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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL     APPEAL     NO.1838     OF     2009   

Ravi Kapur … Appellant

Versus

State of Rajasthan … Respondent

J     U     D     G     M     E     N     T   

Swatanter     Kumar,     J  .

1. The present appeal is directed against the judgment of the  

High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jaipur Bench, Jaipur,  

dated 12th August, 2008.   

2. The facts giving rise to the present appeal in brief are :   

One Sukhdev Singh, PW2, had informed and made a  

statement, parcha bayan, Ex.P2, to the police at the police station  

M.I.A. Alwar on 20th April, 1991 stating that at about 9.15 a.m.  

on that very day, he was going in a jeep to Govindgarh from Alwar  

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to attend the marriage of his brother-in-law, Joga Singh.  When  

they reached Baggad Tiraya, one jeep bearing no. RNA-638 was  

also going ahead of his jeep and in the said jeep, his wife, Chet  

Kaur, daughter Rinki, father-in-law, Lahori Singh, mother-in-law,  

Gita and paternal uncle father-in-law (Fufi sasur) Niranjan Singh  

and his wife Kailashwati and his brother-in-law Multan Singh and  

his son Tinku were travelling.  A maruti car was also going ahead  

of them.  Bus No. RNA 339 was coming from Baggad Tiraya side  

at a very high speed.  The driver of the Maruti car immediately  

turned his car to one side to save himself and the bus crashed  

into the jeep bearing no. RNA-638.  As a result of this fatal  

accident, Chet Kaur, Rinki, Geeta and the jeep driver died on the  

spot.  The condition of the other occupants of the jeep,  

particularly Lahori Singh, Niranjan Singh, Kailashwanti and  

Tinku was very critical and they were admitted to the hospital  

where they later died.  According to this witness, the bus was  

being driven by Ravi Kapur who took the bus towards large pits  

in the agricultural fields and after parking the bus there, he ran  

away from the spot.   

3. On the basis of Ex.P2, a case under Section 304-A of the  

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, the ‘IPC’) was registered  

against the accused Ravi Kapur.  The Investigating Officer, PW11,  

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conducted the investigation, prepared the site plan, Ex.P3, and  

recorded the statement of various witnesses.  A chargesheet  

[report under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,  

1973 (for short the ‘Cr.P.C.’)] was filed against the accused under  

Sections 279, 337, 338 and 304-A IPC.  The court framed charges  

against the accused and he was put to trial.   

4. The prosecution examined as many as 11 witnesses  

including four eye-witnesses, doctors and the Investigating Officer  

himself.  Upon closing of the case of the prosecution, all the  

incriminating evidence against the accused was put before him  

and his statement under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. was recorded  

wherein he took the stand of complete denial and stated that the  

case of the prosecution was false.  The trial court, vide its  

judgment dated 11th May, 2006, held that the prosecution has not  

been able to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and the  

accused was entitled to an order of acquittal.  Consequently, the  

Court acquitted the accused Ravi Kapur of all the above-

mentioned charges.  At this stage itself, we may refer to the  

relevant extract of the judgment of the trial court, which is the  

reasoning for acquitting the accused:

“Now only 3 witnesses remain to be  considered in the instant case, viz., P.W.2- Sukhdev Singh; P.W.4-Multan Singh and  

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P.W.11-Sohan Lal who is the investigating  officer.  The Court has to consider  testimonies adduced by these witnesses and  has to see whether it is proved from the  statements of these witnesses that accused  was driving the bus rashly and negligently  and hit the jeep or not and whether accused  Ravi Kapur was driving the said bus no.RNA- 339 at the time of the accident or not?  In  this regard, P.W.2-Sukhdev Singh who is  also the person who lodged first information  report has stated in his parcha statement  Ex.P2 (sic) that one Maruti Van was gone  ahead of jeep which had met with the  accident and his jeep was behind the said  jeep involved in accident.  All these three  vehicles were on one side of the road and  were at a distance of 20 Ft. from each other.  One bus came no. RNA-339 towards them  near Bagar tiraha and this bus was driven  rashly and negligently and directly hit the  jeep.  However, the Maruti car which was  ahead of accident jeep and the jeep in which  he was travelling and which was behind the  accident jeep, escaped in the said accident by  bus.  Both these vehicles swerved towards  kuchha side of the road.  This witness has  mentioned in his first information report that  driver of the Bus no.RNA-339 hit the jeep  with intention to kill the persons travelling in  the accidented jeep.  He has further stated  that he identified the driver of the bus and he  was accused Ravi Kapur.  He was identified  by the passers-by also and they also  disclosed his name.  Therefore, now this  Court has to see whether facts disclosed by  this witness  in his parcha statement –  first  information report, stand fully proved or not?  Conclusion which can be drawn from perusal  of examination in chief of this witness is that  this witness has stated in statement before  court that Maruti car was ahead of all and  the jeep in which he was sitting was behind  the Maruti car and the jeep which met with  

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the accident was in behind (sic) the above  vehicles.  Therefore, in the circumstances  there is contradiction in the statements of  this witness given by him in his parcha  statement and in court with regard to fact as  to whether the accidented jeep was in front  or rear of the aforesaid vehicles.  In his  statement in court he states that the jeep in  which he was sitting was behind the  accidented jeep and he himself was sitting  behind driver’s seat.  Therefore, in such  circumstances it cannot be safely accepted  that this witness has actually seen the  accident.  Because there are material self- contradictions regarding the fact as to  whether the jeep of this witness was ahead or  behind the accidented jeep….

