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REPORTABLE  

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA  

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION  

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.594 of 2019   

(arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.8103/2018)  

RASHMI CHOPRA       ...APPELLANT(S)   

VERSUS  

THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR.   ...RESPONDENT(S)   

WITH  

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.598 of 2019   

(arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.8050/2018)  

ANITA GANDHI         ...APPELLANT(S)   

VERSUS  

THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR.   ...RESPONDENT(S)   

WITH  

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.599 of 2019   

(arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.8052/2018)  

NAYAN CHOPRA THROUGH POA HOLDER   

RAJESH CHOPRA       ...APPELLANT(S)   

VERSUS  

THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR.   ...RESPONDENT(S)   

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WITH  

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.597 of 2019   

(arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.8042/2018)  

AMIT CHOPRA            ...APPELLANT(S)   

VERSUS  

THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR.   ...RESPONDENT(S)   

WITH  

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.596 of 2019   

(arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.8041/2018)  

KULDEEP GANDHI          ...APPELLANT(S)   

VERSUS  

THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR.   ...RESPONDENT(S)   

AND  

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.595 of 2019   

(arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.8039/2018)  

RAJESH CHOPRA       ...APPELLANT(S)   

VERSUS  

THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR.   ...RESPONDENT(S)   

J U D G M E N T  

ASHOK BHUSHAN,J.  

These appeals have been filed challenging the  

judgment of Allahabad High Court dated 08.08.2018 by

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which the application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. filed  

by the appellants praying for quashing the complaint  

and proceedings in Complaint Case No. 4967 of 2015 have  

been dismissed.      

2. All the appeals having been filed against the same  

judgment, facts of the case are being taken from  

Criminal Appeal No. 594 of 2019 – Rashmi Chopra & Ors.  

Vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr., in which criminal  

appeal, reply affidavit and rejoinder affidavit have  

been filed.  The background facts of the case necessary  

to be noted for deciding these appeals are:-  

2.1 Nayan Chopra, son of Rashmi Chopra and Rajesh  

Chopra got married with Vanshika Bobal,  

daughter of respondent No.2, Indrajeet Singh  

on 15.04.2012.  All the appellants are family  

members of Nayan Chopra.  Rashmi Chopra is  

mother, Rajesh Chopra is father, Amit Chopra  

is Brother and Anita Gandhi is Mother’s  

Sister of Nayan Chopra, whereas Kuldeep  

Gandhi is husband of Anita Gandhi.  Nayan

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Chopra with his mother, father and brother  

are resident of 203, Jainti Apartment, Police  

Station – Begumpet, Hyderabad (Andhra  

Pradesh).  Anita Gandhi and Kuldeep Gandhi  

are resident of Greater Kailash – I, New  

Delhi.    

2.2 After the marriage of Nayan Chopra and  

Vanshika, which was performed at Noida,  

District Gautam Buddha Nagar on 15.04.2012,  

Vanshika went alongwith her husband at  

Hyderabad, the matrimonial home of Vanshika.   

On 28.04.2012, Vanshika and Nayan Chopra left  

for the U.S.A.  On or about November, 2013,  

Vanshika and Nayan Chopra separated.  On  

23.10.2014, an application was filed by Nayan  

Chopra in the Circuit Court for the County  

of Kalamazoo Family Division, Michigan, USA,  

seeking divorce.    

2.3 On 10.11.2014, a complaint was sent by  

respondent No.2 through registered post to  

the Superintendent of Police, Gautam Buddha

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Nagar, Noida making allegations against  

Rajesh Chopra and two other unknown persons.    

An application under Section 156(3) was filed  

by respondent No.2.  The application of the  

respondent No.2 was sent by the Magistrate  

to Mediation Centre running under the  

District Legal Services Authority for  

counselling.  After failure of counselling  

and mediation, an application under Section  

156(3) Cr.P.C. was filed by respondent No.2  

dated 10.05.2015 making allegations against  

all the appellants under Section 498A and  

Sections 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act.    

2.4 In the complaint, allegations have been made  

on the basis of incident dated 08.11.2014  

against Rajesh Chopra and his associates.  It  

was alleged that Rajesh Chopra call the  

respondent No.2 near the Gurudwara at Sector  

18, Noida to talk about the problem of Nayan  

Chopra and Vanshika and when respondent No.2  

went for talks, he met Rajesh Chopra with two  

unknown persons.  Respondent No.2 further

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alleges that on his request to accept his  

daughter, Rajesh Chopra repeated his demand  

of one crore rupees and used filthy words  

against Vanshika, which was objected by  

respondent No.2, on which Rajesh Chopra and  

his associates became annoyed and they abused  

and beat the respondent No.2 and snatched his  

gold chain from his neck and Rs.60,000/- from  

his pocket.  The allegations within the  

meaning of Sections 323, 324, 504, 506, 392  

of I.P.C. were made on the basis of the  

aforesaid incident. In the application, it  

was also stated that Nayan Chopra has filed  

a petition for dissolution of marriage in  

America.    

