Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.   2085 of 2012

Ravi Yashwant Bhoir                                                ....Appellant  

Versus

District Collector, Raigad & Ors.                              ....Respondents

J U D G M E N T

Dr. B. S. CHAUHAN, J  .   

1. This  appeal  has  been  preferred  against  the  impugned  

judgment and order dated 18.6.2009 passed by the High Court of  

Bombay  in  Writ  Petition  No.  4665  of  2009  by which  the  High  

Court has affirmed and upheld the judgment of the Hon’ble Chief  

Minister of Maharashtra declaring that the conduct of the appellant  

was unbecoming of the President of Uran Municipal Council and  

declared him to be disqualified for remaining tenure of municipal  

councilorship  under  Section  55B  of  the  Maharashtra  Municipal  

Councils,  Nagar  Panchayats  and Industrial  Townships  Act,  1965  

(hereinafter  called  as  the  `Act  1965)  and  further  declared  him

disqualified for a period of six years from the date of the order i.e.  

21.3.2009.   

2. Facts and circumstances giving rise to this appeal are:

A. That  the  appellant  was  elected  as  member  of  Uran  

Municipal Council and, subsequently, elected as a President of the  

Municipal Council.   The appellant was served with a show cause  

notice dated 3.12.2008 by the State  of Maharashtra  calling  upon  

him to explain why action under Section 55B of the Act 1965 be  

not taken against him. The chargesheet contained the following six  

charges:  

Charge No.1  

        Uran Charitable Medical Trust has built up unauthorized  construction on Survey Nos. 8 + 9 + 10 + 11 situated at Mouje  Mhatawali to the extent of 1140 square meters for their hospital  and you are the Trustee of the said Trust. Municipal Council  had issued  notice dated  17.10.2006  for  demolishing  the said  unauthorized  construction  on  its  own.  Shri  Dosu  Ardesar  Bhiwandiwala  had filed  Regular  Civil  Suit  No.95/07  against  the  said  notice  in  the  court  of  Civil  Judge,  Junior  Division,  Uran  and  the  same  was  decided  on  19.12.2007  in  which  plaintiff's application was rejected.  

       Junior  Engineer of Uran Municipal  Council  lodged a  complaint with Uran police Station under Sections 53 and 54 of  the  Maharashtra  Regional  and  Town  Planning  Act,  1966  against  the said unauthorized construction on 24.7.2007. Shri  Jayant  Gosal  and three others  filed Public  Interest  Litigation  No. 57 of 2008 concerning the said unauthorized construction  of the said Trust in the Bombay High Court and the same is  presently subjudice. You are the Trustee of the said Trust and  

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as President of the Municipal Council, you are duty bound to  oppose  the  unauthorized  construction.  However,  you did  not  take any action to oppose the same and it appears that you have  supported the unauthorized construction. You have, therefore,  violated  Sections  44,  45,  52  and  53  of  the  Maharashtra  Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966.  

Charge No.2  

The Municipal Council had called the General Body Meeting  on 22.3.2007 by way of Resolution No. 2 Survey Nos. 8 + 9 +  10  +  11  at  Mouje  Mhatawali  area  admeasuring  about  4000  square  meters  was  proposed  for  reservation  of  garden.  However,  instead  of  that,  the  resolution  was  passed  for  reserving  the  same  for  hospital,  nursing  home  and  medical  college. At that time, you were presiding over the meeting. By  this illegal Act, you have violated Sections 44( 1 )(e) and 42(1),  (2)  and  (3)  of  Maharashtra  Municipal  Councils,  Panchayat  Samiti and Industrial Township Act, 1965.  

Charge No.3  

After  you  were  elected  as  the  President  on  20.12.2006,  a  General  Body Meeting was held on 9.1.2007.  Although it  is  required  under  Section  80(1)  of  the  Maharashtra  Municipal  Councils, Panchayat Samiti and Industrial Township Act, 1965  to hold the General Body Meeting once in two months, no such  meeting  was  held  for  a  period  of  three  months  between  28.2.2007 and 28.5.2007.  By the said act,  you have violated  Section  81  (1)  of  the  Maharashtra  Municipal  Councils,  Panchayat Samiti and Industrial Township Act, 1965.  

Charge No.4  

In the meeting held on 9.1.2007, the suggestion to the Agenda  No.4  made  by  Members  Shri  Chintaman  Gharat  and  Shri  Shekhar Mhatre that a rented car be provided for the use of the  President  was  rejected  by  you.  Similarly,  the  Members  Shri  Chintaman  Gharat  and  Shri  Shekhar  Mhatrehad  made  suggestion to the Agenda No.ll of the same meeting that new  Nalla be constructed near Ughadi at Bhavara Phanaswadi. The  said suggestion was rejected after being read over. Similarly,  

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Members Shri Chintaman Gharat and Shri Shekhar Mhatre had  made suggestion to the Agenda No.20 in the same meeting that  new Nalla be constructed in front of the house of Shri Kailash  Patail  at  Bhavara  Phanaswadi.  The  said  suggestion  was  rejected.  Similarly,  suggestion  was  made  by Shri  Chintaman  Gharat  and  Shri  Shekhar  Mhatre  to  Agenda  No.23  that  the  Standing Committee be authorized to open the tender/approvals  and give sanctions for diverse works of the Municipal Council.  The  said  suggestion  was  rejected.  Similarly,  suggestion  was  made by Shri Chintaman Gharat and Shri Shekhar Mhatre to  Agenda  No.  27  of  the  same  meeting  regarding  allotment  of  contract for spraying insecticides in Ward Nos. 1 to 17 of the  Municipal Council. It appears from the minutes of the meeting  dated  9.1.2007  that  even  said  suggestion  was  rejected.  You  have,  therefore,  violated  rules  30,  32(1)  and  (2)  of  the  Maharashtra Municipal Councils (Conduct of Business) Rules,  1966 by frequently rejecting the suggestions of the Members of  the Municipal Council.  

Charge No.5  

Tenders were invited on 5.10.2006 for installing CI Pipeline of  300  mm.  diameter  for  outlet  and  inlet  of  GSR  Tank  at  Sarvodayawadi  within  Uran  Municipal  Council  by  the  construction  department  of  Maharashtra  Jeevan  Pradhikaran,  Panvel  by  its  Outward  No.MJPBV  /MC/MS/Uran  /311/3/06  dated  7.12.2006  at  the  Town  Hall  of  the  Uran  Municipal  Council.  Pursuant  to  the  same  three  tenders  were  invited,  details whereof are as follows :

Name &  Address of the  

Contractor

Tender Amount

1. M/s Shailesh  Construction  Ulhasnagar

9,11,351.50

2. M/s Padmavati  Enterprise,  Ambernath

8,92,375.00

3. M/s Kiran B.  Jadhav,  Ulhasnagar

8.47,462.98

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Out  of  the  aforesaid  three  tenders,  the  lowest  tender  of  M/s  Kiran B. Jadhav, Ulhasnagar was accepted as per Clause 171 of  the Maharashtra Accounts Code, 1971. However, the estimate  was prepared as per the DSR of 2005-2006. As a result when  the tenders were invited, there was a difference of more than  10% in the tender amount. Therefore, by citing Item No.44 of  the Standing Order No.36 of the Commissioner and Director,  Directorate  of   Municipal  Administration,  the  Municipal  Council called for the current market rates from the concerned  commercial  dealers.  M/  s  Nazmi  Electrical  &  Hardware  Limited,  Kalyan  and  M/s  Sanjay  Steel  Tube  Corporation  Limited on 5.1.2007 to compare the difference in the rates of  the tenderers/ contractors and the market rates and decided that  the rates of the tenderers were less than the market rates on the  basis of the comparison and sanctioned the tenders and the bills  of  the  tenderers  were  paid  thereby  you  have  violated  paragraphs Nos. 44 to 47 of  Standing Order No.36 regarding  inviting  tenders  and approvals  dated 29.12.2005 bearing No.  NPS/Inviting  Tenders/2005/Case  No.151/05and  Rule  No.171  of the Maharashtra Accounts Code, 1971.  

