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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.600 OF 2007

RAMDEV FOOD PRODUCTS PRIVATE LIMITED … APPELLANT

VERSUS

STATE OF GUJARAT         …RESPONDENT

J U D G M E N T

ADARSH KUMAR GOEL J.

1. This  appeal  by  special  leave  has  been  preferred  

against the Judgment and Order dated 17th February, 2006 of  

the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad in Special Criminal  

Application No.1821 of 2005.

2. The  High Court  declined  to  interfere  with  the  Order  

dated  16th August,  2005,  of  the  Judicial  Magistrate,  First  

Class, Sanand on a complaint filed by the appellant against  

fourteen accused for alleged commission of offences under  

Sections  409,  420,  406,  467,  468,  471  read  with  Section

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120-B and 114 of the Indian Penal Code directing the Police  

Sub-Inspector, Sanand, to give a report to the Court within  

thirty  days  under  Section  202(1)  of  the  Code of  Criminal  

Procedure, 1973 (for short “the Code”) instead of directing  

investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code, as sought by  

the appellant.

3. The  case  of  the  appellant-complainant  in  complaint  

filed by it before the Magistrate is that it is running business  

of  food  products  and  had  permitted  M/s.  New  Ramdev  

Masala  Factory,  wherein  accused  No.1  Mr.  Jasvantbhai  

Somabhai  Patel  was  one  of  the  partners,  to  use  the  

trademark  “Ramdev”  for  seven  years  under  agreement  

dated 4th June, 1990.  However, M/s. New Ramdev Masala  

Factory  was  closed  on  30th May,  1994.   Accused  No.1  

executed  forged  partnership  documents  with  the  help  of  

other accused and thereby committed the alleged offences.  

4. The appellant sought direction for investigation under  

Section  156(3)  of  the  Code.   However,  the  Magistrate  

instead of directing investigation as prayed, thought it fit to  

conduct further inquiry under Section 202 and sought report  

of the Police Sub Inspector within thirty days.  Grievance of  

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the appellant before the High Court was that in view of the  

allegation that documents had been forged with a view to  

usurp the trademark, which documents were in possession  

of the accused and were required to be seized, investigation  

ought to have been ordered under Section 156(3) instead of  

conducting further inquiry under Section 202.  Thus, there  

was non application of mind by the Magistrate.  It  is  also  

submitted  in  the  alternative,  that  even  in  the  course  of  

investigation for giving report under Section 202, police is  

entitled  to  arrest  the  accused  as  arrest  is  part  of  

‘investigation’ but the police failed to effect the arrest.

5. The  High  Court  did  not  accept  the  stand  of  the  

appellant.   It  was  observed  that  the  appellant  had  

approached  the  High  Court  against  the  Order  of  the  

Magistrate after delay of four months from the date of the  

Order which itself disentitled it to a direction under Section  

156(3).   It  was  further  observed  that  the  Magistrate  had  

given  reasons  for  declining  to  direct  investigation  under  

Section  156(3)  and  the  said  Order  did  not  call  for  any  

interference.   The  reasons  given by  the  Magistrate,  inter  

alia, are  that  the  Police  had  refused  to  register  a  case.  

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There was civil litigation which had gone up to the Supreme  

Court  and  thus  the  case  was  of  civil  nature.   The  fact  

whether the documents in question were forged or not could  

be ascertained in civil proceedings by getting the opinion of  

the hand writing expert.  Scope of inquiry under Section 202  

was limited to find out whether a case was made out for  

issue of process.    Suppression of material fact of pendency  

of civil dispute by the complainant also justified the order of  

the  Magistrate  to  proceed  under  Section  202  instead  of  

Section 156(3).  It was further observed that a Magistrate is  

not justified in ordering police investigation in mechanical  

manner  as  laid  down  by  the  Gujarat  High  Court  in  

Arvindbhai  Ravjibhai  Patel vs. Dhirubhai  

Shambhubhai Kakadiya  1   .

6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties.  When  

the  matter  came up  for  hearing  on  11th April,  2007,  this  

Court framed the question as follows:

“The question involved in the instant Special   Leave  Petition  is  as  to  the  extent  of  power   that may be exercised by a police officer while   making an inquiry under Section 202(1) of the   Code  of  Criminal  Procedure  particularly,   whether he has power to arrest in course of   the  inquiry  entrusted  to  him  by  the  Magistrate.  Reliance is placed on Sub-Section   

1 1997 (2) GLR 1572

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3 of Section 202 to contend that the power to  arrest without warrant cannot be exercised by  a person not being a police officer.  Impliedly   it is contended that so far as the police officer   is concerned that constraint is not there.”

However, in the light of submissions made during the  

hearing, we frame following questions for consideration:

“(i)   Whether discretion of  the Magistrate to  call for a report under Section 202 instead of   directing investigation 156(3) is controlled by  any defined parameters?

(ii)  Whether in the course of investigation in  pursuance of  a  direction  under Section  202,   the  Police  Officer  is  entitled  to  arrest  an  accused?

(iii)    Whether  in  the  present  case,  the  Magistrate  erred  in  seeking  report  under  Section 202 instead of directing investigation   under Section 156(3)?”

7. Contention  on  behalf  of  the  appellant  is  that  the  

Magistrate and the High Court  erred in declining to order  

investigation under Section 156(3) which was necessary in  

view of the allegation of forgery of documents and stamp  

papers  by  the  accused  to  create  back  dated  partnership  

deeds  by  forging  signatures  of  a  dead  person.   Such  

documents  being in  custody of  the accused could not  be  

otherwise  produced  except  on  arrest  in  the  course  of  

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investigation  and  in  accordance  with  Section  27  of  the  

Evidence Act.  Option of proceeding under Section 202, as  

against  Section  156(3),  has  to  be  exercised  only  when  

evidence has already been collected and what remained to  

be  decided  was  whether  there  was  sufficient  ground  to  

proceed.  Mere fact that the appellant first approached the  

Police and the police did not register First Information Report  

could not be taken against it nor the dispute being of civil  

nature  was  a  bar  to  criminal  proceedings,  if  a  case  was  

made out.

8. Learned counsel for the appellant also submitted that  

direction under Section 156(3) for investigation was all the  

more  necessary  in  view  of  interpretation  given  by  the  

Gujarat  High  Court  in   Sankalchand  Valjibhai  Patel vs.  

