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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.   1340 of 2007   

Ramesh Harijan                               …..Appellant  

Versus

State of U.P.                       .... Respondent  

JUDGMENT

Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.  

l.        This criminal appeal has been preferred against the judgment  

and order dated 23.3.2007 passed by the High Court of Allahabad in  

Government Appeal No. 1246 of 1999 by which the High Court has  

reversed the  judgment  of  Additional  District  and Sessions  Judge,  

Basti in Sessions Trial No. 312 of 1996 dated 2.2.1999 acquitting the  

appellant.  Thus, the High Court has convicted the appellant for the  

offence  punishable  under  Sections  302  and  376  of  Indian  Penal  

Code, 1860 (hereinafter called as `IPC’) and awarded him the life  

imprisonment  for  both the offences.  However,  both the sentences  

have been directed to run concurrently.

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2.  Facts and circumstances giving rise to this appeal are that:

A. One Smt. Batasi Devi (PW.2) lodged an FIR on 2.2.1996  in  

Haraiya Police Station  alleging that her daughter Renu, aged 5-6  

years, was found dead on her cot in Muradipur, the village of her  

maternal grandmother on 30.1.1996 at about 9.00 p.m. Initially, she  

had been told that her daughter died of  paralysis and she was buried  

at the bank of Manorama river.  Later on she got information from  

Shitla Prasad Verma (PW.8), Jata Shankar Singh (PW.7) and other  

persons of the same village that her daughter had been raped and  

killed by Ramesh, appellant.  She also made a request that the dead  

body of the child be exhumed and sent for post-mortem.   

B.      On the order of the concerned Sub-Divisional Magistrate, the  

dead body of Renu was dug out from the grave and sent for post-

mortem  on  3.2.1996.   The  autopsy  was  conducted  by  Dr.  Ajay  

Kumar  Verma and Dr. S.S. Dwedi of District Hospital.   In their  

opinion, death was due to shock and haemorrhage as a result of ante-

mortem vaginal injuries.   

C.       On the basis of the post-mortem report, Case Crime No. 22 of  

1996 was registered against  the appellant  under Sections 302 and  

376  IPC.   After  having  the  investigation,  the  police  filed  the  

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chargesheet  against  the  appellant.   During  the  trial  prosecution  

examined 14 witnesses to prove its case including Kunwar Dhruv  

Narain Singh (PW.1),  the scribe of  the FIR,  Batasi  Devi  (PW.2),  

mother  of  the  deceased  Renu,  Jata  Shankar  Singh (PW.7),  Shitla  

Prasad  Verma  (PW.8)  and  after  conclusion  of  the  trial  and  

considering the evidence on record, the trial court vide its judgment  

and  order  dated  2.2.1999  acquitted  the  appellant  of  both  the  

aforesaid charges.   

D. Being aggrieved,  the State  preferred Criminal  Appeal  No.  

1246  of  1999  which  has  been  allowed  by  the  High  Court  vide  

judgment  and  order  dated  23.3.2007  and  the  appellant  has  been  

convicted and awarded the sentence of life imprisonment on both  

counts.

            Hence, this appeal.  

3. Shri Rajender Parsad Saxena, learned counsel appearing for  

the appellant, has submitted that High Court has committed an error  

by  reversing  the  well-reasoned  judgment  of  acquittal  by  the  trial  

court.  There is no iota of evidence against the appellant on the basis  

of which the conviction can be sustained.  The evidence relied upon  

by the High Court particularly that of Kunwar Dhruv Narain Singh  

(PW.1), Jata Shankar Singh (PW.7) and Shitla Prasad Verma (PW.8)  

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cannot stand judicial scrutiny as these witnesses had been motivated;  

improvement in the depositions of Jata Shankar Singh (PW.7) and  

Shitla Prasad Verma (PW.8) had been to the extent that it is liable to  

be discarded as a whole.  The other witnesses have turned hostile,  

therefore, there is nothing on record to show that the appellant was  

connected with the crime by any means.  There is no evidence on  

record  on  the  basis  of  which  it  can  be  established  that  Renu  

(deceased) used to sleep in the house of the appellant or the appellant  

had an opportunity to commit the offence.  The findings recorded by  

the High Court are perverse not being based on  evidence on record.  