Charge No.6  

Tenders were invited on 5.10.2006 for installing CI Pipeline of  300  mm.  diameter  for  outlet  and  inlet  of  GSR  Tank  at  Sarvodayawadi  within  Uran  Municipal  Council  by  the  construction  department  of  Maharashtra  Jeevan  Pradhikaran,  Panvel  by  its  Outward  No.MJPBV/MC/MS/Uran  /311/3/06  dated  7.12.2006  at  the  Town  Hall  of  the  Uran  Municipal  Council.  Pursuant  to  the  same  three  tenders  were  invited,  details whereof are as follows:

Name & Address  of the Contractor

Tender  Amount

1. M/s Shailesh  Construction  Ulhasnagar

4,21,165.00

2. M/s Padmavati  Enterprise,  Ambernath

4,18,889.28

M/s Kiran B. 3,78,507.78

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3. Jadhav,  Ulhasnagar

    Out of the aforesaid three tenders, the lowest tender of M/s  Kiran B. Jadhav, Ulhasnagar was accepted as per Clause 171 of  the Maharashtra Accounts  Code, 1971. However, the estimate  was prepared as per the DSR of 2005-2006. As a result when  the tenders were invited, there was a difference of more than  10% in the tender amount. Therefore, by citing Item No.44 of  the Standing Order No.36 of the Commissioner and Director,  Directorate  of  Municipal  Administration,  the  Municipal  Council called for the current market rates from the concerned  commercial  dealers.  M/s  Nazmi  Electrical  &  Hardware  Limited,  Kalyan  and  M/s  Sanjay  Steel  Tube  Corporation  Limited on 5.1.2007 to compare the difference in the rates of  the tenderers / contractors and the market rates and decided that  the rates of the tenderers were less than the market rates on the  basis of the comparison and sanctioned the tenders and the bills  of  the  tenderers  were  paid  thereby  you  have  violated  paragraphs Nos. 44 to 47 of Standing Order No.36 regarding  inviting  tenders  and approvals  dated 29.12.2005 bearing No.  NPS/lnviting Tenders/2005/Case No.151/05 and Rule No.171  of the Maharashtra Accounts Code, 1971.  

B.              The  appellant  submitted  his  explanation  dated  

18.12.2008  in  writing.  After  considering  the  same,  the  appellant  

was  issued  a  notice  for  hearing  on  23.1.2009.   The  appellant  

remained  present  alongwith  his  advocate  before  the  competent  

authority  i.e.  Hon’ble  Chief  Minister  holding  the  portfolio  of  

Department.  However, vide impugned order dated 21.3.2009, the  

appellant  was  declared  disqualified  for  his  remaining tenure  and  

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further declaring him disqualified for a period of six years even as  

member of the Council.  

C. Being  aggrieved,  the  appellant  filed  the  writ  petition  

challenging  the  order  dated  21.3.2009.  The  writ  petition  stood  

dismissed vide impugned judgment and order dated 18.6.2009.  

Hence, this appeal.  

3. Shri  Vinay  Navare,  learned  counsel  appearing  for  the  

appellant, has submitted that only three charges i.e. charge nos.3, 5  

and 6 have been held proved against the appellant.  One charge is  

that the appellant did not call for a meeting for a period of three  

months i.e. from 28.2.2007 to 28.5.2007 as required under Section  

81(1)  of  the  Act  1965,  for  which  the  appellant  had  furnished  

explanation which was worth acceptance.  The officer concerned of  

the  municipal  council  did  not  inform  the  appellant,  nor  the  

members  asked  to  hold  such  meeting  as  required  under  Section  

81(1) of the Act 1965, so it was merely an inadvertent act and could  

not  be  intentional.  Therefore,  the  question  of  committing  any  

misconduct could not arise.   

4.       Other  charges  which  stood  proved  are  regarding  the  

acceptance of fresh tenders at  high rates  for  incomplete  work of  

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laying down 300 mm. CI pipeline for water supply. The tender for  

lower estimated cost  was not accepted rather there was a difference  

of more than 10 per cent in tender amount.  The explanation was  

furnished by the appellant that there was a resolution by the council  

itself  accepting  the  said  tenders  and,  therefore,  the  appellant  

exclusively could not be held responsible for acceptance of tenders  

on the high rate of CI pipes.  Even the rate of C.I. pipe purchased  

by Maharashtra Jivan Pradhikaran were also considered and after  

considering all  these factors,  the lowest  bid was accepted by the  

Uran Municipal Council.  The Chief Officer, the Junior Engineer  

has  also  considered  the  technical  aspect,  and,  then  the  

recommendation was forwarded under the signature of President,  

Chief  Officer  and  Jr.  Engineer  and  thereafter,  the  Municipal  

Council passed resolution and accepted the said tender.  Therefore,  

it cannot be said that by doing this the appellant has breached any  

of the statutory provisions.   

5. It  is  further  submitted  that  at  the  time  of  hearing  on  

21.3.2009, the complainant wanted to rely upon some new grounds,  

and,  therefore,  the  appellant  raised  the  objection.   The  Hon’ble  

Chief Minister directed the Secretary to fix up a date of hearing,  

however, no date of hearing was fixed and impugned order dated  

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21.3.2009 had been passed  without  affording any opportunity of  

hearing to the appellant.   Therefore, the said order was passed in  

utter  disregard  of  the  principles  of  natural  justice  and cannot  be  

sustained in the eyes of law.    

 The Competent/Statutory authority has not recorded reasons  

for conclusions arrived, by which, at least the three charges stood  

proved against the appellant. The expression ‘misconduct’ has not  

been understood in correct  perspective.  Even if  the three charges  

stood proved, the punishment  imposed is totally disproportionate,  

more so, was not warranted in the facts and circumstances of the  

case. The High Court erred in not appreciating the facts in correct  

perspective, therefore, the impugned judgment and order is liable to  

be set aside.   

6. Shri  Mike  Prakash  Desai  and  Shri  Sudhansu  Choudhary,  

learned  counsel  appearing  on  behalf  of  the  respondents,  have  

vehemently  opposed  the  appeal  contending  that  charges  proved  

against the appellant constituted grave misconduct on his part and  

was liable to be removed and has rightly been declared disqualified  

for further period of six years. The appellant had been given full  

opportunity to defend himself.  The period of disqualification has  

lapsed,  thus  this  Court  is  dealing  with  an  academic  issue.  The  

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impugned order does not warrant any interference in the facts and  

circumstances of the case.  The appeal lacks merit and, accordingly,  

is liable to be dismissed.  

7. We  have  considered  the  rival  submissions  made  by  the  

learned  counsel  of  the  parties  and  perused  the  record.  

Before considering the case on merits, it is pertinent to deal  

with certain legal issues.  

