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PETITIONER: RAM GOPAL

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: NAND LAL AND OTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 14/11/1950

BENCH: MUKHERJEA, B.K. BENCH: MUKHERJEA, B.K. FAZAL ALI, SAIYID AIYAR, N. CHANDRASEKHARA

CITATION:  1951 AIR  139            1950 SCR  766  CITATOR INFO :  R          1952 SC 145  (7)  R          1954 SC 355  (15)  F          1963 SC1703  (7,8)  R          1972 SC1279  (10)  R          1976 SC 794  (8)

ACT:      Hindu  Law--Gift to  female  owner--Construction--’Gift for maintenance--Estate conveyed, whether absolute or limit- ed--Use of the word ’Malik’, effect of.

HEADNOTE:         In  construing a document whether in English  or  in vernacular  the fundamental rule is to ascertain the  inten- tion from the words used; the surrounding circumstances  are to be considered but that is only for the purpose of finding out  the intended meaning of the words which  have  actually been employed.     To  convey  an absolute estate to a  Hindu  female,  no express  power of alienation need be given; it is enough  if words of such amplitude are used as would convey full rights of ownership. The  term ’Malik’ when used in a will or other  document  as descriptive  of  the position which a devisee  or  donee  is intended  to  held, has been held apt to describe  in  owner possessed of full proprietory rights, including a full right of  alienation, unless there is something in the context  or in the surrounding circumstances to indicate that such  full proprietory rights were not intended be conferred to       767     The  mere fact that a gift of property is made  for  the support  and maintenance of a female relation could  not  be taken to be a prima facie indication of the intention of the donor, that the donee was to enjoy the property only  during her  life-time.  The extent of interest, which the donee  is to  take,  depends upon the intention of the  donor  as  ex- pressed  by the language used, and if the dispositive  words employed  in  the  document are clear  and  unambiguous  and import  absolute ownership, the purpose of the  grant  would not,  by  itself,  restrict or cut down  the  interest.  The desire  to  provide maintenance or rcsidence  of  the  donee

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would only show the motive which prompted the donor to  make the  gift,  but  it could not be read as a  measure  of  the extent of the gift.     Where a Hindu died leaving two widows, a widowed  daugh- terin-law and a daughter’s son, and a relative of the family acting as guardian of the daughter’s son’s son who was  then the  nearest reversioner got a relinquishment deed from  the daughter-in-law renouncing all her claims to the estate  and in  return executed a  deed of ’tamlikhama’ to her with  re- spect to certain properties which ran as follows:     "I  have  therefore,  of my own accord  and  free  will, without  any compulsion or coercion on the part of  any  one else  while in my proper senses made a Tamlik of  a  double- storied  pucca  built  shop  .........  and a  house  and  a kothri  in Etawah  .........  worth Rs. 8,000  for  purposes of  residence        of the Musammat  (the  daughter-in-law) owned  by  the  minor         aforesaid   .........    which present stands let out on out on rent to Sunder Lal, brother of Mst. Meria aforesaid  .........  in favour of Mst.  Meria aforesaid,  widow  of  Chhedi Lal and  made  her  the  owner (Malik) "’     Held,  that  there  was nothing in the  context  of  the document  or  in the surrounding circumstances  which  would displace  the presumption of full proprietory  rights  which the use of the words ’Malik’ is apt ordinarily to convey and the  daughter-in-law  obtained under the gift  deed  a  full heritable  and transferable title to t, he  properties  con- veyed thereby.     Rajendra  Prasad v. Gopal Prasad (57 I.A. 296),  Kollani Koer v. Luchmee Parsad (94 W.R. 395), Tagore v. Tagore (I.A. Supp.  Sasiman  Chaudhurain v. Shib Narayan  (49  I.A.  25), Biswanath Prasad v. Chandrika (60 I.A. 56) relied on. Baja  Ram Baksh v. Arjun (60 I.A. 56), Woodayaditta  Deb  v. W.R. 229) distinguished.