2.5 On the basis of the application of divorce  

by Nayan Chopra, the Circuit 9th Court for  

the County of Kalamazoo Family Division,  

Michigan gave a judgment of divorce on  

24.02.2016.  The order of judgment of divorce  

was passed after hearing both Nayan Chopra  

and Vanshika Bobal, who were represented

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through attorneys.  The judgment of divorce  

made provisions for alimony, pension  

benefits and retirement benefits, life  

insurance, property settlement and provision  

in lieu of dower, mutual release of claims  

and other provisions.    

2.6 The application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C.  

filed by respondent No.2 was treated as a  

complaint and registered as Complaint No.  

4967 of 2015, on which the learned Judicial  

Magistrate, Gautam Budh Nagar issued a  

summoning order on 17.01.2017 summoning the  

appellants under Sections 498A, 323, 504, 506  

of I.P.C. and Section 3/4 of Dowry  

Prohibition Act.    

2.7 The appellants filed an application under  

Section 482 Cr.P.C. in the High Court praying  

for quashing the complaint and proceedings  

and order dated 17.01.2017 in Complaint Case  

No. 4967 of 2015.  In the application under  

Section 482 Cr.P.C., High Court passed an

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order referring the matter to mediation  

centre of Allahabad High Court.  The  

mediation having failed between the parties,  

application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. was  

heard.  The prayer of the appellants to quash  

the complaint and proceedings have been  

refused.  The application was disposed of  

after directing that the applicants may  

surrender in the court below and make an  

application for bail within a period of two  

months.  Aggrieved against the judgment of  

the High Court, these appeals have been  

filed.            

3. All appeals arise out of the same order passed in  

their application under Section 482 Cr.P.C.    

4. We have heard Shri Shikhil Suri, learned counsel  

for the appellants and Shri Santosh Krishnan, learned  

AOR appearing for the respondent No.2.  We have also  

heard learned counsel for the State of Uttar Pradesh.  

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5. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that  

High Court failed to exercise jurisdiction under  

Section 482 Cr.P.C. in quashing the entire complaint  

proceedings, which proceedings are nothing but abuse  

of the process of the court.  It is submitted that  

Nayan Chopra and Vanshika Bobal had already been  

granted divorce by Family Court of Michigan, which fact  

was not brought into notice of the Magistrate by  

respondent No.2 before summoning order was passed.  It  

is submitted that a reading of the complaint does not  

prima facie discloses any offence under Section 498A  

and 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act against the  

appellants.  The appellants, Anita Gandhi and Kuldeep  

Gandhi separately resides and they have never met  

Vanshika, the girl after marriage.  The allegations in  

the complaint are vague, sweeping and general.  The  

complaint is not even filed by Vanshika, the girl nor  

she got her statement recorded in support of the  

complaint. In so far as incident alleged on 08.11.2014  

at Sector 18, Noida no such incident took place and  

allegations are false and concocted to somehow rope in  

Rajesh Chopra, the father of the boy Nayan Chopra.  The

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complaint has not been filed by competent person, hence  

ought not to have been entertained.    

6. Shri Santosh Krishnan, learned counsel appearing  

for respondent No.2 submits that there is no error in  

summoning of the appellants by the Magistrate by order  

dated 17.01.2017.  It is well settled that Magistrate  

is not required to record elaborate reasons for  

summoning of an accused.  The complaint discloses  

several allegations pertaining to offence under Section  

498A and other offences mentioned therein.  Two courts  

having taken one particular view of the matter, this  

Court may not exercise its jurisdiction in interfering  

with the orders.  It is further submitted that Section  

498A does not indicate that complaint on behalf of the  

women has to be filed by the women herself.  The  

complain was fully competent and no error has been  

committed by Magistrate in taking cognizance of the  

complaint.    

7. Learned counsel for the parties have placed  

reliance on various judgments of this Court in support

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of their submissions, which shall be referred to while  

considering the submissions in detail.   

8. We have considered the submissions of the learned  

counsel for the parties and have perused the records.   

9. The copy of the complaint under Section 156(3)  

Cr.P.C., which has been treated as private complaint  

by Magistrate has been brought on the record as  

Annexure P-2.  The allegations in the complaint are  

that marriage was solemnised on 15.04.2012 in which  

marriage, gifts of Rs.50 lakhs were given to Nayan  

Chopra and his family members.  It is alleged that  

after the marriage, all family members were not  

satisfied by the gifts and they started harassing the  

daughter of respondent No.2 by demanding further dowry  

of one crore rupees.  They further pressurised to  

solemnise the marriage of Vanshika as per Punjabi rites  

and ceremonies, on which pressure, marriage was  

solemnised on 06.11.2012 in Gurudwara at Sector 37,  

Noida as per Punjabi rites and ceremonies.  Further  

allegations are that family members of Nayan Chopra  

kept on threatening Vanshika to desert her and on

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01.12.2013 Nayan Chopra threw Vanshika out of house and  

since then Vanshika is residing with respondent No.2.   

