24 August 2017
Supreme Court
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RAM CHAND (D) TH LRS. Vs UDAI SINGH @ DAYA RAM .

Bench: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE R.K. AGRAWAL, HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE
Judgment by: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE
Case number: C.A. No.-011107-011108 / 2017
Diary number: 4883 / 2013
Advocates: N. ANNAPOORANI Vs


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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL Nos. 11107-11108 OF 2017 (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) Nos.25664-65 of 2013)  

Ram Chand(Deceased) Through L.Rs. & Ors. ….Appellant(s)

VERSUS

Udai Singh @ Daya Ram & Ors.        …Respondent(s)

J U D G M E N T

Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.

1) These  appeals  are  filed  by  the  legal

representatives  of  original  plaintiff  against  the

common final judgment and order dated 21.11.2011

passed by the High Court of  Punjab & Haryana at

Chandigarh  in  Regular  Second  Appeal  Nos.  1791

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and  2037  of  1980  whereby  the  High  Court

dismissed  RSA  No.1791  of  1980  filed  by  the

appellants (plaintiff) and allowed R.S.A. No.2037 of

1980 filed by the respondents (defendants).

2) We  herein  set  out  the  facts,  in  brief,  to

appreciate the issue involved in these appeals.  

3) The  dispute  in  the  suit  out  of  which  this

appeal arises relates to agricultural lands comprises

of  Khewat  No.  280 Khata  No.  350  Rect.  No.  258

Killa No. 25 area 5 kanal, Rect. No. 295 Killa No. 5

area -01 marla, Rect. No. 214 Killa 11 area 5 kanals

12 marlas, killa no. 12 area 8 kanal, Rect. No. 255

Killa No. 6/1 area 2 kanals 10 marlas, 6/2 area 2

kanals 17 marlas, 7/1 area 4 kanals 3 marlas, 7/2

area 3 killa 17 marlas Killa 8 area 8 kanals, Rect.

258 killa 16 area 6 kanals 6 marlas, killa 24 area 8

kanals,  total  area 54 kanals  6 marlas situated in

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Patti  Bedha,  Hodel  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  the

"suit land").

4) The plaintiff (Ram Chand) since dead and now

represented by his legal representatives (appellants

herein) filed a civil suit out of which these appeals

arise against the respondents (defendants) claiming

right, title and interest in the suit land. The plaintiff

(appellants)  also  claimed  possession  of  the  suit

lands from the defendants (respondents).

5) The  claim  of  the  plaintiff,  in  substance,  is

based  on  the  law  of  inheritance.  It  is,  inter  alia,

alleged  in  the  plaint  that  the  suit  land  originally

belonged  to  one  Hiri,  son  of  Bhondu  and  on  his

death,  the  plaintiff  claimed  his  right,  title  and

interest in the suit land as one of the nearest heirs

of the deceased Hiri through inheritance.

6) The defendants (respondents) denied the claim

of the plaintiff and further denied his right to claim

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the  ownership  of  the  suit  land  by  inheritance

through  Hiri.  The  defendants  then  claimed

ownership over the suit land on the basis of a Will

said to have been executed in their favour by the

erstwhile owner of the suit land.

7) So the basic question, involved in the suit, was

who is  the  owner of  the  suit  land-plaintiff  or  the

defendants.  

8) By  judgment/decree  dated  24.12.1979,  the

Trial  Court  (sub-Judge,  1st Class),  Palwal  decreed

the suit against the defendants for possession and

held that the plaintiff would be entitled to get only

symbolic  possession of  the  suit  land because  the

suit  land  was  in  possession  of  Ram  Narain

(defendant No.5) as tenant.  

9) Being aggrieved by the said judgment/decree,

both the parties filed first appeals before the District

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Judge, Gurgaon being Civil Appeal Nos. 5 and 6 of

1980.

10) The District Judge, by his judgment and order

dated 09.04.1980, dismissed both the appeals and

affirmed the  judgment/decree  passed by the  Trial

Court.