Thus, the appeal deserves to be allowed.  

4. On  the  contrary,  Shri  Manoj  Kumar  Dwivedi,  learned  

counsel appearing for the State has vehemently opposed the appeal  

contending  that  the  judgment  of  the  trial  court  has  rightly  been  

reversed by the High Court being contrary to the evidence on record.  

The  High  Court  has  recorded  the  findings  of  fact  on  correct  

appreciation of evidence.    Thus, no interference is warranted.   The  

appeal is liable to be dismissed.  

5. We have considered the rival submissions made by learned  

counsel for the parties and perused the records.  

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6. Admittedly,  Renu,  aged 5-6 years  of  age,  died of  vaginal  

injuries.   The  post-mortem  report  disclosed  the  following  ante-

mortem injuries:

(1) Contusion 4 cm x 2 cm over the right side face  

below the right ear lobules on upper part of the neck.  

(2)      Contusion 5 cm x 3 cm over the left side face in  

front and above tragus of the left ear.  

(3) Abraded contusion 4 cm X 3 cm over the back  

of the right shoulder joint and scapular region.  

(4) Contusion 3 cm x 2 cm over the upper part of  

the left scapula and back portion of the shoulder tip.  

(5) Abraded contusion 4 cm x 1 cm on each side of  

office and labia majora.  

(6) Abraded with tearing of  labia majora of  both  

side 2 cm x 1 cm.  

(7) Hymen  absent,  lower  part  of  vagina  badly  

lacerated and pubic lower part  upper abdomen,  and  

vaginal tear up to upper part of Guel orifice.  

         The internal examination of the supra pubic  

region on opening the abdomen revealed that  blood  

and  gases  were  present  and  the  lower  part  of  the  

uterus had a bloodstained tear 1 cm x 1 cm. The cause  

of death was shock and haemorrhage. The death could  

have taken place on 30.1.1996 between 9.00 or 9.30  

pm.  If a hard object like a human penis was inserted  

in the vagina it could have caused the injuries Nos. 6  

and 7.”

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7. The prosecution has examined Kunwar Dhruv Narain Singh  

(PW.1), the scribe of the FIR lodged by Batasi Devi (PW.2), mother  

of the deceased Renu. He deposed that Renu was living with her  

maternal  grandmother  Smt.  Phulpatta  Devi  who was  totally  blind  

and a very poor woman.   Her thatched house had fallen down so she  

used to sleep in the house of Ramesh, appellant which was adjacent  

to her house.  Renu was found dead on 30.1.1996 in the night on her  

cot in the house of Ramesh, appellant.   Ramesh, appellant made the  

extra-judicial  confession  before  him  in  presence  of  Jata  Shankar  

Singh  (PW.7)  and  Shitla  Prasad  Verma  (PW.8).   The  father  of  

Ramesh used to work in his house, however, at the relevant time, he  

was working in Sidharth Nagar.  Batasi Devi (PW.2) had come to  

him and asked him to write the FIR so that she can lodge the same  

with the police station.  However, he denied the suggestion that he  

had a  grudge against  Ramesh,  appellant  as  it  was because  of  the  

appellant and his father that other persons of the village were not  

working at his house.

 8. Batasi Devi (PW.2), mother of Renu, deceased, deposed that  

her mother was very poor and her house was having a thatched roof  

which had fallen down so she used to sleep in the house of Ramesh,  

appellant  which is  in  very  close  proximity  of  her  house.   In  the  

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fateful night, Renu slept with her maternal grandmother in the house  

of Ramesh, appellant. She had been informed that her daughter died  

of paralysis.  Renu had been buried at the bank of Manorama river.  