Another set of allegations are with regard to incident  

dated 08.11.2014 alleged to have been taken place at  

6.00 PM near the Gurudwara, Sector-18, Noida.  It is  

alleged that Rajesh Chopra, father of Nayan Chopra  

called the respondent No.2 to talk about their problem  

on which date Rajesh Chopra again repeated his demand  

of one crore rupees and used filthy words against  

Vanshika to which respondent No.2 objected, on which  

Rajesh Chopra and his associates became annoyed and  

they abused and beat the respondent No.2 and snatched  

his gold chain from his neck and Rs.60,000/- from his  

pocket.  The above two sets of allegations have given  

rise to summoning order.  The summoning order passed  

by the Magistrate on 17.01.2017 is as follows:-  

“ORDER  

The accused persons Nayan Chopra, Rajesh  

Chopra, Rashi Chopra, Amit Chopra, Kuldeep  

Gandhi & Anita Gandhi are summoned for the  

offence under Sections 498A, 323, 504, 506  

of IPC and Section 3/4 of D.P. Act.  The  

complainant is directed to take steps as per  

Rules within one week.  Case is fixed for  

08.03.2017 for appearance.   

Sd/- illegible

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17.01.2017  

(Vikas)  

Civil Judge (Jr. Division)  

J.M. Gautam Budh Nagar.”   

10. One of the submissions, which has been pressed by  

learned counsel for the respondent No.2 is that  

Magistrate has to be satisfied that there are grounds  

for proceeding and there is no requirement of giving  

any elaborate reasons for summoning the accused.              

11. Learned counsel for the respondent has placed  

reliance on Dy. Chief Controller of Imports & Exports  

Vs. Roshanlal Agarwal & Ors., (2003) 4 SCC 139, this  

Court in paragraph No. 9 of the judgment laid down  

following:-  

“9. In determining the question whether any  

process is to be issued or not, what the  

Magistrate has to be satisfied is whether  

there is sufficient ground for proceeding and  

not whether there is sufficient ground for  

conviction. Whether the evidence is adequate  

for supporting the conviction, can be  

determined only at the trial and not at the  

stage of inquiry. At the stage of issuing the  

process to the accused, the Magistrate is not  

required to record reasons. This question was  

considered recently in U.P. Pollution Control  

Board v. Mohan Meakins Ltd., (2000) 3 SCC 745  

and after noticing the law laid down in Kanti  

Bhadra Shah v. State of W.B., (20000 1 SCC

14    

722, it was held as follows: (SCC p. 749,  

para 6)  

The legislature has stressed the need  

to record reasons in certain  

situations such as dismissal of a  

complaint without issuing process.  

There is no such legal requirement  

imposed on a Magistrate for passing  

detailed order while issuing summons.  

The process issued to accused cannot  

be quashed merely on the ground that  

the Magistrate had not passed a  

speaking order.”  

12. Same proposition was reiterated by this Court in  

Nupur Talwar Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation &  

Anr., (2012) 11 SCC 465.  There can be no dispute to  

the above proposition as laid down by this Court that  

while taking cognizance of an offence, a Magistrate is  

not required to pass a detailed order, however, in a  

case when Magistrate issues process against a person,  

who is not even charged with the offence for which he  

is summoned, whether in such cases also the summoning  

order cannot be assailed?    

13. In the present case, there are two sets of  

allegations, which are contained in the complaint,  

which has also been repeated in the statements recorded

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by respondent No.2 and his two witnesses – PW1 – Raj  

Kumar, brother of respondent No.2 and PW2 – Deepa, wife  

of respondent No.2.  One set of allegations of offence  

under Section 498A and Section 3/4 of D.P. Act and  

second set of allegations are allegations made for  

offences under Sections 323, 504 and 506 of I.P.C.       

14. We may first take up the allegations for offences  

under Sections 323, 504 and 506 of I.P.C. The  

allegations under Sections 323, 504 and 506 has been  

made citing the incident dated 08.11.2014.  It is  

useful to extract the entire allegations pertaining to  

incident dated 08.11.2014 from the complaint, which are  

to the following effect:-  

“…………………..On 08.11.2014 at about 6 p.m. Nayan  

Chopra’s father Rajesh Chopra called the  

Applicant near the Gurudwara at Sector 18,  

Noida to talk about their problem.  When the  

Applicant reached there for talk then he met  

there Rajesh Chopra alongwith two unknown  

persons.  When the Applicant requested Rajesh  

Chopra to accept his daughter the Rajesh  

Chopra again repeated his demand of one core  

Rupees and said that if he has arranged for  

one crore Rupees then he can send his  

daughter at their home, otherwise keep  

Vanshika at his house and Rajesh Chopra used  

filthy words against Vanshika, then the  

Applicant objected for the same, on which

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Rajesh Chopra and his associates became  

annoyed and they abused and beat the  

Applicant and snatched his gold chain from  

his neck and Rs.60,000/- from his pocket.   

The wife of the Applicant and a number of  

other people gathered at the spot and saved  

the Applicant from them.  While leaving these  

persons threatened the Applicant that after  

arranging for one crore Rupees he can send  

his daughter at their house, otherwise keep  

her at his house and if he dare to inform the  

police then they will kill the Applicant and  

his daughter Vanshika…….”  

