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REPORTABLE       

    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA   CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.11466 OF 2014  (Arising out of SLP(C) NO. 8113 OF 2014)

RAMAN                           ………APPELLANT

Vs.

UTTAR HARYANA BIJLI VITRAN  NIGAM LTD.& ORS.       ………RESPONDENTS

J U D G M E N T

V.GOPALA GOWDA, J.

Leave granted.

2.  The  appellant,  represented  through  his  natural  

guardian father - Manoj Kumar, has filed this appeal  

questioning  the  judgment  and  order  dated  30.10.2013  

passed  by  the  Division  Bench  of  the  High  Court  of  

Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in the Letters Patent  

Appeal No.1631 of 2013 in Civil Writ Petition No. 14046  

of 2012.

3. The brief facts are stated herein:

The appellant, a four year old boy was electrocuted

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on  03.11.2011  by  coming  in  direct  contact  with  the  

naked  electric  wire  lying  open  on  the  roof  of  his  

house.  Immediately  after  the  incident,  the  boy  was  

taken for first aid to a nearby R.M. Anand Hospital in  

Panipat, Haryana from where he was referred to Post  

Graduate  Institute  of  Medical  Sciences,  Rohtak.  The  

final treatment was given at Safdarjang Hospital, New  

Delhi, where the doctors left with no other option but  

to carry out triple amputation by removing both his  

arms  upto  arm  pit  and  left  leg  upto  knee  as  the  

grievous  injuries  suffered  were  not  curable.  On  

08.02.2012, the disability certificate was issued to  

the  appellant  certifying  to  be  100%  permanent  

disability.  

4. It is stated on behalf of the appellant that prior  

to this tragic incident, on 16.08.2011 the appellant’s  

father along with other neighbours had approached the  

SDO, Chhajpur, Panipat i.e. respondent No. 3 through a  

representation,  to  remove  the  iron  angle  from  the  

vicinity of the residential area, as it endangers the  

life  of  around  40  to  60  families  which  is  densely  

populated. But no action was taken by him.

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5. The appellant approached the High Court by filing a  

writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of  

India seeking for an award of compensation from the  

respondents on account of the negligence on the part of  

the respondents which resulted in the tragic electric  

shock leading to triple amputation of the appellant.

6.  The  said  writ  petition  was  opposed  by  the  

respondents by filing a written statement denying the  

allegations made therein stating that the iron angle  

found on the roof of the house was not installed by any  

employee of the respondent electricity department.  It  

is stated by the respondents that the father of the  

appellant was to be squarely blamed for installing the  

insulator himself on the roof of the house on which  

high tension wire was erected to keep it at bay so as  

not to touch brick and mortal.  Therefore, neither the  

first respondent-Uttar Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Ltd.  

nor  its  employees  can  be  held  responsible  or  

accountable for the mishap occurred on the fateful day  

much less the damages or monetary compensation to be  

awarded in favour of the appellant herein.

7. The learned Single Judge of the High Court adverted

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to Section 68 of the Indian Electricity Act, 2003 (for  

short “the Act”) and Rule 91 of the Electricity Rules,  

1956  (for  short  “the  Rules”)  which  lay  down  the  

procedure  of  safety  and  protective  devices  to  be  

provided for overhead electric lines erected over any  

part of the street or public place or any consumer’s  

premises and mandate that those shall be protected with  

a device approved by the Inspector for rendering the  

line electrically harmless in case it breaks.

8. The learned Single Judge of the High Court further  

referred to Rules 29, 44 and 46 of the Rules which are  

statutory  in  nature  which  require  the  electricity  

authorities  to  conduct  periodical  inspection  of  the  

lines maintained by them and to take all such safety  

measures to prevent accident and maintain the lines in  

such a manner that life and property of the general  

public  is  protected.   The  learned  Single  Judge  has  

considered the position of law declared by this Court  

in  catena  of  cases  for  awarding  compensation,  

particularly,  the  electrocution  cases,  and  held  the  

principle  of  “strict  liability”  and  consequential  

negligence in awarding compensation in favour of the  

claimant  against  the  State  Electricity  Board.  This

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Court and the various High Courts such as High Courts  

of Madras, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Kerala and Gujarat  

have  awarded  compensation  to  the  victims  of  

electrocution  in  exercise  of  the  extraordinary  and  

appellate  jurisdiction,  and  have  held  that  the  

Electricity Board Supply Companies are duty bound to  

take precautionary measures under the provisions of the  

Act.  Therefore, the learned Single Judge has held the  

electricity  authority  -  the  first  respondent  to  be  

liable  to  pay  the  compensation  to  the  claimant  

irrespective of the fact that the harm could have been  

avoided  by  the  consumer  by  taking  precautionary  

measures.  The learned Single Judge of the High Court  

has referred to various judgments of this Court as well  

as the aforesaid High Courts rendered under the Motor  

Vehicles Act for determination and awarding just and  

reasonable compensation in favour of the claimant, viz.  

General  Manager,  Kerala  State  Road  Transport  

Corporation,  Trivandrum  v. Susamma  Thomas  and  Ors.1,  

Sarla Dixit and Anr.  v. Balwant Yadav & Ors.2,  U.P.  

