Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 223 OF 2008

Rattiram & Ors.         .....……..Appellant

Versus

State of M. P. Through  Inspector of Police  ………Respondent  

WITH

CRIMINAL  APPEAL NO. 458 OF 2008

Satyanarayan & ors.         ……......Appellant

Versus

The State of Madhya Pradesh Through  Incharge, Police Station Cantt. ………Respondent  

J U D G M E N T

Dipak Misra, J.

Perceiving divergent and contradictory views as regards the  

effect  and  impact  of  not  committing  an  accused  in  terms  of  

Section  193 of  the  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure  (for  short  ‘the  

Code’) in cases where charge-sheet is filed under Section 3(1)(x)  

of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of

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Atrocities)  Act,  1989  (for  brevity  ‘the  Act’)  and  cognizance  is  

directly taken by the Special Judge under the Act, a  two-Judge  

Bench thought it apposite to refer the matter to a larger Bench  

and  on  the  basis  of  the  said  reference,  the  matter  has  been  

placed before us. At this juncture, it is requisite to clarify that the  

real conflict or discord is manifest in Moly and Another v. State  

of Kerala1  and Vidyadharan v. State of Kerala2  on one hand  

wherein it has been held that the conviction by the Special Court  

is  not  sustainable  if  it  has  suo motu  entertained  and  taken  

cognizance  of  the  complaint  directly  without  the  case  being  

committed to it  and, therefore,  there should be retrial  or  total  

setting aside of the conviction, as the case may be, and the other  

in  State of M. P.  v.  Bhooraji & Ors.3 wherein, taking aid of  

Section 465 (1) of the Code, it has been opined that when a trial  

has been conducted by the court of competent jurisdiction and a  

conviction has been recorded on proper appreciation of evidence,  

the same cannot be erased or effaced merely on the ground that  

there  had  been  no  committal  proceeding  and  cognizance  was  

taken by the Special Court inasmuch as the same does not give  

rise to failure of justice.  

1 AIR 2004 SC 1890  2 (2004) 1 SCC 215 3 AIR 2001 SC 3372

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2. The  necessitous  facts  required  to  be  adumbrated  for  the  

purpose  of  answering  the  present  reference  are  that  the  

appellants were charge sheeted  under Section 3 (1) (x) of the Act  

but  eventually,  charges  were  framed under  Sections  147,  148  

and 302  read  with  Section  149 of  the  Indian Penal  Code  (for  

short, ‘the IPC’).  The learned Trial Judge vide judgment dated  

31.08.1996 in Sessions Trial  No.  97 of  1995 convicted all  the  

accused persons barring Mohan for the offences under Section  

302  read  with  Section  149  IPC  and  sentenced  them  to  

imprisonment  for  life  with  a  fine  of  Rs.  1000/-,  in  default  of  

payment of fine, to suffer further rigorous imprisonment for three  

months  and  sentenced  to  one  month  rigorous  imprisonment  

under Section 147 of the IPC.  The accused Mohan was convicted  

for the offence under Sections 148 and 302 of the IPC and was  

sentenced to undergo one month  rigorous imprisonment on the  

first  score  and to  further  life  imprisonment  and pay  a  fine  of  

Rupees 1000/-, in default of payment of fine, to suffer further  

R.I. for three months on the second count.

3. Being dissatisfied with the judgment of conviction and the  

order  of  sentence,  the  appellants  along  with  others  preferred

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Criminal  Appeal  No.  1568  of  1996  before  the  High  Court  of  

Judicature of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur.  Apart from raising  

various contentions on merits, it was pressed that the entire trial  

was  vitiated  as  it  had  commenced  and  concluded  without  

committal of the case to the Court of Session as provided under  

Section 193 of the Code.  Heavy reliance was placed on Gangula  

Ashok and Another  v.  State of Andhra Pradesh4 and  Moly  

and  Another  (supra)   and  Vidyadharan (supra)   but  the  

Division  Bench  placed  reliance  on  Bhooraji  (supra)  wherein  

Gangula Ashok (supra) was distinguished keeping in view the  

stage of the case and regard being had to the provision contained  

in Section 465 of the Code and treated the same to be a binding  

precedent in view of the special Bench decision of the High Court  

of  Madhya  Pradesh  rendered  in  Jabalpur  Bus  Operators  

Association and Another  v.  State of Madhya Pradesh and  

Another5  and repelled the contention accordingly.  Thereafter,  

as the impugned judgment would reveal, the Bench proceeded to  

deal  with  the  matter  on  merits  and  eventually  sustained  the  

conviction  and  affirmed  the  sentence  as  has  been  indicated  

hereinbefore.  

4 AIR 2000 SC 740  5  2003 (1) MPJR 158

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4. We have heard Mr. Fakhrudin, learned senior counsel and  

Mr. Anis Ahmed Khan for the appellants in both the appeals and  

Ms.  Vibha Datta Makhija,  learned counsel  for  the respondent-

State.  

5.  At  the  very  outset,  we  shall  advert  to  the  jurisdiction  or  

authority of the Special Court to take cognizance of the offence  

under the Act regardless of the interdict stipulated in Section 193  

of the Code.  Section 193 of the Code reads as follows:

“193.  Cognizance  of  offence  by  Court  of  Session- Except  as  otherwise  expressly  provided by this Code or by any other law for  the  time  being  in  force,  no  court  of  Session  shall take cognizance of any offence as a court  of  original  jurisdiction  unless  the  case  has  been  committed  to  it  by  a  Magistrate  under  this code.”

On a plain reading of the aforesaid provision, it is clear as  

noon day that no Court of Session can take cognizance of any  

offence  as  a  court  of  original  jurisdiction  except  as  otherwise  

expressly  provided by  the Code or  any other  law for  the  time  

being in force.   

6. The  questions  that  emanate,  as  a  natural  corollary,  for  

consideration are whether the Special Court as constituted under

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the Act is a Court of Session; and whether there is any special  

provision in the Act enabling the said court to take cognizance.   

7. In  Gangula  Ashok (supra),  a  two-Judge  Bench  of  this  

Court, after taking note of Section 6 of the Code and Section 14  

of the Act,  came to the conclusion that the intendment of  the  

legislature is  to treat the Special  Court  under the Act to be a  

Court of Session even after specifying it as a Special Court and it  

would continue to be essentially a Court of Session and not get  

denuded of its character or power as a Court of Session.  The  

Court  scanned  the  anatomy  of  the  Act  and  analysed  the  

postulates  contained  in  Sections  4  and  5  of  the  Code  and  

thereafter, referring to the Constitution Bench decisions in A. R.  

Antulay  v. Ramdas  Sriniwas  Nayak  and  another6 and  in  

Directorate  of  Enforcement  v. Deepak  Mahajan  and  

another7, expressed thus:      

“16.  Hence we have no doubt that a Special  Court under this Act is essentially a Court of  Session  and  it  can  take  cognizance  of  the  offence when the case is committed to it by the  Magistrate in accordance with the provisions of  the Code.   In other words,  a complaint  or a  charge-sheet  cannot  straight  away  be  laid  down before the Special Court under the Act.    

