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                   REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1354 OF 2012

RAM DEO PRASAD           … APPELLANT

VERSUS

STATE OF BIHAR        … RESPONDENT

J U D G M E N T

Aftab Alam,J.

1. The appellant  Ram Deo Prasad has been awarded death penalty for  

raping and inflicting injuries to a four year old child causing her death.  

2. The  prosecution  case  is  based  on  the  statement  of  one  Mohd.  

Kamruddin  Mian  made  before  Sub-Inspector,  Birendra  Kumar  Pandey  of  

Siwan Town P.S. on December 21, 2004 at 8:15 a.m. at the Sadar Hospital,  

Siwan. Mohd.  Kamruddin stated that on the previous night after finishing  

their meal at about 8:30 p.m. his family had gone to sleep at his house in  

village  Badka  Gaon,  P.S.  Pachrukhi  District  Siwan.   His  four  year  old  

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daughter Laila Khatoon was sleeping by the side of her grandmother on the  

outer verandah of the house and on the other side of the straw bed, the girl’s  

mother was sleeping with her infant child. In the middle of the night,  the  

Informant who was sleeping in an inside room came out to relieve himself  

and found Laila Khatoon missing from the side of her grandmother.  A search  

started for the girl and then his neighbour, Suman Kumar Sah (PW.2) told  

them that just a little while ago he had seen the appellant swiftly running  

away towards east,  carrying a  girl  child  in  his  arms who was crying.  As  

informed by Suman Sah, he (the Informant) and the villagers assembled there  

proceeded  towards  east  in  search  (of  the  child).  After  going  for  about  a  

kilometer,  they heard  the  sound  of  heavy foot-steps  and on going  in  the  

direction of the sound they saw that the appellant, who was fleeing away with  

the child, flung the child in the wheat field (by the side of the pathway) and  

ran away. On going to the child, he found that it was his missing daughter.  

She was moaning and bleeding from her private parts. The informant further  

stated that he fully believed that the appellant after committing rape on her  

child was taking her away with the intent to kill her and to hide the body  

somewhere.  

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3. The statement was reduced to writing, as the fard-e-beyan (Exhibit 4)  

by Sub-Inspector, Birendra Kumar Pandey (PW.6) and was duly signed by  

the Informant and a witness, apart from the Sub-Inspector recording it. It was  

dispatched to Pachrukhi police station, within the jurisdiction of which the  

offence was committed, and there the recorded statement was incorporated in  

the formal FIR (Exhibit 1), registered as Pachrukhi P.S. case No.131/2004  

dated December 21, 2004 under section 376 of the Penal Code.  

4. The child Laila Khatoon died at the Sadar Hospital Siwan on the same  

day and consequently section 302 of the Penal Code was also added to the  

case.  

5. On  the  following  day  (December  22,  2004)  at  11:00  a.m.  the  

Investigating Officer of  the case (PW.4) went to the collector’s office (in  

Siwan  town)  for  a  meeting  in  connection  with  the  preparations  for  the  

elections that were to be held shortly.  There he was told by the officer in-

charge of the Siwan Town P.S. that at 9.00 that morning the appellant was  

caught at the Siwan bus-stand and he was detained at  the Town P.S. The  

Investigating Officer went to the Town P.S., prepared the arrest memo of the  

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appellant and sent him for production before the Magistrate with the request  

to take him in judicial custody.  The appellant was, thus, produced before the  

Magistrate on December 22, 2004 and as per the request of the Investigating  

Officer, was remanded to judicial custody.  

6. It did not occur to the Investigating Officer to take the appellant on  

remand for interrogations or getting him examined by a doctor or seizing his  

clothes etc.  

7. In course of investigation, the Investigating Officer inspected two sites  

as “the place of occurrence”; one, the verandah of the Informant’s house from  

where the child was lifted and the other, the wheat field where the child was  

said  to  have  been  thrown  by  the  appellant;  nothing  was  found  of  any  

significance at either of two places. No attempt was made to find out the spot  

where the child was sexually abused and brutalized and where it might have  

been possible to find some blood or some other article that could have thrown  

any light on the identity of the offender. The “investigation” mainly consisted  

of recording the statements of witnesses under section 161 of the Code of  

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Criminal Procedure and as it was completed charge-sheet was submitted on  

March 30, 2005, naming the appellant as the accused.