MISCONDUCT:

8. Misconduct  has  been  defined  in  Black's  Law Dictionary,  

Sixth Edition as:

“A transgression of some established and definite rule of   action,  a forbidden act,  a dereliction from duty,  unlawful   behavior, wilful in character, improper or wrong behavior,   its  synonyms  are  misdemeanor,  misdeed,  misbehavior,   delinquency,impropriety,mismanagement  offense,  but  not   negligence or carelessness.”

Misconduct in office has been defined as:

“Any unlawful  behavior by a public officer in relation to   the duties of his office, wilful in character. Term embraces   acts which the office holder had no right to perform, acts   performed improperly, and failure to act in the face of an   affirmative duty to act.”

P. Ramanatha Aiyar's Law Lexicon, Reprint Edition 1987 at   page 821 defines ‘misconduct’ thus:

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“The term misconduct  implies  a  wrongful  intention,  and   not  a  mere  error  of  judgment.  Misconduct  is  not   necessarily  the  same  thing  as  conduct  involving  moral   turpitude. The word misconduct is a relative term, and has   to be construed with reference to the subject matter and   the context wherein the term occurs, having regard to the   scope  of  the  Act  or  statute  which  is  being  construed.   Misconduct  literally  means  wrong  conduct  or  improper   conduct.  In  usual  parlance,  misconduct  means  a   transgression  of  some  established  and  definite  rule  of   action,  where  no  discretion  is  left,  except  what  necessity   may demand and carelessness, negligence and unskilfulness   are transgressions of some established, but indefinite, rule   of  action, where some discretion is necessarily  left  to the   actor.  Misconduct  is  a  violation  of  definite  law;   carelessness or abuse of discretion under an indefinite law.   Misconduct  is  a  forbidden  act;  carelessness,  a  forbidden   quality of an act, and is necessarily indefinite. Misconduct   in office may be defined as unlawful behaviour or neglect   by a public officer, by which the rights of a party have been   affected.”

Thus it could be seen that the word ‘misconduct’ though   not capable of precise definition, on reflection receives its   connotation  from  the  context,  the  delinquency  in  its   performance and its effect on the discipline and the nature   of  the  duty.  It  may  involve  moral  turpitude,  it  must  be   improper or wrong behaviour;  unlawful  behaviour,  wilful   in character; forbidden act, a transgression of established   and definite rule of action or code of conduct but not mere   error  of  judgment,  carelessness  or  negligence  in   performance  of  the  duty;  the  act  complained  of  bears   forbidden  quality  or  character.  Its  ambit  has  to  be   construed  with  reference  to  the  subject  matter  and  the   context wherein the term occurs,  regard being had to the   scope  of  the  statute  and  the  public  purpose  it  seeks  to   serve….”.

(See also:  State of Punjab & Ors. v. Ram Singh Ex. Constable,  

AIR 1992 SC 2188).

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9. Mere error of judgment resulting in doing of negligent act  

does  not  amount  to  misconduct.  However,  in  exceptional  

circumstances,  not  working  diligently  may be  a  misconduct.   An  

action  which is  detrimental  to  the prestige  of  the institution  may  

also  amount  to  misconduct.  Acting  beyond  authority  may  be  a  

misconduct.   When  the  office  bearer   is  expected  to  act  with  

absolute  integrity  and  honesty  in  handling  the  work,  any  

misappropriation,  even  temporary,  of  the  funds  etc.  constitutes  a  

serious  misconduct,  inviting  severe  punishment.   (Vide:  

Disciplinary  Authority-cum-Regional  Manager  &  Ors.  v.  

Nikunja Bihari Patnaik, (1996) 9 SCC 69;  Government of Tamil  

Nadu v. K.N. Ramamurthy, AIR 1997 SC 3571;  Inspector Prem  

Chand v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Ors., (2007) 4 SCC 566; and  

State Bank of India & Ors. v. S.N. Goyal, AIR 2008  SC 2594).

10. In  Government of A.P. v. P. Posetty, (2000) 2 SCC 220,  

this Court held that since acting in derogation to the prestige of the  

institution/body  and  placing  his  present  position  in  any  kind  of  

embarrassment may amount to misconduct, for the reason, that such  

conduct may ultimately lead that the delinquent had behaved in a  

manner which is unbecoming of an incumbent  of the post.  

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11. In M.M. Malhotra v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 2006 SC  

80, this Court explained as under:

“…….It  has,  therefore,  to be noted that  the word   'misconduct'  is  not  capable  of  precise  definition.   But at  the same time though incapable  of  precise   definition,  the  word  'misconduct'  on  reflection   receives  its  connotation  from  the  context,  the   delinquency  in  performance  and  its  effect  on  the   discipline  and  the  nature  of  the  duty.  The  act   complained  of  must  bear  a  forbidden  quality  or   character  and its  ambit  has  to be construed with   reference  to  the  subject-matter  and  the  context   wherein  the  terms  occurs,  having  regard  to  the   scope of the statute and the public purpose it seeks   to serve.”

A similar view has been reiterated in Baldev Singh Gandhi  

v. State of Punjab & Ors., AIR 2002 SC 1124.

12.  Conclusions about the absence or lack of personal qualities  

in the incumbent do not amount to misconduct holding the person  

concerned liable for punishment.  

(See: Union of India & Ors. v. J. Ahmed, AIR 1979 SC 1022).

13. It  is also a settled legal proposition that  misconduct  must  

necessarily be measured in terms of the nature of the misconduct  

and  the  court  must  examine  as  to  whether  misconduct  has  been  

detrimental  to  the  public  interest.  (Vide:  General  Manager,  

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Appellate  Authority,  Bank  of  India  &  Anr.  v.  Mohd.  

Nizamuddin  AIR 2006 SC 3290).

14. The  expression  ‘misconduct’  has  to  be  understood  as  a  

transgression  of  some  established  and  definite  rule  of  action,  a  

forbidden  act,  unlawful  behaviour,  wilful  in  character.  It  may be  

synonymous as mis-demeanour  in propriety and mismanagement.  

In  a  particular  case,  negligence  or  carelessness  may  also  be  a  

misconduct for example, when a watchman leaves his duty and goes  

to  watch  cinema,  though  there  may  be  no  theft   or  loss  to  the  

institution  but  leaving  the  place  of  duty  itself  amounts  to  

misconduct.  It may be more serious in case of disciplinary forces.  

Further,  the  expression  ‘misconduct’  has  to  be  construed  and  

understood in reference to the subject matter and context wherein  

the term occurs taking into consideration the scope and object of the  

statute which is being construed.  Misconduct is to be measured in  

the terms of the nature of misconduct and it should be viewed with  

the  consequences  of  misconduct  as  to  whether  it  has  been  

detrimental to the public interest.   

DISGRACEFUL CONDUCT :

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15.  The expression ‘disgraceful conduct’ is not defined in the  

statute.  Therefore,  the  same  has  to  be  understood  in  given  

dictionary meaning.   The term ‘disgrace’ signifies  loss  of  honor,  

respect,  or  reputation,  shame  or  bring  disfavour  or  discredit.  

Disgraceful  means  giving  offence  to  moral  sensibilities  and  

injurious to reputation or conduct or character deserving or bringing  

disgrace or  shame.    Disgraceful  conduct  is  also  to  be examined  

from the context in which the term has been employed under the  

statute. Disgraceful conduct need not necessarily be connected with  

the official  of the office bearer.  Therefore,  it  may be outside  the  

ambit of discharge of his official duty.  

REMOVAL OF AN ELECTED OFFICE BEARER :   16. The  municipalities  have  been  conferred  Constitutional  

status  by  amending  the  Constitution  vide  74 th Amendment  Act,  

1992  w.e.f. 1.6.1993.  The municipalities have also been conferred  

various powers under Article 243B  of the Constitution.  