State  Road  Transport  Corporation  &  Ors.  v.  Trilok  

1  (1994) 2 SCC 176 2   (1996) 3 SCC 179

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Chandra & Ors.3, United India Insurance Co. Ltd. & Ors.  

v. Patricia Jean Mahajan & Ors.4 and Abati Bezbaruah v.  

Dy.  Director  General,  Geological  Survey  of  India  &  

Anr.5 by applying the multiplier method as specified in  

the schedule of the M.V. Act.  

9. The learned Single Judge awarded compensation to  

the appellant and issued directions to the respondent  

which runs into (xiii) clauses/paragraphs. Therelevant  

paragraph  Nos. (v)  and (vi)  of the  judgment of  the  

learned  Single  Judge,  prior  to  modification  by  the  

Division Bench of the High Court in its judgment, are  

extracted below:

“v)  In  order  to  secure  the  financial  and  monetary  future  of  the  minor  Raman,  it  is  directed that the respondent-Nigam would pay  compensation  of  Rs.  30  lacs  to  him  immediately for loss of enjoyment of life,  trauma suffered and to act as a guard against  neglect  and  dependence  on  others,  loss  of  future employability and the agony of it all,  pain and mental shock suffered and continue  to  be  suffered  by  an  irreconcilable  event  that  has  completely  changed  the  life  of  a  family.   This  amount  would  when  made  available with interest on reaching the age  of 21 years act as a financial security and  building block for the future.  The amount  will be deposited in a fixed deposit account  in the name of the petitioner (minor) under  joint guardianship of the parents of Raman  

3   (1996) 4 SCC 362 4   (2002) 6 SCC 306 5   (2003) 3 SCC 148

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and  the  Engineer-in-Chief  or  his  nominee  representing  the  respondent-Nigam,  in  a  nationalised  bank,  preferably  in  the  State  Bank of Patiala, Branch at Punjab and Haryana  High  Court,  Chandigarh.   The  amount  is  directed to be so deposited within 60 days of  receipt  of  certified  copy  of  this  order  failing  which  the  amount  will  carry  8.5%  interest till deposit in the Bank where after  the principal amount will earn interest at  bank rates for fixed deposits fixed from time  to time.   However, the amount awarded under  this head will only be available to the minor  Raman on attaining the age of majority i.e.  21 years.  In case the minor Raman does not  survive till the age of majority, this amount  with all interest accrued shall revert to the  respondent-Nigam with no claim on it by any  third  party  or  the  parents  or  siblings  of  Raman.   This would ensure that the child is  valued  and  cared  for  till  he  attains  majority. vi)  Since  the  above  amount  of  Rs.30  lakhs  would remain inaccessible to the petitioner  for his use he would require running income  to  meet  his  daily  expenses  for  paid  caregivers/attendants  or  family  help/labour  equivalent to such expenses and other bare  and sundry expenses, which are quantified at  about Rs.20,000/- plus per month for life as  at present.  To earn interest of Rs.20,000/-  per  month  a  corpus  of  Rs.  30  lakhs  is  required to be invested in the Bank to earn  interest @   8.5% being current rates on long  term fixed deposits.   Therefore, in addition  to Rs.30 Lakhs as awarded in direction (v),  the  respondent-Nigam  would  pay  and  deposit  compensation  of  a  further  amount  of  Rs.30  lakhs  to  be  kept  in  a  separate  interest  bearing account in the same bank as directed  under  point  no.  (v),  under  the  same  joint  guardianship arrangement.   This will be an  interest  accruing  account  with  interest  proceeds  available  to  meet  the  day-to-day  needs  of  the  petitioner.   The  interest  so

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accrued  will  be  transferred  in  a  separate  savings bank account to be opened in the same  branch in minor Raman’s name to be operated  jointly  by  the  parents  payable  to  the  petitioner  on  regular  monthly  basis  to  be  applied  for  the  care  of  the  child  by  the  parents, his educational expenses, nutritious  food,  costs  of  attendants/care  givers  to  minister to him day after day etc.   The  above  amount  of  Rs.30  lacks  from  which  interest will be used for the petitioner from  month to month will also not be allowed to be  withdrawn  for  any  purpose,  till  the  petitioner  attains  the  age  of  21,  without  obtaining  orders  from  this  Court,  if  circumstances so warrant, except the monthly  interest  as  directed.   The  State  Bank  of  Patiala, Branch at Punjab and Haryana High  Court, Chandigarh would open the said Savings  Bank Account in the name of the minor; under  the  guardianship  of  mother  and  father  and  transfer the said savings Bank Account to the  Branch  nearest  to  the  residence  of  the  petitioner  and  the  bank  would  remit  the  interest accrued thereon every month to the  said savings account at Panipat Branch, to be  auto-renewed till the petitioner reaches the  age of 21 years.  The amount is directed to  be so deposited within 60 days of receipt of  certified copy of this order failing which  the  amount  will  carry  8.5%  interest  till  deposit in the bank where after the principal  amount will earn interest at bank rates for  fixed deposits from time to time.”