However,  on  the  next  day,  the  rumour  broke  out  that  Ramesh,  

appellant, had committed rape and she died of the same.  Then, she  

lodged the FIR.   

9.      Jata Shankar Singh (PW.7) deposed that he was originally of  

another village but was living in the house of Kunwar Dhruv Narain  

Singh (PW.1), in the same village for 15-16 years.    He told that on  

30.1.1996 when he was returning alongwith  Shitla  Prasad  Verma  

(PW.8), to his house after marketing at about 9.00 p.m., he heard  

some  whispering  near  the  house  of  appellant  Ramesh.   He  was  

having a torch so he focussed it in the same direction and found that  

Ramesh, appellant was committing rape on a little girl  of 6 years  

beneath a tree situated outside his house.  His associate Shitla Prasad  

Verma (PW.8) raised a cry as a result of which some persons from  

the village gathered but appellant Ramesh ran out.  The girl had died  

of rape.   

10. Shitla Prasad Verma (PW.8).  has supported the prosecution  

case  narrating  the  similar  facts  as  stated  by  Jata  Shankar  Singh  

(PW.7).

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11. Doctor Ajay Kumar Verma (PW.11) who has conducted the  

autopsy on the body of Renu, deceased, supported the prosecution  

case to the extent that deceased was having the ante-mortem injuries  

as mentioned hereinabove on her body.  

12. Sharafat  Hussain,  S.I.,  (PW.13),  the  Investigating  Officer,  

deposed that he had recovered a part of Khatari (thin mattress) and  

white sheet with which Renu was covered. He tried to search the  

appellant/accused, however, the appellant could be arrested at 3.35  

a.m.  in the intervening night of 3/4.2.1996 from the junction of three  

roads at Mahulghat when he was waiting for some transport to leave  

the area.   

13. The  prosecution  also  examined  Sumaiya  Devi  (PW.3),  

Urmila  Devi  (PW.4),  Hira  Devi  (PW.6),  Sona  Devi  (PW.9).  

However, they did not support the prosecution case and had been  

declared hostile.   According to the aforesaid witnesses, they reached  

the place of occurrence after having the information of Renu’s death  

and they found her dead body lying at the house of her maternal  

grandmother Smt. Phulpatta Devi.    

14. The learned  trial  court  after  appreciating  the  evidence  on  

record acquitted the appellant on the following grounds:  

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I) The prosecution could not  produce any evidence to prove  

that in the night of the incidence, Renu, deceased, had been  

sleeping in the house of the appellant Ramesh or her dead  

body had been lying  on the cot in his house.  

II) Smt.  Phulpatta,  maternal  grandmother  of  Renu,  deceased,  

was neither examined, nor any satisfactory explanation had  

been given for not examining her.

III) The deposition of Kunwar Dhruv Narain Singh (PW.1) was  

not worthy of reliance as he has deposed that the appellant  

had  made  extra-judicial  confession  before  him  for  

committing  the  aforesaid  crime  in  the  presence  of  Jata  

Shankar  Singh  (PW.7)  and  Shitla  Prasad  Verma  (PW.8).  

Such  statement  had  not  been  made  by  either  of  the  said  

witnesses.   

IV) Kunwar Dhruv Narain Singh (PW.1) was a Jamindar and it  

was because of the appellant’s father that other poor persons  

were not rendering service to him and Kunwar Dhruv Narain  

Singh (PW.1) had been inimical to the appellant.

V) The  deposition  of  Sumaiya  Devi  (PW.3),  Urmila  Devi  

(PW.4), Hira Devi (PW.6) and Sona Devi (PW.9) was not in  

support  of  the prosecution  case  and all  the aforesaid  four  

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witnesses  had been cross-examined but  they could not  be  

held to be hostile witnesses.  

