Page 1

I.A. No. 4 of 2014 in C.A. No. 8785 of 2013             1

NON REPORTABLE  

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

I.A. No. 4 of 2014  

IN  

CIVIL APPEAL NO.8785 OF 2013  

  RAJIV CHOWDHRIE HUF            ………APPELLANT

Vs.

  UNION OF INDIA & ORS.           ………RESPONDENTS    

    J U D G M E N T

V.GOPALA GOWDA, J.

1. This I.A. No.4 of 2014 in Civil Appeal  No. 8785  

of 2013 is filed by the appellant seeking for issuing  

direction  and  pass  an  order  for  disposal  of  this  

appeal in terms of Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair  

Compensation  and  Transparency  in  Land  Acquisition,  

Rehabilitation  and Resettlement  Act, 2013  (in short  

‘the Act of 2013’). The appellant-land owner has come  

to  this  Court  questioning  the  correctness  of  the  

judgment  and  order  dated  26.03.2010  passed  by  the  

Division  Bench  of  the  High  Court  of  Delhi  in  W.P.

Page 2

I.A. No. 4 of 2014 in C.A. No. 8785 of 2013             2

(C)No. 2161 of 2006, wherein, the High Court dismissed  

the said petition.

 2. Brief facts of the case are stated hereunder:   

The appellant Hindu Undivided Family (for short  

HUF)  purchased  land  comprising  of  Khasra  Nos.  569,  

575, 581, 586, 591, 592 (New Khasra Nos. 27/9, 12, 19,  

22, 36/2, 9) on 07.06.1984 in all measuring 27 bighas  

situated in the revenue estate of village Bamnauli,  

Tehsil  Mehrauli  (presently  Tehsil  Vasant  Vihar,  

Kapashera),  New  Delhi.  On  application  made  by  the  

appellant,  the Municipal  Corporation of  Delhi (MCD)  

vide Sanction Letter No.972/B/HQ/84 dated 23/01/1985  

sanctioned the plan for constructing a farm house on  

part of the said land. In January 1985, the appellant  

constructed a farm house on the aforesaid land, which  

was in accordance with the plan duly sanctioned. After  

the completion of the construction, the MCD issued a  

completion  certificate  dated  06.11.1985  to  the  

appellant.

3. On  26.11.2004,  the  Government  of  National  

Capital Territory (NCT) issued the notification dated

Page 3

I.A. No. 4 of 2014 in C.A. No. 8785 of 2013             3

04.11.2004  under  Section  4  of  the  repealed  Land  

Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short ‘the L.A. Act’) in  

respect  of  land  area  measuring  2100  bighas  and  06  

biswas  in  respect  of  village  Bamnauli,  Tehsil  

Mehrauli.  The  public  purpose  mentioned  in  the  

notification under Section 4 of the L.A. Act was for  

construction  of  Dwarka,  Phase  II,  the  land  of  the  

appellant was covered in the said notification. The  

appellant filed his objections under Section 5A of the  

L.A. Act before the Land Acquisition Collector (for  

short ‘LAC’), South West Delhi opposing the proposed  

acquisition for public purpose.

4. Thereafter,  on  10.11.2005,  the  declaration  

notification under Section 6(1) of the L.A. Act dated  

31.10.2005 was published in the government Gazette in  

respect of the land sought to be acquired including  

the land owned by the appellant.

5. The  appellant  filed  Writ  Petition  (Civil)  No.  

2161 of 2006 before the High Court of Delhi at New  

Delhi, challenging the legality of the notifications  

under Sections 4 and 6 of the L.A. Act. The High Court

Page 4

I.A. No. 4 of 2014 in C.A. No. 8785 of 2013             4

issued notice and passed an order of “status quo” in  

respect  of  the  land  in  question.  The  other  land  

holders  who  were  similarly  situated  had  also  

challenged  the  said  two  notifications  and  the  High  

Court  upon  examining  the  writ  petitions  on  merits  

dismissed the same with a direction to the land owners  

that they were permitted to file a representation to  

the competent authority under Section 48 of the L.A.  

