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NON-REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 56 OF 2006

Ramesh Vithal Patil …Appellant

Versus

State of Karnataka and Ors. …Respondents

J  U  D  G  M  E  N  T

(SMT.) RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.

1. The appellant-accused no.1 was tried along with  five  

others (original accused nos. 2 to 6 respectively) by the III  

Additional Sessions Judge, Belgaum for offences punishable  

under Sections 498-A, 304-B read with Section 34 of the IPC.

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2.  Accused no.1 is  the husband of deceased Hira alias  

Vaishali (‘the deceased’, for convenience).  Accused no. 2  

is the father of the appellant, accused nos. 3 & 4 are the  

brothers  of  the  appellant,  accused  no.  5  is  the  wife  of  

accused no. 2 and accused no. 6 is the wife of accused no. 3.

3.  The  appellant  was  married  to  the  deceased  on  

27/06/1985.  According to the prosecution, the appellant and  

other  accused  subjected  the  deceased  to  cruelty  in  their  

house  at  Kasaba  Nandgad,  Taluka  Khanapur,  District  

Belgaum.  They asked her  to  bring five tolas of  gold and  

Rs.10,000/- from her parents.  On account of this unbearable  

cruelty, on 10/12/1987 the deceased committed suicide by  

jumping in the Malaprabha River near Khanapur along with  

her ten month old daughter Jyoti.

4. In  support  of  its  case  the  prosecution  examined  11  

witnesses.   The  important  witnesses  who  unfolded  the  

prosecution  story  are  PW1-Bhavakanna  and  PW2-Balram,  

elder brothers of the deceased and PW5-Babita, wife of PW2.  

PW4-Dr. Ishwarappa, the Medical Officer attached to District  

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Civil  Hospital  at  Belgaum,  conducted  post-mortem  

examination of the deceased.  He opined that death of the  

deceased was due to asphyxia on account of drowning.  The  

accused pleaded not guilty to the charge.

5.  The  trial  court  came  to  a  conclusion  that  the  

prosecution had failed to prove its case beyond reasonable  

doubt and acquitted the accused.  The trial court observed  

that while in court PW1 and PW2 stated that all the accused  

were harassing the deceased and asking her to bring 5 tolas  

of gold and cash of Rs. 10,000/- from her parents; that the  

deceased was made to work in the house for the whole day;  

that the deceased was not given food to eat and that on her  

last visit to her maternal house the deceased had told her  

brothers that if  the demand of her in-laws is not met she  

would be murdered, the FIR lodged by PW1 does not contain  

these allegations.   In  the  FIR  there are  vague allegations  

about the demand.  PW5, the wife of PW2 has not referred to  

the  specific  amount  and  quantum  of  gold  allegedly  

demanded by the in-laws of the deceased. She has not even  

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referred to the last visit of the deceased.  The trial court was  

also of the view that since the accused belonged to a rich  

family it is inconceivable that they would make a demand for  

money and gold.  The trial court was further of the view that  

since the evidence on record established that the deceased  

was  allowed  to  visit  her  maternal  home  and  that  the  

appellant  and  his  father  visited  her  maternal  home,  the  

allegation that the deceased was ill-treated in the house is  

not  true.   The  trial  court  in  the  circumstances  held  that  

demand was not proved and that it cannot be said that the  

deceased committed suicide because she was ill-treated by  

the accused.  

6. Being aggrieved by the judgment of acquittal, the State  

of Karnataka preferred an appeal before the Karnataka High  

Court.   The  High  Court  held  that  PW2  had  stated  in  his  

evidence that the appellant and the deceased were staying  

in another house belonging to the accused.  The evidence  

also shows that effort was made by PWs.1 and 2 to open that  

house to find out whether the deceased was in that house.  

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The High Court observed that therefore the possibility of the  

deceased staying with the appellant in that house at least  

for  major  part  of  the day cannot be ruled out  and hence  

though the other accused can be given benefit of doubt, the  

appellant  cannot  escape  the  liability.   The  High  Court  

observed that it is more so because the appellant kept mum  

after  the  disappearance of  the  deceased for  a  long time.  