J.P. Chavda and Ors.  2   that under Section 202, the Police  

Officer had no power of arrest.  In such a situation calling for  

report  under  Section  202  will  not  serve  the  purpose  of  

finding out the truth.   It was also submitted that the said  

view was erroneous and contrary view in other judgments  

was  sound  and  needs  to  be  approved  by  this  Court.  

Referring to Section 202 (3), it was pointed out that a person  2 (1979) 1 GLR 17

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other than police officer could not exercise power of arrest  

but police officer was not so debarred.  Moreover, arrest was  

integral part of investigation.

9. Jasvantbhai Somabhai Patel, the alleged accused has  

filed  an  application  for  impleadment  stating  that  dispute  

between the parties is of civil nature.  His contention is that  

the appellant is attempting to abuse the process of law to  

arm-twist the accused by having him arrested by the police.  

In the circumstances, no interference was called for by this  

Court.  This application has been opposed by the appellant  

on the ground that during the stage of inquiry under Section  

202 of the Code, the accused has no right to be heard as  

laid down by this Court in Adalat Prasad vs. Rupal Jindal  

& Others  3  .  Having regard to the legal issue involved, we  

have  heard  learned  counsel  for  the  accused  on  the  

questions involved.

10. As already observed, the contention of the appellant is  

that  when there  is  allegation  of  forgery  and discovery  of  

documents  is  necessary,  a  Magistrate  must  order  

investigation  under  Section  156(3)  instead  of  proceeding  

3 (2004) 7  SCC 338

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under Section 202.  Alternatively, direction to the Police to  

investigate  and  give  a  report  under  Section  202  implies  

arrest and discovery which under Section 157 of the Code  

are integral parts of investigation.  Contrary view of Gujarat  

High Court in  Sankalchand  Valjibhai Patel (supra) and  

other High Courts was erroneous while the view taken by  

other High Courts to which reference will be made in later  

part of this Judgment is correct.  Section 202 (3) expressly  

provides that if a person, other than police officer is required  

to  conduct  investigation  under  Section 202 (1),  he is  not  

authorized  to  arrest  without  warrant  which  implied  that  

there is no such restriction on power of arrest available with  

a police officer.  

11. On the other hand, contention on behalf of the alleged  

accused  is  that  both  the  powers  of  the  Magistrate  -  (i)  

directing  investigation  under  Section  156(3);  and  (ii)  

direction  under  Section  202  to  seek  a  report  from police  

after  investigation  to  enable  the  Magistrate  to  decide  

whether  to  proceed  further  and  issue  process  are  

qualitatively  different  and are in different  chapters  of  the  

Code.  Thus, as per scheme of the Code, power of police in  

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pursuance of directions under the said two provisions is not  

the same.

The  Magistrate  has  discretion  either  to  direct  

registration of  a case under  Section 156(3)  or  to  conduct  

inquiry himself as the situation may warrant.  This discretion  

is  to  be  exercised  by  the  Magistrate  in  his  wisdom  and  

having regard to the nature of material available.  Direction  

under  Section  156(3)  to  register  a  criminal  case  and  to  

investigate  is  to  be  exercised  where  the  Magistrate  is  

satisfied  that  prima  facie  a  cognizable  offence  has  been  

committed.  On the contrary, where he thinks it necessary to  

conduct further inquiry before deciding whether he should  

proceed further in the matter, matter has to be dealt with  

under Section 202.  Mere allegation of forgery is not enough  

to require the Magistrate to pass the order under Section  

156(3).   

12. It is further submitted that in the present case, the civil  

proceedings  are  pending  between  the  parties  where  the  

question  of  genuineness  or  otherwise  of  the  partnership  

deed is  an issue.   The process of  criminal  law cannot be  

used  when  a  dispute  is  primarily  of  civil  nature.  

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Simultaneously  initiation  of  criminal  proceedings  may  be  

permitted  where  an  offence  is  shown  to  have  been  

committed.   Thus,  the  Magistrate  was  entitled  to  satisfy  

himself  as  to  whether  any  cognizable  offence  had  been  

committed before proceeding further.  The Magistrate was  

not satisfied from the material available that any cognizable  

offence  had  been  committed  and  he  rightly  decided  to  

conduct further enquiry under Section 202.  Having regard  

to  the  limited  nature  of  inquiry  under  Section  202  which  

option had been rightly chosen by the Magistrate, direction  

to the police to investigate and give a report was limited by  

the very  purpose for  which  the limited inquiry  was to  be  

held,  as  against  procedure  for  investigation  in  cases  not  

covered under Section 202 of the Code.  The purpose was to  

enable the Magistrate to decide whether there was ground  

to proceed further.  The Magistrate having taken cognizance  

of  the  offence  and  the  police  having  not  registered  a  

criminal case nor the Magistrate having directed registration  

of criminal case, procedure and power of the Police in the  

matter are different and in such a situation police did not  

have  the  power  to  arrest,  without  permission  of  the  

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Magistrate as was the view of the Gujarat and other High  

Courts.   

13. We may first deal with the question as to whether the  

Magistrate ought to have proceeded under Section 156(3) or  

was justified in proceeding under Section 202(1) and what  

are  the  parameters  for  exercise  of  power  under  the  two  

provisions.   

14. The two provisions are in two different chapters of the  

Code, though common expression ‘investigation’ is used in  

both the provisions.  Normal rule is to understand the same  

expression in two provisions of an enactment in same sense  

unless the context otherwise requires.  Heading of Chapter  

XII  is  “Information  to  the  Police  and  their  Powers  to  

Investigate”  and  that  of  Chapter  XV  is  “Complaints  to  

Magistrate”.   Heading  of  Chapter  XIV  is  “Conditions  

Requisite for Initiation of Proceedings”.  The two provisions  

i.e. Sections 156 and 202 in Chapters XII and XV respectively  

are as follows :    

“156.  Police  officer's  power  to  investigate cognizable case.

(1)  Any officer  in  charge of  a  police  station   may,  without  the  order  of  a  Magistrate,   investigate any cognizable case which a Court   having jurisdiction over the local area within   

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the limits of such station would have power to   inquire  into  or  try  under  the  provisions  of   Chapter XIII.

(2)   No proceeding of a police officer in any   such  case  shall  at  any  stage  be  called  in   question on the ground that the case was one  which such officer was not empowered under  this section to investigate.