15. In the statement made by the complainant in support  

of his submission, complainant repeated the same  

allegations regarding incident dated 08.11.2014 as made  

in the complaint, as noted above.  PW-2, Deepa, wife  

of respondent No.2 has also about the incident dated  

08.11.2014 repeated the allegations as narrated in the  

complaint. A perusal of the allegations in the  

complaint makes it clear that the complaint with regard  

to offences under Sections 323, 504 and 506 has been  

made only against Rajesh Chopra and two unknown  

persons.  Neither in the complaint nor statements made  

by complainant or his witnesses, there is any  

allegation with regard to above offences against any  

other appellants before us.  There being no allegations

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for offences under Sections 323, 504 and 506 in the  

complaint or statement before the Magistrate, there was  

no question of summoning the other appellants for  

offences under Sections 323, 504 and 506 of I.P.C. When  

the complaint does not allege any offence against other  

appellants, we fail to see that how the cognizance of  

the complaint can be taken against other appellants  

with regard to offences under Sections 323, 504 and  

506.  In above view of the matter, the complaint as  

well as summoning order are liable to be quashed  

against all the appellants except Rajesh Chopra due to  

the above reasons in above regard.    

16. Now, we come to the allegations in the complaint  

under Section 498A and Section 3/4 of D.P. Act.  Learned  

counsel for the respondent in support of his submission  

that power of the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C.  

has to be exercised in exceptional circumstances, has  

relied on judgment of this Court in Rakhi Mishra Vs.  

State of Bihar and Others, (2017) 16 SCC 772.  This  

Court in the above case has relied on an earlier  

judgment of this Court in Sonu Gupta Vs. Deepak Gupta,

18    

(2015) 3 SCC 424, in which judgment, in paragraph No.8  

following proposition was laid down, which has been  

referred to and relied on:-  

“8. … At the stage of cognizance and  

summoning the Magistrate is required to apply  

his judicial mind only with a view to take  

cognizance of the offence … to find out  

whether a prima facie case has been made out  

for summoning the accused persons. At this  

stage, the learned Magistrate is not required  

to consider the defence version or materials  

or arguments nor is he required to evaluate  

the merits of the materials or evidence of  

the complainant, because the Magistrate must  

not undertake the exercise to find out at  

this stage whether the materials would lead  

to conviction or not.”  

17. This Court in Rakhi Mishra’s case has also laid  

down that High Court in exceptional circumstances can  

exercise power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. when a prima  

facie case is not made out against the accused.   

Paragraph No.5 of the judgment is as follows:-  

“5. The order passed by the trial court  

taking cognizance against R-2 and R-4 to R-9  

is in conformity with the law laid down in  

the above judgment. It is settled law that  

the power under Section 482 CrPC is exercised  

by the High Court only in exceptional  

circumstances only when a prima facie case  

is not made out against the accused. The test  

applied by this Court for interference at the  

initial stage of a prosecution is whether the

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uncontroverted allegations prima facie  

establish a case.”  

18. Learned counsel for the appellant has also relied  

on various judgments of this Court in support of his  

submissions.  In K. Subba Rao and Others Vs. State of  

Telangana, (2018) 14 SCC 452, this Court laid down  

following in paragraph Nos. 5 and 6:-  

“5. A perusal of the charge-sheet and the  

supplementary charge-sheet discloses the  

fact that the appellants are not the  

immediate family members of the third  

respondent/husband. They are the maternal  

uncles of the third respondent. Except the  

bald statement that they supported the third  

respondent who was harassing the second  

respondent for dowry and that they conspired  

with the third respondent for taking away his  

child to the U.S.A., nothing else indicating  

their involvement in the crime was mentioned.  

The appellants approached the High Court when  

the investigation was pending. The charge-

sheet and the supplementary charge-sheet were  

filed after disposal of the case by the High  

Court.  

6. Criminal proceedings are not normally  

interdicted by us at the interlocutory stage  

unless there is an abuse of the process of a  

court. This Court, at the same time, does not  

hesitate to interfere to secure the ends of  

justice. See State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal,  

1992 Suppl. (1) SCC 335. The courts should  

be careful in proceeding against the distant  

relatives in crimes pertaining to matrimonial  

disputes and dowry deaths. The relatives of  

the husband should not be roped in on the

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basis of omnibus allegations unless specific  

instances of their involvement in the crime  

are made out. See Kans Raj v. State of Punjab,  

(2000) 5 SCC 207 and Kailash Chandra Agrawal  

v. State of U.P., (2014) 16 SCC 551”  

19. This Court in Vineet Kumar and Others Vs. State of  

Uttar Pradesh and Another, (2017) 13 SCC 369 had  

occasion to examine the parameters of exercise of power  

under Section 482 Cr.P.C. in respect of quashing of  

criminal proceeding.  One of us (Justice Ashok Bhushan)  

speaking for the Bench after examining the scope and  

ambit of Section 482 Cr.P.C. laid down following in  

Paragraph Nos. 22 to 25:-  

“22. Before we enter into the facts of the  

present case it is necessary to consider the  

ambit and scope of jurisdiction under Section  

482 CrPC vested in the High Court. Section  

482 CrPC saves the inherent power of the High  

Court to make such orders as may be necessary  

to give effect to any order under this Code,  

or to prevent abuse of the process of any  

court or otherwise to secure the ends of  

justice.  

23. This Court time and again has examined  

the scope of jurisdiction of the High Court  

under Section 482 CrPC and laid down several  

principles which govern the exercise of  

jurisdiction of the High Court under Section  

482 CrPC. A three-Judge Bench of this Court  

in State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy, (1977)  

2 SCC 699, held that the High Court is  

entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes

21    

to the conclusion that allowing the  

proceeding to continue would be an abuse of  

the process of the court or that the ends of  

justice require that the proceeding ought to  

be quashed. In para 7 of the judgment, the  

following has been stated: (SCC p. 703)  

“7. … In the exercise of this  

wholesome power, the High Court is  

entitled to quash a proceeding if it  

comes to the conclusion that allowing  

the proceeding to continue would be an  

abuse of the process of the court or  

that the ends of justice require that  

the proceeding ought to be quashed.  