The High Court relied upon evidence of PWs.1, 2 & 5 and by  

the  impugned  judgment  partly  allowed  the  appeal.   The  

acquittal of the appellant of the offence under Section 304-B  

of  the  IPC  was  set  aside.   Instead  he  was  convicted  for  

offence  punishable  under  Section  306  of  the  IPC  and  

sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years.  

The acquittal of the other accused was confirmed.  The High  

Court held that they must be given benefit of doubt.  Being  

aggrieved by his conviction, the appellant has approached  

this Court.

7. We  have  heard  at  some  length  Mr.  P.  Vishwanath  

Shetty,  learned  counsel  appearing  for  the  appellant.   He  

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submitted  that  the  High  Court  erred  in  disturbing  the  

acquittal of the appellant. He submitted that the trial court’s  

view was a reasonably possible view.  It was not a perverse  

view warranting interference from the High Court. In support  

of this submission counsel relied on Shyamal Saha & Anr.  

v.   State of West Bengal  1  .  Counsel submitted that all the  

witnesses  examined  by  the  prosecution  are  interested  

witnesses and, therefore, the High Court ought not to have  

placed reliance on them.   Their evidence is not corroborated  

by the other evidence on record.   Counsel  submitted that  

there  is  nothing  on  record  to  suggest  that  the  appellant  

demanded dowry, in fact, the High Court has acquitted the  

appellant  of the offence punishable under Section 304-B of  

the IPC.  There is no cogent evidence to establish that the  

deceased was subjected to cruelty by the appellant which  

led  her  to  commit  suicide.   Counsel  pointed  out  that  the  

evidence of PW1, brother of the deceased, shows that the  

deceased  was  regularly  visiting  her  parents’  house.  

Therefore,  cruelty  or  ill-treatment  is  not  established.  

1 2014 (2) SCALE 690

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Counsel  submitted  that  there  is  a  vague  allegation  of  

demand  for  money  and  gold  ornaments  in  the  FIR.   The  

demand is not specified in the complaint. Whereas PW1 and  

PW2  the  brothers  of  the  deceased  have  tried  to  give  

particulars of the demand PW5, the wife of PW2, has omitted  

to  do  so.  The  prosecution  witnesses  have  improved  their  

version in court. There is no evidence to establish that the  

appellant  abetted  the  suicide  of  the  deceased.   In  the  

circumstances, the impugned order deserves to be set aside.  

8. Mr.  K.  Parameshwar, learned counsel for the State of  

Karnataka,  on  the  other  hand,  submitted  that  the  

prosecution has proved it’s case beyond reasonable doubt.  

The brothers and sister-in-law of the deceased have clearly  

stated  that  she  was  subjected  to  cruelty.   Moreover,  the  

deceased was staying in the matrimonial house.  She was in  

the custody of the appellant.  The bodies of the deceased  

and her daughter Jyoti were found in Malaprabha river near  

Khanapur.  It was incumbent upon the appellant to explain  

how the deceased and her daughter Jyoti died in suspicious  

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circumstances.  Counsel submitted that Section 106 of the  

Indian  Evidence  Act,  1872  (‘Evidence  Act’,  for  short)  is  

clearly attracted to this case.  In support of his submissions  

counsel  relied on  K. Prema S. Rao & Anr.  v.   Yadla   

Srinivasa   Rao & Ors  .2,    Thanu Ram v. State of Madhya  

Pradesh  3  ,  Narwinder  Singh   v.   State  of  Punjab  4  ,  

Rakhal Devnath  v. State of West of Bengal  5  ,  Gurnaib  

Singh    v.   State  of  Punjab  6   and  Babu  @  

Balasubramaniam & Anr.  v.  State of Tamil Nadu  7  .

9. Since we are dealing with a case involving reversal of  

acquittal order by the High Court, it is necessary to see the  

principles  laid  down  by  this  Court  in  that  behalf.   After  

adverting to several judgments of this court in Ganpat   v.  

State  of  Haryana  &  Ors.  8  ,  this  Court  reformulated  the  

principles as under:  

“(i) There is no limitation on the part of the  appellate court to review the evidence upon  

2 (2003) 1 SCC 217 3 (2010) 10 SCC 353 4 (2011) 2 SCC 47 5 (2012) 11 SCC 347 6 (2013) 7 SCC 108 7 (2013) 8 SCC 60 8 (2010) 12 SCC 59

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which the order of acquittal is founded and to  come to its own conclusion.