6  (1984) 2 SCC 500 7 (1994)  3 SCC 440

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8. In  Vidyadharan (supra),  the  Court  delved  into  the  said  

issue and eventually proceeded to state as follows:

“23. Hence, we have no doubt that a Special  Court under this Act is essentially a Court of  Session  and  it  can  take  cognizance  of  the  offence when the case is committed to it by the  Magistrate in accordance with the provisions of  the  Code.  In  other  words,  a  complaint  or  a  charge-sheet  cannot  straight  away  be  laid  down before the Special Court under the Act.  We are reiterating the view taken by this Court  in  Gangula Ashok v.  State of A.P. [(2000) 2  SCC 504 : 2000 SCC (Cri)  488] in the above  terms  with  which  we  are  in  respectful  agreement. The Sessions Court in the case at  hand,  undisputedly,  has  acted  as  one  of  original  jurisdiction,  and the requirements of  Section 193 of the Code were not met.”

The aforesaid view was reiterated in Moly (supra).  In M. A.  

Kuttappan  v. E  Krishnan  Nayanar  and  another8, another  

two-Judge  Bench ruled  that  the  Special  Judge  under  the  Act  

cannot  entertain  a  complaint  filed  before  it  and issue  process  

after taking cognizance without the case being committed to it for  

trial by the competent Magistrate. It is apt to mention here that  

similar view has been spelt out in Bhooraji (supra).

9. After careful perusal of the aforesaid decisions, we have no  

scintilla of doubt that the view expressed which has a base of  

8 (2004) 4 SCC 231

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commonality  is absolutely  correct  and there is  no necessity  to  

dwell upon the same more so when there is no cavil or conflict in  

this regard and there has been no reference on the said score.  

Additionally,  no  doubt  has  been  expressed  relating  to  the  

exposition of the said view, and irrefragably correctly so.

10. The demonstrable facet of the discord is that if cognizance is  

directly taken by the Special Judge under the Act and an accused  

without assailing the same at the inception allows the trial  to  

continue  and  invites  a  judgment   of  conviction,  would  he  be  

permitted in law to question the same and seek quashment of the  

conviction on the bedrock that the trial Judge had no jurisdiction  

or authority to take cognizance without the case being committed  

to it and thereby violated the mandate enshrined under Section  

193 of the Code.   

11. To  make  the  maze  clear,  it  is  profitable  to  note  that  in  

Gangula Ashok (supra),  the appellants had called in question  

the legal substantiality of the order passed by the  Single Judge  

of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh who, after expressing the  

view  that  the  Special  Judge  had  no  jurisdiction  to  take  

cognizance of the offence under the Act without the case being

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committed to it,   set aside the proceedings of the Special Court  

and further directed the charge-sheet and the connected papers  

to be returned to the police officer concerned who, in turn, was  

required to present the same before the Judicial Magistrate of Ist  

Class for the purpose of  committal to  the Special Court.  That  

apart, the Single Judge further directed that on such committal,  

the Special Court shall frame appropriate charges in the light of  

the observation made in the order.  

12. The  two-judge  Bench  accepted  the  view  as  far  as  it  

pertained  to  setting  aside  of  the  impugned  order  but  did  not  

approve  the  direction issued for  the  steps  to  be  taken by  the  

Special Judge for framing of charges as it was of the view that no  

direction could have been issued to the Special Court as it was  

open to the appellants therein to raise all their contentions at the  

stage of framing of charge if they wished to advance a plea for  

discharge.   Thus, it is evident that the accused-appellants had  

challenged the order of framing of charge and sought quashing of  

the same before the High Court.  They did not wait for the trial to  

commence and the judgment of conviction to visit them.   

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13. After the dictum in Gangula Ashok (supra), the High Court  

of  Madhya  Pradesh  was  dealing  with  an  appeal,  Bhooraji  

(supra), wherein  the  appellants  were  convicted  under  Sections  

148, 323, 302/149 IPC and sentenced to various punishments  

including imprisonment for life. It is worth noting that they were  

tried by the Special  Judge under  the Act as charge-sheet was  

filed under Section 3 (2) of the Act along with other offences of  

the IPC.  When the matter came up before the Division Bench of  

the  High Court,  the  learned Judges commenced the judgment  

with the prelude that the case had sluggished for more than nine  

years and the end was not in sight as direction for retrial seemed  

inevitable  because  of  the  decision  rendered  by  this  Court  in  

Gangula Ashok (supra).  

14. Be it  noted,  cognizance was taken directly by the Special  

Judge in the said case also.  The anguish and the helplessness  

expressed by the High Court was taken note of when the State of  

Madhya  Pradesh  approached  this  Court.   This  Court  laid  

emphasis  on  the  fact  that  it  was  a  case  where  the  accused  

neither raised any objection when they were heard at the time of  

framing of the charge nor did they raise such a plea at any stage  

either before or after the evidence was recorded by the trial Court

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but, a significant one, proponed such a contention only after the  

conviction  was  recorded  and  that  too  after  the  decision  in  

Gangula Ashok (supra) was rendered.   

15. As is perceptible, the Bench posed the question whether the  

High  Court  necessarily  should  have  quashed  the  trial  

proceedings to be repeated  only on account of the declaration of  

the legal position made by this Court concerning the procedural  

aspect about the cases involving the offences under the Act.  The  

Bench referred to the provisions contained in Sections 462 and  

465  of  the  Code  and  adverted  to  the  concept  of  “a  failure  of  

justice” and held thus:

“15.  A  reading  of  the  section makes  it  clear  that the error, omission or irregularity in the  proceedings held before or during the trial or  in  any  enquiry  were  reckoned  by  the  legislature as possible occurrences in criminal  courts.   Yet the legislature disfavoured axing  down the proceedings or to direct repetition of  the  whole  proceedings  afresh.   Hence,  the  legislature imposed a prohibition that  unless  such  error,  omission  or  irregularity  has  occasioned “a  failure  of  justice”  the  superior  court shall not quash the proceedings merely  on  the  ground  of  such  error,  omission  or  irregularity.   

       xxx    xxx     xxx    xxx    xxx

17. It is an uphill task for the accused in this  case to show that failure of justice had in fact

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occasioned  merely  because  the  specified  Sessions Court took cognizance of the offences  without  the  case  being  committed  to  it.  The  normal  and  correct  procedure,  of  course,  is  that the case should have been committed to  the  Special  Court  because  that  court  being  essentially  a  Court  of  Session  can  take  cognizance of any offence only then. But if  a  specified Sessions Court,  on the basis of the  legal position then felt to be correct on account  of a decision adopted by the High Court, had  chosen to take cognizance without a committal  order, what is the disadvantage of the accused  in following the said course?

18. It is apposite to remember that during the  period prior to the Code of Criminal Procedure  1973,  the  committal  court,  in  police  charge- sheeted  cases,  could  examine  material  witnesses,  and  such  records  also  had  to  be  sent over to the Court  of  Session along with  the  committal  order.  But  after  1973,  the  committal  court,  in  police  charge-sheeted  cases, cannot examine any witness at all. The  Magistrate in such cases has only to commit  the cases involving offences exclusively triable  by the Court of Session. Perhaps it would have  been  possible  for  an  accused  to  raise  a  contention  before  1973  that  skipping  committal proceedings had deprived him of the  opportunity to cross-examine witnesses in the  committal court and that had caused prejudice  to his defence. But even that is not available to  an accused after 1973 in cases charge-sheeted  by the police. We repeatedly asked the learned  counsel  for  the  accused  to  tell  us  what  advantage  the  accused  would  secure  if  the  case  is  sent  back  to  the  Magistrate’s  Court  merely for the purpose of retransmission of the  records  to  the  Sessions  Court  through  a  committal  order.  We  did  not  get  any

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satisfactory answer to the above query put to  the counsel.”