The saving of the High Court’s  

inherent powers, both in civil and  

criminal matters, is designed to  

achieve a salutary public purpose  

which is that a court proceeding ought  

not to be permitted to degenerate into  

a weapon of harassment or persecution.  

In a criminal case, the veiled object  

behind a lame prosecution, the very  

nature of the material on which the  

structure of the prosecution rests and  

the like would justify the High Court  

in quashing the proceeding in the  

interest of justice. The ends of  

justice are higher than the ends of  

mere law though justice has got to be  

administered according to laws made by  

the legislature. The compelling  

necessity for making these  

observations is that without a proper  

realisation of the object and purpose  

of the provision which seeks to save  

the inherent powers of the High Court  

to do justice, between the State and  

its subjects, it would be impossible  

to appreciate the width and contours  

of that salient jurisdiction.”  

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24. The judgment of this Court in State of  

Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335,  

has elaborately considered the scope and  

ambit of Section 482 CrPC. Although in the  

above case this Court was considering the  

power of the High Court to quash the entire  

criminal proceeding including the FIR, the  

case arose out of an FIR registered under  

Sections 161, 165 IPC and Section 5(2) of the  

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. This  

Court elaborately considered the scope of  

Section 482 CrPC/Article 226 of the  

Constitution in the context of quashing the  

proceedings in criminal investigation. After  

noticing various earlier pronouncements of  

this Court, this Court enumerated certain  

categories of cases by way of illustration  

where power under Section 482 CrPC can be  

exercised to prevent abuse of the process of  

the Court or secure the ends of justice.  

25. Para 102 which enumerates 7 categories  

of cases where power can be exercised under  

Section 482 CrPC is extracted as follows:  

(Bhajan Lal case, SCC pp. 378-79)  

“102. In the backdrop of the  

interpretation of the various relevant  

provisions of the Code under Chapter  

XIV and of the principles of law  

enunciated by this Court in a series  

of decisions relating to the exercise  

of the extraordinary power under  

Article 226 or the inherent powers  

under Section 482 of the Code which we  

have extracted and reproduced above,  

we give the following categories of  

cases by way of illustration wherein  

such power could be exercised either  

to prevent abuse of the process of any  

court or otherwise to secure the ends  

of justice, though it may not be  

possible to lay down any precise,

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clearly defined and sufficiently  

channelised and inflexible guidelines  

or rigid formulae and to give an  

exhaustive list of myriad kinds of  

cases wherein such power should be  

exercised.  

(1) Where the allegations made in  

the first information report or  

the complaint, even if they are  

taken at their face value and  

accepted in their entirety do not  

prima facie constitute any offence  

or make out a case against the  

accused.  

(2) Where the allegations in the  

first information report and other  

materials, if any, accompanying  

the FIR do not disclose a  

cognizable offence, justifying an  

investigation by police officers  

under Section 156(1) of the Code  

except under an order of a  

Magistrate within the purview of  

Section 155(2) of the Code.  

(3) Where the uncontroverted  

allegations made in the FIR or  

complaint and the evidence  

collected in support of the same  

do not disclose the commission of  

any offence and make out a case  

against the accused.  

(4) Where the allegations in the  

FIR do not constitute a cognizable  

offence but constitute only a non-

cognizable offence, no  

investigation is permitted by a  

police officer without an order of  

a Magistrate as contemplated under  

Section 155(2) of the Code.

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(5) Where the allegations made in  

the FIR or complaint are so absurd  

and inherently improbable on the  

basis of which no prudent person  

can ever reach a just conclusion  

that there is sufficient ground  

for proceeding against the  

accused.  

(6) Where there is an express legal  

bar engrafted in any of the  

provisions of the Code or the Act  

concerned (under which a criminal  

proceeding is instituted) to the  

institution and continuance of the  

proceedings and/or where there is  

a specific provision in the Code  

or the Act concerned, providing  

efficacious redress for the  

grievance of the aggrieved party.  

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is  

manifestly attended with mala fide  

and/or where the proceeding is  

maliciously instituted with an  

ulterior motive for wreaking  

vengeance on the accused and with  

a view to spite him due to private  

and personal grudge.”  

20. After referring to several other cases, this Court  

concluded and made following observations in Paragraph  

No. 41:-  

“41. Inherent power given to the High Court  

under Section 482 CrPC is with the purpose  

and object of advancement of justice. In case  

solemn process of Court is sought to be  

abused by a person with some oblique motive,  

the Court has to thwart the attempt at the

25    

very threshold. The Court cannot permit a  

prosecution to go on if the case falls in one  

of the categories as illustratively  

enumerated by this Court in State of Haryana  

v. Bhajan Lal. Judicial process is a solemn  

proceeding which cannot be allowed to be  

converted into an instrument of operation or  

harassment. When there are materials to  

indicate that a criminal proceeding is  

manifestly attended with mala fide and  

proceeding is maliciously instituted with an  

ulterior motive, the High Court will not  

hesitate in exercise of its jurisdiction  

under Section 482 CrPC to quash the  

proceeding under Category 7 as enumerated in  

State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, which is to  

the following effect: (SCC p. 379, para 102)  

“102. (7) Where a criminal proceeding  

is manifestly attended with mala fide  

and/or where the proceeding is  

maliciously instituted with an  

ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance  

on the accused and with a view to spite  

him due to private and personal  

grudge.”  

