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“  REPORTABLE”   

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4824   OF 2013 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 4722 OF 2012)

Rajendra Nagar Adarsh  Grah Nirman Sahkari Samiti Ltd. … Appellant

Versus

State of Rajasthan & Ors.          … Respondents

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4825  OF 2013 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 4874 OF 2012)

Yogesh Chand Arora … Appellant

Versus

State of Rajasthan & Ors.          … Respondents

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4826   OF 2013 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 5041 OF 2012)

Durga Devi Dharmarth Trust & Anr. … Appellants

Versus

State of Rajasthan & Ors.          … Respondents

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4827   OF 2013 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 5089 OF 2012)

Naresh Chand Arora … Appellant

Versus

State of Rajasthan & Ors.          … Respondents

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WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4828    OF 2013 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 5206 OF 2012)

Madrampura Grih Nirman Sahkari  Samiti Ltd. & Ors. … Appellants

Versus

State of Rajasthan & Ors.          … Respondents

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4829 OF 2013 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 12072 OF 2012)

Yashmeen Abrar … Appellant

Versus Union of India & Ors.          … Respondents

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4830  OF 2013 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 21205 OF 2012)

Sunita Rathi  & Ors. … Appellants

Versus

State of Rajasthan & Ors.          … Respondents

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4831  OF 2013 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 21226 OF 2012)

Arjun Nagar Vikas Samiti  through its President  Vimla Verma … Appellant

Versus

State of Rajasthan & Ors.          … Respondents

J U D G M E N T

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Jagdish Singh Khehar

1. The instant common order will dispose of the following matters:-

(i) Rajendra Nagar Adarsh Grah Nirman Sahkari  Samiti  Ltd.  vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors., Civil  Appeal arising out of  SLP (C) No. 4722 of 2012);

(ii) Yogesh Chand Arora vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors., Civil  Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 4874 of 2012);  

(iii) Durga Devi Dharmarth Trust & Anr. vs. State of Rajasthan  & Ors.,  Civil  Appeal  arising  out  of  SLP (C)  No.  5041 of  2012);

(iv) Naresh Chand Arora vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors.,  Civil  Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 5089 of 2012);  

(v) Madrampura  Grih  Nirman  Sahkari  Samiti  Ltd.  &  Ors.vs.  State of Rajasthan & Ors., Civil Appeal arising out of SLP  (C) No. 5206 of 2012);

(vi) Yashmeen Abrar vs.  Union of  India  & Ors.,  Civil  Appeal  arising out of SLP (C) No. 12072 of 2012);

(vii) Sunita Rathi  &  Ors. vs.  State  of  Rajasthan  & Ors.,  Civil  Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 21205 of 2012);

(viii) Arjun  Nagar  Vikas  Samiti  through  its  President  Vimla  Verma vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors., Civil Appeal arising  out of SLP (C) No. 21226 of 2012);

2. Leave granted in all the matters.

3. Insofar  as  the  instant  judgment  is  concerned,  Rajendra  Nagar  

Adarsh Grah Nirman Sahkari Samiti Ltd. vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors.  

(i.e., the Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 4722 of 2012 shall be  

treated as the lead case.  The factual narration recorded herein, shall  

be based on the pleadings thereof.   However,  in  situations  wherein,  

during the course of  hearing, reference has been made to pleadings  

from other cases, the same will also be adverted to.

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4. The  appellants  herein  are  all  land  losers.   Their  lands  were  

acquired  for  establishing  a  zonal  office  complex,  and  residential  

quarters for Railway staff, for the North Western Railway Zone, at Jaipur  

in the State of Rajasthan.

5. The  sequence  of  facts  commencing  from  the  initiation,  and  

leading to the finalization of the acquisition proceedings, are of pointed  

significance, in the present controversy.  As such, all the relevant factual  

details, are being narrated hereunder, first of all.

6. On  15.11.1996,  the  Officer  on  Special  Duty,  North  Western  

Railway,  posted  at  Jaipur,  addressed  a  communication  to  the  

Commissioner, Jaipur Development Authority, Jaipur, indicating that 26  

bighas of Government land was available in front of the Getor Jagatpura  

railway station.  It was pointed out, that the aforesaid land had been  

allotted to the Scouts & Guides Organization.  It was submitted, that the  

said land was ideally located, and could be effectively put to use for  

establishing the required infrastructure for the North Western Railway  

Zone complex, at Jaipur.  It was accordingly requested, that the said  

Government land be transferred to the Railways.  A relevant extract of  

the aforesaid letter is reproduced hereunder:-

“As you are aware,  the  new North-Western  Railway Zone has  been set up with headquarters at Jaipur.

The actual requirements of land for setting up of the Zonal office  and Quarters at Jaipur is being worked out which may take some  time, but in any case adequate railway land is not available at  Jaipur for the purpose.

It is understood that 26 Bighas of land of the State Government to  allotted to Scouts & Guides Organization is available in front of  Getor Jagatpura Railway Station.  This is an ideal location for use  

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by the North-Western Railway and it is requested that this land  may be transferred to Railway early for immediate use.  Further  requirements of land will be indicated to the State Government in  due course.”

(emphasis is ours)

The  first  communication  on  the  record  of  the  case,  relating  to  the  

requirement  of  land  for  setting  up  the  North  Western  Railway  Zone  

Complex, reveals the desire (of the Railways), that vacant Government  

land be transferred by the State Government, to the Railways.  At this  

juncture, one would notice, that there is no thought about acquiring land  

for the Railways.

7. Following  the  aforesaid  communication  dated  15.11.1996,  the  

Officer  on  Special  Duty,  North  Western  Railway,  addressed  another  

letter  dated  12.12.1996  to  the  Commissioner,  Jaipur  Development  

Authority,  Jaipur,  depicting the total  requirements of  the Railways for  

setting up the aforesaid zonal headquarters.  The text of the said letter  

is being reproduced hereunder:-

“In continuation of this office letter referred above the appropriate  requirement  of  land for  setting up of  the zonal  office and staff  quarters at Jaipur has been assessed and about 87 acres of land  is considered as necessary for this purpose.

It is proposed to have the land for the above purpose at the  locations at Getor Jagatpura.  At least 40 acres of land will be  required including the 20 bigha for which a request has already  been made for transfer vide this office letter referred above.  For  the reasoning 47 acres land nearest to the Jaipur Railway Station  in the Prithviraj Nagar on Jaipur-Ajmer Road will be suitable.

