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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1671 OF 2011

RAMAIAH @ RAMA …..APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

STATE OF KARNATAKA …..RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

A.K. SIKRI, J.

Laxmi, since deceased, was 14 years of age when she was  

married to  the appellant  on 18.11.1992.   Within  six  months of  her  

marriage i.e. on 22.05.1993, she died an unfortunate unnatural death.  

Her body was recovered on 22.05.1993 at 4 p.m. from a well.  It was  

cremated  on  that  day.   However,  four  days  thereafter  i.e.  on  

26.05.1993, at 8 p.m., Mr. Mariyappa (PW-1), maternal uncle of the  

deceased, lodged the complaint with the Police Station and the case  

was registered as Cr. No.160/93.   

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2. As per his statement, it  is he and his wife (PW-2) who brought up  

Laxmi.   At  the age of  14,  appellant's  father asked for  the hand of  

Laxmi in marriage with the appellant which resulted in solemnization  

of  marriage  between  deceased  Laxmi  and  the  appellant  on  

18.11.1992.  PW-1 also stated in his complaint that at the time of her  

marriage,  there  were  negotiations  wherein  the  appellant  and  her  

parents  had  demanded  a  cash  of  Rs.5,000/-  and  certain  gold  

ornaments.   PW-1 could arrange Rs.2,000/-  cash only at  that  time  

which was given by him in dowry at the time of marriage alongwith  

certain gold ornaments, clothes and other articles.  However, since  

they  were  not  able  to  pay  the  balance  of  Rs.3,000/-,  Laxmi  was  

harassed  and  tortured,  mentally  and  physically,  because  of  non-

fulfillment of dowry demand and was asked repeatedly to bring the  

balance of Rs.3,000/- which was due towards dowry amount.  Laxmi  

had intimated about this demand and harassment to her to PW-1 and  

PW-2 whenever she visited her parental house.  In spite of their best  

efforts, they could not comply with the said demand.  Few days before  

the fateful day, when she had come to her parents house, PW-1 and  

PW-2 sent her back to her matrimonial home by convincing her that  

they would pay the requisite amount soon after harvest of the crops.  

It  was  further  alleged  that  five  days  before  her  death,  Laxmi  had  

complained about ill-treatment and harassment to her at the hands of  

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the  appellant  and  his  parents.   However,  on  22.05.1993  between  

10.00 a.m.  to  12.30 p.m.,  the maternal  uncle  was informed of  the  

death of the deceased due to drowning in a well  belonging to one  

Bylappa.  Her parents were also informed of the said unnatural death  

of the deceased.  According to the informant, they did not accept the  

theory of accidental fall into the well when deceased went to wash the  

clothes, as set up by the appellant and that the accused persons after  

doing away with her life, had thrown her into the well.  It  was also  

alleged that before they could reach the village of accused, the dead  

body of  deceased Laxmi  was cremated and they did  not  have an  

opportunity of seeing her face before she was cremated.   

3. On  the  basis  of  the  aforesaid  complaint,  a  case  was  registered  

against  the husband (appellant  herein),  father-in-law,  mother-in-law  

and  brother-in-law  of  the  deceased  Laxmi.   No  doubt,  the  initial  

complaint by Mariyappa (PW-1) was to the effect that the accused  

persons murdered Laxmi and then threw her into the well and also led  

the evidence of such crime to disappear by burning the dead body  

much  prior  to  the  approval  of  maternal  uncle  and  parents  of  the  

deceased.   However, after investigation, the chargesheet was filed  

only for offences punishable under Sections 498-A, 304-B, 201 and  

176 of the Indian Penal Code (for short 'IPC') read with Sections 3, 4  

and 6 (2) of the Dowry Prohibition Act.  During trial, mother-in-law and  

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father-in-law of  the  deceased passed away.   Brother-in-law of  the  

deceased,  being  a  minor,  was  sent  to  Juvenile  Offenders'  Court.  

Thus, only the appellant was tried for the aforesaid change.

4. The prosecution examined 9 witnesses and 4 exhibits were marked.  

The appellant gave his statement under Section 313 of the Code of  

Criminal  Procedure  (for  short  'Cr.P.C.')  and  thereafter  one  

Ramakrishnappa was examined as DW-1.   After  the conclusion of  

trial, arguments were heard by the learned Additional Sessions Judge  

who returned his verdict vide judgment dated 24.08.2001 acquitting  

the appellant of the charges with the findings that prosecution was not  

able to prove the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt.  The  

State challenged the judgment of acquittal by filing the appeal under  

Section  378  of  Cr.P.C.  in  the  High  Court  of  Karnataka.   After  re-

appreciating the entire evidence on record, the High Court has come  

to  the  conclusion  that  the  appellant  was  in  fact  guilty  of  offence  

punishable under Sections 3 & 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act as well as  

under Sections 498-A, 304-B, 201 and 176 IPC.  The judgment and  

order of acquittal of trial court is, thereby, set aside by the High Court  

pronouncing  the  following  sentences  on  the  appellant  under  the  

aforesaid provisions:

“Having regarding to the facts and circumstances  of  this  case,  we  impose  a  sentence  of  five  year  of  rigorous  imprisonment  and  also  minimum  fine  of  

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Rs.15,000/-  for  the  offence  punishable  u/s  3  of  the  Dowry  Prohibition  Act,  in  default,  to  undergo  rigorous  imprisonment for a period of six months.

So far as offence u/s 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act  is  concerned,  the  accused  is  sentenced  to  undergo  rigorous imprisonment for a period of 6 months and fine  of  Rs.5000/-,  in  default  to  undergo  rigorous  imprisonment for a period of three months.