(ii)  The appellate court can also review the  trial  court’s conclusion with respect to both  facts and law.

(iii)  While dealing with the appeal preferred  by the State, it is the duty of the appellate  court  to  marshal  the  entire  evidence  on  record  and  by  giving  cogent  and  adequate  reasons  may  set  aside  the  judgment  of  acquittal.

(iv) An order of acquittal is to be interfered  with  only  when  there  are  “compelling  and  substantial reasons” for doing so. If the order  is  “clearly unreasonable”,  it  is a compelling  reason for interference.

(v)  When  the  trial  court  has  ignored  the  evidence or misread the material evidence or  has  ignored  material  documents  like  dying  declaration/report of ballistic experts, etc. the  appellate court is competent to reverse the  decision of the trial court depending on the  materials placed. (Vide Madan Lal v. State of  J&K(1997)  7  SCC 677,  Ghurey Lal  v.  State of  U.P. (2008) 10 SCC 450, Chandra Mohan Tiwari  v. State of M.P. (1992) 2 SCC 105 and Jaswant  Singh v. State of Haryana(2000) 4 SCC 484.”

10. In  Shyamal Saha this Court referred to  Ganpat and  

observed  that  it  is  the  obligation  of  the  High  Court  to  

consider  and identify  the error in  the decision of  the trial  

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court and then decide whether the error is gross enough to  

warrant interference.  The High Court is not expected merely  

to substitute its opinion for that of the trial court because it  

has power to do so – it has to correct an error of law or fact  

significant enough to necessitate overturning the verdict of  

the trial  court.   This Court further observed that the High  

Court  has  to  exercise  its  discretion  keeping  in  mind  the  

acquittal of the accused and the rights of the victim (who  

may or may not be before it).  We shall proceed to deal with  

this case keeping these principles in mind.  

11. There is no dispute about the fact that the bodies of the  

deceased  and  her  daughter  Jyoti  were  recovered  from  

Malaprabha  river  near  Khanapur  on  11/12/1987.   In  the  

complaint  dated  11/12/1987  PW1 Bhavakanna stated  that  

the deceased was treated well in her matrimonial house for  

4  to  5  months  after  her  marriage,  thereafter,  she  was  

subjected to harassment.   She was asked to bring money  

and gold from her parents for the business of her husband.  

It  is  further  stated  that  during  her  visits  to  her  parents’  

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house the deceased used to complain about the harassment  

meted out to her.  They used to console her and send her  

back.  It is further stated that about 15 days back when the  

deceased had visited their house she complained about the  

demand for money and gold and the harassment meted out  

to  her.  The  complaint  further  goes  on  to  say  that  on  

10/12/1987 the appellant came to the village and told them  

that  the  deceased  had  left  their  house  along  with  her  

daughter Jyoti.  The appellant enquired whether she was in  

their  house.   All  of  them rushed to the appellant’s  house  

where  they  were  ill-treated  and  abused.   They  started  

searching for the deceased.  They found the dead bodies of  

the  deceased  and  her  daughter  Jyoti  lying  in  Malaprabha  

river.   The complaint ends with the apprehension expressed  

by PW1 that there was some foul-play.  

12. In his evidence PW1-Bhavakanna reiterated the same  

story.  He stated that during marriage they had given 2½  

tolas gold Mangalsutra and 2½ tolas gold Laxmihar to the  

deceased.   About  4  to  5  months  after  her  marriage,  the  

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appellant and the members of his family started harassing  

her.   They  asked  her  to  get  5  tolas  of  gold  and  cash  of  

Rs.10,000/- from her parents house.  They were making the  

deceased work for the whole day.  They were not giving her  

food.    She  used  to  convey  her  woes  to  her  brothers  

whenever she visited their house.   Even after birth of the  

child, the appellant continued to ill-treat her.   Fifteen days  

prior  to  her  death,  the  deceased  had  visited  her  parents  

house  and  told  them that  if  5  tolas  of  gold  and  cash  of  

Rs.10,000/-  were  not  given  to  her  in-laws  she  would  be  

murdered.  She refused to go to her matrimonial house, but,  

they told her that after the draught is over they may think of  

meeting the demands of the appellant.  After consoling her  

they took her to her matrimonial house and left her there.  

