Ranjit Singh Vs State of M.P & Ors

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Reportabl e

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1545 OF 2013 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 7678 of 2013)

Ranjit Singh … Appellant

Versus

State of M.P. and others …Respondents

J U D G M E N T

Dipak Misra, J.

Leave granted.

2. This appeal, by special leave, is directed against the

order dated 16.8.2013 passed by the High Court of

Madhya Pradesh, Bench at Gwalior, in M.Cr.C. No. 3370

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of 2013 whereby the learned single Judge has cancelled

the order of bail granted by learned first Additional

Sessions Judge, Guna vide order dated 6.2.2013 to the

appellant.

3. The facts giving rise to the present appeal are that on

14.8.2012 an FIR bearing No. 376/2012 was registered

at Police Station, Kotwali, Guna, for offences punishable

under Sections 307, 147, 148, 149, 120B read with

Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Sections

25 and 27 of the Arms Act alleging that the appellant

along with one Abhishek Hada and two unknown

persons had come to the market place where an

altercation ensued between them and the informant

and others. It was alleged in the FIR that two of these

four persons were carrying weapons and they fired at

the informant, respondent No. 3 herein, and one Dilip

Singh. After the injured succumbed to the injuries,

Section 302 IPC was added. The appellant

apprehending arrest filed an application under Section

438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) before the

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first Additional Sessions Judge, Guna, who vide order

dated 14.9.2012 rejected the same. Being

unsuccessful in obtaining an anticipatory bail the

appellant filed M.Cr.C. No. 8023 of 2012 which was

dismissed as withdrawn.

4. As the facts would further uncertain, after a gap of

sometime the appellant preferred the second

application for grant of anticipatory bail and the learned

single Judge in M.Cr.C. No. 701 of 2013, by order dated

1.2.2013, took note of the fact that the petitioner

therein was an accused in crime No. 376/12 registered

for commission of offences punishable under Sections

307, 302/34, 147, 148, 149, 120-B IPC and Sections 25

and 27 of the Arms Act and the submissions canvassed

on behalf of the learned counsel for the accused and

the learned counsel for the prosecution and ultimately

directed as follows: -

“Considering the nature of the allegation and the evidence collected in the case-diary, the petition is disposed of with a short direction that the petitioner shall surrender before the Competent

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Court and shall apply for regular bail and the same shall be considered upon furnishing necessary bail bond.”

5. After the said order came to be passed, the appellant

moved two applications, one under Section 44(2) and

the other under Section 439 CrPC before the learned

Sessions Judge, Guna, who transferred the applications

to the learned Additional Sessions Judge for

consideration. The learned Additional Sessions Judge,

Guna, admitted the appellant to bail on imposition of

certain conditions. We shall refer to the said order in

detail when we deal with the legal propriety of the

same and the cancellation of the same by the High

Court by the impugned order.

6. At this juncture, it is apposite to note that the wife of

the deceased filed S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 2055 of 2013

assailing the order dated 1.2.2013 passed by the

learned single Judge in M.Cr.C. No. 701 of 2013. This

Court allowed the application for permission to file the

special leave and thereafter observed as follows: -

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“Although, we are of the view that this special leave petition has no substance, since the order under challenge merely directed the respondent- accused to surrender and pray for regular bail.”

7. Be it noted, in the said order taking note of the

grievance that the wife and children of the deceased

were threatened by the accused this Court granted

liberty to apply to the Superintendent of Police, Guna,

M.P. and also the Station House Officer of Police Station

Kotwali, Guna and a direction was issued that if such

application would be made, the said authorities shall

look into the matter with all seriousness and take

appropriate steps for the safety of the wife and the

children. This Court also took note of the fact that an

application for modification of the order was pending

before the Division Bench of the High Court and,

accordingly, observed that the Division Bench may

consider disposing of the said application as

expeditiously as possible.

8. The Division Bench, while dealing with the application

for modification, i.e., M.Cr.C. No. 971 of 2013, vide

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order dated 15.3.2013, reproduced the order passed in

M.Cr.C. No. 701 of 2013 and ascribing certain reasons

modified the order and set aside the order dated

6.2.2013 granting regular bail by the learned Additional

Sessions Judge to the accused.

9. Grieved by the aforesaid order, the appellant preferred

Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 2826 of 2013. This

Court on 4.4.2013, while dealing with the legal

substantiality of the said order, opined thus: -

“Having heard learned counsel for the parties, we are of the view that no useful SLP (Crl.) 2826/13 purpose will be served in keeping this matter pending here in view of the fact that the Code of Criminal Procedure does not provide for any review against an order passed in criminal proceedings.

