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REPORTABLE

       IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

  CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL  APPEAL No. 3813 of 2007     

    RAM DHARI JINDAL MEMORIAL TRUST ...   APPELLANT(s)                         Versus

UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS ...   RESPONDENT(s)

J U D G M E N T  

 R.M. LODHA,J.

The judgment of the Delhi High Court dated July 9,  

2007 is impugned in this appeal.

2. It is the case of the respondents that there was  

requirement of houses for nearly 8 lakh persons within  

the reach of common man in Delhi.  To meet the shortage  

of  housing  accommodation,  the  Delhi  Development  

Authority (DDA) sought requisition of the land for its  

scheme known as 迭 ohini Residential Scheme(hereinafter  

referred  to  as  鍍 he  Scheme.   The  said  Scheme  was  

initially planned in three phases  - Phases I, II, and  

III.  The three phases in the  Scheme were developed.  

Even then, the acute shortage of houses in the  city of  

Delhi  continued.   Accordingly,  the  plan  for  

development  of  Rohini  Phases  IV  and  V  was

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formulated.  

3.  On the requisition of the DDA, on October 27, 1999,  

a  Notification  under  Section  4(1)  of  the  Land  

Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short  鍍 he Act was issued  

indicating that land stated therein was likely to be  

required  by  the  Government  of  Delhi  for  the  public  

purpose namely;   Rohini Residential Scheme, Delhi.  In  

the said Notification, it was also mentioned that  Lt.  

Governor, Delhi was satisfied that provisions of sub-

section (1) of Section 17 of the Act were applicable to  

the  land  mentioned  in  the  Notification  and  he  was  

pleased  under sub-section (4) of  Section 17 to direct  

that all the provisions of Section 5A of the Act  would  

not  apply.

4. On  April  3,  2000,  a  declaration  was  made  by  the  

Government of Delhi under Section 6 of the Act stating  

that the land mentioned therein  was acquired for the  

public purpose namely; Rohini Residential Scheme.

5. Another notification of the same  date was issued  

under  Section  7  of  the  Act   directing  the  Land  

Acquisition  Collector,  Narela  to  take  orders  for  

acquisition of the said land and take possession of the  

land mentioned therein.

6. The appellant in the present appeal claims to be the  

owner of the land ad-measuring 14 Bighas 18 Biswas in  

Khasra Nos. 22 and 39 of Village Shahbad-Daulatpur

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after the said land came to be donated to it by the  

erstwhile owners.  The appellant further claims  that a  

school has been set up on the above land  which imparts  

education to a large number of students.  The appellant  

challenged  the  acquisition  of  the  above  land  which  

forms part of  the above notifications before the Delhi  

High Court.  Large number of other Writ Petitions also  

came to be filed before the High Court challenging the  

above notifications.

7. Before the High Court, diverse grounds in challenging  

the acquisition of the subject land were set up; two of  

such grounds being that Lt. Governor has not applied  

his mind for dispensation of the enquiry under Section  

5A  of  the  Act  and  that   resort  to  the   urgency  

provisions  contained  in  Section  17  of  the  Act   was  

unwarranted and unjustified.        

8. The respondents contested the group of Writ Petitions  

and  justified  their  action  including  invocation  of  

urgency clause and dispensation of the enquiry under  

Section 5A of the Act.

9. The Division Bench of the  High Court, on hearing the  

parties, was not persuaded by the contentions of the  

appellant and the other writ petitioners which formed  

part  of  the  group  matters  and   dismissed  the  Writ  

Petitions being devoid of merit on July 9, 2007. It is  

from this judgment that the present appeal has

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arisen.

