speech.   The  Ramlila  Maidan has the  capacity  of  50,000,  which  

number,  admittedly,  was  never  reached  and  the  doubts  in  the  

minds  of  the  authority  were  merely  speculative.   The  security  

measures had been baffed up.  Baba Ramdev had been given Z+  

security  and,  therefore,  all  the  apprehensions  of  the  authorities  

were  misplaced,  much  less  that  they  were  real  threats  to  an  

individual or to the public at large.  The perception of the Trust was  

that they were carrying on their anshan and yoga shivir peacefully,  

as law abiding citizens of the country.  No complaint had ever been  

received of any disturbance or breach of public trust.  The events,  

right from January 2011, showed that all the camps and protests  

170

organized by the Trust, under the leadership of Baba Ramdev had  

been  completed  peacefully,  without  any  damage  to  person  or  

property and without any disturbance to anyone.  The action of the  

Police in revoking the permissions as well as that of the executive  

authorities in passing the order under Section 144 Cr.P.C. was a  

colourable exercise of power and was not called for in the facts and  

circumstances of the case.

183. It  is  also  not  understandable  that  if  the  general  ‘threat  

perception’  and  likelihood  of  communal  disharmony  were  the  

grounds for revoking the permission and passing the order under  

Section 144 Cr.P.C., then why the order passed under Section 144  

Cr.P.C.  permitted all other rallies, processions which had obtained  

the  Police  permission  to  go  on  in  the  area  of  the  same  Police  

Division.   The decision, therefore, appears to be contradictory in  

terms.

184. There  is  some  merit  in  the  submissions  of  learned  Amicus  

curiae.   Existence  of  sufficient  ground  is  the  sine  qua  non for  

invoking  the  power  vested  in  the  executive  under  Section  144  

171

Cr.P.C.  It is a very onerous duty that is cast upon the empowered  

officer by the legislature.  The perception of threat should be real  

and not imaginary or a mere likely possibility.  The test laid down  

in this Section is not that of ‘merely likelihood or tendency’.  The  

legislature, in its wisdom, has empowered an officer of the executive  

to discharge this duty with great caution, as the power extends to  

placing a restriction and in certain situations, even a prohibition,  

on the exercise of the fundamental right to freedom of speech and  

expression.   Thus,  in case  of  a mere  apprehension,  without  any  

material facts to indicate that the apprehension is imminent and  

genuine, it may not be proper for the authorities to place such a  

restriction upon the rights of the citizen.  At the cost of repetition, I  

may notice that all the grounds stated were considered at various  

levels of the Government and the Police and they had considered it  

appropriate  not  to  withdraw  the  permissions  or  impose  the  

restriction of Section 144 Cr.P.C. even till 3rd June, 2011.  Thus, it  

was expected of the authorities to show before the Court that some  

very material information, fact or event had occurred between 3rd  

and 4th June, 2011, which could be described as the determinative  

172

factor  for  the  authorities  to  change  their  mind  and  pass  these  

orders.  I am unable to accept the contention of the Police that a  

situation had arisen in which there was imminent need to intervene  

instantly having regard to the sensitivity and perniciously perilous  

consequences that may result, if not prevented forthwith.

185. The  administration,  upon  taking  into  consideration  the  

intelligence inputs, threat perception, likelihood of disturbance to  

public  order  and  other  relevant  considerations,  had  not  only  

prepared its planned course of action but also declared the same.  

In  furtherance  thereto,  the  Police  also  issued  directions  for  

compliance  to  the  organizers.   The  authorities,  thus,  had  full  

opportunity  to  exercise  their  power  to  make  a  choice  permitting  

continuation  and/or  cancellation  of  the  programme  and  thereby  

prohibit  the  activity  on the  Ramlila  Maidan.    However,  in their  

wisdom, they opted to permit the continuation of the agitation and  

holding of the  yoga shivir, thereby impliedly permitting the same,  

even in the changed circumstances, as alleged.  Quinon prohibit qua  

prohibere protest asentire videthir (He who does not prohibit when  

he is able to prohibit assents to it). 173

186. The  authorities  are  expected  to  seriously  cogitate  over  the  

matter in its entirety keeping the common welfare in mind.  In my  

view, the Police have not placed on record any document or even  

affidavits  to  show  such  sudden  change  of  circumstances,  

compelling the authorities to take the action that they took.  Denial  

of  a  right  to  hold  such  meeting  has  to  be  under  exceptional  

circumstances  and  strictly  with  the  object  of  preventing  public  

tranquility and public order from being disturbed.

Reasonable notice is a requirement of Section 144 Cr.P.C.

187. The  language  of  Section  144  Cr.P.C.  does  not  contemplate  

grant of any time for implementation of the directions relating to  

the prevention or prohibition of certain acts for which the order is  

passed  against  the  person(s).   It  is  a  settled  rule  of  law  that  

wherever provision of a statute does not provide for a specific time,  

the  same  has  to  be  done  within  a  reasonable  time.   Again  

reasonable time cannot have a fixed connotation.  It must depend  

upon the facts and circumstances of a given case.  There may also  

be cases where the order passed by an Executive Magistrate under  

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Section 144 Cr.P.C. requires to be executed forthwith, as delay in  

its execution may frustrate the very purpose of such an order and  

may  cause  disastrous  results  like  rioting,  disturbance  of  public  

order and public tranquility, while there may be other cases where  

it  is  possible,  on the principles  of  common prudence,  that some  

time  could  be  granted  for  enforcement  and  complete  

implementation  of  the  order  passed  by  the  Executive  Authority  

under  Section  144  Cr.P.C.   If  one  reads  the  entire  provision  of  

Section  144  Cr.P.C.,  then  the  legislature  itself  has  drawn  a  

distinction between cases of urgency, where the circumstances do  

not admit to serving of a notice in due time upon the person against  

whom such an order  is  directed  and the  cases  where  the  order  

could be passed after giving a notice to the affected party.  Thus, it  

is  not  possible  to  lay  down  any  straight  jacket  formula  or  an  

absolute proposition of law with exactitude that shall be applicable  

uniformly  to  all  the  cases/situations.   In  fact,  it  may  not  be  

judicially proper to state such a proposition.  It must be left to the  

discretion of the executive  authority,  vested with such powers to  

examine each case on its own merits.

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188. Needless to repeat that an order under Section 144 Cr.P.C.  

affects the right vested in a person and it will not be unreasonable  

to expect the authorities to grant adequate time to implement such  

orders, wherever the circumstances so permit.  Enforcement of the  

order in undue haste may sometimes cause a greater damage than  

the good that it expected to achieve.   

189. If for the sake of arguments, I would accept the contention of  

the Police that the order withdrawing the permission as well as the  

order under Section 144 Cr.P.C. are valid and had been passed for  

good  reasons,  still  the  question  remains  as  to  whether  the  

authorities  could  have  given  some  reasonable  time  for  

implementation/enforcement  of  the  directions  contained  in  the  

order  dated  4th June,  2011.   It  is  undisputable  and,  in  fact,  is  

disputed by none that all the persons who had gathered in the tent  

at the Ramlila Maidan were sleeping when the Police went there to  

serve  the  order  passed  under  Section  144  Cr.P.C.  upon  the  

representatives of the Trust; the order itself having been passed at  

11.30 p.m. on 4th June, 2011.  There are serious disputes raised as  

to the manner in which the order was sought to be executed by the  

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Police.  According to respondent No. 4 and the learned  amicus, it  

was not executed as per the legal framework provided under the  

Police Rules and the guidelines issued, whereas according to the  

Police,  it  adhered  to  its  prescribed procedure.  This  issue  I  shall  

discuss separately.  But at this stage, I  may notice that nothing  

prevented  the  authorities  from  making  proper  announcements  

peacefully requiring the persons gathered at the Ramlila Maidan to  

leave for their respective homes early in the morning and before the  

yoga  camp could resume.  Simultaneously,  they could also have  

prohibited entry into the Ramlila Maidan, as the same was being  

controlled by the Police itself.  No facts or circumstances have been  

stated which could explain as to why it was absolutely necessary  

for the Police to wake up the people from their sleep and force their  

eviction, in a manner in which it has been done at the late hours of  

night.  In  absence  of  any  explanation  and  special  circumstances  

placed on record, I have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion  

that, in the facts of the present case, it was quite possible and even  

desirable for the authorities concerned to grant a reasonable time  

for eviction from the ground and enforcement of the orders passed  

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under Section 144 Cr.P.C.  Except in cases of  emergency or the  

situation unexceptionally demanding so, reasonable notice/time for  

execution of the order or compliance of the directions issued in the  

order itself or in furtherance thereto is the pre-requisite.

190. Non-grant of reasonable time and undue haste on the part of  

the  Police  authorities  to  enforce  the  orders  under  Section  144  

Cr.P.C. instantaneously had resulted in the unfortunate incident of  

human  irony  which  could  have  been  avoided  with  little  more  

patience and control.  It was expected of the Police authorities to  

bastion the rights of the citizens of the country.  However, undue  

haste on the part of the Police created angst and disarray amongst  

the gathering at the Ramlila Maidan, which finally resulted in this  

sad cataclysm.

Requirement of Police permission and its effect on the right  conferred in terms of Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(b) respectively  with reference to the facts of the present case

191. The contention on behalf  of  respondent No.4 is that no law  

requires  permission  of  the  Police  to  go  on  fast  and/or  for  the  

purposes  of  holding  an  agitation  or  yoga camp.   The  Police,  

therefore, had no power to cancel such permission.  The law is clear  

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that it is the fundamental right of the people to hold such agitation  

or  morchas in the streets and on public land and the Police have  

been vested with no power to place any restriction, much less an  

unreasonable restriction, upon the exercise of such right.  There is  

no  statutory  form provided  for  seeking  permission  of  the  Police  

before  holding  any  such  public  meeting.  While  relying  on  the  

Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Himat Lal  

(supra),  the  contention  is  that  the  Police  cannot  be  vested  with  

unrestricted and unlimited power for grant or refusal of permission  

for  holding such public  functions.   In  fact,  it  is  stated to be  no  

requirement of law.  In the alternative, the contention is that there  

was no condition imposed by the  Police  for  grant of  permission,  

which  had  been  violated.   Thus,  there  was  no  occasion  or  

justification, not even a reasonable apprehension, for revoking that  

permission.   The  imposition  of  restriction  must  be  preceded  by  

some act or threatening behavior which would disturb the public  

order or public tranquility.  

192. The  Ramlila  Maidan belongs  to  MCD and  they  granted  the  

permission/licence to use the said property from 1st June, 2011 to  179

20th June, 2011.  They having granted the permission/license to  

use the said property, never revoked the same.  Thus, the Police  

had no jurisdiction to indirectly revoke the permission which they  

could not directly revoke and evict the persons from Ramlila Maidan  

forcibly, by brutal assaults and causing damage to the person and  

property of the individuals.  The permission had been revoked in  

violation of the principles of natural justice.  The submission was  

sought to be buttressed by referring to Rule 10 of the MCD Rules  

which  requires  grant  of  personal  hearing  before  revocation  of  a  

permission granted by the MCD.

193. To contra, the contention raised on behalf of respondent No.3,  

the Commissioner of Police, Delhi, is that there are specific powers  

vested in the Police in terms of the DP Act, the Punjab Police Rules,  

as applicable to Delhi and the Standing Orders, according to which  

the Police is obliged to maintain public order and public tranquility.  