The proceedings before the Division Bench was entirely misconceived. In the event the order of the learned Single Judge of the High Court was misconstrued by the learned trial court while granting bail to the petitioner, the remedy of the complainant would be to challenge the same before the High Court.

Accordingly, the Special Leave Petition is allowed, the order of the Division Bench of the High Court impugned in the Special Leave Petition is set aside. The complainant will be at liberty to

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proceed against the order of the trial court, granting bail, if so advised.”

10. It may be noted here that a grievance was made with

regard to grant of police protection and this Court

taking note of its earlier order dated 6.3.2013 made

certain observations.

11. At this stage, we may sit in a time machine and take

note of certain proceedings and the orders passed

therein as they have been emphatically stressed upon

by Mr. Anupam Lal Das, learned counsel for the

appellant. An application for cancellation of bail was

filed before the learned 1st Additional Sessions Judge,

Guna by Dinesh Raghuvanshi, the informant, who, on

2.4.2013, withdrew the application as by that time the

Division Bench had already set aside the order granting

bail. It is also necessary to state that the Additional

Public Prosecutor, Guna, had also filed application for

cancellation of bail on 11.2.2013. An assertion has

been made by learned counsel for the appellant that

the same has been withdrawn when the High Court was

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moved for cancellation of the order granting bail. We

have referred to these events, as the learned counsel

has endeavoured hard to impress upon us that there

has been suppression of facts by the informant as well

as the State, but we have no scintilla of doubt that the

non-reference to the said facts or non-mentioning of the

same has, in fact, no impact on the merits of the

impugned order passed by the High Court.

12. Coming back to the chronology of narration, after

disposal of the Special Leave Petition (Crl.) 2826 of

2013, the informant and the wife of the deceased filed

an application under Section 439(2) CrPC for

cancellation of bail order dated 6.2.2013 passed by the

learned 1st Additional Sessions Judge, Guna in Bail

Application No. 13 of 2013. The learned single Judge,

by the impugned order, narrated the factual matrix,

referred to the order passed by the High Court under

Section 438 CrPC, took note of the submissions

advanced at the Bar and after referring to certain

authorities which deal with cancellation of bail, the

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allegations made in the FIR, the proceedings before the

High Court and this Court, import of the order passed in

M.Cr.C. No. 701 of 2013 and thereafter stated thus: -

“In the instant case, as pointed hereinabove, the learned First ASJ has not taken pain to consider the aforesaid aspects. When this Court has expressly given the direction that respondent No. 1 shall surrender before the Competent Court and shall apply for regular bail and the same shall be considered, it was the bounden duty of the learned First ASJ to consider whether respondent No. 1 is entitled for the benefit of bail or not. It is unfortunate that despite the objection raised on behalf of the petitioners that this Court has not granted the bail, the learned First ASJ, Guna, did not think it fit to seek the clarification from this Court. Instead of doing so, the learned First ASJ has granted the benefit of bail to respondent No. 1.”

13. Thereafter, the learned single Judge referred to the

criminal antecedents of the accused and, ultimately,

passed the following order: -

“In view of the aforesaid analysis, considering that learned First ASJ, Guna, while granting bail, misread the order of this Court passed in M.Cr.C. No. 701/13 on 1.2.13, has ignored relevant material and has not considered the well recognized principles underlying the power to grant bail and further that there is prima facie material that after releasing on bail, respondent No. 1 gave threatening to the widow of the

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deceased and her children and obstructed the course of justice, the petition deserves to be allowed. Hence, it is allowed and the bail granted by learned First ASJ, Guna, vide order dated 6/2/2013 to respondent No. 1 is hereby cancelled. Bail Bonds of respondent No. 1 are cancelled. It is directed that respondent No. 1 shall surrender before the learned First ASJ, Guna, and he shall be taken into custody forthwith.”

14. We have heard Mr. Anupam Lal Das, learned counsel

appearing for the appellant, Mr. Surendra Singh,

learned senior counsel appearing for respondent Nos. 2

and 3, and the learned counsel for the State.

15. First, we shall deal with the order passed by the High

Court in M.Cr.C. No. 701 of 2013. We have already

reproduced the same. The said order was the subject-

matter of challenge in Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.

