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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1240 OF 2004

Ram Niranjan Roy …Appellant

Versus

State of Bihar and Ors. …Respondents

J  U  D  G  M  E  N  T

(SMT.) RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.

1. A petition was filed in public interest in the Patna High  

Court being C.W.J.C. No. 1311 of 2003 by Bihar Vyavsayik  

Sangharsh  Morcha  and  another  raising  several  issues  

relating to law and order problem in the State of Bihar.  The  

State of Bihar, the Director General of Police of Bihar and  

others  were  made  party  respondents.   The  issues  raised  

inter alia were whether the respondents were duty bound to

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provide  safe  and  healthy  atmosphere  for  the  proper  

development of the State or not and whether the inaction of  

the  respondents  was  violative  of  fundamental  rights  

guaranteed under Articles 19 and 20 of the Constitution of  

India.   The  petitioner  inter  alia sought  direction  to  the  

respondents  to  take  measures  to  stop  exploitation  of  

shopkeepers, dealers, artisans, labourers and industrial units  

by officers and police personnel.  

2. The  High  Court  issued  notices  to  the  respondents  

pursuant to which they filed affidavits.  On 14/08/2003 the  

High Court directed the Director General of Police to make a  

list  of  officers  from  the  Station  House  Officers  upto  the  

Additional  Director  General  of  Police,  of  those  who  have  

remained in their station for more than four years.  Relevant  

paragraphs from the High Court’s order could be quoted:

“The court suggests the following measures as an   ad interim exercise:

a) Let  the Director General  Police make out a   list of officers from the Station House Officer upto   the Additional Director General of Police, of those   who have remained in their station for more than   

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four years.  This dossier is to be supported with   information from service record as to which officer   throughout  their  career  has  remained  at  which   station  and  for  how  long.   Officers  who  have  remained at one station for over four years must   see  a  posting  out  within  six  weeks  from today.   These  would  be  officers  below  the  rank  of   Inspector General of Police.  Staff below the SHOs   who have remained at a particular station beyond  three years will be identified by the District heads   of  police concerned and their  movement will  be   undertaken by the Director General of Police.

It must be mentioned that the period of four   years  is  set  because  in  the  normal  course  of   government  service,  transfers  and  postings  are   made for officers if they have been at a particular   station  for  more  than  three  years.   This  order   obviously does not preclude the Director General   of  Police  from  making  any  transfers  should  an   officer have been at a posting for a lesser period,   which is within normal administrative powers.”

3. In December, 2003, the appellant, who was holding the  

post of Deputy Superintendent of Police, Crime Investigation  

Department  (CID),  Bihar,  filed  an  intervention  application  

being  I.A.No.5588 of  2003.   The appellant  claimed in  the  

application that he was the President of Bihar Police Seva  

Sangh,  a  service  association  of  members  of  Bihar  Police  

Service.  He stated in the application that the transfers and  

postings of  the officers  of  Bihar  Police Service were done  

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arbitrarily  in  violation  of  guiding  principles  framed by  the  

Home Department of Government of Bihar.  The appellant  

referred  to  a  Writ  Application  filed  by  him being  C.W.J.C.  

No.12225 of  1999 against  the State of  Bihar  for  an order  

directing  the  respondents  to  implement  the  said  guiding  

principles.  He stated that the said writ application has been  

pending in the High Court for last four years during which  

the government has tried to victimize him mala fide.   He  

further stated that his application should be heard along with  

the C.W.J.C. No.1311 of 2003.  He, therefore, prayed that he  

may be impleaded in C.W.J.C. No.1311 of 2003.

4. Admittedly, the appellant is posted at Patna for several  

years.  It is clear from several orders that the High Court has  

passed in this matter that while dealing with the question of  

law and order situation in Bihar, the High Court was looking  

into the State Government’s policy of postings and transfer  

of police officers, obviously because that has a direct bearing  

on efficiency and rectitude of the police officers.   The High  

Court even recorded the statement of the Advocate General  

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that certain transfers of police officers are being effected.  

The appellant  was unhappy and disturbed about  the  task  

undertaken by the High Court.  This is evident from the first  

paragraph  of  his  intervention  application  where  he  has  

referred to the order passed by the High Court directing the  

respondents to submit a list of officers who have not been  

removed from their station for more than four years.  It is  

this that made him intervene in C.W.J.C. No.1311 of 2003.

