REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL     NO.594 of     2019  (arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.8103/2018)

RASHMI CHOPRA   ...APPELLANT(S)  

VERSUS

THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR.   ...RESPONDENT(S)  

WITH

CRIMINAL APPEAL     NO.598 of     2019  (arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.8050/2018)

ANITA GANDHI    ...APPELLANT(S)  

VERSUS

THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR.   ...RESPONDENT(S)  

WITH

CRIMINAL APPEAL     NO.599 of     2019  (arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.8052/2018)

NAYAN CHOPRA THROUGH POA HOLDER  RAJESH CHOPRA   ...APPELLANT(S)  

VERSUS

THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR.   ...RESPONDENT(S)  

1

WITH

CRIMINAL APPEAL     NO.597 of     2019  (arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.8042/2018)

AMIT CHOPRA        ...APPELLANT(S)  

VERSUS

THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR.   ...RESPONDENT(S)  

WITH

CRIMINAL APPEAL     NO.596 of     2019  (arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.8041/2018)

KULDEEP GANDHI      ...APPELLANT(S)  

VERSUS

THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR.   ...RESPONDENT(S)  

AND

CRIMINAL APPEAL     NO.595 of     2019  (arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.8039/2018)

RAJESH CHOPRA   ...APPELLANT(S)  

VERSUS

THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR.   ...RESPONDENT(S)  

J     U     D     G     M     E     N     T ASHOK     BHUSHAN,J.

These  appeals  have  been  filed  challenging  the

judgment of Allahabad High Court dated 08.08.2018 by

2

which the application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. filed

by the appellants praying for quashing the complaint

and proceedings in Complaint Case No. 4967 of 2015

have been dismissed.    

2. All  the  appeals  having  been  filed  against  the

same judgment, facts of the case are being taken from

Criminal Appeal No. 594 of 2019 – Rashmi Chopra &

Ors. Vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr., in which

criminal  appeal,  reply  affidavit  and  rejoinder

affidavit have been filed.  The background facts of

the case necessary to be noted for deciding these

appeals are:-

2.1 Nayan  Chopra,  son  of  Rashmi  Chopra  and

Rajesh  Chopra  got  married  with  Vanshika

Bobal,  daughter  of  respondent  No.2,

Indrajeet  Singh  on  15.04.2012.   All  the

appellants  are  family  members  of  Nayan

Chopra.  Rashmi Chopra is mother, Rajesh

Chopra is father, Amit Chopra is Brother

and  Anita  Gandhi  is  Mother’s  Sister  of

3

Nayan  Chopra,  whereas  Kuldeep  Gandhi  is

husband of Anita Gandhi.  Nayan Chopra with

his mother, father and brother are resident

of 203, Jainti Apartment, Police Station –

Begumpet,  Hyderabad  (Andhra  Pradesh).

Anita  Gandhi  and  Kuldeep  Gandhi  are

resident of Greater Kailash – I, New Delhi.

2.2 After  the  marriage  of  Nayan  Chopra  and

Vanshika,  which  was  performed  at  Noida,

District Gautam Buddha Nagar on 15.04.2012,

Vanshika  went  alongwith  her  husband  at

Hyderabad,  the  matrimonial  home  of

Vanshika.   On  28.04.2012,  Vanshika  and

Nayan Chopra left for the U.S.A.  On or

about  November,  2013,  Vanshika  and  Nayan

Chopra  separated.   On  23.10.2014,  an

application was filed by Nayan Chopra in

the  Circuit  Court  for  the  County  of

Kalamazoo  Family  Division,  Michigan,  USA,

seeking divorce.   

4

2.3 On  10.11.2014,  a  complaint  was  sent  by

respondent No.2 through registered post to

the Superintendent of Police, Gautam Buddha

Nagar,  Noida  making  allegations  against

Rajesh  Chopra  and  two  other  unknown

persons.    An  application  under  Section

156(3) was filed by respondent No.2.  The

application of the respondent No.2 was sent

by  the  Magistrate  to  Mediation  Centre

running under the District Legal Services

Authority for counselling.  After failure

of  counselling  and  mediation,  an

application  under  Section  156(3)  Cr.P.C.

was  filed  by  respondent  No.2  dated

10.05.2015  making  allegations  against  all

the  appellants  under  Section  498A  and

Sections 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act.   

2.4 In  the  complaint,  allegations  have  been

made  on  the  basis  of  incident  dated

08.11.2014  against  Rajesh  Chopra  and  his

associates.   It  was  alleged  that  Rajesh

5

Chopra called the respondent No.2 near the

Gurudwara at Sector 18, Noida to talk about

the problem of Nayan Chopra and Vanshika

and when respondent No.2 went for talks, he

met Rajesh Chopra with two unknown persons.

Respondent No.2 further alleges that on his

request  to  accept  his  daughter,  Rajesh

Chopra  repeated  his  demand  of  one  crore

rupees  and  used  filthy  words  against

Vanshika, which was objected by respondent

No.2,  on  which  Rajesh  Chopra  and  his

associates became annoyed and they abused

and beat the respondent No.2 and snatched

his  gold  chain  from  his  neck  and

Rs.60,000/-  from  his  pocket.   The

allegations within the meaning of Sections

323, 324, 504, 506, 392 of I.P.C. were made

on the basis of the aforesaid incident. In

the application, it was also stated that

Nayan  Chopra  has  filed  a  petition  for

dissolution of marriage in America.   