2055 of 2013 and this Court has observed that the

order under challenge was a mere direction to the

accused to surrender and pray for bail. Thus, this is the

interpretation placed by this Court on that order. It is

apt to mention here that prior to passing of the said

order the learned Additional Sessions Judge had allowed

the application for grant of regular bail. The Division

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Bench entertaining an application under Section 482

CrPC had modified the order dated 1.2.2013 passed in

M.Cr.C. No. 701 of 2013 and on that basis had cancelled

the order granting bail in favour of the accused. The

said order was assailed before this Court in Special

Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 2826 of 2013 and it was set

aside holding that the order was wholly misconceived

as the Division Bench could not have reviewed the

earlier order under Section 482 CrPC. However, as

stated hereinbefore, this Court clearly stated that in the

event the order of the learned single Judge of the High

Court is misconstrued by the learned trial Court while

granting bail to the accused, remedy of the

complainant would be to challenge the same before the

High Court. There cannot be any trace of doubt that

the challenge to the grant of bail order by the learned

Additional Sessions Judge was kept alive by this Court

and, accordingly, application was filed before the High

Court which has been dealt with by the learned single

Judge by the impugned order.

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16. The thrust of the matter is whether the learned trial

Judge has actually misconstrued the order and granted

bail or has really considered the necessary facets as

required to be considered while entertaining an

application under Section 439 CrPC. We have bestowed

our anxious consideration and carefully scrutinized the

order dated 6.2.2013 passed by the learned Additional

Sessions Judge, Guna. It is manifest that the learned

trial Judge accepted the application for surrender and

thereafter referring to the order passed in M.Cr.C. No.

701 of 2013 has opined thus: -

“In the aforementioned case the Hon’ble High Court vide its order dated 01.02.2013 passed the orders with the directions that the applicant will surrender himself before the Competent Court and he will submit his application for regular bail, and the said concerned court will accept the said application after furnishing of bail bonds. Therefore, the Hon’ble High Court has issued the orders to the competent court in favour of the applicant. In compliance of order dated 01.02.2013 passed by the Hon’ble High Curt in MCRC Case No. 701/13 u/s 438 Cr.P.C. surrendered before the Ld. Court, and because for trial of case u/s 302 IPC the Ld. Court is the Competent Court, hence the application of surrender of applicant may be accepted and the

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bail application u/s 439 Cr.P.C. submitted by the applicant may please be decided.”

17. It is apt to note here that number of times the learned

Additional Sessions Judge has referred to the order

passed by the High Court and at one stage he has

stated as follows: -

“… the applicant had submitted a bail application being No. 154/2012 u/s 438 Cr.P.C. before the Ld. Session Judge. The said application was rejected on 14.09.2012 by the Ld. First Additional Session Judge Shri R.P. Mankalia and being aggrieved with the said order, the applicant filed a petition being application No. M.C.R.C. No. 701/13 u/s 438 Cr.P.C. before the Hon’ble High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Gwalior Bench. In this matter, the Hon’ble High Court passed its judgment and order dated 01.02.2013 with the directions that the applicant will surrender himself before the competent court and the applicant will submit his application for regular bail and the concerned court will accept the application and bail bonds of the applicant. Therefore the Hon’ble High Court has issued the directions for the Competent Court in favour of the applicant.”

18. After so stating the learned trial Judge has referred to

the submissions, application for remand for further

investigation and, eventually, passed the following

order: -

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“It has been revealed after perusal of case and case diary of the case that the bail application of the co-accused persons has already been admitted by the Hon’ble High Court. Offence of the applicant/ accused person is not different from the offence of other co-accused persons. Applicant himself has presented himself before the Ld. Session Judge, Guna and he also presented himself before this Court. After hearing all the parties by the Hon’ble High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Gwalior Bench titled Ranjit Singh Versus State of Madhya Pradesh in M.C.R.C. No. 701/13, the Hon’ble High Court has passed the orders for furnishing necessary bail bonds, hence, the application filed by the applicant u/s 439 Cr.P.C. is justified and found proper, therefore, the application of the applicant is accepted and he may be enlarged on bail on furnishing two bail bonds of sureties of Rs.75,000-75,000 each and personal bail bond of Rs.1,50,000/- to the satisfaction of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Guna.”

19. We have reproduced the said order in extenso to

appreciate whether as a matter of fact the learned

Additional Sessions Judge has misconstrued the import

of the order or decided the application under Section

439 CrPC regard being had to the considerations that

are to be kept in mind while dealing with such an

application. As is evincible, there has been no

deliberation with regard to the requirements under

Section 439 CrPC. The order read in entirety clearly

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reflects that the learned Additional Sessions Judge had

an erroneous perception and fallacious understanding

of the order passed by the High Court and it is clear as

day that the regular bail was granted on the bedrock of

the order passed by the High Court. He had absolutely

misconstrued the order. Thus, the order passed by the

learned Additional Sessions Judge is totally unjustified

and illegal.