It  is  therefore  requested  that  40 acres land including  20  bigha of State Government land now used by scouts and guides  at Getor Jagatpura and 47 acres land in Prithviraj Nagar scheme  on Jaipur Ajmer Road nearest to Jaipur Railway Station may be  acquired and transferred to Railways.

Necessary  plans  of  both  the  areas  may kindly  be  made  available to Railways.”

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(emphasis is ours)

In its follow up action, the State Government was informed about the  

extent  of  land required.   The Railways sought  governmental  land to  

satisfy its requirement.  The process thus suggests, that the Railways  

and the State Government,  were jointly  pursuing the objective.   The  

State Government was requested to acquire some more land, so as to  

make up the deficiency, and to transfer the same to the Railways.

8. Mr.  Ram Vilas  Paswan,  the  then  Union  Minister  for  Railways  

addressed a letter dated 30.12.1996 to Mr. Bhairon Singh Shekhawat,  

the then Chief Minister of the State of Rajasthan, indicating the Union  

Government’s desire, to set up a zonal complex for the North Western  

Railways, at Jaipur.  The Railways requested the State Government, to  

provide the required land “free of cost”.  It was emphasized by the Union  

Minister for Railways, that the setting up of the new Railway Zone at  

Jaipur,  would  improve  train  services  to  and  within  the  State  of  

Rajasthan,  and thereby,  meet  the expectations  of  public  and private  

entities, of the area.  Relevant extract of the aforesaid letter is being  

reproduced hereunder:-

“In  order  to  improve the train  services  in  Rajasthan,  meet  the  expectations  of  public  and  private more  responsive  administration, the Railways have decided to create a new Zone,  North Western Railway with Zonal Hqrs. Office at Jaipur.

The setting  up of  the  Railway Zonal  Hqrs.  Office,  would  require  office  accommodation,  housing  for  staff,  and  other  ancillary facilities,  all  of which need about  150 to 200 acres of  land.

May  I  therefore  request  you  to  ask  the  concerned  officials  to  identify a suitable piece of land, about 150-200 acres at Jaipur,  and provide the same to the Railways free of cost for setting up  

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the Zone.  This gesture of the State Government would go a long  way in enabling us to make the Zone functional early.”

(emphasis is ours)

A perusal  of  the  aforesaid  letter  reveals,  that  the  Railway Ministry’s  

request was for about 150-200 acres of land.  The land would be used  

for establishing zonal offices for the North Western Railway Zone, and  

also,  for  raising  residential  quarters  for  Railway  staff.   The  letter  

indicated, that the gesture of the State Government to provide land to  

the Railways “free of cost”, would go a long way in making the zone  

functional.  If the acquired land, was to exclusively serve the purpose of  

the  Railways,  then  financial  contribution  thereto  by  the  State  

Government, would be unthinkable.  But strangely, the Union Minister  

for  Railways  was  expecting  the  State  Government  to  provide  the  

required land, even after acquiring it, “free of cost”.  Logically, this would  

be  acceptable,  when  the  State  (of  Rajasthan)  was  to  be  a  joint  

beneficiary.   The incidental  benefit  to the State,  is apparent from the  

opening  words  of  the  letter.   The  Union  Minister  in  his  above letter  

emphasized,  that  the  proposed  project  would  “…improve  the  train  

services in Rajasthan, meet the expectations of public and private…”.

9. On 28.2.1997, the Commissioner, Jaipur Development Authority,  

pursuant to the correspondence with the Officer on Special Duty, North  

Western  Railway,  pressed  the  Secretary,  Department  of  Transport,  

Government of Rajasthan, to initiate acquisition proceedings in respect  

of land identified at villages Bindayaka and Todi Ramjanipura, in tehsil  

Sanganer of district Jaipur.  Relevant portion of the aforesaid letter is  

being reproduced below:-

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“Please  peruse  the  letter  dated  12.12.1996  by  Officer,  North  Western Railway Zone, Jaipur.  The Railway had demanded land  for Railway Zonal Office and staff quarters.  You have discussed  in  this  reference  with  the  Commissioner  in  the  room of  Chief  Secretary.   The land village Bindayaka and Todi  Ramjanipura,  Tehsil Sanganer is required by Railway department being near to  the Jagatpura Getor Railway Station.

It  would  be  relevant  to  acquire  the  required  land  by  Transport  Department,  Rajasthan,  Jaipur.   Therefore,  the  proceedings  of  acquisition  of  4-39  hectares  of  land  of  village  Bindayaka  and  9-91  hectares  of  Todi  Ramjanipura,  Tehsil  Sanganer, Jaipur is to be acquired.  The description of the land to  be acquired, trace map and six copies of land record are annexed  with the prayer that the acquisition proceedings be done at your  department level for the Railway Department immediately.”

(emphasis is ours)

10. On  29.3.1997,  the  Deputy  Secretary,  Transport  Department,  

Government of Rajasthan, wrote a letter to the District Collector, Jaipur,  

requiring him to furnish details of land, as also, land records pertaining  

to  villages  Bindayaka  and  Todi  Ramjanipura,  which  was  being  

considered  for  acquisition  for  the  North  Western  Railway  Zonal  

complex.   The  text  of  the  aforesaid  letter,  is  being  reproduced  

hereunder:-

“The Secretary, Jaipur Development Authority, Jaipur by letter no.  P9  (295)  JDA/Acqui.  Off./Land  Acqui./97/362  dated  20.2.1997  informed  this  office  that  Railway  Department  vide  letter  dated  12.12.1996  placed  a  proposal  for  the  land  for  Zonal  Office  in  Jaipur  and  Staff  Quarters.   As  per  proposal  land  of  village  Bindayaka and Todi Ramjanipura, Tehsil Sanganer, Jaipur near  Getor  Jagatpura  Railway  Station  is  to  be  acquired.   In  this  reference information  regarding  details  of  land,  trace  map and  land record alongwith the process of acquisition and inspection  report of the acquisition officer be sent to this office.”

(emphasis is ours)

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11. On 9.5.1997, a communication was addressed by the Officer on  

Special  Duty,  North  Western  Railway,  to  the  Chief  Secretary,  

Government of Rajasthan, reminding him of the request made by the  

Union  Minister  for  Railways.   Relevant  extract  of  the  said  

communication dated 9.5.1997, is being set out hereunder:-

“It had been requested by Hon’ble Minister for Railways, vide this  D.O. letter referred above (copy enclosed).  To the Chief Minister  of Rajasthan, to identify a suitable piece of land about 150-200  acres at Jaipur and to provide the same to the railways, free of  cost, for setting up of new Railway Zone at Jaipur.  Action taken  in the matter by the State Government may please be advised, for  taking further necessary action accordingly.