(3)  Any Magistrate empowered under section  190  may  order  such  an  investigation  as  above- mentioned.

202. Postponement of issue of process.-

(1) Any Magistrate , on receipt of a complaint   of an offence of which he is authorized to take   cognizance or which has been made over to   him under section 192, may, if he thinks fit,   [and  shall  in  a  case  where  the  accused  is   residing at a place beyond the area in which  he  exercises  his  jurisdiction]  postpone  the  issue  of  process  against  the  accused,  and  either inquire into the case himself or direct   an investigation to be made by a police officer   or by such other person as he thinks fit,  for   the purpose of deciding whether or not there   is sufficient ground for proceeding:

Provided that  no  such  direction  for  investigation shall be made, -

(a)  where  it  appears  to  the  Magistrate  that the offence complained of is triable  exclusively by the Court of Sessions; or (b)  where  the  complaint  has  not  been  made by a Court, unless the complainant   and the witnesses present (if  any) have  been  examined  on  oath  under  section   200.

(2)  In an inquiry under sub-section (1), the   Magistrate may, if he thinks fit, take evidence   of witnesses on oath:

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Provided that if it appears to the Magistrate  that  the  offence  complained  of  is  triable   exclusively by the Court of Session,  he shall   call  upon the complainant to produce all  his   witnesses and examine them on oath.

(3) If an investigation under sub-section (1) is   made by a person not being a police officer,   he  shall  have  for  that  investigation  all  the   powers conferred by this Code on an officer in   charge of a police station except the power to   arrest without warrant.”

15. Cognizance  is  taken  by  a  Magistrate  under  Section  

190 (in Chapter XIV) either on “receiving a complaint”, on  

“a police report” or “information received” from any person  

other than a police officer or upon his own knowledge.

Chapter  XV  deals  exclusively  with  complaints  to  

Magistrates.   Reference  to  Sections,  202,  in  the  said  

Chapter, shows that it provides for “postponement of issue  

of process” which is mandatory if accused resides beyond  

the Magistrate’s jurisdiction (with which situation this case  

does not concern) and discretionary in other cases in which  

event an enquiry  can be conducted by the Magistrate or  

investigation can be directed to be made by a police officer  

or  such  other  person  as  may  be  thought  fit  “for  the  

purpose of deciding whether or not there is sufficient  

ground for proceeding”.  We are skipping the proviso as  

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it does not concern the question under discussion.  Clause  

(3) provides that if investigation is by a person other than a  

police  officer,  he  shall  have  all  the  powers  of  an  officer  

incharge of a police station except the power to arrest.

16. Chapter XII, dealing with the information to the police  

and  their  powers  to  investigate,  provides  for  entering  

information relating to a ‘cognizable offence’ in a book to be  

kept by the officer incharge of a police station (Section 154)  

and such entry is called “FIR”.  If from the information, the  

officer incharge of the police station has reason to suspect  

commission  of  an  offence  which  he  is  empowered  to  

investigate subject to compliance of other requirements, he  

shall  proceed,  to  the  spot,  to  investigate  the  facts  and  

circumstances and, if necessary, to take measure,  for the  

discovery and arrest of the  offender (Section 157(1).

17. In Lalita Kumari vs. Govt. of U.P.  4  , this Court dealt  

with the questions :

“30.1. (i)  Whether  the  immediate  non- registration  of  FIR  leads  to  scope  for   manipulation by the police which affects the  right  of  the  victim/complainant  to  have  a  complaint  immediately  investigated  upon  allegations being made; and

4 (2014) 2 SCC 1

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30.2. (ii)  Whether  in  cases  where  the  complaint/information  does  not  clearly   disclose  the  commission  of  a  cognizable   offence but the FIR is compulsorily registered  then does it infringe the rights of an accused.”

18. These questions were answered as follows :

“49. Consequently, the condition that is sine  qua non  for  recording  an  FIR  under  Section   154  of  the  Code  is  that  there  must  be   information  and  that  information  must   disclose  a  cognizable  offence.  If  any  information disclosing a cognizable offence is   led before an officer in charge of  the police   station satisfying the requirement of  Section  154(1),  the  said  police  officer  has  no  other  option except to enter the substance thereof   in  the  prescribed  form,  that  is  to  say,  to   register  a  case  on  the  basis  of  such  information.  The provision  of  Section  154 of   the  Code  is  mandatory  and  the  officer   concerned is duty-bound to register the case  on  the  basis  of  information  disclosing  a  cognizable  offence.  Thus,  the plain words of   Section 154(1) of the Code have to be given   their literal meaning. “Shall” 72. It  is  thus  unequivocally  clear  that   registration of FIR is mandatory and also that   it is to be recorded in the FIR book by giving a   unique annual number to each FIR to enable   strict  tracking  of  each  and  every  registered  FIR by the superior police officers as well as   by  the  competent  court  to  which  copies  of   each FIR are required to be sent. “Information” 73. The legislature has consciously used the  expression “information” in Section 154(1) of   the  Code as  against  the  expression  used in   Sections  41(1)(a)* and  (g)  where  the  expression used for arresting a person without   warrant is “reasonable complaint” or “credible   

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information”.  The  expression  under  Section   154(1)  of  the  Code  is  not  qualified  by  the  prefix  “reasonable”  or  “credible”.  The  non- qualification  of  the  word  “information”  in   Section  154(1)  unlike  in  Sections  41(1)(a)*  and (g) of the Code is for the reason that the   police officer should not refuse to record any   information  relating  to  the  commission  of  a  cognizable offence on the ground that he is   not  satisfied  with  the  reasonableness  or   credibility of the information. In other words,   reasonableness  or  credibility  of  the  said   information  is  not  a  condition  precedent  for   the registration of a case. 94. Principles  of  democracy  and  liberty   demand  a  regular  and  efficient  check  on  police powers. One way of keeping check on   authorities  with  such  powers  is  by  documenting  every  action  of  theirs.   Accordingly,  under  the  Code,  actions  of  the  police,  etc.  are  provided  to  be  written  and  documented.  For  example,  in  case  of  arrest   under Section 41(1)(b) of the Code, the arrest   memo along  with  the  grounds  has  to  be  in   writing mandatorily; under  Section 55 of the  Code,  if  an  officer  is  deputed  to  make  an  arrest,  then the superior officer  has to write   down and record the offence,  etc.  for  which  the person is to be arrested; under Section 91   of the Code, a written order has to be passed   by the officer concerned to seek documents;   under  Section  160  of  the  Code,  a  written   notice has to be issued to the witness so that   he  can  be  called  for  recording  of  his/her   statement,  seizure memo/panchnama has to  be drawn for every article seized, etc. 107. While  registration of  FIR is  mandatory,   arrest  of  the  accused  immediately  on   registration of FIR is not at all mandatory. In   fact,  registration  of  FIR  and  arrest  of  an   accused  person  are  two  entirely  different   concepts under the law, and there are several   safeguards available against arrest. Moreover,   it is also pertinent to mention that an accused  person  also  has  a  right  to  apply  for   