    In addition to the compensation awarded by the  

learned Single Judge in the above terms in favour of  

the  appellant,  certain  other  directions  were  also  

given to the respondents for its compliance to avert  

any unfortunate electrocution accidents in future.

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10. Being aggrieved  of the  judgment and  order dated  

02.07.2013 of the learned Single Judge, the respondents  

filed the LPA in the High Court urging various grounds  

and prayed to set aside the same.  The Division Bench  

of the High Court on 30.10.2013 passed a cryptic order  

while  partially  allowing  the  LPA  filed  by  the  

respondents  on  the  basis  of  the  alleged  concession  

given  by  the  advocate  on  behalf  of  the  appellant,  

holding that the learned counsel for the parties have  

obtained requisite instructions and they are ad idem  

that instant appeal be disposed of on the following  

agreed terms, which read thus:-

“(1) The impugned order is accepted by  the parties, except to the extent of  modification hereinafter specified.  (2)  The  amount  of  Rs.  30  lakhs  specified  in  clause  (v)  of  the  direction  would  be  deposited  in  the  State Bank of Patiala, Panipat Branch,  instead of Branch at Punjab and Haryana  High Court, Chandigarh.  (3)  This  amount  will  be  deposited  within 10 days in the account number  given  to  the  appellants  and  to  be  converted immediately into FDR in terms  of  directions  contained  in  same  sub- para;and   (4)  The  directions  given  in  sub-para  (vi)  will  stand  substituted  by  a  direction to pay a sum of Rs.10,000/- p.m. on or before 7th of every month in  advance, directly to the bank account  already intimated and such payment will

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continue  to  be  made  till  the  minor  attains the age of 21 years.”

11. It is urged by the learned senior counsel on behalf  

of  the  appellant  Mr.  Sushil  Kumar  Jain  that  the  

unfortunate appellant boy or his parents who are his  

natural guardians in the proceedings were unaware of  

the nexus of their advocate with the respondents and  

when they came to know about the order passed in LPA, a  

legal notice dated 27.01.2014 was sent to his advocate  

for purging from breach of trust and for committing  

professional misconduct under the Advocates Act, 1961  

in giving concession before the Division Bench of the  

High  Court  without  their  either  oral  or  written  

instructions.

Hence, the appellant has approached this Court with  

this appeal questioning the correctness of the impugned  

judgment and order of the Division Bench of the High  

Court by urging various grounds.    

12.  The  learned  senior  counsel  on  behalf  of  the  

appellant has contended that the order of the Division  

Bench  of  the  High  Court  reducing  the  compensation  

amount awarded by the learned Single Judge from Rs. 60  

lakhs to Rs.30 lakhs and reducing the monthly payment

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from Rs.20,000/- to Rs.10,000/-, till he attains the  

age of 21 years, on account of ad idem, which in fact  

is arbitrary, unreasonable and is not correct, as the  

appellant  has  not  given  such  instructions  to  his  

lawyer to give concessions before the Division Bench  

for reducing the compensation awarded by the learned  

Single Judge.  

13. It is further urged by the learned senior counsel  

on behalf of the appellant that the Division Bench of  

the High Court was required to examine the case keeping  

in mind the nature of grievous injuries sustained by  

the  appellant  in  the  electrocution  accident  and  the  

compensation awarded by the learned Single Judge under  

sub-para  (vi)  should  not  have  been  modified  to  the  

extent  of  payment  of  Rs.10,000/-p.m.  in  place  of  

Rs.20,000/- p.m. as per the impugned judgment, on the  

basis  of  the  alleged  instructions  received  by  the  

counsel from the appellant and disposed of the appeal  

by passing impugned judgment by reducing compensation  

awarded in favour of the appellant, which action of it  

is wholly unsustainable in law and therefore, the same  

is liable to be set aside.

14. On the other hand, Mr. Narendra Hooda, the learned

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senior counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents  

submitted that there is no reduction of compensation  

awarded  by  the  learned  senior  counsel,  except  

modification  made  as  mentioned  at  para  4  in  the  

impugned  judgment  to  the  extent  of  Rs.10,000/-  p.m.  

instead of Rs.20,000/-p.m. towards monthly expenses of  

the appellant which would not affect the rights of the  

appellant and hence, he has prayed for dismissal of the  

appeal as the same is devoid of merit.  

15.  We  have  heard  learned  senior  counsel  for  the  

parties who have made their respective submissions in  

support of their respective claim which were carefully  

examined by us with reference to the undisputed facts,  

particularly, the amputation of both the arms upto the  

arm pit and the left leg upto knee which has resulted  

in 100% permanent disability caused to the appellant as  

per the Doctor’s certificate which is produced in the  

case.   

16.  Having regard to the age of the boy as 5 years at  

the  time of  the incidence  and longevity  of life  of  

Indian citizen as 70 years, the remaining 65 years the  

appellant is required to suffer from mental agony and  

hardship. He is virtually dead wood and further he has

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to undergo continuous pain and suffering at the time of  

attending the nature’s call, sitting, standing, walking  

and sleeping. He has to face difficulties on all walks  

of life, which is worse than death. His childhood is  

lost, the marital status and happiness is lost, which  

cannot be compensated in terms of money.  He has to  

undergo the great ordeal and agony throughout his life.  