16. After so stating, the Court proceeded to deal with the stance  

whether the Special Judge as a Court of Session would remain  

incompetent to try the case until the case is committed and, after  

critical  ratiocination,  declined  to  accept  the  said  stand  and  

opined that the expression “a Court of competent jurisdiction” as  

envisaged  in  Section  465  of  the  Code  is  to  denote  a  validly  

constituted court conferred with the jurisdiction to try the offence  

or  offences  and  such  a  court  could  not  get  denuded  of  its  

competence to try the case on account of any procedural lapse  

and  the  competence  would  remain  unaffected  by  the  non-

compliance with the procedural requirement. The Bench further  

proceeded to lay down that the inability to take cognizance of an  

offence  without  a  committal  order  does  not  mean that  a  duly  

constituted court becomes an incompetent court for all purposes.  

It was also ruled that had an objection been raised at the earlier  

stage,  the  Special  Judge  could  have  sent  the  record  to  the  

Magistrate for adopting committal proceeding or return the police  

report  to  the  Public  Prosecutor  or  the  police  for  presentation  

before the Magistrate.  In essentiality, it has been laid down that

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the bar against taking cognizance of certain offences or by certain  

courts cannot govern the question whether the Court concerned  

is a “Court of competent jurisdiction” and further the condition  

precedent for taking cognizance is not the standard to determine  

whether  the  Court  concerned  is  “a  Court  of  competent  

jurisdiction”.  In the ultimate eventuate,  Bhooraji (supra) ruled  

that when the trial had been conducted by a Court of competent  

jurisdiction, the same cannot be annulled by such a lapse and,  

accordingly, remitted the matter to the High Court for disposal of  

the appeal afresh on the basis of evidence already on record.  It  

needs no special emphasis to highlight that in Bhooraji (supra),  

the controversy had emerged on the similar set of facts and the  

legal  issues had emanated on the common platform and were  

dealt  with.   Therefore,  unquestionably,  it  was  a  precedent  

operating in the field.   

17. It is seemly to note that the decision in  Bhooraji (supra)  

was possibly not brought to the notice  of  their  Lordships who  

have  decided  the  cases  in  Moly (supra)  and  Vidyadharan  

(supra).   In  Moly (supra),  later two-Judge Bench set aside the  

judgment  of  conviction and remitted the matter  as cognizance

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was  directly  taken  by  the  Special  Court.    In  Vidyadharan  

(supra), the Bench held thus:-

“24. The  inevitable  conclusion  is  that  the  learned  Sessions  Judge,  as  the  undisputed  factual position goes to show, could not have  convicted  the  appellant  for  the  offence  relatable  to  Section 3(1)(xi)  of  the  Act  in  the  background of the legal position noted supra.  That  is,  accordingly,  set  aside.  However,  for  the offence under Sections 354 and 448 IPC,  custodial  sentence  for  the  period  already  undergone,  which  as  the  records  reveal  is  about three months, would meet the ends of  justice considering the background facts and  the special features of the case.”  

As is perceivable, in one case, the matter was remitted and in the  

other, the conviction under Section 3 (1)(xi) was set aside and no  

retrial was directed.   

18. At this stage, we may proceed to x-ray the ratio of  M. A.  

Kuttappan (supra).  In the said case, the challenge was to the  

order passed by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code  

wherein the learned Judge had quashed the order of the Special  

Judge taking cognizance of the offence under Section 3 (1)(x) of  

the  Act.    The  two-Judge Bench referred to  the  authorities  in  

Gangula Ashok (supra) and Vidyadharan (supra) and gave the

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stamp of approval to the order passed by the High Court  and  

eventually, while dismissing the appeal, observed as follows:-

“However, it will be open to the appellant, if so  advised, to file a complaint before a competent  Magistrate  who  shall  consider  the  complaint  on its merit  and then proceed in accordance  with law.  The learned Special Court as well as  the High Court have made certain observations  touching on the merit of the controversy.  We  make it clear that in case a complaint is filed  by  the  appellant  before  a  competent  Magistrate,  he  shall  proceed  to  consider  the  matter in accordance with law uninfluenced by  any  observation  made  either  by  the  learned  Special Judge or by the High Court.  Nothing  said in this judgment also shall be construed  as expression of  opinion on the merit  of  the  case.”

19. It is apposite to note that in the said case, the assail was  

different and the Bench was not considering the effect of non-

committal  under Section 193 of  the Code after  conviction was  

recorded.  Though it referred to the authority in  Vidyadharan  

(supra),  yet  that  was  to  a  limited  extent.  Hence,  the  said  

pronouncement cannot be regarded or treated  to be one in line  

with  Vidyadharan (supra)  and  is,  therefore,  kept  out  of  the  

purview  of  conflict  of  opinion  that  has  emerged  in  the  two  

streams of authorities.

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20. Before  we  advert  whether  Bhooraji (supra)  was  correctly  

decided or Moly (supra) and Vidyadharan (supra) laid down the  

law appositely, it is appropriate to dwell upon whether Bhooraji  

(supra)  was  a  binding  precedent  and,  what  would  be  the  

consequent effect of the later decisions which have been rendered  

without noticing it.

21.  In Union of India and Another v. Raghubir Singh (dead)  

by  L.  Rs.  And  Others9,  the  Constitution  Bench,  speaking  

through R. S. Pathak, CJ, has held thus:-  

“We are  of  opinion that  a pronouncement  of  law  by  a  Division  Bench  of  this  Court  is  binding on a Division Bench of the same or a  smaller number of Judges, and in order that  such decision be binding, it is not necessary  that it  should be a decision rendered by the  Full  Court  or  a  Constitution  Bench  of  the  Court”

22. In  Indian  Oil  Corporation Ltd.,  v.  Municipal  

Corporation  and  Another10, the  Division  Bench  of  the  High  

Court had come to the conclusion that the decision in Municipal  

Corporation, Indore v. Smt. Ratna Prabha & Ors.11 was not a  

binding precedent in view of the later decisions of the co-equal  

9 ( 1989) 2 SCC 754 10 AIR 1995 SC 1480 11 AIR 1977 SC 308

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Bench of this Court in Dewan Daulat Rai Kapoor v. New Delhi  

Municipal  Committee12 and  Dr.  Balbir  Singh  v. Municipal  

Corporation Delhi13.  It is worth noting that the Division Bench  

of the High Court proceeded that the decision in Ratna Prabha  

(supra) was no longer good law and binding on it.  The matter  

was  referred  to  the  Full  Bench  which  overruled  the  decision  

passed by the Division Bench.   When the matter travelled to this  

Court, it observed thus:-

“The Division Bench of the High Court in 1989  MPLJ 20 was clearly in error in taking the view  that the decision of this Court in Ratna Prabha  (AIR 1977 SC 308) (supra) was not binding on  it.  In doing so, the Division Bench of the High  Court  did  something  which  even  a  later  co- equal Bench of this Court did not and could  not do.”