Act, to de-notify their land and further held that  

till  such  time  as  their  representation  for  

denotification is decided by the NCT, the parties are  

directed to maintain “status quo” as to nature, title  

and possession of the land in question. Hence, this  

appeal.

6. This Court vide order dated 08.11.2010 passed an  

interim order to maintain “status quo” in respect of  

the possession of the land in question, subsequently  

the same was made absolute till the disposal of the  

appeal.  

  7. It is the case of the appellant that throughout  

the proceedings before the High Court as well as this

Page 5

I.A. No. 4 of 2014 in C.A. No. 8785 of 2013             5

Court, it has been in physical possession of the land  

involved in this appeal. In fact, the actual physical  

possession  of  the  land  was  never  taken  by  the  

respondents. Furthermore, the appellant was protected  

by various interim orders of “status quo” both by the  

High Court as well as this Court with respect to the  

possession of the land in question.

8. Mr.  Chandra  Uday  Singh,  the  learned  senior  

counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant placed  

reliance  upon  Section  24(2)  of  the  Act  of  2013  to  

support  the  plea  of  the  appellant  that  the  land  

acquisition proceedings initiated under the L.A. Act  

would be deemed to have lapsed where an award was made  

5 years prior to the commencement of the Act of 2013  

and physical possession of the land has not been taken  

or the compensation towards the acquired land was not  

paid to the appellant. Therefore, the above provision  

of  the  Act  of  2013  provides  for  lapse  of  such  

acquisition  proceedings  which  provision  is  aptly  

applicable to the fact situation. Section 24(2) of the  

2013 Act, upon which strong reliance has been placed  

by  the  learned  senior  counsel  on  behalf  of  the

Page 6

I.A. No. 4 of 2014 in C.A. No. 8785 of 2013             6

appellant is extracted as under:-  

“(2)  Notwithstanding  anything  contained  in  sub- section  (1),  in  case  of  land  acquisition  proceedings initiated under the LA Act, where an  Award under the said Section 11 has been made five  years or more prior to the commencement of this  Act but the physical possession of the land has  not been taken or the compensation has not been  paid the said proceedings shall be deemed to have  lapsed and the appropriate government, if it so  chooses, shall initiate the proceedings of such  land  acquisition  afresh  in  accordance  with  the  provisions of this Act.

  Provided that whether an award has been made  and compensation in respect of a majority of land  holdings has not been deposited in the account of  the beneficiaries specified in the notifications  for acquisition under Section 4 of the said land  acquisition and shall be entitled to compensation  in accordance with the provisions of this Act.”

9. Having regard to the facts narrated above, it is  

contended  by  the  learned  senior  counsel  for  the  

appellant that by virtue of Section 24(2) of the Act  

of  2013,  the  land  acquisition  proceedings  in  the  

present case on hand initiated under the L.A. Act have  

lapsed for the reason that the award under Section 11  

of  the  L.A.  Act,  which  was  made  by  the  LAC  on  

06.08.2007  vide Award  No.1/2007-2008 more  than five  

years prior to the commencement of the Act of 2013,  

which  has  commenced  from  01.01.2014  and  physical

Page 7

I.A. No. 4 of 2014 in C.A. No. 8785 of 2013             7

possession of the land in dispute is neither taken nor  

has  the  compensation  awarded  been  paid  to  the  

appellant in respect of his acquired land.