8. On the basis of the charge-sheet the appellant was put on trial before  

the 1st Additional Sessions Judge, Siwan.

9. It needs to be stated here that in support of its case, the prosecution  

examined six (6) witnesses before the trial court. PW.6 is the Sub-Inspector  

who had recorded the statement of the victim’s father Kamruddin Mian. He  

was simply called to formally prove the fard-e-beyan, giving rise to the FIR.  

PW.4 is the Investigating Officer. He formally proved the FIR. He also stated  

that he had recorded the statements of Rukhsana Khatoon (the mother of the  

victim:  PW.3),  Suman  Sah  (PW.1),  Hasmuddin  (not  examined),  Nasir  

(PW.2),  Ram  Chhabila  Prasad  (not  examined),  Gumani  Pandit  (not  

examined) and some others. PW.5 is the doctor who was a member of the  

team of doctors which had conducted post-mortem over the body of the child.  

She formally proved the post-mortem report.  

10. Apart from the two policemen and the doctor the prosecution examined  

three other witnesses. PW.1 is Suman Sah, the neighbour of the Informant  

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who was the first to say that he had seen the appellant running away, carrying  

a  girl  child  who  was  crying.  PW.2  is  Nasir,  the  paternal  cousin  of  the  

Informant  who  was  one  of  the  group  which  had  gone  in  pursuit  of  the  

appellant and who had seen the appellant flinging the child in the wheat field  

and making good her escape. PW.3 is Rukhsana Khatoon, the unfortunate  

mother of the child. We shall presently see their evidences in greater detail.  

But at this stage it is important to note that the Informant, the father of the  

child did not appear as one of the witnesses. By the time the trial took place  

he had gone somewhere abroad to earn the livelihood.

11. Further,  the  prosecution  took  steps  to  examine  two other  witnesses  

mentioned in the charge-sheet, namely Hasmuddin and Gumani Pandit and  

obtained warrants of arrest for their production. They were produced before  

the trial court on October 5, 2007 but from the order dated October 30, 2007  

passed  by  the  court,  it  appears  that  though  the  prosecution  produced  the  

aforesaid two witnesses, besides one Ram Chhabila Prasad (also named in the  

charge-sheet as one of the witnesses), the In-charge Public Prosecutor filed a  

petition that the three witnesses were not inclined to support the prosecution  

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case and, as such, he was giving them up and was not in favour of examining  

them. That petition was disposed of by order dated November 13, 2007 and  

the three persons were discharged from giving evidence in the case.        

12. At the commencement of the trial, the court framed the charge against  

the appellant.   It  is  relevant  to see what  was said in the charge which is  

reproduced below:

“First - That you, on or about the 21st day of December 4 at  Badaka Gaon you committed rape on Laila Khatoon hardly aged  about 4 years and thereby committed an offence punishable under  section 376 of the Indian Penal Code and within my cognizance.

Secondly – That  you on or about  the  same date/  day of  same month and same place you committed murder intentionally  and knowingly that the act of rape was likely to cause death of  Laila Khatoon and that thereby committed an offence punishable  section 302 of the Indian penal Code and within my cognizance.

And I hereby direct that you be tried by the said court on  the said charge.  

The charge was read over and explained to the accused in  Hindi to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.  

Dated this 19 day of 04, 2007.”

13. It is, thus, to be seen that the charge is completely silent in regard  

to the first part of the prosecution case that immediately after the child  

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was missing, the appellant was seen running away carrying in his arms  

a girl child who was crying. There was no charge under section 366A  

or section 367 of the Penal Code.  

14. At  the  conclusion  of  the  prosecution  evidence,  the  court  

examined  the  appellant  under  section  313  of  the  Code  of  Criminal  

Procedure.  It  is  also  important  to  see  how  the  examination  under  

section 313 took place; hence, the full examination under section 313 is  

quoted below.

“Question: Have you heard the statements of the witnesses?

Answer: Yes.

Question: Against  you  the  charge  and  evidence  are  that  on  20/12/2004  in  the  night  at  12.00  you  went  to  the  house  of  Kamruddin  Miyan  s/o  Babujaan  Miyan,  village  Barka  Gaon P.S.  Pachrukkhi  district  Siwan  and abducted his daughter Laila Khatoon (6 years).

Answer: No.