17. Amendment in the Constitution by adding Parts IX and IX-

A confers upon the local self Government a complete autonomy on  

the  basic  democratic  unit  unshackled  from official  control.  Thus,  

exercise of any power having effect of destroying the Constitutional  

15

Institution besides being outrageous is dangerous to the democratic  

set-up  of  this  country.  Therefore,  an  elected  official  cannot  be  

permitted  to  be  removed  unceremoniously  without  following  the  

procedure  prescribed  by  law,  in  violation  of  the  provisions  of  

Article  21 of  the Constitution,  by the State  by adopting a casual  

approach and resorting to manipulations to achieve ulterior purpose.  

The Court being the custodian of law cannot tolerate any attempt to  

thwart the Institution.

The  democratic  set-up  of  the  country  has  always  been  

recognized as a basic feature of the Constitution, like other features  

e.g.  Supremacy  of  the  Constitution,  Rule  of  law,  Principle  of  

separation of powers, Power of judicial review under Articles 32,  

226  and  227  of  the  Constitution  etc.  (Vide:  His  Holiness  

Keshwananda Bharti Sripadagalvaru & Ors. v. State of Kerala  

& Anr., AIR 1973 SC 1461; Minerva Mills Ltd. & Ors. v. Union  

of  India  &  Ors., AIR  1980  SC  1789; Union  of  India  v.  

Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr., AIR 2002 SC 2112;  

Special  Reference  No.  1  of  2002 (Gujarat  Assembly  Election  

Matter), AIR 2003 SC 87; and Kuldip Nayar v. Union of India &  

Ors., AIR 2006 SC 3127).  

16

18. It is not permissible to destroy any of the basic features of  

the Constitution even by any form of amendment, and therefore, it is  

beyond imagination that  it  can be eroded by the executive on its  

whims without any reason. The Constitution accords full faith and  

credit to the act done by the executive in exercise of its statutory  

powers, but they have a primary responsibility to serve the nation  

and enlighten the citizens to further strengthen a democratic State.  

Public administration is responsible for the effective implication of  

the rule of law and constitutional commands which effectuate fairly  

the  objective  standard  set  for  adjudicating  good  administrative  

decisions. However, wherever the executive fails, the Courts come  

forward to strike down an order passed by them passionately and to  

remove arbitrariness and unreasonableness, for the reason, that the  

State by its illegal action becomes liable for forfeiting the full faith  

and credit trusted with it. (Vide: Scheduled Castes and Scheduled  

Tribes  officers  Welfare  Council  v.  State  of  U.P.  & Ors.,  AIR  

1997 SC 1451; and State of Punjab & Ors. v. G.S. Gill & Anr.,  

AIR 1997 SC 2324).

19. Basic means the basis of a thing on which it stands, and on  

the failure of which it  falls.  In democracy all  citizens have equal  

17

political  rights.  Democracy  means  actual,  active  and  effective  

exercise of power by the people in this regard. It  means political  

participation  of  the  people  in  running  the  administration  of  the  

Government. It conveys the State of affair in which each citizen is  

assured of the right of equal participation in the polity. (See:  R.C.  

Poudyal v.  Union of India & Ors., AIR 1993 SC 1804).

20. In  Peoples Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) & Anr. v.  

Union of India & Anr., AIR 2003 SC 2363, this  Court held as  

under:–

“The trite saying that “democracy is for the   people, of the people and by the people” has to be   remembered for ever. In a democratic republic, it is   the  will  of  the  people  that  is  paramount  and   becomes  the  basis  of  the  authority  of  the   Government.  The  will  is  expressed  in  periodic   elections based on universal adult suffrage held by   means of secret ballot. It is through the ballot that   the voter expresses his choice or preference for a   candidate  “Voting is  formal  expression of  will  or   opinion by the person entitled to exercise the right   on the subject or issue”, as observed by the Court   in  Lily Thomas v. Speaker,  Lok Sabha,  (1993) 4   SCC 234 quoting from Black’s Law Dictionary. The   citizens of the country are enabled to take part in   the  Government  through  their  chosen   representatives. In a parliamentary democracy like   ours,  the Government of  the day is responsible  to   the  people  through  their  elected  representatives.   The  elected  representative  acts  or  is  supposed  to   act  as  a  live  link  between  the  people  and  the   Government.  The  people’s  representatives  fill  the   

18

role  of  law-makers  and  custodians  of  the   Government.  People  look  to  them  for  ventilation   and redressal of their grievances.”

21. In State of Punjab v.  Baldev Singh etc. etc., AIR 1999 SC  

2378, this Court considered the issue of removal of an elected office  

bearer   and  held  that  where  the  statutory  provision  has  a  very  

serious  repercussions,  it  implicitly  makes  it  imperative  and  

obligatory on the part of the authority to have strict adherence to the  

statutory  provisions.  All  the  safeguards  and  protections  provided  

under the statute have to be kept in mind while exercising such a  

power.  The Court  considering  its  earlier  judgments  in  Mohinder  

Kumar v. State, Panaji, Goa  (1998) 8 SCC 655;  and Ali Mustafa  

Abdul Rehman Moosa v. State of Kerala, AIR 1995 SC 244,  held  

as under:–

“It  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  severer  the   punishment, greater has to be the care taken to see   that  all  the  safeguards  provided  in  a  statute  are   scrupulously followed.”

22. The Constitution Bench of this Court in G. Sadanandan v.  

State of Kerala & Anr., AIR 1966 SC 1925, held that if all  the  

safeguards  provided under  the Statute  are  not  observed,  an  order  

having serious consequences is passed without proper application of  

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mind,  having  a  casual  approach  to  the  matter,  the  same  can  be  

characterised as having been passed mala fide, and thus, is liable to  

be quashed.

23. There  can  also  be  no  quarrel  with  the  settled  legal  

proposition that removal of a duly elected Member on the basis of  

proved misconduct  is  a quasi-judicial  proceeding in nature.  (Vide:  

Indian  National  Congress  (I)  v.  Institute  of  Social  Welfare  &  

Ors., AIR 2002 SC 2158). This view stands further fortified by the  

Constitution Bench judgments of this Court in  Bachhitar Singh v.  

State of Punjab & Anr., AIR 1963 SC 395 and Union of India v.  

H.C. Goel, AIR 1964 SC 364. Therefore, the principles of natural  

justice are required to be given full play and strict compliance should  

be ensured, even in the absence of any provision providing for the  

same.  Principles  of  natural  justice  require  a  fair  opportunity  of  

defence to such an elected office bearer.

24. Undoubtedly, any elected official in local self-government  

has to be put on a higher pedestal as against a government servant.  

If  a  temporary  government  employee  cannot  be  removed  on  the  

ground of misconduct without holding a full  fledged inquiry, it is  

difficult  to imagine how an elected office bearer  can be removed  

20

without  holding  a  full  fledged  inquiry.  In  service  jurisprudence,  

minor punishment is permissible to be imposed while holding the  

inquiry  as  per  the  procedure  prescribed  for  it  but  for  removal,  

termination or reduction in rank, a full fledged inquiry is required  

otherwise it will be violative of the provisions of Article 311 of the  

Constitution of India. The case is to be understood in an entirely  

different context as compared to the government employees, for the  

reason, that for the removal of the elected officials, a more stringent  

procedure and standard of proof is required.  