So far as offence u/s 498-A IPC is concerned, the  accused  is  sentenced  to  undergo  two  years  rigorous  imprisonment  and  fine  of  Rs.2000/-,  in  default,  to  undergo  rigorous  imprisonment  for  a  period  of  two  months.

So  far  as  Sec.304-B  IPC,  the  accused  shall  undergo  minimum  sentence  of  seven  years  rigorous  imprisonment.

As  far  as  offence  under  Section  201  IPC  is  concerned,  the accused shall  undergo sentence for  a  period of one year.

So  far  as  offence  under  Section  176  IPC,  the  accused shall pay a fine of Rs.1000/-.

As  the  substantive  sentence  is  imposed  for  the  offence punishable u/s 304-B of IPC, all other sentences  shall run concurrently.   

The accused  shall  have the  benefit  of  Sec.  428  Cr.P.C.”

5. Before  we  proceed  to  discuss  the  tenability  of  the  merits  of  this  

appeal  preferred  by  the  accused,  we  would  like  to  state  certain  

admitted facts appearing in the case and would also like to discuss  

the approach of  the trial  court as well  as the High Court  in giving  

conflicting verdicts.

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6. As mentioned above, deceased Laxmi was 14 years of age at the  

time of  marriage  and  was hardly  15  years  old  when  she  met  an  

unnatural  death.   Marriage  between the  appellant  and  Laxmi  was  

solemnized on 18.11.1992 and within six months of the marriage, she  

died on 22.05.1993.  As per the prosecution, Shri Mariyappa (PW-1)  

learnt about the unnatural death of Laxmi through the message sent  

from the village of the appellant between 10.00 a.m. and 12.30 p.m.  

on 22.05.1993.  It is not in dispute that the unnatural death of Laxmi  

was not intimated to the Police by her in-laws.  Though the parents of  

the  deceased  were  informed,  it  is  also  not  in  dispute  that  no  

postmortem was sought  on the dead body of  the deceased.   The  

appellant has also accepted the fact that as per the prevalent custom  

in the community of the appellant as well as the complainant, dead  

bodies are buried.  However, in the present case, deceased Laxmi  

was cremated.

7. There is, however, some dispute about the presence of the parents  

of the deceased at the time of cremation.  As per the prosecution,  

Laxmi was cremated before the parents or maternal uncle/aunt of the  

deceased could reach the place of the appellant.  On the other hand,  

the appellant maintains that they had reached well in time and she  

was  not  only  cremated  in  their  presence  but  it  was  with  their  

concurrence that the body was cremated and not buried.

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8. The persistent and consistent defence put up by the appellant was  

that it was an accidental death which occurred when Laxmi had gone  

to the well to wash the clothes at about 8.00 a.m. on 22.05.1993 as  

she fell into the well accidentally.  As per the defence due to this fall,  

the cause of death was asphyxia as a result of drowning.  It was also  

the defence of the appellant that though, as per the customs in their  

community the dead bodies are buried,  it  was decided to cremate  

Laxmi because of unnatural death and this decision was taken on the  

persuasion of the parents of the deceased themselves.   The defence  

had also taken a stand that the appellant and his family even wanted  

to inform the Police about the incident but her parents did not agree  

to the same.  In so far  as allegations of  demand of dowry by the  

appellant and his family are concerned, there was a complete denial  

on the part of the accused persons.

9. A perusal of the judgment of the learned trial court would reflect that it   

framed the following questions which had arisen for consideration:

“(1)   Whether  the  prosecutor  has  proved  that,  the  accused  No.1  while  marrying  with  deceased  Lakshmamma has  demanded dowry from her  parents  for a sum of Rupees Five Thousand and the ornaments  and accordingly they had given ornaments and cash of  Rupees  Two  thousand  as  dowry,  but  he  has  not  summoned the same either to Lakshmamma or to her  parents  and  thus  committed  an  offence  punishable  under section 3, 4 and 6 of Dowry Prevention Act ?

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(2)  Whether the Prosecutor has proved that, after the  marriage  Lakshmamma  started  marital  life  with  1st  accused,  the  first  accused  demanding  his  wife  Lakshmamma to bring the remaining dowry amount of  Rupees Three Thousand from her parents and started  giving  pinpricks  and  thus  committed  an  offence  punishable under section 498 (A) of Indian Penal Code?

(3)   Whether  the  prosecutor  has  proved  that,  the  1st  accused was giving more pinpricks to his deceased wife  and on that reason on 22.05.1993 she has committed  suicide.  Hence he has committed an offence punishable  under section 304 (B) of Indian Penal Code?

(4)   Whether  the  Prosecutor  has  proved  that,  the  1st  accused with an intention to destroy the evidence has  removed the dead body of Lakshmamma from the well  and  burn  her  body  and  thus  committed  an  offence  punishable under section 201 of the Indian Penal Code?

(5)   Whether  the  Prosecutor  has  proved  that,  the  1st  accused intentionally has not informed the matter to the  concerned officers about the suicide committed by his  wife  Lakshmamma  and  thus  committed  an  offence  punishable under section 176 of the Indian Penal Code?

(6) What order?

10. Dealing with question No.1, which pertains to the allegation regarding  

demand of dowry, the trial court concluded that allegation of demand  

of  dowry  was  not  true  and  in  arriving  on  this  conclusion,  it  was  

swayed by the following factors:

(1)  No elders  or  seniors  had  come forward  and given  evidence even when it was stated that dowry was given in  their presence.