They are expected to keep a watch on public meetings.  There is no  

act  attributable  to  the  Police  which  has  impinged  upon  any  

democratic rights of the said respondents or the public.  The orders  

passed and the action taken by the Police, including withdrawal of  180

permission,  was  in  public  interest  as  weighed  against  private  

interest.   Since  the  Police,  as  an  important  organ  of  the  State  

Administration, is responsible to maintain public order and peace,  

it  will  be  obligatory  upon  the  persons  desirous  of  holding  such  

public meetings as well as the concerned authorities to associate  

Police  and  seek  their  permission  for  holding  such  public  

satyagraha, camp etc. as safety of a large number of people may be  

at  stake.   According to learned  Amicus curiae,  the withdrawal  of  

permission was for political and  mala fide reasons.  There existed  

no circumstances which could justify the withdrawal of permission.  

In fact, the contention is that possibility of Government and Police  

working  in  liaison  to  prevent  Baba  Ramdev  from  holding  

Satyagrah/Anshan  cannot  be  ruled  out  particularly,  when  there  

was no threat,  much less an imminent  threat,  to  disturb public  

order or tranquility justifying the withdrawal of permission.

194. I have already discussed that the term ‘social order’ has a very  

wide ambit which includes ‘law and order’, ‘public order’ as well as  

‘security  of  the  State’.    In  other  words,  ‘social  order’  is  an  

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expression of wide amplitude.  It has a direct nexus to the Preamble  

of  the Constitution which secures justice  – social,  economic and  

political – to the people of India.   An activity which could affect ‘law  

and order’ may not necessarily affect public order and an activity  

which  might  be  prejudicial  to  public  order,  may not  necessarily  

affect  the  security  of  the  State.    Absence  of  public  order  is  an  

aggravated form of disturbance of  public peace which affects the  

general course of public life, as any act which merely affects the  

security of others may not constitute a breach of public order.  The  

‘security of  the  State’,  ‘law and order’  and ‘public  order’  are  not  

expressions  of  common meaning  and  connotation.   To  maintain  

and preserve public  peace,  public  safety and the public  order is  

unequivocal  duty of the State and its organs.   To ensure social  

security to the citizens of India is not merely a legal duty of the  

State but a constitutional mandate also.   There can be no social  

order or proper state governance without the State performing this  

function and duty in all its spheres.  

195. Even  for  ensuring  the  exercise  of  the  right  to  freedom  of  

speech and assembly,  the State  would be duty bound to ensure  182

exercise of such rights by the persons desirous of exercising such  

rights as well as to ensure the protection and security of the people  

i.e. members of the assembly as well as that of the public at large.  

This tri-duty has to be discharged by the State as a requirement of  

law  for  which  it  has  to  be  allowed  to  apply  the  principle  of  

reasonable restriction, which is constitutionally permissible.

196. Articles  19(1)(a)  and  19(1)(b)  are  subject  to  the  reasonable  

restrictions which may be imposed on exercise of such right and  

which  are  in  the  interest  of  sovereignty  and  integrity  of  India,  

security of the State, public order, decency or morality and friendly  

relations with foreign states.   Besides this, such restriction could  

also relate  to contempt of  court,  defamation or  incitement to an  

offence.   Thus, sphere of such restrictions is very wide.   While  

some  may  be  exercising  their  fundamental  rights  under  Articles  

19(1)(a) and 19(1)(b) of the Constitution, others may be entitled to  

the protection of social safety and security in terms of Article 21 of  

the Constitution and the State may be called upon to perform these  

functions  in  the  discharge  of  its  duties  under  the  constitutional  

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mandate  and  the  requirements  of  Directive  Principles  of  State  

Policy.

197. I  have  also  noticed  that  in  terms  of  Article  51A  of  the  

Constitution, it is the constitutional duty of every citizen to perform  

the duties as stated under that Article.

198. The  security  of  India  is  the  prime concern of  the  Union of  

India.  ‘Public order’ or ‘law and order’ falls in the domain of the  

State.   Union  also  has  the  power  to  enact  laws  of  preventive  

detention  for  reasons  connected  with  the  security  of  the  State,  

maintenance of the public order, etc.  I am not entering upon the  

field of legislative competence but am only indicating Entries in the  

respective Lists to show that these aspects are the primary concern,  

either of the Union or the State Governments, as the case may be  

and  they hold jurisdiction to enact laws in that regard.  The Union  

or the State is expected to exercise its legislative power in aid of  

civil power, with regard to the security of the State and/or public  

order, as the case may be, with reference to Entry 9 of List I, Entry  

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1 of List II and Entries 3 and 4 of List III of the Seventh Schedule of  

the Constitution of India.

199. These are primarily the fields of legislation, but once they are  

read  with  the  constitutional  duties  of  the  State  under  Directive  

Principles with reference to Article 38 where the State is to secure a  

social order for promotion of welfare of the people, the clear result  

is that the State is not only expected but is mandatorily required to  

maintain social order and due protection of fundamental rights in  

the State.  

200. Freedom  of  speech,  right  to  assemble  and  demonstrate  by  

holding dharnas and peaceful agitations are the basic features of a  

democratic system. The people of a democratic country like ours  

have a right to raise their voice against the decisions and actions of  

the  Government  or  even  to  express  their  resentment  over  the  

actions  of  the  Government  on  any  subject  of  social  or  national  

importance.   The  Government  has  to  respect  and,  in  fact,  

encourage exercise of such rights.  It is the abundant duty of the  

State  to  aid  the  exercise  of  the  right  to  freedom  of  speech  as  

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understood  in  its  comprehensive  sense  and  not  to  throttle  or  

frustrate  exercise  of  such  rights  by  exercising  its  executive  or  

legislative  powers  and  passing  orders  or  taking  action  in  that  

direction in the  name of  reasonable  restrictions.   The preventive  

steps  should  be  founded  on  actual  and  prominent  threat  

endangering  public  order  and  tranquility,  as  it  may  disturb  the  

social order.   This delegate power vested in the State has to be  

exercised with great caution and free from arbitrariness.  It must  

serve the ends of the constitutional rights rather than to subvert  

them.  

201. The ‘law and order’ or ‘public order’ are primarily and certainly  

the concerns of the State.  Police, being one of the most important  

organs of the State, is largely responsible for ensuring maintenance  

of public security and social order.  To urge that the Police have no  

concern with the holding of public meetings would be a misnomer  

and misunderstanding of  law.   To discharge  its  duty,  the  Police  

organization of a State is a significant player within the framework  

of  law.   In  this  view  of  the  matter,  I  may  now  refer  to  certain  

statutory provisions under the relevant Acts or the Rules.  Chapter  186

V  of  the  DP  Act  requires  special  measures  for  maintenance  of  

public  order  and  security  of  State,  to  be  taken  by  the  Police.  

Sections 28 and 29 of the DP Act give power to the Police to make  

regulations  for  regulating  traffic  and for  preservation of  order  in  

public  places  and  to  give  directions  to  the  public,  respectively.  

Under  Section  31  of  the  DP  Act,  the  Police  is  under  a  duty  to  

prevent disorder at places of public amusement or public assembly  

or meetings.  Section 36 contemplates that the Police is to ensure  

and reserve streets or other public places for public purposes and  

empowers it to authorize erecting of barriers in streets.  It also is  

vested with the power to make regulations regulating the conduct  

or behaviour of persons constituting assemblies or processions on  

or along with the streets and specifying, in the case of processions,  

the rules by which and the time and order in which the same may  

pass.

202. The power to make regulations relates to regulating various  

activities including holding of melas and public amusements, in the  

interest of public order, the general public or morality.  Delhi Police  

has also issued a Standing Order 309 in relation to ‘Regulation of  187

processions  and  rallies’  laying  down  the  procedure  for  making  

application for grant of permission, its acceptance or rejection and  

the consequences thereof.  This Standing Order also provides as to  

how  the  proceedings  in  furtherance  to  an  order  passed  under  

Section 144 Cr.P.C. should be carried out. It further indicates that  

the entire tilt of the regulation is to grant permission for holding  

processions or rallies and they need to be accommodated at the  

appropriate  places  depending  upon  the  number  of  persons  

proposing to attend the said rally or meeting and the nature of the  

activity that they are expected to carry on.   For instance,  under  

clause  (h),  as  the  Parliament  Street  and  Jantar  Mantar  cannot  

accommodate more than 5000 persons, if there is a larger crowd,  

they should be shifted to the Ramlila Ground and if the crowd is  

expected to be more than 50,000 and the number of vehicles would  

accordingly swell up, then it should be shifted to a park or another  

premises, which can safely accommodate the gathering.   

203. The learned Solicitor General appearing for the Union of India  

argued that the Ministry of Home Affairs had never told the Police  

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to take any action.   The Police only kept the senior officers in the  

Ministry of Home Affairs informed.   What transpired at the site is  

correctly  stated  by  the  Police  in  its  affidavit  and  the  extent  of  

judicial  review  of  such  action/order  is  a  very  narrow  one.  

According to him, the scope of the suo moto petition itself is a very  

limited  one,  as  is  evident  from the  order  of  the  Court  dated  6 th  

June, 2011.   The statement of the Home Minister relied upon by  

respondent No. 2 as well as referred to by the learned Amicus in his  

submissions  has to  be  read in conjunction with the  explanation  

given  by  the  Minister  of  Home  Affairs  soon  after  the  incident.  

Thus,  no  fault  or  error  is  attributable  to  the  Ministry  of  Home  

Affairs, Government of India in relying upon the judgment of this  

Court  in  Babulal  Parate (supra),  Madhu  Limaye  (supra),  Amitabh  

Bachchan Corpn. Ltd. v. Mahila Jagran Manch & Ors. [(1997) 7 SCC  

91],  R.K.  Garg  v.  Superintendent,  District Jail,  Saharanpur  & Ors.  

[(1970)  3  SCC  227]  and  Dr.  Praveen  Bhai  Thogadia (supra)  to  

contend that the authorities have to be given some leverage to take  

decisions  in  such  situations.  There  are  sufficient  inbuilt  

safeguards  and  that  the  judicial  intervention  in  such  executive  

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orders has to be very limited.   It is his contention that the present  

case does not fall in that category.    

204. There  cannot  be  any dispute  that  the  executive  authorities  

have to be given some leverage while taking such decisions and the  

scope  of  judicial  review  of  such  orders  is  very  limited.    These  

propositions of law are to be understood and applied with reference  

to the facts of a given case.   It is not necessary for me to reiterate  

those  facts.   Suffice  it  to  note  that  the  action of  the  Police  was  

arbitrary.   The Seven Judges Bench of this Court in Madhu Limaye  

(supra)  reiterated  with  approval  the  law  enunciated  in  Babulal  

Parate (supra)  and  further  held  that  “These  fundamental  facts  

emerge from the way the occasions for the exercise of the power are  

mentioned. Disturbances of public tranquility, riots and affray lead  

to subversion of  public  order unless they are prevented in time.  

Nuisances dangerous to human life, health or safety have no doubt  

to be abated and prevented…………..”   The fundamental emphasis  

is on prevention of situation which would lead to disturbance of  

public tranquility, however, action proposed to be taken should be  

one which itself is not likely to generate public disorder and disturb  

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the public tranquility.   It should be preventive and not provocative.  