25. This  Court  examined  the  provisions  of  the  Punjab  

Municipal Act, 1911, providing for the procedure of removal of the  

President  of  the  Municipal  Council  on  similar  grounds  in  

Tarlochan Dev Sharma v. State of Punjab & Ors., AIR 2001 SC  

2524  and  observed  that  removal  of  an  elected  office  bearer  is  a  

serious  matter.  The  elected  office  bearer  must  not  be  removed  

unless a clear-cut case is made out, for the reason that holding and  

enjoying an office, discharging related duties is a valuable statutory  

right of not only the elected member but also of his constituency or  

electoral  college.  His  removal  may curtail  the  term of  the  office  

bearer  and  also  cast  stigma  upon  him.  Therefore,  the  procedure  

21

prescribed under a statute for removal must be strictly adhered to  

and unless a clear case is made out, there can be no justification for  

his removal. While taking the decision, the authority should not be  

guided by any other extraneous consideration or should not come  

under any political pressure.

26. In  a  democratic  institution,  like  ours,  the  incumbent  is  

entitled to hold the office for the term for which he has been elected  

unless his election is set aside by a prescribed procedure known to  

law or he is removed by the procedure established under law. The  

proceedings  for  removal  must  satisfy  the  requirement  of  natural  

justice and the decision must show that the authority has applied its  

mind to the allegations made and the explanation furnished by the  

elected office bearer sought to be removed.

27. The elected official is accountable to its electorate because  

he is being elected by a large number of voters.  His removal has  

serious repercussions as he is removed from the post and declared  

disqualified to contest the elections for a further stipulated period,  

but it also takes away the right of the people of his constituency to  

be represented by him. Undoubtedly, the right to hold such a post is  

statutory and no person can claim any absolute or vested right to the  

22

post,  but  he  cannot  be  removed  without  strictly  adhering  to  the  

provisions provided by the legislature for his removal (Vide:  Jyoti  

Basu & Ors. v. Debi Ghosal & Ors., AIR 1982 SC 983;  Mohan  

Lal  Tripathi  v.  District  Magistrate,  Rai  Barelly  & Ors., AIR  

1993  SC  2042; and  Ram  Beti  etc.  etc.  v.  District  Panchayat  

Rajadhikari & Ors., AIR 1998 SC 1222).  

28. In view of the above, the law on the issue stands crystallized  

to the effect that an elected member can be removed in exceptional  

circumstances giving strict adherence to the statutory provisions and  

holding  the  enquiry,  meeting  the  requirement  of  principles  of  

natural  justice  and giving an incumbent  an opportunity to defend  

himself,  for  the  reason  that  removal  of  an  elected  person  casts  

stigma upon him and takes away his valuable statutory right. Not  

only the elected office bearer but  his constituency/electoral college  

is also deprived of representation by the person of his choice.  A  

duly elected person is entitled to hold office for the term for which  

he  has  been  elected  and  he  can  be  removed  only  on  a  proved  

misconduct or any other procedure established under law like ‘No  

Confidence Motion’ etc.  The elected official is accountable to its  

electorate as he has been elected by a large number of voters and it  

23

would  have  serious  repercussions  when  he  is  removed  from the  

office and further declared disqualified to contest the election for a  

further stipulated period.   

RECORD  ING OF REASONS:   

29. It is a settled proposition of law that even in administrative  

matters, the reasons should be recorded as it is incumbent upon the  

authorities  to  pass  a  speaking  and  reasoned  order.  In  Kumari  

Shrilekha Vidyarthi etc. etc.  v. State of U.P. & Ors., AIR 1991  

SC 537, this  Court has observed as under:–

“Every such action may be informed by reason and   if  follows  that  an  act  un-informed  by  reason  is   arbitrary, the rule of law contemplates governance   by law and not by humour, whim or caprice of the   men to whom the governance  is  entrusted  for  the   time being. It is the trite law that “be you ever so   high, the laws are above you.” This is what a man   in power must remember always.”

30. In  L.I.C. of India & Anr. v.  Consumer Education and  

Research Centre & Ors., AIR 1995 SC 1811, this  Court observed  

that the State or its instrumentality must not take any irrelevant or  

irrational  factor  into  consideration  or  appear  arbitrary  in  its  

decision.  “Duty to  act  fairly” is  part  of  fair  procedure  envisaged  

under Articles 14 and 21. Every activity of the public authority or  

24

those under public duty must be received and guided by the public  

interest.  A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Union  

of India v. M.L. Capoor & Ors., AIR 1974 SC 87; and  Mahesh  

Chandra v.  Regional  Manager,  U.P. Financial  Corporation &  

Ors., AIR 1993 SC 935.   

31. In  State of West Bengal v. Atul Krishna Shaw & Anr.,  

AIR 1990 SC 2205, this Court observed that “giving of reasons is  

an essential element of administration of justice. A right to reason  

is,  therefore,  an  indispensable  part  of  sound  system  of  judicial  

review.”

32. In S.N. Mukherjee v. Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 1984,  

it has been held that the object underlying the rules of natural justice  

is to prevent miscarriage of justice and secure fair play in action.  

The expanding horizon of the principles of natural justice provides  

for requirement to record reasons as it is now regarded as one of the  

principles of natural justice, and it was held in the above case that  

except in cases where the requirement to record reasons is expressly  

or  by  necessary  implication  dispensed  with,  the  authority  must  

record reasons for its decision.

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33. In  Krishna Swami v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1993  

SC 1407, this Court observed that the rule of law requires that any  

action or decision of a statutory or public authority must be founded  

on the reason stated in the order or borne-out from the record. The  

Court further observed:

“Reasons are the links between the material, the   foundation  for  their  erection  and  the  actual   conclusions.  They  would  also  demonstrate  how   the mind of the maker was activated and actuated   and  their  rational  nexus  and  synthesis  with  the   facts  considered  and  the  conclusions  reached.   Lest  it  would  be  arbitrary,  unfair  and  unjust,   violating Article 14 or unfair procedure offending   Article 21.”

34. This Court while deciding the issue  in  Sant Lal Gupta &  

Ors.  v.  Modern  Co-operative  Group  Housing  Society  Ltd.  &  

Ors.,   (2010) 13 SCC 336, placing reliance on its  various earlier  

judgments held as under:  

“28. It is a settled legal proposition that not only   administrative  but  also  judicial  order  must  be   supported  by  reasons,  recorded  in  it.   Thus,  while   deciding an issue, the Court is bound to give reasons   for its conclusion.  It is the duty and obligation on the   part of the Court to record reasons while disposing   of the case.  The hallmark of order and exercise of   judicial power by a judicial forum is for the forum to   disclose  its  reasons  by  itself  and giving of  reasons   has  always  been  insisted  upon  as  one  of  the   fundamentals of sound administration of the justice –   delivery system, to make it known that there had been   

26

proper  and  due  application  of  mind  to  the  issue   before the Court and also as an essential requisite of   the  principles  of  natural  justice.  “The  giving  of   reasons  for  a  decision  is  an  essential  attribute  of   judicial  and  judicious  disposal  of  a  matter  before   Courts,  and  which  is  the  only  indication  to  know   about the manner and quality of exercise undertaken,   as also the fact that the Court concerned had really   applied its mind.” The  reason  is  the  heartbeat  of   every conclusion.   It  introduces  clarity  in  an order   and  without  the  same,  the  order  becomes  lifeless.   Reasons substitute subjectivity with objectivity.  The   absence  of  reasons  renders  an  order   indefensible/unsustainable  particularly  when  the   order is subject to further challenge before a higher   forum. Recording of reasons is principle  of natural   justice and every judicial order must be supported by   reasons recorded in writing.  It ensures transparency   and fairness in decision making.  The person who is   adversely affected must know why his application has   been rejected.”