The  State  Government  officials  required  to  be  contacted  for  pursuing the case may also please be advised so as to enable  me to instruct my officers for expediting the process of acquisition  of land for setting up of facilities for North Western Railway zone.”

(emphasis is ours)

A  perusal  of  the  letter  extracted  above  reveals,  that  officers  of  the  

Railways  establishment  were  in  touch  with  highest  levels  of  

governmental  functionaries  in  the  State  of  Rajasthan,  and  were  

seriously soliciting land “free of cost” for establishing the North Western  

Railway Zone complex.

12. Pursuant  to  the  aforesaid  correspondence,  the  Secretary,  

Transport Department, Government of Rajasthan issued a notification  

under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred  

to as, the Acquisition Act), indicating the State Government’s desire to  

acquire 15.50 hectares of land situated in the revenue estate of villages  

Bindayaka and Todi Ramjanipura, in tehsil Sanganer, of district Jaipur.  

The public purpose depicted therein was, that the aforesaid land was  

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required to establish a zonal office of the North Western Railways and  

for  raising  residential  quarters  for  Railway  staff.   The  aforesaid  

notification  was  duly  published  in  the  State  Government  gazette.  

Importantly, the acquisition of land for the project under reference, was  

being  made  by  the  Transport  Department  of  the  Government  (of  

Rajasthan),  presumably  because  the  setting  up  of  the  project  was  

aimed at improving transport services to and within the State, for the  

benefit  of  public  and  private  entities.   In  terms  of  the  mandatory  

requirements  of  the  Acquisition  Act,  the  aforesaid  notification  under  

Section 4, was published on 6.9.1997 in the “Dainik Navjyoti” and on  

7.9.1997 in the “Rajasthan Patrika”.  The pleadings of the case bear-

out, that publication in the locality was also made on 10.4.1998.

13. Yet  again,  the  Deputy  Chief  Engineer,  North  Western  Railway  

addressed a communication dated 11.6.1998 to the Deputy Secretary,  

Transport  Department,  Government  of  Rajasthan intimating  him,  that  

even though permission had been received to acquire 69 bighas (17.52  

hectares) of land near Getor Jagatpura railway station, yet no further  

details had been communicated by the State Government, in respect of  

the action taken by it, for acquiring the aforesaid land for the Railways,  

after the publication of the notification under Section 4 of the Acquisition  

Act.   The aforesaid  factual  position,  is  evident  from the  letter  dated  

11.6.1998, which is reproduced hereunder:-

“In the above subject it is submitted that there is no information of  further  proceedings after  notification under Section 4 has been  published on 19.8.1997.  Please, inform this office immediately  after proper proceedings to acquire land for Railway Zonal Office  and staff quarters.

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It is pertinent to mention that permission has been received by  this  office  from  Railway  Ministry  to  acquire  69  bighas  (17.52  hectare)  land  near  Getor  Jagatpura  Railway  Station.   Hence  inform this office immediately regarding proceedings to acquire of  the above land.”

The above communication reveals that  the Railways, as well  as,  the  

State Government were proceeding in the matter in complete tandem.

14. Objections were invited under Section 5A of the Acquisition Act  

from persons interested in the land.  Having considered the objections  

raised  by  the  persons  interested,  the  Land  Acquisition  Collector  

submitted  a  report  to  the  Government.   Insofar  as  Rajendra  Nagar  

Adarsh Grah Nirman Sahkari Samiti Ltd. (appellant in the Civil Appeals  

arising out of SLP (C) no. 4722 of 2012, which is hereinafter referred to  

as, the appellant Samiti) is concerned, the determination was as under:-

“An application on 8.4.2009 was filed by Shrawan Singh Khinchi,  Hemant  Goyal,  Prabhu  Lal  Meena,  Sharda  Purohit,  Nirmala,  Suresh  Kumar  Sharma,  Yogesh  Aroda,  Naresh  Chand  Aroda,  Ganga  Sahay  Meena,  residents/members  of  Madrampura  Grih  Nirman Sahakari Samiti planning Prakash Nagar and Gopalpura  Grih  Nirman  Sahakari  Samiti  planning  Jagatppura  first  (Mayur  Vihar) stating that the tenants of Khasra no. 280, 282, 284 and  291 Girijadevi and Rampal Das Swami sold and handed over the  possession  of  the  land  to  Madrampura  Grih  Nirman  Sahakari  Samiti and Gopalpura Grih Nirman Sahakari Samiti in 1981 and  received  the  entire  sale  consideration.   The  societies  have  allotted the land to the plot holders/members from 1981 to 1983  and most of the members have constructed houses before the  acquisition proceedings.  The applicants have submitted that the  houses  have  been  constructed  before  the  acquisition  proceedings.  Hence if the land is left out of acquisition being on  one side corner only, it will not affect the railway scheme.  The  applicants submitted that the tenant Girija Devi and Rampal Das  Swami  are  not  interested  persons,  therefore,  their  objections  should not be considered and they should be given 15 days time  to file objections.

Objections  of  the  applicants  were  considered  and  the  application  dated  8.4.1999  is  filed  which  is  after  due  date  5.4.1999.  Even then the claim is being decided on merits in the  interest  of  justice.   The  applicants  have  not  produced  any  

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documents  or  evidence  in  their  favour.   As  it  is  determined  hereinabove  that  the  society  cannot  get  any  right  only  on  the  basis of agreement to sale and similarly the members cannot get  any legal right on the basis of allotment letter issued by society.  This matter is purely a matter between the Khatedar and society  and  its  members.   The  plot  holders  cannot  be  considered  as  interest  persons  to  get  compensation.   They  can  get  compensation  from  the  Khatedars.   Hence  the  objection  is  rejected.

(emphasis is ours)

A  perusal  of  the  aforesaid  determination  reveals,  that  the  appellant  

Samiti  had  not  filed  its  objections  within  the  prescribed  period  of  

limitation, and as such, its objections could have been rejected simply  

because the same were filed belatedly.  Yet the matter was examined  

on  merits.   The  claims  of  the  appellant  Samiti  were  found  to  be  

unsustainable because the appellant Samiti did not have any right to file  

objections.  In this behalf it was noticed, that the appellant Samiti had  

relied  on  agreements  to  sell  in  respect  of  the  acquired  land.  