10. It has been further contended that the case of  

the  appellant  herein  is  duly  covered  under  the  

aforesaid provisions of the Act as the appellant has  

been in continuous possession of the land in question  

and compensation has not been paid to the appellant  

while the award was made more than 5 years prior to  

the  commencement  of  the  Act  of  2013.  Reliance  was  

placed on the three Judge Bench decision of this Court  

in Pune Municipal Corporation and Anr. Vs. Harakchand  

Misirimal Solanki & Ors.1, and the other judgments of  

this  Court  in  Bharat  Kumar  v. State  of  Haryana  &  

Another2, Bimla Devi & Others  v. State of Haryana &  

Others3 and Union of India & Others  v.  Shiv Raj &  

Others4, wherein Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013, was  

examined by this Court at length and held that the  

land acquisition proceedings initiated under the L.A.  

Act are deemed to have lapsed, where the award has  

1   (2014) 3 SCC 183 2  (2014) 6 SCC 586 3  (2014) 6 SCC 583 4 (2014) 6 SCC 564

Page 8

I.A. No. 4 of 2014 in C.A. No. 8785 of 2013             8

been made five years or more prior to the commencement  

of the Act of 2013 and physical possession of the land  

is not taken or compensation has not been paid to the  

appellant. It is further contended that the law laid  

down by this Court in the Pune Municipal Corporation’s  

case  (supra)  and  other  cases  referred  to  supra,  

squarely  cover  the  case  on  hand  in  favour  of  the  

appellant. Therefore, it is prayed by him that the  

instant appeal be disposed of since the acquisition  

proceedings  of  the  land  have  lapsed  in  terms  of  

Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013.

11. On the other hand, it has been contended by the  

learned counsel for the respondents that the Act of  

2013 is prospective in operation by virtue of Section  

24  read  with  Section  114  of  the  Act  of  2013.  As  

provided under Section 24, the effect of Section 6 of  

the General Clauses Act of 1897, the actions taken by  

the respondents in acquiring the land in dispute and  

passing  an  award  have  been  saved.   By  reading  the  

above provisions of the two Sections, it is clear that  

Legislature wanted to protect and save the acquisition  

proceedings  initiated  under  the  repealed  L.A.  Act,

Page 9

I.A. No. 4 of 2014 in C.A. No. 8785 of 2013             9

particularly where either possession of the acquired  

land has not been taken or compensation has not been  

paid to the landowners. It is further submitted that  

the  Act  of  2013  never  intended  to  destroy  entire  

acquisition proceedings in acquiring the land for the  

public purpose under the repealed L.A. Act, 1894. It  

is well settled position of law that the proceedings  

initiated  and  culminated  under  the  repealed  Act  of  

1894  are  not  to  be  disturbed  by  applying  the  

interpretation of the provisions of Section 24(2) of  

the  Act  of  2013  made  by  this  Court  in  the  above  

referred  cases.  By  operation  of  the  provisions  of  

Section 16 or 17(1) of the L.A. Act as the case may  

be, once the possession of the acquired land is taken  

by the respondents, the land will be vested in the  

State  Government  which  is  absolutely  free  from  all  

encumbrances.  Thereafter, it is not open even for the  

State Government to denotify and restore the land to  

the land owner in exercise of its power under Section  

48 of the repealed L.A. Act as it is not permissible  

in law.  In the cases reported as Satendra Prasad Jain  

Vs. State of UP5. and Sanjeevanagar Medical and Health  5    (1993) 4 SCC 369

Page 10

I.A. No. 4 of 2014 in C.A. No. 8785 of 2013             10

Emloyees’ Co-operative Housing Society Vs. Mohd. Abdul  

Wahab  and  Ors.6,  this  Court  has  held  that  once  

possession is taken by the Land Acquisition Collector  

in exercise of its statutory power under Section 16 or  

17(1) of the repealed L.A. Act, 1894, the land vests  

with the State Government, free from all encumbrances,  

even if no compensation has been awarded under Section  

11 of the repealed L.A. Act within two years, that is,  

the  statutory  period  prescribed  under  the  repealed  

L.A.  Act  for  passing  an  award.   In  the  aforesaid  

cases, this Court has also held that Section 11(A) of  

the  repealed  L.A.  Act  is  not  applicable  (which  is  

analogous  to  Section  24  of  the  Act  of  2013)  and  

further  held  that  in  such  circumstances,  the  only  

consequence provided under the repealed L.A. Act is  

payment of interest under Section 34 in respect of the  

acquired  land.  Therefore,  he  submits  that  the  

acquisition of land cannot be deemed to have lapsed  

under Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013, in view of the  

law laid down in the above cases referred to supra.  