6

2.5 On the basis of the application of divorce

by Nayan Chopra, the Circuit 9th Court for

the  County  of  Kalamazoo  Family  Division,

Michigan  gave  a  judgment  of  divorce  on

24.02.2016.   The  order  of  judgment  of

divorce was passed after hearing both Nayan

Chopra  and  Vanshika  Bobal,  who  were

represented  through  attorneys.   The

judgment  of  divorce  made  provisions  for

alimony,  pension  benefits  and  retirement

benefits,  life  insurance,  property

settlement and provision in lieu of dower,

mutual  release  of  claims  and  other

provisions.   

2.6 The  application  under  Section  156(3)

Cr.P.C.  filed  by  respondent  No.2  was

treated as a complaint and registered as

Complaint No. 4967 of 2015, on which the

learned  Judicial  Magistrate,  Gautam  Budh

Nagar  issued  a  summoning  order  on

17.01.2017  summoning  the  appellants  under

7

Sections 498A, 323, 504, 506 of I.P.C. and

Section 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act.   

2.7 The appellants filed an application under

Section  482  Cr.P.C.  in  the  High  Court

praying  for  quashing  the  complaint  and

proceedings and order dated 17.01.2017 in

Complaint Case No. 4967 of 2015.  In the

application under Section 482 Cr.P.C., High

Court passed an order referring the matter

to  mediation  centre  of  Allahabad  High

Court.  The mediation having failed between

the parties, application under Section 482

Cr.P.C.  was  heard.   The  prayer  of  the

appellants  to  quash  the  complaint  and

proceedings  have  been  refused.   The

application was disposed of after directing

that the applicants may surrender in the

court  below  and  make  an  application  for

bail  within  a  period  of  two  months.

Aggrieved against the judgment of the High

Court, these appeals have been filed.

8

3. All appeals arise out of the same order passed in

their application under Section 482 Cr.P.C.   

4. We have heard Shri Shikhil Suri, learned counsel

for the appellants and Shri Santosh Krishnan, learned

AOR appearing for the respondent No.2.  We have also

heard learned counsel for the State of Uttar Pradesh.

5. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that

High  Court  failed  to  exercise  jurisdiction  under

Section 482 Cr.P.C. in quashing the entire complaint

proceedings, which proceedings are nothing but abuse

of the process of the court.  It is submitted that

Nayan  Chopra  and  Vanshika  Bobal  had  already  been

granted divorce by Family Court of Michigan, which

fact was not brought into notice of the Magistrate by

respondent  No.2  before  summoning  order  was  passed.

It is submitted that a reading of the complaint does

not prima facie discloses any offence under Section

498A and 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act against the

appellants.  The appellants, Anita Gandhi and Kuldeep

9

Gandhi  separately  reside  and  they  have  never  met

Vanshika, the girl after marriage.  The allegations

in  the  complaint  are  vague,  sweeping  and  general.

The complaint is not even filed by Vanshika, the girl

nor she got her statement recorded in support of the

complaint.  In  so  far  as  incident  alleged  on

08.11.2014 at Sector 18, Noida no such incident took

place  and  allegations  are  false  and  concocted  to

somehow rope in Rajesh Chopra, the father of the boy

Nayan Chopra.  The complaint has not been filed by

competent  person,  hence  ought  not  to  have  been

entertained.   

6. Shri Santosh Krishnan, learned counsel appearing

for respondent No.2 submits that there is no error in

summoning  of  the  appellants  by  the  Magistrate  by

order  dated  17.01.2017.   It  is  well  settled  that

Magistrate  is  not  required  to  record  elaborate

reasons for summoning of an accused.  The complaint

discloses several allegations pertaining to offence

under  Section  498A  and  other  offences  mentioned

therein.  Two courts having taken one particular view

10

of  the  matter,  this  Court  may  not  exercise  its

jurisdiction in interfering with the orders.  It is

further submitted that Section 498A does not indicate

that complaint on behalf of the women has to be filed

by  the  women  herself.   The  complaint  was  fully

competent  and  no  error  has  been  committed  by

Magistrate in taking cognizance of the complaint.   

7. Learned  counsel  for  the  parties  have  placed

reliance  on  various  judgments  of  this  Court  in

support of their submissions, which shall be referred

to while considering the submissions in detail.  

8. We have considered the submissions of the learned

counsel for the parties and have perused the records.