He  requires  a  permanent  attendant  throughout  his  

lifetime to assist him for all purposes, to whom the  

appellant is required to pay minimum at an average of  

Rs.10,000/-  to  Rs.15,000/-  p.m.  and  it  is  a  hard  

reality that the cost of living in our country is also  

steadily increasing day by day.  This aspect of the  

matter should have been taken into consideration by the  

Division  Bench  of  the  High  Court  at  the  time  of  

reducing the compensation awarded to the appellant.  

17.  The learned  Single Judge  of the  High Court  has  

awarded compensation keeping all these aspects of the  

matter  and  has  applied  the  guiding  principle  of  

multiplier method after adverting to the case of Sarla  

Verma & Ors. v. Delhi Transport Corporation & Anr6. for  

the  purpose  of  computation  of  just  and  reasonable  

6  (2009) 6  SCC 121

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compensation in favour of the appellant which method  

should  not  have  been  applied  to  the  case  on  hand,  

particularly, having regard to the statutory negligence  

on the part of the respondents in not providing the  

safety measures to see that live electric wires should  

not  fall  on  the  roof  of  the  building  by  strictly  

following the Rules to protect the lives of the public  

in the residential area.  This Court in the case of Dr.  

Balram  Prasad  v. Kunal  Saha7,  has  deviated  from  

following  the  multiplier  method  to  award  just  and  

reasonable compensation in favour of the claimant in a  

medical negligence case. The same principle will hold  

good in the case on hand too. The following case law is  

followed by this Court in the above referred case, the  

relevant paragraphs are extracted herein to award just  

and reasonable compensation in favour of the appellant:

68. …….. three-Judge Bench decision of  this Court in  Indian Medical Assn. v.  V.P.  Shantha,  wherein  this  Court  has  categorically disagreed on this specific  point in another case wherein “medical  negligence”  was  involved.  In  the  said  decision, it has been held at para 53  that to deny a legitimate claim or to  restrict  arbitrarily  the  size  of  an  award  would  amount  to  substantial  injustice to the claimant.

                *********

7  (2014) 1 SCC 384

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99. In  Govind  Yadav v.  New  India  Insurance Co. Ltd. this Court at para 15  observed as under which got reiterated at  SCC pp. 639-40, para 13 of  Ibrahim v.  Raju:  

“15. In Reshma Kumari v. Madan Mohan    [(2009) 13 SCC 422]  this Court reiterated  that  the  compensation  awarded  under  the  Act  should  be  just  and  also  identified  the  factors  which  should  be kept in mind while determining the  amount of compensation. The relevant  portions  of  the  judgment  are  extracted below:  

26.  The  compensation  which  is  required to be determined must be  just.  While  the  claimants  are  required to be compensated for the  loss of their dependency, the same  should not be considered to be a  windfall. Unjust enrichment should  be discouraged. This Court cannot  also lose sight of the fact that  in  given  cases,  as  for  example  death of the only son to a mother,  she  can never  be compensated  in  monetary terms.

27.  The  question  as  to  the  methodology required to be applied  for determination of compensation  as  regards  prospective  loss  of  future earnings, however, as far  as  possible  should  be  based  on  certain principles. A person may  have a bright future prospect; he  might  have  become  eligible  to  promotion immediately; there might  have been chances of an immediate  pay revision, whereas in another  (sic  situation)  the  nature  of  employment was such that he might

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not have continued in service; his  chance of promotion, having regard  to the nature of employment may be  distant  or  remote.  It  is,  therefore, difficult for any court  to  lay  down  rigid  tests  which  should  be  applied  in  all  situations.  There  are  divergent  views. In some cases it has been  suggested  that  some  sort  of  hypotheses  or  guesswork  may  be  inevitable. That may be so.

   XXX      XXX             XXX

46. In the Indian context several  other factors should be taken into  consideration including education  of the dependants and the nature  of  job.  In  the  wake  of  changed  societal  conditions  and  global  scenario,  future  prospects  may  have  to  be  taken  into  consideration  not  only  having  regard  to  the  status  of  the  employee,  his  educational  qualification;  his  past  performance  but  also  other  relevant  factors,  namely,  the  higher  salaries  and  perks  which  are being offered by the private  companies  these  days.  In  fact  while determining the multiplicand  this Court in  Oriental Insurance  Co.  Ltd. v.  Jashuben held  that  even dearness allowance and perks  with regard thereto from which the  family would have derived monthly  benefit,  must  be  taken  into  consideration.

47. One of the incidental issues  which has also to be taken into  consideration is inflation. Is the

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practice of taking inflation into  consideration  wholly  incorrect?  Unfortunately,  unlike  other  developed  countries,  in  India  there  has  been  no  scientific  study.  It is  expected that  with  the rising inflation the rate of  interest would go up. In India it  does  not  happen.  It,  therefore,  may be a relevant factor which may  be  taken  into  consideration  for  determining  the  actual  ground  reality.  No  hard-and-fast  rule,  however,  can  be  laid  down  therefor.’