10.  The  High  Court  in  the  impugned  judgment  

noticed  the  contentions  of  the  Writ  Petitioners  in  

paragraph 2   as follows:

“The contention of the  petitioners is that the  Lt.  Governor  had  not  specifically  authorised  invocation of Section 17(4) of the stridently  Land Acquisition Act and that this is all the  more  significant  since  the  draft  of  the  Notification  placed  before  him  adverts  to  Section 17(4).  According to the petitioners,  the only inference that can be drawn is that the  Lt. Governor did not approve of dispensing with  the petitioners valuable rights to  object  to  the acquisition.  The further contention is that  since the petitioners have not been permitted to  avail of their rights to file objections under  Section  5A  and  have  not  been  given  an  opportunity  of  being  heard  the  entire  acquisition should be struck down.  It has also  been argued on behalf of the petitioners  that  even  assuming  that  Section  17(4)  need  not  in  terms  have to be mentioned by the Lt. Governor  while granting his approval to the Scheme    and  that  reference  only  to  Section  17(1)  would  suffice,  the  Lt.  Governor  has  not   properly  exercised his mind in approving the waiver  and  withdrawal  of  the  petitioners  valuable  right  under section 5A of the Act.  In other words, it  is  their  stance  that  resort  to  the  emergency  provisions contained in Section 17 of the Act  were unwarranted and unjustified in the facts of  the present case.”

11. The High Court noted the statutory provisions  

contained in Sections 4,5A,6,8,9,11,16 & 17 of the Act  

and  referred to the decisions of this Court relating  

to the interpretation of Section 17 of the Act in the  

cases namely;  Nandeshwar Prasad vs. The State of U.P.1;  

1(1964) 3 SCR 425

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Sarju Prasad Sinha vs. The State of U.P.2;, Union of  

India vs. Mukesh Hans3; Munshi Singh and others  Vs.  

Union of India4; Union of India vs. Krishan Lal Arneja5.  

With regard to decisions of this Court in Nandeshwar  

Prasad1, Krishan Lal Arneja5 and Mukesh Hans3,   the High  

Court, observed as follows:

“We have carefully perused the judgments in  Nandeshwar  Prasad,  Krishan  Lal  Arneja  and  Mukesh Hans and in order to ascertain whether  it had been argued that a separate decision  must be taken under Section 17(1) or (2) on  the one hand and Section 17(4) on the other;  or that even if Section 17(1) or 17(2) are  resorted to objections under Section 5A must  be invited and decided before  an acquisition  can be completed.  Our research is that these  contentions had not been raised.   Therefore,  the  dictum  in  Quinn  assumes  great  significance.  We will nonetheless give due  deference   to all the observations made by  the Apex Court, even though we find from the  pleadings before us, that grounds predicated  on  the  above  arguments  have  not  been  articulated in the petitions.  Indubitably,  these are legal contentions and we would be  loath to ignore them solely for the reason  that they have not been pleaded.  But this  state of affairs has obviously been occasioned  because  of  the  views  ventilated  in  Mukesh  Hans.”

12. The  High  Court  then  considered  the  three  

decisions  of  that  Court  in  Sri  Ballabh  Marbles  vs.  

Union of India6; Chaman Lal Malhotra vs. Union of India,  

W.P. (C)  4002 of 1997 decided on August 8, 2005 and  

2 AIR 1965 SC 1783 3 (2004) 8 SCC 14 4 (1973) 2 SCC 337 5 AIR 2004 SC 3582 6 117 (2005) DLT 387

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Vasant Kunj Enclave Housing Welfare Society vs. Union  

of India7 and observed that they were not persuaded to  

follow the line of reasoning  in the above three cases  

relied upon by the Writ Petitioners.

13. The  High  Court  also  considered  the   Act  

XXXVIII of 1923 whereby the Act  came to be amended.  

The High Court indicated its opinion in the following  

words:

“In our considered opinion Section 17(4) is not a  fasciculous of the Act, a sub-pandect or a self- contained code having its own realm of operation.  Its sole purpose is to clarify that Sections 17(1)  and (2) continue to operate as they did prior to  1923. If Section 17(4) is to function in its own  field, the factual matrix attending thereto should  be  spelt  out  on  the  lines  delineated  in  its  preceding sub-sections (1) and (2). On a careful  perusal of the provision of Section 17(4) it will  be evident that it contemplates the formation of an  opinion by the Government as to existence of the  fact situation postulated either by Section 17 (1),  thereby enabling possession to be taken over after  fifteen days, or under Section 17(2) empowering the  taking  of  similar  action  after  only  two  days.  Originally, neither of these provisions had Section  5A within their respective sights. Sections 17(1)  and (2) predated the introduction of the rights of  landowners/occupiers to object to the acquisition  of  their  lands.  Furthermore,  we  think  it  hallucinatory  to  visualize  the  taking  over  of  possession in less than two days. We have not come  across  a  case  where  a  citizen  is  dispossessed  instantaneously with the taking of a decision to  acquire his land. If this is the practical reality,  we are unable to conceive of a situation of such  urgency  as  would justify or  necessitate the  formation   of   an   opinion   in  respect  of  a  decision  to  be  taken  other  than  in  the  factual  matrix disclosed in sub-section (1) or sub-section  (2)  of  Section  17  (i.e.  signing  and  executing  virtually instantly) reference to which would not  have been necessary if there were other and even  