Agreements  to  sell,  it  was  felt,  did  not  vest  any  legal  right  in  the  

appellant  Samiti  (on  the  date  of  issuance  of  the  notification  under  

Section 4 of the Acquisition Act).

15. On 19.8.1997, the State Government authorized the OSD-II i.e.  

the Collector, Jaipur, to enter into the land sought to be acquired.

16. After  having  dealt  with  the  objections  of  interested  persons  

including the appellant Samiti, on the subject of compensation, it was  

observed as under:-

It was considered as to who should be given the compensation of  the acquired land.  The objections filed before this court makes it  clear that certain Khatedar tenants have transferred their land to  the housing societies or certain other persons and construction  has also been made by such persons.  First of all, no such sale  agreement has been filed before this court.  Secondly land cannot  

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be  considered  to  be  sold  on  the  basis  of  agreement  to  sale.  According to Section 17 of the Registration Act, any immoveable  property of value more than Rs.100/- is required to be registered  compulsorily.  Hence any transfer of possession by unregistered  document  is  not  valid.   Hon’ble  Rajasthan  High  Court  has  confirmed this view in Writ Petition no. 2027/92, 1017/92, 4102/91  by judgment passed on 8.12.1992.  Hence the transfer by way of  agreement  to  the housing  society  cannot  be recognized.   And  subsequent transfer of possession is illegal.  It has been settled in  the case of Banwari Lal Vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors., 1986 (2)  WLN 648, that such transfer of land for non-agricultural purpose  is  useless.   Transfer  of  agricultural  land  for  non-agricultural  purposes  is  against  the  provisions  of  Section  42A  of  the  Rajasthan Tenancy Act and Section 90A of the Land Revenue  Act.   Thus  any  constructions  made  by  persons  other  than  Khatedars  on the land under  acquisition are illegal.   Therefore  compensation for the illegal construction is not proper.”

(emphasis is ours)

17. Having rejected the objections raised by the persons interested  

(including  all  those  at  whose  behest,  the  present  proceedings  have  

been  initiated  before  this  Court),  the  State  Government  notified  its  

declaration  under  Section  6  of  the  Acquisition  Act,  in  the  State  

Government gazette, expressing its final determination for acquiring the  

land  in  question.   The  aforesaid  declaration  dated  13.1.1999  was  

published in the State Government gazette dated 21.1.1999.

18. Thereafter,  public  notices were issued by the Land Acquisition  

Officer,  intimating  all  interested  persons  the  intent  of  the  State  

Government to take possession of the acquired land.  On 21.3.2001, the  

Land  Acquisition  Officer  passed  an  award,  determining  the  

compensation payable to land owners, whose land was being acquired.

19. The first contention advanced at the hands of the learned counsel  

for  the  appellants  was,  that  the  instant  acquisition  proceedings  

emerging  out  of  the  notification  issued  under  Section  4  of  the  

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Acquisition  Act  (dated  19.8.1997),  and  the  consequential  declaration  

under Section 6 of the Acquisition Act (dated 13.1.1999) could not have  

been  issued  by  the  State  Government.   In  fact,  it  was  the  pointed  

submission  of  the  learned  counsel  for  the  appellants,  that  the  State  

Government had no jurisdiction to acquire the land in question.  In this  

behalf it was submitted, that the land was for the use and utility of the  

Railways, namely, for establishing zonal offices for the North-Western  

Zone, as also, for raising residential quarters for the staff to be posted  

there.  Since Railways is a Union subject (under entry 22 of the Union  

List,  in  the  Seventh  Schedule  to  the  Constitution  of  India),  it  was  

submitted,  that  it  is  the  Union  Government  alone,  which  had  the  

jurisdiction  to  acquire  the land in  question.   In so far  as  the instant  

aspect of the matter is concerned, learned counsel for the appellants  

invited our attention to Sections 4 and 6 of  the Acquisition Act.  The  

aforesaid provisions are being extracted herein :

“4. Publication of preliminary notification and powers of officers  thereupon—(1)  Whenever  it  appears  to  the  appropriate  Government that land in any locality is needed or is likely to be  needed for any public purpose or for a company a notification to  that effect shall be published in the Official Gazette [and in two  daily newspapers circulating in that locality of which at least one  shall be in the regional language] and the Collector shall cause  public notice of the substance of such notification to be given at  convenient places in the said locality the last of the dates of such  publication and the giving of such public notice, being hereinafter  referred to as the date of publication of the notification.

(2) Thereupon it shall be lawful for any officer, either, generally or  specially authorised  by such Government in this behalf, and for  his servants and workmen, to enter upon and survey and take  levels of any land in such locality;

to dig or bore in the sub-soil;

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to do all other acts necessary to ascertain whether the land  is adapted for such purpose;

to set out the boundaries of the land proposed to be taken  and the intended line of the work (if  any) proposed to be  made thereon;

to mark such levels, boundaries and line by placing marks  and cutting trenches,

and, where otherwise the survey cannot be completed and  the levels taken and the boundaries and line marked, to cut  down and clear away any part of any standing crop, fence  or jungle:

Provided that no person shall enter into any building  or upon any enclosed court or garden attached to a  dwelling-house (unless with the consent of the  occupier thereof) without previously giving such  occupier at least seven days' notice in writing of his  intention to do so.

xxx xxx xxx

6.  Declaration that  land is  required for  a public  purpose.— (1)  Subject  to  the  provisions  of  Part  VII  of  this  Act,  when  the  appropriate Government is satisfied after considering the report, if  any, made under section 5A, sub-section (2), that any particular  land  is  needed  for  a  public  purpose,  or  for  a  company,  a  declaration shall be made to that effect under the signature of a  Secretary to such Government or of some officer duly authorised  to certify its orders an different declarations may be made from  time to time in respect of different parcels of any land covered by  the same notification under section 4, sub-section (!), irrespective  of whether one report or different reports has or have been made  (wherever required) under section 5-A, sub-section (2):

Provided  that  no  declaration  in  respect  of  any  particular  land  covered by a notification under section 4, sub-section (1),--

(i)  published  after  the  commencement  of  the  Land  Acquisition (Amendment  and Validation)  Ordinance,  1967  but  before  the  commencement  of  the  Land  Acquisition  (Amendment) Act, 1984 shall be made after the expiry of  three  years  from  the  date  of  the  publication  of  the  notification; or

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(ii)  published  after  the  commencement  of  the  Land  Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, shall be made after the  expiry of one year from the date of the publication of the  notification:

Provided  further  that  no  such  declaration  shall  be  made  unless  the  compensation  to  be  awarded  for  such property is to be paid by a company, or wholly  or  partly  out  of  public  revenues  or  some  fund  controlled or managed by a local authority.