JUDGMENT: APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. LIX of 1949.     Appeal  from  the judgment of the Allahabad  High  Court (Verma  and  Yorke JJ.) dated 6th September, 1943  in  First Appeal No. 3 of 1940.     P.L.  Banerjee (B. Banerjee, with him), for  the  appel- lant. 768     S.P. Sinha (N.C. Sen, with him), for the respondents.     1950.  November  14.  The court  delivered  judgment  as follows :--     MUKHERJEA J.--This appeal is directed against an  appel- late  judgment  of a Division Bench of  the  Allahabad  High Court dated September 6, 1943, by which the  learned  Judges reversed   a  decision of the Civil Judge, Etawah,  made  in Original Suit No. 28 of 1936.     The  suit  was one commenced by the  plaintiff,  who  is respondent No. 1 in this appeal, for recovery of  possession of two items of immovable property--one, a residential house and other, a shop--both of which are situated in the town of Etawah.   The   properties  admittedly formed  part  of  the estate  of one Mangal Sen who died sometime towards the  end of  the last century, leaving behind him, as his heirs,  his two  widows, Mst. Mithani and Mst. Rani.   Mangal Sen had  a son named Chhedi Lal and    a daughter named Janki Kuar born of  his  wife Mst.  Rani, but both of them died  during  his lifetime.    Chhedi Lal had no issue and he was survived  by his   widow Mst. Meria,while Janki left a son  named  Thakur

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Prasad. Janki’s husband married another wife and by her  got a son named Babu Ram.  On Mangal Sen’s death, his properties devolved  upon  his two widows, and Mst.  Rani  having  died subsequently, Mst. Mithani came to hold the entire estate of her  husband in the restricted rights of a Hindu widow.   On 27th  November  1919,  Mst. Mithani  surrendered  the  whole estate of her husband by a deed of gift in favour of  Thakur Prasad who was the nearest reversioner at that time.  Thakur Prasad died in 1921, leaving a minor son named Nand Lal  who succeeded to his properties and this Nand Lal is the  plain- tiff  in the suit out of which this appeal arises.  On  27th October  1921, there was a transaction entered into  between Babu  Ram  on his own behalf as well as guardian  of  infant Nand Lal on the One hand and Mst. Meria, the widow of Chhedi Lal, on       769 the  other,  by which two items of property  which  are  the subject-matter  of the present litigation were  conveyed  to Meria  by a deed of transfer which has been described  as  a Tamliknama;  and she on her part executed a deed  of  relin- quishment  renouncing  her claims to every  portion  of  the estate  left by Mangal Sen.  It is not disputed  that  Meria took  possession of the properties on the basis of the  Tam- liknama and on 10th April 1923 she executed a will, by which these  properties were bequeathed to her three nephews,  who are  the sons of her brother Sunder Lal. Meria died on  19th June  1924.   One  Ram Dayal had  obtained  a  money  decree against  Sunder Lal and his three sons, and in execution  of that decree the properties in suit were attached and put  up to sale and they were purchased by Ram Dayal himself on 30th January 1934. On 1st June 1936, the present suit was  insti- tuted  by Nand Lal and he prayed for recovery of  possession of  these  two items of property on the allegation  that  as they were given to Mst. Meria for her maintenance and  resi- dence, she could  enjoy  the same only so long as she  lived and after her death, they reverted to the plaintiff.  Sunder Lal,  the brother of Meria, was made the first defendant  in the  suit, and his  three sons figured as defendants Nos.  2 to  4.  Defendant No. 5 is a lady named  Chimman  Kunwar  in whose favour Sunder Lal was alleged to have executed a  deed of transfer in respect of a portion of the disputed  proper- ty.   Ram Dayal, the  decree-holder auction purchaser,  died in May 1935 and his properties vested in his daughter’s  son Ram Gopal under a deed of gift executed by him in favour  of the latter. On 1st September 1938, Ram Gopal was added as  a party  defendant to the suit on the plaintiff’s  application and  he  is defendant No. 6.  The   two   other  defendants, namely,  defendants 7 and 8, who were also made  parties  at the  same  time, are respectively the widow and  an  alleged adopted son of Ram Dayal.     The  suit was contested primarily by  defendant  No.  6, and the substantial contentions raised by him in his written statement were of a two-fold character. 770 The first and the main contention was that Mst. Meria got an absolute title to the disputed properties on the strength of the  ’Tamliknama’ executed in her favour by the guardian  of the plaintiff and after her death, the properties passed  on to the three sons of Sunder Lal who were the legatees  under her  will.   Ram Dayal, it was said, having purchased  these properties  execution of a money decree against  Sunder  Lal and  his  three sons acquired a valid title  to  them.   The other  contention  raised was that the suit  was  barred  by limitation.   The trial Judge decided both these  points  in favour of the contesting defendant and dismissed the  plain-