7 2006 (89) DRJ 406

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more  extreme  situations  (in  practical  terms  unthinkable  to  us),  envisaged  by sub-section  (4) alone. This is why we have said that Section  17(4)  is  not  a  self-contained  sub  code;  if  theoretically there is urgency which does not brook  even a delay of forty-eight hours, it should have  been articulated in painstakingly minute detail, so  that  its  abuse  is  safeguarded  against.  It  is  equally  unrealistic  to  expect  that  objections,  which are normally numerous, can be decided in two  days  or  even  in  fifteen  days.  The  original  intendment  of  Section  17  of  the  Act  was  merely  clarified in Section 17(4) to continue even after  the  introduction  of  Section  5A,  viz  that  in  emergent situations acquisition proceedings could  be concluded virtually instantly.”

14. The  High  Court,  thereafter  again  considered  

few decisions of this Court and held as under:

“The conclusion that we have arrived at as a result  of the above discussion is that Section 17, as a  composite  whole,  is  a  pandect  within  the  Land  Acquisition Act, in much the same manner in which  Section 25B of the Delhi Rent Control Act has been  viewed by  the Hon'ble  Supreme  Court. Section  17  deals with the entire spectrum of emergencies which  call for urgent action leading to expropriation of  private property. It empowers  the State to take  possession of lands required for public purposes in  two  categories  of  contingencies  (a)  in  urgent  circumstances   as  adumbrated  in  the  first  sub- section enabling dispossession after fifteen days  and (b) situations specifically spelt out in the  second  sub-section  empowering  immediate  dispossession,  i.e.  after  two  days.  These  provisions were available  to the  State  from the  very inception of the Act, and had the result of  permitting the Government to take possession along  with the publishing of a notification under Section  4, leaving the matter of computing and tendering  compensation to follow. The introduction in 1923 of  the  right  to  file  objections  under  Section  5A  within thirty days of the Section 4 Notification  required  necessary  clarification  that  where  circumstances obtain necessitating urgent action,  it  could  be  taken.  This  was  clarified  by  the  simultaneous  inclusion  of  Section  17(4),  which  notably does not have its own field of  operation,  distinct of sub-sections (1) and (2). Therefore,  once   the  Government is subjectively  satisfied  that circumstances chronicled in the first two sub-

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sections exist, the effect is the suspension of the  right to file Objections under Section 5A. In the  present case Section 17(1) has been resorted to, it  would  not   be  open  to  the  Authorities  to  take  possession of the property till the expiration of  fifteen  days  from  the  publication  of  the  Notification.  We  have  come  to  this  conclusion  respectfully  and  humbly  mindful  of  observations  made by their Lordships in   Nandeshwar Prasad,  Krishan Lal Arneja and Mukesh Hans, in which cases  the  argument  that  separate  orders  under  Section  17(4) are essential, were not raised.  