(2)  Further, there was no written documents before the  Court in this regard.

(3)  None of the villagers had led their evidence before  

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the Court with regard to demand and receiving of dowry.

(4)  PW-1 in his complaint  had stated that  prior to the  marriage, discussions were held wherein accused No.1  (father  of  the  appellant)  had  demanded  a  sum  of  Rs.5,000/- cash and ornaments.  However, PW-8, Police  Sub-Inspector who received the complaint, admitted in his  cross-examination that this fact was not mentioned in the  complaint  (Ex.P/1).   He  also  admitted  that  in  the  complaint, it was also not mentioned that PW-1 would pay  the remaining dowry after few days.  He also admitted  that  the  averment  of  PW-1  that  two  days  before  the  marriage he had given Rs.2,000/-  and had told that he  would give remaining Rs.3,000/- at the time of Shivratri  festival was also not mentioned in Ex.P/1.

(5)   The trial  court  disbelieved  the  statement  of  PW-1  regarding  payment  of  Rs.2,000/-  and  ornaments  etc.  because of the reason that he had stated in his cross- examination that he had got 3 acres of land which is dry  land and he has to maintain his family from his income  with no other source of income.  Therefore, he was not  capable of giving the aforesaid money and ornaments.

(6)  The trial  court further noted that as per PW-1 and  PW-3,  Laxmi  was  very  beautiful  girl  and  that  was  the  reason the appellant married Laxmi as he got attracted by  her  beauty.   PW-1  and  PW-3  also  admitted  that  the  accused  persons  had  incurred  the  marriage  expenses  and the marriage was also performed at the residence of  the accused/appellant.

(7)  The P.W.1 Mariyappa in his cross-examination stated  that, he had given cash and ornaments to the bride and  bride groom as per the customs in their community.  In his  examination-in-chief  he  stated  that,  the  2nd accused  Venkatappa demanded the dowry.  The 2nd accused had  died.  He in his examination-in-chief had not stated about  dowry demand by the appellant.  To the same effect is the  testimony of PW-2, wife of PW-1 who categorically stated  that  there  was  a  custom  of  giving  silver  and  gold  ornaments  and  clothes;  the  ornaments  given  were  got  prepared much prior to the marriage of Laxmi; the alleged  demand of dowry was made by the parents of groom and  his  brother  i.e.  accused Nos.  2  to  4  and did  not  state  about the demand of dowry by the appellant.  Even, PW- 3, natural mother of Laxmi deposed on the identical lines  

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in respect of the dowry demand.

11. On that  basis,  the  trial  court  arrived at  the conclusion that  in  the  

absence of any evidence, oral or documentary, the chances are that  

whatever  cash,  clothes  or  ornaments  were  given  at  the  time  of  

marriage, was as per the prevailing customs in the community and it  

was not the result of any demand made by the appellant.

12. In so far as question Nos.2 and 3 are concerned, they were taken up  

together by the trial court.  In the first instance, the trial court pointed  

out that though the complainant got the information about the death  

of  Laxmi on 22nd May,  1993,  he lodged delayed complaint  on 26th  

May, 1993 i.e. four days thereafter.  From the statement of PW-1 in  

the  cross-examination  that  Laxmi  was  staying  in  her  matrimonial  

house  and  visited  her  parental  house  5-6  times  alongwith  her  

husband and even stayed there with her husband for some days and  

also  from  the  admission  of  PW-1  that  even  they  were  visiting  

matrimonial house of Laxmi and had visited her house for 5-6 times  

within a span of six months, the trial court observed that it was an  

indication that the relationship of husband and wife was cordial and  

with mutual  love towards each other.   Even, PW-2 and PW-3 had  

admitted these facts in their cross-examination.  The trial court further  

observed  that  when  the  giving  of  dowry  on  the  demand  of  the  

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accused persons was not established, it was not possible to believe  

that  they were demanding the alleged remaining dowry amount  of  

Rs.3,000/-  and  giving  pinpricks  to  her  for  not  fulfilling  the  said  

demand.  According to the trial court, it was significant that PW-3 who  

is the natural mother of the deceased did not even state that Laxmi  

was being harassed for not bringing the balance dowry amount.  She  

had rather admitted that her daughter was happy for the first three  

months and also accepted in her cross-examination that she had not  

told the Police about living peaceful life only for three months.  She  

also admitted that she never told the Police about giving of dowry of  

Rs.2,000/- and demand of balance amount which remained unpaid.  

The trial court analysed the testimony of PW-4, PW-5 and PW-6 on  

this aspect and pointed out that the allegation of demand of dowry  

could not be proved from their testimony either.  The discussion on  

this aspect is concluded in the following manner:

“(27)  After the marriage during the period of 6 months it  was  not  mentioned in  the  complaint  that  the accused  have assaulted Lakshmamma physically and thrown out  of  the  house  nor  stated  the  same  before  the  court.  Neither the villagers wherein the accused are residing  nor their neighbors have given any evidence before the  court about pinpricks meted out to her.  As against which  D.W.1 Ramakrishnappa, aged 56 years, said that, from  the beginning till the death of Lakshamma the accused  persons  looked  after  here  well  and  not  given  any  pinpricks  to  her,  he  further  told  that  on  that  day  she  came to well for washing the cloth and due to slip of her  leg she fell in the well and he came to know about the  same.  In his cross-examination no other statement was  

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given on behalf of prosecution.