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“anticipatory  bail”  under  the  provisions  of   Section  438  of  the  Code  if  the  conditions  mentioned  therein  are  satisfied.  Thus,  in   appropriate  cases,  he  can  avoid  the  arrest   under  that  provision  by  obtaining  an  order   from the court. 108. It is also relevant to note that in Joginder  Kumar v. State of U.P.(1994) 4 SCC 260], this  Court has held that arrest cannot be made by  the  police  in  a  routine  manner.  Some  important  observations  are  reproduced  as  under: (SCC pp. 267-68, para 20)

“20.  … No arrest  can be made in  a routine  manner on a mere allegation of commission of   an offence made against a person. It would be  prudent for a police officer in the interest of   protection  of  the  constitutional  rights  of  a   citizen and perhaps in his own interest that no   arrest should be made without a reasonable   satisfaction reached after some investigation  as  to  the  genuineness  and  bona  fides  of  a   complaint and a reasonable belief both as to  the person’s complicity and even so as to the   need to effect arrest. Denying a person of his   liberty  is  a  serious  matter.  The  recommendations  of  the  Police  Commission   merely reflect the constitutional concomitants   of  the  fundamental  right  to  personal  liberty   and freedom. A person is not liable to arrest   merely  on  the  suspicion  of  complicity  in  an   offence.  There  must  be  some  reasonable   justification  in  the  opinion  of  the  officer   effecting  the  arrest  that  such  arrest  is   necessary  and  justified.  Except  in  heinous   offences, an arrest must be avoided if a police   officer  issues notice to person to attend the  Station  House  and  not  to  leave  the  Station   without permission would do.” 111. Besides,  the  Code  gives  power  to  the   police to close a matter both before and after   investigation. A police officer can foreclose an  FIR before an investigation under Section 157  of the Code, if it appears to him that there is   no sufficient ground to investigate the same.  

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The section itself  states that a police officer   can start investigation when he has “reason to  suspect  the  commission  of  an  offence”.  Therefore,  the requirements  of  launching an   investigation under Section 157 of the Code  are  higher  than  the  requirement  under   Section 154 of the Code. The police officer can   also, in a given case, investigate the matter  and then file a final report under Section 173  of  the  Code  seeking  closure  of  the  matter.   Therefore, the police is not liable to launch an  investigation in every FIR which is mandatorily   registered on receiving information relating to   commission of a cognizable offence. 114. It is true that a delicate balance has to   be  maintained  between  the  interest  of  the  society  and  protecting  the  liberty  of  an  individual. As already discussed above, there   are already sufficient safeguards provided in   the Code which duly protect the liberty of an  individual in case of registration of false FIR.   At  the  same  time,  Section  154  was  drafted  keeping in mind the interest of the victim and  the society. Therefore,  we are of the cogent   view that mandatory registration of FIRs under  Section  154  of  the  Code  will  not  be  in   contravention of Article 21 of the Constitution  as purported by various counsel. 115. Although, we, in unequivocal terms, hold  that Section 154 of  the Code postulates the   mandatory registration of FIRs on receipt of all   cognizable  offences,  yet,  there  may  be  instances  where  preliminary  inquiry  may  be  required owing to the change in genesis and  novelty  of  crimes  with  the  passage of  time.   One such instance is in the case of allegations   relating to medical negligence on the part of   doctors.  It  will  be  unfair  and  inequitable  to  prosecute a medical professional only on the   basis of the allegations in the complaint. 120.6. As  to what  type and in  which  cases   preliminary  inquiry  is  to  be  conducted  will   depend  on  the  facts  and  circumstances  of   each  case.  The  category  of  cases  in  which   

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preliminary  inquiry  may  be  made  are  as   under: (a) Matrimonial disputes/family disputes (b) Commercial offences (c) Medical negligence cases (d) Corruption cases (e)  Cases  where  there  is  abnormal   delay/laches in initiating criminal prosecution,   for example, over 3 months’ delay in reporting   the  matter  without  satisfactorily  explaining  the reasons for delay.”

19. Thus,  this  Court  has  laid  down  that  while  prompt  

registration  of  FIR  is  mandatory,  checks  and balances  on  

power of police are equally important.  Power of arrest or of  

investigation is  not mechanical.   It  requires application of  

mind in the manner provided.  Existence of power and its  

exercise  are  different.   Delicate  balance  had  to  be  

maintained between the interest of society and liberty of an  

individual.   Commercial  offences  have  been  put  in  the  

category of cases where FIR may not be warranted without  

enquiry.

20. It has been held, for the same reasons, that direction  

by  the  Magistrate  for  investigation  under  Section  156(3)  

cannot  be  given  mechanically.   In  Anil  Kumar vs.  M.K.  

Aiyappa  5  , it was observed :

5 (2013) 10 SCC 705

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“11. The scope of Section 156(3) CrPC came  up  for  consideration  before  this  Court  in   several  cases.  This  Court  in  Maksud  Saiyed  case  [(2008)  5  SCC  668] examined  the  requirement of the application of mind by the  Magistrate before exercising jurisdiction under   Section  156(3)  and  held  that  where  jurisdiction is exercised on a complaint filed in   terms of Section 156(3) or Section 200 CrPC,   the Magistrate is required to apply his mind, in   such  a  case,  the  Special  Judge/Magistrate  cannot refer the matter under Section 156(3)   against  a  public  servant  without  a  valid  sanction order. The application of mind by the   Magistrate  should  be  reflected  in  the  order.   The mere statement that he has gone through   the  complaint,  documents  and  heard  the  complainant,  as  such,  as  reflected  in  the  order,  will  not  be  sufficient.  After  going  through  the  complaint,  documents  and  hearing the complainant,  what weighed with   the  Magistrate  to  order  investigation  under  Section  156(3)  CrPC,  should  be  reflected  in   the order, though a detailed expression of his   views is  neither  required nor warranted.  We  have already extracted the order  passed by  the learned Special Judge which, in our view,   has  stated  no  reasons  for  ordering  investigation.”