9. The copy of the complaint under Section 156(3)

Cr.P.C., which has been treated as private complaint

by  Magistrate  has  been  brought  on  the  record  as

Annexure P-2.  The allegations in the complaint are

that marriage was solemnised on 15.04.2012 in which

marriage, gifts of Rs.50 lakhs were given to Nayan

Chopra and his family members.  It is alleged that

11

after  the  marriage,  all  family  members  were  not

satisfied by the gifts and they started harassing the

daughter  of  respondent  No.2  by  demanding  further

dowry of one crore rupees.  They further pressurised

to solemnise the marriage of Vanshika as per Punjabi

rites and ceremonies, on which pressure, marriage was

solemnised on 06.11.2012 in Gurudwara at Sector 37,

Noida as per Punjabi rites and ceremonies.  Further

allegations are that family members of Nayan Chopra

kept on threatening Vanshika to desert her and on

01.12.2013 Nayan Chopra threw Vanshika out of house

and since then Vanshika is residing with respondent

No.2.  Another set of allegations are with regard to

incident dated 08.11.2014 alleged to have been taken

place  at  6.00  PM  near  the  Gurudwara,  Sector-18,

Noida.  It is alleged that Rajesh Chopra, father of

Nayan Chopra called the respondent No.2 to talk about

their  problem  on  which  date  Rajesh  Chopra  again

repeated  his  demand  of  one  crore  rupees  and  used

filthy  words  against  Vanshika  to  which  respondent

No.2  objected,  on  which  Rajesh  Chopra  and  his

associates became annoyed and they abused and beat

12

the respondent No.2 and snatched his gold chain from

his neck and Rs.60,000/- from his pocket.  The above

two sets of allegations have given rise to summoning

order.  The summoning order passed by the Magistrate

on 17.01.2017 is as follows:-

“ORDER

The  accused  persons  Nayan  Chopra,  Rajesh Chopra, Rashi Chopra, Amit Chopra, Kuldeep Gandhi & Anita Gandhi are summoned for the offence under Sections 498A, 323, 504, 506 of IPC and Section 3/4 of D.P. Act.  The complainant  is  directed  to  take  steps  as per Rules within one week.  Case is fixed for 08.03.2017 for appearance.  

Sd/- illegible 17.01.2017

(Vikas) Civil Judge (Jr. Division) J.M. Gautam Budh Nagar.”  

10. One of the submissions, which has been pressed by

learned  counsel  for  the  respondent  No.2  is  that

Magistrate has to be satisfied that there are grounds

for proceeding and there is no requirement of giving

any elaborate reasons for summoning the accused.

11. Learned  counsel  for  the  respondent  has  placed

reliance on Dy. Chief Controller of Imports & Exports

13

Vs. Roshanlal Agarwal & Ors., (2003) 4 SCC 139, this

Court in paragraph No. 9 of the judgment laid down

following:-

“9. In determining the question whether any process is to be issued or not, what the Magistrate has to be satisfied is whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding and not whether there is sufficient ground for  conviction.  Whether  the  evidence  is adequate for supporting the conviction, can be determined only at the trial and not at the  stage  of  inquiry.  At  the  stage  of issuing  the  process  to  the  accused,  the Magistrate  is  not  required  to  record reasons.  This  question  was  considered recently in U.P. Pollution Control Board v. Mohan Meakins Ltd., (2000) 3 SCC 745 and after noticing the law laid down in  Kanti Bhadra Shah v. State of W.B., (20000 1 SCC 722, it was held as follows: (SCC p. 749, para 6)

The legislature has stressed the need to  record  reasons  in  certain situations  such  as  dismissal  of  a complaint  without  issuing  process. There  is  no  such  legal  requirement imposed on a Magistrate for passing detailed order while issuing summons. The process issued to accused cannot be quashed merely on the ground that the  Magistrate  had  not  passed  a speaking order.”

12. Same proposition was reiterated by this Court in

Nupur Talwar Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation &

Anr., (2012) 11 SCC 465.  There can be no dispute to

14

the above proposition as laid down by this Court that

while taking cognizance of an offence, a Magistrate

is not required to pass a detailed order, however, in

a  case  when  Magistrate  issues  process  against  a

person, who is not even charged with the offence for

which he is summoned, whether in such cases also the

summoning order cannot be assailed?   

13. In  the  present  case,  there  are  two  sets  of

allegations,  which  are  contained  in  the  complaint,

which  has  also  been  repeated  in  the  statements

recorded by respondent No.2 and his two witnesses –

PW1 – Raj Kumar, brother of respondent No.2 and PW2 –

Deepa,  wife  of  respondent  No.2.   One  set  of

allegations of offence under Section 498A and Section

3/4 of D.P. Act and second set of allegations are

allegations made for offences under Sections 323, 504

and 506 of I.P.C.      

14. We may first take up the allegations for offences

under  Sections  323,  504  and  506  of  I.P.C.  The

allegations under Sections 323, 504 and 506 has been

15

made citing the incident dated 08.11.2014.  It is

useful to extract the entire allegations pertaining

to  incident  dated  08.11.2014  from  the  complaint,

which are to the following effect:-

“…………………..On  08.11.2014  at  about  6  p.m. Nayan Chopra’s father Rajesh Chopra called the Applicant near the Gurudwara at Sector 18,  Noida  to  talk  about  their  problem. When the Applicant reached there for talk then he met there Rajesh Chopra alongwith two  unknown  persons.   When  the  Applicant requested  Rajesh  Chopra  to  accept  his daughter the Rajesh Chopra again repeated his demand of one core Rupees and said that if  he  has  arranged  for  one  crore  Rupees then  he  can  send  his  daughter  at  their home, otherwise keep Vanshika at his house and Rajesh Chopra used filthy words against Vanshika, then the Applicant objected for the same, on which Rajesh Chopra and his associates became annoyed and they abused and  beat  the  Applicant  and  snatched  his gold  chain  from  his  neck  and  Rs.60,000/- from his pocket.  The wife of the Applicant and a number of other people gathered at the spot and saved the Applicant from them. While leaving these persons threatened the Applicant  that  after  arranging  for  one crore Rupees he can send his daughter at their  house,  otherwise  keep  her  at  his house and if he dare to inform the police then they will kill the Applicant and his daughter Vanshika…….”

