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REPORTABLE  IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA  

  CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION  

 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5040 OF 2008  

   RAKESH & ORS.            ...APPELLANTS   

 Vs.    

BOARD OF REVENUE U.P. & ORS. ETC.     ...RESPONDENTS     

J U D G M E N T  

ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.  

This appeal has been filed against the judgment of  

Allahabad High Court dated 03.03.2006 deciding the two  

writ petitions being Writ Petition No. 16105 of 1983  

filed by predecessors-in-interest of the appellant and  

Writ Petition No. 3020 of 1984 filed by respondent  

No.4.    

 2. Brief facts of the case necessary for deciding this  

appeal are:-  

2.1 One Pursottam was the Sirdar (a category of  

tenancy) of agricultural plots Nos. 243, 503  

and 1/3rd share in Plot No. 521 situated in

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Village Pilkhana, District Shahjahanpur.  On  

25.11.1974, Pursottam deposited 20 times of  

the land revenue and made an application for  

grant of Bhumidhar rights in accordance with  

U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act,  

1950.   On 26.11.1974, Pursottam executed a  

sale deed of the aforesaid three plots in  

favour of Ajudhi @ Ayodhya.  On 23.05.1975,  

application of Pursottam for grant of  

Bhumidhari Sanad for plot Nos. 243 and 503 was  

rejected. A revision application was filed by  

Pursottam challenging the order dated  

23.05.1975.  With regard to Plot No. 521,  

Bhumidhari Sanad was granted in the name of  

Pursottam by order of Assistant collector on  

05.01.1976, before which on 04.12.1975,  

Pursottam has died.    

2.2 By Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land  

Reforms (Amendment) Ordinance, 1977 (U.P.  

Ordinance No.1 of 1977), promulgated on  

28.01.1977, Bhumidhar with transferable rights

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were granted to every Sirdar referred to in  

Sections 130 and 131 of U.P. Zamindari  

Abolition and Land Reforms Act. The ordinance  

No.1 of 1977 was substituted by U.P.Act No.8  

of 1977 enforced with effect from 28.01.1977.     

 2.3  Ajudhi @ Ayodhya filed two suits – Suit No.  

30 of 1978 praying for declaration of  

Bhumidhari Rights in Plot Nos. 243 and 503 and  

Suit No. 31 of 1978 claiming declaration of  

Bhumidhari Rights in Plot No. 521 on the basis  

of sale deed dated 26.11.1974 executed by  

Pursottam.  

 2.4 The trial court dismissed both the suits by  

judgment dated 23.03.1979.  Two appeals were  

filed by respondents against the judgment of  

trial court.  Additional Commissioner allowed  

Appeal No. 436/6 of 1979 decreeing the suit  

No. 31 of 1978 with regard to Plot No. 521,  

with regard to which Sanad was granted, but  

the Additional Commissioner dismissed the  

appeal No. 435/5 of 1979 arising out of Suit

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No. 30 of 1978.  Both appellant and respondent  

filed second appeal before the Board of  

Revenue against the judgment of the Additional  

Commissioner.  Board of Revenue vide its  

judgment dated 18.11.1983 dismissed both the  

second appeals.    

 2.5 Parties filed writ petitions against the order  

of Board of Revenue.  Ram Bilas died during  

the pendency of the writ petition, whose heirs  

were brought on record.  Writ Petition No.  

16105 of 1983 was filed by predecessor-in-

interest of the appellant whereas Writ  

Petition No. 3020 of 1984 was filed by  

respondents.  High Court vide its impugned  

judgment dated 03.03.2006 allowed the Writ  

Petition filed by respondent and dismissed the  

writ petition filed by the appellant.  By  

judgment of the High Court, Suit No.30 of 1978  

also stood decreed.  Appellant, aggrieved by  

the said judgment has come up in this appeal.    