It is contended by the learned counsel on behalf of  

the respondents that the above said judgments were not  6     (1996) 3 SCC 600

Page 11

I.A. No. 4 of 2014 in C.A. No. 8785 of 2013             11

brought to the notice of this Court while disposing of  

the  case  of  Pune  Municipal  Corporation’s case  and  

other  cases  referred  to  supra  which  are  strongly  

relied on behalf of the appellant and therefore the  

legal question in this regard requires to be referred  

to a larger Bench of this Court.

12. Further, it is contended by the respondents that  

by a careful reading of Section 24(2) of the Act of  

2013,  it  would  show  that  the  proceedings  initiated  

under the L.A. Act shall be deemed to have lapsed, if  

two conditions as mentioned below are not satisfied by  

the appellant. They are:

(i)An Award under Section 11 of 1894 Act should  have been made five years or more prior to the  commencement of Act of 2013;

(ii)Whether  physical  possession  had  not  been  taken or the compensation has not been paid.

A perusal of the provision of Section 24(2) of the Act  

reveals  that  it  is  in  two  parts.  The  first  part  

relates to a positive state of affair, namely, the  

existence of award for more than five years on the  

commencement of the New Act, whereas, the second part  

lays down two negative conditions. Thus, the word ‘or’

Page 12

I.A. No. 4 of 2014 in C.A. No. 8785 of 2013             12

has  been  used  to  express  an  alternative  of  the  

terms/conditions  enumerated  therein.  Therefore,  if  

either of the two negative conditions which are found  

to be mentioned in Section 24(2) remains unfulfilled  

by  the  respondents,  the  acquisition  proceedings  in  

respect of the land be held to be not lapsed, is the  

legal contention urged on behalf of the respondents by  

placing reliance upon the decision of this Court in  

the case of  The Punjab Produce and Trading Co. Ltd.  

v. CIT, West Bengal, Calcutta7. Neither the said legal  

issue  is  considered  nor  the  law  laid  down  in  the  

aforesaid judgment was brought to the notice of this  

Court at the time of hearing of the case of  Pune  

Municipal  Corporation and  other  cases  referred  to  

supra and thus have not been considered by this Court  

while disposing of the cases on which reliance has  

been  placed  by  the  appellant  as  they  have  to  be  

referred to the larger Bench for its reconsideration  

is the submissions of the learned senior counsel on  

behalf of NCT. Further, it is contended that if the  

above provisions are read in this manner, then it will  

be in harmony with the L.A. Act. 7    (1971) 2 SCC 540

Page 13

I.A. No. 4 of 2014 in C.A. No. 8785 of 2013             13

13. Further, it is contended that the appellant had  

filed writ petition in this Court when this Court was  

pleased to grant “status quo” in respect of the land  

in question. Although the High Court has dismissed the  

Writ Petition on 26.03.2010 but extended the interim  

order of “status quo” regarding the possession of the  

land till the representation filed by the appellant  

for release of the land under Section 48 of the L.A.  

Act was decided by the Competent Authority of NCT.  

When the appellant challenged the said order before  

this  Court  by  way  of  Special  Leave  Petition,  this  

Court directed the parties to maintain “status quo” in  

respect of the land in question resultantly on the  

strength of the interim order passed by the High Court  

as well as by this Court the possession of the land  

could not be taken by the respondents and the same  

remained  with  the  appellant.  In  the  teeth  of  the  

aforesaid fact that the appellant continued to be in  

possession of the land in question only due to interim  

order of “status quo” passed in their favour is not  

proper for the appellant to turn around and contend  

now at this stage that physical possession of the land

Page 14

I.A. No. 4 of 2014 in C.A. No. 8785 of 2013             14

has not been taken by the respondents and therefore,  

the acquisition proceedings of the land are lapsed.