(28)   It  is  an  arranged  marriage  in  the  presence  of  elders, in the event of giving any pinpricks about dowry  harassment, this matter would have been brought to the  notice of elders and convene a panchayath.  But it never  revealed  anywhere  about  conveying  the  panchayath.  Hence it is hereby seen that the accused or her husband  had not given pinpricks either in the matter of dowry or in  any  other  matter.   It  cannot  be  said  that  she  has  committed for the said reason.  Hence I answer both the  questions Negatively.”

13. The aforesaid was the  raison d'etre  which led to the acquittal of the  

appellant by the trial court.  The High Court has, however, given a  

different  glance to the entire matter.   According to it,  the aforesaid  

approach  of  the  trial  court  was  erroneous  in  law  as  well  as  in  

appreciation of the evidence on record.  After taking note of the fact  

that  Laxmi  died  within  six  months  of  her  marriage  and  it  was  an  

unnatural death, the High Court has lamented on the conduct of the  

appellant and has arrived at the conclusion that it was the appellant  

who was responsible for the death of Laxmi and found him guilty of  

offence  under  Section  304-B  of  IPC.   The  High  Court  has  also  

accepted the version of the prosecution that Laxmi was harassed and  

humiliated on account of non fulfillment of the demand of dowry made  

by the appellant and, therefore, presumption under Section 113-B of  

the Evidence Act was attracted.  As per the High Court, the appellant  

has not been able to lead any satisfactory evidence to dislodge this  

presumption.  The infirmities found in the depositions of PW-1 to PW-

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5 by the trial court have been brushed aside and discarded by the  

High Court as irrelevant and perverse.  The High  Court held that it  

would be impossible to expect any party to the marriage talks to keep  

a record of demand and payment of dowry as if it was a commercial  

transaction and, therefore, the absence of documentary evidence in  

this regard should not have weighed with the trial court.  The High  

Court also observed that there was no admission made by PW-1 that  

even  without  the  alleged  demand  of  dowry,  he  would  have  given  

customary articles like clothes and ornaments and no such customary  

practice was indicated.  The finding of the trial court that the case of  

the prosecution regarding demand and payment  of  dowry was not  

proved in the absence of anyone from the village of the accused is  

also brushed aside by observing that such a demand and payment  

would not be made public inasmuch as such talks would be within  

closed doors and would be within the knowledge of the parties to the  

marriage and kith and kin of the bride and bridegroom.  Further, apart  

from PW-1 to PW-3, PW-4, who is the neighbour of PW-1 and PW-2,  

supported the version of the demand of dowry and the harassment of  

Laxmi at the hands of the appellant and his family members.

14. Due  to  the  aforesaid  divergent  and  conflicting  outcome  of  the  

proceedings  in  the  two  courts  below,  we  have  gone  through  the  

testimony of these witnesses.  After examining the record and going  

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through  the  reasons  recorded  by  both  the  courts  below,  we  are  

inclined to accept conclusions reached by the trial court as we are of  

the view that the High Court committed grave error in ignoring and  

glossing  over  various contradictions  in  the  testimonies  of  PW-1 to  

PW-5 which were pointed out by the trial court.

15. At the outset, we may record that some of the comments of the High  

Court deprecating few of the reasons recorded by the trial  court in  

support of its findings are fully justified.  The High Court is correct in  

its observation that it was not appropriate for the trial court to expect  

documentary evidence regarding acceptance of dowry as generally  

such  a  record  would  not  be  kept  since  it  was  not  a  commercial  

transaction.   The  High  Court  also  appears  to  be  justified  in  its  

observation that non production of the villagers to prove the dowry  

demand would not be fatal.  We have eschewed and discarded these  

reasons assigned by the trial court.  At the same time, it is necessary  

to find out as to whether the evidence of these witnesses (PW-1 to  

PW-3) is worthy of credence, on this aspect.  We find that there are  

certain very glaring and weighty factors which compel us to disbelieve  

the prosecution version on this account.

16. In the present case, it  would be prudent to start  the discussion by  

taking note of the conduct of the maternal uncle (PW-1), his wife (PW-

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2)  and natural  mother  (PW-3)  of  the deceased.   They accept  that  

information about the death of Laxmi was received by them between  

10.00 a.m. to 12.30 p.m. on 22.05.1993.  They also accept the fact  

that they had reached the place of occurrence.  Body of the deceased  

was cremated on 22.05.1993.  There is some dispute as to whether  

these persons were present at the time of cremation.  According to  

them, deceased was cremated before they reached the village of the  

appellant.  To falsify this position taken by the prosecution through  

these witnesses, the learned counsel for the appellant had taken us to  

the evidence of PW-8 who had drawn Mahazar near the well.  This  

Mahazar  coupled  with  the statement  of  PW-8 is  a  very  significant  

piece  of  evidence  which  has  considerable  effect  in  denting  the  

creditworthiness of the testimony of these witnesses.  As per PW-8  

himself,  when he  had reached the  spot,  it  was the mother  of  the  

deceased who pointed out the place where the dead body was lying.  