…In the circumstances it is not clear from  the statements of this witness whether driver  of the bus was negligent, what was the speed  of the bus and accidented jeep was in its  right side of the road.  This witness also  states that there was one jeep and a maruti  car ahead the accidented jeep, but drivers of  both these vehicles saved their vehicles from  the bus and therefore the bus hit the jeep in  which this witness was sitting.  Court has to  see that if driver of the bus was actually  driving the bus rashly and negligently, then  why he did not collide with the jeep and  maruti car which were plying ahead the  accidented jeep and why it collided with the  accidented jeep.  The court has also to  consider whether the accident was due to  over-taking of the jeep by the driver of the  jeep.  Because witnesses who appeared on  behalf of prosecution have stated that right  side of bus suffered moch.  But prosecution  has not filed any mechanical expert report  nor has produced any expert witness in this  regard which could have proved that the bus  actually hit the jeep from front.  It is also not  clear whether any loss was caused to bus in  

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front or not.  Conclusion which can be drawn  out from perusal of statement made by  P.W.11-Sohan Lal/investigating officer in his  cross examination, is that accident took  place at a place where there was a  turn/crossing on road and therefore both the  drivers of the bus as well as jeep ought to  have been careful and cautious.  Moreover it  is also not clear from statement of this  witness that the bus had actually collided  with the front portion of jeep.  He has stated  that accident could have been caused due to  over-taking of the middle vehicle.  Whereas  this witness ought to have been proved that  the accident is a head-on collision between  bus and jeep.  Apart from this, this witness  did not conduct identification proceedings of  the accused because the persons present at  the spot had told him that Ravi Kapur is the  accused and he is the owner and driver of  the bus.  This witness has not clarified as to  why he did not send any notice under  Section 133 of M.V. Act to the owner of  vehicle.  Therefore, in these circumstances, it  is apparent from statements of this witness  that neither notice under Section 133 of  M.V.Act was given to owner of the bus nor  identification proceedings of accused were  held.  Although persons at the spot had told  that Ravi Kapur was driver of the bus,  but  prosecution has not produced and examined  any such independent witness who was  present at the spot at the time of this  accident who could have explained that Ravi  Kapur was driving the bus no. RNA-339.  Infact prosecution ought to have recorded the  statements of eye witnesses and produced  them in court which could have corroborated  statement of P.W.2-Sukhdev that Ravi Kapur  was driving Bus No.RNA-339 at the time of  accident and also the identification  proceedings of accused were very necessary  because both the witnesses who have been  produced by prosecution, have not identified  

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accused Ravi Kapur or that the accident was  caused to rash and negligent driver of the  bus by Ravi Kapur.  One of the witness has  stated that he saw the driver running away  from the spot, but he has not stated that he  saw the driver of the bus hitting the jeep.  Notice under Section 133 of the M.V. Act was  very necessary which could have proved that  Ravi Kapur was actually driving the bus  no.RNA-339 at the time of accident.  Moreover, none of the prosecution witnesses  have explained that the bus was being driven  rashly and negligently….”

5. The above findings recorded by the trial court were reversed  

by the High Court, which set aside the judgment of acquittal.  

Upon appreciating the evidence, the High Court, vide its judgment  

dated 12th August, 2008, came to the conclusion that the  

judgment of the trial court was incorrect and while particularly  

dealing with the issue of grant of notice under Section 133 of the  

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short, ‘the Act’), the Court held as  

under :

“Now so far as notice under section 133 of  the Motor Vehicles Act was concerned which  was not served upon the owner, because the  statement of PW.2 Sukh Dev Singh, Multhan  Singh P.W.4 stated that the accused  respondent was the driver and they have  identified him on the spot as well as in the  court also.  In such situation, service of  notice under section 133 of the Motor Vehicle  upon the owner has no relevancy.  As such,  in the light of the statement of PW.2 Sukh  Dev Singh and P.W.4 Multhan Singh no  identification parade is necessary.  The FIR  

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Ex.P.1 shows that the name of the accused  respondent has already mentioned.”

6. The High Court convicted the accused under Section 304-A  

IPC and awarded him simple imprisonment for two years with  

fine of Rs.5000/-, in default of payment of fine, to undergo  

further imprisonment of six months.  The Court also convicted  

the accused for offences under Sections 279 and 337 of the IPC,  

awarding him six months simple imprisonment with fine of  

Rs.1000/-, in default of payment of fine to undergo one month  

simple imprisonment and one month simple imprisonment with  

fine of Rs.500/-, in default of payment of fine to undergo 15 days  

rigorous imprisonment, respectively. Aggrieved from the judgment  

of conviction and order of sentence passed by the High Court, the  

present Special Leave Petition has been filed.   

7. Mr. Patwalia, learned senior advocate appearing for the  

appellant, while raising a challenge to the judgment of the High  

Court, has prayed that the judgment of acquittal recorded by the  

Trial Court be restored and the judgment of the High Court be set  

aside.  The learned counsel has raised the following submissions:

(a) It is a settled principle of law that the Appellate Court  

should normally not interfere with the judgment of  

acquittal unless it is perverse and contrary to the evidence  

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on record.  The scope of an appeal against an order of  

acquittal is very limited and the High Court, in the present  

case, has exceeded its jurisdiction in reversing the  

judgment of acquittal passed by the Trial Court.   

(b) There is no evidence on record to identify or link the  

accused with the commission of the offence, i.e., whether or  

not he was driving the said vehicle.  In fact, according to  

the counsel, there is no direct evidence to show that the  

accused Ravi Kapur was driving the bus involved in the  

accident.

(c) Even if it is presumed that the accused was the person  

driving the bus at the relevant time, still there is no  

evidence to prove that he drove the bus rashly and  

negligently.   

In absence of any evidence on these two counts, the  

appellant is entitled to acquittal.

8. While refuting the above-said arguments, the learned  

counsel appearing for the State has contended that there are eye-

witnesses to the occurrence who have categorically stated the  

entire incident.  After the case had been remanded by the Court  

of Special Judge, by order dated 28th October, 1999, in regard to  

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the issue of non-holding the test identification parade and non-

examination of the doctor, the Trial Court had disturbed its own  

earlier judgment of conviction dated 24th June, 1999 vide its  

above-mentioned judgment dated 11th May, 2006.  This  

subsequent judgment of the Trial Court was challenged before the  

High Court.  The High Court reversed the judgment of acquittal to  

that of conviction.  This itself shows that there were apparent  

errors and complete lack of proper appreciation of evidence in the  

later judgment of the Trial Court.  Therefore, that judgment  

should not be restored by this Court.  According to him, the  

statements of PW2, PW4 and PW11 clearly establish the case of  

rash and negligent driving by the accused.  There is no material  

contradiction between the statements of the witnesses and the  

parcha statement, etc.  The judgment of the High Court does not  

call for any interference by this Court.  

9. Firstly, we would discuss the last contention raised on  

behalf of the appellant, as it relates to appreciation of evidence by  

this Court, particularly keeping in view the fact that the  

impugned judgment is a judgment of reversal against the  

judgment of acquittal.