               ********

101.  …………………….. he has also strongly placed  reliance upon the observations  made at para  170 in Malay Kumar Ganguly’s case referred to  supra  wherein  this  Court  has  made  observations as thus: (SCC p. 282)

“170.  Indisputably,  grant  of  compensation involving an accident is  within the realm of law of torts. It  is  based  on  the  principle  of  restitutio  in  integrum.  The  said  principle  provides  that  a  person  entitled to damages should, as nearly  as  possible,  get  that  sum  of  money  which  would  put  him  in  the  same  position as he would have been if he  had  not  sustained  the  wrong.  (See  Livingstone v. Rawyards Coal Co.)”

********** 103.1. In  Ningamma’s  case, this  Court  has  observed at para 34 which reads thus: (SCC p.  721)

“34. …….in our considered opinion a  party  should  not  be  deprived  from  getting ‘just compensation’ in case

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the claimant is able to make out a  case  under  any  provision  of  law.  Needless  to  say,  the  MVA  is  beneficial  and  welfare  legislation.  In fact, the court is duty-bound and  entitled to award ‘just compensation’  irrespective of the fact whether any  plea in that behalf was raised by the  claimant or not.”                *********

      112. The  claimant  has  also  placed  reliance  upon Nizam’s Institute of Medical Sciences v.  Prasanth S.Dhananka’s [(2009) 2 SCC 688] case  in support of his submission that if a case  is made out, then the Court must not be chary  of  awarding  adequate  compensation.  The  relevant paragraph reads as under:   

“88. We must emphasise that the court  has to strike a balance between the  inflated and unreasonable demands of  a  victim  and  the  equally  untenable  claim  of  the  opposite  party  saying  that nothing is payable. Sympathy for  the victim does not, and should not,  come in the way of making a correct  assessment,  but  if  a  case  is  made  out, the court must not be chary of  awarding  adequate  compensation.  The  ‘adequate compensation’ that we speak  of, must to some extent, be a rule of  thumb measure, and as a balance has  to be struck, it would be difficult  to  satisfy  all  the  parties  concerned.”

    Further in para 119, it is held ……this Court  

has  rejected  the  use  of  multiplier  system  to  

calculate  and  award  the  quantum of  compensation  

which must be just and reasonable. The relevant

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paragraph is quoted hereunder: (SCC para 92)

“92.  Mr  Tandale,  the  learned  counsel  for  the  respondent  has,  further  submitted  that  the  proper  method  for  determining  compensation  would  be  the  multiplier  method.  We  find  absolutely  no  merit  in  this  plea.  The  kind  of  damage  that  the  complainant  has  suffered, the expenditure that he has  incurred and is likely to incur in the  future and the possibility that his      rise in his chosen field would now be  restricted, are matters which cannot be  taken  care  of  under  the  multiplier  method  .”   

(emphasis supplied)

    Further under paragraph No. 121, the relevant  

paragraph  from  United  India  Insurance  Co.  Ltd. v.  

Patricia Jean Mahajan read as under: (SCC pp. 295-96,  

paras 20)

“20.  The  court  cannot  be  totally  oblivious to the realities. The Second  Schedule  while  prescribing  the  multiplier,  had  maximum  income  of  Rs  40,000  p.a.  in  mind,  but  it  is  considered  to  be  a  safe  guide  for  applying  the  prescribed  multiplier  in  cases of higher income also but in cases  where the gap in income is so wide as in  the  present  case  income  is  2,26,297  dollars, in such a situation, it cannot  be  said  that  some  deviation  in  the  multiplier  would  be  impermissible.  Therefore, a deviation from applying the  multiplier  as  provided  in  the  Second  Schedule  may  have  to  be  made  in  this  case. Apart  from  factors  indicated

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earlier the amount of multiplicand also  becomes  a  factor  to  be  taken  into  account  which  in  this  case  comes  to  2,26,297  dollars,  that  is  to  say,  an  amount of around Rs 68 lakhs per annum  by converting it at the rate of Rs 30.  By Indian standards it is certainly a  high amount. Therefore, for the purposes  of  fair  compensation,  a  lesser  multiplier  can  be  applied  to  a  heavy  amount  of  multiplicand.  A  deviation  would be reasonably permissible in the  figure of multiplier even according to  the observations made in Susamma Thomas  where a specific example was given about  a person dying at the age of 45 leaving  no  heirs  being  a  bachelor  except  his  parents.”

(emphasis supplied)

Further, in paragraph 177, it was held as under:-

“177. Under the heading of loss due to  pain and suffering and loss of amenities  of the wife of the claimant, Kemp and Kemp  write as under:

"The award to a plaintiff of damages  under the head "pain and suffering"  depends as Lord Scarman said in Lim  Poh  Choo  v.  Camden  and  Islington  Area  health  Authority,  "upon  the  claimant’s  personal  awareness  of  pain,  her  capacity  of  suffering.  Accordingly, no award is appropriate  if and in so far as the claimant has  not suffered and is not likely to  suffer pain, and has not endured and  is not likely to endure suffering,  for example, because he was rendered  immediately  and  permanently  unconscious  in  the  accident.  By  contrast,  an  award  of  damages  in

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respect  of  loss  of  amenities  is  appropriate  whenever  there  is  in  fact such a loss regardless of the  claimant's awareness of the loss."