20. It needs no special emphasis to state that there is

distinction between the parameters for grant of bail and

cancellation of bail. There is also a distinction between

the concept of setting aside an unjustified, illegal or

perverse order and cancellation of an order of bail on

the ground that the accused has misconducted himself

or certain supervening circumstances warrant such

cancellation. If the order granting bail is a perverse one

or passed on irrelevant materials, it can be annulled by

the superior court. We have already referred to various

paragraphs of the order passed by the High Court. We

have already held that the learned trial Judge has

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misconstrued the order passed by the High Court.

However, we may hasten to add that the learned single

Judge has taken note of certain supervening

circumstances to cancel the bail, but we are of the

opinion that in the obtaining factual matrix the said

exercise was not necessary as the grant of bail was

absolutely illegal and unjustified as the court below had

enlarged the accused on bail on the strength of the

order passed in M.Cr.C. No. 701 of 2013 remaining

oblivious of the parameters for grant of bail under

Section 439 Cr.P.C. It is well settled in law that grant of

bail though involves exercise of discretionary power of

the court, yet the said exercise has to be made in a

judicious manner and not as a matter of course.

21. In Chaman Lal v. State of U.P.1, this Court, while

dealing with an application for bail, has stated that

certain factors are to be borne in mind and they are: -

“…. (i) the nature of accusation and the severity of punishment in case of conviction and the nature of supporting evidence, (ii) reasonable apprehension

1 (2004) 7 SCC 525

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of tampering with the witness or apprehension of threat to the complainant, and (iii) prima facie satisfaction of the court in support of the charge.”

22. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee2,

this Court, while emphasizing on the exercise of

discretionary power generally has to be done in strict

compliance with the basic principles laid down in

plethora of decisions of this Court, has observed as

follows: -

“9… among other circumstances, the factors which are to be borne in mind while considering an application for bail are:

(i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to be believed that the accused had committed the offence;

(ii) nature and gravity of the accusation;

(iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction;

(iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if released on bail;

(v) character, behavior, means, position and standing of the accused;

(vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated;

(vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being influenced; and

2 (2010) 14 SCC 496

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(viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of bail.”

23. The said principles have been reiterated in Ash

Mohammad v. Shiv Raj Singh alias Lalla Babu and

another3.

24. In this context, we may refer with profit to the recent

pronouncement in Central Bureau of Investigation

v. V. Vijay Sai Reddy4 wherein the learned Judges

have expressed thus: -

“28. While granting bail, the court has to keep in mind the nature of accusation, the nature of evidence in support thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction will entail, the character of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the public/ State and other similar considerations. It has also to be kept in mind that for the purpose of granting bail, the Legislature has used the words “reasonable grounds for believing” instead of “the evidence” which means the Court dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy it as to whether there is a genuine case against the accused and that the prosecution will be able to produce prima facie evidence in support of the charge. It is not expected, at this stage, to have the evidence

3 (2012) 9 SCC 446 4 2013 (7) SCALE 15

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establishing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.”

25. We repeat at the cost of repetition that the aforesaid

aspects have not been kept in view by the learned

Additional Sessions Judge and, therefore, we are

obliged in law to set aside the order passed by him and

we so do. In view of the extinction of the order granting

bail, the appellant shall surrender forthwith to custody

failing which he shall be taken to custody as per law.

Liberty is granted to the appellant to move an

application for grant of regular bail. Needless to say, on

such application being moved, the same shall be

considered on its own merits regard being had to the

parameters which have been laid down in aforestated

authorities.

26. We may hasten to add that because of our above

direction the judgment of the High Court is required to

be modified as the learned single Judge has cancelled

the bail by taking certain other aspects into

consideration. We may clearly state that it would have

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been appropriate on the part of the High Court to set

aside the order of granting bail by the learned

Additional Sessions Judge and permit the accused to

surrender to custody and move an application for

regular bail. Accordingly, the order passed by the High

Court is modified to that extent. It needs to be stated

that when an application for regular bail is moved, the

learned trial Judge shall be free to deal with the matter

as per law without being influenced by the factum that

there had been an order of cancellation of bail. We

have said so as we have set aside the order admitting

the appellant to bail as it is illegal and unjustified being

solely based on the observation made by the High

Court in its order passed in M.Cr.C. No. 701 of 2013.