23. In  Chandra Prakash and Others  v.  State of  U.P.  and  

Another14, a subsequent Constitution Bench reiterated the view  

that had already been stated in Raghubir Singh (supra).  

24. Thus viewed, the decision in Bhooraji (supra) was a binding  

precedent,  and  when  in  ignorance  of  it  subsequent  decisions  

have been rendered, the concept of per incuriam would come into  

play.   In this context, it is useful to refer to a passage from A. R.  12 AIR 1980 SC 541 13  AIR 1985 SC 339 14 (2003) SCC (L & S) 827

19

Antulay (supra),  wherein,  Sabyasachi  Mukharji,  J  (as  his  

Lordship  then  was),  while  dealing  with  the  concept  of  per  

incuriam, had observed thus:-  

““Per  incuriam”  are  those  decisions  given  in  ignorance or forgetfulness of some inconsistent  statutory  provision  or  of  some  authority  binding  on  the  court  concerned,  so  that  in  such cases some part of the decision or some  step in the reasoning on which it is based, is  found,  on  that  account  to  be  demonstrably  wrong.”  

Again, in the said decision, at a later stage, the Court observed:-  

“It is a settled rule that if a decision has been  given per incuriam the court can ignore it.”

25. In  Punjab  Land  Development  &  Reclamation  

Corporation  Ltd.  v.  Presiding   Officer,  Labour  Court,  

Chandigarh & Ors.15, another Constitution Bench, while dealing  

with the issue of per incuriam, opined as under:-

“The  Latin  expression  per  incuriam  means  through inadvertence.  A decision can be said  generally  to  be given  per  incuriam  when this  Court  has  acted  in  ignorance  of  a  previous  decision of its own or when a High Court has  acted in ignorance of a decision of this Court.”

26. In  State  of  U.  P.  And  Another  v.  Synthetics  and  

Chemicals Ltd. And Another16,  a two-Judge Bench adverted in  15 (1990) 3 SCC 682 16  (1991) 4 SCC 139

20

detail to the aspect of per incuriam and proceeded to highlight as  

follows:-  

“‘Incuria’  literally  means  ‘carelessness’.   In  practice  per  incuriam  appears  to  mean  per  ignoratium.    English  courts  have  developed  this principle in relaxation of the rule of stare  decisis.  The ‘quotable in law’ is avoided and  ignored  if  it  is  rendered,  ‘in  ignoratium  of  a  statute or other binding authority’.  (Young v.  Bristol  Aeroplane Co.  Ltd.17).   Same has been  accepted, approved and adopted by this Court  while  interpreting  Article  141  of  the  Constitution  which  embodies  the  doctrine  of  precedents as a matter of law.”

27. Recently, in  Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of  

Maharashtra  and Ors. 18,  while  addressing  the  issue  of  per  

incuriam, a  two-Judge  Bench,  speaking  through  one  of  us  

(Bhandari,  J.),   after  referring  to  the  dictum  in  Bristol  

Aeroplane  Co.  Ltd. (supra)  and   certain  passages  from  

Halsbury’s Laws of England and  Raghubir Singh (supra),  has  

stated thus:-

“149. The analysis of English and Indian Law  clearly leads to the irresistible conclusion that  not only the judgment of a larger strength is  binding on a judgment of smaller strength but  the  judgment  of  a  co-equal  strength  is  also  binding  on  a  Bench  of  Judges  of  co-equal  strength.   In  the  instant  case,  judgments  

17 (1944) 1 KB 718 : (1944) 2 ALL ER 293 18  AIR 2011 SC 312 : ( 2011) 1 SCC 694

21

mentioned in paragraphs 135 and 136 are by  two  or  three  judges  of  this  Court.   These  judgments have clearly ignored a Constitution  Bench judgment of this Court in Sibbia’s case  (supra) which has comprehensively dealt with  all  the facets of anticipatory bail  enumerated  under  Section  438  of  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure  Consequently,  judgments  mentioned in paragraphs 135 and 136 of this  judgment are per incuriam.

150. In  case  there  is  no  judgment  of  a  Constitution Bench or larger Bench of binding  nature and if the court doubts the correctness  of the judgments by two or three judges, then  the proper course would be to request Hon’ble  the Chief Justice to refer the matter to a larger  Bench of appropriate strength.”

28. The sequitur of the above discussion is that the decisions  

rendered in Moly (supra) and Vidyadharan (supra) are certainly  

per incuriam.  

29. Presently, we shall proceed to address which view should be  

accepted as  just  and flawless.    The centripodal  issue,  as  we  

understand,  is  whether  non-compliance  of  the  interdict  as  

envisaged and engrafted under Section 193 of the Code nullifies  

the final verdict after the trial and warrants its total extinction  

resulting in retrial, or it is incumbent on the part of the convict  

to exposit and satisfy that such guillotining of the interdict has  

occasioned in ‘failure  of  justice’  or  culminated in causation of

22

prejudice to him for the purpose of declaring that the trial was  

vitiated.  

30. In Bhooraji (supra), the Bench has referred to Sections 462  

and 465 of the Code which occur in Chapter  35 of the Code.  

Section 465 reads as follows:-

“465. Finding or sentence when reversible  by reason of error, omission or irregularity.  -   (1)  Subject  to  the  provisions  hereinbefore  contained,  no  finding,  sentence  or  order  passed  by  a  Court  of  competent  jurisdiction  shall  be  reversed  or  altered  by  a  Court  of  appeal, confirmation or revision on account of  any  error,  omission  or  irregularity  in  the  complaint,  summons,  warrant,  proclamation,  order, judgment or other proceedings before or  during  trial  or  in  any  inquiry  or  other  proceedings under this Code, or any error, or  irregularity in any sanction for the prosecution  unless in the opinion of that court, a failure of  justice has in fact been occasioned thereby.  

(2)  In  determining  whether  any  error,  omission  or  irregularity  in  any  proceeding  under this Code, or any error, or irregularity in  any  sanction  for  the  prosecution  has  occasioned a failure of justice, the Court shall  have regard to the fact whether the objection  could  and  should  have  been  raised  at  an  earlier stage in the proceedings.”

31. On a studied scrutiny of the anatomy of the said provision,  

it  is  luculent  that  the  emphasis  has  been laid  on  a  ‘court  of  

competent jurisdiction’ and ‘error, omission or irregularity in the

23

complaint, summons, warrant, proclamation, order, judgment or  

other proceedings before or during trial’ and ‘a failure of justice  

has in fact been occasioned thereby’.   The legislative intendment  

inhered  in  the  language  employed  is  graphically  clear  that  

lancination or  invalidation  of  a  verdict  after  trial  is  not  to  be  

taken recourse to solely because there is an error, omission or  

irregularity in the proceeding. The term ‘a failure of justice’ has  

been treated as the sine qua non for setting aside the conviction.  

32.  The submission of Mr. Fakkruddin and Mr. Anis Ahmed  

Khan, learned counsel for the appellants, is that it is not a mere  

irregularity but a substantial illegality.  They have placed heavy  

reliance on paragraph 11 of Moly (supra) wherein the Bench has  

used the expression ‘that Section 193 imposes an interdict on all  

courts of Session against taking cognizance of an offence as a  

Court  of  original  jurisdiction’  and have also drawn inspiration  

from paragraph 17 of the said decision which uses the words  

‘lack of jurisdiction’.   The question posed by us fundamentally  

relates to the non-compliance of such interdict. The crux of the  

matter  is  whether  it  is  such  a  substantial  interdict  which  

impinges upon the fate of the trial beyond any redemption or, for  

that  matter  it  is  such  an  omission  or  it  is  such  an  act  that

24

defeats the basic conception of fair trial.  Fundamentally, a fair  

and  impartial  trial  has  a  sacrosanct  purpose.   It  has  a  

demonstrable object that the accused should not be prejudiced.  