The  above  observations  apply  to  category  of  cases  

mentioned in Para 120.6 in Lalita Kumari (supra).

21. On  the  other  hand,  power  under  Section  202  is  of  

different nature.  Report sought under the said provision has  

limited  purpose  of  deciding  “whether  or  not  there  is  

sufficient ground for proceeding”.  If this be the object, the  

procedure under Section 157 or Section 173 is not intended  

to be followed.  Section 157 requires sending of report by  

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the police that the police officer suspected commission of  

offence  from  information  received  by  the  police  and  

thereafter  the  police  is  required  to  proceed  to  the  spot,  

investigate the facts and take measures for discovery and  

arrest.  Thereafter, the police has to record statements and  

report on which the Magistrate may proceed under Section  

190.  This procedure is applicable when the police receives  

information  of  a  cognizable  offence,  registers  a  case  and  

forms the requisite opinion and not every case registered by  

the police.

22. Thus, we answer the first question by holding that the  

direction  under  Section 156(3)  is  to  be issued,  only  after  

application of mind by the Magistrate.  When the Magistrate  

does not take cognizance and does not find it necessary to  

postpone instance of process and finds a case made out to  

proceed  forthwith,  direction  under  the  said  provision  is  

issued.   In other words, where on account of credibility of  

information available, or weighing the interest of justice it is  

considered appropriate to straightaway direct investigation,  

such a direction is issued.  Cases where Magistrate takes  

cognizance  and  postpones  issuance  of  process  are  cases  

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where  the  Magistrate  has  yet  to  determine  “existence  of  

sufficient  ground  to  proceed”.   Category  of  cases  falling  

under Para 120.6 in Lalita Kumari (supra) may fall under  

Section  202.   Subject  to  these  broad  guidelines  available  

from the scheme of the Code, exercise of discretion by the  

Magistrate is guided by interest of justice from case to case.

23. We now proceed to deal with the second question of  

power of police to arrest in the course of investigation under  

Section 202 with a view to give its report to the Magistrate  

to enable him to decide whether a case to proceed further  

existed.  Careful examination of scheme of the Code reveals  

that in such situation power of arrest is not available with  

the police.  Contention based on language of Section 202(3)  

cannot be accepted.   

24. The  maxim  ‘expressio  unius  est  exclusion  alterious’   

(express  mention of  one thing  excludes others)  has  been  

called a valuable servant but a dangerous master.  In Mary  

Angel and others vs. State of T.N.  6  , this Court observed  

as follows on the scope of the maxim:  

“19. Further, for the rule of interpretation on   the basis of the maxim “expressio unius est  exclusio  alterius”,  it  has  been  considered in   

6 (1999) 5 SCC 209

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the decision rendered by the Queen’s Bench  in the case of Dean v. Wiesengrund [(1955) 2  QB  120  :  (1955)  2  All  ER  432].  The  Court   considered the said maxim and held that after   all it  is no more than an aid to construction   and  has  little,  if  any,  weight  where  it  is   possible to account for the “inclusio unius” on  grounds  other  than  intention  to  effect  the   “exclusio  alterius”.  Thereafter,  the  Court   referred  to  the  following  passage  from  the  case of  Colquhoun v.  Brooks [(1887) 19 QBD  400  :  57  LT  448]  QBD  at  406  wherein  the   Court called for its approval—

“…  ‘The  maxim  “expressio  unius  est  exclusio alterius” has been pressed upon us. I   agree with what is said in the court below by  Wills,  J.  about  this  maxim.  It  is  often  a   valuable servant, but a dangerous master to   follow  in  the  construction  of  statutes  or   documents. The exclusio is often the result of   inadvertence  or  accident,  and  the  maxim  ought not to be applied, when its application,   having regard to the subject-matter to which   it  is  to be applied,  leads to inconsistency or   injustice.’ In my opinion, the application of the  maxim here would lead to inconsistency and  injustice, and would make Section 14(1) of the   Act  of  1920  uncertain  and  capricious  in  its   operation.”

20. The aforesaid maxim was referred to by  this  Court  in  the  case  of  CCE v.  National  Tobacco Co. of India Ltd. [(1972) 2 SCC 560].   The  Court  in  that  case  considered  the  question  whether  there  was  or  was  not  an   implied  power  to  hold  an  enquiry  in  the  circumstances  of  the  case  in  view  of  the   provisions of Section 4 of  the Central Excise  Act read with Rule 10-A of the Central Excise   Rules and referred to the aforesaid passage  “the maxim is often a valuable servant, but a   dangerous master …” and held that the rule is   subservient to the basic principle that courts   must  endeavour  to  ascertain  the  legislative  intent and purpose, and then adopt a rule of   

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construction  which  effectuates  rather  than  one that may defeat these. Moreover, the rule   of prohibition by necessary implication could   be applied only where a specified procedure is   laid down for the performance of a duty. In the  case of  Parbhani Transport Coop. Society Ltd.  v. Regional Transport Authority  [AIR 1960 SC  801 : (1960) 3 SCR 177] this Court observed  that the maxim “expressio unius est exclusio   alterius”  is  a  maxim  for  ascertaining  the  intention  of  the  legislature  and  where  the  statutory language is plain and the meaning  clear, there is no scope for applying. Further,   in  Harish Chandra Bajpai v.  Triloki Singh [AIR  1957 SC 444 : 1957 SCR 370, 389] SCR at p.   389  the  Court  referred  to  the  following   passage  from  Maxwell  on  Interpretation  of   Statutes, 10th Edn., pp. 316-317:

“Provisions  sometimes  found  in  statutes,   enacting  imperfectly  or  for  particular  cases   only that which was already and more widely   the  law,  have  occasionally  furnished  ground  for  the  contention  that  an  intention  to  alter   the general law was to be inferred from the   partial  or  limited  enactment,  resting  on  the   maxim expressio unius, exclusio alterius. But   that maxim is inapplicable in such cases. The  only  inference which a court  can draw from  such superfluous  provisions  (which generally   find  a  place  in  Acts  to  meet  unfounded  objections  and  idle  doubts),  is  that  the  legislature was either ignorant or unmindful of   the real state of the law, or that it acted under   the influence of excessive caution.”