16

15. In  the  statement  made  by  the  complainant  in

support of his submission, complainant repeated the

same allegations regarding incident dated 08.11.2014

as  made  in  the  complaint,  as  noted  above.   PW-2,

Deepa, wife of respondent No.2 has also about the

incident dated 08.11.2014 repeated the allegations as

narrated  in  the  complaint.  A  perusal  of  the

allegations in the complaint makes it clear that the

complaint with regard to offences under Sections 323,

504 and 506 has been made only against Rajesh Chopra

and two unknown persons.  Neither in the complaint

nor statements made by complainant or his witnesses,

there is any allegation with regard to above offences

against any other appellants before us.  There being

no allegations for offences under Sections 323, 504

and  506  in  the  complaint  or  statement  before  the

Magistrate, there was no question of summoning the

other appellants for offences under Sections 323, 504

and 506 of I.P.C. When the complaint does not allege

any offence against other appellants, we fail to see

that how the cognizance of the complaint can be taken

against  other  appellants  with  regard  to  offences

17

under Sections 323, 504 and 506.  In above view of

the matter, the complaint as well as summoning order

are liable to be quashed against all the appellants

except  Rajesh  Chopra  due  to  the  above  reasons  in

above regard.   

16. Now, we come to the allegations in the complaint

under  Section  498A  and  Section  3/4  of  D.P.  Act.

Learned counsel for the respondent in support of his

submission that power of the High Court under Section

482  Cr.P.C.  has  to  be  exercised  in  exceptional

circumstances, has relied on judgment of this Court

in Rakhi Mishra Vs. State of Bihar and Others, (2017)

16 SCC 772.  This Court in the above case has relied

on an earlier judgment of this Court in  Sonu Gupta

Vs.  Deepak  Gupta,  (2015)  3  SCC  424,  in  which

judgment, in paragraph No.8 following proposition was

laid down, which has been referred to and relied on:-

“8. …  At  the  stage  of  cognizance  and summoning  the  Magistrate  is  required  to apply his judicial mind only with a view to take cognizance of the offence … to find out  whether  a  prima  facie  case  has  been made out for summoning the accused persons. At  this  stage,  the  learned  Magistrate  is not  required  to  consider  the  defence

18

version or materials or arguments nor is he required  to  evaluate  the  merits  of  the materials or evidence of the complainant, because the Magistrate must not undertake the  exercise  to  find  out  at  this  stage whether  the  materials  would  lead  to conviction or not.”

17. This Court in  Rakhi Mishra’s case has also laid

down that High Court in exceptional circumstances can

exercise power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. when a prima

facie  case  is  not  made  out  against  the  accused.

Paragraph No.5 of the judgment is as follows:-

“5. The  order  passed  by  the  trial  court taking cognizance against R-2 and R-4 to R- 9 is in conformity with the law laid down in the above judgment. It is settled law that the power under Section 482 CrPC is exercised  by  the  High  Court  only  in exceptional circumstances only when a prima facie  case  is  not  made  out  against  the accused. The test applied by this Court for interference  at  the  initial  stage  of  a prosecution  is  whether  the  uncontroverted allegations prima facie establish a case.”

18. Learned counsel for the appellant has also relied

on various judgments of this Court in support of his

submissions.  In K. Subba Rao and Others Vs. State of

Telangana, (2018) 14 SCC 452, this Court laid down

following in paragraph Nos. 5 and 6:-

19

“5. A perusal of the charge-sheet and the supplementary  charge-sheet  discloses  the fact  that  the  appellants  are  not  the immediate  family  members  of  the  third respondent/husband.  They  are  the  maternal uncles of the third respondent. Except the bald  statement  that  they  supported  the third  respondent  who  was  harassing  the second respondent for dowry and that they conspired  with  the  third  respondent  for taking  away  his  child  to  the  U.S.A., nothing  else  indicating  their  involvement in the crime was mentioned. The appellants approached  the  High  Court  when  the investigation was pending. The charge-sheet and  the  supplementary  charge-sheet  were filed  after  disposal  of  the  case  by  the High Court.

6. Criminal  proceedings  are  not  normally interdicted  by  us  at  the  interlocutory stage  unless  there  is  an  abuse  of  the process of a court. This Court, at the same time,  does  not  hesitate  to  interfere  to secure the ends of justice. See  State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Suppl. (1) SCC 335.  The  courts  should  be  careful  in proceeding against the distant relatives in crimes  pertaining  to  matrimonial  disputes and  dowry  deaths.  The  relatives  of  the husband should not be roped in on the basis of  omnibus  allegations  unless  specific instances of their involvement in the crime are  made  out.  See  Kans  Raj v.  State  of Punjab,  (2000)  5  SCC  207 and  Kailash Chandra Agrawal v. State of U.P., (2014) 16 SCC 551”   

19. This Court in  Vineet Kumar and Others Vs. State

of Uttar Pradesh and Another, (2017) 13 SCC 369 had

20

occasion  to  examine  the  parameters  of  exercise  of

power  under  Section  482  Cr.P.C.  in  respect  of

quashing of criminal proceeding.  One of us (Justice

Ashok Bhushan) speaking for the Bench after examining

the scope and ambit of Section 482 Cr.P.C. laid down

following in Paragraph Nos. 22 to 25:-

“22. Before we enter into the facts of the present  case  it  is  necessary  to  consider the ambit and scope of jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC vested in the High Court. Section 482 CrPC saves the inherent power of the High Court to make such orders as may  be  necessary  to  give  effect  to  any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.