Question: There  is  also  evidence  against  you  that  you  committed rape on her and flung her in the field and  as a result she died.

Answer: No.

Question: Do you have anything to say in your defense?

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Answer: I  have  been  falsely  implicated.  The  villagers  have  wrongly declared me as mad.”  

15. This is all! The first question was an empty formality and the second  

question was evidently asked even without looking to the charge as there was  

no  charge  of  abducting  the  child  from  her  father’s  house  against  that  

appellant. The whole of section 313 was, thus, squeezed into the third and the  

last question. We shall advert back to this aspect of the matter later but there  

is something else in the appellant’s statement under section 313 which we  

cannot fail to notice. There is an allusion to the villagers’ calling him, “mad”.  

Unfortunately, this aspect of the matter received absolutely no attention either  

in investigation or during trial. We may here clarify that on the basis of that  

isolated fragment of a sentence we are not suggesting that the appellant was  

of unsound mind. But what we wish to emphasize is that in a case involving  

death sentence, the court cannot afford to leave any detail, howsoever small  

and apparently insignificant, fully explored.

16. At the conclusion of the trial, the court found the appellant guilty of  

committing rape and causing injuries to the child leading to her death and  

accordingly, by judgment and order dated September 6, 2008/September 9,  

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2008 passed in Sessions Trial No. 417 of 2006, convicted him under sections  

376 and 302 of the Penal Code and awarded him the death penalty.  

17. Since the punishment given to the appellant was death, the trial court  

made a reference under section 366 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which  

was registered in the High Court as Death Reference No.15/2008.

18. It needs to be stated here that before the trial court, the appellant was  

unrepresented and, therefore, the court had appointed an advocate to defend  

him from the panel of lawyers for undefended accused. Further, even after  

being punished with death, the appellant did not file any appeal before the  

High Court and, thus, what the High Court had before it was only the death  

reference made by the trial court. The High Court in its judgment has brushed  

aside the fact that no appeal was filed by the appellant, observing as under.

“The  respondent  has  not  preferred  an  appeal,  understandably  because  he  could  challenge  the  findings  upon  which the orders of conviction and sentence are based as if he  had preferred an appeal.”

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19. In our view, the High Court, attributed to the appellant, knowledge of  

law and the court procedure for which there does not appear to be any basis.   

To  our  mind,  the  appellant  filed  no  appeal  before  the  High  Court  either  

because of the lack of resources or because he did not fully realize the gravity  

of his position and we are unable to accept the view taken by the High Court  

for the appellant filing no appeal against the judgment of the trial court giving  

him the death penalty.    

20. Anyway, since there was no one to represent the appellant in the death  

reference, the High Court requested a senior advocate of that court to assist it  

in hearing and disposing of the reference and finally by a detailed judgment  

dated September 17, 2009 accepted the reference and confirmed the death  

penalty awarded to the appellant.  

21. After  the  High Court  judgment,  the  Registry  of  the  Supreme Court  

received the jail petition (special leave petition) (death case) on behalf of the  

appellant through the Superintendent, Central jail, Buxar, Bihar.  Though the  

petition was barred by limitation by 42 days, it was not accompanied by any  

application for condonation of delay. The jail petition along with copies of  

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the judgments passed by the trial court and the High Court were handed over  

to the Amicus Curiae, appointed as per the instructions contained in Circular,  

dated December 6, 2008. The amicus then drew up and filed a proper special  

leave petition on which notice was issued and the execution of the appellant  

was  stayed by order  dated  March  19,  2010.  Leave  to  appeal  was  finally  

granted by order dated September 3, 2012.  

22. The amicus appointed by the office assisted us to the best of his ability  

but we also requested Mr. P.S. Patwalia, learned senior counsel, to assist the  

Court  in  the  hearing  of  the  appeal and  Mr.  Patwalia  rendered  admirable  

assistance to us.  

23. Since the appeal involves death penalty, we propose to re-examine all  

the issues arising in the case ourselves, independently of any findings arrived  

at by the courts below.  

24. It is noted above that the prosecution examined six witnesses in support  

of its case. Dr. Seema Choudhary (PW.5) is the doctor who was a member of  

the Medical Board constituted to examine the dead body of Laila Khatoon.  