We are of the view that the maxim does not apply for  

interpretation of Section 202 (3) for the reasons that follow.  

In our view, the correct interpretation of the provision is that  

merely negating the power of arrest to a person other than  

police officer does not mean that police could exercise such  

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power.  The emphasis in the provision is to empower such  

person  to  exercise  other  powers  of  incharge  of  a  police  

station than the power of arrest. As regards the power of  

police to arrest,  there are express provisions dealing with  

the same and power of police to arrest is not derived from or  

controlled by Section 202 (3).  The said power is available  

under Section 41 or under a warrant.  The power remains  

available  subject  to  conditions  for  exercise  thereof.   For  

example  it  can  be  exercised  if  cognizable  offence  is  

committed in the presence of a police officer (Section 41(1)

(a).  Under Section 202, since the Magistrate is in seisin of  

the matter and has yet to decide “whether or not there is  

sufficient ground for proceeding”,  there is no occasion for  

formation  of  opinion  by  the  police  about  credibility  of  

available information necessary to exercise power of arrest  

as  the  only  authority  of  the  police  is  to  give  report  to  

Magistrate  to  enable  him  to  decide  whether  there  is  

sufficient ground to proceed.  Power of arrest is not to be  

exercised mechanically.   In M.C.  Abraham vs. State of  

Maharashtra  7  , it was observed :

7 (2003) 2 SCC 649

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“14. ……In  the  first  place,  arrest  of  an  accused is a part of the investigation and is   within  the  discretion  of  the  investigating  officer.  Section  41  of  the  Code  of  Criminal   Procedure  provides  for  arrest  by  a  police   officer without an order from a Magistrate and  without a warrant. The section gives discretion  to  the  police  officer  who  may,  without  an  order from a Magistrate and even without a   warrant,  arrest  any  person  in  the  situations   enumerated in that section. It is open to him,   in  the course of  investigation,  to  arrest  any  person  who  has  been  concerned  with  any  cognizable  offence  or  against  whom  reasonable  complaint  has  been  made  or   credible information has been received, or a   reasonable suspicion exists of his having been  so concerned. Obviously, he is not expected to   act in a mechanical manner and in all cases to   arrest  the  accused as  soon as the report  is   lodged.  In  appropriate  cases,  after  some  investigation,  the  investigating  officer  may  make  up  his  mind  as  to  whether  it  is   necessary  to  arrest  the  accused  person.  At   that stage the court has no role to play. Since   the power is discretionary, a police officer is   not always bound to arrest an accused even if   the  allegation  against  him  is  of  having   committed  a  cognizable  offence.  Since  an  arrest is in the nature of an encroachment on   the liberty of the subject and does affect the  reputation and status of the citizen, the power   has  to  be  cautiously  exercised.  It  depends  inter  alia  upon  the  nature  of  the  offence   alleged  and  the  type  of  persons  who  are  accused of having committed the cognizable   offence.  Obviously,  the  power  has  to  be  exercised with caution and circumspection.”

25. Nature of cases dealt with under Section 202 are cases  

where material available is not clear to proceed further.  The  

Magistrate  is  in  seisin  of  the  matter  having  taken  the  

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cognizance.  He has to decide whether there is ground to  

proceed further.  If at such premature stage power of arrest  

is exercised by police, it will be contradiction in terms.  As  

regards  denial  of  opportunity  to  record  confession  under  

Section 27 of the Evidence Act, it has to be kept in mind that  

admissibility  of  such  confession  cannot  guide  exercise  of  

power of arrest.  Source of power of arrest is governed by  

other provisions and not by Section 27.  It is only if arrest is  

otherwise permissible that provision of Section 27 may be  

invoked.   If  exercise  of  power  of  arrest  is  not  otherwise  

warranted,  admissibility  of  confession  under  Section  27  

cannot  facilitate  such  exercise.   We,  thus,  hold  that  the  

police of its own cannot exercise its power of arrest in the  

course of making its report in pursuance of direction under  

Section 202.

26. We  may  now  proceed  to  deal  with  the  conflict  in  

decisions  which  has  been  pointed  out  to  us.   Bombay,  

Gujarat and Delhi  High Courts in  Sankalchand Valjibhai  

Patel  (supra),  Emperor vs. Nurmahomed  

Rajmahomed  8  , Mahendrasinh Shanabhai Chauhan and  

8 (1929) 31 BOMLR 84

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Ors. vs. State of Gujarat and Anr.  9   and Harsh Khurana  

vs. Union  of  India  10   have  held  that  in  the  course  of  

investigation  directed  under  Section  202  (1)  the  police  

cannot exercise the power of arrest.  Reasoning is by and  

large similar.  Cases covered by Section 202 are such where  

Magistrate  is  yet  to  decide  whether  the  material  was  

sufficient to proceed.  Till formation of such opinion, arrest  

will be incongruous.  We may only refer to the observations  

of  M.P.  Thakker,  J.  (as  he  then  was)  in  Sankalchand  

Valjibhai Patel (supra) :

“2. The question that has surfaced in the back   drop of the aforesaid facts and circumstances  is:  when  upon  receipt  of  a  complaint  of  an   offence  a  Magistrate  instead  of  issuing  process  postpones  the  issue  of  process   against  the  accused  and  direct?  a  police   officer  to  make  an  investigation  for  the  purpose of  deciding whether or  not  there is   sufficient  ground  for  proceeding,  can  the  police officer in charge of the investigation on  his  own,  place  the  accused  under  arrest?   Section 202 (1)  in so far as material reads as   under:

202.  (1)  Any Magistrate,  on  receipt   of a complaint of an offence of which  he is authorised to take cognizance   or which has been made over to him  under Section 192, may, if he thinks   fit,  postpone  the  issue  of  process   against  the  accused,  and  either   inquire  into  the  case  himself  or   

9 (2009) 2 GLR 1647 10 121 (2005) DLT 301 (DB)

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direct  an  investigation  to  be  made  by a police officer or by such other   person  as  he  thinks  fit,  for  the  purpose of  deciding whether or not   there  is  sufficient  ground  for   proceeding.”