23. This Court time and again has examined the scope of jurisdiction of the High Court under  Section  482  CrPC  and  laid  down several  principles  which  govern  the exercise of jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in  State of Karnataka v.  L. Muniswamy, (1977) 2 SCC 699, held that the High  Court  is  entitled  to  quash  a proceeding  if  it  comes  to  the  conclusion that  allowing  the  proceeding  to  continue would be an abuse of the process of the court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. In para 7 of the judgment, the following has been stated: (SCC p. 703)

“7.  …  In  the  exercise  of  this wholesome  power,  the  High  Court  is entitled to quash a proceeding if it

21

comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the court or that the ends of justice require that  the  proceeding  ought  to  be quashed.  The  saving  of  the  High Court’s  inherent  powers,  both  in civil  and  criminal  matters,  is designed to achieve a salutary public purpose  which  is  that  a  court proceeding ought not to be permitted to  degenerate  into  a  weapon  of harassment  or  persecution.  In  a criminal  case,  the  veiled  object behind a lame prosecution, the very nature of the material on which the structure  of  the  prosecution  rests and the like would justify the High Court in quashing the proceeding in the interest of justice. The ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice has got to be administered according to laws made by  the  legislature.  The  compelling necessity  for  making  these observations is that without a proper realisation of the object and purpose of the provision which seeks to save the inherent powers of the High Court to do justice, between the State and its subjects, it would be impossible to appreciate the width and contours of that salient jurisdiction.”

24. The judgment of this Court in State of Haryana v.  Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, has elaborately considered the scope and ambit of Section 482 CrPC. Although in the above case this Court was considering the power of the High Court to quash the entire  criminal  proceeding  including  the FIR,  the  case  arose  out  of  an  FIR registered under Sections 161, 165 IPC and

22

Section  5(2)  of  the  Prevention  of Corruption  Act,  1947.  This  Court elaborately considered the scope of Section 482 CrPC/Article 226 of the Constitution in the context of quashing the proceedings in criminal  investigation.  After  noticing various  earlier  pronouncements  of  this Court,  this  Court  enumerated  certain categories of cases by way of illustration where power under Section 482 CrPC can be exercised to prevent abuse of the process of the Court or secure the ends of justice.

25. Para 102 which enumerates 7 categories of cases where power can be exercised under Section 482 CrPC is extracted as follows: (Bhajan Lal case, SCC pp. 378-79)

“102.  In  the  backdrop  of  the interpretation  of  the  various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law  enunciated  by  this  Court  in  a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under  Article  226  or  the  inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which  we  have  extracted  and reproduced  above,  we  give  the following categories of cases by way of  illustration  wherein  such  power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise  to  secure  the  ends  of justice,  though  it  may  not  be possible  to  lay  down  any  precise, clearly  defined  and  sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or  rigid  formulae  and  to  give  an exhaustive  list  of  myriad  kinds  of cases  wherein  such  power  should  be exercised.

23

(1) Where the allegations made in the  first  information  report  or the complaint, even if they are taken  at  their  face  value  and accepted in their entirety do not prima  facie  constitute  any offence  or  make  out  a  case against the accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the first  information  report  and other  materials,  if  any, accompanying  the  FIR  do  not disclose  a  cognizable  offence, justifying  an  investigation  by police  officers  under  Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.

(3)  Where  the  uncontroverted allegations  made  in  the  FIR  or complaint  and  the  evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.

(4) Where the allegations in the FIR  do  not  constitute  a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation  is  permitted  by  a police  officer  without  an  order of  a  Magistrate  as  contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.

(5) Where the allegations made in the  FIR  or  complaint  are  so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person  can  ever  reach  a  just

24

conclusion  that  there  is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6)  Where  there  is  an  express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the Act concerned (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution  and  continuance  of the  proceedings  and/or  where there is a specific provision in the  Code  or  the  Act  concerned, providing efficacious redress for the  grievance  of  the  aggrieved party.

(7)  Where  a  criminal  proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior  motive  for  wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a  view  to  spite  him  due  to private and personal grudge.”

20. After  referring  to  several  other  cases,  this

Court  concluded  and  made  following  observations  in

Paragraph No. 41:-

“41. Inherent power given to the High Court under Section 482 CrPC is with the purpose and  object  of  advancement  of  justice.  In case solemn process of Court is sought to be  abused  by  a  person  with  some  oblique motive, the Court has to thwart the attempt at  the  very  threshold.  The  Court  cannot permit a prosecution to go on if the case falls  in  one  of  the  categories  as illustratively enumerated by this Court in State  of  Haryana v.  Bhajan  Lal.  Judicial

25

process is a solemn proceeding which cannot be  allowed  to  be  converted  into  an instrument of operation or harassment. When there  are  materials  to  indicate  that  a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with  mala  fide  and  proceeding  is maliciously  instituted  with  an  ulterior motive, the High Court will not hesitate in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482  CrPC  to  quash  the  proceeding  under Category  7  as  enumerated  in  State  of Haryana v.  Bhajan  Lal,  which  is  to  the following effect: (SCC p. 379, para 102)

“102. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or  where  the  proceeding  is maliciously  instituted  with  an ulterior  motive  for  wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.”

Above  Category  7  is  clearly  attracted  in the  facts  of  the  present  case.  Although, the High Court has noted the judgment of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, but did not advert to the relevant facts of the present case, materials on which final report was submitted by the IO. We, thus, are fully satisfied that the present is a fit case where  the  High  Court  ought  to  have exercised  its  jurisdiction  under  Section 482  CrPC  and  quashed  the  criminal proceedings.”