5. The appellant wanted his writ application pending in the  

Patna High Court to be heard with C.W.J.C. No. 1311 of 2003.  

We  have,  therefore,  carefully  gone  through  that  petition.  

The  appellant  wants  to  create  an  impression  that  he  is  

fighting for the cause of police officers of Bihar, but a careful  

reading of his application makes it clear that he is espousing  

his own cause.  He has stated that he is continuously posted  

for seven years in Cabinet Vigilance Department.   He has  

stated that his posting in Criminal Investigation Department  

is wrong and he should be posted as Sub Divisional Police  

Officer anywhere in Patna or in any other proper office such  

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as traffic or transport department in Patna, so that he may  

do government duties and  take over the responsibility as  

the President of Bihar Police Seva Sangh.  We shall advert to  

this Seva Sangh a little later,  but,  suffice it  to say at this  

stage  that  the  appellant’s  pending  writ  application  

concentrates  on  his  posting  and  he  figures  in  the  prayer  

clause also.  

6. From  the  impugned  order  it  appears  that  on  

27/01/2004,  the  appellant  appeared  in-person  before  the  

High  Court.   He  shouted  and  told  the  court  that  he  was  

intervener  and  that  the  High  Court  has  not  focused  its  

attention on the wrong policies of transfers within the police  

department.   He  raised  his  voice  with  impertinence  and  

declared  that  the  High  Court  is  not  taking  up  his  case  

wherein he has challenged his transfer and posting made in  

the  police  department.   Learned  Judges,  then,  asked  him  

whether he had been granted leave by the Director General  

of Police to present his case.  He again shouted at the court  

and stated that he had applied for leave but whether leave is  

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granted to him or not is not the concern of the court.  The  

High Court has observed that he could not show to the court  

that  leave  had  been  granted  to  him  by  the  Police  

Headquarters  to  argue  his  case  in-person  and  challenge  

transfer policy of the police department. The High Court has  

further observed that the appellant baited the court.    He  

wanted his writ application to be considered out-of-turn on  

the ground that it was concerning transfers and postings of  

police  officers.   The  High  Court,  therefore,  called  for  the  

record,  perused the  appellant’s  application  and found out  

that  it  mainly  related  to  his  own  transfer.  The  appellant,  

then,  claimed to  be an office  bearer  of  Bihar  Police Seva  

Sangh and stated that the Police Manual has declared him  a  

member of the protected staff  and he has immunity from  

transfers and he cannot be touched.  He produced a letter  

addressed  by  a  Cabinet  Minister  to  the  Chief  Minister  of  

Bihar  questioning  why  he  was  transferred  from  one  

establishment to another, though, within the city.  The said  

letter is quoted in the impugned order.  It appears from the  

impugned order that the appellant did not show the slightest  

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remorse nor regret and instead continued to bait the court  

and repeat that even the Minister had given him protection  

and  had  granted  stay  of  his  transfer.   In  view  of  this  

contumacious behaviour,  the High Court  directed that  the  

appellant may be taken into custody by the Court Officer and  

the Sergeant and sent to jail as punishment for a day i.e.  for  

twenty four hours.   His intervention application came to be  

rejected.   Aggrieved  by  this  order,  the  appellant  has  

approached this Court.

7. The  appellant   appeared  in-person.   Looking  to  the  

importance  of  the  matter,  we  requested  Mr.  Siddharth  

Luthra, learned Additional Solicitor General, to assist us.  As  

usual, Mr. Luthra has rendered remarkable assistance to this  

Court.   We  heard  the  appellant  at  some  length.   He  

submitted that  he is  not  guilty  of  contempt of  court.   He  

submitted that he has highest regard for the court and he  

never shouted in the court as stated in the impugned order.  

He submitted that  he  is  the President  of  the Bihar  Police  

Seva Sangh and is espousing the cause of police officers in  

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general.  On a query made by this Court, whether the Bihar  

Police Seva Sangh is a registered society or whether it has  

got any recognition, he submitted that the application in that  

behalf is pending.  The Bihar Police Seva Sangh, however,  

has not received any recognition so far.  He submitted that  

the respondents have not refuted any of his contentions by  

filing any affidavit in reply.  He drew our attention to Section  

14 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and submitted that  

no opportunity, as contemplated therein, was given to him to  

make  his  defence.   He  submitted  that  he  had  filed  an  

application for bail.  However, no order was passed thereon.  