11) Against the said judgment, both plaintiff and

defendants  filed  second  appeals  before  the  High

Court being R.S.A. No. 1791 of 1980 (filed by the

plaintiff)  and R.S.A. No.2037 of 1980 (filed by the

defendants).

12) The  High  Court,  by  the  impugned  common

judgment  and  order  dated  21.11.2011,  dismissed

R.S.A.  No.1791  of  1980  filed  by  the  plaintiff  and

allowed  R.S.A.  No.2037  of  1980  filed  by  the

defendants.   As  a  result,  the  suit  came  to  be

dismissed.

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13) Against  the  said  judgment,  the  legal

representatives  of  the  original  plaintiff,  filed these

appeals by way of special leave before this Court.

14) Having  heard  the  learned  counsel  for  the

parties and on perusal of the record of the case, we

are  constrained  to  allow  the  appeals  and  while

setting aside the impugned judgment, remand the

case  to  the  High  Court  for  deciding  the  second

appeals afresh in accordance with law as indicated

below.

15) The reasons to remand the case to the High

Court  has  occasioned due to  the  reason that  the

High Court while disposing of second appeals filed

by the both parties did not frame any substantial

question of law as is required to be framed at the

time  of  admission  of  the  second  appeal  and

proceeded  to  allow  the  appeal  filed  by  the

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defendants  and  dismiss  the  appeal  filed  by  the

plaintiff.

16) A three Judge Bench of this Court in Santosh

Hazari  vs.  Purushottam  Tiwari  (Deceased)  by

L.Rs., (2001) 3 SCC 179 had examined the scope of

Section 100 of  the  Code of  Civil  procedure,  1908

(hereinafter referred to as “the Code”). Justice R. C.

Lahoti (as His Lordship then was) speaking for the

Bench laid down the following proposition of law in

Para 9:

“9. The High Court cannot proceed to hear a second  appeal  without  formulating  the substantial  question  of  law  involved  in  the appeal and if it does so it acts illegally and in abnegation or abdication of the duty cast on Court. The existence of substantial question of law is the sine qua non for the exercise of the jurisdiction under the amended Section 100  of  the  Code.  (See  Kshitish  Chandra Purkait v.  Santosh Kumar Purkait,(1997) 5 SCC  438  Panchugopal  Barua v.  Umesh Chandra  Goswami,  (1997)  4  SCC  413 and Kondiba Dagadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar, (1999) 3 SCC 722.)”

17) His Lordship then in Paras 10 to 14 succinctly

explained  the  meaning  of  the  words  "substantial

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question of law” and "question of law" and held that

in  order  to  admit  the  second  appeal,  what  is

required to be made out by the appellant being sine

qua non for exercise of powers under Section 100 of

the  Code,  is  existence  of  "substantial  question  of

law" arising in the case so as to empower the High

Court  to  admit  the  appeal  for  final  hearing  by

formulation on such question.   In the  absence  of

any substantial question arising in appeal, the same

merits dismissal  in  limine on the ground that the

appeal does not involve any substantial question of

law within the meaning of Section 100 of the Code.

18) Perusal of the impugned order shows that no

such question  was  formulated  except  to  note  the

submissions of  learned counsel  for  the  appellants

that it so arises but not beyond that as to whether it

actually arises and, if so, what is that question.

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19) In the light of foregoing discussion and keeping

in view the law laid down in the case of  Santosh

Hazari (supra), we are of the considered view that

the impugned order is not legally sustainable and

thus liable to be set aside.  

20) As  a  result,  the  appeals  succeed  and  are

allowed. Impugned order is  set  aside.  The case is

remanded to the High Court for deciding the second

appeals  afresh in accordance with law keeping in

view the law laid down in Santosh Hazari (supra).  

               ………...................................J.

[R.K. AGRAWAL]             

                                                    …...……..................................J.

        [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE] New Delhi; August  24, 2017