IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NOS.9748-9749 OF 2011 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 19714-15 of 2009)  

Ranjit Kaur                ..…Appellant

versus

Major Harmohinder Singh and others                ……Respondents

J U D G M E N T

1. Leave granted.

2. The appellant is aggrieved by the order of the learned Single  

Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court whereby he allowed  

the revision filed by respondent No. 1 and vacated the order  

of injunction passed by the trial Court, which had been partly  

confirmed by the lower appellate Court insofar as it related  

to her forcible eviction from suit property, i.e. Kothi No.  

84, Phase-IX, SAS Nagar (Mohali).

3. The  appellant  and  respondent  No.  1  were  married  in  1978.  

After 15 years of the marriage, respondent No. 1 filed a suit  

for permanent injunction for restraining the appellant from  

interfering with the suit property.   On being noticed, the  

appellant filed counter claim and pleaded that in terms of  

Section 18 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956,  

she is entitled to reside in the suit property.  The trial  

Court dismissed the suit of respondent No. 1 and decreed the

counter  claim  filed  by  the  appellant.   The  first  and  the  

second appeals filed by respondent No. 1 were dismissed by the  

lower  appellate  Court  and  the  High  Court.   Special  Leave  

Petition  (Civil)  No.  4193/2000  filed  by  him  was  summarily  

dismissed by this Court vide order dated 16.3.2000.   

4. In the meanwhile, respondent No. 1 filed a petition under  

Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 for dissolution of  

marriage on the ground of cruelty. The same was decreed by  

Additional  District  Judge,  Ropar  vide  judgment  dated  

4.10.2001. The appeal preferred by the appellant was dismissed  

by the High Court and the decree of divorce was confirmed.

5. After dissolution of the marriage, the appellant filed suit  

for permanent injunction and prayed that respondent No. 1 be  

restrained from alienating the suit property and interfering  

with her peaceful possession over the suit property.  She also  

prayed  for  restraining  Punjab  Urban  Development  Authority  

(PUDA) (Respondent No. 5 herein) from issuing ‘No Objection  

Certificate’ to respondent No. 1 to enable him to alienate or  

transfer the suit property.   

6. Along with the suit, the appellant filed an application under  

Order  XXXIX  Rules  1  and  2  CPC  for  grant  of  temporary  

injunction  against  alienation  of  the  property  and  her  

dispossession.  By an order dated 23.2.2005, the trial Court  

allowed the application and directed respondent No.1 not to  

dispossess the appellant.  The trial Court also restrained

PUDA  from  issuing  ‘No  Objection  Certificate’  in  favour  of  

respondent No. 1.  

7. On an appeal filed by respondent No. 1, the aforesaid order of  

injunction was partly set aside by the lower appellate Court and  

the restraint imposed by the trial Court against alienation of the  

suit property was withdrawn.  However, a direction was given that  

in the event of alienation of the suit property, respondent No.1  

shall incorporate the factum of pendency of suit in the transfer  

deed/sale  deed  and  also  make  alternative  arrangement  for  the  

appellant.  

8. Both,  the  appellant  and  respondent  No.  1  challenged  the  

appellate order by filing separate revisions.  The learned Single  

Judge adverted to the history of litigation between the parties and  

held  that  in  the  absence  of  any  stipulation  in  the  decree  of  

divorce, the appellant was not entitled to an order of injunction  

against  alienation  of  the  suit  property  or  a  restraint  order  

against her dispossession.  In the opinion of the learned Single  

Judge, once the decree of divorce was passed, matrimonial relation  

between the parties ceased and, therefore, the appellant cannot  

continue to occupy the house owned by respondent No. 1 as of right.  

The  learned  Single  Judge  also  opined  that  there  was  no  

justification to impose any restriction against alienation of the  

suit property by respondent No. 1.

9. We have heard Shri S. K. Dholakia, learned senior counsel  

appearing for the appellant and Shri Rohit Sharma, learned counsel

appearing for respondent No. 1 and perused the record.  

10.  It is not in dispute that the decree of divorce passed by  

Additional District Judge, Ropar has become final.  It is also not  

in dispute that the petition filed by the appellant under Section  

125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for grant of maintenance was  

dismissed by the concerned Court and in the decree of divorce, no  

provision was made for maintenance of the appellant including the  

right of residence in the suit property.  Therefore, it is not  

possible to find any fault with the order passed by the lower  

appellate  Court,  whereby  injunction  granted  by  the  trial  Court  

against alienation of the suit property was vacated and there is no  

warrant for this Court’s interference with the impugned order in so  

far as it confirms this part of the order passed by the lower  

appellate Court.   

11. However, we find merit in the arguments of learned senior  

counsel for the appellant that the High Court was not justified in  

vacating the restraint order passed by the trial Court against the  

dispossession  of  his  client.   Learned  counsel  is  right  in  his  

submission that even though in the decree of divorce, the appellant  

has not been given a right of residence and her occupation of the  

suit property can be treated as unauthorized, respondent No. 1  

cannot evict her except after following the procedure established  

by law.   The material placed on record shows that the appellant  

had entered into the property as the wife of respondent No. 1.  

Therefore, even though, after passing of the decree of the divorce  

she may not have a legal right to continue to remain in possession

of the suit property, respondent No. 1 cannot be given liberty to  

forcibly evict her.

12.In the result, the appeals are partly allowed, the impugned  

order is set aside insofar as it enables respondent No. 1 to  

forcibly evict the appellant from the suit property.   This  

would necessarily mean that respondent No. 1 shall be free to  

evict the appellant from the suit property in accordance with  

law. The appellant’s prayer for restraining respondent No.1  

from alienating the suit property is,  however, rejected and,  

to that extent, the appeals are dismissed. The  parties  are  

left to bear their own costs.

           ……………………………………………….J. (G.S. SINGHVI)

……………………………………………….J.       (SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA)

New Delhi, November 02, 2011.