A fair trial is required to be conducted in such a manner which  

would  totally  ostracise  injustice,  prejudice,  dishonesty  and  

favouritism.   

33. In Mrs. Kalyani Baskar v. Mrs. M. S. Sampoornam 19, it  

has  been  laid  down  that  ‘fair  trial’  includes  fair  and  proper  

opportunities allowed by law to the accused to prove  innocence  

and, therefore, adducing evidence in support of the defence is a  

valuable right and denial of that right means denial of fair trial.  

It is essential that rules of procedure designed to ensure justice  

should  be  scrupulously  followed  and  the  courts  should  be  

zealous in seeing that there is no breach of them.    

34. In this regard, we may fruitfully reproduce the observations  

from  Sidhartha Vashisht v. State (NCT of Delhi)20 wherein it  

has been so stated: -

“In  the  Indian  Criminal  jurisprudence,  the  accused is placed on a somewhat advantageous  position  than  under  different  jurisprudence  of  some of the countries in the world.  The criminal  justice  administration  system  in  India  places  

19 (2007) 2 SCC 258 20 (2010) 6 SCC 1

25

human  rights  and  dignity  for  human  life  at  a  much higher pedestal.  In our jurisprudence an  accused is  presumed to be innocent till  proved  guilty, the alleged accused is entitled to fairness  and  true  investigation  and  fair  trial  and  the  prosecution is expected to play balanced role in  the trial of a crime.  The investigation should be  judicious,  fair,  transparent  and  expeditious  to  ensure compliance to the basic rule of law.  These  are  the  fundamental  canons  of  our  criminal  jurisprudence  and they  are  quite  in  conformity  with  the  constitutional  mandate  contained  in  Articles 20 and 21 of the Constitution of India.”    

[Underlining is ours]

35. It would not be an exaggeration if it  is stated that a ‘fair  

trial’  is  the heart  of  criminal  jurisprudence and, in a way,  an  

important facet of a democratic polity that is governed by Rule of  

Law.  Denial of ‘fair trial’  is crucifixion of human rights.  It is  

ingrained  in  the  concept  of  due  process  of  law.  While  

emphasising the principle  of  ‘fair  trial’  and the practice  of  the  

same in the course of  trial,  it  is obligatory on the part  of  the  

Courts to see whether in an individual case or category of cases,  

because of  non-compliance of  a certain provision,  reversion of  

judgment of conviction is inevitable or it is dependent on arriving  

at  an indubitable  conclusion that  substantial  injustice  has  in  

fact occurred.  The seminal issue is whether protection given to  

the  accused  under  the  law  has  been  jeopardised  as  a

26

consequence  of  which  there  has  been  failure  of  justice  or  

causation of any prejudice. In this regard, it is profitable to refer  

to  the  decision  in  Gurbachan  Singh  v.  State  of  Punjab 21  

wherein a three-Judge Bench has opined thus:-  

“This  court  in  ‘Willie  (William)  Slaney  v.  The  state  of  Madhya  Pradesh22 elaborately  discussed the question of the applicability  of  Section 537 and came to the conclusion that  in judging a question of prejudice, as a guilt,  courts must act with a broad vision and look  to the substance and not to technicalities, and  their main concern should be to see whether  the accused had a fair trial, whether he knew  what he was being tried for, whether the main  facts  sought  to  be  established  against  him  were  explained to him fairly  and clearly  and  whether he was given a full and fair chance to  defend himself.  

[Emphasis added]

36. Having dealt with regard to the concept of ‘fair trial’ and its  

significant facets, it is apt to state that once prejudice is caused  

to  the  accused during  trial,  it  occasions in  ‘failure  of  justice’.  

‘Failure  of  justice’  has  its  own  connotation  in  various  

jurisprudences.  As far as criminal jurisprudence is concerned,  

we may refer with profit to certain authorities. Be it noted that in  

Bhooraji (supra),  the  Court  has  referred  to  Shamnsaheb  M.  

21  AIR 1957 SC 623  22  1956 CriLJ 291 : AIR 1956 SC 116

27

Multtani v. State of Karnataka23  wherein it has been observed  

as follows:-

“23.  We  often  hear  about  "failure  of  justice" and quite often the submission in  a criminal court is accentuated with the  said expression. Perhaps it is too pliable  or  facile  an  expression  which  could  be  fitted  in  any  situation  of  a  case.  The  expression  ‘failure  of  justice’  would  appear,  sometimes,  as  an  etymological  chameleon (the  simile  is  borrowed  from  Lord  Diplock  in Town  Investments  Ltd.  vs.  Department  of  the  Environment24).  The  criminal  court,  particularly  the  superior  court  should  make  a  close  examination  to  ascertain  whether  there  was really a failure of justice or whether  it is only a camouflage.”  

[Emphasis supplied]

37. In  State by Police Inspector v. T. Venkatesh Murthy25,   

the High Court of Karnataka had upheld an order of discharge  

passed  by  the  trial  court  on  the  ground  that  the  sanction  

granted to prosecute the accused was not in order.  The two-

Judge Bench referred to Sections 462 and 465 of the Code and  

ultimately held thus:-  

23 (2001) 2 SCC 577 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 358 24 (1977) 1 All ER 813  25 AIR 2004 SC 5117

28

“13. In State of   M.P.     v  .     Bhooraji and Ors.   (2001)  (7) SCC 679, the true essence of the expression  "failure  of  justice"  was  highlighted.  Section 465 of  the  Code  in  fact  deals  with  "finding  or  sentences  when  reversible  by  reason  of  error,  omission  or  irregularity",  in  sanction.

14. In the instant case neither the Trial Court  nor  the  High  Court  appears  to  have  kept  in  view  the  requirements  of  sub-section  (3)  relating  to  question  regarding  "failure  of  justice". Merely because there is any omission,  error or irregularity in the matter of according  sanction that does not affect the validity of the  proceeding  unless  the  Court  records  the  satisfaction  that  such  error,  omission  or  irregularity  has resulted  in  failure  of  justice.  The same logic also applies to the appellate or  revisional  Court.  The  requirement  of  sub- section  (4)  about  raising  the  issue,  at  the  earliest  stage  has  not  been  also  considered.  Unfortunately the High Court by a practically  non-reasoned  order,  confirmed  the  order  passed by the learned trial judge. The orders  are,  therefore,  indefensible.  We set  aside  the  said orders. It would be appropriate to require  the trial Court to record findings in terms of  Clause (b) of Sub-section (3) and Sub-section  (4) of Section 19.”  

38. We have referred to the said authority only for the purpose  

of  a  failure  of  justice  and  the  discernible  factum that  it  had  

concurred with the view taken in Bhooraji (supra).  That apart,  

the matter was remitted to adjudge the issue whether there had

29

been failure of justice, and it was so directed as the controversy  

pertained to the discharge of the accused.