She stated before the court the findings of the post-mortem and proved the  

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post-mortem report which was marked as Ex.3. The evidence of the doctor  

coupled with the post-mortem report leaves no room for doubt that the child  

was sexually abused and brutalized with utmost cruelty and perversity and  

the injuries inflicted upon her in course of the sexual abuse caused her death.  

25. Birendra Kumar Pandey (PW.6) is the Sub-Inspector of Police of Siwan  

(Town) P.S. who had taken down the statement made by Mohd. Kamruddin  

Mian and recorded it  as  the  fard-e-beyan.  He  identified  the  fard-e-beyan  

which was marked as Ex.4.   

26. Mehboob Alam Khan (PW.4) is the Investigating Officer of the case.  

There is hardly anything significant in his deposition before the court.

27.  This leaves us with the statements of PW.1 to PW.3.  

28.  Suman  Kumar  Sah  (PW.2)  is  the  Informant’s  neighbour.   In  his  

deposition before the court he stated that about two and a half years before  

the  date  of  the  deposition  he  woke  up  one  night  at  about  11-  11.30  for  

relieving himself, he saw that a person carrying a child in his arms was going  

towards the field of Ram Bachan Mishra.  He then went back to sleep. After  

10-20  minutes,  he  saw  Mohd.  Kamruddin  (the  Informant),  Nasir  Mian  

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(PW.1),  Gumani  Pandit  (not  examined),  Ram  Chhabila  Prasad  (not  

examined) and others, coming on the road in front of his house.  He went out  

to meet them and then he came to know that someone had taken away a child  

from Kamruddin’s house. He further said that he did not tell them that a  

little while ago he had seen someone carrying a child. However, he also  

joined them and proceeded with them. He further said that they found a girl  

lying in the field of Sachidanand Mishra.  The girl  was bleeding from her  

private parts.  The girl was brought to Siwan where she died.  He added that  

he did not know who had abducted the girl.  He concluded by saying that  

he  knew the  appellant  who  was  present  in  court.  At  that  stage  he  was  

declared  hostile  by  the  prosecution  and  was  subjected  to  cross-

examination. He denied that he had made any statement before the police  

that he had seen the appellant taking away the child from the verandah of  

Kamruddin and further that in course of search he had seen the appellant with  

the child. The Investigating Officer (PW.4), however, stated before the court  

that Suman Sah had said before him that he had seen the appellant coming  

out from the verandah of Kamruddin and in course of the search too had seen  

the appellant with the victim child.

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29. The second witness  Nasir  Mian (PW.1)  stated before  the  court  that  

about two and a half years earlier, at about 12:00 in the night, Kamruddin got  

up and found that his daughter was missing from the side of his mother with  

whom she  was sleeping.  Kamruddin  came to  him and then there  was  an  

outcry  that  the  child  was  missing.  He,  along  with  Kamruddin  and  other  

villagers started searching for the child. In course of the search they went to  

Suman Sah who told them that the appellant had gone towards east, in the  

direction of Ram Bachan Mishra’s orchard, carrying a child.  They then went  

to Ram Bachan Mishra’s orchard and, lighting the torch there, they saw the  

appellant running away with a child.  The appellant, on seeing them coming  

after him, flung the child in Ram Bachan Mishra’s wheat field. They ran after  

him  but  he  succeeded  in  fleeing  away.  In  the  wheat  field  they  found  

Kamruddin’s daughter who was about 4 years old.  She was injured and was  

bleeding from her private parts. They brought the child to the Sadar Hospital,  

Siwan,  where  she passed away the  following morning.  The mouth of  the  

child was filled with earth and she was also bleeding from her nose.  

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30. In  cross-examination  he  stated  that  the  occurrence  took  place  on  a  

winter night which was very cold and there was a dense fog on that night. He  

also  stated  that  he  had  produced  the  torch  in  the  light  of  which  he  had  

identified  the  appellant  before  the  darogaji.  The torch,  however,  was  not  

presented before the court.

31. On an overall scrutiny of the deposition of Nasir Mian we find that he  

remained quite firm and unshaken on his part of the story.

32. The  third  witness,  Rukhsana  Khatoon  (PW.3),  is  the  mother  of  the  

child.  She stated that as the child was found missing and a search started,  

Suman Kumar Sah one of the neighbours informed that (he had seen) the  

appellant going away carrying a child. She then stated about the group of  

villagers going in search of and finding the girl whom the appellant had flung  

in the field. In the course of cross-examination, however, she said that she  

was also a part of the group which had gone in search of the child on the  

fateful night and her mother-in-law was also a part of that group.