VI) Sharafat  Hussain,  S.I.,  (PW.13),  the  Investigating  Officer,  

had recovered a part of the bed sheet and it had been sent for  

CFSL  report  and  to  the  said  recovery  Ram  Prasad  alias  

Parsadi  (PW.5)  and  Bhikari  (PW.10)  did not  support  the  

recovery  and,  therefore,  recovery  of  the  aforesaid  

incriminating material is to be disbelieved.   

VII) The  evidence  of  Jata  Shankar  Singh  (PW.7)  and  Shitla  

Prasad Verma (PW.8) could not be relied upon as they had  

made knowingly improvements  in  the  case  of  having last  

seen Renu, deceased, with the appellant rather distorted the  

whole case of the prosecution totally as both of them had  

deposed that they had seen the appellant committing rape on  

Renu, deceased.

15. In  the  appeal,  the  High  Court  has  reversed  the  findings  

recorded by the trial court on the following grounds:

(I) There was sufficient evidence on record to show that Smt.  

Phulpatta  Devi,  maternal  grandmother  of  Renu,  deceased,  

was totally blind and a very poor woman and the roof of  her  

thatched house had fallen and she used to sleep in the house  

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of the appellant Ramesh in her neighbourhood with Renu,  

deceased.

(II) It  was  no  one’s  case  that  Kunwar  Dhruv  Narain  Singh  

(PW.1)  was  inimical  to  the  appellant  for  any  reason  

whatsoever as none of the witnesses had deposed that after  

the appellant’s father  joined the service,  he had supported  

the other  villagers  financially  and,  therefore,  they stopped  

working  at  the  house  of  Kunwar  Dhruv  Narain  Singh  

(PW.1).  

(III) The witnesses Sumaiya Devi (PW.3), Urmila Devi (PW.4),  

Hira  Devi  (PW.6)  and Sona Devi  (PW.9),  once  had been  

cross-examined  by  the  prosecution  as  they  had  not  

supported  the  case  of  the  prosecution,  the  trial  court  was  

wrong  that  they  were  not  hostile  witnesses.   Similarly  

remained the position  of  the witnesses  of  the recovery of  

sheet  cover  and  bichona  i.e.  of  Ram Prasad  alias  Parsadi  

(PW.5) and  Bhikari (PW.10).   

(IV) The evidence of Kunwar Dhruv Narain Singh (PW.1), Jata  

Shankar  Singh  (PW.7)  and  Shitla  Prasad  Verma  (PW.8)  

could be relied upon at least to the extent that deceased was  

last seen in the company of the appellant.  

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(V) The  trial  court  had  given  undue  importance  to  the  minor  

contradictions in the depositions of  the witnesses.  In fact,  

there was evidence that after committing the crime outside,  

the appellant brought the corpus of the child and placed it on  

the cot.  

           16. The law of interfering with the judgment of acquittal is well-

settled. It is to the effect that only in exceptional cases where there  

are compelling circumstances and the judgment in appeal is found to  

be perverse, the appellate court can interfere with the order of the  

acquittal. The appellate court should bear in mind the presumption of  

innocence of the accused and further that the trial court’s acquittal  

bolsters  the  presumption  of  innocence.   Interference  in  a  routine  

manner where the other view is possible should be avoided, unless  

there are good reasons for interference.  (Vide:  State of Rajasthan  

v. Talevar & Anr., AIR 2011 SC 2271;  State of U.P. v. Mohd.  

Iqram & Anr.,  AIR 2011 SC 2296;  Govindaraju @ Govinda v.  

State by Srirampuram Police Station & Anr., (2012) 4 SCC 722;  

and State of Haryana v. Shakuntla & Ors., (2012) 4 SCALE  526).  

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17. In  the  aforesaid  fact-situation,  we  have  to  weigh  as  to  

whether the High Court is justified in reversing the judgment and  

order of acquittal recorded by the trial court.  