Explanation  1.-In  computing  any  of  the  periods  referred to in the first proviso, the period during which  any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of  the notification issued under Section 4, sub-section  (1),  is  stayed  by  an  order  of  a  Court  shall  be  excluded.

Explanation  2.-Where  the  compensation  to  be  awarded for such property  is to be paid out of  the  funds  of  a  corporation  owned  or  controlled  by  the  State,  such  compensation  shall  be  deemed  to  be  compensation paid out of public revenues].

(2) Every declaration shall  be published in the Official Gazette,  and in two daily newspapers circulating in the locality in which the  land  is  situate  of  which  at  least  one  shall  be  in  the  regional  language,  and  the  Collector  shall  cause  public  notice  of  the  substance of such declaration to be given at convenient places in  the said locality (the last of the date of such publication and the  giving of such public notice, being hereinafter referred to as the  date of publication of the declaration), and such declaration shall  state] the district or other territorial division in which the land is  situate, the purpose for which it is needed, its approximate area,  and where a plan shall have been made of the land, the place  where such plan may be inspected.

(3)  The said  declaration  shall  be  conclusive  evidence  that  the  land is needed for a public purpose or for a Company,  as the  case may be; and, after making such declaration the appropriate  Government may  acquire  the  land  in  manner  hereinafter  appearing.”

(emphasis is ours)

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A perusal  of  Sections 4 and 6 extracted above reveal,  that  it  is  the  

“appropriate  Government”  which  is  to  be  satisfied  about  the  public  

purpose for which the land in question is to be acquired.  And it is the  

“appropriate  Government”  alone,  which  is  vested  with  the  

responsibilities  contemplated  under  the  aforesaid  Sections  4  and  6.  

Accordingly, it is only the “appropriate Government” which can issue the  

required  notifications  expressing  the  intention  to  acquire  land,  and  

thereafter, the postulated declaration, after examining the objections of  

the persons interested.  

20. In order to substantiate the appellants’ contention, that jurisdiction  

to acquire land for the Railways, could have been exercised only by the  

Central Government, and that the State Government had no authority to  

acquire  land  for  the  Railways,  learned  counsel  placed  reliance  on  

Section 3(ee) of the Acquisition Act.  Section 3(ee) aforementioned is  

being reproduced below :

“3(ee)  The  expression  "appropriate  Government"  means  in  relation to acquisition of land for the purposes of the Union, the  Central Government, and, in relation to acquisition of land for any  other purposes, the State Government.”

Relying on Section 3(ee) extracted above, it was the submission of the  

learned counsel for the appellants, that in relation to acquisition of land  

for  the  Union,  the  Central  Government  alone  had  the  jurisdiction  to  

acquire the land.  Accordingly, it was contended, that it was the Central  

Government alone,  which had the jurisdiction to issue the prescribed  

notification  under  Section  4  of  the  Acquisition  Act,  (expressing  the  

intention  of  the  Union  Government  to  acquire,  the  land).   Having  

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thereby, brought the “appropriate Government’s” intention to acquire the  

land to the notice of all interested persons, and having considered the  

objections (if  any) filed at the behest of such interested persons, the  

Central  Government  alone  could  have  issued  the  consequential  

declaration under Section 6 of the Acquisition Act.  Learned Counsel for  

the appellants was emphatic, that the notification to acquire land for the  

Railways could have only been issued by the Central Government.   

21. Learned counsel for the appellants ventured to substantiate his  

above  contention,  by  reading  the  definition  of  the  term  ‘appropriate  

Government’ along with the said words used in Sections 4, 5, 5A(2), 6,  

7, the first and second proviso to Section 11(1), Sections 12 to 14, 15A,  

16, 17(1) and (2), 31(3), 40, 41, 48, 49(2) and 50 of the Acquisition Act.  

The thrust of the instant submission is being summarized hereunder:

Firstly,  referring  to  Section  4  of  the  Acquisition  Act,  it  was  the  

submission of the learned counsel for the appellants, that the use of the  

term “appropriate Government” in Section 4(1) of the Acquisition Act,  

with reference to the publication of the intention to acquire land (by way  

of a notification) has to be visualized with reference to the definition of  

the  said  term under  Section  3(ee)  of  the  Acquisition  Act.   On  such  

examination, according to the learned counsel, it would clearly emerge,  

that it was only the Central Government which could have issued the  

notification  dated  19.8.1997.   But  in  the  present  case,  the  said  

notification has been issued by the Government of Rajasthan.   

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Secondly,  with  reference  to  Section  5  of  the  Acquisition  Act,  it  was  

submitted, that the term “Collector” used therein, must be viewed with  

reference to Section 3(c) of the Acquisition Act.  Section 3(c) is being  

extracted hereunder:

“3(c) the expression "Collector" means the Collector of a district,  and includes a Deputy Commissioner  and any officer  specially  appointed  by  the  Appropriate  Government  to  perform  the  functions of a Collector under this Act”

Based  on  the  aforesaid  definition  of  the  term  “Collector,  it  was  the  

contention of the learned counsel for the appellants, that the nomination  

of the “Collector/Deputy Commissioner/Officer specially appointed” has  

to be made by the “appropriate Government”.  Since the “appropriate  

Government” in the facts and circumstances of the present case is the  

Central Government, according to the learned counsel, the nomination  

of the ‘Collector’ with reference to Section 5 of the Acquisition Act, could  

only  have  been  ordered  by  the  Central  Government;  whereas,  it  is  

apparent from the facts of this case, that the State Government by an  

order  dated  19.8.1997,  authorized  the  SDO-II/Land  Acquisition  

Officer/Collector, Jaipur, as “Collector” for all purposes connected with  

the present acquisition.  The nomination of the Collector by the State  

Government, when the land was being acquired for the benefit of the  

Railways,  according  to  the  learned  counsel,  was  clearly  beyond  the  

jurisdiction of the State Government.   