21. The  criminal  prosecution  can  be  allowed  to

proceed only when a prima facie offence is disclosed.

This Court has observed that judicial process is a

26

solemn  proceeding  which  cannot  be  allowed  to  be

converted  into  an  instrument  of  oppression  or

harassment.   If  High  Court  finds  that  proceedings

deserve to be quashed in parameters as laid down by

this Court in  State of Haryana Vs. Bhajan Lal, 1992

Supp (1) SCC 335, High court shall not hesitate in

exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to

quash the proceedings.   

22. Now, we revert back to the allegations made in

the complaint under Section 498A and Section 3/4 of

D.P. Act.  Few facts have to be noticed before we

look into the allegations made in the complaint in

the above regard.  The complaint has been filed by

the respondent No.2 before the C.J.M., Gautam Budh

Nagar on 10.05.2015, before which date, the petition

for divorce has already been filed by Nayan Chopra on

23.10.2014 before the Circuit Court for the County of

Kalamazoo Family Division, Michigan.  It is on the

record that at the time of filing of the complaint

Vanishka  Bobal  was  living  at  Canada  whereas  Nayan

Chopra was living at U.S.A.  Both were separately

27

living.   It  was  pleaded  in  the  application  for

divorce that husband and wife had separated on or

around November, 2013.  It is on the record that on

the day criminal complaint was filed on 10.05.2015 in

the Court of C.J.M. Gautam Budh Nagar by respondent

No.2, neither Vanishka was in India nor she was in

India at the time when statements were recorded in

complaint  of  complainant  as  well  as  his  two

witnesses.  The complaint is not by Vanishka but it

has  been  filed  by  father  of  Vanishka,  respondent

No.2.  In the divorce application filed in the State

of Michigan, Vanishka Bobal was represented by her

attorney.   The  divorce  was  granted  with  orders

relating to alimony, pension benefits and retirement

benefits,  life  insurance,  property  settlement  and

provision in lieu of dower, mutual release of claims

and other aspects on 24.02.2016.   

23. There is nothing on the record to indicate that

orders  of  divorce  between  the  parties  was  brought

into  the  notice  of  the  Magistrate  when  he  issued

process against the appellants.  We, however, are in

28

agreement with the submission of Shri Santosh Krishan

that  decree  of  divorce  between  Nayan  Chopra  and

Vanshika  shall  not  wipe  out  any  criminal  offence,

which has been committed within the meaning of I.P.C.

or D.P. Act and the criminal offence committed in

jurisdictional court has to be examined despite the

divorce decree having been granted.   

24. Coming back to the allegations in the complaint

pertaining to Section 498A and Section 3/4 of D.P.

Act.  A perusal of the complaint indicates that the

allegations against the appellants for offence under

Section 498A and Section 3/4 of D.P. Act are general

and sweeping.  No specific incident dates or details

of any incident has been mentioned in the complaint.

The complaint having been filed after proceeding for

divorce was initiated by Nayan Chopra in State of

Michigan, where Vanshika participated and divorce was

ultimately granted. A  few months after filing of the

divorce petition, the complaint has been filed in the

Court  of  C.J.M.,  Gautam  Budh  Nagar  with  the

allegations as noticed above.  The sequence of the

29

events and facts and circumstances of the case leads

us to conclude that the complaint under Section 498A

and  Section  3/4  of  D.P.  Act  have  been  filed  as

counter blast to divorce petition proceeding in State

of Michigan by Nayan Chopra.    

25. There being no specific allegation regarding any

one  of  the  applicants  except  common  general

allegation  against  everyone  i.e.  “they  started

harassing  the  daughter  of  the  applicant  demanding

additional dowry of one crore” and the fact that all

relatives  of  the  husband,  namely,  father,  mother,

brother,  mother’s  sister  and  husband  of  mother’s

sister  have  been  roped  in  clearly  indicate  that

application  under  Section  156(3)  Cr.P.C.  was  filed

with a view to harass the applicants. Further, prior

to  filing  of  the  application  under  Section  156(3)

Cr.P.C. there was no complaint at any point of time

by the girl or her father making allegation of demand

of any dowry by any one of the applicants. When both

Nayan Chopra and Vanshika started living separately

since November, 2013, had there been any dowry demand

30

or harassment the girl would have given complaint to

Police  or  any  other  authority.  Further,  in  the

divorce proceedings at Michigan, U.S.A., parties have

agreed for dividing their properties including gifts

given at marriage but no complaint was made in those

proceedings  regarding  harassment  by  her  husband  or

his  family  members.  The  judgment  of  the  divorce

contains  following  clauses  regarding  “Property

Settlement and Provision in Lieu of Dower”:

“  PROPERTY SETTLEMENT AND  PROVISION IN LIEU OF DOWER

1.  Each  party  affirms  that  he  or  she fully  and  accurately  disclosed  all  the assets owned by him or her in which he or she  has  any  interest.  By  affixing  their signatures on this Judgment, Plaintiff and Defendant  affirm  that  each  has  disclosed all assets each owns or has any interest in,  whether  held  by  him  or  her individually,  by  both  of  them  jointly  or with  any  other  person  or  entity,  or  by another person or entity for the benefit of a party. The property division set forth in this Judgment of Divorce is intended to be a  distribution  and  allocation  of  all  the property  of  the  parties  and  also  is intended to declare the parties’ property interests as of entry of this Judgment of Divorce. If either party has failed, either intentionally  or  unintentionally,  to disclose  any  of  his  or  her  assets,  the issue of property division may be reopened on the motion of either party to determine

31

and  resolve  the  distribution  of  any previously undisclosed assets.