On 10/12/1987 the appellant came to their house and asked  

them whether the deceased had come there.  The appellant  

told  them that  she  had  left  the  house  with  the  child  on  

9/12/1987.   Thereafter,  he  along  with  his  brother  PW2-

Balram went to Nandgad.  They searched for the deceased  

but could not find her.  On 11/12/1987 they again went in  

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search of the deceased and her daughter Jyoti.  They found  

their bodies lying in Malaprabha river.   PW1 then, went to  

Khanapur police station and lodged the FIR,  Ex.P-1.  

13. In  the cross-examination PW1 has stuck to the same  

story.  This witness comes across as a truthful witness.  He  

admitted  that  the  appellant  is  a  leading  merchant  in  

Nandgad.  He  admitted  that  for  her  first  delivery  the  

deceased came to their house and after the child was born  

the appellant and her father-in-law came to their house to  

see the child.  He also admitted that the deceased had been  

to  their  house  to  see  PW-2  Balram,  who  was  sick.   It  is  

argued  that  the  evidence  of  this  witness  shows  that  the  

relations  between  both  the  families  were  cordial.  It  is  

submitted  that  the  appellant  is  a  rich  merchant  and,  

therefore, he could not have made any demand for money.  

It is not possible for us to accept this submission.  It would  

be wrong to say that the poor are avaricious and not the  

rich.  Many a murder are committed by the rich out of greed  

for money.  Besides, merely because the appellant and his  

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father visited the maternal house of the deceased it cannot  

be  presumed  that  both  the  families  maintained  cordial  

relationship  and,  therefore,  the  deceased  must  not  have  

been ill-treated. The trial  court has  wrongly come to this  

conclusion, despite there being cogent evidence on record to  

establish  the  demand.  PW1  Bhavakanna’s  evidence  

establishes  this  case  of  the  prosecution.  His  evidence  

becomes more acceptable because of the honesty displayed  

by him.  There is no reason to disbelieve  his statement that  

whenever the deceased  used to come to their house  she  

used to tell them about  the demand  for money and gold  

and the  harassment  meted out  to  her  in  her  matrimonial  

home in that connection.  It is argued that, whereas in the  

evidence, PW1 stated that the appellant made demand for 5  

tolas of gold and cash of Rs.10,000/-,  it is not so mentioned  

in the complaint.  This is hardly a significant omission.  The  

fact that the deceased was asked to bring money and gold  

from her parents’  house and she was harassed for that is  

stated in the complaint.  The specific details of the demand  

are given in the evidence.  PW1 must have been in a great  

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shock when he saw the dead bodies of his sister and niece  

lying in Malprabha river.  He could not have therefore given  

details  of  the  demand  made  by  the  appellant  and  other  

particulars  of  harassment  to  which  the  deceased  was  

subjected, in his complaint. In any case, it  cannot be said  

that he has completely omitted to say anything about the  

demand.    The  trial  court  wrongly  gave  importance  to  

absence of such details in the FIR.  It is not necessary for us  

to repeat that the FIR is not expected to be a treatise.  

14. PW2-Balram,  the  other  brother  of  the  deceased,  has  

supported  PW1-Bhavakanna.   PW2  explained  why  their  

family had not disclosed the ill-treatment meted out to the  

deceased to anyone.  He stated that they felt that if these  

facts  are  disclosed  to  people,  the  ill-treatment  of  the  

deceased may increase.   This reaction is normal and the  

fear  appears  to  be  genuine.  He  also  stated  that  the  

deceased  was  not  given  food  in  the  house  and  she  was  

made to work for the whole day.  Both PW1 and PW2 stated  

that the deceased was asked to bring money and gold from  

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her parents’ house and was given dire threats.  Both these  

witnesses have been cross-examined at length. The cross-

examiner could not make any dent in their evidence.  PW5  

Babita  wife  of  PW2 Balram has supported  PW1 and PW2.  