He further submitted that the High Court has unnecessarily  

cast aspersions on him.  He urged that the impugned order  

may be set aside.   

8. Mr. Luthra, learned Additional Solicitor General, on the  

other  hand,  submitted  that  the  appellant  is  guilty  of  

contempt committed in the face of the High Court and his  

case  is  covered  by  the  judgment  of  this  Court  in  Leila  

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David(6)   v.   State of Maharashtra and Others  1    where  

this Court has observed that when a contemnor disrupts the  

court  proceedings  by  using  offensive  language,  it  is  

permissible to adopt summary proceedings to punish him.  

Mr. Luthra further submitted that the appellant tried to get  

his  personal  application  tagged  to  the  Public  Interest  

Litigation  petition  for  his  personal  gain  and  he  utilized  a  

letter of a Cabinet Minister to overawe the court.  Besides,  

he produced incorrect copy of the impugned order in this  

Court.  He claimed that he had filed bail application when no  

such application is found in the record.  He has committed  

breach  of  undertaking  given  in  the  affidavit  filed  in  this  

Court.   Mr.  Luthra  submitted  that  no  leniency  should  be  

shown to such a person and the appeal may, therefore, be  

dismissed.  

9. We  have  extensively  referred  to  the  contents  of  the  

impugned order of the High Court with a purpose.  It reflects  

the appellant’s rude behaviour.  The intemperate language  

used by the appellant while addressing learned Judges of the  1 (2009) 10 SCC 337

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High Court  is  most  objectionable  and contumacious.   The  

appellant is Deputy Superintendent of Police.  He claims to  

be the President of Bihar Police Seva Sangh.  A responsible  

police officer is not expected to behave in such undignified  

and unruly manner in the Court.  He shouted at the Judges.  

When they asked him whether the police headquarters had  

granted him any permission to argue his case in-person and  

challenge transfer policy of the police department, he rudely  

stated that that was not the concern of the court.  He was,  

however, unable to produce any permission.  Thereafter, he  

told the court that his application should be heard along with  

Public  Interest  Litigation  as  it  related  to  postings  and  

transfers of police officers.  On scrutiny, it was found that it  

mainly  related  to  his  transfer.   Thus,  he  made  a  wrong  

statement before the Court.  He, then, stated that he is a  

protected staff member and has immunity from transfer and  

he cannot be touched.   He tried to overawe the court by  

producing a Cabinet Minister’s letter addressed to the Chief  

Minister  recommending  his  case.   He  did  not  show  any  

remorse.  He did not tender any apology, but, continued his  

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rude  behaviour  of  shouting  at  the  court  and  baiting  the  

court.   By  this  behaviour  he  lowered  the  dignity  and  

authority of the High Court.  He challenged the majesty of  

the  High  Court  by  showing  utter  disrespect  to  it.  

Undoubtedly he committed contempt of the High Court in its  

presence  and  hearing.   He  is,  therefore,  guilty  of  having  

committed contempt in the face of the High Court.  His case  

is squarely covered by Section 14 of the Contempt of Courts  

Act, 1971.   

10. In  Re: Vinay Chandra Mishra  2  , on a question put to  

him by a Judge of the Allahabad High Court, the contemnor,  

who was an advocate, started shouting at the Judge and told  

him that the question could not have been put to him and he  

would get  the Judge transferred or see that impeachment  

motion is brought against him in Parliament.  He made more  

such  derogatory  comments.   Learned  Judge  addressed  a  

letter to the Acting Chief Justice narrating the incident.  The  

Acting Chief Justice forwarded the letter to the then Chief  

2 (1995) 2 SCC 584

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Justice  of  India.   This  Court,  then,  issued a  notice  to  the  

advocate taking a view that there was a prima facie case of  

the criminal contempt of the court.  This Court treated the  

said contempt as criminal contempt committed in the face of  

the High Court and sentenced the advocate.  Commenting  

on the contemnor’s conduct, this Court observed as under:

“To resent the questions asked by a Judge, to be  disrespectful to him, to question his authority to   ask the questions, to shout at him, to threaten him  with transfer  and impeachment,  to  use insulting   language and abuse him, to dictate the order that   he should pass, to create scenes in the court, to   address  him  by  losing  temper  are  all  acts   calculated  to  interfere  with  and  obstruct  the   course of justice. Such acts tend to overawe the   court and to prevent it from performing its duty to   administer  justice.  Such  conduct  brings  the   authority  of  the  court  and the  administration of   justice  into  disrespect  and  disrepute  and   undermines and erodes the very foundation of the   judiciary by shaking the confidence of the people   in the ability of the court to deliver free and fair   justice.”