The Police action in the present case led to a terror in the minds of  

members of the assembly and finally the untoward incident.    

205. It  is  also  true  that  a  man on the  spot  and responsible  for  

maintenance of public peace is the appropriate person to form an  

opinion as contemplated in law.   But, here the onus was on the  

Police Authorities to show existence of such circumstances at the  

spot when, admittedly, all persons were sleeping peacefully.   The  

courts have to realize that the rights of the organizers and other  

members  of  the  Society  had  to  be  protected  if  a  law and  order  

situation was created as a result of a given situation.    

206. The  learned  Solicitor  General  is  correct  in  his  submissions  

that the scope of  the present  suo moto petition is a limited one.  

But  certainly  it  is  not  so  limited  that  the  Court  would  neither  

examine  facts  nor  the  law  applicable  but  would  accept  the  

government affidavits as a gospel truth.   The order dated 6th June,  

2011 has two distinct requirements.   Firstly, relating to the take of  

the  police  authorities.    Secondly,  circumstances  in  which  such  

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power  with  brutality  and  atrocities  was  asserted  against  large  

people who had gathered at the Ramlila ground.

207. While  keeping  the  principles  of  law  in  mind,  the  Court  

essentially  has  to  deliberate  upon  these  two  aspects.    I  am  

examining the circumstances which generated or resulted into the  

unfortunate  situation at  the  Ramlila  Ground on the  midnight  of  

4th/5th June, 2011.   The statement made by the Home Minister on  

8th June,  2011  has  already  been  referred  by  me  above.    This  

statement clearly demonstrated the stand of the Government that  

in the event Baba Ramdev persisted in his efforts to go on with the  

fast,  he  would  be  removed.    The  Police  had  been  issued  

appropriate directions under Section 65 of the DP Act to enforce the  

same.   The decision so had also been taken by the Delhi Police.  

The  Minister  had requested the  general  public  to  appreciate  the  

constraints  and  difficult  circumstances  under  which  the  Delhi  

Police  had to discharge its functions.   This statement was even  

clarified  with  more  reasons  and  elaborately  in  the  exclusive  

interview of the Minister with DD News on the same date on the  

television.   He is stated to have said that ultimately when the talks  

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failed or Baba Ramdev went back on his words, the Police was told  

to enforce the decision.    

208. There  are  circumstances  and  reasons  given  by  the  Home  

Minister in his statement for making the statement that he made.  

The  decision  of  the  Delhi  Police  in  the  normal  course  of  events  

would have a connection with the declaration made by the Ministry.  

Police might have acted independently or in consultation with the  

Ministry.  Either way, there is no material before me to hold that  

the decision of the Ministry or the Police was mala fide in law or in  

fact.  Upon taking into consideration the cumulative effect of the  

affidavits  filed  on  record  and other  documentary  evidence,  I  am  

unable to dispel the argument that the decision of Ministry of Home  

Affairs, Union of India reflected its shadow on the decision making  

process and decision of the Police authorities.     

209. I shall make it clear even at the cost of repetition that neither  

am I  adjudicating  upon  the  validity  of  the  order  passed  by  the  

Government qua respondent No. 4, nor adjudicating any disputes  

between Baba Ramdev, on the one hand, and the Government, on  

the other.   Within the scope of this Court’s order dated 6th June,  

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2011, I would examine all the relevant facts and the principles of  

law applicable for returning the findings in relation to the interest  

of the large public present at the Ramlila Maidan in the midnight of  

4th/5th June, 2011.

210. The learned Amicus also contended that the doctrine of limited  

judicial  review would not  stricto sensu apply to the present case.  

The case is not limited to the passing of an order under Section  

144, Cr.PC, but involves the larger issue of fundamental freedom  

and restrictions in terms of Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution, as  

well as the interest of number of injured persons and Rajbala, the  

deceased.   It is also his contention that there is a clear abdication  

of powers by the Police to the Ministry of Home Affairs.  The order  

and  action  of  the  Police  are  patently  unjustifiable.   If  the  

trajectories of two views, one of the Ministry and other of the Police  

point out towards the action being  mala fide, be it so, the Court  

then should  decide  the  action to  be  mala  fide.  Mala fides  is  a  

finding which the Court can return only upon proper allegations  

supported by documentary or other evidence.   It is true that if the  

factual matrix of the case makes the two trajectories (case of both  

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the  respondents)  point  towards  an  incorrect  decision,  the  Court  

would be reluctant to return a finding of mala fides or abdication of  

power.  The decision was taken by the competent authority and on  

the basis of inputs and the situation existing at the site.  It may be  

an incorrect decision taken in somewhat arbitrary manner and its  

enforcement may be totally contrary to the rule of law and common  

sense.  In such an event, the action may be liable to be interfered  

with but cannot be termed as mala fide.

211. Furthermore,  the  constitutional  mandate,  the  statutory  

provisions  and  the  regulations  made  thereunder,  in  exercise  of  

power of delegated legislation, cast a dual duty upon the State.  It  

must ensure public order and public tranquility with due regard to  

social order, on the one hand, while on the other, it must exercise  

the authority vested in it to facilitate the exercise of fundamental  

freedoms available to the citizens of India.  A right can be regulated  

for the purposes stated in that Article itself.   

212. In Himat Lal K. Shah (supra), this Court observed that even in  

pre-independence days the public meetings have been held in open  

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spaces and public streets and the people have come to regard it as  

a part of  their  privileges and amenities.   The streets and public  

parks existed primarily for other purposes and the social interest  

promoted by untrammelled  exercise  of  freedom of  utterance  and  

assembly in public streets must yield to the social interest which  

the prohibition and regulation of speech are designed to protect.  

There is a constitutional difference between reasonable regulation  

and arbitrary exclusion.  The power of the appropriate authority to  

impose  reasonable  regulation,  in  order  to  ensure  the  safety  and  

convenience of the people in the use of public highways, has never  

been  regarded  as  inconsistent  with  the  fundamental  right  to  

assembly.  A system of licensing as regards the time and manner of  

holding public meeting on public streets has not been regarded as  

an infringement of a fundamental right of public assembly or free  

speech. This Court,  while  declaring Rule  7 of  the Bombay Police  

Rules  ultra  vires,  stated  the  principle  that it  gave  an  unguided  

discretion, practically dependent upon the subjective whims of the  

authority, to grant or refuse permission to hold public meeting on a  

public street.  Unguided and unfettered power is alien to proper  

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legislation and even good governance.   The  principles  of  healthy  

democracy  will  not  permit  such  restriction  on  the  exercise  of  a  

fundamental right.   

213. The contention made by Mr. Ram Jethmalani, learned Senior  

Advocate, is that this judgment should be construed to mean that it  

is not obligatory or even a directory requirement to take permission  

of the Police authorities for holding such public meetings at public  

places.  According to him the Police have no such power in law.  I  

am not  quite  impressed  by  this  submission.   This  argument,  if  

accepted, can lead to drastic and impracticable consequences.  If  

the Department of Police will have no say in such matters, then it  

will not only be difficult but may also be improbable for the Police  

to maintain law and order and public tranquility, safeguarding the  

interest of the organizers, the persons participating in such public  

meetings as well as that of the public at large.   

214. I am bound and, in fact, I would follow the view expressed by  

a Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of Himat Lal (supra)  

in paragraph 31 of the judgment :

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public  and  private  properties  resulting  from public  rioting.   The  

Court indicated the need for participation and for taking the Police  

into the organizational activity for such purposes.  The Court, while  

following  the  principles  stated  in  the  case  of  Union  of  India  v.   

Association  of  Democratic  Reforms [(2002)  3  SCC  696],  gave  

directions and guidelines, wherever the Act or the Rules were silent  

on  a  particular  subject,  for  the  proper  enforcement  of  the  

provisions.   In  paragraph 12 of  the  judgment,  the  Court  clearly  

stated  that  as  soon  as  there  is  a  demonstration  organized,  the  

organizers shall meet the Police to review and revise the route to be  

taken and lay down the conditions for peaceful march and protest.

217. Admittedly,  the  Court  in  that  case  was  not  determining  an  

issue whether Police permission is a pre-requisite for holding such  

public meetings or not, but still, the Court mandated that the view  

of the Police is a requirement for organization of such meetings or  

for taking out public processions.  Seeking of such permission can  

be justified on the basis that the said right is subject to reasonable  

restrictions.   

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218. Further, exercise of such rights cannot be claimed at the cost  

of impinging upon the rights of others.  This is how the restriction  

imposed is to be regulated.  Restriction to a right has to come by  

enactment of law and enforcement of such restriction has to come  

by a regulatory mechanism, which obviously would take within its  

ambit the role of Police.    The Police have to perform their functions  

in the administration of criminal justice system in accordance with  

the provisions of the Cr.P.C. and the other penal statutes.  It has  

also to ensure that it takes appropriate preventive steps as well as  

maintains public order or law and order, as the case may be.  In  

the event of any untoward incident resulting into injury to a person  

or property of an individual or violation of his rights, it is the Police  

alone  that  shall  be  held  answerable  and  responsible  for  the  

consequences as may follow in law.  The Police is to maintain and  

give precedence to the safety of the people as salus populi supremo  

lex  (the  safety  of  the  people  is  the  supreme  law)  and salus  

republicae  supremo  lex (safety  of  the  State  is  the  supreme  law)  

coexist and are not only important and relevant but lie at the heart  

of the doctrine that the welfare of an individual must yield to that of  

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the community.  Besides, one fact that cannot be ignored is that  

respondent no.4, in furtherance to the understanding of law, had  

itself  applied  to  the  Deputy  Commissioner  of  Police,  Central  

District, Darya Ganj, seeking sanction for holding of  yoga shivir at  

the Ramlila Maidan.

219. It is difficult for the Court to even imagine a situation where  

the  Police  would  be  called  upon  to  discharge  such  heavy  

responsibility without having any say in the matter.  The persons  

who are organizing the public meeting would obviously have their  

purpose and agenda in mind but the Police also have to ensure that  

they  are  able  to  exercise  their  right  to  freedom  of  speech  and  

assembly and, at the same time, there is no obstruction, injury or  

danger to the public at large.

220. Thus, in my considered opinion, associating Police as a pre-

requirement to hold such meetings, dharnas and protests, on such  

large scale,  would not infringe the fundamental  rights enshrined  

under  Articles  19(1)(a)  and  19(1)(b)  of  the  Constitution  as  this  

would squarely fall within the regulatory mechanism of reasonable  

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restrictions,  contemplated  under  Articles  19(2)  and  19(3).  

Furthermore, it would help in ensuring due social order and would  

also not  impinge  upon the  rights of  the others,  as contemplated  

under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.  That would be the  

correct approach of law, as is supported by various judgments and  

reasoning, that I have detailed in the initial part of this judgment.   

221. A solution to such an issue has to be provided with reference  

to exercise of a right, imposition of reasonable restrictions, without  

disturbing the social order, respecting the rights of others with due  

recognition of the constitutional duties that all citizens are expected  

to discharge.

222. Coming to the facts of the present case, it is nobody’s case  

that the permissions were declined.  The permissions, whether for  

holding of the  yoga shivir at the Ramlila Maidan or the protest at  

Jantar  Mantar,  were  granted  subject  to  certain  terms  and  

conditions.  The argument that no permission of the Police is called  

for  in  absolute  terms,  as  a  pre-requirement  for  holding  of  such  

meetings, needs no further deliberation.