10. In order to examine the merit or otherwise of contentions (b)  

and (c) raised on behalf of the appellant, it is necessary for the  

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Court to first and foremost examine (a) what is rash and negligent  

driving; and (b) whether it can be gathered from the attendant  

circumstances.  Rash and negligent driving has to be examined in  

light of the facts and circumstances of a given case.  It is a fact  

incapable of being construed or seen in isolation.  It must be  

examined in light of the attendant circumstances.  A person who  

drives a vehicle on the road is liable to be held responsible for the  

act as well as for the result.  It may not be always possible to  

determine with reference to the speed of a vehicle whether a  

person was driving rashly and negligently.  Both these acts  

presuppose an abnormal conduct.  Even when one is driving a  

vehicle at a slow speed but recklessly and negligently, it would  

amount to ‘rash and negligent driving’ within the meaning of the  

language of Section 279 IPC.  That is why the legislature in its  

wisdom has used the words ‘manner so rash or negligent as to  

endanger human life’.  The preliminary conditions, thus, are that  

(a) it is the manner in which the vehicle is driven; (b) it be driven  

either rashly or negligently; and (c) such rash or negligent driving  

should be such as to endanger human life.  Once these  

ingredients are satisfied, the penalty contemplated under Section  

279 IPC is attracted.

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11. ‘Negligence’  means omission to do something which a  

reasonable and prudent person guided by the considerations  

which ordinarily regulate human affairs would do or doing  

something which a prudent and reasonable person guided by  

similar considerations would not do.  Negligence is not an  

absolute term but is a relative one; it is rather a comparative  

term.  It is difficult to state with precision any mathematically  

exact formula by which negligence or lack of it can be infallibly  

measured in a given case.  Whether there exists negligence per se  

or the course of conduct amounts to negligence will normally  

depend upon the attending and surrounding facts and  

circumstances which have to be taken into consideration by the  

Court.  In a given case, even not doing what one was ought to do  

can constitute negligence.   

12. The Court has to adopt another parameter, i.e., ‘reasonable  

care’  in determining the question of negligence or contributory  

negligence.  The doctrine of reasonable care imposes an obligation  

or a duty upon a person (for example a driver) to care for the  

pedestrian on the road and this duty attains a higher degree  

when the pedestrian happen to be children of tender years.  It is  

axiomatic to say that while driving a vehicle on a public way,  

there is an implicit duty cast on the drivers to see that their  

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driving does not endanger the life of the right users of the road,  

may be either vehicular users or pedestrians.  They are expected  

to take sufficient care to avoid danger to others.

13. The other principle that is pressed in aid by the courts in  

such cases is the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.  This doctrine  

serves two purposes – one that an accident may by its nature be  

more consistent with its being caused by negligence for which the  

opposite party is responsible than by any other causes and that  

in such a case, the mere fact of the accident is prima facie  

evidence of such negligence.  Secondly, it is to avoid hardship in  

cases where the claimant is able to prove the accident but cannot  

prove how the accident occurred.  The courts have also applied  

the principle of res ipsa loquitur in cases where no direct evidence  

was brought on record.  The Act itself contains a provision which  

concerns with the consequences of driving dangerously alike the  

provision in the IPC that the vehicle is driven in a manner  

dangerous to public life.  Where a person does such an offence he  

is punished as per the provisions of Section 184 of the Act.  The  

courts have also taken the concept of ‘culpable rashness’  and  

‘culpable negligence’ into consideration in cases of road accidents.  

‘Culpable rashness’  is acting with the consciousness that  

mischievous and illegal consequences may follow but with the  

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hope that they will not and often with the belief that the actor has  

taken sufficient precautions to prevent their happening.  The  

imputability arises from acting despite consciousness (luxuria).  

‘Culpable negligence’ is acting without the consciousness that the  

illegal and mischievous effect will follow, but in circumstances  

which show that the actor has not exercised the caution  

incumbent upon him and that if he had, he would have had the  

consciousness.  The imputability arises from the neglect of civic  

duty of circumspection.  In such a case the mere fact of accident  

is prima facie evidence of such negligence.  This maxim suggests  

that on the circumstances of a given case the res speaks and is  

eloquent because the facts stand unexplained, with the result  

that the natural and reasonable inference from the facts, not a  

conjectural inference, shows that the act is attributable to some  

person’s negligent conduct.  [Ref. Justice Rajesh Tandon’s ‘An  

Exhaustive Commentary on Motor Vehicles Act, 1988’ (First Edition,  

2010].

14. We have noticed these principles in order to examine the  

questions raised in the present case in their correct perspective.  

We may notice that certain doctrines falling in the realm of  

accidental civil or tortuous jurisprudence, are quite applicable to  

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the cases falling under criminal jurisprudence like the present  

one.

15. Now, we may refer to some judgments of this Court which  

would provide guidance for determinatively answering such  

questions.  In the case of Alister Anthony Pareira v. State of  

Maharashtra [(2012) 2 SCC 648] where the driver of a vehicle was  

driving the vehicle at a high speed at late hours of the night in a  

drunken state and killed seven labourers sleeping on the  

pavement, injuring other eight, this Court dismissing the appeal,  

laid down the tests to determine criminal culpability on the basis  

of ‘knowledge’, as follows :

“41. Rash or negligent driving on a public  road with the knowledge of the dangerous  character and the likely effect of the act and  resulting in death may fall in the category of  culpable homicide not amounting to murder.  A person, doing an act of rash or negligent  driving, if aware of a risk that a particular  consequence is likely to result and that result  occurs, may     be     held     guilty     not     only     of     the     act    but     also     of     the     result  .  As a matter of law—in  view of the provisions of IPC—the cases  which fall within the last clause of Section  299 but not within clause “Fourthly”  of  Section 300 may cover the cases of rash or  negligent act done with the knowledge of the  likelihood of its dangerous consequences and  may entail punishment under Section 304  Part II IPC.  Section 304-A IPC takes out of  its ambit the cases of death of any person by  doing any rash or negligent act amounting to  culpable homicide of either description.”

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16. Again, in the case of Naresh Giri v. State of M.P. [(2008) 1  

SCC 791], where a train had hit a bus being driven by the  

appellant at the railway crossing and the bus was badly damaged  

and two persons died, this Court, while altering the charges from  

Section 302 IPC to Section 304-A IPC, observed :

“7. Section 304-A IPC applies to cases where  there is no intention to cause death and no  knowledge that the act done in all probability  will cause death. The provision is directed at  offences outside the range of Sections 299  and 300 IPC. Section 304-A applies only to  such acts which are rash and negligent and  are directly the cause of death of another  person. Negligence and rashness are  essential elements under Section 304-A.