Above Category 7 is clearly attracted in the  

facts of the present case. Although, the High  

Court has noted the judgment of State of  

Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, but did not advert to  

the relevant facts of the present case,  

materials on which final report was submitted  

by the IO. We, thus, are fully satisfied that  

the present is a fit case where the High Court  

ought to have exercised its jurisdiction  

under Section 482 CrPC and quashed the  

criminal proceedings.”  

21. The criminal prosecution can be allowed to proceed  

only when a prima facie offence is disclosed.  This

26    

Court has observed that judicial process is a solemn  

proceeding which cannot be allowed to be converted into  

an instrument of oppression or harassment.  If High  

Court finds that proceedings deserve to be quashed in  

parameters as laid down by this Court in State of  

Haryana Vs. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, High  

court shall not hesitate in exercise of jurisdiction  

under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the proceedings.    

22. Now, we revert back to the allegations made in the  

complaint under Section 498A and Section 3/4 of D.P.  

Act.  Few facts have to be noticed before we look into  

the allegations made in the complaint in the above  

regard.  The complaint has been filed by the respondent  

No.2 before the C.J.M., Gautam Budh Nagar on  

10.05.2015, before which date, the petition for divorce  

has already been filed by Nayan Chopra on 23.10.2014  

before the Circuit Court for the County of Kalamazoo  

Family Division, Michigan.  It is on the record that  

at the time of filing of the complaint Vanishka Bobal  

was living at Canada whereas Nayan Chopra was living  

at U.S.A.  Both were separately living.  It was pleaded

27    

in the application for divorce that husband and wife  

had separated on or around November, 2013.  It is on  

the record that on the day criminal complaint was filed  

on 10.05.2015 in the Court of C.J.M. Gautam Budh Nagar  

by respondent No.2, neither Vanishka was in India nor  

she was in India at the time when statements were  

recorded in complaint of complainant as well as his two  

witnesses.  The complaint is not by Vanishka but it has  

been filed by father of Vanishka, respondent No.2.  In  

the divorce application filed in the State of Michigan,  

Vanishka Bobal was represented by her attorney.  The  

divorce was granted with orders relating to alimony,  

pension benefits and retirement benefits, life  

insurance, property settlement and provision in lieu  

of dower, mutual release of claims and other aspects  

on 24.02.2016.    

23. There is nothing on the record to indicate that  

orders of divorce between the parties was brought into  

the notice of the Magistrate when he issued process  

against the appellants.  We, however, are in agreement  

with the submission of Shri Santosh Krishan that decree

28    

of divorce between Nayan Chopra and Vanshika shall not  

wipe out any criminal offence, which has been committed  

within the meaning of I.P.C. or D.P. Act and the  

criminal offence committed in jurisdictional court has  

to be examined despite the divorce decree having been  

granted.    

24. Coming back to the allegations in the complaint  

pertaining to Section 498A and Section 3/4 of D.P. Act.   

A perusal of the complaint indicates that the  

allegations against the appellants for offence under  

Section 498A and Section 3/4 of D.P. Act are general  

and sweeping.  No specific incident dates or details  

of any incident has been mentioned in the complaint.   

The complaint having been filed after proceeding for  

divorce was initiated by Nayan Chopra in State of  

Michigan, where Vanshika participated and divorce was  

ultimately granted. A  few months after filing of the  

divorce petition, the complaint has been filed in the  

Court of C.J.M., Gautam Budh Nagar with the allegations  

as noticed above.  The sequence of the events and facts  

and circumstances of the case leads us to conclude that  

the complaint under Section 498A and Section 3/4 of

29    

D.P. Act have been filed as counter blast to divorce  

petition proceeding in State of Michigan by Nayan  

Chopra.     

25. There being no specific allegation regarding any  

one of the applicants except common general allegation  

against everyone i.e. “they started harassing the  

daughter of the applicant demanding additional dowry  

of one crore” and the fact that all relatives of the  

husband, namely, father, mother, brother, mother’s  

sister and husband of mother’s sister have been roped  

in clearly indicate that application under Section  

156(3) Cr.P.C. was filed with a view to harass the  

applicants. Further, prior to filing of the application  

under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. there was no complaint at  

any point of time by the girl or her father making  

allegation of demand of any dowry by any one of the  

applicants. When both Nayan Chopra and Vanshika started  

living separately since November, 2013, had there been  

any dowry demand or harassment the girl would have  

given complaint to Police or any other authority.  