Proceeding on the basis that no legal impropriety  or infirmity has been committed in failing to make  a  mention  of  Section  17(4)  of  the  Act,  the  controversy  is  still  not  set  at  rest.  This  is  because it is axiomatic and uncontrovertable that  the Lt. Governor must, on the basis of material  available in the records placed before him, arrive  at a soundly considered and informed decision that  such grave urgency exists as justifies overriding  the basic rights of the land owners, which partake  the character of fundamental rights. In State of  Punjab -vs- Gurdial Singh, AIR 1980 SC 319 it has  been  observed  that  -  妬 t  is  fundamental  that  compulsory taking of a man's property is a serious  matter and the smaller the man the more serious the  matter. Hearing him before depriving him is both  reasonable  and  preemptive  of  arbitrariness,  and  denial  of  this  administrative  fairness  is  constitutional  anathema  except  for  good  reasons.  Save in real urgency where public interest does not  brook  even  the  minimum  time  needed  to  give  a  hearing, land acquisition authorities should not,  having  regard  to  Article  14  &  19  of  the  Constitution  of  India,   brook  an  inquiry  under  Section 17 of the Act. Here a slumbering process,  pending for years and suddenly exciting itself into  immediate  forcible  taking,  makes  a  travesty  of  emergency powers.It is also trite that the attitude  of the Administration should be neither cavalier  nor  casual  (Dora  Phalauli -vs- State of Punjab,  (1979)  4  SCC  485).  While  we  prefer  not  to  get  bogged down by the semantics and syntax of Section  17,  we  are  unwilling  to  dilute  the  stringent  rigours  which  must  be  satisfied  before  the  circumvention  of  Section  5A  passes  judicial  muster.”

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15. While dealing with the question  whether the  

decision of the Lt. Governor to dispense with Section  

5A of the Act was properly taken or not, the Division  

Bench observed thus:  

“It cannot possibly be over-emphasized that such  a decision must be taken with due caution with  even greater care than while deciding objections  under  Section  5A.  Judicial  review  of  such  decisions would entail a jural investigation as  to whether there was adequate material before the  Authority concerned and whether the outcome  was  predicated  on  cogitation  centered  on  such  material.  Courts will be loathe to substitute  the subjective satisfaction of the authority with  their  own.   Before  Section  5A  objections  are  disposed  of,  the  objectors  must  be  given  an  opportunity of being heard.  In the present case  it is palpably clear that the Lt. Governor had  looked into the ambit of Section 17(1) of the  Act,  and  finding  that  the  circumstances  postulated  therein  exist,  had  approved  of  the  draft  notification  which  clarified  that  the  provisions of Section 5A would  not apply.  We do  not need to locate a reasoned order so long as  the  impugned administrative decision appears to  have  been  taken  on  the  basis  of  the  material  available on the record.  

16. The High Court considered few other decisions  

of this Court and ultimately held as follows:

“We  find  that  there  was  abundant  material  available  for forming a subjective opinion  that  public  purpose  would  be  sub  served  through  the  acquisition  and  that  there  was  sufficient urgency in invoking the provisions  of Section 17  valuable but not unalienable of  the Act fully mindful that the consequence was  the  deprivation  of  the  rights  of  persons  having  an  interest  in  the  land  of  filing  Objections under Section 5A of the Act.”

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17. In a recent decision of this Court in Anand  

Singh  and  another  vs.  State  of  Uttar  Pradesh  and  

others8, this court considered elaborately the power of  

urgency conferred upon the Government under Section 17  

of the Act, its  invocation and   dispensation of  

enquiry  under  Section  5A  of  the  Act.   This  Court  

speaking through  one of us (R.M. Lodha,J.) in Anand  

Singh8  considered the previous decisions of this Court  

in Raja Anand Brahma Shah vs. State of U.P.9; Jage Ram  

vs. State of Haryana10; Narayan Govind Gavate vs. State  

of Maharashtra11; State of Punjab vs. Gurdial Singh12;  

Deepak Pahwa vs. Lt. Governor of Delhi13; State of U.P.  

vs.  Pista Devi14; Rajasthan Housing Board vs. Shri  

Kishan15;  Chameli  Singh  s.  State  of  U.P.16;  Meerut  

Development Authority vs Satbir Singh17; Om Prakash vs.  