We may further add that proper opportunity shall be

afforded to the Public Prosecutor to put forth his stand

and stance at the time of consideration of the

application preferred by the accused for grant of bail.

27. After saying so we would have proceeded to record our

formal conclusion. But, something more is required to

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be stated. We are absolutely conscious that this Court

on earlier occasion in Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.

2055 of 2013 had clearly stated that the order under

challenge merely directed the respondent-accused to

surrender and pray for regular bail. The said

clarification was made by this Court. Prior to that, the

learned trial Judge misconstruing the order had

enlarged the accused on bail.

28. This Court in Rashmi Rekha Thatoi and another v.

State of Orissa and others5 has dealt with an order

of the High Court whereby the learned single Judge,

while not granting anticipatory bail to some accused

persons, had directed that in case the accused persons

surrender and move an application for regular bail, they

shall be released on bail on such terms and conditions

as may be deemed fit and proper. After referring to the

language employed in Section 438 CrPC, the

Constitution Bench decision in Gurbaksh Singh,

Sibbia v. State of Punjab6, and the law laid down in 5 (2012) 5 SCC 690 6 (1980) 2 SCC 565

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Savitri Agarwal v. State of Maharashtra7, Adri

Dharan Das v. State of West Bengalr8, State of

Maharashtra v. Mohd. Rashid9 and Union of India

v. Padam Narain Aggarwal10, this Court has ruled

thus: -

“33. We have referred to the aforesaid pronouncements to highlight how the Constitution Bench in Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia had analysed and explained the intrinsic underlying concepts under Section 438 of the Code, the nature of orders to be passed while conferring the said privilege, the conditions that are imposable and the discretions to be used by the courts. On a reading of the said authoritative pronouncement and the principles that have been culled out in Savitry Agarwal there is remotely no indication that the Court of Session or the High Court can pass an order that on surrendering of the accused before the Magistrate he shall be released on bail on such terms and conditions as the learned Magistrate may deem fit and proper or the superior court would impose conditions for grant of bail on such surrender. When the High Court in categorical terms has expressed the view that it is not inclined to grant anticipatory bail to the petitioner-accused it could not have issued such a direction which would tantamount to conferment of benefit by which the accused would be in a position to avoid arrest. It is in clear violation of the language employed in the statutory provision and in flagrant violation of

7 (2009) 8 SCC 325 8 (2005) 4 SCC 303 9 (2005) 7 SCC 56 10 (2008) 13 SCC 305

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the dictum laid down in Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia and the principles culled out in Savitri Agarwal.”

In the said case it has also been observed thus: -

“… it is to be borne in mind that a court of law has to act within the statutory command and not deviate from it. It is a well-settled proposition of law what cannot be done directly, cannot be done indirectly. While exercising a statutory power a court is bound to act within the four corners thereof. The statutory exercise of power stands on a different footing than exercise of power of judicial review. This has been so stated in Bay Berry Apartments (P) Ltd. v. Shobha11 and U.P. State Brassware Corpn. Ltd. v. Uday Narain Pandey12.”

29. In the case at hand, though such an order was not

passed by the learned single Judge, yet the order

passed by him was potent enough to create enormous

confusion. And it has so happened. It is the duty of the

superior courts to follow the command of the statutory

provisions and be guided by the precedents and issue

directions which are permissible in law. We are of the

convinced opinion that the observations made by the

learned single Judge while dealing with second

application under Section 438 CrPC was not at all 11 (2006) 13 SCC 737 12 (2006) 1 SCC 479

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warranted under any circumstance as it was neither in

consonance with the language employed in Section 438

CrPC nor in accord with the established principles of law

relating to grant of anticipatory bail. We may reiterate

that the said order has been interpreted by this Court

as an order only issuing a direction to the accused to

surrender, but as we find, it has really created colossal

dilemma in the mind of the learned Additional Sessions

Judge. We are pained to say that passing of these kind

of orders has become quite frequent and the sagacious

saying, “A stitch in time saves nine” may be an

apposite reminder now. We painfully part with the case

by saying so.

30. The appeal is disposed of in terms of the modification in

the order passed by the learned single Judge in M.Cr.C.

No. 701 of 2013 and the observations made

hereinabove.

……………………….J. [Anil R. Dave]

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……………………….J. [Dipak Misra]

New Delhi; September 27, 2013.