Further, in the divorce proceedings at Michigan,

30    

U.S.A., parties have agreed for dividing their  

properties including gifts given at marriage but no  

complaint was made in those proceedings regarding  

harassment by her husband or his family members. The  

judgment of the divorce contains following clauses  

regarding “Property Settlement and Provision in Lieu  

of Dower”:  

“PROPERTY SETTLEMENT AND   

PROVISION IN LIEU OF DOWER  

1. Each party affirms that he or she fully  

and accurately disclosed all the assets owned  

by him or her in which he or she has any  

interest. By affixing their signatures on  

this Judgment, Plaintiff and Defendant affirm  

that each has disclosed all assets each owns  

or has any interest in, whether held by him  

or her individually, by both of them jointly  

or with any other person or entity, or by  

another person or entity for the benefit of  

a party. The property division set forth in  

this Judgment of Divorce is intended to be a  

distribution and allocation of all the  

property of the parties and also is intended  

to declare the parties’ property interests  

as of entry of this Judgment of Divorce. If  

either party has failed, either intentionally  

or unintentionally, to disclose any of his  

or her assets, the issue of property division  

may be reopened on the motion of either party  

to determine and resolve the distribution of  

any previously undisclosed assets.  

2. It appears to the court that the  

parties have divided between them to their  

mutual satisfaction all articles of personal  

property, household furniture and

31    

appliances, cash, savings and checking  

accounts and vehicles except as provided  

below. The personal property as so divided  

shall be the sole and absolute property of  

the party in whose possession or under whose  

control each of the articles of personal  

property are now found and each shall defend  

and hold the other harmless from liability  

thereon.  

a. The parties agree to return all jewelry  to the other party that they currently  

have in their possession, which was  

acquired as a result of their marriage.  

Plaintiff testified that he only had  

one item of jewelry and provided the  

only jewelry he had in his possession  

to Defendant-a single gold ring.  

Plaintiff testified she does not have  

any jewelry in her possession.  

b. The parties agree that their respective  parents will return to the other  

party’s parents, all jewelry given as  

gifts to their parents and are in their  

parent’s possession, which was acquired  

by them as a result of the parties’  

marriage. The parents agree to exchange  

at a mutually agreed upon location and  

at a mutually agreed upon time.  

3.  Except as otherwise provided herein,  

each party shall be liable for the debts  

incurred by him or her after separation  

(11/1/2013) and shall defend and hold the  

other harmless from all liability thereon.  

4. Except as provide herein, each party  

shall be liable for the debts in his or her  

name and for the debts associated with  

property awarded to him/her pursuant to the  

Judgment of Divorce and shall defend and hold

32    

the other harmless from all liability  

therein.  

5. Except as otherwise provided herein,  

each party shall retain all monies in their  

respective names, including but not limited  

to checking accounts, savings accounts,  

certificates of deposit, stocks, bonds, IRAs  

or 401Ks.   

6. There are no joint debts of the parties  

except as provided herein.   

7. Plaintiff, NAYAN CHOPRA, shall receive  

the 2013 Honda CRV free and clear from any  

claim of the Defendant, VANSHIKA BOBAL, and  

the Plaintiff assumes and agrees to pay the  

liability thereon and to defend and hold the  

Defendant harmless thereon. Defendant shall  

transfer title of such vehicles to the  

Plaintiff if transferring is needed.  

8. Plaintiff, NAYAN CHOPRA, shall receive  

the 2005 Toyota Camry free and clear from any  

claim of the Defendant, VANSHIKA BOBAL, and  

the Plaintiff assumes and agrees to pay the  

liability thereon and to defend and hold the  

Defendant harmless thereon.   

9. The provisions for each party herein  

made for the parties shall be in lieu of the  

dower or spousal right in the lands of the  

other and each shall hereafter hold their  

remaining lands free, clear and discharged  

from any such dower, spousal right and claim  

and said provision shall be in full  

satisfaction of all claims either may have  

in any property which the other owns, or may  

hereafter own, in which either has or may  

hereafter have an interest.  

10. The parties warrant that neither has  

incurred any debt in the other party’s name,  

or on which the other party may be liable,

33    

which is not expressly disposed of in this  

Judgment.   

11. This Judgment of Divorce shall  

constitute a termination of all rights of a  

surviving spouse including, but not limited  

to, homestead allowance, election, exempt  

property, settlement and family allowance by  

each party in the property of the other, and  

a termination of all benefits which would  

otherwise pass to one party from the other  

by testate and intestate, succession or by  

virtue of any provision of any will executed  

prior to the entry of this Judgment of  

Divorce.”  

26. The above judgment in divorce proceedings  

indicates that Nayan Chopra and Vanshika have settled  

all issues between them including division of  

properties at the time when divorce proceedings were  

in progress at Michigan and both the parties were not  

in India, the complaint under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C.  

had been filed making allegation under Section 498A of  

IPC and the Dowry Prohibition Act only to harass and  

put pressure on the applicants.  

27. One observation also needs to be made with regard  

to order passed by the High Court.  High Court in its  

impugned judgment has not referred to allegations made  

in the complaint except noticing the summoning order

34    

has been passed and noticing the principles of law.   