35. In  Institute of  Chartered Accountants of  India v.  L.K.  

Ratna & Ors.,  AIR 1987 SC 71, this Court held that on charge of  

misconduct the authority holding the inquiry must  record reasons  

for  reaching its  conclusion and  record clear  findings.  The Court  

further held:  

“In fairness and justice, the member is entitled to   know why he has been found guilty. The case can be   so  serious  that  it  can  attract  the  harsh  penalties   provided  by  the  Act.  Moreover,  the  member  has   been  given  a  right  of  appeal  to  the  High  Court   under S. 22 A of the Act. The exercise his right of   appeal effectively he must know the basis on which   the Council has found him guilty. We have already   pointed out that a finding by the Council is the first   

27

determinative finding on the guilt of the member. It   is  a  finding  by  a  Tribunal  of  first  instance.  The   conclusion of the Disciplinary Committee does not   enjoy  the  status  of  a  "finding".  Moreover,  the   reasons contained in the report by the Disciplinary   Committee  for  its  conclusion  may  or  may  not   constitute the basis of the finding rendered by the   Council.  The  Council  must,  therefore,  state  the   reasons for its finding”.

36. The  emphasis  on  recording  reason  is  that  if  the  decision  

reveals  the  ‘inscrutable  face  of  the  sphinx’,  it  can  be  its  silence,  

render  it  virtually  impossible  for  the  courts  to  perform  their  

appellate  function  or  exercise  the  power  of  judicial  review  in  

adjudging  the  validity  of  the  decision.  Right  to  reason  is  an  

indispensable  part  of  a  sound  judicial  system,  reasons  at  least  

sufficient to indicate an application of mind of the authority before  

the court. Another rationale is that the affected party can know why  

the decision has gone against him. One of the salutary requirements  

of natural justice is spelling out reasons for the order made.  In other  

words,  a  speaking  out,  the  inscrutable  face  of  the  sphinx  is  

ordinarily incongruous with a judicial or quasi-judicial performance.  

MALICE IN LAW  :   

37. This Court has consistently held that the State is under an  

obligation to act fairly without ill will or malice- in fact or in law.  

28

Where malice is attributed to the State,  it  can never be a case of  

personal ill-will or spite on the part of the State.  “Legal malice” or  

“malice in law” means something done without lawful excuse. It is a  

deliberate act in disregard to the rights of others. It is an act which is  

taken with an oblique or indirect object. It is an act done wrongfully  

and  wilfully  without  reasonable  or  probable  cause,  and  not  

necessarily  an  act  done  from  ill  feeling  and  spite.   Mala  fide  

exercise  of  power  does  not  imply  any moral  turpitude.  It  means  

exercise of statutory power for “purposes foreign to those for which  

it is in law intended.” It means conscious violation of the law to the  

prejudice  of  another,  a  depraved  inclination  on  the  part  of  the  

authority to disregard the rights of others, where intent is manifested  

by  its  injurious  acts.  Passing  an  order  for  unauthorized  purpose  

constitutes malice in law. (See: Addl. Distt. Magistrate, Jabalpur  

v.  Shivakant  Shukla, AIR 1976  SC 1207; Union of  India   thr.  

Govt. of  Pondicherry & Anr. v. V. Ramakrishnan & Ors., (2005)  

8 SCC 394; and  Kalabharati Advertising v. Hemant Vimalnath  

Narichania & Ors., AIR 2010 SC 3745).

38. Section  55  of  the  Act  1965  provides  for  removal  of  the  

President of the Council by No Confidence Motion.  Sections 55A  

29

and 55B provide a mode of removal of duly elected President on  

proved misconduct or negligence etc., which read as under:  

Section 55A.- Removal of President and Vice-President by   Government:-

Without prejudice to the provisions of Section 55-1A and   55, a  President or a Vice-President may be removed from   office  by  the  State  Government  for  misconduct  in  the   discharge of his duties, or for neglect of or incapacity to   perform,  his  duties  or for being guilty of  any disgraceful   conduct,  and the President  or Vice-President  so removed   shall  not  be eligible  for  re-election  or  re-appointment  as   President or Vice-President as the case may be, during the   remainder of the term of office of the Councillors:

Provided  that,  no  such  President  or  Vice- President shall be removed from office, unless he has been   given a reasonable opportunity to furnish an explanation.

55B.-  Disqualification   for  continuing  as  Councillor  or   becoming  Councillor  on  removal  as  President  or  Vice- President :

Notwithstanding  anything  contained  in  Section   55A, if  a Councillor  or a person is found to be guilty  of   misconduct in the discharge of his official duties or being   guilty of any disgraceful conduct while holding or while he   was holding the office of the President or Vice-President, as   the case may be, the State Government  may,-

(a) disqualify  such  Councillor  to  continue  as  a   Councillor for the remainder of his term of office as a   Councillor  and  also  for  being  elected  as  a   Councillor,  till  the  period  of  six  years  has  elapsed   from the order of such disqualification;

(b) Disqualify  such  person  for  being  elected  as  a   Councillor  till  the  period  of  six  years  has  elapsed   from the order of  such disqualification.

30

39. It is also pertinent to refer to the provisions of Section 81 of  

the Act 1965 which reads as under:  

“Section 81- Provisions in regard to meetings of Council:

The following provisions shall be observed with respect   to the meetings of a Council:

(1) For the disposal of general business, which shall   be restricted to matters relating to the powers,   duties and functions of the Council as specified   in this Act or any other law for the time being   in  force,  and  any  welcome  address  to  a   distinguished  visitor,  proposal  for  giving   Manpatra  to  a  distinguished  person  or   resolution of condolence (where all or any of   these are duly proposed), an ordinary meeting   shall  be  held  once  in  two  months.  The  first   such meeting, shall be held within two months,   from  the  date  on  which  the  meeting  of  the   Council  under  Section  51  is  held,  and  each   succeeding  ordinary  meeting  shall  be  held   within two months from the date on which the   last  preceding  ordinary  meeting  is  held.  The   President  may  also  call  additional  ordinary   meetings as he deems necessary. It shall be the   duty  of  the  President  to  fix  the  dates  for  all   ordinary meetings and, to call such meetings in   time.  

(1A) If the President fails to call an ordinary meeting   within the period specified in clause (1), the Chief Officer   shall  forthwith  report  such  failure  to  the  Collector.  The   Collector shall, within seven days from receipt of the Chief   Officer’s  report  or  may,  suo  motu,  call  the  ordinary   meeting. The agenda for such meeting shall be drawn up by   the Collector, in consultation with the Chief Officer:

(2) The  President  may,  whenever  he  thinks  fit,  and   shall upon the written request of not less than one-fourth of   the total number of Councillors and on a date not later than   

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fifteen  days  after  the  receipt  of  such  request  by  the   President,  call  a  special  meeting.  The  business  to  be   transacted at any such meeting shall also be restricted to   matters specified in clause (1).

(3)          If the President fails to call a meeting within the   period  specified  in  clause  (2),  the  Councillors  who  had   made a request  for the special meeting being called, may   request the Collector to call a special meeting. On receipt   of such request, the Collector, or any officer whom he may   designate in this behalf, shall call the special meeting on a   date  within  fifteen  days  from the  date  of  receipt  of  such   request  by  the  Collector.  Such meeting  shall  be presided   over by the Collector or the Officer designated, but he shall   have no right to vote.”  