This assertion amply demonstrates that mother of the deceased had  

known where the body was kept and she along with PW-1 and PW-2  

had  reached  the  place  of  occurrence  before  the  dead  body  was  

cremated.  Relying upon this evidence, the trial court has disbelieved  

the story of  the prosecution that  Laxmi was cremated even before  

these persons had reached the village of the appellant.  Strangely, the  

High  Court  has  discarded  Mahazar  drawn  by  PW-8  by  giving  a  

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spacious reason viz.  it  was not  an exhibited document  before  the  

Court,  little  realising  that  this  was  the  document  produced  by  the  

prosecution  itself  and  even  without  formal  proof  thereto  by  the  

prosecution, it was always open for the defence to seek reliance on  

such an evidence to falsify the prosecution version.  Moreover, PW-8  

has specifically referred to this document in his evidence.  It is also a  

matter of record that a specific suggestion was made to PW-3 (mother  

of the deceased) in the cross-examination to the effect that it is she  

who had pointed out the place of the dead body lying near the well to  

the Police personnel.  The version of PW-1 to PW-3 that they reached  

the village of the appellant after Laxmi had already been cremated,  

does not inspire confidence and appears to be mendacious.   

17. In the aforesaid circumstances, we have to proceed on the basis that  

PW-1 to PW-3, on coming to know of the death of Laxmi, had reached  

the village of the appellant when the dead body was still lying near the  

well from where it was extracted.  If the body was cremated thereafter,  

and not buried, it  can clearly be inferred that same was done with  

consent,  express  or  implied,  of  the  complainant  namely  maternal  

uncle and the mother of the deceased.  It can also be inferred that  

parties had decided at that time that matter be not reported to the  

Police and body be cremated.  To say it otherwise, by accepting the  

version of the prosecution, would lead to some absurdities.  It would  

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mean that when maternal uncle or aunt as well as mother of Laxmi  

were present  and had seen the dead body lying at  the spot,  they  

objected to the body being cremated.  They also wanted Police to be  

informed.  If it was so, why they did not put up any resistance? We  

have to keep in mind that these family members of Laxmi have come  

out with the allegation that Laxmi was harassed as well as mentally  

and physically tortured because of non fulfillment of dowry demand.  

In such a scenario, they would not have remained silent and mute  

spectators to the events that followed even when they were not to  

their liking.  Not only this conduct belies their version, another weighty  

factor is that the complainant remained silent about these happenings  

for a period of 4 days and lodged the report with the Police only on  

26.05.1993 when they came out with the allegations of demand of  

dowry and harassment.

18. We are conscious of the fact that in such cases, sometimes there may  

be delay in lodging the FIR for various valid reasons.  However, it is  

important  that  those  reasons  come  on  record.   There  is  no  

explanation worth the name given by the complainant as to why the  

complainant maintained stoic silence.  In this backdrop, the testimony  

of  these witnesses alleging dowry demand has to  be tested more  

stringently  and  with  some caution.   On that  touchstone,  when we  

analyse the statements, we find the contradictions therein, as pointed  

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out by the learned trial court, become very appealing and meaningful.

19. With  the  aforesaid  observations,  we  proceed  to  discuss  the  first  

specific charge under Section 498-A of the IPC relating to the demand  

of dowry.  We have already stated the reasons which prevailed with  

the trial court in not accepting the prosecution version of demand of  

dowry  by  the  appellant  herein,  as  well  as  the  reasons  which  

influenced the High Court to take a contrary view.  After going through  

the evidence of PW-1 to PW-3 as well as PW-4 to PW-6, we find that  

the  trial  court  correctly  appreciated  and  analysed  the  evidence  of  

these witnesses.  In the first instance, it needs to be recorded with  

due  emphasis  that  none  of  the  witnesses  had  made  any  specific  

allegation for the demand of the dowry in so far as the appellant is  

concerned.  The prosecution also could not establish that any dowry  

articles were given at  the time of  marriage.  On the contrary,  it  is  

accepted by these witnesses that  the appellant  had asked for  the  

hand of Laxmi because of her beauty by which he was attracted.  We  

are not suggesting that this reason, by itself, is sufficient to rule out  

the  possibility  of  demand  of  dowry.   At  the  same  time,  this  

circumstance when seen with all other attendant factors surfacing on  

the record of this case, makes it  somewhat difficult  to swallow the  

prosecution  version  that  there would  be a  demand of  dowry  as  a  

precondition for marriage.  Other attendant circumstances also negate  

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the theory of demand.  PW-1 and PW-3 have themselves admitted  

that  it  is  the  accused  persons  who  had  incurred  all  the  marriage  

expenses  and  also  admitted  that  marriage  was  performed  at  the  

residence of the appellant.  This would be because of the reason, as  

pleaded  by  the  appellant  in  support  of  which  the  appellant  led  

evidence  as  well,  that  the  family  members  of  Laxmi  were  poor  

persons and had not sufficient means to even incur the expenditure  

on  the wedding  of  Laxmi.   Even in  respect  of  alleged demand of  

dowry, PW-1 Mariyappa stated that the so-called demand was by the  

father of the appellant and did not at all accuse the appellant in this  

behalf.  To the same effect is the testimony of PW-2.

20. When  the  demand  of  dowry  and  giving  of  dowry  at  the  time  of  

marriage  has  not  been  proved,  further  version  of  the  prosecution  

witnesses that there was a demand for payment of remaining amount  

of  Rs.3,000/-  and  harassment  of  Laxmi  on  that  account,  also  

becomes  doubtful.   It  has  come  on  record,  and  can  be  clearly  

discerned  from  the  reading  of  the  statements  of  the  material  

witnesses viz.  the family  members of  Laxmi,  that  during this  short  

period of 6 months of the marriage, she had visited her matrimonial  

house 5-6 times.  Pertinently, her visits were alongwith her husband.  