8. Section 304-A carves out a specific offence  where death is caused by doing a rash or  negligent act and that act does not amount  to culpable homicide under Section 299 or  murder under Section 300. If a person  wilfully drives a motor vehicle into the midst  of a crowd and thereby causes death to some  person, it will not be a case of mere rash and  negligent driving and the act will amount to  culpable homicide. Doing an act with the  intent to kill a person or knowledge that  doing an act was likely to cause a person's  death is culpable homicide. When intent or  knowledge is the direct motivating force of  the act, Section 304-A has to make room for  the graver and more serious charge of  culpable homicide. The provision of this  section is not limited to rash or negligent  driving. Any rash or negligent act whereby  death of any person is caused becomes  

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punishable. Two elements either of which or  both of which may be proved to establish the  guilt of an accused are rashness/negligence;  a person may cause death by a rash or  negligent act which may have nothing to do  with driving at all. Negligence and rashness  to be punishable in terms of Section 304-A  must be attributable to a state of mind  wherein the criminality arises because of no  error in judgment but of a deliberation in the  mind risking the crime as well as the life of  the person who may lose his life as a result  of the crime. Section 304-A discloses that  criminality may be that apart from any mens  rea, there may be no motive or intention still  a person may venture or practise such  rashness or negligence which may cause the  death of other. The death so caused is not  the determining factor.

9. What constitutes negligence has been  analysed in Halsbury's Laws of England (4th  Edn.), Vol. 34, Para 1 (p. 3), as follows:

“1. General principles of the law of  negligence.—Negligence is a specific tort  and in any given circumstances is the  failure to exercise that care which the  circumstances demand. What amounts  to negligence depends on the facts of  each particular case. It may consist in  omitting to do something which ought  to be done or in doing something which  ought to be done either in a different  manner or not at all. Where there is no  duty to exercise care, negligence in the  popular sense has no legal  consequence. Where there is a duty to  exercise care, reasonable care must be  taken to avoid acts or omissions which  can be reasonably foreseen to be likely  to cause physical injury to persons or  property. The degree of care required in  

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the particular case depends on the  surrounding circumstances, and may  vary according to the amount of the risk  to be encountered and to the magnitude  of the prospective injury. The duty of  care is owed only to those persons who  are in the area of foreseeable danger;  the fact that the act of the defendant  violated his duty of care to a third  person does not enable the plaintiff who  is also injured by the same act to claim  unless he is also within the area of  foreseeable danger. The same act or  omission may accordingly in some  circumstances involve liability as being  negligent, although in other  circumstances it will not do so. The  material considerations are the absence  of care which is on the part of the  defendant owed to the plaintiff in the  circumstances of the case and damage  suffered by the plaintiff, together with a  demonstrable relation of cause and  effect between the two.”

13. According to the dictionary meaning  “reckless”  means “careless”, regardless or  heedless of the possible harmful  consequences of one's acts. It presupposes  that if thought was given to the matter by the  doer before the act was done, it would have  been apparent to him that there was a real  risk of its having the relevant harmful  consequences; but, granted this,  recklessness covers a whole range of states of  mind from failing to give any thought at all to  whether or not there is any risk of those  harmful consequences, to recognising the  existence of the risk and nevertheless  deciding to ignore it.”

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17. In the case of Mohd. Aynuddin alias Miyam v. State of A.P.  

[(2000) 7 SCC 72], wherein the appellant was driving a bus and  

while a passenger was boarding the bus, the bus was driven  

which resulted in the fall of the passenger and the rear wheel of  

the bus ran over the passenger.  This Court, drawing the  

distinction between a rash act and a negligent act held that it was  

culpable rashness and criminal negligence and held as under :

“7. It is a wrong proposition that for any  motor accident negligence of the driver  should be presumed. An accident of such a  nature as would prima facie show that it  cannot be accounted to anything other than  the negligence of the driver of the vehicle may  create a presumption and in such a case the  driver has to explain how the accident  happened without negligence on his part.  Merely because a passenger fell down from  the bus while boarding the bus, no  presumption of negligence can be drawn  against the driver of the bus.

9. A rash act is primarily an overhasty act. It  is opposed to a deliberate act. Still a rash act  can be a deliberate act in the sense that it  was done without due care and caution.  Culpable rashness lies in running the risk of  doing an act with recklessness and with  indifference as to the consequences. Criminal  negligence is the failure to exercise duty with  reasonable and proper care and precaution  guarding against injury to the public  generally or to any individual in particular. It  is the imperative duty of the driver of a  vehicle to adopt such reasonable and proper  care and precaution.”

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18. In light of the above, now we have to examine if negligence in  

the case of an accident can be gathered from the attendant  

circumstances.  We have already held that the doctrine of res ipsa  

loquitur is equally applicable to the cases of accident and not  

merely to the civil jurisprudence.  Thus, these principles can  

equally be extended to criminal cases provided the attendant  

circumstances and basic facts are proved.  It may also be noticed  

that either the accident must be proved by proper and cogent  

evidence or it should be an admitted fact before this principle can  

be applied.  This doctrine comes to aid at a subsequent stage  

where it is not clear as to how and due to whose negligence the  

accident occurred.  The factum of accident having been  

established, the Court with the aid of proper evidence may take  

assistance of the attendant circumstances and apply the doctrine  

of res ipsa loquitur. The mere fact of occurrence of an accident  

does not necessarily imply that it must be owed to someone’s  

negligence.  In cases where negligence is the primary cause, it  

may not always be that direct evidence to prove it exists.  In such  

cases, the circumstantial evidence may be adduced to prove  

negligence.  Circumstantial evidence consists of facts that  

necessarily point to negligence as a logical conclusion rather than  

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providing an outright demonstration thereof.  Elements of this  

doctrine may be stated as :

 The event would not have occurred but for someone’s  

negligence.

 The evidence on record rules out the possibility that  

actions of the victim or some third party could be the  

reason behind the event.

 Accused was negligent and owed a duty of care towards  

the victim.

19. In the case of Thakur Singh v. State of Punjab [(2003) 9 SCC  

208], the petitioner drove a bus rashly and negligently with 41  

passangers and while crossing a bridge, the bus fell into the  

nearby canal resulting in death of all the passengers.  The Court  

applied the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur since admittedly the  

petitioner was driving the bus at the relevant time and it was  

going over the bridge when it fell down.  The Court held as under:

“4. It is admitted that the petitioner himself  was driving the vehicle at the relevant time.  It is also admitted that bus was driven over a  bridge and then it fell into canal. In such a  situation the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur  comes into play and the burden shifts on to  the man who was in control of the  automobile to establish that the accident did  

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not happen on account of any negligence on  his part. He did not succeed in showing that  the accident happened due to causes other  than negligence on his part.”