 XXX           XXX          XXX

‘  Even though the claimant may die    from his injuries shortly after the  accident, the evidence may justify  an  award  under  this  head.  Shock  should also be taken account of as  an ingredient of pain and suffering  and  the  claimant's  particular  circumstances  may  well  be  highly  relevant  to  the  extent  of  her  suffering. ..........’

By  considering  the  nature  of  amenities  lost  and  the  injury  and  pain  in  the  particular  case,  the  court  must  assess  the  effect  upon  the particular claimant. In deciding  the appropriate award of damages, an  important  consideration  show  long  will  he  be  deprived  of  those  amenities and how long the pain and  suffering  has  been  and  will  be  endured. If it is for the rest of  his life the court will need to take  into  account  in  assessing  damages  the  claimant's  age  and  his  expectation in life…….”

(emphasis supplied)

18. Further,  in  the  case  of  Rekha  Jain  v. National  

Insurance Co. Ltd.8 this Court at paras 34 and 35, with  

regard to the quantum of damages, has held as under:

8  (2013) 8 SCC 389

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“34.……….In  deciding  on  the  quantum of damages to be paid to  a  person  for  the  personal  injuries  suffered  by  him,  the  Court is bound to ascertain all  considerations  which  will  make  good  to  the  sufferer  of  the  injuries, as far as money can do,  the loss which he has suffered as  a  natural  consequence  of  the  wrong done to him. [K. Narasimha  Murthy vs. the Manager, Oriental  Insurance  Company  Limited  and  Anr.]. [ILR 2004 KAR 2471]

35.……..Therefore, the general principle  which should govern the assessment of  damages  in  personal  injury  cases  is  that the Court should award to injured  person such a sum of money as will put  him in the same position as he would  have been in if he had not sustained  the injuries. But, it is manifest that  no  award  of  money  can  possibly  compensate an injured man and renew a  shattered human frame.”  39…..In  Mediana,  in  re  [1900  AC  113  (HL)], it is held at para 32 which is  extracted as herein  

‘………  32….In  personal  injury  cases,  the  Court  is  constantly  required to form an estimate of  chances and risks which cannot be  determined with precision. It is  because,  the  law  will  disregard  possibilities which are slight or  chances  which  are  nebulous;  otherwise, all the circumstances  of  the  situation  must  be  taken  into account, whether they relate  to the future which the plaintiff  would  have  enjoyed  if  the  accident had not happened, or to  the  future  of  his  injuries  and  his  earning  power  after  the

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accident.  Damages  are  compensation  for  an  injury  or  loss, that is to say, the full  equivalent of money so far as the  nature  of  money  admits;  and  difficulty  or  uncertainty  does  not  prevent  an  assessment.’  [K.  Narasimha Murthy vs. the Manager,  Oriental  Insurance  Company  Limited  and Anr.]  [ILR  2004  KAR  2471]

    In Fowler v. Grace, [(1970) 114 Sol Jo 193 (CA)]  Edmund Davies, L.J., has said that:

“It  is  the  manifest  duty  of  the  Tribunal to give as perfect a sum  as was within its power'. There are  many losses which cannot easily be  expressed in terms of money. If a  person, in an accident, loses his  sight, hearing or smelling faculty  or  a  limb,  value  of  such  deprivation cannot be assessed in  terms of market value because there  is no market value for the personal  asset which has been lost in the  accident, and there is no easy way  of  expressing  its  equivalent  in  terms of money.”

 41. McGregor  on  Damages (14th  Edn.)  at  Para  1157,  referring  to  the  heads  of  damages in personal injury actions, states  as under:

“The  person  physically  injured  may  recover both for his pecuniary losses  and  his  non-pecuniary  losses.  Of  these the pecuniary losses themselves  comprise two separate items viz. the  loss  of  earnings  and  other  gains

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which the plaintiff would have made  had  he  not  been  injured  and  the  medical and other expenses to which  he is put as a result of the injury,  and  the  courts  have  subdivided  the  non-pecuniary  losses  into  three  categories viz. pain and suffering,  loss of amenities of life and loss of  expectation of life.       Besides, the Court is well  advised to remember that the measures  of damages in all these cases ‘should  be  such  as  to  enable  even  a  tortfeasor to say that he had amply  atoned  for  his  misadventure.’  The  observation of Lord Devlin that the  proper approach to the problem or to  adopt a test as to what contemporary  society would deem to be a fair sum,  such as would allow the wrongdoer to  ‘hold  up  his  head  among  his  neighbours  and  say  with  their  approval  that he  has done  the fair  thing’, is quite apposite to be kept  in  mind  by  the  Court  in  assessing  compensation  in  personal  injury  cases  .”   