The couple had even stayed in the parental house of Laxmi for some  

days  on  few  occasions.   This  indicates  that  the  relationship  of  

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husband and wife was cordial.  In this backdrop, evidence of PW-3,  

mother of the deceased Laxmi, assumes great significance, who has  

not even stated that her daughter was harassed for not bringing the  

alleged balance dowry amount.  On the contrary, she accepted that  

her  daughter  was  happy  for  first  3  months.   So  much  so  in  her  

statement  to  the  Police,  she  had  not  told  the  Police  about  living  

peaceful  life  only for  3 months.   She did not  tell  the Police about  

giving of dowry of Rs.2,000/- and demand of balance amount coupled  

with harassment because of death.

21. In addition to  the aforesaid material  aspects which are  highlighted  

from  the  evidence  of  the  prosecution  witnesses,  most  important  

feature which is accepted by these witnesses is that in so far as the  

appellant individually is concerned, there was no demand of dowry by  

him.  In the absence of any particular allegation against the appellant  

in  this  behalf,  would  be  improper  to  convict  the  appellant  under  

Section 498-A IPC.

22. We find that the High Court has ignored the aforesaid features which  

are elaborately discussed in the judgment of  the trial  court,  culling  

from the depositions of the prosecution witnesses.  The High Court,  

while accepting the version of the prosecution on this aspect, namely,  

Laxmi  was harassed and humiliated because of  demand of  dowry  

made by  the  appellant,  has  embarked on  the  discussion  which  is  

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general and non-specific in nature.  Even if  there is little evidence,  

that is too infinitesimal to convict the appellant, more so when that is  

not  only  self  contradictory  but  also  surrounded  by  other  weighty  

circumstances that go in favour of the accused.  Once we find that the  

demand  of  dowry  and  harassment  on  that  account  is  not  proved  

beyond  reasonable  doubt,  question  of  invocation  of  Section  113  

Evidence Act would not arise.  We feel that the High Court has been  

totally influenced by the fact that Laxmi had died within 6 months of  

her marriage and it was an unnatural death.

23. No doubt, it was so.  But only for this reason, the High Court could not  

have convicted the appellant by finding him guilty of offence under  

Section 304-B of IPC as well by primarily relying upon the provisions  

of Section 113-B of the Evidence Act.

24. We are conscious of the fact that it  was an unfortunate demise of  

Laxmi who died within 6 months of the marriage.  However, at the  

same  time,  whether  her  death  was  accidental  as  claimed  by  the  

defence  or  it  was  a  suicide  committed  by  Laxmi,  is  not  clearly  

established.  Had the allegations of demand of dowry and harassment  

of Laxmi were established thereby making it an offence under Section  

498-A of IPC, things would not have been different.  However, when  

we  do  not  find  dowry  demand  and  harassment  of  Laxmi  to  be  

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established, the inferences drawn by the High Court taking the aid of  

Section  113-B  of  the  Evidence  Act  also  deserve  to  be  discarded.  

Section 113-B of the Evidence Act reads as under:

“Presumption as to dowry death:- When the question is  whether a person has committed the dowry death of a  woman and it is shown that soon before her death such  woman had been subjected by such person to cruelty or  harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for  dowry,  the  court  shall  presume  that  such  person  had  caused the dowry death.”

A plain reading of the aforesaid provision would demonstrate that to  

attract  the  presumption  as  to  dowry  death  stated  in  the  aforesaid  

provision, it is necessary to show that soon before her death, she had  

been subjected by such persons to cruelty or harassment for, or in  

connection  with,  any  demand  for  dowry.   When  this  essential  

ingredient has not been established in the present case, the question  

of  drawing any presumption by invoking of  the aforesaid  provision  

would not arise.   

25. In  this  backdrop,  we  revert  back  to  the  conduct  of  the  mother  of  

Laxmi, as well as her maternal uncle and his wife (i.e. PW-1 and PW-

2), which becomes very crucial.  As per our discussion above, it is  

clear that  they had reached the place of  death, after  receiving the  

information,  much  before  Laxmi  was  cremated.   Once  that  is  

accepted, as it  is established from record and particularly Mahazar  

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drawn by PW-8, further events happen thereafter are to be analysed  

keeping in mind this fundamental aspect.  In fact, the entire time of  

thinking of the High Court proceeds on the premise that Laxmi was  

cremated  even  before  her  parents  and  uncle/aunt  reached  the  

appellant's village.  Entire edifice based on thereupon crumbles once  

this finding is found to be erroneous.  As we are of the opinion that the  

finding of the trial court is correct thay they had reached the village  

well  in  time  and  body  was  cremated  in  their  presence,  further  

sequence  of  events  has  to  seen  in  that  hue.   It  was  told  by  the  

accused persons that Laxmi had died accidentally falling into the well  

with  the  active  or  passive  consent  of  PW-1  to  PW-3,  Laxmi  was  

cremated.   Her  last  rites  were  performed  in  which  these  persons  

participated.  They accepted the version of the accused persons, at  

that time.  It is only after a period of 3 days that the complaint is filed  

with  the allegations of  demand of  dowry by the accused persons;  

harassment  of  Laxmi  on  account  of  alleged  non-payment  of  the  

balance dowry; and her unnatural death.  We state at the cost of the  

repetition  that  once  it  is  established  that  the  body  of  Laxmi  was  

cremated in the presence of these persons, it lends credence to the  

defence version that there was an acceptance by them at that time  

that Laxmi had died due to accidental slip in the well and all of them  

decided to cremate Laxmi and not to report the matter to the Police.  

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Otherwise it would baffle any right minded person as to why they did  

not inform the Police or did not put up any resistance.