27. On the other hand in  Emperor vs.  Bikha Moti  11   and  

Asha Das and others vs. The State  12  ,  Sind and Assam  

High  Courts  respectively  have  taken  a  contrary  view  by  

holding that when direction for  investigation issued under  

Section  202  (1)  is  issued,  the  police  is  to  investigate  

precisely  in  the  same manner  and  arrest  the  accused  in  

precisely the same manner as they would have done if they  

had recorded First Information Report.  

28. We may only refer to the observations of Devis, CJ in  

Bikha Moti (supra) as follows:

“Now S. 202(1) refers not only to an enquiry   but  also  to  an  investigation  :  and  Section   202(2)  confers  upon  a  person  other  than  a   Magistrate  or  a  police  officer  all  powers   conferred upon a police officer in charge of a   police  station  except  the  power  of  arrest   without  warrant.  Surely  this  implies  that  a   police officer to whom a complaint has been  referred   for  investigation  has  the  power  to   arrest  without  warrant  under  S.54,  Criminal   P.C.  and  all  other  powers  which  may  be   exercised by a police officer in the course of   an  investigation.   To  us,  the  scheme of  the  section appears to be that when a complaint   

11 AIR (1938) Sind 113 12 AIR (1953) Assam 1

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is  sent  to  the  police  for  investigation  and  report, they are to investigate in precisely the  same manner and to  arrest  in  precisely  the   same way as they would  have done if  their   powers had been first invoked by a first report   under S. 154, their being only this difference,   that  in  the one case the police embody the   result of their investigation to the Magistrate  in a report which the Magistrate proceeds to   consider under S.203, while in the other case  the  police  embody  the  result  of  their   investigation  in  what  is  called  a  challan  or   charge-sheet,  but  which  is  really  a  police   report  under  S.190(b),  the  term  challan  or   charge sheet not occurring in the section, the   accused person, in any case, if arrested by the   police, being produced before the Magistrate  in the ordinary way.  To hold otherwise would   be  to  leave  the  proceedings  started  by  the  Magistrate  under  S.202,  Criminal  P.C.   unfinished, and in the air;  for,  he would not   have, as the law contemplates, a report of the   investigation but he would have a refusal by  the police to report as in this case, and other   and  independent  proceedings  in  the  same  matter  initiated  by  them.   But  the  law  contemplates that proceedings, begun by the  acceptance  by  a  Magistrate  of  a  complaint   under  S.200,  Criminal  P.C.  and  sent  to  the   police  for  investigation  under  Section  202,   should be terminated by the Magistrate as set  out in Section 203 and the following sections.   The proceedings are not terminated when the   Magistrate’s authority is defied, his jurisdiction   in effect denied and the order to investigate   and  report  disobeyed.   The  law  does  not   contemplate this, and we cannot see that this   aspect of the case has been considered in any  of the judgments which have been cited to us   in  support  of  the  case  of  this  Court  in   27 SLR 67.”

29. For the reasons already discussed above, we approve  

the view taken in  Sankalchand Valjibhai Patel (supra),   

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Nurmahomed  Rajmahomed  (supra),  Mahendrasinh  

Shanabhai  Chauhan  (supra)  and  Harsh  Khurana  

(supra) and overrule the rule taken in Bikha Moti  (supra)  

and Asha Das (supra).

30. We  now  come  to  the  last  question  whether  in  the  

present case the Magistrate ought to have proceeded under  

Section 156(3) instead of Section 202.  Our answer is in the  

negative.   The  Magistrate  has  given reasons,  which  have  

been upheld by the High Court.  The case has been held to  

be primarily of civil nature.  The accused is alleged to have  

forged  partnership.   Whether  such  forgery  actually  took  

place, whether it  caused any loss to the complainant and  

whether there is the requisite  mens rea are the questions  

which are yet to be determined.   The Magistrate has not  

found clear material to proceed against the accused.  Even a  

case  for  summoning  has  not  yet  been  found.   While  a  

transaction giving rise to cause of action for a civil  action  

may also involve a crime in which case resort  to criminal  

proceedings  may  be  justified,  there  is  judicially  

acknowledged  tendency  in  the  commercial  world  to  give  

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colour of a criminal case to a purely commercial transaction.  

This Court has cautioned against such abuse.   

31. In  Indian Oil Corpn. vs. NEPC India Ltd.  13  ,  it  was  

observed :

“13. While on this issue, it is necessary to take  notice of a growing tendency in business circles   to  convert  purely  civil  disputes  into  criminal   cases.  This  is  obviously  on  account  of  a  prevalent impression that civil law remedies are   time consuming and do not adequately protect   the  interests  of  lenders/creditors.  Such  a   tendency is seen in several family disputes also,   leading  to  irretrievable  breakdown  of   marriages/families. There is also an impression   that if a person could somehow be entangled in   a criminal  prosecution,  there is  a likelihood of   imminent  settlement.  Any  effort  to  settle  civil   disputes and claims, which do not involve any  criminal  offence, by applying pressure through   criminal prosecution should be deprecated and   discouraged.  In  G.  Sagar  Suri v.  State  of  U.P.  [(2000) 2 SCC 636] this Court observed: (SCC p.   643, para 8)

“It  is  to  be  seen  if  a  matter,  which  is   essentially  of  a  civil  nature,  has  been  given  a  cloak  of  criminal  offence.   Criminal proceedings are not a short cut   of  other  remedies  available  in  law.   Before  issuing  process  a  criminal  court   has to exercise a great deal of caution.   For  the  accused it  is  a  serious  matter.   This Court has laid certain principles on  the basis of which the High Court is  to  exercise  its  jurisdiction  under  Section  482 of the Code. Jurisdiction under this   section  has  to  be  exercised  to  prevent   

13 (2006) 6 SCC 736

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abuse  of  the  process  of  any  court  or   otherwise to secure the ends of justice.”