33. This is all the oral evidence adduced by the prosecution.

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34. We may here broadly divide the prosecution case in two parts. In the  

first part, soon after the child was found missing, the appellant was seen close  

to the house of the Informant, swiftly going eastwards in the direction of Ram  

Bachan Mishra’s fields/orchard carrying in his arms a girl  child who was  

crying. This was at a point when the child was lifted from the verandah of her  

house and before she was subjected to the sexual abuse. In the second part of  

the prosecution case the appellant was seen carrying the child and on seeing  

the group of villagers coming in pursuit of him he threw down the child in the  

wheat field and fled away. This was at a point after the child was subjected to  

the sexual abuse and brutality.

35. The first part of the prosecution case, as seen above, did not form part  

of the charge. Further,  this part  of the prosecution case was based on the  

solitary evidence of Suman Sah and as he turned hostile, this part of the case  

falls to the ground.

36. However,  the  second  part  of  the  case  is  fully  established  by  the  

evidences of Nasir  Mian (PW.1) and Rukhsana Khatoon (PW.3).  What is  

thus established against the appellant is that he was seen carrying the child  

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soon after she was sexually abused and brutalized in the most cruel manner  

and on seeing the group of villagers coming after him he threw down the  

child in the wheat field and ran away. It was, therefore, for him to explain  

how the child came in his possession and in the absence of any explanation  

the court would be fully justified in invoking section 114 of the Evidence Act  

and to hold him guilty of causing the injuries to her private parts leading to  

her death. No exception can, therefore, be taken to the appellant’s conviction  

under sections 376 and 302 of the Penal Code.  

37. But the vital  question is that of the sentence to which he should be  

liable.

38. Mr. Samir Ali Khan, learned counsel appearing for the State of Bihar,  

strongly submitted that the offence committed by the appellant showed not  

only extreme cruelty but also great depravity and urged that this Court while  

confirming his conviction should also confirm the death penalty awarded to  

him by  the  courts  below.  In  support  of  his  submission  he  relied  upon  a  

decision  of  this  Court  in  Rajendra  Pralhadrao  Wasnik  v. State  of   

Maharashtra1.  Like the present  appellant,  Wasnik was also held guilty of  1 (2012) 4 SCC 37

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raping and killing a three year old girl and in his case this Court confirmed  

the death penalty awarded to him. It is true that the case of  Wasnik relied  

upon by Mr. Khan is similar to the case in hand insofar as in both cases girls  

of  very tender age were subjected to extreme sexual  brutality resulting in  

their death.  

39. There can be no doubt that the offence committed by the appellant is  

heinous and revolting but the nature of the offence alone may not in all cases  

be the determining factor for bringing the case in the “rarest of rare” category  

and to impose the ultimate and irreversible punishment of death. There are  

certain features of this case which are not to be found in Wasnik’s case and  

make the present case distinguishable from the decision relied upon by Mr.  

Khan.

40. In the earlier part of the judgment we have indicated the deficiencies of  

investigation.  Apart  from  the  post-mortem  report  there  is  no  medical  

evidence. There is not a scrap of forensic evidence of any kind. Even the  

torch in the light of which the appellant is said to have been identified in the  

cold wintry and foggy night was not produced before the court.

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41. We  have  also  recounted  the  lapses  in  the  trial  proceedings  in  the  

framing  of  the  charge  and  especially  in  the  examination  of  the  appellant  

under section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. On an earlier occasion,  

in the decision in Sajjan Sharma v. State of Bihar2 (to which, one of us, Aftab  

Alam J. was a party) this Court had commented upon the careless and the  

unmindful way in which examination of the accused under section 313 of the  

Code of Criminal Procedure was generally conducted in the State of Bihar.  

The present case is another glaring example. It was incumbent upon the trial  

court to clearly tell the appellant that according to the prosecution evidence,  

the child soon after being sexually abused in the most cruel manner was seen  

in his arms and to ask him to explain this very vital circumstance against him.  

But the section 313 examination made in this case completely falls short of  

the requirements of the law.