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tiff’s  suit. On appeal to the High Court, the  judgment  of the  Civil Judge was set aside and the plaintiff’s suit  was decreed.   The  defendant  No. 6 has now come up on  appeal  to  this court and Mr. Peary Lal Banerjee, who appeared in support of the appeal, pressed before us both the points upon which the decision of the High Court has been adverse to his client.   The  first  point raised by Mr. Banerjee  turns  upon  the construction to be placed upon the document executed by Babu Ram on his own behalf as well as on behalf of Nand Lal  then an  infant, by which the properties in dispute  were  trans- ferred to Mst. Meria by way of a ’Tamliknama’.  The question is whether the transferee got, under it, an absolute  inter- est in the properties, which was heritable and alien able or was it the interest of a life tenant merely.  The documentis by  no means a complicated one.  It begins by a  recital  of the events under which Nand Lal became the sole owner of the properties left by Mangal Sen and refers in this  connection to the obligation on the  part of both Babu Ram and Nand Lal to "support,  maintain and console" Mst. Meria, the widow of the   pre-deceased  son of Mangal Sen.   The  document  then proceeds to state as follows:  "I  have therefore, of my own accord and free will  without any compulsion or coercion on the part of any one else while in my proper senses made a Tamlik of a double-storied  pucca built shop  ......  and a house      771 and  a  kothri  in Etawah  .........  worth  Rs.  8,000  for purposes  of residence of the Musammat, owned by  the  minor aforesaid   ......  which at present stands let out on  rent to Sunder Lal, brother of Mst. Meria aforesaid .........  in favour of Mst. Meria aforesaid, widow of Chhedi Lal and made her  the owner (Malik).  If any portion or the whole of  the property  made a Tamlik of for the purpose  mentioned  above passes  out of the possession of the Musammat  aforesaid  on account  of the claim of Nand Lal minor aforesaid, I and  my property  of every sort shall be responsible and liable  for the same."     This document has got to be read along with the deed  of relinquishment, which is a contemporaneous document  execut- ed  by  Meria  renouncing  all  her claims to  the  property left  by  Mangal Sen.  The deed of relinquishment  like  the Tamliknama  recites elaborately, with reference to  previous events,  particularly to the deed of gift executed  by  Mst. Mithani  in favour of Thakur Prasad, the gradual  devolution of the entire estate of Mangal Sen upon Nand Lal.  It states thereafter  that Babu Ram, as the guardian of the minor  and also  in his own right, "has under a Tamliknama  dated  this day  made  a ’Tamlik’. in my favour of a  shop  alongwith  a Balakhana and a kota for my maintenance and a house  ....... for  purpose of my residence which are quite sufficient  for my maintenance." "I have therefore, of my own accord ",  the document  goes  on  to say, "made a  relinquishment  of  the entire   property  aforesaid  mentioned  in  the   deed   of gift  ......worth Rs. 25,000.  I do covenant and do give  in writing  that I have and shall have no claim to  or  concern with the property  .........  belonging to the minor  afore- said, nor has the property aforesaid remained subject to  my maintenance  allowance  nor shall I bring any claim  at  any time."   The  schedule to the instrument, it may  be  noted, gives a list of all the properties of Mangal Sen in  respect to  which Mst. Mithani executed a deed of gift in favour  of Thakur  Prasad, including the two items of property  covered by the’Tamliknama’ mentioned aforesaid. 772