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3. Shri Pramod Swarup, senior Advocate, learned  

counsel for the appellant submits that both the suits  

filed by respondent deserves to be dismissed in view  

of the fact that Pursottam had no right to executed  

sale deed of Sirdari rights on 26.11.1974.  Although,  

he had submitted an application for Bhumidhari Sanad  

but he having died on 05.12.1976 before grant of Sanad,  

Bhumidhari rights shall accrue to his legal heirs and  

the plaintiffs have no right to be declared as  

Bhumidhari.  He further submits that in any view of the  

matter, with regard to Plot Nos. 243 and 503,  

application for Bhumidhari Sanad was rejected on  

23.05.1975, hence with regard to aforesaid two plots,  

Suit No. 30 of 1978 deserves to be dismissed.  Learned  

counsel for the appellant placed reliance on judgment  

of Allahabad High Court in Ram Sabodh and Another Vs.  

Deputy Director of Consolidation, U.P., Faizabad and  

Others, 1982 All. L.J. 1252.    

4. Shri Abhishek Chaudhary, learned counsel for the  

respondent refuting the submissions of the learned  

counsel for the appellant contends that both the suits

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filed by the respondent deserves to be decreed, since  

Pursottam (deceased) having deposited the 20 times of  

the land revenue and made an application on 25.11.1974  

for grant of Bhumidhari rights, bhumidhari rights shall  

be treated to have been granted, w.e.f., the date of  

making of application, i.e., 25.11.1974, in view of the  

provision of Section 137 of the U.P. Zamindari  

Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950. With regard to  

Plot Nos. 243 and 503, with regard to which application  

for grant of Sanad was rejected on 23.05.1975 a  

revision was filed by Pursottam, which was pending at  

the time when U.P. Ordinance No. 1 of 1977 was enforced  

granting Bhumidhari rights to Sirdars, by which the  

revision stood abated.    

 5. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties  

and have perused the records.   

 6. The High Court in its impugned judgment has taken  

the view that insofar as Suit No. 31 of 1978 filed by  

respondent was concerned, Bhumidhari Sanad was granted  

in favour of Pursottam (deceased), although, after his  

death but the said Sanad will have retrospective effect

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making Pursottam Bhumidhar w.e.f. 25.11.1974, hence no  

error was committed by decreeing Suit No.31 of 1978.   

Coming to Suit No. 30 of 1978, filed by the respondent,  

High Court took the view that in view of the fact that  

Pursottam had challenged the rejection of the  

application, which was subjudice when the proceedings  

were abated on account of Ordinance No.1 of 1977, the  

legal heirs of Pursottam cannot contend contrary to the  

interest of Pursottam.  The High Court also relied on  

Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act in upholding  

the claim of the respondent.    

 7. Before we consider the submissions of the learned  

counsel for the parties, it is necessary to refer to  

provisions of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms  

Act, 1950.  Section 134 of the Act provides for  

acquisition of Bhumidhari rights by a Sirdar.  Section  

134(1) (existing at the relevant time) is as follows:-  

"134. Acquisition of bhumidhari rights by a  sirdar.-- (1) If a sirdar, not being a  sirdar, referred to in clause (b) of  Section  131 deposits to the credit of the State  Government an amount equal to twenty times  the land revenue payable or deemed to be  payable on the date of application for the  land of which he is the sirdar, he shall,

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upon an application duly made in that behalf  to an Assistant Collector, be entitled, with  effect from the date on which the amount has  been so deposited, to a declaration that he  has acquired the rights mentioned in Section  137 in respect of such land:    Explanation I. – For the purposes of this  sub-section, the expression ‘land’ includes  share in land.    Explanation II. – For the purpose of this  section the land revenue payable shall—    

(a) in respect of land referred to in the  proviso to clause (a) of sub-section  (1) of Section 246, be an amount  arrived at after all the increases  have been given effect to; and    

(b) in respect of land to which the  proviso to Section 247 applies, be an  amount determined at hereditary rates  under that section.”    