The above observations of this Court have a bearing on  

the present case.  

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11. In  Ranveer  Yadav    v.    State  of  Bihar  3    the  

appellant  and  the  other  contemnors  disrupted  the  court  

proceedings by aggressively exchanging heated words and  

created unpleasant scenes in the Court.  The decorum and  

dignity of the court was so much threatened that the Judge  

was forced to rise.  This Court held that the offending acts of  

the appellant constitute contempt in the face of the court.  

The relevant paragraph could be quoted.

“The  offending  acts  of  the  appellant  constitute  contempt  in  the  face  of  court.  When  contempt  takes place in the face of the court, peoples’ faith  in the administration of justice receives a severe  jolt and precious judicial time is wasted. Therefore,  the offending acts of the appellant certainly come  within  the  ambit  of  interference  with  the  due  course of judicial proceeding and are a clear case  of criminal contempt in the face of the court.”

12. The  appellant’s  contention  that  no  opportunity  was  

given to him to make his  defence must be rejected.    In  

Pritam  Pal    v.    High  Court  of  Madhya  Pradesh,   

Jabalpur,  through  Registrar  4  ,  while  dealing  with  the  

nature and scope of power conferred upon this Court and the  3 (2010) 11 SCC 493 4 1993 Supp (1) SCC 529

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High Court,  being courts of record under Articles 129 and  

215  of  the  Constitution  of  India  respectively,  this  Court  

observed that  the said power is  an inherent power under  

which the Supreme Court and the High Court can deal with  

contempt of itself.  The jurisdiction vested is a special one  

not  derived from any other  statute but  derived only from  

Articles 129 and 215.  This Court further clarified that the  

constitutionally  vested  right  cannot  be  either  abridged,  

abrogated or cut down by legislation including the Contempt  

of Courts Act.

13. In Leila David(6)    this Court has   discussed what is  

contempt  in  the  face  of  the  Court.   In    this  case,  the  

petitioners    made  contumacious  allegations  in  the  writ  

petition and   supporting affidavits.  Notices were   issued to  

them   as to   why   contempt     proceedings   should   not  

be issued   against   them.   The   hearing commenced.  The  

writ petitioners   disrupted   the   proceedings   by   using  

very offensive,   intemperate   and   abusive   language   at  

a   high pitch.  One of the petitioners stated that the Judges  

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should be jailed by initiating proceedings against them and  

threw footwear at the Judges.  The petitioners stood  by what  

they had said and done in the Court.  One of the learned  

Judges felt  that  there was no need to issue notice to the  

petitioners and held them guilty of criminal contempt of the  

court.  The other learned Judge observed that the mandate  

of Section 14 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 must be  

followed before sending the contemnors to jail.  The question  

was, therefore, whether the petitioners were entitled to any  

opportunity of hearing.   The matter was thereafter placed  

before a three Judge Bench.  The three Judge Bench resolved  

the difference of opinion and observed as under:

“Section  14  of  the  Contempt  of  Courts  Act  no   doubt  contemplates  issuance  of  notice  and  an   opportunity  to  the  contemnors  to  answer  the   charges in the notice to satisfy the principles of   natural justice. However, where an incident of the   instant nature takes place within the presence and   sight of the learned Judges, the same amounts to   contempt in the face of the Court and is required   to be dealt with at the time of the incident itself.   This is  necessary for  the dignity and majesty of   the courts to be maintained. When an object, such   as a footwear, is thrown at the Presiding Officer in   a  court  proceeding,  the  object  is  not  to  merely   scandalise  or  humiliate  the  Judge,  but  to   

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scandalise the institution itself and thereby lower   its dignity in the eyes of the public.”

14. Thus, when a contempt is committed in the face of the  

High Court or the Supreme Court to scandalize or humiliate  

the Judge, instant action may be necessary.  If the courts do  

not  deal  with  such  contempt  with  strong  hand,  that  may  

result  in  scandalizing  the  institution  thereby  lowering  its  

dignity in the eyes of the public.  The courts exist for the  

people.   The courts  cherish  the  faith  reposed in  them by  

people.   To  prevent  erosion  of  that  faith,  contempts  

committed in the face of the court need a strict treatment.  