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Responsibility  of  the Trust,  Members  of  the Assembly,  their  status and duty

223. Once  an order  under  Section 144 Cr.P.C.  is  passed by the  

competent authority and such order directs certain acts to be done  

or abstains from doing certain acts and such order is in force, any  

assembly, which initially might have been a lawful assembly, would  

become an unlawful assembly and the people so assembled would  

be required to disperse in furtherance to such order.    A person  

can not only be held responsible for his own act, but, in light of  

Section 149 IPC, if the offence is committed by any member of the  

unlawful  assembly  in  prosecution  of  a  common  object  of  that  

assembly, every member of such assembly would become member  

of the unlawful assembly.   

224. Obedience of lawful orders is the duty of every citizen.  Every  

action is to follow its prescribed course in law Actio quaelibet it sua  

via.  The course prescribed in law has to culminate to its final stage  

in accordance with law.  In that process there might be either a  

clear disobedience or a contributory disobedience.  In either way, it  

may  tantamount  to  being  negligent.   Thus,  the  principle  of  

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contributory negligence can be applied against parties to an action  

or even a non-party.  The rule of identification would be applied in  

cases  where  a  situation of  the  present  kind  arises.   Before  this  

Court, it is the stand of the Police authorities that Baba Ramdev,  

members of the Trust and their followers refused to obey the order  

and, in fact, they created a situation which resulted in inflictment  

of injuries not only to the members of the public, but even to Police  

personnel.  In fact, they placed the entire burden upon respondent  

No. 4.   

225. The  members  of  the  public  as  well  as  Respondent  No.4  

claimed that there was damage to their person and property as a  

result of the action of the Police.  Thus, this Court will have to see  

the fault of the party and the effective cause of the ensuing injury.  

Also it has to be seen that in the ‘agony of the moment’, would the  

situation have been different and safe, had the people concerned  

acted differently and as to who was majorly responsible for creation  

of such a dilemma.   Under the English law, it has been accepted  

that once a statute has enjoined a pattern of behavior as a duty, no  

individual can absolve another from having to obey it.   Thus, as a  

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matter of public policy, volenti cannot erase the duty or breach of it  

(Ref. Clerk & Lindsell on Torts, Twentieth Edition, pg. 246).   

226. There  is  no  statutory  definition  of  contributory  negligence.  

The  concerns  of  contributory  negligence  are  now  too  firmly  

established  to  be  disregarded,  but  it  has  to  be  understood  and  

applied properly.   ‘Negligence’ materially contributes to injury or is  

regarded as expressing something which is a direct cause of  the  

accident.   

227. The difference in the meaning of “negligence,” when applied to  

a claimant, on the one hand, and to a defendant on the other, was  

pointed out by Lord Simon in Nance v. British Columbia Electric Ry.   

[(1951) A.C. 601 at 611] :

“When contributory negligence is set up as a  defence, its existence does not depend on any  duty  owed by  the  injured  party  to  the  party  sued,  and  all  that  is  necessary  to  establish  such a defence is to prove … that the injured  party  did  not  in  his  own  interest  take  reasonable care of himself and contributed, by  his want of care, to his own injury.  For when  contributory negligence is set  up as a shield  against  the obligation to satisfy the whole  of  the claimant’s claim, the principle involved is  that, where a man is part author of his own  

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injury,  he  cannot  call  on  the  other  party  to  compensate him in full”  

228. The  individual  guilty  of  contributory negligence  may be  the  

employee  or agent of  the claimant,  so as to render the claimant  

vicariously responsible for what he did.  There could be cases of  

negligence  between  spectators  and  participants  in  sporting  

activities.  However,  in  such  matters,  negligence  itself  has  to  be  

established.    In  cases  of  ‘contributory  negligence’,  it  may  not  

always be necessary to show that the claimant is in breach of some  

duty, but the duty to act carefully, usually arises and the liability in  

an  action  could  arise  (Ref.  Charlesworth  &  Percy  on  Negligence,   

Eleventh Edition, Pages 195, 206).  These are some of the principles  

relating  to  the  award  of  compensation  in  cases  of  contributory  

negligence  and  in  determining  the  liability  and  identifying  the  

defaulter.  Even if these principles are not applicable  stricto sensu  

to  the  cases  of  the  present  kind,  the  applied  principles  of  

contributory  negligence  akin  to  these  principles  can  be  applied  

more  effectively on the strength of  the provisions of  Section 149  

IPC.   

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229. A negligence could be composite or contributory.   ‘Negligence’  

does not always mean absolute carelessness, but want of such a  

degree  of  care  as  is  required  in  particular  circumstances.  

‘Negligence’ is failure to observe, for the protection of the interests  

of  another  person,  the  degree  of  care,  precaution  and  vigilance  

which  the  circumstances  justly  demand,  whereby  such  other  

person suffers injury.    Normally,  the  crucial  question on which  

such a liability depends would be whether either party could, by  

exercise  of  reasonable  care,  have  avoided  the  consequence  of  

other's  negligence.    Though,  this is  the  principle  stated by this  

Court  in  a  case  relating  to  Motor  Vehicles  Act,  in  the  case  of  

Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Shri Laxman Iyer & Anr.  

[AIR 2003 SC 4182], it is stated that the principle stated therein  

would be  applicable  to  a  large  extent  to  the  cases  involving  the  

principles of contributory negligence as well.    This Court in the  

case of Municipal Corporation of Delhi, Delhi v. Association of Victims   

of  Uphaar Tragedy and others (C.A. Nos. 7114-7115 of 2003 with  

C.A. No. 7116 of 2003 and C.A. No. 6748 of 2004, pronounced on  

13th October, 2011) while considering awarding of compensation to  

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the victims who died as a result of Uphaar tragedy and the liability  

of  the  persons  responsible,  held  that  even  on  the  principle  of  

contributory  negligence  the  DVB  to  whom  negligence  was  

attributable in relation to installing a transformer was liable to pay  

damages along with licensee.  Whenever an order is passed which  

remains unchallenged before the Court of competent jurisdiction,  

then  its  execution  is  the  obvious  consequence  in  law.   For  its  

execution, all concerned are expected to permit implementation of  

such  orders  and,  in  fact,  are  under  a  legal  obligation  to  fully  

cooperate in enforcement of lawful orders.   Article 19(1)(a) gives the  

freedom  of  speech  and  expression  and  the  right  to  assembly.  

Article 21 mandates that no person shall be deprived of his life and  

personal liberty except according to the procedure established by  

law.   However, Article 51A imposes certain fundamental duties on  

the citizens of India.   Article  38(1) provides that the State shall  

strive  to  promote  the  welfare  of  the  people  by  securing  and  

protecting, as effectively as it may, a social order in which justice –  

social, economic and political – shall inform all the institutions of  

national life.

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230. Article  51A  requires  the  citizens  of  India  to  abide  by  the  

Constitution and to uphold the sovereignty and integrity of India.  

Article 51A(i) requires a citizen to safeguard public property and to  

abjure violence.  An order passed under Section 144 Cr.P.C. is a  

restriction on enjoyment of fundamental rights.   It has been held to  

be a reasonable restriction.  Once an order is passed under Section  

144  Cr.P.C.  within  the  framework  and  in  accordance  with  the  

requirements of the said Section, then it is a valid order which has  

to be respected by all concerned.   Its enforcement is the natural  

consequence.   In the present case, the order was passed under  

Section 144 Cr.P.C. at about 11.30 p.m. whereafter the Police had  

come  to  Ramlila  Maidan  to  serve  the  said  order  on  the  

representatives of respondent No. 4.   The video and the footage of  

CCTV cameras played before this Court show that the officers of the  

Police  along  with  the  limited  force  had  come  to  inform  Baba  

Ramdev and/or the representatives of respondent No. 4 about the  

passing of  the  said  order,  but they did  not  receive  the  requisite  

cooperation from that end.   On the contrary, it is clear from the  

various  documents  before  this  Court  that  Baba Ramdev did  not  

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receive the order though obviously he had come to know about the  

said order.   At the time of the incident, Baba Ramdev was sleeping  

in  the  rest  room.   Thereafter  he  came  to  the  stage  and  when  

approached by the Police  officers,  who were  also  present on the  

stage, he jumped into the crowd, got onto the shoulders of one of  

his  followers and delivered speeches.   Of  course,  there does  not  

appear  to  be  use  of  any  language  which  was,  in  any  way,  

provocative or was a command to his followers to get involved in  

clash with the Police.   On the contrary, in his speeches, he asked  

the people to chant the Gayatri Mantra, maintain Shanti and not to  

take any confrontation with the Police.  He exhorted that he would  

not advise the path of  hinsa, but at the same time, he also stated  

about failure of his talks with the Government and the attitude of  

the Government on the issues that he had raised and also stated  

that  ‘Babaji will go only if people wanted and the God desires it.”

231. After  some time,  Baba Ramdev climbed onto  the  stage  and  

thereafter, disappeared.  In the CCTV cameras, Baba Ramdev is not  

seen thereafter.  He did not disclose to his followers that he was  

leaving  and  what  path  they  should  follow.   This  suspense  and  

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commotion  on  the  stage  added  fuel  to  the  fire.   Thereafter,  the  

scenes  of  violent  protest  and  clash  between  the  Police  and  the  

followers occurred at the site.   

232. The legality and correctness of the order passed under Section  

144 Cr.P.C. was not challenged by respondent No. 4 and, in fact, it  

remains unchallenged till date.   Of course, the attempt on the part  

of  the  authorities  to  enforce  the  order  forthwith,  practically  

frustrated the  right available  to respondent  No.  4 under  law i.e.  

preferring of an appeal or a revision under the provisions of Cr.P.C.

233. Be that as it may, the fact that when an order was passed by  

the authorities competent to pass such an order, it was expected of  

all  concerned to respect the order lawfully passed and to ensure  

that the situation at the site was not converted into a tragedy.   All  

were expected to cooperate in the larger interest of the public.   The  

Police  was  concerned  with  the  problem  of  law  and  order  while  

respondent  No.  4  and Baba Ramdev certainly  should  have  been  

concerned  about  the  welfare  of  their  followers  and  the  large  

gathering present at the Ramlila Maidan.    Thus, to that extent, the  

Police and respondent No. 4 ought to have acted in tandem and  

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ensured  that  no  damage  to  the  person  or  property  should  take  

place, which unfortunately did not happen.   Keeping in view the  

stature and respect that Baba Ramdev enjoyed with his followers,  

he ought to have exercised the moral authority of his office in the  

welfare of the people present.   There exists a clear constitutional  

duty,  legal  liability  and  moral  responsibility  to  ensure  due  

implementation of lawful orders and to maintain the basic rule of  

law. It would have served the greater public purpose and even the  

purpose of the protests for which the rally was being held, if Baba  

Ramdev  had  requested  his  followers  to  instantaneously  leave  

Ramlila Maidan peacefully or had assured the Authorities that the  

morning yoga programme or protest programme would be cancelled  

and  the  people  would  be  requested  to  leave  for  their  respective  

places.   Absence of performance of this duty and the gesture of  

Baba Ramdev led to an avoidable lacerating episode.   Even if the  

Court takes the view that there was undue haste, adamancy and  

negligence on the part of the Police authorities, then also it cannot  

escape to mention that to this negligence, there is a contribution by  

respondent No. 4 as well.   The role of Baba Ramdev at that crucial  

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juncture  could  have  turned  the  tide  and  probably  brought  a  

peaceful  end  rather  than  the  heart  rending  end  of  injuries  and  

unfortunate deaths.     Even if it is assumed that the action of the  

Police was wrong in law, it gave no right to others to commit any  

offence Injuria non excusat injuriam.