State  of  U.P.18;  Union  of  India  vs.  Mukesh  Hans3;  

Hindustan  Petroleum  Corpn.  Ltd.  vs.  Darius  Shapur  

Chenai19;  Mahadevappa  Lachappa  Kinagi  vs.  State  of  

Karnataka20; Babu Ram vs. Statte of Haryana21 and Tika

8 (2010) 11 SCC 242 9 (1967) 1 SCR 373 1 0 (1971) 1 SCC 671 1 1  (1977) 1 SCC 133 1 2 (1980) 2 SCC 471 1 3 (1984) 4 SCC 308 1 4 (1986) 4 SCC 251 1 5 (1993) SCC 84 1 6 (1996) 2 SCC 549 1 7 (1996) 11 SCC 462 1 8 (1998) 6 SCC 1 1 9 (2005) 7 SCC 627 2 0 (2008) 12 SCC 418 2 1 (2009) 10 SCC 115

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Ram  vs.  State  of  U.P.22 and  culled  out   the  legal  

position as follows:

“When  the  Government  proceeds  for  compulsory  acquisition  of  a  particular  property  for  public  purpose,  the  only  right  that  the  owner  or  the  person  interested  in  the  property  has,  is  to  submit his objections within the prescribed time  under  Section  5-A  of  the  Act  and  persuade  the  State authorities to drop the acquisition of that  particular land by setting forth the reasons such  as the unsuitability of the land for the stated  public  purpose;  the  grave  hardship  that  may  be  caused to him by such expropriation, availability  of alternative land for achieving public purpose  etc. Moreover, the right conferred on the owner or  person  interested  to  file  objections  to  the  proposed acquisition is not only an important and  valuable right but also makes the provision for  compulsory acquisition just and in conformity with  the fundamental principles of natural justice.  

The  exceptional  and  extraordinary  power  of  doing  away with an enquiry under Section 5-A in a case  where possession of the land is required urgently  or  in  an  unforeseen  emergency  is  provided  in  Section 17 of the Act. Such power is not a routine  power and save circumstances warranting immediate  possession it should not be lightly invoked. The  guideline  is  inbuilt  in  Section  17  itself  for  exercise  of  the  exceptional  power  in  dispensing  with  enquiry  under  Section  5-A.  Exceptional  the  power, the more circumspect the Government must be  in  its  exercise.  The  Government  obviously,  therefore,  has  to  apply  its  mind  before  it  dispenses  with  enquiry  under  Section  5-A  on  the  aspect whether the urgency is of such a nature that  justifies  elimination  of  summary  enquiry  under  Section 5-A.  

A  repetition  of  the  statutory  phrase  in  the  notification that the State Government is satisfied  that  the  land  specified  in  the  notification  is  urgently  needed  and  the  provision  contained  in  Section 5-A shall not apply, though may initially  raise  a  presumption  in  favour  of  the  Government  that prerequisite conditions for exercise of such  power have been satisfied, but such presumption may  

2 2 (2009) 10 SCC 689

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be displaced by the circumstances themselves having  no reasonable nexus with the purpose for which the  power has been exercised. Upon challenge being made  to  the  use  of  power  under  Section  17,  the  Government must produce appropriate material before  the Court that the opinion for dispensing with the  enquiry under Section 5-A has been formed by the  Government  after  due  application  of  mind  on  the  material placed before it.  

It is true that power conferred upon the Government  under Section 17 is administrative and its opinion  is entitled to due weight, but in a case where the  opinion is formed regarding the urgency based on  considerations  not  germane  to  the  purpose,  the  judicial review of such administrative decision may  become necessary.  

As to in what circumstances the power of emergency  can be invoked are specified in Section 17(2) but  circumstances  necessitating  invocation  of  urgency  under Section 17(1) are not stated in the provision  itself. Generally speaking, the development of an  area  (for  residential  purposes)  or  a  planned  development  of  city,  takes  many  years  if  not  decades  and,  therefore,  there  is  no  reason  why  summary enquiry as contemplated under Section 5-A  may  not  be  held  and  objections  of  landowners/persons  interested  may  not  be  considered.  In  many  cases,  on  general  assumption  likely delay in completion of enquiry under Section  5-A  is  set  up  as  a  reason  for  invocation  of  extraordinary power in dispensing with the enquiry  little  realizing  that  an  important  and  valuable  right of the person interested in the land is being  taken  away  and  with  some  effort  enquiry  could  always be completed expeditiously.