Thirdly, with reference to Section 5A(2) of the Acquisition Act, it  was  

submitted, that the objections under Section 5 of the Acquisition Act are  

to be made to the Collector in writing.  And, it is the Collector who is to  

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afford  an  opportunity  of  hearing  to  the  persons  concerned,  before  

submitting a report  to the appropriate Government.   Learned counsel  

vehemently  contended,  that  in  interpreting  Section  5A(2)  of  the  

Acquisition Act, the term ‘Collector’ has to be interpreted in consonance  

with the definition thereof under Section 3(c), and with reference to the  

term  “appropriate  Government”  defined  in  Section  3(ee)  of  the  

Acquisition Act.   Thus  viewed,  it  was the submission  of  the  learned  

counsel, that not only the “Collector” to whom objections were meant to  

be addressed, but the Collector who had to consider and dispose of the  

said objections, ought to have been a person nominated by the Central  

Government.  Herein, according to the learned counsel, admittedly the  

State Government had notified the “Collector” for acquisition of the land  

in question.  The receipt of the objections, as also, the determination  

thereof,  must,  therefore,  be  deemed  to  have  been  rendered  by  an  

authority  having no jurisdiction (either  to receive the objections or to  

submit a report to the appropriate Government with reference to said  

objections), in the matter.   

Fourthly, it was contended, that the declaration under Section 6 of the  

Acquisition Act  is to be made on the satisfaction of  the “appropriate  

Government”.  Herein also, viewed with reference to the definition of the  

term ‘appropriate Government’ in Section 3(ee) of the Acquisition Act, it  

was  submitted,  that  it  was  the  Central  Government  alone  whose  

satisfaction  was  material,  whereupon,  the  Central  Government  could  

have issued the postulated declaration (contemplated under Section 6  

of  the  Acquisition  Act).   Herein,  according  to  the  learned  counsel,  

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admittedly  the  declaration  was  made  on  13.1.1999  by  the  State  

Government under Section 6 of the Acquisition Act.  As such, it  was  

asserted that the same lacked any authority of law.   

Fifthly,  according  to  the  learned  counsel  for  the  appellants,  under  

Section  7 of  the Acquisition  Act,  after  complying  with  the procedure  

contemplated under Section 6, the “appropriate Government” (or some  

officer  authorized  by  the  “appropriate  Government”)  is  to  direct  the  

Collector “to take order for the acquisition of the land”.  The aforesaid  

procedure contemplated under Section 7, according to learned counsel  

for the appellants, has also been vested with the Central Government.  

Insofar as the present acquisition proceedings are concerned, it was the  

Central  Government  which  had  to  direct  the  Collector  to  take  

appropriate action contemplated under Section 7 of the Acquisition Act.  

Since in the facts of the instant case, it is the Government of Rajasthan,  

which had issued the aforesaid direction, according to learned counsel,  

the same violates the mandate of Section 7 of the Acquisition Act.   

Sixthly, learned counsel for the appellants placed reliance on the first  

and the second provisos to the Section 11(1) of the Acquisition Act, in  

order to contend, that while preparing the award with reference to the  

acquired land, and while determining the true area of the acquired land,  

and the compensation payable therefor,  as also,  the appropriation of  

such  compensation  amongst  persons  interested,  the  power  and  

authority therefor, is vested in the Collector (with the previous approval  

of the “appropriate Government”).  Yet again, it was the contention of  

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the  learned  counsel  for  the  appellants,  that  the  provisos  referred  to  

hereinabove,  were  bound  to  be  appreciated  with  reference  to  the  

definition  of  the  term  “Collector”  in  Section  3(c),  and  the  term  

‘appropriate Government’ under Section 3(ee) of the Acquisition Act.  In  

so doing, according to learned counsel, the inevitable result would be,  

that  the  “appropriate  Government”  contemplated,  is  the  Central  

Government.   And,  accordingly,  the  Collector  contemplated  therein,  

would be one nominated by the Central Government.  It  was pointed  

out, that for the acquisition proceedings under reference, the approval  

of the State Government, and not the Central Government was sought  

by the Collector.  It was further pointed out, that the concerned Collector  

had  been  nominated  by  the  State  Government.   For  the  aforesaid  

reasons  (principally  on  the  same  basis,  as  noticed  in  the  foregoing  

contentions), it was submitted, that the instant action of acquisition, was  

in clear violation of the mandate of the provisions of the Acquisition Act.  

According to learned counsel, all the above actions, had to be taken by  

a  Collector  nominated  by  the  Central  Government,  and  upon  the  

previous approval of the Central Government.  Since the position in the  

facts and circumstance of the present case is not so, it was submitted,  

that  the  instant  process  of  acquisition,  was  in  clear  violation  of  the  

mandate of the above-mentioned provisions of the Acquisition Act.   

Seventhly,  with  reference  to  Sections  12,  13,  13A  and  14,  it  was  

submitted, that the term ‘Collector’ used therein, had to be viewed with  

reference  to  Section  3(c)  of  the  Acquisition  Act,  inasmuch  as,  the  

Collector in the facts of the present case, had to be nominated by the  

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Central Government, and therefore, for the procedure contemplated by  

the  provisions  referred  to  above,  was required  to  be  executed  by  a  

Collector nominated by the Central Government.  In the present case,  

the  State  Government,  by  its  order  dated  19.8.1997  authorized  the  

SDO-II/Land  Acquisition  Collector,  Jaipur,  to  carry  out  the  functions  

contemplated under Sections 12, 13, 13A and 14 of the Acquisition Act.  

As such, according to learned counsel, the aforesaid procedure having  

been carried out by a person having no authority  to do so, must be  

deemed to have been carried out without jurisdiction, and in violation of  

the above mentioned provisions of the Acquisition Act.   

Eighthly, the term ‘appropriate Government’ referred to in Sections 16,  

17(1), 17(2), 31(3), 40, 41 and 49(2), according to the learned counsel,  

could  only  have  meant  the  Central  Government,  and  not  the  State  

Government.   It  was  submitted,  that  in  giving  effect  to  the  above  

provisions, the Central Government had unquestionably remained out of  

reckoning,  and  it  was  the  Government  of  Rajasthan,  which  has  

shouldered  all  the  responsibilities  contemplated  under  the  said  

provisions.  For just the same reasons, as have been noticed above, it  

was  submitted  that  the  scheme  of  the  Acquisition  Act  very  clearly  

defines the manner in which the provisions thereunder, were to be given  

effect to.  Since the land was being acquired for the Railways, according  

to  learned  counsel  representing  the  appellants,  the  responsibilities  

ought to have been shouldered by the Central Government, whereas,  

the  entire  action  for  the  acquisition  of  the  land  in  the  present  

controversy, was dealt with by the State Government.   