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    In  construing  a  document whether in  English  or  in vernacular the fundamental rule is to ascertain the   inten- tion  from the  words used;  the  surrounding  circumstances are  to be considered, but that is only for the  purpose  of finding  out  the intended meaning of the words  which  have actually been employed(1).  In the present case the  instru- ment  of  grant has been described as a  ’Tamliknama’  which means a document by which ’ Maliki ’ or ownership rights are transferred and the document expressly says that the grantee has  been  made a’ Malik’ or owner.  There  are  no  express words making the gift heritable and transferable; nor on the other hand, is there any statement that the transferee would enjoy the properties only during her life-time and that they would revert to the grantor after her death.      It  may be taken to be quite settled that there  is  no warrant  for the proposition of law that when a grant of  an immovable  property is made to a Hindu female, she does  not get  an  absolute or alienable interest  in  such  property, unless  such  power is expressly conferred  upon  her.   The reasoning adopted by Mr. Justice Mitter of the Calcutta High Court  in  Kollani Koer v. Luchmee Parsad(2) which  was  ap- proved of and accepted by the Judicial Committee in a number of  decisions, seems to me to be unassailable.  It was  held by  the Privy Council as early as in the case of  Tagore  v. Tagore(’3)  that  if an estate were given to a  man  without express words of inheritance, it would, in the absence of  a conflicting  context,  carry,  by Hindu Law,  an  estate  of inheritance.  This is the general principle of law which  is recognised  and  embodied in section 8 of  the  Transfer  of Property  Act and unless it is shown that under Hindu Law  a gift to a female means a limited gift or carries with it the restrictions or disabilities similar to those that exist  in a ’widow’s estate’, there is no justification for  departing from  this principle.  There is certainly no such  provision in Hindu Law and no text could be supplied in support of the same. (1) Vide Rajgndra Prasad v. Gopal Prasad. 57 I.A. 296. (2) 24 W.R. 395.         (3) L.R.I.A. Supp. 47 at 65.       773     The  position, therefore, is that to convey an  absolute estate  to  a Hindu female, no express power  of  alienation need be given; it is enough if words are used of such ampli- tude as would convey full rights of ownership.     Mr. Banerjee naturally lays stress upon the  description of  the document as ’Tamliknama’ and the use of the  word  ’ Malik’  or owner in reference to the interest which it  pur- ports  to convey to the transferee.  The word’ Malik’ is  of very  common use in many parts of India and it  cannot  cer- tainly be regarded as a technical term of conveyancing.   In the  language  of the Privy Council, the term  ’Malik’  when used  in  a will or other document "as  descriptive  of  the position  which a devisee or donee is intended to hold,  has been  held apt to describe an owner possessed of  full  pro- prietory  rights,  including  a full  right  of  alienation, unless there is something in the context or in the surround- ing  circumstances  to indicate that such  full  proprietory rights were not intended to be conferred(1).’’  This I think to be a perfectly correct statement of law and I only desire to  add that it should be taken with the caution  which  the Judicial  Committee uttered  in course of the same  observa- tion  that "the meaning of every word in an Indian  document must  always depend upon the setting in which it is  placed, the  subject to which it is related and the locality of  the grantor from which it receives its true shade of meaning."     The question before us, therefore, narrows down to  this