20. Still, in the case of Mohd. Aynuddin (supra), this Court has  

also stated the principle :

“8. The principle of res ipsa loquitur is only a  rule of evidence to determine the onus of  proof in actions relating to negligence. The  said principle has application only when the  nature of the accident and the attending  circumstances would reasonably lead to the  belief that in the absence of negligence the  accident would not have occurred and that  the thing which caused injury is shown to  have been under the management and  control of the alleged wrongdoer.”

21. It has also been stated that the effect of this maxim,  

however, depends upon the cogency of the inferences to be drawn  

and must, therefore, vary in each case.   In light of these  

principles, let us examine the facts of the present case and the  

evidence on record.  The contention raised is that there is not  

even an iota of evidence to show that either the accused was  

driving the vehicle or, as alleged, he was driving the same rashly  

and negligently.  The concerned police officer had recorded  

‘Parcha statement’  (Exhibit P2) of Sukhdev, who in Court was  

examined as PW2.  In furtherance to this statement, a First  

Information Report (FIR) was registered.  It was stated in this  

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document that on 20th April, 1991, Sukhdev was going from Alwar  

to Govindgarh sitting in the jeep to attend the marriage of his  

brother-in-law.  It was at about 9.15 a.m. when they reached near  

crossing of Bagad Tiraya, ahead of that jeep was one jeep RNA  

638 in which his wife and other family members were travelling.  

One more Maruti van was running ahead of that jeep.  A bus RNA  

339 was approaching in fast speed from the side of Baggad.  

Maruti van which having saved itself took to the side and the  

driver of the Bus with an intention to kill the passengers collided  

with the jeep RNA 638.  Chet Kaur, Rinki, Geeta and the driver  

died at the spot and the condition of the rest, i.e., Niranjan Singh,  

Lahori Singh, Kailash, Vainto and Tinku was serious.  They were  

admitted to hospital.  At the time of the accident, the bus was  

being driven by Ravi Kumar (Kapur) who was identified by the  

passersby who told his name to Sukhdev.  Along with him, others  

sitting in the jeep also identified the bus driver.  The driver parked  

the vehicle beneath the pit on the road and fled away.  Upon his  

examination as PW2, this witness stated that the Maruti van got  

down on the kachha road side and even their own jeep was pulled  

to the kachha side but the third jeep collided with the bus from  

the front side.  He identified that the accused person in the Court  

was driving the bus himself and confirmed his statement in  

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parcha bayan (statement), Exhibit P2.  He was subjected to a  

detailed cross-examination in which he admitted that he did not  

see the bus driver while sitting in the jeep, though he had seen  

the accused while the accused was getting down from the bus and  

that this fact was not in his statement (Exhibit P2) because he did  

not remember.  The passersby had told him the name of the  

driver which was recorded in Exhibit P2.  He stated that Exhibit  

P3, the site plan, was not prepared in his presence and his  

signatures were obtained in the hospital.   

22. PW1, Ms. Sheela Gupta, stated that Joga Singh and relatives  

were going in another vehicle ahead of the vehicle in which she  

was travelling.  It collided with the bus.  She was unconscious and  

she did not see anybody or the driver of the bus.

23. PW3, Subhash Chawla, in his examination, admitted the  

accident but stated that he did not know the name of the driver of  

the bus and also that the jeep behind him was giving horns and  

as soon as the jeep in the middle reached the accident took place.  

He was declared hostile.

24. PW4, Multan Singh, has also similarly stated the facts  

leading to the accident.  He stated that he was sitting in the  

second jeep.  According to him, the bus came with speed from the  

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side of Delhi road.  It was a private bus and it hit the jeep.  The  

bus was coming on the wrong side and it hit the front of the jeep.  

He also got injuries on his head and back.   When he got down  

and stood, he saw the driver running away.  Though he was  

injured, he claims to have seen the driver and confirmed that the  

said driver was present in Court and identified the accused.  In  

his cross-examination, he stated that on collision, he heard sound  

like cracker burst.   

25. PW11, Sohan Lal, is the investigating officer who confirmed  

having written the ‘parcha statement’  in furtherance to which he  

proceeded to the site and thereafter recorded the FIR No.119/91  

under Section 304 IPC.  He prepared the site plan, Exhibit  

P29/P3 of the place of occurrence, prepared inquest reports and  

seized bus No.RNA 339 vide seizure memo Exhibit P31 and the  

jeep vide seizure memo Exhibit P32.  In his cross-examination, he  

admitted that the place of occurrence was a turn around.   He did  

not remember whether the jeep hit the front of the bus and it was  

not recorded in Exhibit P32 as to which portion of the jeep hit the  

bus.  He stated, “I don’t know whether driver Ravi Kapur was  

present at the spot or not.  I don’t know whether the bus  

passengers were there or not. But bus was there.  I tried to  

inquire from the passengers but they had already left.  Test  

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identification of accused was not got done from the injured  

because all the people present at the spot had already told me  

about the accused”.   

26. According to the learned counsel appearing for the appellant,  

there are contradictions in the statements of these witnesses and  

the site plan Exhibit P29/P3 does not exhibit any negligence on  

behalf of the appellant.  The appellant was not driving the vehicle  

involved in the accident and as such he is entitled to acquittal.   

27. We are not impressed with this contention.  Firstly, the bus  

was seized vide seizure memo Exhibit P31 and was later on given  

on superdari to the owner of the bus, i.e., the accused.  This bus  

was certainly involved in the accident, in fact, there is no serious  

dispute before us that the accident between the jeep RNA 638 and  

the bus RNA 339 took place at the place of occurrence.  If one  

examines Exhibit P29/P3, it is clear that it was a narrow road  

which was about 18 ft. in width and the accident had occurred at  

a turning point of the road.  The accident took place at point 8.  

The jeep in which number of people died remained stationed at or  

around point XA while the point 8 shows mud divider (dam-

bandh), the accident had taken place at point 1 and point 8 where  

the bus was parked was at a distance which clearly show that the  

bus had been moved after the accident.  Applying the principle of  

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res ipsa loquitur, it can safely be inferred that it was a serious  

accident that occurred at a turning point in which number of  

people had died.  After the accident, the bus driver moved the bus  

away to a different point.  If what is submitted on behalf of the  

appellant had even an iota of truth in it, the most appropriate  

conduct of the bus driver would have been to leave the vehicle at  

the place of accident to show that he was on the extreme left side  

of the road (his proper side for driving) and the jeep which was  

trying to overtake the other vehicle had come on the wrong side of  

the road resulting in the accident.  This would have been a very  

material circumstance and relevant conduct of the driver.   