39. In  Central Bureau of Investigation v. V. K. Sehgal26, it  

was observed: -

“10. A  court  of  appeal  or  revision  is  debarred  from  reversing  a  finding  (or  even  an  order  of  conviction and sentence) on account of any error  of irregularity in the sanction for the prosecution,  unless failure of justice had been occasioned on  account  of  such  error  or  irregularity.   For  determining whether want of valid sanction had  in fact occasioned failure of justice the aforesaid  sub-section  (2)  enjoins  on  the  court  a  duty  to  consider  whether  the  accused  had  raised  any  objection on that score at the trial stage.  Even if  he  had  raised  any  such  objection  at  the  early  stage it is hardly sufficient to conclude that there  was failure of justice.  It has to be determined on  the facts of each case.  But an accused who did  not  raise  it  at  the  trial  stage  cannot  possibly  sustain such a plea made for the first time in the  appellate court.”

The  concept  of  failure  of  justice  was  further  elaborated  as  

follows:-

“11. In a case where the accused failed to raise  the  question  of  valid  sanction  the  trial  would  normally proceed to its logical end by making a  judicial scrutiny of the entire materials.  If that  case ends in conviction there is  no question  of  failure  of  justice  on  the  mere  premise  that  no  valid sanction was accorded for prosecuting the  public  servant  because  the  very  purpose  of  

26 (1999) 8 SCC 501

30

providing such a filtering check is  to safeguard  public  servants  from  frivolous  of  mala  fide  or  vindictive prosecution on the allegation that they  have committed offence in the discharge of their  official  duties.   But  once  the  judicial  filtering  process  is  over  on  completion  of  the  trial  the  purpose of providing for the initial sanction would  bog  down to  a  surplusage.   This  could  be  the  reason for providing a bridle upon the appellate  and  revisional  forums  as  envisaged  in  Section  465 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.”

40.    Adverting  to  the  factum  of  irregular  investigation  and  

eventual conviction, the Constitution Bench in M. C. Sulkunte v.  

State of Mysore27 opined thus: -

“It has been emphasized in a number of decisions  of this Court that to set aside a conviction it must  be  shown  that  there  has  been  miscarriage  of  justice as a result of an irregular investigation.”

41.    After  adverting  to  the  concept  of  failure  of  justice,  it  is  

obligatory to dwell upon the aspect whether there is or can be  

any failure of justice if a Special Judge directly takes cognizance  

of an offence under the Act.  Section 209 of the Code deals with  

the commitment of case to Court of Session when an offence is  

triable exclusively by it. The said provision reads as follows: -

“209. Commitment of case to Court of Session  when  offence  is  triable  exclusively  by  it.  –  

27 AIR 1971 SC 508

31

When in a case instituted on a police report or  otherwise,  the  accused  appears  or  is  brought  before  the  Magistrate  and  it  appears  to  the  Magistrate that the offence is triable exclusively  by the Court of Session, he shall –

(a)Commit, after complying with the provisions of  section 207 or section 208, as the case may be,  the case to the Court of Session, and subject to  the  provisions  of  this  Code  relating  to  bail,  remand  the  accused  to  custody  until  such  commitment has been made;

(b)Subject to the provisions of this Code relating  to bail, remand the accused to custody during,  and until the conclusion of, the trial;

(c) Send to that Court the record of the case and  the documents and articles, if any, which are  to be produced in evidence;

(d)Notify the Public Prosecutor of the commitment  of the case to the Court of Session.”

42. Prior to coming into force of the present Code, Section 207  

of  the Code of  Criminal  Procedure,  1898 dealt  with committal  

proceedings.   By  the  Criminal  Law  Amendment  Act,  1955,  

Section 207 of the Principal Act was substituted by Sections 207  

and  207A.   To  appreciate  the  inherent  aspects  and  the  

conceptual differences in the previous provisions and the present  

one, it is imperative to reproduce Sections 207 and 207A of the  

old Code. They read as under:

32

“207. In  every  inquiry  before  a  magistrate  where the case is triable exclusively by a Court of  Session or High Court, or, in the opinion of the  magistrate, ought to be tried by such Court, the  magistrate shall, -

(a)  In any proceeding instituted on a police  report,  follow the  procedure  specified  in  section 207A; and

(b)In  any  other  proceeding,  follow  the  procedure  specified  in  the  other  provisions of this Chapter.

207A. (1) When, in any proceeding instituted  on  a  police  report  the  magistrate  receives  the  report forwarded under Section 173, he shall, for  the  purpose  of  holding  an  inquiry  under  this  section, fix a date which shall  be a date of the  receipt  of  the report,  unless the magistrate,  for  reasons to be recorded, fixes any later date.

(2) If, at any time before such date, the officer  conducting  the  prosecution  applies  to  the  magistrate  to  issue  a  process  to  compel  the  attendance  of  any witness  or  the  production  of  any document or thing, the magistrate shall issue  such process unless, for reasons to be recorded,  he deems it unnecessary to do so.

(3) At  the  commencement  of  the  inquiry,  the  magistrate shall, when the accused appears or is  brought  before  him,  satisfy  himself  that  the  documents referred to in section 173 have been  furnished to the accused and if he finds that the  accused  has  not  been  furnished  with  such  documents  or  any  of  them,  he  shall  cause  the  came to be so furnished.

33

(4) The  magistrate  shall  then  proceed  to  take  the evidence of such persons, if  any as may be  produced by the prosecution as witnesses to the  actual commission of the offence alleged, and if  the magistrate is of opinion that it is necessary in  the interests of justice to take the evidence of any  one  or  more  of  the  other  witnesses  for  the  prosecution, he may take such evidence also.

(5) The  accused  shall  be  at  liberty  to  cross- examine  the  witnesses  examined  under  sub- section (4), and in such case, the prosecutor may  re-examine them.

(6) When the evidence referred to in sub-section  (4)  has  been  taken  and  the  magistrate  has  considered  all  the  documents  referred  to  in  section 173 and has, if necessary, examined the  accused  for  the  purpose  of  enabling  him  to  explain  any  circumstances  appearing  in  the  evidence against him and given the prosecution  and the accused an opportunity of being heard,  such  magistrate  shall,  if  he  is  of  opinion  that  such  evidence  and  documents  disclose  no  grounds for  committing  the  accused person for  trial,  record  his  reasons  and  discharge  him  unless  it  appears  to  the  Magistrate  that  such  person  should  be  tried  before  himself  or  some  other magistrate, in which case he shall proceed  accordingly.

(7) When,  upon  such  evidence  being  taken,  such  documents  being  considered,  such  examination  (if  any)  being  made  and  the  prosecution  and  the  accused  being  given  an  opportunity of being heard, the magistrate is of  opinion that the accused should be committed for  trial,  he  shall  frame  a  charge  under  his  hand,  declaring  with  what  offence  the  accused  is  charged.

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(8) As soon as such charge has been framed, it  shall be read and explained to the accused and a  copy thereof shall be given to him free of cost.

(9) The  accused  shall  be  required  at  once  to  give in, orally or in writing, a list of the persons, if  any,  whom he  wishes  to  be  summoned to  give  evidence on his trial:

Provided  that  the  magistrate  may,  in  his  discretion, allow the accused to give in his list or  any  further  list  of  witnesses  at  a  subsequent  time;  and,  where  the  accused  is  committed  for  trial before the High Court, nothing in this sub- section shall be deemed to preclude the accused  from giving,  at  any time before his trial,  to the  Clerk  of  the  State  a further  list  of  the  persons  whom he wishes to be summoned to give evidence  on such trial.