 (emphasis supplied)

42. In R. Venkatesh v. P. Saravanan the High  Court  of  Karnataka  while  dealing  with  a  personal  injury  case  wherein  the  claimant  sustained certain crushing injuries due to  which  his  left  lower  limb  was  amputated,  held that in terms of functional disability,  the disability sustained by the claimant is  total and 100% though only the claimant’s  left lower limb was amputated. In para 9 of  the judgment, the Court held as under: (Kant  LJ p. 415)

‘9. As  a  result  of  the  amputation,  the  claimant  had  been  rendered  a  cripple.  He  requires  the  help  of

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crutches  even  for  walking.  He  has  become unfit for any kind of manual  work.  As  he  was  earlier  a  loader  doing manual work, the amputation of  his  left  leg  below  the  knee,  has  rendered  him  unfit  for  any  kind  of  manual work. He has no education. In  such cases, it is well settled that  the  economic  and  functional  disability will have to be treated as  total,  even  though  the  physical  disability is not 100%.’

43. Lord  Reid  in  Baker v.  Willoughby has  said: (AC p. 492A)

“…  A man is not compensated for the  physical  injury:  he  is  compensated  for the loss which he suffers as a  result  of  that  injury.  His  loss  is  not in having a stiff leg: it is in  his  inability  to  lead  a  full  life,  his  inability  to  enjoy  those  amenities which depend on freedom of  movement and his inability to earn as  much as he used to earn or could have  earned.…”

19.  In view of the law laid down by this Court in the  

above referred cases which are extensively considered  

and granted just and reasonable compensation, in our  

considered  view,  the  compensation  awarded  at  Rs.  60  

lakhs in the judgment of the learned Single Judge of  

the  High  Court,  out  of  which  30  lakhs  were  to  be  

deposited  jointly  in  the  name  of  the  appellant  

represented by his parents as natural guardian and the

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Chief  Engineer  or  his  nominee  representing  the  

respondent-Nigam  in  a  nationalised  Bank  in  a  fixed  

deposit till he attains the age of majority, is just  

and proper but we have to set aside that portion of the  

judgment of the learned Single Judge directing that if  

he survives, he is permitted to withdraw the amount,  

otherwise the deposit amount shall be reverted back to  

the respondents as the same is not legal and valid for  

the reason that once compensation amount is awarded by  

the  court,  it  should  go  to  the  claimant/appellant.  

Therefore, the victims/claimants are legally entitled  

for compensation to be awarded in their favour as per  

the principles/guiding factors laid down by this Court  

in catena of cases, particularly, in Kunal Saha’s case  

referred to supra. Therefore, the compensation awarded  

by  the  Motor  Vehicle  Tribunals/Consumer  Forums/State  

Consumer  Disputes  Redressal  Commissions/National  

Consumer  Disputes  Redressal  Commission  or  the  High  

Courts    would  absolutely  belong  to  such  

victims/claimants.  If  the  claimants  die,  then  the  

Succession Act of their respective religion would apply  

to  succeed  to  such  estate  by  the  legal  heirs  of  

victims/ claimants or legal representatives as per the

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testamentary  document  if  they  choose  to  execute  the  

will indicating their desire as to whom such estate  

shall go after their death.  For the aforesaid reasons,  

we  hold  that  portion  of  the  direction  the  of  the  

learned Single Judge contained in sub-para (v), to the  

effect of Rs. 30 lakhs compensation to be awarded in  

favour of the appellant, if he is not alive at the time  

he attains majority, the same shall revert back to the  

respondent-Nigam after paying Rs.5 lakhs to the parents  

of the appellant, is wholly unsustainable and is liable  

to be set aside.  Accordingly, we set aside the same  

and  modify  the  same  as  indicated  in  the  operative  

portion of the order.

20. The remaining compensation amount of Rs. 30 lakhs  

to be deposited in a fixed deposit account in the name  

of the petitioner (minor) under joint guardianship of  

the parents of Raman and the Engineer-in-Chief or his  

nominee  representing  the  respondent-Nigam,  in  the  

Nationalised  Bank  as  corpus  fund,  out  of  which  an  

interest of Rs.20,000/- p.m. towards the expenses as  

indicated in sub-para (vi) of the order passed by the  

learned  Single  Judge,  cannot  be  said  to  be  on  the  

higher  side,  but  in  our  view,  the  said  amount  of

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compensation awarded is less and not reasonable  and  

having  regard  to  the  nature  of  100%  permanent  

disability suffered by the appellant, it should have  

been much higher as the appellant   requires permanent  

assistance of an attendant, treatment charges as he is  

suffering from agony and loss of marital life, which  

cannot  be  compensated  by  the  amount  of  compensation  

awarded by the learned Singh Judge of the High Court.  

Hence, having regard to the facts and circumstances of  

the case, it would be just and proper for this Court to  

restore the judgment of the learned Single Judge on  

this count and we hold that the directions contained in  

the  said  judgment  are  justifiable  to  the  extent  

indicated above. The Division Bench while exercising  

its appellate jurisdiction should not have accepted the  

alleged requisite instructions received by the counsel  

on behalf of the appellant and treated as ad idem  and  

modified  the amount as provided under sub-para (vi) of  

the order of the learned Single Judge and substituted  

the  para  4  in  its  judgment  as  indicated  in  the  

aforesaid  portion  of  the  judgment  which  is  wholly  

unreasonable and therefore, it is unsustainable in law  

as  it  would  affect  the  right  of  the  appellant  for

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getting his legal entitlement of just and reasonable  

compensation  for  the  negligence  on  the  part  of  the  

respondents.    