8. Section 137 provides for Grant of certificate.   

Section 137 as it existed at the relevant time is quoted  

as below:-  

“137.  Grant of certificate.-- (1) If the  application has been duly made and the  Assistant Collector is satisfied that the  applicant is entitled to the declaration  mentioned in Section 134 he shall grant a  certificate to that effect.     (2)  Upon the grant of the certificate under  sub-section (1) the sirdar shall from the

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date on which the amount referred to in sub- section (1) of Section 134 has been  deposited:    (a)  become and the be deemed to be a  

bhumidhar of the holing or the share in  respect of which the certificate has been  granted, and    

(b) Be liable for payment of such reduced  amount on account of land revenue for the  holding or his share therein, as the case  may be as shall one-half of the amount  of Land revenue payable or deemed to be  payable by him therefor on the date of  application.      

Provided further that in the cases  referred to in Explanation II of section 134  sirdar shall, during the period a reduced  amount is payable in accordance with Section  246 or 247, be liable for payment of one-half  of the amount payable from time to time.   

Explanation.—For purpose of clause (b)  the land revenue payable by a sirdar on the  date aforesaid shall, where it exceeds an  amount double that computed at the hereditary  rates applicable, be deemed to be equal to  such amount.  

(2-A) Where the amount referred to in sub- section (1) of Section 134 is deposited on a  date other than the first day of the  agricultural year, the land revenue payable  by the bhumidhar under clause (b) of sub- section (2) for the remainder of the  agricultural year in which the amount is  deposited shall be determined in such manner  as may be prescribed.”   

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9. We may first take up the case of the Suit No.31 of  

1978 filed by the respondent with regard to which  

declaration was sought for Plot No. 521.  With regard  

to Plot No.521 Bhumidhari Sanad was issued on  

05.01.1976 in the name of Pursottam.  Additional  

Commissioner, Board of Revenue and the High Court taken  

the view that Bhumidhari certificate shall relate back  

to the date of application by Pursottam and sale deed  

executed by him for Plot No.521 was valid.  This Court  

had occasion to consider Sections 134 and 137 of U.P.  

Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 as well  

as Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act in Ram  

Pyare Vs. Ram Narain and Others, (1985) 2 SCC 162.  In  

the above case, the Sirdar tenant deposited land  

revenue and made an application for grant of Bhumidhari  

Sanad on 28.10.1961 and on the same day, he sold the  

land to appellant. Certificate was issued on  

30.10.1961.   The suit was filed by the sons of Sirdar  

praying for cancellation of sale deed.  High Court  

decreed the suit against which the appeal was filed.   

This Court held that Section 43 of the Transfer of  

Property Act was applicable and the tenure holder

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acquired the Bhumidhari rights and the suit filed by  

the sons of Matbar Mal was liable to be dismissed.   

After referring to provisions of Section 134 and 137  

of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act,  

1950, this Court laid down following in Paragraph  

No.4:-     

“4. The decision in Dhani Ram v. Jokhu was  approved by another Division Bench of the  same court consisting of S.D. Khare and R.B.  Misra, JJ., in Ram Swarup v. Deputy Director,  Consolidation, ILR (1971) 1 All. 698. In the  latter case the learned Judges expressed the  further opinion that in a situation like the  one before them, there was no reason why  recourse should not be had to Section 43 of  the Transfer of Property Act to feed the  title as it were, if the necessary conditions  were fulfilled. We agree with the reasoning  of the learned Judges in Ram Swarup v. Deputy  Director, Consolidation. In that case, the  matter was remanded to the Deputy Director  of Consolidation to consider the question of  the applicability of Section 43 of the  Transfer of Property Act and proceed to  dispose of the matter in accordance with law.  In the present case, the facts speak for  themselves and we do not think that it is  necessary to remand the case to the lower  courts for a decision on the question of the  applicability of Section 43 of the Transfer  of Property Act. The amount of deposit under  Section 134 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition  Act was made on October 28, 1961 and it was  on the same day that the sale deed was  executed by Matbar Mal. It is clear that  Matbar Mal erroneously represented to the  vendee that he was authorised to transfer the  property and professed to transfer such