We have been taken through the entire evidence on record  

and after re-appreciating the same we can unhesitatingly record that:

(i) Undoubtedly, the trial court has not made any reference to  

the depositions of Batasi Devi (PW.2) and also of Kunwar Dhruv  

Narain Singh (PW.1) in respect to the fact that the thatched house of  

roof  of  Smt.  Phulpatta  Devi,  maternal  grandmother  of  Renu,  

deceased  had fallen and she as well as Renu used to sleep in the  

house of Ramesh, appellant which was in very close vicinity of  Smt.  

Phulpatta’s house.  Ganga Ram (DW.1) has stated that on the day of  

occurrence, Smt. Phulpatta Devi and Renu did not sleep in the house  

of Ramesh, however, as he was living permanently in the city and  

did  not  say  that  he  was  present  on  that  day  in  the  village,  his  

evidence cannot be taken into consideration so far as this issue is  

concerned.    The defence  did not  cross-examine  Kunwar  Dhruv  

Narain Singh (PW.1) and Batasi Devi (PW.2) on this issue. Thus, the  

trial court committed an error recording such finding of fact.  

(ii) It has come on record that Smt. Phulpatta Devi was  an old,  

infirm and totally blind woman and it was for this reason that Renu,  

deceased was left for her assistance. The trial court ought not to have  

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drawn adverse inference for not examining Smt. Phulpatta Devi by  

the prosecution.  Thus, the adverse inference drawn by the trial court  

on this count is unwarranted and uncalled for.  

(iii) The trial court  has held that  Kunwar Dhruv Narain Singh  

(PW.1) had been inimical to Ramesh and his family for the reason  

that appellant’s father had been working in the agricultural field at  

the said witness and after joining the service appellant’s father had  

rendered financial help to other poor persons of the village and thus  

those poor persons were not available for work to the said witness.  

In this regard, the defence has examined Ganga Ram (DW.1) who  

had deposed that the appellant’s father had been looking after the  

agricultural  work  of  that  witness,  however,  joined  the  service  in  

court 14 years prior to the date of incident and Ganga Ram’s family  

was also looking after the agricultural work of the  said witness but 8  

years prior to the date of incident. He had also left the village and  

opened  a  beetle  shop  in  the  city  after  getting  financial  aid  from  

appellant’s father.   

Such an  evidence is required to be examined in the light of  

attending  circumstances  and particularly  taking  into  consideration  

the  proximity  of  time.  Time  is  the  greatest  heeler.  In  case  the  

appellant’s father had left   working in the field of the witness 14  

years prior to the date of incident and Ganga Ram’s (DW.1) family  

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has left 8 years prior to  the said date, the time gap itself falsifies the  

testimony for the reason that the time gap is a factor of paramount  

importance  in this regard. More so, it is not the defence case that  

any other family or labour was available in the village to look after  

the agricultural work of the said witness.  

(iv) The recovery of part of the sheet and white clothes having  

blood and semen  as per the FSL report  has been dis-believed by the  

trial court in view of the fact that Ram Prasad alias Parsadi (PW.5)  

and Bhikari (PW.10)  did not support the prosecution case like other  

witnesses who did not support the last seen theory. The trial court  

failed to appreciate that both the said witnesses, Ram Prasad alias  

Parsadi  (PW.5)  and  Bhikari  (PW.10)  had  admitted  their  

signature/thumb impression on the recovery

The factum of taking the material exhibits and preparing of  

the recovery memo with regard to the same and sending the cut out  

portions to the Serologist who found the blood and semen on them  

vide  report  dated  21.3.1996  (Ext.   Ka  21)  is  not  disputed.   The  

serological  report  also  revealed  that  the  vaginal  swab  which was  

taken by the doctor was also human blood and semen stained.  

18. It  is  a  settled  legal  proposition  that  the  evidence  of  a  

prosecution witness cannot be rejected in toto merely because the  

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prosecution chose to  treat  him as  hostile and cross examine him.  