This Court had occasion to consider a similar order  

passed by the High Court rejecting the application  

under Section 482 Cr.P.C. in Jagdish Prasad and Others  

Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another, (2019) 2 SCC  

184.  In the said case also under Section 482 Cr.P.C.  

proceedings, the challenge was made to summoning order  

as well as entire proceedings of complaint case where  

allegations under Sections 498A and 323 IPC as well as  

Section 3/4 of D.P. Act were made.  In paragraph No.3,  

the facts giving rise to filing the application under  

Section 482 Cr.P.C. before the High Court has been  

noted.  This Court made following observations in  

paragraph Nos.6 to 9:-  

“6. Having heard the learned counsel for the  

parties and on perusal of the record of the  

case we are inclined to set aside the  

impugned order and remand the case to the  

High Court for deciding the appellants’  

application, out of which this appeal arises,  

afresh on merits in accordance with law.  

7. On perusal of the impugned order, we find  

that the Single Judge has quoted the  

principles of law laid down by this Court in  

several decisions relating to powers of the  

High Court on the issue of interference in  

cases filed under Section 482 of the Code  

from para 2 to the concluding para but has

35    

not referred to the facts of the case to  

appreciate the controversy of the case. We  

are, therefore, unable to know the factual  

matrix of the case after reading the impugned  

judgment except the legal principles laid  

down by this Court in several decisions.  

8. In our view, the Single Judge ought to  

have first set out the brief facts of the  

case with a view to understand the factual  

matrix and then examined the challenge made  

to the proceedings in the light of the  

principles of law laid down by this Court  

with a view to record the findings on the  

grounds urged by the appellants as to whether  

any interference therein is called for or  

not. We find that the aforementioned exercise  

was not done by the High Court while passing  

the impugned order.  

9. We, therefore, find ourselves unable to  

concur with such disposal of the application  

by the High Court and feel inclined to set  

aside the impugned order and remand the case  

to the High Court (Single Judge) with a  

request to decide the application afresh on  

merits in accordance with law keeping in view  

the aforementioned observations. Having  

formed an opinion to remand the case in the  

light of our reasoning mentioned above, we  

do not consider it proper to go into the  

merits of the case.”  

28. What was said by this Court in paragraph No. 7 and  

8 of the above judgment is squarely applicable in the  

facts of the present case and the order of the High  

Court deserves to be set aside on this ground alone.    

36    

29. One of the submissions, which has been made by the  

learned counsel for the appellant also needs to be  

considered.  Learned counsel for the appellant had  

submitted that complaint has not been filed by a  

competent person.  It is submitted that complaint is  

not made by Vanshika, but has been filed only by father  

of Vanshika, hence it is not maintainable. The above  

submission has been refuted by Shri Santosh Krishnan.   

He submits that it is not necessary that a complaint  

under Section 498A should be filed only by the victim  

of offence.  He submits that complaint filed by father  

of the victim, respondent No.2 was also fully  

maintainable.  Section 498A provides as follows:-  

“498A. Husband or relative of husband of a  

woman subjecting her to cruelty.— Whoever,  

being the husband or the relative of the  

husband of a woman, subjects such woman to  

cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment  

for a term which may extend to three years  

and shall also be liable to fine.   

Explanation.—For the purpose of this section,  

“cruelty” means—  

(a)  any wilful conduct which is of such  

a nature as is likely to drive the  

woman to commit suicide or to cause  

grave injury or danger to life,

38    

for the appellant that complaint filed by respondent  

No.2 was not maintainable.    

31. In view of the foregoing discussions, insofar as  

the offence under Section 498A and Section 3/4 of D.P.  

Act is concerned, we are of the view that present is a  

case, which is covered by Category 7 as enumerated by  

State of Haryana Vs. Bhajan Lal (supra) and the High  

Court erred in refusing to exercise under Section 482  

Cr.P.C. We, however, observe that in so far as  

allegations against Rajesh Chopra pertaining to  

Sections 323, 504 and 506 of IPC is concerned, there  

were specific allegations, which were also supported  

by the complainant and his two witnesses in the  

evidence,  at this stage, this Court cannot pronounce  

as to whether any incident as alleged by the  

complainant happened on 08.11.2014 or alleged as  

offence by respondent No.2 or offence as alleged was  

committed by Rajesh Chopra or not.  We, thus, are of  

the view that insofar as complaint pertaining to  

offence under Sections 323, 504 and 506 I.P.C. against  

Rajesh Chopra is concerned, said complaint shall be

39    

proceeded with and the order dated 17.01.2017 is upheld  

to the above extent only, i.e., summoning of Rajesh  

Chopra under Sections 323, 504 and 506.  

32. In result,   

(i) Criminal Appeal Nos.594, 598, 599, 597 and  

596 of 2019 (arising out of SLP (Crl.) Nos.  

8103, 8050, 8052, 8042 and 8041 of 2018) are  

allowed.  The complaint as well as summoning  

order dated 17.01.2017 is set aside insofar  

as the appellants in the above-mentioned  

criminal appeals are concerned.  

(ii) Criminal Appeal No.595 of 2019 (arising out  

of SLP (Crl.) No. 8039 of 2018 – Rajesh  

Chopra Vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr.)  

is partly allowed.  The complaint as well as  

summoning order is set aside insofar as  

offence under Section 498A and Section 3/4  

of D.P. Act is concerned, however, complaint  

shall proceed insofar as offence under

40    

Sections 323, 504 and 506 of I.P.C. and  

summoning order to that extent only is  

upheld.   

......................J.   

                           ( ASHOK BHUSHAN )  

......................J.   

                           ( K.M. JOSEPH )  

New Delhi,   

April 30, 2019.