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as  to whether in the present case there is anything in  the context  of these two connected instruments or in  the  sur- rounding  circumstances  to cut down  the  full  proprietory rights that the word ’Malik’ ordinarily imports.     The  High Court in reaching its decision adverse to  the appellant  laid great stress on the fact that the grant  was expressed to be for maintenance and residence of Mst. Meria. This, it is said, would prima facie indicate that the  grant was to enure for the lifetime of the grantee.  It is pointed out by the learned (1)  Vide Sasiman Chowdhurain v. Shib Narayan, 49  I.A,  25. 35. 99 774 Judges that the language of the document does not show  that anybody else besides the lady herself was to be benefited by the grant and the indemnity given by Babu Ram was also given to  the lady personally.  It is further said that  if  Meria was given an absolute estate in the properties comprised  in the ’Tamliknama’, there was no necessity for including these two properties again in the deed of relinquishment which she executed at the same time.     I  do  not  think that the mere fact that  the  gift  of property is made for the support and maintenance of a female relation  could be taken to be a prima facie  indication  of the intention of the donor, that the donee was to enjoy  the property only during her life-time. The extent of  interest, which  the donee is to take, depends upon the  intention  of the  donor as expressed by the language use, d, and  if  the dispositive  words  employed in the document are  clear  and unambiguous  and import absolute ownership, the  purpose  of the  grant  would not, by itself, restrict or cut  down  the interest.  The desire to provide maintenance or residence of the  donee  would only show the motive  which  prompted  the donor to make the gift, but it could not be read as a  meas- ure of the extent of the  gift. This was laid down in  clear terms  by the Judicial Committee in a  comparatively  recent case  which is to be found reported in Bishunath  Prasad  v. Chandrika(1).  There a Hindu executed a registered  deed  of gift of certain properties in favour of his  daughter-in-law for the" support and maintenance" of his daughter-in-law and declared that the donee should remain absolute owner of  the property  (malik   mustaqil)  and  pay  Government  revenue. There  were  no words in the document expressly  making  the interest  heritable or conferring on the donee the power  of making  alienation.  It was held by the  Judicial  Committee that  the donee took under the document, an absolute  estate with powers to make alienation giving title valid after  her death.  In course of the judgment, Lord Blanesburgh  quoted, with approval,  an  earlier decision of the (1) 60 I.A 56       775 Judicial  Committee, where the words "for your  maintenance" occurring  in a deed of gift were held insufficient  to  cut down to life interest the estate taken by the donees.  These words,  it was said, "are quite capable of  signifying  that the  gift was made for the purpose of enabling them to  live in  comfort  and do not necessarily mean that it was  to  be limited to a bare right of maintenance."     On  behalf of the respondent, reliance was  placed  upon the decision of the Judicial Committee in Raja Ram Buksh  v. Arjun(1)in  support of the contention that in a  maintenance grant  it is the prima facie intention of the gift  that  it should be for life.  In my opinion, the decision cited is no authority for the general proposition as is contended for by

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the learned Counsel for the respondent, and it is to be read in the context of the actual facts of the case which  relate to grants of a particular type with special features of  its own.  It was a case where a Talukdar made a grant of certain villages to a junior member of the joint family for  mainte- nance of the latter.  The family was governed by the law  of primegeniture and the estate descended to a single heir.  In such  cases the usual custom is that the junior  members  of the family, who can get no share in the property, are  enti- tled  to provisions by way of maintenance for which  assign- ments  of  lands are generally made in  their  favour.   The extent  of  interest taken by the grantee  in  the  assigned lands depends entirely upon the circumstances of the partic- ular  case,  or rather upon the usage that prevails  in  the particular  family.   In the case before the  Privy  Council there  was  actually no deed of transfer.  It  was  an  oral assignment  made  by  the Talukdar, and the  nature  of  the grant  had to be determined upon the recitals of a  petition for mutation of names made to the Revenue Department by  the grantor after the verbal assignment was made and from  other facts  and circumstances of the case.  The case of  Woodoya- ditta  Deb v. Mukoond(2), which was referred to  and  relied upon  in the judgment of the Privy Council, was (1) 28  I.A, 1.                   (2) 22 w.R. 229. 776 also a case of maintenance or khor phos grant made in favour of  a junior member of the family, where theestate  was  im- partible and descended under the rules of primogeniture.  It was held in that case that such grants, the object of  which was to make suitable provisions for the immediate members of the  family,  were by their very nature and also  under  the custom of the land resumable by the zemindar on the death of the   grantee,  as otherwise the whole  zemindary  would  be swallowed  up  by  continual demands.   This  principle  bas obviously no application to cases of the type which we  have before us and it was never so applied by the Privy  Council, as would appear from the decision referred to above.      The  learned Counsel for the plaintiff respondent  drew our  attention  in  this connection, to the  fact  that  the properties  given  by the ,Tamliknama’ were  valued  at  Rs. 8,000,  whereas  the entire estate left by  Mangal  Sen  was worth  Rs. 25,000 only.  It is argued that the  transfer  of nearly  one-third of the entire estate in absolute right  to one who was entitled to maintenance merely, is, on the  face of it, against probability and common sense.  I do not think that,  on  the facts of this case, any weight could  be  at- tached  to  this argument. In the first place, it is  to  be noted that whatever might have been the actual  market value of  the properties, what the widow got under the  Tamliknama was  a  residential house and a shop, and the shop  was  the only  property  which  fetched any income.   This  shop,  it appears,  was  all along in possession of  Sunder  Lal,  the brother of Meria, and the rent, which he paid or promised to pay  in  respect of the same, was only Rs. 12 a  month.   So from the income of this property it was hardly possible  for Meria to have even abate maintenance, and this would  rather support the inference that the properties were given to  her absolutely  and  not for enjoyment merely, so  long  as  she lived.  But what is more important is, that the object of  creating these two documents, as the surrounding circumstances  show, was not merely to make provision    777 for  the maintenance of Mst. Meria; the other and  the  more important object was to perfect the title of Nand Lal to the