14.   We have carefully gone through the factual and  

rival legal contentions urged on behalf of both the  

parties in the backdrop of the case laws cited above.  

On examining the facts and circumstances of the case  

on hand, it is an undisputed fact that the award was  

made 5 years prior to the date of commencement of the  

Resettlement Act, 2013 i.e. on 06.08.2007 vide Award  

No. 1/2007-2008 and either physical possession of the  

land should have been taken or compensation has been  

paid to the appellant in respect of his acquired land.  

Therefore, the acquisition proceedings of the land of  

the appellant are lapsed in view of Section 24(2) of  

the  Act  of  2013,  which  provision  has  been  rightly  

interpreted  by  this  Court  by  a  three  Judge  Bench  

decision in the case of Pune Municipal Corporation and  

other cases referred to supra, the relevant paras of  

the aforesaid case are extracted hereunder:-

“20…….it is clear that the award pertaining to  the subject land has been made by the Special  Land Acquisition Officer more than five years  prior to the commencement of the 2013 Act. It  is also admitted position that compensation so

Page 15

I.A. No. 4 of 2014 in C.A. No. 8785 of 2013             15

awarded  has  neither  been  paid  to  the  landowners/persons interested nor deposited in  the court. The deposit of compensation amount  in the Government treasury is of no avail and  cannot be held to be equivalent to compensation  paid to the landowners/persons interested. We  have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that  the subject land acquisition proceedings shall  be deemed to have lapsed under Section 24(2) of  the 2013 Act.

21. The argument on behalf of the Corporation  that the subject land acquisition proceedings  have been concluded in all respects under the  1894 Act and that they are not affected at all  in view of Section 114(2) of the 2013 Act, has  no merit at all, and is noted to be rejected.  Section 114(1) of the 2013 Act repeals the 1894  Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 114, however,  makes  Section  6  of  the  General  Clauses  Act,  1897 applicable with regard to the effect of  repeal but this is subject to the provisions in  the  2013  Act.  Under  Section  24(2)  land  acquisition  proceedings  initiated  under  the  1894 Act, by legal fiction, are deemed to have  lapsed where award has been made five years or  more prior to the commencement of the 2013 Act  and  possession  of  the  land  is  not  taken  or  compensation  has  not  been  paid.  The  legal  fiction  under  Section  24(2)  comes  into  operation as soon as conditions stated therein  are satisfied. The applicability of Section 6  of  the  General  Clauses  Act  being  subject  to  Section  24(2),  there  is  no  merit  in  the  contention of the Corporation.”

15. Further,  with  regard  to  the  legal  contention  

that physical possession of the land could not have

Page 16

I.A. No. 4 of 2014 in C.A. No. 8785 of 2013             16

been taken by the respondents in view of the interim  

order of “status quo” passed by this Court. This Court  

in  the  case  of  Sree  Balaji  Nagar  Residential  

Association v. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors.8, held that  

Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 does not exclude any  

period during which the land acquisition proceedings  

might  have  remained  stayed  on  account  of  stay  or  

injunction granted by any court. It was conclusively  

held that the Legislature has consciously omitted to  

extend the period of five years indicated in Section  

24(2) of the Act of 2013 for grant of relief in favour  

of  land  owners  even  if  the  proceedings  had  been  

delayed on account of an order of stay or injunction  

granted by a court of law or for any reason. Thus, the  

said period has to be excluded as provided under the  

amended proviso to Section 6 of the L.A. Act by way of  

an amendment by the legislature to the above Section 6  

through  an  Amendment  Act  68  of  1984,  to  add  

Explanation 1 to the Act, for the purpose of excluding  

the period, when the proceedings suffered stay by an  

order  of  the  Court,  in  the  context  of  limitation  

provided for publishing the declaration notification  8   2014 (10) SCALE 388

Page 17

I.A. No. 4 of 2014 in C.A. No. 8785 of 2013             17

under Section 6(1) of the Act.  The Explanation to  

Section 11A, which was added by Amendment Act 68 of  

1984 was to a similar effect. This Court in the above  

case has examined this legal contention and held that  

the legislature in its wisdom made the period of five  

years under Section 24(2) of the Resettlement Act,  

2013,  absolute  and  unaffected  by  any  delay  in  the  

proceedings on account of any order of stay by a court  

of Law. The plain wordings used by the Legislature  

under the provisions of Section 24(2) are made very  

clear and do not create any ambiguity or conflict. In  

such a situation, the court is not required to depart  

from the literal rule of interpretation, as held by  

this Court in the case of C.I.T., Mysore v. The Indo  

Mercantile Bank Ltd.9 as under:-

“10. Lord  Macmillan  in  Madras  &  Southern  Maharatta  Railway  Co. v.  Bezwada  Municipality  laid down the sphere of a proviso as follows:

“The proper function of a proviso is to except  and deal with a case which would otherwise fall  within  the  general  language  of  the  main  enactment, and its effect is confined to that  case.  Where,  as  in  the  present  case,  the  language  of  the  main  enactment  is  clear  and  unambiguous, a proviso can have no repercussion  

9   AIR 1959 SC 713

Page 18

I.A. No. 4 of 2014 in C.A. No. 8785 of 2013             18

on the interpretation of the main enactment, so  as  to  exclude  from  it  by  implication  what  clearly falls within its express terms.

The territory of a proviso therefore is to carve  out  an  exception  to  the  main  enactment  and  exclude  something  which  otherwise  would  have  been within the section. It has to operate in  the same field and if the language of the main  enactment is clear it cannot be used for the  purpose of interpreting the main enactment or to  exclude  by  implication  what  the  enactment  clearly says unless the words of the proviso are  such that that is its necessary effect.”  

16.   Upon examining the aforesaid decisions with  

reference to the facts and circumstances of the case  

on hand, we are of the view that physical possession  

of the land belonging to the appellant has neither  

been taken by the respondents nor compensation paid to  

him in respect of the land acquired even though more  

than five years have lapsed since the award was passed  

on 06.08.2007, when the Act of 2013 came into force.  

Therefore, the conditions mentioned in Section 24(2)  

of the Act of 2013 are satisfied in this case for  

allowing  the  plea  of  the  appellant  that  the  land  

acquisition proceedings are deemed to have lapsed in  

terms of Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013. The said

Page 19

I.A. No. 4 of 2014 in C.A. No. 8785 of 2013             19

legal principle laid down by this Court in the case of  

Pune  Municipal  Corporation  (supra)  and  other  cases  

referred to supra with regard to the interpretation of  

Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013, is applicable with  

all fours to the fact situation in respect of the land  

covered  in  this  appeal  for  granting  the  relief  as  

prayed by the appellant in the application.

17. In view of the aforesaid findings and reasons  

recorded by us, the acquisition proceedings in respect  

of the appellant’s land have lapsed. The prayer made  

in this Interlocutory Application is allowed in the  

above terms and consequently, the civil appeal is also  

allowed  by  quashing  the  acquisition  proceeding  

notification in so far as the land of the appellant is  

concerned. There shall be no order as to costs.

                          ……………………………………………………………J.                           [V. GOPALA GOWDA]

     ……………………………………………………………J.  

Page 20

I.A. No. 4 of 2014 in C.A. No. 8785 of 2013             20

[C. NAGAPPAN]

New Delhi, December 10,2014