234. Every  law abiding  citizen should  respect  the  law and must  

stand in conformity with the rule, be as high an individual may be.  

Violation of orders has been made punitive under the provisions of  

Section 188 IPC, but still in other allied proceedings, it would result  

in  fastening  the  liability  on  all  contributory  partners,  may  be  

vicariously,  but  the  liability  certainly  would  extend  to  all  the  

defaulting parties.   For these reasons, I have to take a view that in  

the circumstances of the case, Baba Ramdev and the office bearers  

of respondent No. 4 have contributed to the negligence leading to  

the  occurrence  in  question  and  are  vicariously  liable  for  such  

action.

FINDINGS AND DIRECTIONS :

(1) In discharge of its judicial functions, the courts do not strike  

down  the  law  or  quash  the  State  action  with  the  aim  of  

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obstructing democracy in the name of preserving democratic  

process, but as a contribution to the governmental system, to  

make it fair, judicious and transparent.  The courts take care  

of  interests  which  are  not  sufficiently  defended  elsewhere  

and/or of the victims of State action, in exercise of its power of  

judicial review.

In my considered view, in the facts of the present case, the State  

and  the  Police  could  have  avoided  this  tragic  incident  by  

exercising  greater  restraint,  patience  and  resilience.    The  

orders  were  passed  by  the  authorities  in  undue  haste  and  

were  executed  with  force  and  overzealousness,  as  if  an  

emergent situation existed.   The decision to forcibly evict the  

innocent  public  sleeping  at  the  Ramlila  grounds  in  the  

midnight of  4th/5th June,  2011, whether taken by the police  

independently or  in consultation with the Ministry of  Home  

Affairs is amiss and suffers from the element of arbitrariness  

and abuse of power to some extent.   The restriction imposed  

on  the  right  to  freedom  of  speech  and  expression  was  

unsupported by cogent reasons and material facts.  It was an  214

invasion of the liberties and exercise of fundamental freedoms.  

The members of the assembly had legal protections available  

to them even under the provisions of the Cr.P.C.  Thus, the  

restriction  was  unreasonable  and  unwarrantedly  executed.  

The action demonstrated the might of the State and was an  

assault on the very basic democratic values enshrined in our  

Constitution.  Except in cases of emergency or the situation  

unexceptionably  demanding  so,  reasonable  notice/time  for  

execution  of  the  order  or  compliance  with  the  directions  

issued in the order itself or in furtherance thereto is the pre-

requisite.   It  was primarily  an error of  performance of  duty  

both  by  the  police  and  respondent  No.4  but  the  ultimate  

sufferer was the public at large.

(2) From the facts and circumstances that emerge from the record  

before  this  Court,  it  is  evident  that  it  was  not  a  case  of  

emergency.  The police have failed to establish that a situation  

had  arisen  where  there  was  imminent  need  to  intervene,  

having  regard  to  the  sensitivity  and  perniciously  perilous  

215

consequences  that  could  have  resulted,  if  such  harsh  

measures had not been taken forthwith.   

(3) The  State  has  a  duty  to  ensure  fulfillment  of  the  freedom  

enshrined in our Constitution and so it has a duty to protect  

itself against certain unlawful actions.  It may, therefore, enact  

laws which would ensure such protection.  The rights and the  

liberties  are  not  absolute  in  nature  and  uncontrolled  in  

operation.  While placing the two, the rule of justice and fair  

play requires that State action should neither be unjust nor  

unfair,  lest  it  attracts  the  vice  of  unreasonableness  or  

arbitrariness, resultantly vitiating the law, the procedure and  

the action taken thereunder.

(4) It  is  neither  correct  nor  judicially  permissible  to  say  that  

taking of police permission for holding of dharnas, processions  

and rallies of the present kind is irrelevant or not required in  

law.   Thus,  in  my  considered  opinion,  the  requirement  of  

associating police, which is an important organ of the State for  

ensuring implementation of the rule of law, while holding such  216

large scale meetings, dharnas and protests, would not infringe  

the fundamental rights enshrined under Articles 19(1)(a) and  

19(1)(b) of the Constitution.  This would squarely fall within  

the  regulatory  mechanism  of  reasonable  restrictions,  

contemplated under Articles 19(2) and 19(3).  Furthermore, it  

would help in ensuring due social order and would also not  

impinge  upon  the  rights  of  others,  as  contemplated  under  

Article 21 of the Constitution of India.  The police authorities,  

who  are  required  to  maintain  the  social  order  and  public  

tranquility,  should have a say in the organizational  matters  

relating  to  holding  of  dharnas,  processions,  agitations  and  

rallies of the present kind.  However, such consent should be  

considered in a very objective manner by the police authorities  

to ensure the exercise of the right to freedom of speech and  

expression as understood in its wider connotation, rather than  

use the power to frustrate or throttle the constitutional right.  

Refusal and/or withdrawal of permission should be for valid  

and  exceptional  reasons.   The  executive  power,  to  cause  a  

restriction on a constitutional right within the scope of Section  

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144 Cr.P.C.,  has  to  be  used  sparingly  and very  cautiously.  

The authority of the police to issue such permission has an  

inbuilt element of caution and guided exercise of power and  

should be in the interest of the public.  Such an exercise of  

power  by  the  Police  should  be  aimed  at  attainment  of  

fundamental freedom rather than improper suppression of the  

said right.

(5) I have held that the respondent no.4 is guilty of contributory  

negligence.  The Trust and its representatives ought to have  

discharged their legal and moral duty and should have fully  

cooperated in the effective  implementation of a lawful  order  

passed by the competitive authority under Section 144 Cr.P.C.  

Due  to  the  stature  that  Baba  Ramdev  enjoyed  with  his  

followers, it was expected of him to request the gathering to  

disperse peacefully and leave the Ramlila Maidan.  He ought  

not have insisted on continuing with his activity at the place of  

occurrence.  Respondent no.4 and all its representatives were  

bound  by  the  constitutional  and  fundamental  duty  to  

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safeguard public property and to abjure violence.  Thus, there  

was legal and moral duty cast upon the members of the Trust  

to request and persuade people to leave the Ramlila Maidan  

which could have obviously avoided the confrontation between  

the police and the members of the gathering at the Ramlila  

Maidan.

(6) As difficult as it is to anticipate the right to any freedom or  

liberty without any reasonable restriction, equally difficult it is  

to imagine existence of a right not coupled with a duty.  The  

duty  may  be  a  direct  or  an  indirect  consequence  of  a  fair  

assertion of the right.  Part III  of the Constitution, although  

confers  rights,  duties,  regulations  and  restrictions  are  

inherent thereunder.

It  can be stated with certainty that the freedom of speech is the  

bulwark of democratic Government.  This freedom is essential  

for the appropriate functioning of the democratic process.  The  

freedom  of  speech  and  expression  is  regarded  as  the  first  

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condition of liberty in the hierarchy of liberties granted under  

our constitutional mandate.   

(7) It is undisputable that the provisions of Section 144 Cr.P.C.  

are attracted in emergent situations.  Emergent power has to  

be  exercised  for  the  purposes  of  maintaining  public  order.  

The  material  facts,  therefore,  should  demonstrate  that  the  

action is being taken for maintenance of public order, public  

tranquility and harmony.  

(8) Even if an order under Section 144 Cr.P.C. had to be given  

effect  to,  still  Respondent  no.4  had  a  right  to  stay  at  the  

Ramlila Maidan with permissible number of people as the land  

owning authority-MCD had not revoked its permission and the  

same  was  valid  till  20th June,  2011.   The  chain  of  events  

reveals that it was a case of police excesses and, to a limited  

extent, even abuse of power.

(9) From the  material  placed before  the  Court,  I  am unable  to  

hold that the order passed by the  competent  authority  and  

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execution  thereof  are  mala fide in  law  or  in  fact  or  is  an  

abdication of power and functions by the Police.  The action,  

of course, partially suffers from the vice of arbitrariness but  

every  arbitrary  action  necessarily  need  not  be  mala  fide.  

Similarly every incorrect decision in law or on facts of a given  

case may also not be  mala fide but every  mala fide decision  

would be an incorrect and impermissible decision and would  

be  vitiated  in  law.   Upon  taking  into  consideration  the  

cumulative  effect  of  the  affidavits  filed  on record  and other  

documentary evidence,  I  am unable  to dispel  the  argument  

that  the  decision  of  the  Ministry  of  Home Affairs,  Union of  

India reflected its shadow on the decision making process and  

decision of the Police authorities.     

(10) I  also  find  that  there  would  be  no  illegality  if  the  police  

authorities had acted in consultation with the Union Ministry  

as it is the collective responsibility of various departments of  

the State to ensure maintenance of law and order and public  

safety in the State.  

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(11) Every person/body to whom such permission is granted, shall  

give  an undertaking to the authorities  concerned that he/it  

will cooperate in carrying out their duty and any lawful orders  

passed by any competent court/authority/forum at any stage  

of  the  commencement  of  an  agitation/dharna/  procession  

and/or  period  during  which  the  permission  granted  is  

enforced.  This, of course, shall be subject to such orders as  

may be passed by the court of competent jurisdiction.  

(12) Even on the touchstone of the principle of ‘in terrorem’, I am of  

the  view  that  the  police  have  not  acted  with  restraint  or  

adhered  to  the  principle  of  ‘least  invasion’  with  the  

constitutional  and  legal  rights  available  to  respondent  no.4  

and the members of the gathering at the Ramlila Maidan.   

(13) The present case is a glaring example of trust deficit between  

the people governing and the people to be governed.  Greater  

confidence needs to be built between the authorities in power  

and the public at large.  Thus, I  hold and direct that while  

considering the ‘threat  perception’  as a ground for  revoking  222

such  permissions  or  passing  an  order  under  Section  144  

Cr.P.C., ‘care perception’ has to be treated as an integral part  

thereof.  ‘Care perception’ is an obligation of the State while  

performing  its  constitutional  duty  and  maintaining  social  

order.

(14) It  is  unavoidable  for  this  Court  to  direct  that  the  police  

authorities should take such actions properly and strictly in  

accordance  with  the  Guidelines,  Standing  Orders  and  the  

Rules applicable thereto.  It is not only desirable but also a  

mandatory requirement of the present day that the State and  

the  police  authorities  should  have  a  complete  and  effective  

dispersement plan in place, before evicting the gathering by  

use of force from a particular place, in furtherance to an order  

passed  by an executive  authority  under  Section 144 of  the  

Cr.P.C.