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property for consideration. The very  execution of the sale deed on the same day  as the deposit of the requisite amount under  Section 134 is significant enough to  establish that the sale deed was the result  of an erroneous representation by Matbar Mal.  It is also clear that the present plaintiffs  who are the sons of the vendor, Matbar Mal  cannot possibly claim to be transferees in  good faith which indeed they do not claim to  be. Section 43 clearly applies to the  situation. The learned counsel for the  respondents however attempted to disclaim the  applicability of Section 43 of the Transfer  of Property Act by referring to Jumma Masjid  v. Kodimaniandra Deviah, AIR 1962 SC 847. He  invited our attention to the following  observations of the learned Judges:    

“Now the compelling reason urged by  the appellant for reading a further  exception in Section 43 is that if it  is construed as applicable to  transfers by persons who have only  spes succession is at the date of  transfer, it would have the effect of  nullifying Section 6(a). But Section  6(a) and Section 43 relate to two  different subjects, and there is no  necessary conflict between them;  Section 6(a) deals with certain kinds  of interests in property mentioned  therein, and prohibits a transfer  simpliciter of those interests.  Section 43 deals with representations  as to title made by a transferor who  had no title at the time of transfer,  and provides that the transfer shall  fasten itself on the title which the  transferor subsequently acquires.  Section 6(a) enacts a rule of  substantive law, while Section 43  enacts a rule of estoppel which is one  of evidence. The two provisions

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operate on different fields, and under  different conditions, and we see no  ground for reading a conflict between  them or for cutting down the ambit of  the one by reference to the other. In  our opinion, both of them can be given  full effect on their own terms, in  their respective spheres. To hold that  transfers by persons who have only a  spes successionis at the date of  transfer are not within the protection  afforded by Section 43 would destroy  its utility to a large extent.”    

We are unable to see in what manner these  observations can possibly assist the  respondents. In the same decision, it has  been observed later, referring to the  decision of the Madras High Court in Official  Assignee, Madras v. Sampath Naidu, AIR 1933  Mad. 795:    

“This reasoning is open to the  criticism that it ignores the  principle underlying Section 43. That  section embodies, as already stated,  a rule of estoppel and enacts that a  person who makes a representation  shall not be heard to allege the  contrary as against a person who acts  on that representation. It is  immaterial whether the transferor acts  bona fide or fraudulently in making  the representation. It is only  material to find out whether in fact  the transferee has been misled. It is  to be noted that when the decision  under consideration was given, the  relevant words of Section 43 were,  ‘where a person erroneously  represents’, and now, as amended by  Act 20 of 1929, they are ‘where a  person fraudulently or erroneously  represents’, and that emphasises that

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for the purpose of the section it  matters not whether the transferor  acted fraudulently or innocently in  making the representation, and that  what is material is that he did make  a representation and the transferee  has acted on it. Where the transferee  knew as a fact that the transferor did  not possess the title which he  represents he has, then he cannot be  said to have acted on it when taking  a transfer. Section 43 would then have  no application and the transfer will  fail under Section 6(a). But where the  transferee does act on the  representation, there is no reason why  he should not have the benefit of the  equitable doctrine embodied in Section  43, however fraudulent the act of the  transferor might have been.”  

10. Another judgment, which is relevant for the present  

case is Deo Nandan and Another Vs. Ram Saran and Others,  

(2000) 3 SCC 440.  In the said case, one Bechan was the  

Sirdar of agricultural land.  He filed an application  

on 25.08.1964 for grant of Bhumidhari Sanad and on  

25.08.1964, he executed a sale deed of the land to the  

plaintiff-appellant.  Before any order could be passed  

granting the Bhumidhari Sanad in favour of Bechan, he  

died on 15.09.1964.  The widow of Bechan on 05.01.1965  

sold the land.  Sanad was issued on 09.02.1965 in favour  

of Bechan w.e.f. 25.08.1964, the date on which the

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application was made.  Plaintiff-appellant filed a suit  