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estate  left  by Mangal Sen and to quiet all  disputes  that freight  arise in respect of the same. It may be  that  Mst. Meria could not, in law, claim any. thing more than a  right to  be  maintained  out  of  the  estate  of  her   deceased father-in-law.  But  it  is clear that  whatever  her  legal rights might have been, Nand Lal’s own position as the  sole owner of the properties left by Mangal Sen was not altogeth- er  undisputed or free from any hostile attack. As has  been said  already,  Sunder  Lal, the brother of  Meria,  was  in occupation  of the double-storied shop from long before  the Tamliknama was executed and Meria got any legal title to it. It appears from the record that in 1920 a suit was institut- ed on behalf of the infant Nand Lal for evicting Sunder  Lal from  the  shop and the allegation in the  plaint  was  that Sunder Lal was occupying the property as a tenant since  the time of Mst. Mithani by taking a settlement from her. Sunder Lal  in his written statement filed in that  suit  expressly repudiated  the allegation of tenancy and also the title  of Nand Lal and openly asserted that it was Mst. Meria who  was the actual owner of Mangal Sen’s estate. The suit ended in a compromise arrived at through the medium of arbitrators  and the  result was that although Sunder Lal admitted the  title of the plaintiff, the latter had to abandon the claims which were made in the plaint for rents, costs and damages. Sunder Lal continued to be in occupation of the shop and executed a rent agreement in respect of the same in favour of Nand  Lal promising  to pay a rent of Rs. 12 per month. A  few  months later, the Tamliknama was executed and this shop along  with the  residential house were given to Meria in maliki  right. The  recitals in both the Tamliknama and the deed of  relin- quishment  clearly indicate that the supreme anxiety on  the part  of Babu Ram, who was trying his best to safeguard  the interests  of  the minor, was to put an end to  all  further disputes that might be raised by or on behalf of Mst.  Meria with regard to the rights of Nand Lal to the properties 778 of  Mangal Sen and to make his title to the same  absolutely impeccable.  That seems to be the reason why Meria was given a  comparatively  large portion of the  properties  left  by Mangal  Sen which would enable   her to live in comfort  and her  interest  was not limited  to a bare right  of  mainte- nance. It is significant to  note that the shop room,  which was all along in  possession of Sunder Lal, was included  in this  Tamliknama and soon after the grant was  made,  Sunder Lal   executed  a rent agreement in respect of the  shop  in favour  of Mst. Meria acknowledging her to be the  owner  of the property.   It is true that the document does not make any   reference to  the heirs of Meria, but that is not at  all   necessary, nor  is it essential that any express power   of  alienation should be given.  The word "Malik" is  too common an expres- sion in this part of the country  and its meaning and impli- cations were fairly well  settled by judicial pronouncements long  before  the   document was executed.   If  really  the grantee  was  intended to have only a life interest  in  the properties,   there was no lack of appropriate  words,  per- fectly  well  known in the locality, to express such  inten- tion.   The  High  Court seems to have been  influenced  to   some extent  by  the  fact that in the Tamliknama  there   was  a guarantee given by Babu Ram to Meria herself  and to no  one else agreeing to compensate her in case she was dispossessed from   the  properties  at the instance of  Nand  Lal.  This covenant  in  the document was in the nature of  a  personal guarantee  given  by Babu Ram to Mst. Meria for  the  simple