28. All the witnesses, PW1, PW2 and PW4, have so stated.  

There is consistency in the statement of the witnesses that the  

accused was driving the vehicle and after parking the vehicle at a  

place away from the place of occurrence, he had run away.  We  

have no reason to disbelieve the statements of these witnesses  

which are fully supported by the documentary evidence, Exhibit  

P2, to which there was hardly any challenge during the cross-

examination of PW11.  We are unable to notice any serious or  

material contradiction in the statements of the prosecution  

witnesses much less in Exhibit P2, the parcha statement of PW2.  

Minor variations are bound to occur in the statements of the  

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witnesses when their statements are recorded after a considerable  

lapse from the date of occurrence.  The Court can also not ignore  

the fact that these witnesses are not very educated persons.  The  

truthfulness of the witnesses is also demonstrated from the fact  

that PW1, even in her examination-in-chief, stated that she was  

unconscious and did not see the driver.  Nothing prevented her  

from making a statement that she had actually seen the accused.  

Thus, we have no hesitation in holding that the three witnesses,  

i.e., PW1, PW2 and PW4 have given a correct eye account of the  

accident.  We find their statements worthy of credence and there  

is no occasion for the Court to disbelieve these witnesses.  It is a  

settled principle that the variations in the statements of witnesses  

which are neither material nor serious enough to affect the case of  

the prosecution adversely are to be ignored by the courts.  {Ref.  

State v. Saravanan and Anr. [(2008) 17 SCC 587]; and Sunil  

Kumar Sambhudayal Gupta v. State of Maharasthtra [(2010 13  

SCC 657]}.  It is also a settled principle that statements of the  

witnesses have to be read as a whole and the Court should not  

pick up a sentence in isolation from the entire statement and  

ignoring its proper reference, use the same against or in favour of  

a party.  The contradictions have to be material and substantial  

so as to adversely affect the case of the prosecution.  Reference in  

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this regard can be made to Atmaram & Ors. v. State of Madhya  

Pradesh [(2012) 5 SCC 738].   

29. In the case of Nageshwar Shri Krishna Ghobe v. State of  

Maharasthra [(1973) 4 SCC 23], this Court observed that the  

statements of the witnesses who met with an accident while  

travelling in a vehicle or those of the people who were travelling in  

the vehicle driven nearby should be taken and understood in their  

correct perspective as it is not necessary that the occupants of the  

vehicle should be looking in the same direction.  They might have  

been attracted only by the noise or the disturbance caused by the  

actual impact resulting from the accident itself.  The Court held  

as under :

“6. In cases of road accidents by fast moving  vehicles it is ordinarily difficult to find  witnesses who would be in a position to  affirm positively the sequence of vital events  during the few moments immediately  preceding the actual accident, from which its  true cause can be ascertained. When  accidents take place on the road, people  using the road or who may happen to be in  close vicinity would normally be busy in their  own pre-occupations and in the normal  course their attention would be attracted  only by the noise or the disturbance caused  by the actual impact resulting from the  accident itself. It is only then that they would  look towards the direction of the noise and  see what had happened. It is seldom — and  it is only a matter of coincidence —  that a  person may already be looking in the  

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direction of the accident and may for that  reason be in a position to see and later  describe the sequence of events in which the  accident occurred. At times it may also  happen that after casually witnessing the  occurrence those persons may feel  disinclined to take any further interest in the  matter, whatever be the reason for this  disinclination. If, however, they do feel  interested in going to the spot in their  curiosity to know some thing more, then  what they may happen to see there, would  lead them to form some opinion or  impression as to what in all likelihood must  have led to the accident. Evidence of such  persons, therefore, requires close scrutiny for  finding out what they actually saw and what  may be the result of their imaginative  inference. Apart from the eye-witnesses, the  only person who can be considered to be  truly capable of satisfactorily explaining as to  the circumstances leading to accidents like  the present is the driver himself or in certain  circumstances to some extent the person  who is injured. In the present case the  person who died in the accident is obviously  not available for giving evidence. The bhaiya  (Harbansingh) has also not been produced as  a witness. Indeed, failure to produce him in  this case has been the principal ground of  attack by Shri Pardiwala and he has  questioned the bona fides and the fairness of  the prosecution as also the trustworthiness  of the version given by the other witnesses.”

30. The learned counsel for the appellant, while relying upon the  

judgment of this Court in the case of Mulla & Anr. v. State of Uttar  

Pradesh [(2010) 3 SCC 508] and Amit v. State of Uttar Pradesh  

[(2012) 4 SCC 107], argued that none of the witnesses had  

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actually seen the accused driving the vehicle and, therefore, in  

absence of the test identification parade, it has to be held that the  

accused was not driving the vehicle and that he was not  

identified.  In the case of Mulla (supra), relied upon by the learned  

counsel, the Court had observed that it is desirable that a test  

identification parade should be conducted as soon as possible  

after the arrest of the accused to avoid any mistake on the part of  

the witnesses.   

31. On the other hand, to contra this submission, the learned  

counsel appearing for the State relied on the judgment of this  

Court in the case of Myladimmal Surendran & Ors. v. State of  

Kerala [(2010) 11 SCC 129] to say that the test identification  

parade in the facts and circumstances of the case was not  

necessary and in any case no prejudice has been caused to the  

accused and holding of test identification parade is not always  

necessary.

32. In the present case, the accused had been seen by PW2 and  

PW4.  In addition, they had also stated that the passersby had  

informed them that the accused was driving the bus and, in fact,  

he was the owner of the bus.  One fact of this statement is  

established that the bus in question was given on superdari to the  

accused.  It is also stated by these persons that after they had  

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seen the accused, he had run away from the place where he  

parked the vehicle.  These witnesses also identified the accused in  

the Court.  It is not the case of the accused before us that he had  

been shown to the witnesses prior to his being identified in the  

Court.  The Court identification itself is a good identification in the  

eyes of law.  It is not always necessary that it must be preceded  

by the test identification parade.  It will always depend upon the  

facts and circumstances of a given case.  In one case, it may not  

even be necessary to hold the test identification parade while in  

the other, it may be essential to do so.  Thus, no straightjacket  

formula can be stated in this regard.  We may refer to a judgment  

of this Court in the case of Shyamal Ghosh v. State of West Bengal  

[2012 (6) SCALE 381] wherein this Court has held that the Code  

of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short “Cr.P.C.) does not oblige  

the investigating agency to necessarily hold the test identification  

parade without exception.  The Court held as under :

“55. On behalf of accused Shyamal, it was  also contended that despite the identification  parade being held, he was not identified by  the witnesses and also that the identification  parade had been held after undue delay and  even when details about the incident had  already been telecasted on the television.  Thus, the Court should not rely upon the  identification of the accused persons as the  persons involved in the commission of the  

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crime and they should be given the benefit of  doubt.