32. In  Pepsi  Foods  Ltd. vs. Special  Judicial  

Magistrate  14  , it was observed :

“28. Summoning of an accused in a criminal   case is a serious matter. Criminal law cannot   be set into motion as a matter of course. It is   not  that  the  complainant  has  to  bring  only   two  witnesses  to  support  his  allegations  in   the  complaint  to  have  the  criminal  law set  into  motion.  The  order  of  the  Magistrate  summoning the accused must reflect that he  has applied his mind to the facts of the case  and  the  law  applicable  thereto.  He  has  to  examine  the  nature  of  allegations  made  in   the complaint and the evidence both oral and  documentary  in  support  thereof  and  would   that  be  sufficient  for  the  complainant  to  succeed  in  bringing  charge  home  to  the  accused.  It  is  not  that  the  Magistrate  is  a   silent  spectator  at  the time of  recording  of   preliminary  evidence  before  summoning  of   the accused. The Magistrate has to carefully   scrutinise  the  evidence  brought  on  record   and may even himself  put questions to the   complainant  and  his  witnesses  to  elicit   answers  to  find  out  the  truthfulness  of  the   allegations or otherwise and then examine if   any offence is prima facie committed by all or   any of the accused.”

33. In view of above, we find that the Magistrate and the  

High Court rightly held that in the present case report under  

Section 202 was the right course instead of direction under  

Section 156(3).  The question is answered accordingly.

14 (1998) 5 SCC 749

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34. We may now also refer to other decisions cited at the  

bar and their relevance to the questions arising in the case.

In Smt.  Nagawwa vs. Veeranna  Shivalingappa  

Konjalgi  & Ors.  15  ,  referring  to  earlier  Judgments  on  the  

scope of Section 202, it was observed :

“3. In Chandra Deo Singh v. Prokash Chandra  Bose [AIR (1963) SC 1430 this Court had after  fully  considering  the  matter  observed  as   follows:

“The courts have also pointed out in  these cases that what the Magistrate   has  to  see  is  whether  there  is   evidence  in  support  of  the  allegations  of  the  complainant  and  not  whether  the  evidence  is   sufficient  to  warrant  a  conviction.   The learned Judges in some of these  cases have been at pains to observe  that an enquiry under Section 202 is   not to be likened to a trial which can  only  take  place  after  process  is   issued,  and that  there  can be only   one trial. No doubt, as stated in sub- section (1) of Section 202 itself, the  object of the enquiry is to ascertain  the  truth  or  falsehood  of  the  complaint,  but  the  Magistrate  making  the  enquiry  has  to  do  this  only  with  reference  to  the  intrinsic   quality  of  the  statements  made  before  him  at  the  enquiry  which  would naturally mean the complaint   itself,  the  statement  on  oath  made  

15 (1976) 3 SCC 736

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by  the  complainant  and  the  statements  made  before  him  by  persons examined at the instance of   the complainant.”

Indicating the scope, ambit of Section 202 of   the Code of Criminal Procedure this Court in   Vadilal  Panchal v.  Dattatraya  Dulaji   Ghadigaonker [AIR (1960) SC 1113] observed  as follows:

“Section  202  says  that  the  Magistrate may, if  he thinks fit,  for   reasons  to  be  recorded  in  writing,   postpone  the  issue  of  process  for   compelling  the  attendance  of  the  person  complained  against  and  direct an inquiry for the purpose of   ascertaining the truth or falsehood of   the  complaint;  in  other  words,  the  scope of an inquiry under the section   is limited to finding out the truth or   falsehood of  the complaint  in order   to  determine  the  question  of  the   issue of  process.  The  inquiry  is  for   the purpose of ascertaining the truth  or  falsehood of  the  complaint;  that   is, for ascertaining whether there is   evidence in support of the complaint   so as to justify the issue of process   and commencement of  proceedings  against  the  person  concerned.  The   section does not say that a regular   trial  for  adjudging  the  guilt  or   otherwise of the person complained  against  should  take  place  at  that  stage;  for  the  person  complained  against can be legally called upon to   answer the accusation made against   him only when a process has issued  and he is put on trial.”

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Same view has  been taken in  Mohinder Singh vs.  

Gulwant  Singh  16  ,  Manharibhai  Muljibhai  Kakadia  &  

Anr. vs. Shaileshbhai  Mohanbhai  Patel  &  Ors.  17  ,  

Raghuraj  Singh  Rousha vs. Shivam  Sunadaram  

Promoters Pvt. Ltd.  18  ,  Chandra Deo Singh vs. Prokas  

Chandra Bose  19  .     

In  Devrapalli Lakshminaryanan Reddy & Ors. vs.  

V. Narayana Reddy & Ors.  20  ,  National Bank of Oman  

vs. Barakara Abdul Aziz & Anr.  21  ,  Madhao & Anr. vs.  

State of Maharashtra & Anr.  22  , Rameshbhai Pandurao  

Hedau vs. State  of  Gujarat  23  ,  the  scheme  of  Section  

156(3) and 202 has been discussed.  It was observed that  

power  under  Section  156(3)  can  be  invoked  by  the  

Magistrate before taking cognizance and was in the nature  

of  pre-emptory  reminder  or  intimation  to  the  police  to  

exercise  its  plenary  power  of  investigation   beginning  

Section 156 and ending with report or chargesheet under  

16 (1992) 2 SCC 213 17 (2012)  10 SCC 517 18 (2009) 2 SCC 363 19 (1964) 1 SCR 639 20 (1976) 3 SCC 252 21 (2013) 2 SCC 488 22 (2013) 5 SCC 615 23 (2010) 4 SCC 185

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Section 173.   On the other hand, Section 202 applies at  

post  cognizance  stage  and  the  direction  for  investigation  

was for the purpose of deciding whether there was sufficient  

ground to proceed.   

35. These aspects have already been discussed above and  

are indeed undisputed.

36. In H.N. Rishbud and Inder Singh vs. The State of  

Delhi  24  , this Court explained the scope of investigation by  

the  police  and  held  that  investigation  included  power  to  

arrest.  There is no dispute with this legal position.

37. In the light of above discussion, we are unable to find  

any error in the view taken by the Magistrate and the High  

Court that direction under Section 156(3) was not warranted  

in the present case and the police may not be justified in  

exercising power of arrest in the course of submitting report  

under Section 202.

38. The  questions  framed  for  consideration  stand  

answered accordingly. 24 (1955) 1 SCR 1150

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39. The appeal is dismissed.

……..…………………………….J. [  T.S. THAKUR ]

.….………………………………..J.    [ ADARSH KUMAR GOEL ]

……..…………………………….J. [  R. BANUMATHI ]

NEW DELHI MARCH 16, 2015

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