The  appellant,  as  observed  by  the  High  Court  was  not  

remorseful.  He did not file any affidavit tendering apology  

nor did he orally tell the High Court that he was remorseful  

and he wanted to tender apology.  Even in this Court he has  

not tendered apology.  Therefore, since the contempt was  

gross and it was committed in the face of the High Court,  

learned Judges  had to  take immediate  action  to  maintain  

honour and dignity of the High Court.  There was no question  

of giving the appellant any opportunity to make his defence.  

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This  submission  of  the  appellant  must,  therefore,  be  

rejected.  

15. In this Court also the appellant’s behaviour is far from  

satisfactory.  He told us that he had filed an application for  

bail in the High Court, but the High Court did not consider it.  

The bail application attached at Annexure-A/6 to the petition  

is  unsigned,  supported  by  unsigned  affidavit  bearing  no  

name  of  the  lawyer.   We  have  gone  through  the  entire  

record of the High Court and we find that there is no bail  

application in the record.  Still worse is the tampering of the  

impugned order. The appellant has not filed the true copy of  

the impugned order.  The first sentence of paragraph 4 of  

the copy of the impugned order filed in this Court  reads as  

under:   

“The  intervenor  who presents  himself  in  person  otherwise a police officer didn’t shout at the Court   that he is an intervenor in this case….”    

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However,  in  the  original  impugned  order   the  said  

sentence  does not have the words ‘didn’t shout.’ It reads  

as under:  

“the intervenor who presents himself in person  otherwise a police officer shouted at  the Court   that he is an intervenor in this case…….”   

Thus,  the  words  ‘didn’t  shout’ have   replaced  the  

word ‘shouted.’  When we asked for  an explanation,  the  

appellant stated that there is no tampering, but it is merely a  

typing error.  We refuse to accept this explanation.   In this  

case, by replacing the word ‘shouted’ by the words ‘didn’t  

shout’ the appellant has changed the entire meaning of the  

sentence to suit his case that he did not shout in the court.  

Thus, he is guilty of tampering with the High Court’s order  

and filing it  in  this  Court.   This  would,  in  our  opinion,  be  

criminal  contempt  as  defined  by  Section  2(c)  of  the  

Contempt  of  Court  Act,  1971.   There  is  abundance  of  

judgments of this Court on this issue.  This Court has taken a  

strict  view  of  such  conduct.   We  may  usefully  refer  to  

Chandra Shashi   v.   Anil Kumar Verma  5   where in a  5 (1995) 1 SCC 421

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transfer  petition  the  contemnor  had  filed  a  forged  

experience certificate purportedly issued by the Principal of  

a college from Nagpur.  The Principal filed affidavit stating  

that the said certificate is forged.  This Court observed that  

an act which interferes or tends to interfere or obstructs or  

tends  to  obstruct  the  administration  of  justice  would  be  

criminal contempt as defined in Section 2(c) of the Contempt  

of  Courts  Act,  1971.   This  Court  further  observed  that  if  

recourse to falsehood is taken with oblique motive, the same  

would  definitely  hinder,  hamper  or  impede  even  flow  of  

justice and would prevent the courts from performing their  

legal  duties as  they are supposed to do.   The contemnor  

was, therefore, suitably sentenced.  

16. In Re: Bineet Kumar Singh  6    a forged/fabricated  

order of this court was used for the purpose of conferring  

some benefits on a group of persons.  This Court took a strict  

view of the matter and observed as under:

“The law of contempt of court is essentially meant   for keeping the administration of justice pure and   