56.  The whole idea of a Test Identification  Parade is that witnesses who claim to have  seen the culprits at the time of occurrence  are to identify them from the midst of other  persons without any aid or any other source.  The test is done to check upon their veracity.  In other words, the main object of holding an  identification parade, during the  investigation stage, is to test the memory of  the witnesses based upon first impression  and also to enable the prosecution to decide  whether all or any of them could be cited as  eyewitnesses of the crime.  

57. It is equally correct that the CrPC does  not oblige the investigating agency to  necessarily hold the Test Identification  Parade.   Failure to hold the test  identification parade while in police custody,  does not by itself render the evidence of  identification in court inadmissible or  unacceptable.   There have been numerous  cases where the accused is identified by the  witnesses in the court for the first time.   One  of the views taken is that identification in  court for the first time alone may not form  the basis of conviction, but this is not an  absolute rule.  The purpose of the Test  Identification Parade is to test and  strengthen the trustworthiness of that  evidence. It is accordingly considered a safe  rule of prudence to generally look for  corroboration of the sworn testimony of the  witnesses in court as to the identity of the  accused who are strangers to them, in the  form of earlier identification proceedings.  This rule of prudence is, however subjected  to exceptions. Reference can be made to  Munshi Singh Gautam  v. State of M.P.[(2005)  9 SCC 631], Sheo Shankar Singh v State of  Jharkhand and Anr. [(2011) 3 SCC 654].

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58. Identification Parade is a tool of  investigation and is used primarily to  strengthen the case of the prosecution on the  one hand and to make doubly sure that  persons named accused in the case are  actually the culprits.  The Identification  Parade primarily belongs to the stage of  investigation by the police.   The fact that a  particular witness has been able to identify  the accused at an identification parade is  only a circumstance corroborative of the  identification in court.   Thus, it is only a  relevant consideration which may be  examined by the court in view of other  attendant circumstances and corroborative  evidence with reference to the facts of a given  case.”    

33. In our considered view, it was not necessary to hold the test  

identification parade of the appellant for two reasons.  Firstly, the  

appellant was already known to the passersby who had recognized  

him while driving the bus and had stated his name and, secondly,  

he was duly seen, though for a short but reasonable period, when  

after parking the bus, he got down from the bus and ran away.

34. Equally without merit is the contention on behalf of the  

appellant that the Court should draw adverse inference against  

the prosecution as the investigating officer did not serve notice  

under Section 133 of the Act upon the owner of the vehicle.  The  

High Court has rightly rejected this contention on the basis that  

the driver of the vehicle was identified at the place of occurrence  

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and even passersby had informed the prosecution witnesses that  

the driver, Ravi Kapur, was the owner of the vehicle.  The name of  

the accused was duly recorded in the FIR itself.  This fact  

remained undisputed.  With some emphasis, it was even argued  

before us that he was not driving the vehicle, though it was not  

disputed that he is the registered owner of the vehicle in question.  

If that be so, when the statement of the accused under Section  

313 of the Cr.P.C. was recorded by the Trial Court, except denial,  

he did not state anything further.  For reasons best known to the  

accused, instead of stating as to whom he had given his vehicle  

for being driven on that date, he preferred to maintain silence and  

denied the case of the prosecution.   

35. It is true that the prosecution is required to prove its case  

beyond reasonable doubt but the provisions of Section 313  

Cr.P.C. are not a mere formality or purposeless.  They have a dual  

purpose to discharge, firstly, that the entire material parts of the  

incriminating evidence should be put to the accused in  

accordance with law and, secondly, to provide an opportunity to  

the accused to explain his conduct or his version of the case.  To  

provide this opportunity to the accused is the mandatory duty of  

the Court.  If the accused deliberately fails to avail this  

opportunity, then the consequences in law have to follow,  

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particularly when it would be expected of the accused in the  

normal course of conduct to disclose certain facts which may be  

within his personal knowledge and have a bearing on the case.

36. In our considered view, no prejudice has been caused to the  

accused by non-serving of the notice under Section 133 of the Act  

and, in any case, the accused cannot take any advantage thereof.  

37. Lastly, we may proceed to discuss the first contention raised  

on behalf of the accused.  No doubt, the Court of appeal would  

normally be reluctant to interfere with the judgment of acquittal  

but this is not an absolute rule and has a number of well accepted  

exceptions.  In the case of State of UP v. Banne & Anr. [(2009) 4  

SCC 271], the Court held that even the Supreme Court would be  

justified in interfering with the judgment of acquittal of the High  

Court but only when there are very substantial and compelling  

reasons to discard the High Court’s decision.  In the case of State  

of Haryana  v.  Shakuntala & Ors. [2012 (4) SCALE 526], this  

Court held as under :

“36. The High Court has acquitted some  accused while accepting the plea of alibi  taken by them.   Against the judgment of  acquittal, onus is on the prosecution to show  that the finding recorded by the High Court  is perverse and requires correction by this  Court, in exercise of its powers under Article  136 of the Constitution of India.   This Court  

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has repeatedly held that an appellate Court  must bear in mind that in case of acquittal,  there is a double presumption in favour of  the accused.  Firstly, the presumption of  innocence is available to such accused under  the fundamental principles of criminal  jurisprudence,   i.e., that every person shall  be presumed to be innocent unless proved  guilty before the court and secondly, that a  lower court, upon due appreciation of all  evidence has found in favour of his  innocence.   Merely because another view is  possible, it would be no reason for this Court  to interfere with the order of acquittal.