2.  It  appears  to  the  court  that  the parties have divided between them to their mutual  satisfaction  all  articles  of personal property, household furniture and appliances,  cash,  savings  and  checking accounts  and  vehicles  except  as  provided below. The personal property as so divided shall be the sole and absolute property of the  party  in  whose  possession  or  under whose  control  each  of  the  articles  of personal  property  are  now  found  and  each shall  defend  and  hold  the  other  harmless from liability thereon.

a.The  parties  agree  to  return  all jewelry to the other party that they currently  have  in  their  possession, which  was  acquired  as  a  result  of their  marriage.  Plaintiff  testified that he only had one item of jewelry and provided the only jewelry he had in  his  possession  to  Defendant-a single gold ring. Plaintiff testified she does not have any jewelry in her possession.

b.The  parties  agree  that  their respective parents will return to the other  party’s  parents,  all  jewelry given as gifts to their parents and are  in  their  parent’s  possession, which was acquired by them as a result of the parties’ marriage. The parents agree to exchange at a mutually agreed upon location and at a mutually agreed upon time.

3.  Except as otherwise provided herein, each party shall be liable for the debts

32

incurred  by  him  or  her  after  separation (11/1/2013) and shall defend and hold the other harmless from all liability thereon.

4. Except as provide herein, each party shall be liable for the debts in his or her name  and  for  the  debts  associated  with property awarded to him/her pursuant to the Judgment  of  Divorce  and  shall  defend  and hold the other harmless from all liability therein.

5. Except as otherwise provided herein, each party shall retain all monies in their respective names, including but not limited to  checking  accounts,  savings  accounts, certificates  of  deposit,  stocks,  bonds, IRAs or 401Ks.  

6.  There  are  no  joint  debts  of  the parties except as provided herein.  

7.  Plaintiff,  NAYAN  CHOPRA,  shall receive the 2013 Honda CRV free and clear from any claim of the Defendant, VANSHIKA BOBAL, and the Plaintiff assumes and agrees to pay the liability thereon and to defend and  hold  the  Defendant  harmless  thereon. Defendant  shall  transfer  title  of  such vehicles to the Plaintiff if transferring is needed.

8.  Plaintiff,  NAYAN  CHOPRA,  shall receive  the  2005  Toyota  Camry  free  and clear  from  any  claim  of  the  Defendant, VANSHIKA BOBAL, and the Plaintiff assumes and agrees to pay the liability thereon and to defend and hold the Defendant harmless thereon.  

9. The provisions for each party herein made for the parties shall be in lieu of the dower or spousal right in the lands of the  other  and  each  shall  hereafter  hold

33

their  remaining  lands  free,  clear  and discharged  from  any  such  dower,  spousal right and claim and said provision shall be in full satisfaction of all claims either may have in any property which the other owns, or may hereafter own, in which either has or may hereafter have an interest.

10. The parties warrant that neither has incurred  any  debt  in  the  other  party’s name, or on which the other party may be liable, which is not expressly disposed of in this Judgment.  

11. This  Judgment  of  Divorce  shall constitute a termination of all rights of a surviving spouse including, but not limited to,  homestead  allowance,  election,  exempt property,  settlement  and  family  allowance by each party in the property of the other, and  a  termination  of  all  benefits  which would otherwise pass to one party from the other by testate and intestate, succession or by virtue of any provision of any will executed  prior  to  the  entry  of  this Judgment of Divorce.”

26. The  above  judgment  in  divorce  proceedings

indicates that Nayan Chopra and Vanshika have settled

all  issues  between  them  including  division  of

properties at the time when divorce proceedings were

in progress at Michigan and both the parties were not

in India, the complaint under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C.

had been filed making allegation under Section 498A

34

of IPC and the Dowry Prohibition Act only to harass

and put pressure on the applicants.

27. One observation also needs to be made with regard

to order passed by the High Court.  High Court in its

impugned  judgment  has  not  referred  to  allegations

made in the complaint except noticing the summoning

order has been passed and noticing the principles of

law.  This Court had occasion to consider a similar

order  passed  by  the  High  Court  rejecting  the

application  under  Section  482  Cr.P.C.  in  Jagdish

Prasad  and  Others  Vs.  State  of  Uttar  Pradesh  and

Another, (2019) 2 SCC 184.  In the said case also

under Section 482 Cr.P.C. proceedings, the challenge

was  made  to  summoning  order  as  well  as  entire

proceedings of complaint case where allegations under

Sections 498A and 323 IPC as well as Section 3/4 of

D.P. Act were made.  In paragraph No.3, the facts

giving rise to filing the application under Section

482 Cr.P.C. before the High Court has been noted.

This Court made following observations in paragraph

Nos.6 to 9:-

35

“6. Having  heard  the  learned  counsel  for the parties and on perusal of the record of the case we are inclined to set aside the impugned order and remand the case to the High  Court  for  deciding  the  appellants’ application,  out  of  which  this  appeal arises, afresh on merits in accordance with law.

7. On  perusal  of  the  impugned  order,  we find that the Single Judge has quoted the principles of law laid down by this Court in several decisions relating to powers of the High Court on the issue of interference in  cases  filed  under  Section  482  of  the Code from para 2 to the concluding para but has not referred to the facts of the case to appreciate the controversy of the case. We  are,  therefore,  unable  to  know  the factual  matrix  of  the  case  after  reading the  impugned  judgment  except  the  legal principles  laid  down  by  this  Court  in several decisions.