42. We have also seen that the appellant was represented before the trial  

court  by a lawyer appointed by the court  from the panel of advocates for  

undefended accused. Though facing death penalty, he did not file an appeal  

before the High Court and in this Court  his appeal came through the Jail  

2 (2011) 2 SCC 206

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Superintendent.  We  presume  that  the  appellant  did  not  have  sufficient  

resources to engage a lawyer of his own choice and get himself defended up  

to his satisfaction.

43. We are very clear that the aforesaid facts and circumstances are also  

relevant  factors  to be taken into consideration while confirming the death  

penalty given to an accused.

44. Mr. Patwalia, senior counsel, invited our attention to the decision of  

this Court in Santosh Kumar Satishbhushan Bariyar v. State of Maharashtra3.  

In  Santosh  Kumar,  after  surveying  a  large  number  of  decisions  on death  

penalty, this Court in Paragraph 56 of this judgment observed as under:

“56. At  this  stage,  Bachan  Singh informs  the  content  of  the  sentencing hearing. The court must play a proactive role to record  all  relevant  information  at  this  stage.  Some  of  the  information  relating  to  crime  can  be  culled  out  from  the  phase  prior  to  sentencing hearing. This information would include aspects relating  to the nature, motive and impact of crime, culpability of convict,  etc.  Quality of evidence adduced is also a relevant factor. For  instance,  extent  of  reliance  on  circumstantial  evidence  or  child  witness plays an important role in the sentencing analysis. But what  is sorely lacking, in most capital sentencing cases, is information  relating  to  characteristics  and  socio-economic  background of  the  offender. This issue was also raised in the 48th Report of the Law  Commission.”

3 (2009) 6 SCC 498

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(emphasis added)

45. Mr.  Patwalia  submitted that  the  above passage from the decision in  

Santosh Kumar was cited and followed by the Court in  Ramesh v. State of   

Rajasthan4. In Paragraph 68 of the judgment in Ramesh this Court observed  

as under:

“68. Practically, the whole law on death sentence was referred to in  Santosh Kumar case. In SCC para 56, the Court observed: (SCC p.  527)

“56. … The court must play a proactive role to record all relevant  information at this stage. Some of the information relating to crime  can be culled out from the phase prior to sentencing hearing. This  information would include aspects relating to the nature, motive and  impact of crime, culpability of convict, etc.  Quality of evidence is   also  a  relevant  factor.  For  instance,  extent  of  reliance  on   circumstantial evidence or child witness plays an important role in   the sentencing analysis. But what is sorely lacking, in most capital  sentencing  cases,  is  information  relating  to  characteristics  and  socio-economic  background of  the  offender.  This  issue  was also  raised in the 48th Report of the Law Commission.”

(emphasis supplied)

The Court, thus, has in a guided manner referred to the quality of  evidence and has sounded a note of caution that in a case where the  reliance is on circumstantial evidence, that factor has to be taken  into consideration while awarding the death sentence. This is also a  case  purely  on  the  circumstantial  evidence.  We  should  not  be  understood to say that in all cases of circumstantial evidence, the  death sentence cannot be given.”

4 (2011) 3 SCC 685

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Page 23

46. Mr. Patwalia also cited before us the decision of this Court in Amit v.   

State of Uttar Pradesh5. In the case of Amit, though this Court upheld his  

conviction under sections 376 and 302 of the Penal Code finding him guilty  

of  raping  and  killing  a  three  year  old  girl,  commuted  the  death  penalty  

awarded to him by the courts below.

47. In the overall of facts of the case and for the reasons discussed above  

we feel it quite unsafe to confirm the death sentence awarded to the appellant.  

Hence, while confirming his conviction under sections 376 and 302 of the  

Penal  Code,  we  set  aside  the  death  sentence  given  to  the  appellant  and  

substitute  it  by  imprisonment  for  life  that  should  not  be  less  than  actual  

imprisonment for a  period of 18 years.  The case of the appellant  for any  

remission under the  Code of Criminal  Procedure  may be considered only  

after he has served out 18 years of actual imprisonment.

48. In  the  result,  the  appeal  is  dismissed subject  to  the  modification  in  

sentence.

..…..………………………..J.          (Aftab Alam)

5 (2012) 4 SCC 107

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Page 24

..…..………………………..J.          (Ranjana Prakash Desai)

New Delhi; April 11, 2013  

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