The special provision has been made in Section 17  to eliminate enquiry under Section 5-A in deserving  and cases of real urgency. The Government has to  apply its mind on the aspect that urgency is of  such  nature  that  necessitates  dispensation  of  enquiry under Section 5-A. We have already noticed  a few decisions of this Court. There is conflict of  view  in  the  two  decisions  of  this  Court  viz.  Narayan  Govind  Gavate  v.   State  of  Maharashtra,  (1977) 1 SCC 133, and  State of U.P.  v.  Pista  Devi, (1986) 4 SCC 251. In Om Prakash  v.  State of  U.P., (1998) 6 SCC 1, this Court held that decision

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in Pista Devi (supra) must be confined to the fact  situation in those days when it was rendered and  the  two-Judge  Bench  could  not  have  laid  down  a  proposition  contrary  to  the  decision  in  Narayan  Govind Gavate (supra). We agree.  

As regards the issue whether pre-notification and  post-notification delay would render the invocation  of urgency power void, again the case law is not  consistent. The view of this Court has differed on  this  aspect  due  to  different  fact  situation  prevailing  in  those  cases.  In  our  opinion  such  delay will have material bearing on the question of  invocation  of  urgency  power,  particularly  in  a  situation where no material has been placed by the  appropriate Government before the Court justifying  that urgency was of such nature that necessitated  elimination of enquiry under Section 5-A.

In a country as big as ours, a roof over the  head  is a distant dream for a large number of people.  The  urban  development  continues  to  be  haphazard.  There  is  no  doubt  that  planned  development  and  housing  are  matters  of  priority  in  a  developing  nation. The question is as to whether in all cases  of  叢 lanned development of the cityor  素 or the  development  of  residential  area  the  power  of  urgency may be invoked by the Government and even  where  such  power  is  invoked,  should  the  enquiry  contemplated  under  Section  5-A be  dispensed  with  invariably. We do not think so. Whether `planned  development of cityor `development of residential  areacannot brook delay of a few months to complete  the  enquiry  under  Section  5-A?  In  our  opinion,  ordinarily it can. The Government must, therefore,  do a balancing act and resort to the special power  of  urgency  under  Section  17  in  the  matters  of  acquisition of land for the public purpose viz. 叢 lanned development of cityor  素 or development of  residential areain exceptional situation.  

Use of the power by the Government under Section 17  for  `planned  development  of  the  cityor  `the  development of residential areaor for `housingmust  not be as a rule but by way of an exception. Such  exceptional situation may be for the public purpose  viz.  rehabilitation  of  natural  calamity  affected  persons; rehabilitation of persons uprooted  due to  commissioning of dam or housing for  lower  strata  of  the  society   urgently;  

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rehabilitation  of  persons  affected  by  time  bound  projects, etc. The list is only illustrative and  not exhaustive. In any case, sans real urgency and  need  for  immediate  possession  of  the  land  for  carrying out the stated purpose, heavy onus lies on  the Government to justify the  exercise of such  power.  

It must, therefore, be held that the use of the  power of urgency and dispensation of enquiry under  Section 5-A by the Government in a routine manner  for the 叢 lanned development of cityor 租 evelopment  of residential areaand thereby depriving the owner  or person interested of a very valuable right under  Section 5-A may not meet the statutory test nor  could be readily sustained.”

18. If the government seeks to invoke its power of  

urgency, it has to first form the opinion that the  

land for the stated public purpose is urgently needed.  

Such  opinion  has  to  be  founded  on  the  need  for  

immediate possession of the land for carrying out the  

purpose for which land is sought to be compulsorily  

acquired.  The use of power of urgency under Section  

17(1) and (4) of the Act ipso facto does not result in  

elimination  of  enquiry  under  Section  5A  and,  

therefore,  if  the  government  intends  to  eliminate  

enquiry, then it has to apply its mind on the aspect  

that  urgency  is  of  such  nature  that  necessitates  

elimination of such enquiry.  The satisfaction of the  

government on twin aspects viz; (i) need for immediate  

possession  of  the  land  for  carrying  out  the  stated  

purpose  and  (ii)  urgency  is  such  that  necessitates  

dispensation  of  enquiry  is  a  must  and  permits  no  

departure  for  a valid exercise of power under

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Section 17(1)  and (4).  In paragraph 51 of the case  