challenging the sale deed executed by wife of tenure  

holder.  High Court held that on 25.08.1964, Bechan had  

not acquired any right, title or interest, hence he  

cannot transfer any right by executing a sale deed in  

favour of the plaintiff-appellant.  This Court referred  

to provisions of Section 134 and 137 and held that the  

declaration must necessarily take effect from the date  

when the amount is deposited.  In paragraph No.7,  

following has been laid down:-     

“7. Section 134, from its plain language,  indicates and shows that on the application  being made and 10 times the land revenue  being paid, the sirdar becomes entitled “with  effect from the date on which the amount had  been deposited” to a declaration that he has  acquired the rights mentioned in Section 137  of the Act. The section clearly specifies the  date with effect from which the rights would  stand acquired: the date is the one on which  the amount contemplated by Section 134 is  deposited. This clearly obviates the  uncertainty of the point of time when the  title is transferred by fixing the date as  being the one when the amount is deposited.  It would be immaterial as to when the  declaration under Section 137 is made because  that declaration must necessarily take effect  from the date when the amount is deposited.”  

11. The submission that before grant of Sanad, the  

applicant had died was also considered by this Court

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in paragraph No.9 and it was held that the certificate  

will have a retrospective effect.  The view of the High  

Court was disapproved and suit was held to be entitled  

to be decreed.  In paragraph Nos.9 and 10, following  

has been laid down:-  

“9. It is no doubt true that in the Full Bench  decision in Banshidhar v. Dhirajadhari, AIR  1971 ALL. 526 (FB), in the Single Judge  decision in Mobin Khan v. Chunnu Khan, 1981  All. LJ 402, and in the decision in  Raghunandan Singh v. Vashwant Singh, 1978 RD  183, a different view has been expressed by  the Allahabad High Court. In the Full Bench  decision, the view taken is that it is from  the date when the order is passed under  Section 137 that the sirdar becomes a  bhumidhar. In the latter two cases, it has  been held that if after filing of the  application and making payment of the land  revenue the applicant dies, then certificate  in his name cannot be granted. In our  opinion, the said decisions run counter to  the plain language and meaning of Sections  134 and 137 as they stood at the relevant  point of time. When a certificate is issued  under Section 137, it in fact recognises the  position as on the date when the application  was made and the payment contemplated under  Section 134(1) was deposited. The  certificate, in other words, will have a  retrospective effect and would relate back  to the date of the application. There was  nothing to prevent the Revenue Authorities  from allowing the application filed under  Section 134(1) on the day when it was  presented. The underlying intention of the  legislature, therefore, clearly is that as  and when the said application is accepted and  order is passed under Section 137, it must

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relate back to the date when the application  was filed. Such a situation is not unknown  to law. Mr Prem Prasad Juneja, learned  counsel for the appellants, as an analogy,  has drawn our attention to Order 22 Rule 6  CPC which provides that if any of the parties  to a suit dies after the hearing has been  completed and before the judgment is  pronounced, the suit would not abate. The  doctrine of relation back has been  incorporated in Sections 134 and 137 of the  U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms  Act.    10. We are, therefore, of the opinion that  the lower appellate court had rightly  interpreted Sections 134 and 137 and the High  Court was in error in overruling the said  decision.”  

12. In view of law as laid down above, the judgment of  

Allahabad High Court in Ram Sabodh(Supra) cannot help  

the appellant. The judgment of this Court in Deo Nandan  

and Another (supra) fully covers the claim of the  

plaintiff-respondent with regard to Suit No. 31 of 1978  

relating to Plot No.521, with regard to which Sanad was  

granted after death of Pursottam.  We are of the view  

that Additional Commissioner, Board of Revenue and High  

Court committed no error in decreeing Suit No.31 of  

1978.    