The  evidence  of  such  witnesses  cannot  be  treated  as  effaced  or  

washed off the record altogether but the same can be accepted to the  

extent  that  their  version  is  found  to  be  dependable  on  a  careful  

scrutiny thereof. (Vide: Bhagwan Singh v.  The State of Haryana,  

AIR 1976 SC 202; Rabindra Kumar Dey v. State of Orissa, AIR  

1977 SC 170;  Syad Akbar v.  State of  Karnataka, AIR 1979 SC  

1848; and Khujji @ Surendra Tiwari v. State of Madhya Pradesh,  

AIR 1991 SC 1853).

19. In  State of U.P. v.  Ramesh Prasad Misra & Anr., AIR  

1996 SC 2766, this  Court  held that  evidence of  a hostile  witness  

would not be totally rejected if spoken in favour of the prosecution  

or the accused but required to be subjected to close scrutiny and that  

portion  of  the  evidence  which  is  consistent  with  the  case  of  the  

prosecution or defence can be relied upon.   A similar view has been  

reiterated  by  this  Court  in  Balu  Sonba  Shinde v.  State  of  

Maharashtra, (2002) 7 SCC 543; Gagan Kanojia & Anr. v. State  

of  Punjab, (2006) 13 SCC 516; Radha Mohan Singh @ Lal Saheb  

& Ors. v. State of U.P., AIR 2006 SC 951; Sarvesh Narain  Shukla  

v.  Daroga Singh & Ors., AIR 2008 SC 320; and Subbu Singh v.  

State by Public Prosecutor, (2009) 6 SCC 462.  

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 Thus,  the  law  can  be  summarised  to  the  effect  that  the  

evidence of a hostile witness cannot be discarded as a whole, and  

relevant parts thereof which are admissible in law, can be used by  

the prosecution or the defence.   (See also: C. Muniappan & Ors. v.  

State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 2010 SC 3718; and Himanshu @ Chintu  

v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2011) 2 SCC 36)

20. Undoubtedly,  there  may  be  some  exaggeration  in  the  

evidence of the prosecution witnesses, particularly,  that of  Kunwar  

Dhruv Narain Singh (PW.1), Jata Shankar Singh (PW.7) and Shitla  

Prasad  Verma  (PW.8).   However,  it  is  the  duty  of  the  court  to  

unravel the truth under all circumstances.  

21. In  Balka Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab, AIR 1975 SC  

1962,  this Court considered a similar issue, placing reliance upon its  

earlier judgment in  Zwinglee Ariel v. State of Madhya Pradesh,  

AIR 1954 SC 15 and held as under:

“The Court must make an attempt to separate grain   from the chaff, the truth from the falsehood, yet this   could only be possible when the true is separable   from  the  falsehood.  Where  the  grain  cannot  be   separated from the chaff because the grain and the   chaff  are  so  inextricably  mixed  up  that  in  the   process  of  separation,  the  Court  would  have  to   reconstruct  an  absolutely  new  case  for  the   prosecution  by  divorcing  the  essential  details   presented  by  the  prosecution  completely  from the   context and the background against which they are   made, then this principle will not apply.”

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22. In  Sukhdev Yadav & Ors.  v. State  of Bihar, AIR 2001  

SC  3678, this Court held as under:  

“It is indeed necessary however to note that there   would hardly be a witness whose evidence does not   contain  some  amount  of  exaggeration  or   embellishment,  sometimes  there  would  be  a   deliberate attempt to offer the same and sometimes   the witnesses in their over anxiety to do better from   the  witness-box  details  out  an  exaggerated   account.”  