(15) This is not a case where the Court can come to the conclusion  

that the entire police force has acted in violation to the Rules,  

Standing orders  and have  fallen stray in their  uncontrolled  223

zeal  of  forcibly  evicting  innocent  public  from  the  Ramlila  

Maidan.  There has to be a clear distinction between the cases  

of responsibility of the force collectively and the responsibility  

of individual members of the forces.  I find from the evidence  

on record that some of the police officers/personnel were very  

cooperative  with  the  members  of  the  assembly  and  helped  

them to vacate the Ramlila Maidan while others were violent,  

inflicted cane injuries,  threw bricks and even used tear-gas  

shells,  causing  fire  on  the  stage  and  total  commotion  and  

confusion amongst the large gathering at the Ramlila Maidan.  

Therefore, these two classes of Police Force have to be treated  

differently.    

(16) Thus,  while  directing  the  State  Government  and  the  

Commissioner  of  Police  to  register  and  investigate  cases  of  

criminal acts and offences, destruction of private and public  

property against the police officers/personnel along with those  

members of the assembly, who threw bricks at the police force  

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causing injuries to the members of the force as well as damage  

to the property, I issue the following directions:

a. Take  disciplinary  action  against  all  the  erring  police  

officers/personnel  who  have  indulged  in  brick-batting,  

have resorted to  lathi  charge and excessive  use of  tear  

gas shells upon the crowd, have exceeded their authority  

or  have  acted  in  a  manner  not  permissible  under  the  

prescribed procedures, rules or the standing orders and  

their actions have an element of criminality.  This action  

shall be taken against the officer/personnel irrespective  

of what ranks they hold in the hierarchy of police.

b. The police personnel who were present in the pandal and  

still  did not  help the evacuation of  the large gathering  

and in transportation of sick and injured people to the  

hospitals have, in my opinion, also rendered themselves  

liable for appropriate disciplinary action.

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c. The police shall also register criminal cases against the  

police  personnel  and  members  of  the  gathering  at  the  

Ramlila  ground  (whether  they  were  followers  of  Baba  

Ramdev  or  otherwise)  who  indulged  in  damage  to  the  

property, brick-batting etc.  All these cases have already  

been reported to the Police Station Kamla Market.  The  

police shall complete the investigation and file a report  

under  section  173  of  the  Cr.P.C.  within  three  months  

from today.

(17) I also direct that the persons who died or were injured in this  

unfortunate  incident  should  be  awarded  ad  hoc  

compensation.   Smt.  Rajbala,  who  got  spinal  injury  in  the  

incident and subsequently died, would be entitled to the ad-

hoc  compensation  of  Rs.5  lacs  while  persons  who  suffered  

grievous injuries and were admitted to the hospital would be  

entitled  to  compensation  of  Rs.50,000/-  each  and  persons  

who suffered simple injuries and were taken to the hospital  

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but  discharged  after  a  short  while  would  be  entitled  to  a  

compensation of Rs.25,000/- each.

For breach of the legal and moral duty and for its contributory  

negligence, the consequences of financial liability would also  

pass, though to a limited extent, upon the respondent no.4-

Trust  as  well.   Thus,  I  direct  that  in  cases  of  death  and  

grievous hurt, 25% of the awarded compensation shall be paid  

by  the  Trust.   The  said  amount  shall  be  paid  to  the  

Commissioner of Police, who in turn, shall issue a cheque for  

the  entire  amount  in  favour  of  the  injured  or  the  person  

claiming for the deceased.

235. The compensation awarded by this Court shall be treated as  

ad-hoc compensation and in the event, the deceased or the injured  

persons or the persons claiming through them institute any legal  

proceedings  for  that  purpose,  the  compensation awarded in this  

judgment shall be adjusted in those proceedings.

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236. The view expressed by me in this judgment is prima facie and  

is without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the parties that  

may be available to them in accordance with law.

237. The  suo  moto Petition  is  disposed  of  with  above  directions  

while leaving the parties to bear their own costs.

238. This Court would be failing in its duty if appreciation is not  

placed on record for  the  proficient  contribution made and adroit  

assistance rendered by Dr. Rajeev Dhavan, learned  amicus curiae,  

Mr.  R.F.  Nariman,  learned  Solicitor  General  of  India,  Mr.  P.P.  

Malhotra, learned Additional Solicitor General, Mr. Harish N. Salve,  

Mr. P.H. Parekh, Mr. Ram Jethmalani,  learned senior advocates,  

other  learned  counsel  assisting  them  and  all  other  counsel  

appearing in their own right.

………………………………J. New Delhi; [Swatanter Kumar] February 23, 2012

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                  REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

SUO MOTU W.P. (CRL.) NO. 122 OF 2011

 RE : Ramlila Maidan Incident   ....Petitioner DT. 4/5.06.2011

Versus

Home Secretary, Union of India & Ors.       …Respondents  

J U D G M E N T  

Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.

l. Having had the advantage of going through the lucid and elaborately  

discussed judgment of my esteemed brother Justice Swatanter Kumar, I feel  

encouraged to contribute to this pronouncement in my own humble way on  

the  precious  issues  of  liberty  and  freedom,  guaranteed  to  our  citizens  as  

fundamental rights under the Constitution and the possible lawful restrictions  

that can be imposed for curtailing such rights. The legality of the order passed  

under Section 144 Cr.P.C. by the Assistant Commissioner of Police, Kamla  

Market, Central District, Delhi is also subject to legal scrutiny by me in these  

proceedings to find out as to whether the said order is in conformity with the  

229

provisions of Section 144 Cr.P.C. read with Section 134 thereof and the Delhi  

Police Standing Order 309.  

2. I  respectfully  agree  with  all  the  observations  and  the  findings  

recorded by my colleague and I  also  concur  with the  observation  that  the  

findings recorded on the sufficiency of reasons in the order dated 4.6.2011 are  

tentative  which  could  have  been  challenged  if  they  so  desired  before  the  

appropriate forum in proper proceedings. Nonetheless, the reservations that I  

have  about  State  Police  action  vis-a-vis  the  incident  in  question  and  my  

opinion on the curtailment of the right of privacy of sleeping individuals has  

to be expressed as it directly involves the tampering of inviolate rights, that  

are protected under the Constitution. Proceedings under Section 144, even if  

resorted to on sufficient grounds, the order could not be implemented in such  

unruly manner. Such a power is invoked to prevent the breach of peace and  

not to breach the peace itself.  

3. Baba  Ram  Dev  alongwith  his  large  number  of  followers  and  

supporters  performed  a  Shanti  Paath  at  about  10  p.m.  on  4 th June,  2011,  

whereafter, all those who had assembled and stayed back, went to sleep under  

tents and canopies to again get up in the morning the next day at about 4 p.m.  

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to attend the schedule of Ashtang Yoga training to be conducted by Baba  

Ramdev.  

4. Just after midnight, at about 12.30 a.m. on the 5th of June, 2011, a  

huge contingent  of  about  more than a thousand policemen surrounded the  

encampments while everybody was fast asleep inside. There was a sizeable  

crowd of about 20,000 persons who were sleeping. They were forcibly woken  

up by the Police, assaulted physically and were virtually thrown out of their  

tents. This was done in the purported exercise of the police powers conferred  

under  Section  144  Cr.  P.C.  on  the  strength  of  a  prohibitory  order  dated  

4.6.2011  passed  by  the  Assistant  Commissioner  of  Police  as  mentioned  

hereinabove.  

5. The manner in which the said order came to be implemented, raised a  

deep concern about  the tyrannical  approach of  the  administration  and this  

Court  took  cognizance  of  the  incident  calling  upon  the  Delhi  Police  

Administration to answer this cause. The incident had ushered a huge uproar  

and an enormous tirade of criticism was flooded, bringing to our notice the  

said  unwarranted  police  action,  that  too,  even  without  following  the  

procedure prescribed in law.  

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6. The question is as to whether such an order stands protected under the  

restriction clause of Article 19 of the Constitution of India or does it violate  

the rights of a peaceful sleeping crowd, invading and intruding their privacy  

during  sleep  hours.  The  incident  also  raises  serious  questions  about  the  

credibility of the police act, the procedure followed for implementation of a  

prohibitory order and the justification thereof in the given circumstances.  

7. The right to peacefully and lawfully assemble together and to freely  

express  oneself  coupled  with  the  right  to  know about  such  expression  is  

guaranteed  under  Article  19  of  the  Constitution  of  India.  Such  a  right  is  

inherent and is also coupled with the right to freedom and liberty which have  

been conferred under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.  

8. The background in which the said assembly has gathered has  already  

been  explained  in  the  judgment  delivered  by  my  learned  brother  and,  

therefore, it is not necessary to enter into any further details thereof.  

            The fact remains that implementation of promulgated  prohibitory  

orders was taken when the crowd was asleep. The said assembly per-se, at  

that moment, did not prima facie reflect any apprehension of eminent threat or  

danger  to  public  peace  and  tranquillity  nor  any  active  demonstration  was  

232

being performed at that dead hour of night. The Police, however, promulgated  

the  order  on  the  basis  of  an  alleged  information  received  that  peace  and  

tranquillity  of  that  area  would  be  disturbed  and  people  might   indulge  in  

unlawful  activities.  The prohibitory order also  recites  that  conditions  exist  

that  unrestricted holding of a public  meeting in the area is likely to cause  

obstruction  to  traffic,  danger  to  human  safety  and  disturbance  of  public  

tranquillity  and  in  order  to  ensure  speedy  action  for  preventing  any  such  

danger to human life and safety, the  order was being promulgated.  

9. The order further  recites  that since the notice for  the promulgation  

cannot be served individually as such it shall  be published for information  

through the Press and by affixing the copies on the Notice Board of the Office  

of  the  Police  Officials,  Administration  and  Police  Stations,  including  the  

Municipal Corporation Offices.  

10. No doubt, the law of social control is preserved in the hands of the  

State,  but  at  the  same  time,  protection  against  unwarranted  governmental  

invasion and intrusive action is also protected under the laws of the country.  

Liberty is definitely no licence and the right of such freedom is not absolute  

but  can  be  regulated  by  appropriate  laws.  The  freedom  from  official  

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interference is,  therefore,  regulated by law but law cannot  be enforced for  

crippling the freedom merely under the garb of such regulation. The police or  

the  Administration  without  any  lawful  cause  cannot  make  a  calculated  

interference  in  the  enjoyment  of  the  fundamental  rights  guaranteed  to  the  

citizens  of  this  country.  As  to  what  was  material  to  precipitate  such  a  

prohibitory action is one aspect of the matter, but what is more important is  

the  implementation  of  such  an  order.  This  is  what  troubles  me  in  the  

background that a prohibitory order was sought to be enforced on a sleeping  

crowd and not  a violent  one.  My concern is  about  the enforcement  of  the  

order without any announcement as prescribed for being published or by its  

affixation in terms of the Delhi Police Standing Order 309 read with Section  

134 Cr.P.C.  

11. It is believed that a person who is sleeping, is half dead. His mental  

faculties are in an inactive state. Sleep is an unconscious state or condition  

regularly and naturally assumed by man and other living beings during which  

the activity of the nervous system is almost or entirely suspended. It is the  

state of slumber and repose. It is a necessity and not a luxury. It is essential  

for optimal health and happiness as it directly affects the quality of the life of  

an individual when awake inducing his mental sharpness, emotional balance,  

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creativity and vitality. Sleep is, therefore, a biological and essential ingredient  

of  the  basic  necessities  of  life.  If  this  sleep  is  disturbed,  the  mind  gets  

disoriented and it disrupts the health cycle. If this disruption is brought about  

in  odd  hours  preventing  an  individual  from getting  normal  sleep,  it  also  

causes energy disbalance, indigestion and also affects cardiovascular health.  