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22. Having given our thoughtful consideration to the issue canvassed  

at the hands of the learned counsel for the appellants, we are of the  

view that it is necessary in the first instance to determine the subject of  

legislative competence.  If the determination of legislative competence  

so  determined  falls  in  the  realm  of  the  Parliament,  then  the  

contemplated  appropriate  Government  would  be  the  Central  

Government.  Whereas, if the legislative competence falls in the realm  

of the State Legislatures, then the appropriate Government in the facts  

and circumstances of the present case would be the State Government.  

During the course of hearing, while examining the issue of legislative  

competence,  our  attention was invited to entry  33 of  the Union List,  

entry 36 of the State List and entry 42 of the Concurrent List (of the  

Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India).  All the aforesaid entries  

are being extracted hereunder:

Entry 33 (in list I, of the Seventh Schedule)

“33. Acquisition or requisitioning of property for the purposes of  the Union.”

Entry 36 (in list II, of the Seventh Schedule)  

“36.  Acquisition  or  requisitioning  of  property,  except  for  the  purposes of the Union, subject to the provisions of entry 42 of List  III.”

Entry 42 (in list III, of the Seventh Schedule)

“42. Acquisition and requisitioning of property.”

Before proceeding further, it would be relevant to point out that entries  

33 and 36 (in lists I and II respectively, of the Seventh Schedule) were  

omitted by the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956.  And in  

place  of  the  above  two  entries,  entry  42  (in  list  III,  of  the  Seventh  

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Schedule)  was  substituted  (through  the  same  constitutional  

amendment).   Prior to above substitution,  Entry 42 in List III  read as  

under:

Entry 42 (in list III, of the Seventh Schedule), prior to its substitution:

“42. Principles on which compensation for property acquired or  requisitioned for the purpose of the Union or of a State or for any  other public purpose is to be determined, and the form and the  manner in which such compensation is to be given.”

23. The scope and effect of aforesaid three entries, falling in three  

different lists of the Seventh Schedule were examined by a Constitution  

Bench of this Court in  State of Bombay v.  Ali Gulshan, AIR 1955 SC  

810.  The question posed, and the determination rendered thereon, are  

being extracted hereunder:

“2. On the hearing of the petition before Tendolkar, J., the State  succeeded  on  the  ground  that  the  purpose  for  which  the  requisition was made was a "public purpose" within the meaning  of the Act. But, on appeal, it was held that though the requisition  was for a public purpose, the requisition order was invalid, as the  public  purpose  must  be  either  a  purpose  of  the  Union,  or  a  purpose  of  the  State  and  in  this  particular  case  the  accommodation being required for housing a member of a foreign  Consular staff was a Union purpose, which was outside the scope  of the powers of the State.

xxx xxx xxx

5.  The  ultimate  source  of  a  authority  to  requisition  or  acquire  property  is  be  found  in  article  31  of  the  Constitution.  The  requisition or acquisition must be for a public purpose and there  must  be compensation.  This  article applies  with equal  force to  Union legislation and State legislation.  Items 33 and 36 of List I  and List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution empower  respectively Parliament and the State Legislatures to enact laws  with respect to them.  

6.  The reasoning by which the learned appellate Judges of the  Bombay High Court reached their conclusion is shortly this. There  

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can be no public purpose, which is not a purpose of the Union or  a purpose of the State. There are only these two categories to  consider under the statute, as the words "any other purpose" in  the particular context should be read ejusdem generis with "the  purpose  of  the  State".  The  provision  of  accommodation  for  a  member of the foreign consulate staff is a "purpose of the Union"  and not a "purpose of the State".  

7.  We  are  unable  to  uphold  this  view  as  regards  both  the  standpoints. Item 33 in the Union Legislative List (List I) refers to  "acquisition or requisitioning of property for the purposes of the  Union". Item 36 in the State List (List II) relates to "acquisition or  requisitioning of property, except for the purposes of the Union,  subject to the provisions of entry 42 of List III".  Item 42 of the  Concurrent Legislative List (List III) speaks of "the purpose of the  Union or of a State or for any other public purpose".

Reading  the  three  items  together,  it  is  fairly  obvious  that  the  categories  of  "purpose"  contemplated  are  three  in  number,  namely,  Union  purpose,  State  purpose,  and  any  other  public  purpose. Though every State purpose or Union purpose must be  a public purpose, it is easy to think of cases where the purpose of  the acquisition or requisition is neither the one nor the other but a  public purpose. Acquisition of sites for the building of hospitals or  educational  institutions  by  private  benefactors  will  be  a  public  purpose, though it will not strictly be a State or Union purpose.

When we speak of a State purpose or a Union purpose, we think  of  duties and obligations cast  on the State or  the Union to do  particular things for the benefit of the public or a section of the  public. Cases where the State acquires or requisitions property to  facilitate  the  coming  into  existence  of  utilitarian  institutions,  or  schemes having public welfare at heart,  will fall  within the third  category above-mentioned.  

8. With great respect, we are constrained to say that the ejusdem  generis rule of construction, which found favour in the court below  for reaching the result that the words "any other public purpose"  are restricted to a public purpose which is also a purpose of the  State, has scarcely any application. Apart from the fact that the  rule  must  be  confined  within  narrow  limits,  and  general  or  comprehensive  words  should  receive  their  full  and  natural  meaning unless they are clearly restrictive in their intendment, it is  requisite  that  there  must  be  a  distinct  genus,  which  must  comprise more than one species, before the rule can be applied.

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If the words "any other public purpose" in the Statute in question  have  been  used  only  to  mean  a  State  purpose,  they  would  become  mere  surplusage;  Courts  should  lean  against  such  a  construction as far as possible.  

9.  Even  if  it  is  conceded  that  the  law  contemplates  only  two  purposes, namely, State purpose and Union purpose, it is difficult  to  see  how  finding  accommodation  for  the  staff  of  a  foreign  consulate is a Union purpose and not a State purpose. Item 11 in  the  Union  list  specifies  "diplomatic,  consular  and  trade  representation"  as  one  of  the  subjects  within  the  legislative  competence  of  Parliament,  and  under  article  73  of  the  Constitution, the executive power of the Union shall extend to all  such matters.

It can hardly be said that securing a room for a member of the  staff  of  a  foreign  consulate  amounts  to  providing  for  consular  representation, and that therefore it is a purpose of the Union for  which the State cannot legislate. It was conceded by Mr. Rajinder  Narain,  Counsel  for the Respondent,  that there is no duty cast  upon the Union to provide accommodation for the consulate staff,  and this must be so, when we remember that the routine duties of  a Consul in modern times are to protect the interests and promote  the commercial affairs of the State which he represents, and that  his powers, privileges and immunities are not analogous to those  of an ambassador.