23. A similar view has been re-iterated in Appabhai & Anr. v.  

State  of  Gujarat, AIR  1988  SC  696,  wherein  this  Court  has  

cautioned the courts below not to give undue importance to minor  

discrepancies  which  do  not  shake  the  basic  version  of  the  

prosecution case.  The court by calling into aid its vast experience of  

men and matters in different cases must evaluate the entire material  

on record by excluding the exaggerated version given by any witness  

for  the  reason  that  witnesses  now-a-days  go  on  adding  

embellishments  to  their  version  perhaps  for  the  fear  of  their  

testimony being rejected by the court. However, the courts should  

not dis-believe the evidence of such witnesses altogether if they are  

otherwise trustworthy.  

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24. In  Sucha Singh v. State of  Punjab, AIR 2003 SC 3617,  

this Court had taken note of its various earlier judgments and held  

that even if major portion of the evidence is found to be deficient, in  

case residue is sufficient to prove guilt of an accused, it is the duty of  

the court to separate grain from chaff. Falsity of particular material  

witness or material particular would not ruin it from the beginning to  

end. The maxim falsus in uno falsus in omnibus has no application in  

India and the witness cannot be branded as a liar.  In case this maxim  

is applied in all  the cases it  is to be feared that administration of  

criminal justice would come to a dead stop. Witnesses just cannot  

help  in  giving embroidery to  a  story,  however,  true  in  the  main.  

Therefore, it has to be appraised in each case as to what extent the  

evidence is worthy of credence, and merely because in some respects  

the  court  considers  the  same  to  be  insufficient  or  unworthy  of  

reliance, it does not necessarily follow as a matter of law that it must  

be disregarded in all respects as well.  

25. In  Shivaji  Sahebrao  Bobade  &  Anr.  v.  State  of  

Maharashtra, AIR 1973 SC 2622,  this Court held :

“…Thus too frequent  acquittals  of  the  guilty  may   lead to a ferocious penal law, eventually eroding the   judicial  protection  of  the  guiltless.  For  all  these   reasons it is true to say, with Viscount Simon, that   "a  miscarriage  of  justice  may  arise  from  the   acquittal  of  the  guilty  no  less  than  from  the   

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conviction  of  the  innocent  ..."  In  short,  our   jurisprudential enthusiasm for presumed innocence   must be moderated by the pragmatic need to make   criminal justice potent and realistic. A balance has   to be struck between chasing chance possibilities as   good enough to set the delinquent free and chopping   the  logic  of  preponderant  probability  to  punish   marginal innocents. We have adopted these cautions   in  analysing  the  evidence  and  appraising  the   soundness  of  the contrary  conclusions  reached by   the  courts  below.  Certainly,  in  the  last  analysis   reasonable doubts must operate to the advantage of   the appellant…”  

(See also: Bhagwan Singh & Ors. v. State of M.P., AIR 2002 SC  

1621; Gangadhar Behera & Ors. v. State of Orissa, AIR 2002 SC  

3633;  Sucha  Singh   (supra);  and  S.  Ganesan  v.  Rama  

Raghuraman & Ors., (2011) 2 SCC 83).

26. Therefore, in such a case the paramount importance of the  

court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is avoided.  The benefit  

of  doubt particularly in every case may not nurture fanciful doubts  

or  lingering  suspicion  and  thereby  destroy  social  defence.  A  

reasonable  doubt  is  not  an  imaginary  trivial  or  merely  possible  

doubt, but a fair doubt based upon reason and common sense.   

27. In view of the above, we are of the considered opinion that  

the acquittal in the instant case by the trial court was totally illegal,  

unwarranted  and  based  on  mis-appreciation  of  evidence  for  the  

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reason  that  the  court  had  given  undue  weightage  to  unimportant  

discrepancies and inconsistencies which resulted in miscarriage of  

justice.   Thus, the High Court was fully justified in reversing the  

order of acquittal.   

In  view  of  the  above,  the  appeal  lacks  merit  and  is  

accordingly dismissed.   

      ………………………..J.        (Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN)

                   ………………………..J.                   (DIPAK MISRA)

New Delhi,  May 21, 2012       

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