These symptoms, therefore, make sleep so essential that its deprivation would  

result  in mental and physical  torture both. It has a wide range of negative  

effects.  It  also  impairs  the  normal  functioning  and  performance  of  an  

individual which is compulsory in day-to-day life of a human being. Sleep,  

therefore, is a self rejuvenating element of our life cycle and is, therefore, part  

and partial of human life. The disruption of sleep is to deprive a person of a  

basic  priority,  resulting  in  adverse  metabolic  effects.  It  is  a  medicine  for  

weariness which if impeded would lead to disastrous results.  

12. Deprivation of sleep has tumultuous adverse effects. It causes a stir  

and disturbs the quiet and peace of an individual's physical state. A natural   

process  which is  inherent  in  a human being if  disturbed obviously affects  

basic life. It is for this reason that if a person is deprived of sleep, the effect   

thereof, is treated to be torturous. To take away the right of natural rest is also  

therefore violation of a human right. It becomes a violation of a fundamental   

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right when it is disturbed intentionally, unlawfully and for no justification. To  

arouse a person suddenly, brings about a feeling of shock and benumbness.  

The pressure of a sudden awakening results  in almost  a void of sensation.  

Such an action, therefore, does affect the basic life of an individual. The state  

of sleeping is assumed by an individual when he is in a safe atmosphere. It is  

for  this  reason  that  this  natural  system has  been  inbuilt  by our  creator  to  

provide relaxation to a human being. The muscles are relaxed and this cycle  

has a normal recurrence every night and lasts for several hours. This necessity  

is so essential that even all our transport systems provide for facilities of sleep  

while  travelling.  Sleep  is  therefore,  both,  life  and  inherent  liberty  which  

cannot be taken away by any unscrupulous action. An Irish Proverb goes on  

to  say  that  the  beginning  of  health  is  sleep.  The  state  of  sleep  has  been  

described by Homer in the famous epic Iliad as "sleep is the twin of death". A  

person, therefore, cannot be presumed to be engaged in a criminal activity or  

an activity to disturb peace of mind when asleep.  Aristotle, the great Greek  

philosopher has said that all men are alike when asleep. To presume that a  

person was scheming to disrupt public peace while asleep would be unjust  

and would be entering into the dreams of that person.  

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13. I  am  bewildered  to  find  out  as  to  how  such  declaration  of  the  

intention to impose the prohibition was affected on a sleeping crowd. There  

may  be  a  reason  available  to  impose  prohibitory  orders  calling  upon  an  

assembly to disperse, but  to me, there does not appear to be any plausible   

reason for the police to resort to blows on a sleeping crowd and to throw them  

out of their encampments abruptly. The affidavits and explanation given do  

not disclose as to why the police could not wait till morning and provide a  

reasonable time to this crowd to disperse peacefully. The undue haste caused  

a huge disarray and resulted in a catastrophe that was witnessed on Media and  

Television  throughout  the  country.  I  fail  to  find  any  explanation  for  the  

gravity or the urgent situation requiring such an emergent action at this dark  

hour of midnight. I, therefore, in the absence of any such justification have no  

option but to deprecate such action and it also casts a serious doubt about the  

existence of the sufficiency of reasons for such action. The incident in this  

litigation is an example of a weird expression of the desire of a tyrannical  

mind to threaten peaceful life suddenly for no justification. This coupled with  

what is understood of sleep hereinbefore, makes it clear that the precipitate  

action  was  nothing   but  a  clear  violation  of  human  rights  and  a  definite  

violation of procedure for achieving the end of dispersing a crowd.  

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14. Article 355 of the Constitution provides that the Government of every  

State would act in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. The  

primary task of the State is to provide security to all citizens without violating  

human dignity.  Powers conferred upon the statutory authorities have to be,  

perforce, admitted. Nonetheless, the very essence of constitutionalist is also  

that  no  organ  of  the  State  may  arrogate  to  itself  powers  beyond  what  is  

specified  in  the  Constitution.  (Vide:  GVK  Industries  Ltd.  &.  Anr.  v.  

Income Tax Officer &. Anr.,  (2011) 4 SCC 36; and  Nandini Sundar &  

Ors. v. State of Chhatisgarh, AIR 2011 SC 2839).  

15. In  H.H.  Maharajadhiraja  Madhav  Rao  Jivaji  Rao  Scindia  

Bahadur & Ors. v. Union of India,  AIR 1971 SC 530, this Court held that  

even  in  civil  commotion  or  even  in  war  or  peace,  the  State  cannot  act  

catastrophically  outside  the  ordinary law and there  is  legal  remedy for  its  

wrongful  acts  against  its  own subjects  or  even a friendly alien  within  the  

State.  

16. In M/S Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of U.P. &.  

Ors.,  AIR 1979  SC 621,  this  Court  held  that  rule  of  law means,  no  one,  

however, high or low is above the law. Everyone is subject to the law fully  

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and completely as any other and the Government is no exception. Therefore,  

the State authorities are under a legal obligation to act in a manner that is fair  

and  just.  It  has  to  act  honestly  and  in  good  faith.  The  purpose  of  the  

Government is always to serve the country and ensure the public good. (See  

also: D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1997 SC 610).  

17. Privacy  and  dignity  of  human  life  has  always  been  considered  a  

fundamental  human right  of  every human being like any other  key values  

such as freedom of association and freedom of speech. Therefore, every act  

which offends or impairs human dignity tantamounts to deprivation pro tanto  

of his right to live and the State action must be in accordance with reasonable,  

fair  and  just  procedure  established  by law which  stands  the  test  of  other  

fundamental rights. (Vide:  Francis Coralie Mullin v. The Administrator,  

Union Territory of Delhi &. Ors., AIR 1981 SC 746).  

18. The Constitution does not merely speaks for human right protection.  

It is evident from the catena of judgments of this Court that it also speaks of  

preservation and protection of man as well as animals, all creatures, plants,   

rivers,  hills  and environment. Our Constitution professes for  collective life  

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and  collective  responsibility  on  one  hand  and  individual  rights  and  

responsibilities on the other hand.  

19. In Kharak Singh v. State of U.P. & Ors., AIR 1963 SC 1295; and  

Govind v.  State of  Madhya Pradesh & Anr.,  AIR 1975  SC 1378,   this  

Court  held  that  right  to  privacy  is  a  part  of  life  under  Article  21  of  the  

Constitution  which has specifically been re-iterated in  People's  Union for  

Civil Liberties v. Union of India &. Anr., AIR 1997 SC 568, wherein this  

Court held:  

“We do not entertain any doubt that the word 'life' in Article   21 bears the same signification. Is then the word 'personal   liberty'  to  be  construed  as  excluding  from its  purview  an  invasion on the part of the police of the sanctity of a man's   home  and  an  intrusion  into  his  personal  security  and  his   right  to  sleep which  is  the  normal  comfort  and  a  dire   necessity  for human existence even as an animal? It might   not  be  inappropriate  to  refer  here  to  the  words  of  the   preamble to the Constitution that it is designed to 'assure the   dignity  of  the  individual'  and  therefore  of  those  cherished   human values as the means of ensuring his full development   and  evolution.  We are  referring  to  these  objectives  of  the   framers merely to draw attention to the concepts underlying   the Constitution  which would  point  to  such vital  words  as   'personal  liberty'  having  to  be  construed  in  a  reasonable   manner and to be attributed that sense which would promote   and achieve those objectives and by no means to stretch the   meaning  of  the  phrase  to  square  with  any  preconceived   notions  or  doctrinaire  constitutional  theories". (Emphasis  added).  

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20. The  citizens/persons have a right to leisure;  to sleep;  not to hear and  

to remain silent.  The knock at the door,  whether by day or by night,  as a  

prelude to a search without authority of law amounts to be police incursion  

into privacy and violation of fundamental  right of a citizen.  (See:  Wolf v.  

Colorado, (1948) 338 US 25).

21. Right to privacy has been held to be a fundamental right of the citizen  

being an integral part of Article 21 of the Constitution of India by this Court.   

Illegitimate intrusion into privacy of a person is not permissible as right to  

privacy  is  implicit  in  the  right  to  life  and  liberty  guaranteed  under  our  

Constitution. Such a right has been extended even to woman of easy virtues  

as she has been held to be entitled to her right of privacy. However, right of  

privacy  may not  be  absolute  and  in  exceptional  circumstance  particularly  

surveillance in consonance with the statutory provisions may not violate such  

a right. (Vide:  Malak Singh etc.  v. State of Punjab & Haryana & Ors.,  

AIR 1981 SC 760;  State of Maharashtra & Anr. v. Madhukar Narayan  

Mardikar, AIR 1991 SC 207; R. Rajagopal @ R.R. Gopal & Anr. v. State  

of Tamil Nadu & Ors., AIR 1995 SC 264; PUCL v. Union of India & Anr.,  

AIR 1997 SC 568;  Mr. ‘X’ v. Hospital ‘Z’, (1998) 8 SCC 296;  Sharda v.  

Dharmpal, (2003) 4 SCC 493 ; People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL)  

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& Anr. v. Union of India & Anr., AIR 2003 SC 2363 ; District Registrar  

and Collector, Hyderabad & Anr. v. Canara Bank & Ors., (2005) 1 SCC  

496 ;  Bhavesh Jayanti Lakhani v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., (2009) 9  

SCC 551;  and  Smt. Selvi   & Ors.  v.  State of  Karnataka, AIR 2010 SC  

1974).

22. In Ram Jethmalani & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., (2011) 8 SCC  

1, this Court dealt with the right of privacy elaborately and held as under:

“Right to privacy is an integral part of right to life. This is a   cherished  constitutional  value,  and  it  is  important  that   human beings be allowed domains of freedom that are free of   public scrutiny unless they act in an  unlawful manner…….   The solution for the problem of  abrogation of  one zone of   constitutional values cannot be the creation of another zone   of  abrogation  of  constitutional  values…..  The  notion  of   fundamental rights, such as a right to privacy as part of right   to  life,  is  not  merely  that  the  State  is  enjoined  from   derogating from them. It also includes the responsibility of   the State to uphold them against the actions of others in the   society, even in the context of exercise of fundamental rights   by those others”.

23.  The courts have always imposed the penalty on disturbing peace of  

others  by  using  the  amplifiers  or  beating  the  drums  even  in  religious  

ceremonies. (Vide:  Rabin Mukherjee &. Ors. v. State of West Bengal &.  

Ors.,  AIR 1985 Cal.  222;  Burrabazar Fireworks Dealers Association v.  

Commissioner of Police, Calcutta, AIR 1998 Cal 121; Church of God (Full  242

Gospel) in India v. K.K.R. Majestic Colony Welfare Assn. &. Ors., AIR  

2000  SC  2773;  and  Forum,  Prevention  of  Environment  and  Sound  

Pollution  v.  Union  of  India  &.  Ors.,  AIR  2006  SC  348).  In  the  later  

judgment, this court issued several directions including banning of using the  

fireworks  or  fire  crackers except  between 6.00 a.m. and 10.00 p.m. There  

shall no use of fire crackers in silence zone i.e. within the area less than 100  

meters around hospitals, educational institutions, courts, religious places.  