13. Now, we come to the claim of the plaintiff-

respondent with regard to Plot Nos. 243 and 503 in Suit

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No.30 of 1978.  The facts reveal that with regard to  

aforesaid plots, although application was made on  

25.11.1974 by depositing the 20 times amount of the  

land revenue, but the application was rejected on  

23.05.1975 by the Assistant Collector.  A revision was  

filed by Pursottam challenging the said order, which  

was pending at the time when U.P. Ordinance No.1 of  

1977 was issued abating the proceedings.  High Court  

has noted that the claim of Pursottam to grant of  

Bhumidhari Sanad was subjudice in revision, when the  

proceedings were abated.  It was further observed that  

legal heirs, who were brought on the record on the  

revision, due to death of Pursottam, were competent to  

represent the estate of deceased and cannot setup any  

claim adverse to the interest of the deceased.  High  

Court observed that had Pursottam not died, he would  

have acquired the status of Bhumidhar under Ordinance  

No.1 of 1977 and since he had already executed the sale  

deed after depositing 20 times land revenue, it would  

have related back to the date when he made the  

application and deposited the amount.   

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14. We may first notice the provisions of U.P.  

Ordinance No.1 of 1977, which has been referred to by  

the High Court and which are relevant in the facts of  

the present case.  We have noticed above that under  

Section 134 read with Section 137, a Sirdar after  

depositing 20 times of land revenue and making an  

application could obtain Bhumidhari Sanad.  Sections  

130 and 131 of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land  

Reforms Act, 1950 were substituted by U.P. Ordinance  

No.1 of 1977 - U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land  

Reforms (Amendment) Ordinance, 1977, which was  

subsequently enacted as an Act namely, the Uttar  

Pradesh Land Laws (Amendment) Act, 1977, which are to  

the following effect:-  

“Section 3: Substitution of sections 130 and  131--For sections 130 and 131 of the  principal Act, the following sections shall  be substituted, namely:--    

"130. Bhumidhar with transferable  rights.--Every person belonging to any of  the following classes, not being a person  referred to in section 131, shall be  called a bhumidhar with transferable  rights, and shall have all the rights and  be subject to all the liabilities  conferred or imposed upon such bhumidhars  by or under this Act, namely—   

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(a) every person who was a bhumidhar  immediately before the date of  commencement of the Uttar Pradesh  Land Laws (Amendment) Act, 1977;    

(b) every person who, immediately before  the said date, was a sirdar referred  to in clause (a) or clause (c) of  section 131, as it stood immediately  before the said date;  

 (c) every person who in any other manner  

acquires on or after the said date  the rights of such a bhumidhar under  or in accordance with the provisions  of this Act.  

 131. Bhumidhar with non-transferable  rights.--Every person belonging to any  of the following classes shall be called  a bhumidhar with non-transferable  rights, and shall have all the rights and  be subject to all the liabilities  conferred or imposed upon such  bhumidhars by or under this Act, namely- -  

 (a)  every person admitted as a sirdar of  

any land under section 195 before  the date of commencement of the  Uttar Pradesh Land Laws (Amendment)  Act, 1977, or as a bhumidhar with  non-transferable rights under the  said section on or after the said  date;  

(b)  every person who in any other manner  acquires on or after the said date,  the rights of such a bhumidhar under  or in accordance with the provisions  of this Act;  

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(c) every person who is, or has been  allotted any land under the  provisions of the Uttar Pradesh  Bhoodan Yagna Act, 1952."  

15. Section 134 was omitted by the Uttar Pradesh Land  

Laws (Amendment) Act, 1977.  The effect of the  

provision was that by statute, Bhumidhari right was  

conferred on Sirdar, w.e.f., 28.01.1977, the date of  

issue of U.P. Ordinance No.1 of 1977, which was  

subsequently enacted as an Act, namely, U.P. Land Laws  

(Amendment) Act, 1977, which was deemed to have come  

into effect on 28.01.1977, the date of issuance of  

Ordinance.    

16. The most important provision, which needs to be  

noticed in the Uttar Pradesh Land Laws (Amendment) Act,  

1977 is Section 73, which dealt with transitory  

provisions, which is as follows:-        

“Section 73: Transitory provisions    (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any  other law for the time being in force all  proceedings for acquisition of bhumidhari  rights under sections 134 and 135 of the  Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land

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Reforms Act, 1950, as they stood immediately  before January 28, 1977 and all proceedings  arising therefrom, pending on such date  before any court or authority shall abate.    (2) Where any proceeding has abated under  sub-section (1) the amount deposited for the  acquisition of such rights shall be refunded  to the person depositing the same or to his  legal representatives as the case may be.”  