26. Let us test the veracity of the version of these persons from another  

angle.  If there was harassment and cruel treatment given to Laxmi by  

her  in-laws,  on  reaching  the  place  of  the  accused  persons  after  

receiving the unnatural demise of Laxmi, they would have perceived  

the same to have happen in mysterious circumstances.  In such a  

situation,  they  would  not  have  kept  quite  and  inform  the  Police  

immediately.  They would have also insisted on the postmortem of the  

body of  Laxmi to find out  the cause of  death.   That would be the  

natural reaction of any such persons who believe that their daughter  

had  faced  harassment  on  account  of  non-fulfillment  of  the  dowry  

demand and it would be fresh in their mind, if their version is to be  

believed that just 5 days before the death, Laxmi had complained of  

the cruel behaviour of her in-laws.  No such thing happened, on the  

contrary,  body of  Laxmi  was cremated in  their  presence and after  

performing the last rites, they turned back to their home quietly.  It is 4  

days  thereafter  that  they  thought  of  lodging  the  complaint  to  the  

Police.

27. In the case of  State of Andhra Pradesh v.  M. Madhusudhan Rao,  

2008 (14) SCALE 118,  in similar circumstances, the Court termed  

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such  a  delay  as  'embellishment  and  exaggeration'  though  in  that  

case,  it  was an abnormal  delay of  1  month.   The principle  stated  

therein was equally applied herein as well which would be clear from  

the following observation herein:

“18.  Having gone through the depositions of PW-1 and  PW-3,  to  which  out  attention  was  invited  by  learned  Counsel for the State, we are convinced that in the light  of the overall evidence, analysed by the High Court, the  order of acquittal of the respondent is well merited and  does not call for interference, particularly when the First  Information Report was lodged by the complainant more  than  one  month  after  the  alleged  incident  of  forcible  poisoning.  Time and again, the object and importance of  prompt lodging of the First Information Report has been  highlighted.   Delay  in  lodging  the  First  Information  Report,  more  often  than  not,  results  in  embellishment  and exaggeration, which is a creature of an afterthought.  A delayed report not only gets bereft of the advantage of  spontaneity,  the danger of  the introduction of  coloured  version,  exaggerated  account  of  the  incident  or  a  concocted  story  as  a  result  of  deliberations  and  consultations, also creeps in, casting a serious doubt on  its veracity.   Therefore,  it  is  essential  that the delay in  lodging the report should be satisfactorily explained.

19.   In  the  present  case,  as  noted  supra,  First  Information Report in regard to the alleged occurrence  on  19th April,  1996  was  lodged  on  22nd May,  1996.  Admittedly after her discharge from the hospital on 22nd  April, 1996, the complainant went to her parents' house  and resided there.  In her testimony, the complainant has  deposed  that  since  no  one  from  the  family  of  the  accused came to enquire about her welfare, she decided  to  lodge the First  Information Report.   No explanation  worth the name for delay in filing the complaint with the  police has come on record.  We are of the opinion that  this  circumstance  raises  considerable  doubt  regarding  the genuineness of the complaint and the veracity of the  evidence of the complainant (PW-1) and her father (PW- 3),  rendering  it  unsafe  to  base  the  conviction  of  the  respondent upon it.  Resultantly, when the substratum of  the evidence given by the complainant (PW-1) is found to  

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be unreliable, the prosecution case has to be rejected in  its entirety.

28. We may hasten to add here that many times in such type of cases,  

there can be reasons for  keeping quite at  the given time and not  

reporting the matter immediately.  Therefore, we are conscious of the  

legal  position  that  delay  per  se  may not  render  prosecution  case  

doubtful as there may be various reasons for lodging the FIR with  

some delay (see Sahebrao and another  v. State of Maharashtra,  

(2006) 9 SCC 794.  Thus, there is no hard and fast rule that any delay  

in lodging the FIR would automatically render the prosecution case  

doubtful.  However, what is emphasised is that if that was so, it was  

necessary  for  the  prosecution  to  at  least  come  forward  with  the  

explanation as to why the complainant kept quite and why he did not  

report the matter to the Police immediately.  No such explanation is  

coming forward in the present case.  Moreover, in the instant case,  

the delay is seen as fatal when examined in juxtaposition with other  

material that has come on record and discussed above, which shakes  

the veracity of prosecution case, bringing it within the four corners of  

doubtful prosecution story.   

29. We find that when going by all these considerations, the trial court  

gave benefit of doubt to the appellant and acquitted him, in the case  

of reversal of such a verdict of acquittal, the High Court should have  

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specifically dealt with the aforesaid circumstances weighing in favour  

of  the  appellant  and  should  have  given  suitable  justification  for  

overturning the verdict of acquittal.  The approach of the High Court,  

as  the  appellate  court,  while  dealing  with  the  case  of  acquittal  is  

stated by this Court in the case of Harbans Singh v. State of Punjab,  

(1962) Supp. 1 SCR 104, in the following manner:

“8. The question as regards the correct principles to be  applied by a  Court hearing an appeal against acquittal of a  person has engaged the attention of  this  Court  from the  very beginning.  In many cases, especially the earlier ones,  the Court has in laying down such principles emphasised  the  necessity  of  interference  with  an  order  of  acquittal  being based only on “compelling and substantial reasons”  and has expressed the view that unless such reasons are  present an Appeal Court should not interfere with an order  of acquittal. (Vide Suraj Pal Singh v. The State (1952) SCR  194; Ajmer Singh v. State of Punjab MANU/SC/0042/1952 :  1953CriLJ  521;  Puran  v.  State  of  Punjab  MANU/SC/0090/1952 : AIR 1953 SC 459).  The use of the  words “compelling reasons” embarrassed some of the High  Courts  in  exercising  their  jurisdiction  in  appeals  against  acquittals and difficulties occasionally arose as to what this  Court had meant by the words “compelling reasons”.   In  later  years  the  Court  has  often  avoided  emphasis  on  “compelling reasons” but nonetheless adhered to the view  expressed earlier that before interfering in appeal with an  order of acquittal a Court must examine not only questions  of law and fact in all their aspects but must also closely and  carefully  examine  the  reasons  which  impelled  the  lower  courts  to acquit  the accused and should interfere only  if  satisfied  after  such  examination  that  the  conclusion  reached by the lower court that the guilt of the person has  not  been  proved  is  unreasonable.   (Vide  Chinta  v.  The  State of Madhya Pradesh (Criminal Appeal No. 178 of 1959  decided on 18-11-60); Ashrafkha Haibatkha Pathan v. The  State of Bombay (Criminal Appeal No. 38 of 1960 decided  on 14-12-60).

9. It  is  clear  that  it  emphasising  in  many  cases  the  necessity of “compelling reasons” to justify an interference  with an order of acquittal the Court did not in any way try to  

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curtail  the power  bestowed on appellate  courts  under  s.  423  of  the  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure  when  hearing  appeals  against  acquittal;  but  conscious  of  the  intense  dislike in  our  jurisprudence of  the conviction of  innocent  persons  and  of  the  facts  that  in  many  systems  of  jurisprudence the law does not provide at all for any appeal  against  an  order  of  acquittal  the  Court  was  anxious  to  impress  on  the  appellate  courts  the  importance  of  bestowing special care in the sifting of evidence in appeal  against acquittals.  As has already been pointed out less  emphasis  is  being  given  in  the  more  recent  pronouncements  of  this  Court  on  “compelling  reasons”.  But,  on close analysis,  it  is  clear  that  the principles  laid  down by the Court in this matter have remained the same.  What may be called the golden thread running through all  these decisions is the rule that in deciding appeals against  acquittal the Court of Appeal must examine the evidence  with  particular  care,  must  examine  also  the  reasons  on  which the order of acquittal was based and should interfere  with the order only when satisfied that the view taken by  the  acquitting  Judge is  clearly  unreasonable.   Once the  appellate court comes to the conclusion that the view taken  by the lower court is clearly an unreasonable one that itself  is a “compelling reason” for interference.  For, it is a court's  duty to convict a guilty person when the guilt is established  beyond  reasonable  doubt,  no  less  than  it  is  its  duty  to  acquit the accused when such guilt is not so established.”

30. This  very  principle  of  law  was  formulated  by  the  Court  in  M.  

Madhusudhan Rao (supra) in the following manner:

“13.  There is no embargo on the appellate court to review,  reappreciate  or  reconsider  the evidence upon which the  order of acquittal is founded.  Yet, generally, the order of  acquittal is not interfered with because the presumption of  innocence,  which  is  otherwise  available  to  an  accused  under the fundamental principles of criminal jurisprudence  that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless  he is proved guilty by a court of law, gets further reinforced  and strengthened by his acquittal.  It is also trite that if two  views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case  and the one favourable to the accused has been taken by  the trial  court,  it  should not  be disturbed.   Nevertheless,  where the approach of the lower court in considering the  

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evidence in the case is vitiated by some manifest illegality  or  the  conclusion  recorded  by  the  court  below  is  such  which  by  some  manifest  illegality  or  the  conclusion  recorded by the court below is such which could not have  been possibly  arrived  at  by  any  court  acting reasonably  and judiciously and is, therefore, liable to the characterised  as  perverse,  then,  to  prevent  miscarriage of  justice,  the  appellate court is obliged to interfere.

14.  All these principles have been succinctly culled out by  one of us (C.K. Thakker, J.) in  Chandrappa and Ors.  v.  State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415.”

31. In Chandrappa (supra), which was followed in the aforesaid case, the  

Court had observed:

“44. In our view, if in the light of above circumstances, the  trial court felt that the accused could get benefit of doubt,  the  said  view  cannot  be  held  to  be  illegal,  improper  or  contrary to law.  Hence, even though we are of the opinion  that in an appeal against acquittal, powers of the appellate  court are as wide as that of the trial court and it can review,  reappreciate and reconsider the entire evidence brought on  record by the parties and can come to its own conclusion  on fact  as well  as on law, in the present case, the view  taken  by  the  trial  court  for  acquitting  the  accused  was  possible  and  plausible.   On  the  basis  of  evidence,  therefore, at the most, it  can be said that the other view  was equally possible.  But it is well established that if two  views are possible on the basis of evidence on record and  one favourable to the accused has been taken by the trial  court, it ought not to be disturbed by the appellate court.  In  this case, a possible view on the evidence of prosecution  had been taken by the trial court which ought not to have  been disturbed by the appellate court.  The decision of the  appellate court (the High Court), therefore, is liable to be  set aside.”

32. We thus, find that there were no solid and weighty reasons to reverse  

the verdict of acquittal and to convict the appellant under the given  

circumstances.  Accordingly, we allow this appeal and set aside the  

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judgment of the High Court, holding that the appellant is not guilty of  

the charges foisted against him.   

33. During the pendency of this appeal, the appellant was enlarged on  

bail vide order dated 31.03.2014.  The bail bonds and sureties given  

by the appellant are hereby discharged.

…......................................J. (J. Chelameswar)

…......................................J. (A.K. Sikri)

New Delhi; August 7, 2014.

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