24.  It is in view of this fact that, in many countries there are complete  

night curfews (at the airport i.e. banning of landing and taking off between  

the  night  hours),  for  the  reason  that  the  concept  of  sound  sleep  has  been  

associated with sound health which is inseparable facet of Article 21 of the  

Constitution.  

 25. It  may  also  be  pertinent  to  mention  here  that  various  statutory  

provisions prohibit arrest of a judgment debtor in the night, a woman wanted  

in a criminal case after sunset and before sunrise and restrain to enter in the  

night into a constructed area suspected to have been raised in violation of the  

sanctioned  plan,  master  plan  or  Zonal  Plan  for  the  purpose  of  survey  or  

demolition.

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(See: S.55 of Code of Civil Procedure; S.46(4) Cr.P.C.; and Sections 25 and  

42 of the U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973).

26.  While  determining  such  matters  the  crucial  issue  in  fact  is  not  

whether such rights exist, but whether the State has a compelling interest in  

the  regulation  of  a  subject  which is  within  the  police  power  of  the  State.  

Undoubtedly, reasonable regulation of time, place and manner of the act of  

sleeping would not violate any constitutional guarantee, for the reason that a  

person may not claim that sleeping is his fundamental right, and therefore, he  

has a right to sleep in the premises of the Supreme Court itself or within the  

precincts of the Parliament.  

27.  More  so,  I  am  definitely  not  dealing  herein  with  the  rights  of  

homeless  persons  who  may  claim  right  to  sleep  on  footpath  or  public  

premises but restrict the case only to the extent as under what circumstances a  

sleeping  person  may  be  disturbed  and  I   am of  the  view  that  the  State  

authorities cannot deprive a person of that right anywhere and at all times.  

28.  While  dealing  with  the  violation  of  Human  Rights  by  Police  

Officials, this Court in  Prithipal Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab & Anr.  

(2012) 1 SCC 10, held as under:  

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"The  right  to  life  has  rightly  been  characterized  as   "supreme"  and  'basic';  it  includes  both  so-called  negative   and  positive  obligations  for  the  State".  The  negative   obligation  means  the  overall  prohibition  on  arbitrary   deprivation  of  life.  In  this  context,  positive  obligation   requires  that  State has  an overriding obligation  to  protect   the  right  to  life  of  every  person  within  its  territorial   jurisdiction."  

29.      Thus, it is evident that right of privacy and the right to sleep have  

always been treated to be a fundamental right like a right to breathe, to eat, to   

drink, to blink, etc.  

30.  Section  144  Cr.P.C.  deals  with  immediate  prevention  and  speedy  

remedy. Therefore, before invoking such a provision, the statutory authority  

must be satisfied regarding the existence of the circumstances showing the  

necessity of an immediate action. The sine qua non for an order under Section  

144 Cr.P.C. is urgency requiring an immediate and speedy intervention by  

passing of an order. The order must set out the material facts of the situation.  

Such a provision can be used only in grave circumstances for maintenance of  

public  peace.  The  efficacy  of  the  provision  is  to  prevent  some  harmful  

occurrence immediately. Therefore, the emergency must be sudden and the  

consequences sufficiently grave.  

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31.  The disobedience of the propitiatory order becomes punishable under  

Section  188  I.P.C.  only  "if  such  disobedience  causes  or  tends  to  cause  

obstruction, annoyance or injury, or risk of obstruction, annoyance or injury  

to any person lawfully employed" or "if such disobedience causes or tends to  

cause damage to human life, health or safety or causes or tends to cause riot  

or affray". Disobedience of an order by public servant lawfully empowered  

will  not  be  an  offence  unless  such  disobedience  leads  to  enumerated  

consequences  stated  under  the  provision  of  Section  188  IPC.  More  so,  a  

violation  of  the  propitiatory  order  cannot  be  taken  cognizance  of  by  the  

Magistrate who passed it. He has to prefer a complaint about it as provided  

under Section 195 (l)(a) IPC. A complaint is not maintainable in the absence  

of allegation of danger to life, health or safety or of riot or affray.  

32. Section 144 Cr.P.C. itself provides the mode of service of the order in  

the manner provided by Section 134 Cr.P.C:  

Section 134 Cr.P.C. reads as under:  

"Service or notification of order. -  

(1) The order shall,  if  practicable,  be served on the person  against whom it is made, in the manner herein provided for  service of a summons.   (2) If such order cannot be so served, it shall be notified by  proclamation,  published  in  such  manner,  as  the  State  

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Government may, by rules, direct, and a copy thereof shall be  stuck  up  at  such  place  or  places  as  may  be  fittest  for  conveying the information to such persons.  

33.  Delhi  Police Standing Order 309 - Regulation of Processions  and  

Rules prescribe the mode of service of the order passed under Section 144  

Cr.P.C.,  inter-alia:  

xx xx xx  

(5) Arrangement at the place of demonstration should include  the following:  

a) Display of banner indicating promulgation of Section 144  Cr.P.C.  

b) At least 2 videographers be available on either side of the  demonstration  to  capture  both  demonstrators  as  well  as  police response/action.  

c)  Location  of  Ambulance/PCR  vans  for  shifting  injured  persons.  

d) Loud hailers should be available.  

(6)  Repeated  use  of  PA  system  a  responsible  officer- appealing/advising  the  leaders  and  demonstrators  to  remain  peaceful and come forward for memorandum/deputation etc. or  court  arrest  peacefully.  Announcements  should  be  videographed.  

(7) If they do not follow appeal and turn violent  declare the  assembly unlawful on PA system & videograph.  

(8) Warning on PA system prior to use of any kind of force  must be ensured and also videographed.  

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xx xx xx  

(13)  Special  attention  be  paid  while  dealing  with  women's  demonstrations - only women police to tackle them.  

34. The order dated 4.6.2011 passed under Section 144 Cr.P.C. reads as  

under:  

"(i)  whereas  information  has  been  received  that  some  people/groups  of  people  indulge  in  unlawful  activities  to  disturb  the  peace  and  tranquillity  in  the  area  of  Sub  Div.  Kamla Market, Delhi.  

(ii) And whereas reports have been received indicating that  such conditions now exist that unrestricted holding of public  meeting, processions/demonstration etc. in the area is Iikely  to  cause obstruction  to  traffic,  danger  to  human safety and  disturbance of public tranquillity.  

(iii) And whereas it is necessary to take speedy measures in  this  regard  to  prevent  danger  to  human  life,  safety  and  disturbance of public tranquillity.  

(iv) Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred upon  me by virtue of Section 144 Criminal Procedure Code 1973  read with Govt. of India, Ministry of Home Affairs and New  Delhi's  Notification  No.  U.11036/1/2010,  (i)  UTI,  dated  09.09.2010.  I  Manohar  Singh,  Assistant  Commissioner  of  Police,  Sub-Division Kamla Market,  Central  District,  Delhi  do hereby make this written order prohibiting.  

xx xx xx  

(vi) Any person contravening this order shall be liable to be  punished in accordance with the provisions of section 188 of  the Indian Penal Code; and  

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(vii)  As  the  notice  cannot  be  served  individually  on  all  concerned,  the  order  is  hereby passed  ex-parte.  It  shall  be  published for the information of the public through the press  and by affixing copies on the notice boards of the office of all  DCPs, Addl. DCPs, ACPs, Tehsil officers, all police stations  concerned and the offices of the NDMC and MCD.  

(viii)  Religious  functions/public  meeting  etc.  can  be  held  with prior permission, in writing, of Deputy Commissioner of  Police, Central District, Delhi and this order shall not apply  to  processions  which  have  the  requisite  permission  of  the  Police."  

35. It is evident from the order passed under Section 144 Cr.P.C. itself  

that the people at large, sleeping in tents, had not been informed about such  

promulgation and were not asked to leave the place. There had been a dispute  

regarding the service of the orders on the organizers only. Therefore, there  

was utter confusion and the gathering could not even understand what the real  

dispute was and had reason to believe that police was trying to evict Baba  

Ramdev  forcibly.  At  no  point  of  time,  the  assembly  was  declared  to  be  

unlawful. In such a fact-situation, the police administration is to be blamed  

for  not  implementing  the  order,  by  strict  adherence  to  the  procedural  

requirements.  People  at  large have a  legitimate  expectation  that  Executive  

Authority would ensure strict compliance to the procedural requirements and  

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would  certainly  not  act  in  derogation  of  applicable  regulations.  Thus,  the  

present is a clear cut case of Human Rights violation.  

36. There  was  no  gossip  or  discussion  of  something  untrue  that  was  

going on. To the contrary, it was admittedly an assembly of followers, under a  

peaceful  banner  of  Yogic training,  fast  asleep.  The assembly was at  least,  

purportedly, a conglomeration of individuals gathered together, expressive of  

a determination to improve the material condition of the human race. The aim  

of  the  assembly  was  prima  facie  unobjectionable  and  was  not  to  inflame  

passions.  It  was  to  ward  off  something  harmful.  What  was  suspicious  or  

conspiratory  about  the  assembly,  may  require  an  investigation  by  the  

appropriate forum, but to my  mind the implementation appears to have been  

done in an unlawful and derogatory manner that did violate the basic human  

rights  of  the  crowd  to  have  a  sound  sleep  which  is  also  a  constitutional  

freedom, acknowledged under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.  

37. Such an assembly is necessarily illegal cannot be presumed, and even  

if  it  was,  the  individuals  were  all  asleep  who  were  taken  by  surprise  

altogether for a simultaneous implementation and action under Section 144  

Cr.P.C.  without  being  preceded  by  an  announcement  or  even  otherwise,  

giving  no  time in  a  reasonable  way to  the  assembly to  disperse  from the  

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Ramlila  Ground.  To  the  contrary,  the  sleep  of  this  huge  crowd  was  

immodestly and  brutally outraged and it was dispersed by force making them  

flee hither and thither,  which by such precipitate action, caused a mayhem  

that was reflected in the media.  

38. An individual is entitled to sleep as comfortably and as freely as he  

breathes. Sleep is essential for a human being to maintain the delicate balance  

of health necessary for its very existence and survival. Sleep is, therefore, a  

fundamental and basic requirement without which the existence of life itself  

would be in peril. To disturb sleep, therefore, would amount to torture which  

is now accepted as a violation of human right. It would be similar to a third  

degree method which at times is sought to be justified as a necessary police  

action to extract the truth out of an accused involved in heinous and cold-

blooded crimes. It is also a device adopted during warfare where prisoners of  

war and those involved in espionage are subjected to treatments  depriving  

them of normal sleep.  

39. Can  such  an  attempt  be  permitted  or  justified  in  the  given  

circumstances of the present case? Judicially and on the strength of impartial  

logic,  the answer has to be in the negative as a sleeping crowd cannot be  

included within the bracket of an unlawful category unless there is sufficient  

material  to  brand  it  as  such.  The  facts  as  uncovered  and  the  procedural  

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mandate having been blatantly violated, is malice in law and also the  part  

played  by  the  police  and  administration  shows  the  outrageous  behaviour  

which cannot  be justified by law in any civilized society. For the reasons  

aforesaid, I concur with the directions issued by my learned colleague with a  

forewarning to the respondents to prevent any repetition of such hasty and  

unwarranted act affecting the safe living conditions of the citizens/persons in  

this country.  

            ....……………………..J.

                                       (Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN) New Delhi, February 23,   2012

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