40. The  instant  case  requires  to  be  examined  in  the  light  of  

aforesaid settled legal propositions and the statutory provisions.  

41. The case has initially originated because of the complaint  

filed by Shri  Chintaman Raghunath  Gharat,  Ex-President  and the  

then  sitting  Municipal  Councillor,  Uran  Municipal  Council  

(Respondent No.5) dated 3.5.2007 regarding the misconduct of the  

appellant.   The  preliminary  inquiry  was  conducted  through  

Collector, Raigad.  The Collector, Raigad made an inquiry through  

Deputy Collector and submitted the inquiry report dated 25.8.2008  

and as no action was taken by the Statutory Authority against the  

appellant, Shri Gharat filed a Writ Petition No. 2309 of 2008 before  

the High Court which was disposed of vide order dated 3.4.2008  

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directing the  respondent no. 2 (Hon’ble Minister of State, Urban  

Development, the then Hon’ble Chief Minister) to take a decision  

on  the  application/complaint  submitted  by  Shri  Gharat  within  a  

period of  8 weeks.  As the decision could not be taken within that  

stipulated  time,  Shri  Gharat  filed  Contempt  Petition  No.  379  of  

2008  which  was  disposed  of  by  the  High  Court  directing  the  

statutory authority to take up the decision expeditiously.  

               It was, in fact, in view of the High Court’s order, the  

chargesheet/showcause  notice  dated  3.12.2008   containing  6  

charges  was  served  upon  the  appellant.  In  response  to  the  said  

chargesheet  dated  3.12.2008,  the  appellant  furnished  explanation  

dated 18.12.2008 denying all  the charges framed against  him and  

furnished a detailed explanation.  In this respect, hearing was held  

on  23.1.2009  wherein  the  appellant  as  well  as  the  complainant  

appeared  alongwith  their  advocates  and  made  their  submissions  

before the Hon’ble Minister.  The impugned order was passed on  

21.3.2009 holding the appellant guilty of three charges imposing the  

punishment  as referred to hereinabove.   

The impugned order dated 21.3.2009 runs from pages 28 to  

52 of the appeal paper-book.  The facts and the charges run from  

pages 28 to 36.  Explanation furnished by the appellant runs from  

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pages 36 to 47.  The order of the Hon’ble Minister runs only to 5  

pages.  It is evident from the said order that the Hon’ble Minister  

did not make any reference to the pleadings taken by the appellant  

either in his reply to show cause or during the course of hearing.  

The order simply reveals that the Hon’ble Minister noticed certain  

things.  Two paragraphs at  page 48 are not  relevant at all  for  our  

consideration.  The admission of the appellant that meeting was not  

held for a period of 3 months between 28.2.2007 to 28.5.2007 has  

been relied upon. In other paragraphs reference has been made to  

Standing  Order  36  issued  by  the  Director  and  Commissioner,  

Directorate  of  Municipal  Administration,  providing  for  the  

procedure for inviting tenders and then straightaway without giving  

any reason, finding is recorded as under:  

“Out of the 3 tenders received for installation of 300  mm diameter  pipeline for  outlet  and inlet  of  GSR  tank  at  Sarvodayawadi  and  Town  Hall  of  Uran  Municipal Council, lowest tender is accepted as per  clause  171  of  the  Maharashtra  Municipal  Council  Accounts Code, 1971.  However, the tenders were  invited as per the DSR rates for the year 2005-2006.  The  lowest  tender  received  at  that  time  and  was  more  than  10%  of  the  rates  of  the  estimate  (approximately  31% and  37%).   Despite  this,  the  said tender was accepted.”

           Then, a very cryptic order of punishment has been passed.  

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42.        The explanation furnished by the appellant for not holding  

the meeting and acceptance of tender by the council itself and not  

by the appellant, has not been considered at all.  No reasoning has  

been given by the Statutory Authority for reaching the conclusions.  

We  fail  to  understand  as  on  what  basis  such  a  cryptic  order  

imposing such a severe punishment can be sustained in the eyes of  

law.   

43.        The High Court has also erred in not dealing with any of the   

issues raised by the appellant while furnishing his explanation rather  

relied upon the findings recorded by the Hon’ble Minister.  There is  

nothing in the judgment of the High Court wherein the grievance of  

the appellant has been considered or any reasoning has been given  

to uphold the findings recorded by the Statutory Authority imposing  

such a severe punishment.   

44.      Shri Chintaman Raghunath Gharat,  Ex-President was the  

complainant,  thus,  at  the  most,  he  could  lead  the  evidence  as  a  

witness.  He could not claim the status of an adversial litigant.  The  

complainant  cannot  be  the  party  to  the  lis.  A  legal  right  is  an  

averment of entitlement  arising out of law. In fact, it is a benefit   

conferred  upon a person by the rule  of  law. Thus,  a person who  

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suffers  from legal  injury can only challenge  the  act  or  omission.  

There may be some harm or loss that may not be wrongful in the  

eyes of law because it may not result in injury to a legal right or  

legally protected interest of the complainant but juridically harm of  

this description is called damnum sine  injuria. The complainant has  

to establish that he has been deprived of or denied of a legal right  

and he has sustained injury to any legally protected interest. In case  

he has no legal peg for a justiciable claim to hang on, he cannot be  

heard as a party in a lis.  A fanciful   or sentimental grievance  may  

not be sufficient to confer a locus standi to sue upon the individual.   

There must be injuria or a legal grievance which can be appreciated  

and not a  stat pro ratione valuntas reasons i.e. a claim devoid of  

reasons. Under the garb of being necessary party, a person cannot be  

permitted to make a case as that of general public interest. A person  

having a remote interest cannot be permitted to become a party in  

the  lis,  as  the  person  wants  to  become a party in  a  case,  has  to  

establish  that  he  has  a  proprietary  right  which  has  been  or  is  

threatened to be violated, for the reason that a legal injury creates a  

remedial right in the injured person. A person cannot be heard as a  

party unless he answers the description of aggrieved party.  (Vide:  

Adi Pherozshah Gandhi v. H.M. Seervai, Advocate General of  

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Maharashtra, AIR  1971  SC  385;  Jasbhai  Motibhai  Desai  v.  

Roshan Kumar, Haji Bashir Ahmed & Ors., AIR 1976 SC 578;  

Maharaj Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., AIR 1976 SC  

2602;  Ghulam Qadir v. Special Tribunal & Ors., (2002) 1 SCC  

33;  and  Kabushiki  Kaisha  Toshiba  v.  Tosiba  Appliances  

Company & Ors., (2008) 10 SCC 766).  The High Court failed to  

appreciate that it  was a case of political rivalry.  The case of the  

appellant has not been considered in correct perspective at all.

45. In  such  a  fact-situation,  the  complaint  filed  by  the  

respondent  No.  5  could  at  the  most  be  pressed  into  service  as  a  

material exhibit in order to collect the evidence to find out the truth.  

In  the  instant  case,  as  all  the  charges  proved  against  the  

appellant  have  been  dealt  with  exclusively  on  the  basis  of  

documentary  evidence,  there  is  nothing  on  record  by  which  the  

complainant  could  show that  the  General  Body  meeting  was  not  

called, as statutorily required, by the appellant intentionally.  