(10) When the accused, on being required to give  in a list under sub-section (9), has declined to do  so,  or  when  he  has  given  in  such  list,  the  magistrate  may  make  an  order  committing  the  accused for trial by the High Court or the Court  of  Session,  as  the  case may be,  and shall  also  record briefly the reasons for such commitment.

(11) When the accused has given in any list of  witnesses  under  sub-section  (9)  and  has  been  committed for trial, the magistrate shall summon  the witnesses included in the list to appear before  the  Court  to  which  the  accused  has  been  committed:

Provided that where the accused has been  committed to the High Court, the magistrate may,  in  his  discretion,  leave  such  witnesses  to  be  summoned by the  Clerk of  the  State  and such  witnesses may be summoned accordingly:

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Provided also that if  the magistrate thinks  that  any witness is  included in the  list  for  the  purpose of vexation of delay, or of defeating the  ends of  justice,  the  magistrate  may require  the  accused to satisfy him that there are reasonable  grounds for  believing that the evidence of  such  witness is material, and if he is not so satisfied,  may refuse to summon the witness (recording his  reasons  for  such  refusal),  or  may  before  summoning  him  require  such  sum  to  be  deposited as such magistrate thinks necessary to  defray the expense of obtaining the attendance of  the witness and all other proper expenses.

(12) Witnesses  for  the  prosecution,  whose  attendance before the Court  of  Session or High  Court  is  necessary  and  who  appear  before  the  magistrate  shall  execute  before  him  bonds  binding  themselves  to  be  in  attendance  when  called upon by the Court of Session or High Court  to give evidence.

(13) If  any witness refuses to attend before the  Court  of  Session or High Court,  or  execute the  bond above directed, the magistrate may detain  him in custody until  he executes such bond or  until  his attendance at the Court  of Session or  High Court is required, when the magistrate shall  send him in custody to the Court of Session or  High Court as the case may be.

(14) When the accused is committed for trial, the  magistrate shall issue an order to such person as  may  be  appointed  by  the  State  Government  in  this  behalf,  notifying  the  commitment,  and  stating  the  offence  in  the  same  form  as  the  charge; and shall send the charge, the record of  the inquiry and any weapon or other thing which  is  to  be  produced  in  evidence,  to  the  Court  of  Session or where the commitment is made to the  High  Court,  to  the  Clerk  of  the  State  or  other  officer appointed in this behalf by the High Court.

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(15) When the commitment is made to the High  Court  and  any  part  of  the  record  is  not  in  English, an English translation of such part shall  be forwarded with the record.

(16) Until  and  during  the  trial,  the  magistrate  shall,  subject  to  the  provisions  of  this  Code  regarding the taking of bail, commit the accused  by warrant to custody.”

43.   On a bare perusal of the above quoted provisions, it is plain  

as day that an exhaustive procedure was enumerated prior  to  

commitment of the case to the Court of Session.  As is evincible,  

earlier if a case was instituted on a police report, the magistrate  

was required to hold enquiry, record satisfaction about various  

aspects, take evidence as regards the actual commission of the  

offence  alleged  and  further  was  vested  with  the  discretion  to  

record evidence of one or more witnesses.  Quite apart from the  

above, the accused was at liberty to cross-examine the witnesses  

and  it  was  incumbent  on  the  magistrate  to  consider  the  

documents  and,  if  necessary,  examine  the  accused  for  the  

purpose of enabling him to explain any circumstances appearing  

in the evidence against him by the prosecution and afford the  

accused  an  opportunity  of  being  heard  and  if  there  was  no  

ground  for  committing  the  accused  person  for  trial,  record

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reasons  and  discharge  him.  Thus,  the  accused  enjoyed  a  

substantial right prior to commitment of the case. It was indeed a  

vital  stage. But, in the committal proceedings  in praesenti,  the  

magistrate  is  only  required  to  see  whether  the  offence  is  

exclusively  triable  by  the  Court  of  Session.   Mr.  Fakhruddin,  

learned senior counsel, would submit that the use of the words  

“it appears to the magistrate” are of immense signification and  

the magistrate has the discretion to form an opinion about the  

case and not to accept the police report.  To appreciate the said  

submission,  it  is  apposite  to  refer  to Section 207 of  the  1973  

Code which lays down for furnishing of certain documents to the  

accused  free  of  cost.   Section  209(a)  clearly  stipulates  that  

providing of the documents as per Section 207 or Section 208 is  

the only condition precedent for commitment.  It is noteworthy  

that after the words, namely, “it appears to the Magistrate”, the  

words that follow are “that the offence is triable exclusively by the  

Court  of  Session”.   The  limited  jurisdiction  conferred  on  the  

magistrate is only to verify the nature of the offence.  It is also  

worth noting that thereafter,  a  mandate  is  cast  that he  “shall  

commit”.  Evidently, there is a sea of difference in the proceeding  

for commitment to the Court of Session under the old Code and

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under the existing Code.  There is nothing in Section 209 of the  

Code  to  even remotely  suggest  that  any  of  the  protections  as  

provided under the old Code has been telescoped to the existing  

one.

44. It  is  worth  noting  that  under  the  Code  of  Criminal  

Procedure,  1898,  a  full-fledged  Magisterial  enquiry  was  

postulated in the committal proceeding and the prosecution was  

then required to examine all the witnesses at this stage itself.  In  

1955,  the  Parliament  by  Act  26  of  1955  curtailed  the  said  

procedure and brought in Section 207A to the old Code.  Later  

on, the Law Commission of India in its 41st Report, recommended  

thus:-  

“18.19.   After a careful consideration we are  of  the  unanimous  opinion  that  committal  proceedings are largely a waste of time and  effort and do not contribute appreciably to  the efficiency of the trial before the Court of  Session.   While  they  are  obviously  time- consuming, they do not serve any essential  purpose.  There can be no doubt or dispute  as to the desirability of every trial, and more  particularly of the trial for a grave offence,  beginning as  soon as  practicable  after  the  completion  of  investigation.   Committal  proceedings which only serve to delay this  step,  do not  advance the cause  of  justice.  The  primary  object  of  protecting  the  innocent  accused  from  the  ordeal  of  a  sessions  trial  has  not  been  achieved  in

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practice;  and  the  other  main  object  of  apprising the accused in sufficient detail of  the case he has to meet at the trial could be  achieved  by  other  methods  without  going  through a  very  partial  and ineffective  trial  rehearsal  before  a  Magistrate.  We  recommend  that  committal  proceedings  should be abolished.”

We have reproduced the same to accentuate the change that has  

taken  place  in  the  existing  Code.  True  it  is,  the  committal  

proceedings have not been totally abolished but in the present  

incarnation, it has really been metamorphosed and the role of  

the Magistrate has been absolutely constricted.  