of Anand Singh8, it has been held that use of  the  

power of urgency and dispensation of enquiry  under  

Section 5A of the Act by the Government in a routine  

manner  for  the  菟 lanned  development  of  cityor  電

evelopment  of  residential  areaand  thereby  depriving  

the  owner  or  person  interested  of  a  very  valuable  

right under Section 5-A may not  meet the statutory  

test  nor  could  be  readily  sustained (emphasis  

supplied).   Ordinarily,  therefore,  invocation  of  

urgency  power  by  the  government  for  a  Residential  

Scheme that does not fall in exceptional category as  

illustrated in para 50 of Anand Singh8 cannot be held  

to be legally sustainable.  

19. Adverting   now  to  the  Notification  dated  

October 27, 1999, the statement made therein is to the  

effect  鍍 he Lt. Governor, Delhi is satisfied also  

that provisions of sub-section (1) of Section 17 of  

the  said  Act   are  applicable  to  this  land  and  is  

further  pleased  under  sub-section  (4)  of  the  said  

Section to direct that all the provisions of Section  

5A shall not apply  For what has been stated just  

above in immediately preceding paragraph, the exercise  

of  power  by  the  Lt.  Governor,  Delhi  under  Section  

17(1) and (4) has to be held bad in law.  Moreover,  

except the above

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statement  in  the  Notification,  there  is  no  other  

material  available  on   record  which  indicates  that  

there  has  been  application  of  mind  by  the  Lt.  

Governor, Delhi on the aspect that  urgency was of  

such nature that necessitated dispensation of enquiry  

under Section 5A of the Act.   The respondents have  

miserably  failed  to  show  that  the  stated  purpose  

'Rohini Residential Scheme'  could not have brooked  

the  delay  of  few  months  and  the  conclusion  of  the  

enquiry  under  Section  5A  of  the  Act  would   have  

frustrated the said public purpose.

20. Where  the  government  invokes  urgency  power  

under  Section  17(1)  and  (4)  for  the  public  purpose  

like 'planned development of city' or 'development of  

residential area' or 'Residential Scheme', the initial  

presumption in favour of the government does not arise  

and the burden lies on the government to prove that  

the  use  of  power  was  justified  and  dispensation  of  

enquiry  was  necessary.   In  the  present  case,  the  

respondents  have  miserably  failed  to  show   to  the  

satisfaction of the Court that power of urgency and  

dispensation  of  enquiry  under  Section  5A  has  been  

exercised with justification. The action of the Lt.  

Governor, Delhi, in the facts of the case whereby he  

directed that the provisions of Section 5A shall not  

apply, if allowed to stand, it would  amount to

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depriving a person of his property without  authority  

of law.

21. The power of urgency by the Government under  

Section  17  for  a  public  purpose  like  Residential  

Scheme cannot be invoked as a rule but has to be by  

way  of  exception.   As  noted  above,  no  material  is  

available  on  record  that  justifies  dispensation  of  

enquiry under Section 5A of the Act. The High Court  

was  clearly  wrong  in  holding  that   there  was  

sufficient  urgency  in  invoking  the  provisions  of  

Section 17 of the Act.  

22. Consequently,  the  appeal  is  allowed.   The  

Notification dated October 27, 1999 to the effect 鍍 he  

Lt. Governor, Delhi is satisfied also that provisions  

of sub-section (1) of  Section 17 of the said Act  are  

applicable to this land and is further pleased under  

sub-section (4) of the said Section to direct that all  

the provisions of Section 5(A) shall not applyinsofar  

as appellant's land is concerned  is quashed.  The  

declaration dated April 3, 2000 issued and published  

under  Section  6  of  the  Act  concerning  the  subject  

property is also quashed.  The Competent Authority may  

now  invite  objections  under  Section  5A  of  the  Act  

pursuant to the Notification dated October

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27,  1999  and  proceed  with  the  matter  in  accordance  

with law.  No order as to costs.

              .....................J.                                (R.M. LODHA)

                    .....................J.                          (H.L. GOKHALE)

  NEW DELHI    MARCH 21, 2012.