6 (2001) 5 SCC 501

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undefiled. It is difficult to rigidly define contempt.   While on the one hand, the dignity of the court has   to be maintained at all costs, it must also be borne   in  mind  that  the  contempt  jurisdiction  is  of  a   special nature and should be sparingly used. The  Supreme Court is the highest court of record and  it is charged with the duties and responsibilities of   protecting the dignity of the court. To discharge its   obligation as the custodian of the administration   of justice in the country and as the highest court   imbued with supervisory and appellate jurisdiction   over  all  the  lower  courts  and  tribunals,  it  is   inherently  deemed to  have been entrusted with   the power to see that the stream of justice in the   country  remains  pure,  that  its  course  is  not   hindered or obstructed in any manner, that justice   is delivered without fear or favour.  To discharge  this  obligation,  the  Supreme  Court  has  to  take  cognizance  of  the  deviation  from  the  path  of   justice.  The sole object  of  the court  wielding its   power  to  punish  for  contempt  is  always  for  the   course  of  administration  of  justice.  Nothing  is   more incumbent upon the courts of justice than to   preserve  their  proceedings  from  being  misrepresented,  nor  is  there  anything  more   pernicious when the order of the court is forged   and produced to gain undue advantage. Criminal   contempt  has  been  defined  in  Section  2(c)  to  mean  interference  with  the  administration  of   justice in any manner. A false or misleading or a   wrong statement deliberately and wilfully made by   a party to the proceedings to obtain a favourable   order  would  undoubtedly  tantamount  to   interference  with  the  due  course  of  judicial   proceedings.  When  a  person  is  found  to  have  utilised an order of a court which he or she knows   to be incorrect for conferring benefit on persons   who  are  not  entitled  to  the  same,  the  very   utilisation of  the fabricated order  by the person   

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concerned  would  be  sufficient  to  hold  him/her   guilty  of  contempt,  irrespective  of  the  fact   whether he or she himself or herself is the author   of fabrication.”  

We respectfully concur with these observations.  

17. We shall now turn to the affidavit filed by the appellant  

in  this  Court.   He has  sworn an  affidavit  stating that  the  

annexures of the criminal appeal are the true copies of the  

originals and the facts stated in the criminal appeal are true  

to his knowledge.  As already noted by us, the appellant has  

tampered with the original impugned order.  He stated that  

he had filed a bail application in the High Court.  The copy of  

the said bail application filed in this Court is unsigned and  

supported  by  unsigned  affidavit  bearing  no  name  of  the  

lawyer.   The appellant  has not made the Registrar of the  

Patna High Court party to the appeal.  The Registrar could  

have clarified whether any bail application was, in fact, filed  

by the appellant.  In any case, we have perused the record  

and  we find  that  there  is  no  such  bail  application  in  the  

record.  Thus, in this Court the appellant has filed a false  

affidavit.  This amounts to contempt of this Court.  

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18. Another  very  disturbing  feature  of  this  case  is  the  

manner in which the appellant flourished in the High Court a  

Cabinet  Minister’s  letter  addressed  to  the  Chief  Minister  

recommending his case.  We do not want to comment on the  

propriety of the Cabinet Minister in addressing such a letter  

to the Chief Minister in this case, though this Court has in  

Prakash Singh and ors.   v.   Union of India and ors  7    

sought to insulate the police from political interference.  In  

any case, the appellant should not have tried to overawe the  

High Court by producing the said letter.  We deprecate this  

conduct.  We were also  taken aback when we were informed  

that the appellant is the President of the Bihar Police Seva  

Sangh.  We are, however, informed that membership of such  

association is  permitted in the State of  Bihar  even to the  

police  officers.   However,  the  fact  remains  that  the  said  

association is not registered.  

19. The appellant’s contention that since the respondents  

have not filed affidavit, his case is unrebutted is without any  

7 (2006) 8 SCC 1

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merit.   A  contempt  matter  is  essentially  between  the  

contemnor and the court.  On the basis of the record and the  

attendant  circumstances  the  court  has  to  decide  whether  

there is any contempt or not.  No doubt, the respondents  

could have  filed an affidavit, but merely because there is no  

affidavit,  the  contemnor  cannot  escape  his  liability.   The  

facts of the case are gross.  The contempt is in the face of  

the  High Court.   The fact  that  the respondents have not  

filed   affidavit  in  reply  does  not  dilute  the  contempt  

committed by the appellant.  

20. In the ultimate analysis we are of the view that the High  

Court  cannot  be  faulted  for  punishing  the  appellant  for  

contempt of  court.   No interference is  necessary with the  

impugned order.  We are also concerned with the contempt  

of  this  Court  committed  by  the  appellant.   We direct  the  

appellant  to  pay  a  fine  of  Rs.25,000/-.  The fine  shall   be  

deposited with the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee  

within  four  weeks  from today,  failing  which  the  appellant  

shall  suffer  simple  imprisonment  for  seven  days.   The  

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amount deposited by the appellant may be utilized for issues  

concerning juvenile justice.  

21. The appeal is disposed of in the afore-stated terms.  

…….……………………………..J. (Ranjana Prakash Desai)

……………………………………J. (Madan B. Lokur)

New Delhi; March 31, 2014.  

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