45. In  our  considered  opinion,  because  of  the  restricted  role  

assigned to the Magistrate at the stage of commitment under the  

new Code, the non-compliance of the same and raising of any  

objection in that regard after conviction attracts the applicability  

of  the  principle  of  ‘failure  of  justice’  and the convict-appellant  

becomes obliged in law to satisfy the appellate court that he has  

been prejudiced and deprived of  a fair  trial  or  there  has been  

miscarriage  of  justice.   The  concept  of  fair  trial  and  the  

conception  of  miscarriage  of  justice  are  not  in  the  realm  of  

abstraction.  They do not operate in a vacuum.  They are to be  

concretely  established  on  the  bedrock  of  facts  and  not  to  be

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deduced from procedural lapse or an interdict like commitment  

as enshrined under Section 193 of the Code for taking cognizance  

under the Act.   It should be a manifestation of reflectible and  

visible  reality  but  not  a  routine  matter  which  has  roots  in  

appearance sans any reality.  Tested on the aforesaid premised  

reasons, it is well  nigh impossible to conceive of any failure of  

justice or causation of prejudice or miscarriage of justice on such  

non-compliance.  It would be totally inapposite and inappropriate  

to hold that such non-compliance vitiates the trial.

46. At  this  juncture,  we  would  like  to  refer  to  two  other  

concepts,  namely,  speedy  trial  and  treatment  of  a  victim  in  

criminal jurisprudence based on the constitutional paradigm and  

principle.   The entitlement  of  the  accused to  speedy trial  has  

been  repeatedly  emphasized  by  this  Court.   It  has  been  

recognised as an inherent and implicit aspect in the spectrum of  

Article 21 of the Constitution.  The whole purpose of speedy trial  

is  intended  to  avoid  oppression  and  prevent  delay.   It  is  a  

sacrosanct  obligation  of  all  concerned  with  the  justice  

dispensation system to see that the administration of  criminal  

justice becomes effective, vibrant and meaningful.  The concept of  

speedy trial cannot be allowed to remain a mere formality (see

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Hussainara Khatoon and Ors.  v. Home Secretary, State of  

Bihar28, Moti Lal Saraf  v. State of Jammu & Kashmir29 and  

Raj Deo Sharma v. State of Bihar30).   

47. While delineating on the facets of speedy trial, it cannot be  

regarded as an exclusive right of the accused.  The right of a  

victim has been given recognition in Mangal Singh and Anr. v.  

Kishan Singh and ors.31 wherein it has been observed thus: -

“Any  inordinate  delay  in  conclusion  of  a  criminal  trial  undoubtedly  has  highly  deleterious  effect  on the  society  generally  and  particularly on the two sides of the case.  But it  will be a grave mistake to assume that delay in  trial does not cause acute suffering and anguish  to the victim of the offence.  In many cases the  victim may suffer even more than the accused.  There  is,  therefore  no  reason  to  give  all  the  benefits on account of the delay in trial to the  accused and to completely deny all justice to the  victim of the offence.”

[Emphasis supplied]

48. It  is  worthnoting  that  the  Constitution  Bench  in  Iqbal  

Singh  Marwah  and  another v. Meenakshi  Marwah  and  

another32, though in a different context, had also observed that  

delay  in  the  prosecution  of  a  guilty  person  comes  to  his  

28 (1980) 1 SCC 81 29 AIR 2007 SC 56 30 AIR 1998 SC 3281 31 AIR 2009 SC 1535 32 AIR 2005 SC 2119

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advantage as witnesses becomes reluctant to give evidence and  

the evidence gets lost.  

49. We have referred to the aforesaid authorities to illumine and  

elucidate that the delay in conclusion of trial has a direct nexus  

with the collective cry of the society and the anguish and agony  

of an accused.  Decidedly,  there has to be a fair  trial  and no  

miscarriage  of  justice  and  under  no  circumstances,  prejudice  

should  be  caused  to  the  accused  but,  a  pregnant  one,  every  

procedural lapse or every interdict that has been acceded to and  

not  objected  at  the  appropriate  stage  would  not  get  the  trial  

dented or make it unfair. Treating it to be unfair would amount  

to an undesirable state  of  pink of  perfection in procedure. An  

absolute apple pie order in carrying out the adjective law, would  

only be sound and fury signifying nothing.

50. In  the  case  at  hand,  as  is  perceivable,  no  objection  was  

raised at the time of framing of charge or any other relevant time  

but  only  propounded  after  conviction.   Under  these  

circumstances, the right of the collective as well as the right of  

the victim springs to the forefront and then it becomes obligatory  

on the part of the accused to satisfy the court that there has

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been  failure  of  justice  or  prejudice  has  been  caused  to  him.  

Unless the same is established, setting aside of conviction as a  

natural corollary or direction for retrial as the third step of the  

syllogism solely on the said foundation would be an anathema to  

justice.  Be it noted, one cannot afford to treat the victim as an  

alien  or  a  total  stranger  to  the  criminal  trial.   The  criminal  

jurisprudence, with the passage of time, has laid emphasis on  

victimology which fundamentally is a perception of a trial from  

the view point of the criminal as well as the victim.  Both are  

viewed in the social context.  The view of the victim is given due  

regard  and  respect  in  certain  countries.  In  respect  of  certain  

offences in our existing criminal jurisprudence, the testimony of  

the  victim  is  given  paramount  importance.   Sometimes  it  is  

perceived that it is the duty of the court to see that the victim’s  

right is protected.  A direction for retrial is to put the clock back  

and it would be a travesty of justice to so direct if the trial really  

has not been unfair and there has been no miscarriage of justice  

or failure of justice.

51. We may state without any fear of contradiction that if the  

failure of justice is not bestowed its due signification in a case of  

the present nature, every procedural lapse or interdict would be

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given a privileged place on the pulpit. It would, with unnecessary  

interpretative dynamism, have the effect potentiality to cause a  

dent  in  the  criminal  justice  delivery  system  and  eventually,  

justice would become illusory like a mirage.  It is to be borne in  

mind that the Legislature deliberately obliterated certain rights  

conferred on the accused at the committal stage under the new  

Code.  The intendment of the Legislature in the plainest sense is  

that  every  stage  is  not  to  be  treated  as  vital  and  it  is  to  be  

interpreted to subserve the substantive objects of the criminal  

trial.  

52. Judged from these spectrums and analysed on the aforesaid  

premises,  we  come  to  the  irresistible  conclusion  that  the  

objection relating to non-compliance of Section 193 of the Code,  

which eventually has resulted in directly entertaining and taking  

cognizance by the Special Judge under the Scheduled Castes and  

the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities)  Act,  1989, does  

not vitiate the trial and on the said ground alone, the conviction  

cannot be set aside or there cannot be a direction of retrial and,  

therefore, the decision rendered in  Bhooraji (supra) lays down  

the correct law inasmuch as there is no failure of justice or no  

prejudice is caused to the accused.  The decisions rendered in

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Moly (supra)  and  Vidyadharan (supra)  have  not  noted  the  

decision  in  Bhooraji (supra),  a  binding  precedent,  and hence  

they  are  per  incuriam and further,  the  law laid down therein,  

whereby the conviction is set aside or matter is remanded after  

setting aside the conviction for fresh trial, does not expound the  

correct proposition of law and, accordingly, they are hereby, to  

that extent, overruled.

53. The  appeals  be  placed  before  the  appropriate  Bench  for  

hearing on merits.

....................................J.             [Dalveer Bhandari]

....................................J.                      [T. S. Thakur]

....................................J.             [Dipak Misra]

New Delhi; February 17, 2012.