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reason that the property belonged to an infant and it was as guardian  of the minor that Babu Ram was purporting to  act. It  was too much to expect that Babu Ram would bind  himself for  all  time to come and give a guarantee  to  the  future heirs  of Meria as well. Probably no such thing was  contem- plated by the parties and no  such undertaking was  insisted upon  by  the other side. But whatever the reason  might  be which led to the  covenant being expressed in this  particu- lar  form, I do not think that it has even a remote  bearing on the       779 question  that arises for our consideration in  the  present case. It is of no assistance to the plaintiff in support  of the  construction that is sought to be put upon the ,  docu- ment on his behalf.     I  am  also not at all impressed by the other  fact  re- ferred  to  in the judgment of the High Court  that  if  the properties were given to Meria in absolute right, there  was no necessity for including them again in the schedule to the deed  of relinquishment which Meria executed. I fail to  see how  the inclusion of the properties in the deed  of  relin- quishment would go to indicate that Meria’s rights to  these properties were of a restricted and not an absolute  charac- ter.  It is after all a pure matter of conveyancing and  the two  documents have to be read together as parts of one  and the  same’ transaction. Under the ’ Tamliknama ’, Meria  got two properties in absolute right out of the estate of Mangal Sen. By the deed of relinquishment, she renounced her  claim for  maintenance  in respect of all the properties  left  by Mangal  Sen including the two items which she got under  the ’Tamliknama’.  After the ’ Tamliknama’ was executed  in  her favour,  there Was no further question of her  claiming  any right  of  maintenance  in respect of  these  two  items  of property.  She became the absolute owner thereof in exchange of her rights of maintenance over the entire estate and this right of maintenance she gave up by the deed of  relinquish- ment.  On a construction of the entire document, my  conclu- sion  is that there is nothing in the context of  the  docu- ment,  or in the surrounding circumstances which would  dis- place  the presumption of full proprietory rights which  the use  of the word "Malik" is apt ordinarily to  convey.   The first  contention of the appellant, therefore, succeeds  and in  view of my decision on this point, the  second  question does not arise for determination at all.     The  result is that the appeal is allowed, the  judgment and decree of the High Court are set aside and those of  the trial  Judge  restored. The defendant No. 6  will  have  his costs from the plaintiff in all the courts. There will be no order for costs as regards the other parties: 780     FAZL  ALI J.--I agree with the judgment delivered by  my learned brother, Mukherjea J.     CHANDRASEKHARA  AIYAR  J.--During  the  hearing  of  the appeal  I entertained doubts whether the view taken  by  the High Court was not correct. But on further consideration,  I find  that  it cannot be maintained, having  regard  to  the terms  of the ’ Tamliknama’ (deed of transfer) in favour  of Musammat Meria and the context in which it came into  exist- ence.  The name of the document or deed does not  very  much matter.  Though the word ’ malik ’ is not a term of art,  it has  been  held in quite a large number  of  cases,  decided mostly by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council,  that the  word, as employed in Indian documents,  means  absolute owner  and  that unless the context  indicated  a  different meaning, its use would be sufficient to convey a full  title

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even  without the addition of the words,  ’ heirs ’,  or   ’ son ’,    ’ grandson ’   and   ’ great grandson’. Of course, if there are other clauses in the document which control the import of the word and restrict the estate to a limited one, we  must give the narrower meaning; otherwise the word  must receive its full significance.  Especially is this so,  when the rule of interpretation laid down in Mohammed Shamsul  v. Sewak Ram(’) has come to be regarded as unsound.     The  language employed  in  the  ’ Tamliknama’ (Ex.  II) is almost similar to the language of the deeds construed  in Bhaidas  Shivdas  v. Bai Gulab & Another(’2)  and  Bishunath Prasad Singh v. Chandika  Prasad Kumari and Others(s)  where it was held that an absolute estate was conveyed.   I  agree that the judgment and decree of the High Court should be set aside  and  that  the decree of the trial  Judge  should  be restored with costs to the appellant in all the Courts.                           Appeal allowed. Agent for the appellant: R.K.Kuba. Agent for the respondents: S.P. Varma. (1) L.R. 21 A. 7   (2) 49 I.A. 1      (3) 60 I.A. 56       781