37. In Girja Prasad (Dead) By Lrs. v. State of  M.P. [(2007) 7 SCC 625], this Court held as  under:-

“28. Regarding setting aside acquittal  by the High Court, the learned Counsel  for the appellant relied upon Kunju  Muhammed v. State of Kerala (2004) 9  SCC 193, Kashi Ram v. State of M.P.  AIR 2001 SC 2902 and Meena v. State  of Maharashtra 2000 Cri LJ 2273.   In  our opinion, the law is well settled.   An  appeal against acquittal is also an  appeal under the Code and an Appellate  Court has every power to reappreciate,  review and reconsider the evidence as a  whole before it.   It is, no doubt, true  that there is presumption of innocence  in favour of the accused and that  presumption is reinforced by an order  of acquittal recorded by the Trial Court.  But that is not the end of the matter.  It is for the Appellate Court to keep in  view the relevant principles of law, to  reappreciate and reweigh the evidence  as a whole and to come to its own  conclusion on such evidence in  

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consonance with the principles of  criminal jurisprudence.”

38. In Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka  [(2007) 4 SCC 415], this Court held as  under:-

“42. From the above decisions, in our  considered view, the following general  principles regarding powers of the  appellate court while dealing with an  appeal against an order of acquittal  emerge:

(1) An appellate court has full  power to review, reappreciate and  reconsider the evidence upon  which the order of acquittal is  founded.

(2) The Code of Criminal  Procedure, 1973 puts no  limitation, restriction or condition  on exercise of such power and an  appellate court on the evidence  before it may reach its own  conclusion, both on questions of  fact and of law.

(3) Various expressions, such as,  “substantial and compelling  reasons”, “good and sufficient  grounds”, “very strong  circumstances”, “distorted  conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”,  etc. are not intended to curtail  extensive powers of an appellate  court in an appeal against  acquittal. Such phraseologies are  more in the nature of “flourishes of  language”  to emphasise the  reluctance of an appellate court to  

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interfere with acquittal than to  curtail the power of the court to  review the evidence and to come to  its own conclusion.

(4) An appellate court, however,  must bear in mind that in case of  acquittal, there is double  presumption in favour of the  accused. Firstly, the presumption  of innocence is available to him  under the fundamental principle  of criminal jurisprudence that  every person shall be presumed to  be innocent unless he is proved  guilty by a competent court of law.  Secondly, the accused having  secured his acquittal, the  presumption of his innocence is  further reinforced, reaffirmed and  strengthened by the trial court.

(5) If two reasonable conclusions  are possible on the basis of the  evidence on record, the appellate  court should not disturb the  finding of acquittal recorded by the  trial court.”

39. In C. Antony v. K.G. Raghavan Nair  [(2003) 1 SCC 1], this Court held :-

“6. This Court in a number of cases  has held that though the appellate  court has full power to review the  evidence upon which the order of  acquittal is founded, still while  exercising such an appellate power  in a case of acquittal, the appellate  court, should not only consider  every matter on record having a  bearing on the question of fact and  the reasons given by the courts  below in support of its order of  

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acquittal, it must express its  reasons in the judgment which led  it to hold that the acquittal is not  justified. In those line of cases this  Court has also held that the  appellate court must also bear in  mind the fact that the trial court  had the benefit of seeing the  witnesses in the witness box and  the presumption of innocence is  not weakened by the order of  acquittal, and in such cases if two  reasonable conclusions can be  reached on the basis of the  evidence on record, the appellate  court should not disturb the  finding of the trial court. (See Bhim  Singh Rup Singh v. State of  Maharashtra1 and Dharamdeo  Singh v. State of Bihar.)”

40. The State has not been able to make  out a case of exception to the above settled  principles.  It was for the State to show that  the High Court has completely fallen in error  of law or that judgment in relation to these  accused was palpably erroneous, perverse or  untenable.  None of these parameters are  satisfied in the appeal preferred by the State  against the acquittal of three accused.”

38. In the present case, there are more than sufficient reasons  

for the High Court to interfere with the judgment of acquittal  

recorded by the Trial Court.  Probably, this issue was not even  

raised before the High Court and that is why we find that there  

are hardly any reasons recorded in the judgment of the High  

Court impugned in the present appeal.  Be that as it may, it was  

not a case of non-availability of evidence or presence of material  

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and serious contradictions proving fatal to the case of the  

prosecution. There was no plausible reason before the Trial Court  

to disbelieve the eye account given by PW2 and PW4 and the  

Court could not have ignored the fact that the accused had been  

duly identified at the place of occurrence and even in the Court.  

The Trial Court has certainly fallen in error of law and  

appreciation of evidence.  Once the Trial Court has ignored  

material piece of evidence and failed to appreciate the prosecution  

evidence in its correct perspective, particularly when the  

prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt, then it  

would amount to failure of justice.  In some cases, such error in  

appreciation of evidence may even amount to recording of  

perverse finding.  We may also notice at the cost of repetition that  

the Trial Court had first delivered its judgment on 24th June, 1999  

convicting the accused of the offences.  However, on appeal, the  

matter was remanded on two grounds, i.e., considering the effect  

of non-holding of test identification parade and not examining the  

doctor.  Upon remand, the Trial Court had taken a different view  

than what was taken by it earlier and vide judgment dated 11th  

May, 2006, it had acquitted the accused.  This itself became a  

ground for interference by the High Court in the judgment of  

acquittal recorded by the Trial Court.  From the judgment of the  

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Trial Court, there does not appear to be any substantial  

discussion on the effect of non-holding of the test identification  

parade or the non-examination of the doctor.  On the contrary,  

the Trial Court passed its judgment on certain assumptions.  

None of the witnesses, not even the accused, in his statement,  

had stated that the jeep was at a fast speed but still the Trial  

Court recorded a finding that the jeep was at a fast speed and was  

not being driven properly.  The Trial Court also recorded that a  

suspicion arises as to whether Ravi Kapur was actually driving  

the bus at the time of the accident or not and identification was  

very important.   

39. We are unable to understand as to how the Trial Court could  

ignore the statement of the eye-witnesses, particularly when they  

were reliable, trustworthy and gave the most appropriate eye  

account of the accident.  The judgment of the Trial Court,  

therefore, suffered from errors of law and in appreciation of  

evidence both.  The interference by the High Court with the  

judgment of acquittal passed by the Trial Court does not suffer  

from any jurisdictional error.

40. For the reasons afore-recorded, we find no merit in the  

present appeal.  The same is dismissed accordingly.

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………...….…………......................J.                                           (Swatanter Kumar)

………...….…………......................J.                                          (Fakkir Mohamed Ibrahim Kalifulla)

New Delhi, August 16, 2012  

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