8. In our view, the Single Judge ought to have first set out the brief facts of the case with a view to understand the factual matrix and then examined the challenge made to  the  proceedings  in  the  light  of  the principles of law laid down by this Court with a view to record the findings on the grounds  urged  by  the  appellants  as  to whether any interference therein is called for or not. We find that the aforementioned exercise  was  not  done  by  the  High  Court while passing the impugned order.

9. We, therefore, find ourselves unable to concur  with  such  disposal  of  the application  by  the  High  Court  and  feel inclined  to  set  aside  the  impugned  order and  remand  the  case  to  the  High  Court (Single Judge) with a request to decide the

36

application afresh on merits in accordance with law keeping in view the aforementioned observations. Having formed an opinion to remand  the  case  in  the  light  of  our reasoning  mentioned  above,  we  do  not consider it proper to go into the merits of the case.”

28. What was said by this Court in paragraph No. 7

and 8 of the above judgment is squarely applicable in

the facts of the present case and the order of the

High Court deserves to be set aside on this ground

alone.   

29. One of the submissions, which has been made by

the learned counsel for the appellant also needs to

be considered.  Learned counsel for the appellant had

submitted  that  complaint  has  not  been  filed  by  a

competent person.  It is submitted that complaint is

not  made  by  Vanshika,  but  has  been  filed  only  by

father of Vanshika, hence it is not maintainable. The

above  submission  has  been  refuted  by  Shri  Santosh

Krishnan.  He submits that it is not necessary that a

complaint under Section 498A should be filed only by

the victim of offence.  He submits that complaint

filed by father of the victim, respondent No.2 was

37

also fully maintainable.  Section 498A provides as

follows:-

“498A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty.— Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine.  

Explanation.—For  the  purpose  of  this section, “cruelty” means—

(a) any  wilful  conduct  which  is  of such  a  nature  as  is  likely  to drive the woman to commit suicide or  to  cause  grave  injury  or danger  to  life,  limb  or  health (whether  mental  or  physical)  of the woman; or

(b) harassment  of  the  woman  where such harassment is with a view to coercing  her  or  any  person related  to  her  to  meet  any unlawful demand for any property or  valuable  security  or  is  on account of failure by her or any person  related  to  her  to  meet such demand.”

30. Section 498A provides for an offence when husband

or  the  relative  of  the  husband,  subject  her  to

38

cruelty.  There is nothing in Section 498A, which may

indicate that when a woman is subjected to cruelty, a

complaint has to be filed necessarily by the women so

subjected.  A perusal of Section 498A, as extracted

above,  indicates  that  the  provision  does  not

contemplate that complaint for offence under Section

498A should be filed only by women, who is subjected

to cruelty by husband or his relative.  We, thus, are

of the view that complaint filed by respondent No.2,

the  father  of  Vanshika  cannot  be  said  to  be  not

maintainable on this ground.  We, thus, reject the

submission  of  the  counsel  for  the  appellant  that

complaint  filed  by  respondent  No.2  was  not

maintainable.   

31. In view of the foregoing discussions, insofar as

the offence under Section 498A and Section 3/4 of

D.P.  Act  is  concerned,  we  are  of  the  view  that

present is a case, which is covered by Category 7 as

enumerated by State of Haryana Vs. Bhajan Lal (supra)

and the High Court erred in refusing to exercise its

jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. We, however,

39

observe that in so far as allegations against Rajesh

Chopra pertaining to Sections 323, 504 and 506 of IPC

is concerned, there were specific allegations, which

were also supported by the complainant and his two

witnesses in the evidence,  at this stage, this Court

cannot  pronounce  as  to  whether  any  incident  as

alleged by the complainant happened on 08.11.2014 or

alleged as offence by respondent No.2 or offence as

alleged was committed by Rajesh Chopra or not.  We,

thus,  are  of  the  view  that  insofar  as  complaint

pertaining to offence under Sections 323, 504 and 506

I.P.C.  against  Rajesh  Chopra  is  concerned,  said

complaint shall be proceeded with and the order dated

17.01.2017 is upheld to the above extent only, i.e.,

summoning of Rajesh Chopra under Sections 323, 504

and 506.

32. In result,  

(i) Criminal Appeal Nos.594, 598, 599, 597 and

596 of 2019 (arising out of SLP (Crl.) Nos.

8103, 8050, 8052, 8042 and 8041 of 2018)

40

are  allowed.   The  complaint  as  well  as

summoning  order  dated  17.01.2017  is  set

aside  insofar  as  the  appellants  in  the

above-mentioned  criminal  appeals  are

concerned.

(ii) Criminal Appeal No.595 of 2019 (arising out

of SLP (Crl.) No. 8039 of 2018 – Rajesh

Chopra Vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh &

Anr.) is partly allowed.  The complaint as

well  as  summoning  order  is  set  aside

insofar as offence under Section 498A and

Section  3/4  of  D.P.  Act  is  concerned,

however, complaint shall proceed insofar as

offence under Sections 323, 504 and 506 of

I.P.C. and summoning order to that extent

only is upheld.  

......................J.                              ( ASHOK BHUSHAN )

......................J.                              ( K.M. JOSEPH )

New Delhi,  April 30, 2019.        

41