PW5’s evidence cannot be overlooked because she has not  

verbatim repeated the version of PW1 and PW2.  Being wife  

of  PW2  her  presence  in  the  house  is  natural  and  her  

evidence can be safely relied upon.  In our opinion, on the  

basis  of  evidence of  PWs 1,  2 and 5,  the High Court  has  

rightly concluded that the deceased committed suicide and  

the suicide was abetted by the appellant.   

15. It  is  true  that  the  appellant  was  not  charged  under  

Section 306 of the IPC.  The charge was under Section 304-B  

of the IPC.  It was, however, perfectly legal for the High Court  

to convict him for offence punishable under Section 306 of  

the  IPC.   In  this  connection,  we  may  usefully  refer  to  

Narwinder Singh.  In that case the accused was charged  

under  Section 304-B of  the IPC.   The death had occurred  

within seven years of the marriage.  The trial court convicted  

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the accused for an offence punishable under Section 304-B  

of the IPC.  Upon reconsideration of the entire evidence, the  

High Court came to the conclusion that the deceased had  

not committed suicide on account of demand for dowry, but,  

due to harassment caused by the husband in particular.  The  

High  Court  acquitted  the  parents  of  the  accused  and  

converted  the  conviction  of  the  accused  from  one  under  

Section 304-B of the IPC to Section 306 of the IPC.   This  

Court  dismissed the  appeal  filed  by  the  accused.   It  was  

observed that  it  is  a  settled proposition of  law that  mere  

omission or defect in framing charge would not disable the  

court from convicting the accused for the offence which has  

been found to be proved on the basis of the evidence on  

record.  In such circumstances, the matter would fall within  

the  purview  of  Sections  221(1)  and  (2)  of  the  Code  of  

Criminal Procedure, 1973.  The relevant observations of this  

Court could be quoted:

“21. The High Court upon meticulous scrutiny of  the  entire  evidence  on  record  rightly  concluded  that  there  was  no  evidence  to  indicate  the  commission of offence under Section 304-B IPC. It  was  also  observed  that  the  deceased  had  

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committed suicide due to harassment meted out  to her by the appellant but there was no evidence  on  record  to  suggest  that  such  harassment  or  cruelty  was  made  in  connection  to  any  dowry  demands.  Thus,  cruelty  or  harassment  sans  any  dowry demands which drives the wife to commit  suicide  attracts  the  offence  of  “abetment  of  suicide”  under  Section  306  IPC  and  not  Section  304-B  IPC  which  defines  the  offence  and  punishment for “dowry death”.”

16. Moreover, admittedly the deceased committed suicide  

within a period of seven years from the date of her marriage.  

Section  113-A  of  the  Evidence  Act  is,  therefore,  clearly  

attracted to this  case.   Presumption contemplated therein  

must  spring  in  action.   This  provision  was  introduced  by  

Criminal Law Second Amendment Act, 1983 to resolve the  

difficulty  of  proof  where  married  women  are  forced  to  

commit suicide but incriminating evidence  is difficult to get  

as  it   is  usually   available  within  the  four  walls  of  the  

matrimonial home.  Section 113-A reads as under:

“113A-   Presumption  as  to  abetment  of  suicide  by  a  married  woman.- When  the  question is whether the commission of suicide by a  woman had been abetted by her husband or any  relative of her husband and it is shown that she  had committed  suicide  within  a  period  of  seven  

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years from the date of her marriage and that her  husband  or  such  relative  of  her  husband  had  subjected her to cruelty, the court may presume,  having regard to all the other circumstances of the  case, that such suicide had been abetted by her  husband or by such relative of her husband.  

Explanation.--  For  the  purposes  of  this  section,  “cruelty"  shall  have  the  same  meaning  as  in  section  498A  of  the  Indian  Penal  Code  (45  of  1860 ).”

In  this  case  the  prosecution  has  led  evidence  to  

establish  cruelty  or  harassment  caused  to  the  deceased,  

which is rightly taken into account by the High Court.  Thus,  

the foundation for the presumption exists.   The appellant,  

however,  has  led  no  evidence  to  rebut  the  presumption.  

Therefore, it can be safely concluded in the facts of this case  

that the appellant abetted the suicide of the deceased.  