46.     Not calling the meeting of the General Body of the House  

may be merely a technical misconduct committed inadvertently in  

ignorance  of  statutory  requirements.  It  is  nobody’s  case  that  the  

appellant had done it intentionally/purposely in order to avoid some  

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unpleasant resolution/demand of the council. No finding of fact has  

been  recorded  either  by  the  competent  authority  or  by  the  High  

Court that some urgent/important work could not be carried out  for  

want  of  General  Body  meeting  of  the  council.   Merely  not  to  

conduct oneself according to the procedure prescribed or omission  

to  conduct  a  meeting  without  any  corresponding  loss  to  the  

corporate body, would not be an automatic misconduct by inference,  

unless  some positive  intentional  misconduct  is  shown.  It  was  an  

admitted fact that the meeting had not been called.  However, in the  

absence of any imputation of motive, not calling the meeting by the  

appellant could not in itself, be enough to prove the charge.  

          Section 81 of the Act 1965 requires that for the disposal of  

the general  business,  the President  should call  the meeting of the  

Council within a period of two months from the date on which the  

last preceding ordinary meeting was held. The statutory provisions  

further provided that in case the President fails to call the ordinary  

meeting  within  the  said  stipulated  period,  the  Chief  Officer  may  

report such failure to the Collector and the Collector can call  the  

ordinary meeting of the Council following the procedure prescribed  

therein.  The President can also call the meeting on the request of  

the  members  not  less  than  one-fourth  of  the  total  number  of  

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councils.  Therefore, the cogent reading of all the provisions makes  

it clear that in case the President fails to call the meeting, there are  

other modes of calling the meeting and in such an eventuality where  

reasonable explanation has been furnished by the appellant to the  

show cause notice on this count, the competent authority could not  

have passed such a harsh order.

47. So  far  as  the  other  charges  regarding  laying  down  the  

pipelines at a much higher rate are concerned,  it has been a positive  

case of the appellant  that  as earlier contractor had abandoned the  

work in between and there was a scarcity of water in the city, the  

Chief Officer, the Junior Engineer considered the technical aspect  

and then recommendations were forwarded under the signatures of  

the appellant, the Chief Officer and Junior Engineer to the  council,  

which ultimately passed the resolution accepting the said tenders. In  

such a fact-situation, it was a collective consensus decision of the  

house  after  due  deliberations.  Admittedly,  it  was  not  even  the  

ratification of contract awarded by the appellant himself. Thus, even  

by any stretch of imagination it cannot be held to be an individual  

decision  of  the  appellant  and  the  competent  authority  failed  to  

appreciate that the tenders were accepted by the Council itself and  

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not  by  the  appellant  alone.  Therefore,  he  could  not  be  held  

responsible for acceptance of tenders.    

We  have  gone  through  the  counter  affidavit  filed  by  

respondent No.5, complainant before this court and he has not stated  

anywhere that the tenders were not accepted by the council, rather  

allegations have been made that the tenders had been accepted at a  

higher  rate  so  that  the  contractor  could  get  the  financial  gain.  

Similarly,  technical  issue  has  been  raised  for  not  calling  the  

meeting,  committing  serious  irregularities  sufficiently  warranting  

dis-qualification  of  the  appellant  on  his  omission  to  call  the  

meeting,  but  it  is  not  his  case  that  he  did  it  intentionally.   The  

counter  affidavit  filed  by  the  State  does  not  reveal  anything  in  

relation  to  the  issues  involved  herein  and  it  appears  that  the  

deponent/officer has merely completed the formalities without any  

purpose.

48.   To conclude, we are of the considered opinion and that too  

after  appreciation  of  the  entire  evidence  on  record  that  the  first  

charge proved against the appellant for not calling the meeting of  

Council, did not warrant the order of removal and the explanation  

furnished  by  appellant  could  have  been  accepted.  Other  charges  

could not be proved against the appellant, in view of the fact, that  

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the tenders at a higher rate were accepted by the Council itself and  

the appellant could not be held exclusively responsible for it. The  

Respondent  no.  5,  being  a  political  rival,  could  not  have  been  

entertained  as  a  party  to  the  lis.  The  charge  of  not  calling  the  

meeting of the Council had been admitted by the appellant himself,  

thus,  no  further  evidence  was  required,  for  the  reason,  that  the  

admission is the best evidence.  The competent authority could have  

considered  his  explanation  alone  and  proceeded  to  take  a  final  

decision.  So far  as  the  other  charges  are  concerned,  as  has  been  

observed hereinabove, it had been a consensus collective decision  

of the Council to accept the tender at higher rate and the appellant  

could  not  have  been   held  guilty  of  the  said  charges.  Thus,  the  

instant  case has been a crystal  clear  cut  case of legal  malice and  

therefore, the impugned orders are liable to be quashed.  The duly  

elected  member/chairman  of  the  council  could  not  have  been  

removed in such a casual and cavalier manner without giving strict  

adherence to the safeguards provided under the statute which had to  

be scrupulously followed.  

49. The appellant has raised a question of fact before the High  

Court as well as before this Court submitting that at the time  

of  hearing before  the  Hon’ble  Chief  Minister,  respondent  

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No.5  has  raised  new  grounds  and  the  appellant   raised  

serious  objections  as  he  had  no  opportunity  to  meet  the  

same. Thus, in order to give the appellant an opportunity to  

rebut the same the competent  authority had adjourned the  

case  and  directed  the  Secretary  to  fix  a  date  so  that  the  

appellant  may  meet  those  new  objections/grounds.  

However, the order impugned removing the appellant from  

the post and declaring him further disqualified for a  period  

of  six  years  had been passed.   It  is  not  evident  from the  

order impugned as what could be  those new grounds which  

had not been disclosed to the appellant. Thus, to ascertain as  

to whether in order to give an opportunity to the appellant to  

meet the alleged new grounds, the competent authority had  

adjourned the case, this Court while reserving the judgment  

vide  order  dated  13.2.2012  asked  the  learned  Standing  

Counsel for the State Shri Mike Prakash Desai to produce  

the original record before this Court within a period of two  

weeks.  For the reasons best known to the State Authorities  

neither  the  record  has  been  produced  before  us,  nor  any  

application has been filed to extend the time to produce the  

same.   

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             In fact,  this Court has been deprived of seeing the original  

record and to examine the grievance of the appellant.  We express  

our  grave  concern  and  shock  the  way  the  State  Authorities  has  

treated the highest  court  of the land.  In such a fact-situation,  the  

court has no option except to draw the adverse inference against the  

State.   

50. In view of the above, the appeal succeeds and is allowed.  

The judgment and order of the High Court dated 18.6.2009 as well  

as the order passed by the Hon’ble Chief Minister dated 21.3.2009  

are hereby set aside.   

This  Court  while  entertaining  the  petition  had  granted  

interim  protection  to  the  appellant  vide  order  dated  17.7.2009,  

which was extended till further orders vide order dated 13.8.2009  

and, thus, the orders impugned remained inoperative. Thus, it will  

be deemed as no order had ever been passed against the appellant.  

In the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no  

order as to costs.  

A copy of the order be sent directly to the Chief Secretary,  

State of Maharashtra, Bombay, who may conduct an enquiry and  

send his personal affidavit as under what circumstances the State  

Authorities could decide not to ensure compliance of the order of  

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this Court dated 13.2.2012, within a period of four week from the  

date of receipt of this order, to the Registrar General of this Court  

who may place it alongwith the file before the Bench.   

                                                  ....…………….....................J.                                              ( Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN )

                                                  .…………............................J.                  ( J.S. KHEHAR )  New Delhi,           March 2, 2012

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