17. Section 73(1) provides that all proceedings for  

acquisition of bhumidhari rights under sections 134 and  

135 of the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land  

Reforms Act, 1950, as they stood immediately before  

28.01.1977 and all proceedings arising therefrom,  

pending on such date before any court or authority  

shall abate.  

18. The revision against the order dated 23.05.1975  

was pending against the rejection of grant of  

Bhumidhari Sanad, which stood abated by virtue of  

Ordinance No.1 of 1977, as has been noted by the High  

Court in its judgment.  The most important provision  

is Section 73(2), which provides that where any  

proceeding has abated under sub-section (1) the amount  

deposited for the acquisition of such rights shall be

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refunded to the person depositing the same or to his  

legal representatives as the case may be.  

 19. Thus, sub-section (2) of Section 73 of U.P.Act No.8  

of 1977 contemplated that all proceedings pertaining  

to grant of Bhumidhari Sanad shall be abated and amount  

deposited shall be refunded to the person applying or  

the legal representative.  The consequence of the said  

provision is that the revision, which was filed by  

Pursottam stood abated and the amount so deposited was  

to be refunded to his legal representative.  The claim  

of Pursottam to get Bhumidari rights on the basis of  

his application dated 25.11.1974 with regard to Plot  

Nos. 243 and 503, thus, stood terminated by virtue of  

provisions of Section 73 as extracted above.  In view  

of provisions of Section 73 as extracted above, the  

claim of Pursottam to get Bhumidhari rights on the  

basis of his application dated 25.11.1974 stood  

negated.  Hence, on the basis of the pendency of  

revision, no benefit can be taken by Pursottam and High  

Court erred in law in holding that by Ordinance No.1  

of 1977, Pursottam had also got benefited  

retrospectively.

24    

20. By statutory provision, i.e. Section 73, all  

pending applications and proceedings were abated and  

grant of Bhumidhari rights was contemplated under  

Sections 130 and 131, which was sought to be inserted  

by U.P. Ordinance No.1 of 1977.  The benefit of a  

statutory provision shall be applicable to those  

Sirdars, who were Sirdars on the date when Ordinance  

was enforced, which subsequently became an Act.  On  

28.01.1977, Pursottam was already dead and his legal  

heirs were mutated in his place, thus, benefit of  

Ordinance No.1 of 1977 and the U.P. Act No. 8 of 1977  

cannot be availed by Pursottam, so as to validate his  

sale deed dated 26.11.1974 with regard to Plot Nos. 243  

and 503.  High Court, thus, committed error in allowing  

the writ petition filed by the contesting respondent  

and decreeing the Suit No. 30 of 1978.  

 21. The writ petition filed by respondent No.3  

questioning the decision of Courts below with regard  

to Suit No.30 of 1978 was not liable to be allowed by  

the High Court.  All the Courts below including the  

Board of Revenue had taken correct view with regard to  

Suit No.30 of 1978 filed by the respondent.   

25    

 22. In result, the appeal is partly allowed.  The  

judgment of the High Court insofar as it allows the  

Writ Petition No.3020 of 1984 filed by Ajudhi @ Ayodhya  

is set aside.  The judgment of the High Court insofar  

as it dismissed the Writ Petition No. 16105 of 1983 is  

affirmed.  In consequences, the judgment of the Courts  

below decreeing the Suit No. 31 of 1978 of respondent  

Ajudhi @ Ayodhya is maintained, whereas judgment of  

High Court decreeing the Suit No. 30 of 1978 is set  

aside.  Suit No.30 of 1978 of Ajudhi @ Ayodhya stands  

dismissed.  The appeal is decided accordingly.  Parties  

shall bear their own costs.           

......................J.                               ( ASHOK BHUSHAN )  

......................J.                               ( K.M. JOSEPH )  

New Delhi,   March 08, 2019.