21.  In  view  of  the  foregoing  reasons,  after  

considering  rival  legal  contentions  and  noticing  

the  100%  permanent  disability  suffered  by  the  

appellant in the electrocution accident on account  

of which he lost all the amenities and become a  

deadwood throughout his life, and after adverting  

the law laid down by this Court in catena of cases  

in  relation  to  the  guiding  principles  to  be  

followed to award just and reasonable compensation  

in favour of the appellant, we pass the following  

order:-

(I) The  appeal  is  allowed  after  setting  

aside the substituted paragraph No.4 of  

the  impugned  judgment  and  order  of  the  

Division  Bench  of  the  High  Court  

particularly, in place of sub para (vi)  

of the judgment and order of the learned  

Single Judge with modifications made by  

us  in  this  judgment  in  the  following  

terms.

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(II) We restore the compensation awarded at  

sub-paras (v) and (vi) of the order of  

the learned single Judge:

(a) in  the  modified  form  that  the  

compensation is awarded with direction to  

the  respondents  to  keep  Rs.30  lakhs  in  

the Nationalised Bank in the name of the  

appellant represented by his father as a  

natural  guardian   till  the  age  of  

attaining majority of the appellant.  

(b) The  further  direction  contained  in  

the judgment of the learned Single Judge  

that if the appellant is not alive at the  

time  of  attaining  the  age  of  majority,  

the deposit amount shall be reverted to  

the respondents, is set aside.  

(c)  We  further  declare  that  the  said  

amount  of  compensation  of  Rs.30  lakhs  

exclusively belongs to the appellant and  

after his demise it must go to the legal  

heirs  or  representatives  as  it  is  the  

exclusive estate of the appellant as the  

it is the compensation awarded to him for  

the 100% permanent disability suffered by  

him  due  to  electrocution  on  account  of

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the  negligence  of  the  respondents.  The  

monthly  interest  that  would  be  earned  

during the period of his minority  shall  

be withdrawn by the appellant’s guardian  

and  spend  the  same  towards  his  monthly  

expenses  and  after  he  attains  the  

majority, it is open for him either to  

continue the deposit or withdraw the same  

and appropriate for himself or his legal  

heirs or legal representative, if he does  

not survive.

(d) The deposit of Rs. 30 lakhs as corpus  

amount as directed at sub-para(vi) of the  

judgment  of  the  learned  Single  Judge  

shall  be  in  the  name  of  the  appellant  

exclusively  represented  by  his  natural  

guardians/parents  till  he  attains  

majority, the income that would be earned  

on such deposit amount can be drawn by  

the parents  every month to be spent for  

personal expenses.  The Bank in which the  

deposit  is  made  in  the  name  of  Chief  

Engineer shall be deleted and the name of  

the  appellant  shall  be  entered  as  

directed above.  After attaining the age  

of majority, the appellant is at liberty  

to withdraw the above said amount also.  

If for any reason the appellant does not

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stay  alive,  his  heirs/legal  

representatives  can  withdraw  the  said  

amount.

(e) The other directions in the judgment  

of  the  learned  Single  Judge  to  the  

respondents  for  compliance  shall  remain  

intact, the same shall be complied with  

and the report shall be submitted before  

the learned Single Judge.

The appeal is allowed in the above said  

terms, but without costs.  

………………………………………………………………………J.    [V. GOPALA GOWDA]  

………………………………………………………………………J.      [C. NAGAPPAN]

New Delhi,                                 December 17, 2014

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ITEM NO.1B-For JUDGMENT      COURT NO.11            SECTION IVB

              S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A                        RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

C.A. No. …...../2014 arising from SLP (C) No(s).8113/2014

RAMAN                                              Petitioner(s)

                               VERSUS

UTTAR HARYANA BIJLI VITRAN NIGAM LT.& ORS          Respondent(s)

Date : 17/12/2014 This appeal was called on for pronouncement of  JUDGMENT today.

CORAM :           HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE V. GOPALA GOWDA          HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE C. NAGAPPAN

For Petitioner(s)  Mr. Sushil Kr. Jain, Sr. Adv.  Ms. Anisha Jain, Adv.  Mr. Nitin Jain, Adv.

                    Dr. (Mrs.) Vipin Gupta,Adv.                  

For Respondent(s)  Mr. Narendera Hooda, Adv.  Mr. Manoj Dwivedi, Adv.

                    Mr. Kamal Mohan Gupta,Adv.

                     Hon'ble  Mr.  Justice  V.Gopala  Gowda  pronounced  the  

judgment of the Bench comprising His Lordship and Hon'ble  

Mr. Justice C. Nagappan.

Leave granted.

The  appeal  is  allowed  in  terms  of  the  signed  

reportable judgment.

   (VINOD KR.JHA)    (MALA KUMARI SHARMA) COURT MASTER COURT MASTER

(Signed Reportable judgment is placed on the file)