17. There  is  also  another  angle  to  this  case.   The  

prosecution  has  succeeded in  proving  facts  from which  a  

reasonable  inference  can  be  drawn  that  the  deceased  

committed  suicide by jumping in  the  river  along with  her  

daughter.  The deceased was in the custody of the appellant.  

She  left  the  appellant’s  house  with  the  small  child.  

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Admittedly,  neither  the  appellant  nor  any  member  of  his  

family  lodged  any  missing  complaint.   The  appellant  

straightway went to the house of the deceased to enquire  

about her.  This conduct is strange.  When his wife and small  

child had left the house and were not traceable the appellant  

was expected to move heaven and earth to trace them.  As  

to when and why the deceased left the house and how she  

died  in  suspicious  circumstances  was  within  the  special  

knowledge  of  the  appellant.   When  the  prosecution  

established facts  from which  reasonable  inference can  be  

drawn that the deceased committed suicide, the appellant  

should have,  by virtue of his  special  knowledge regarding  

those facts,  offered an explanation which might  drive  the  

court to draw a different inference.  The burden of proving  

those facts was on the appellant as per Section 106 of the  

Evidence Act but the appellant has not discharged the same  

leading  to  an  adverse  inference being  drawn against  him  

(See: Tulshiram Sahadu Suryawanshi & Anr.   v.  State  

of Maharashtra  9     and     Babu    alias Balasubramaniam)   

9 (2012) 10 SCC 373

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18. In  our  opinion,  the  trial  court  erred  in  giving  undue  

importance to trivial matters.  The trial court missed the core  

of  the  prosecution  case  which  is  established  by  the  

straightforward and honest evidence of the brothers of the  

deceased.   The trial  court  should  have seen that  when a  

woman is harassed and ill-treated in her matrimonial house,  

it  is  not  possible to  get  independent  witnesses to depose  

about  the  harassment.   No  doubt,  the  brothers  of  the  

deceased  are  interested  witnesses.   It  is,  therefore,  

necessary  to  scrutinize  their  evidence  carefully.   Keeping  

this  caution  in  mind  if  the  evidence  of  the  brothers  is  

examined,  the  conclusion  is  irresistible  that  it  inspires  

confidence and bears out  the prosecution case.   The trial  

court should have taken note of the callous and indifferent  

attitude of the appellant.  It should have taken into account  

the fact that there is nothing on record to suggest that the  

deceased was schizophrenic or was insane.  That is not even  

the  case  of  the  defence.   It  is  also  not  the  case  of  the  

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defence  that  the  death  was  accidental.   When  a  married  

woman jumps in a river along with her small child that too  

within seven years of  marriage and when the prosecution  

leads reliable evidence to establish harassment caused to  

her in her matrimonial house in connection with demand of  

money for her husband’s business and the accused-husband  

leads no evidence to prove to the contrary the logical and  

legal  conclusion  that  must  follow  is  that  she  committed  

suicide and her suicide was abetted by her husband.  

19. Undoubtedly, the High Court should not interfere with  

an order of acquittal because it has power to do so and just  

because some other view is also possible.  The High Court  

must locate some gross error of law or fact and must feel  

impelled to interfere with the order of acquittal to rectify it.  

The purpose behind such interference is obviously to prevent  

miscarriage of justice.  If in a given case the High Court feels  

that the trial court could never have taken the view it has  

taken and that  it  is  a  perverse  view which may result  in  

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gross miscarriage of justice, it is not only its legal obligation  

but duty to interfere with such order of acquittal.  

20. Applying the above principles, we have no hesitation in  

recording that the trial court’s order acquitting the appellant  

is replete with gross errors of facts resulting in miscarriage  

of justice.  The High Court has rightly held that the other  

members of the appellant’s family can be given benefit of  

doubt,  but  the  appellant  cannot  escape  the  liability.   We  

concur with the High Court.   We see no reason to interfere  

with the impugned judgment of the High Court.  The appeal  

is,  therefore,  dismissed.    The appellant is  on bail.   He is  

directed  to  surrender  forthwith.   His  bail  bond  stands  

cancelled.  

…………………………………..J. (Ranjana Prakash Desai)

……………………………………J. (Madan B. Lokur)

New Delhi; March 31, 2014.  

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