The trade and commerce of the State which appoints him with the  State in which he is located are his primary concern. The State of  Bombay is  primarily  interested in its  own trade and commerce  and in the efficient discharge of his duties by the foreign consul  functioning  within  the  State.  We  are  inclined  to  regard  the  purpose for which the requisition was made in this case more as  a State purpose than as a Union purpose.  

10. In any event, as already pointed out, "other public purpose" is  a distinct category for which the State of Bombay can legislate, as  the  acquisition  or  requisitioning  of  property  except  for  the  purposes of the Union, is within its competence under item 36 of  the State List.  

11. There is another way of looking at the question involved. An  undertaking may have three different facets or aspects, and may  serve the purpose of  a State,  the purpose of  the Union and a  general public purpose. Even if one may regard the requisition of  a room for the accommodation of a member of a Consulate as  

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one  appertaining  to  a  Union  purpose,  it  does  not  necessarily  cease to be a State purpose or a general public purpose. In this  view also, the requisition in this case must be held to have been  validly made.”

(emphasis is ours)

In  its  determination  with  reference  to  public  purpose  (relatable  to  

acquisition  proceedings),  this  Court  in  the  judgment  referred  to  

hereinabove, clearly held, that public purpose may be relatable to the  

Central  Government,  alternatively,  it  may  be  relatable  to  the  State  

Government.   Besides the aforesaid two alternatives,  there is also a  

third  alternative,  namely,  a  situation wherein  the public  purpose is  a  

general  public  purpose,  which  is  neither  exclusively  relatable  to  the  

Central  Government  and/or  fully  relatable  to  the  State  Government.  

The  third  alternative,  would  be  a  situation,  wherein  the  cause  in  

question furthers a common public purpose and is relatable both to a  

Union and a State cause.   

24. It would be relevant to mention, that the judgment rendered by  

this Court in State of Bombay vs. Ali Gulshan (supra) was brought to our  

notice by the learned counsel for the appellants.  The purpose for doing  

so, was to enable us to examine the matter in the correct perspective.  

For this,  learned counsel  for the appellants pointed out,  that the law  

declared  by  the  above  judgment,  came  to  be  negated  by  the  

Constitution (Seventh Amendment)  Act, 1956, which repealed entries  

33 and 36 (in lists I and II respectively, of the Seventh Schedule) and  

substituted entry 42 (in list III, of the Seventh Schedule).

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25. Before recording any final determination, we may now refer to the  

judgments cited at the behest of the appellants.  Reference was made  

to the decision rendered by the Allahabad High Court in Balak & Ors. v.  

State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr., AIR 1962 Allahabad 208.  The facts in  

the afore-cited judgment are almost similar to the controversy in hand.  

From  the  cited  judgment,  our  attention  was  drawn  to  the  following  

observations:

“6. Now I proceed to discuss the merits of the writ petition. The  main  contention  of  Mr.  S.C.  Khare  is  that  the  acquisition  proceedings are for a Union purpose. It was not open to the State  Government to initiate the acquisition proceedings. The impugned  notifications mention that land is being acquired for construction  of  staff  quarters  in  connection  with  the  North  Eastern  Railway  Head-quarters Scheme. This is a Union purpose. But it has been  urged for  the  opposite  parties  that,  the  State  Government  has  authority to acquire land for the benefit of the Union.

xxx xxx xxx

13. We have to consider whether the 1952 notification can be  considered to be an order by the President of India, although the  notification  purports  to  have  been  issued  by  the  Central  Government. Under Article 53 of the Constitution, the Executive  power of the Union shall be vested in the President and shall be  exercised by him either directly Or through officers subordinate to  him in accordance with the Constitution. According to Clause (1)  of  Article  77  of  the  Constitution,  all  executive  action  of  the  Government of India shall be expressed to be taken in the name  of the President. Under this Article, even if action is taken by the.  Central Government, the relevant order ought to be issued in the  name  of  the  President.  I  do  not  find  in  the  Constitution  the  converse  proposition.  There  is  no  provision  to  the  effect  that,  orders to be issued by the President might be issued in the name  of the Central Government. We have seen that under Clause (1)  of  Article  258  of  the  Constitution,  it  is  the  President  who  can  delegate his functions to the State Government. There is nothing  in the Constitution to suggest that the Central Government may  act on behalf of the President for purposes of Article 258. It is true  that, under Article 74 of the Constitution, the President is aided by  a Council of Ministers. It was open to the Council of Ministers to  advise the President for issuing an order under Article 258 of the  Constitution.  But  ultimately  the  order  had  to  be  issued  by  the  

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President, or in the name of the President. In the instant case the  1952 notification was issued by the Central Government, and not  by the President. I agree with Mr. Khare that the notification dated  29-3-1952  is  not  a  valid  notification  delegating  powers  under  Article  258  of  the  Constitution.  The  1952  notification  did  not  empower the State Government to take action under the Act on  behalf  of  the  Union  Government.  In  the  absence  of  any  such  delegation of  powers,  action in the instant  case ought  to have  been  taken  by  the  appropriate  Government  (the  Central  Government). It was not open to the State Government to issue  notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act on behalf of the  Union Government. The two notifications dated 2-3-59 and 16-4- 59 with reference to the area of  113.78 acres are invalid. The  authorities have tried to dispossess the petitioners on the strength  of these notifications. The petitioners are entitled to be restored to  possession,  in  case the authorities  have already  dispossessed  the petitioners. Since the petition partly succeeds, the parties may  be directed to bear their own costs.

(emphasis is ours)

It  was  the  vehement  contention  of  the  learned  counsel  for  the  

appellants, that the Allahabad High Court had interpreted the provisions  

of  the  Acquisition  Act,  by  appropriately  referring  to  the  relevant  

provisions of  the Constitution  of  India.   Learned counsel  accordingly  

submitted, that the legal/constitutional inferences recorded in the cited  

judgment would clearly demonstrate, that only the Central Government  

had  the  jurisdiction,  to  issue  the  notification  and  declaration  under  

Sections 4 and 6 respectively of the Acquisition Act, in the case in hand.

(ii) Reference  was  also  made  to  the  paragraphs  extracted  below  

from  the  decision  rendered  by  the  Bombay  High  Court  in  Ramdas  

Thanu Dessai  & Ors.  v. State of  Goa & Ors.,  2009 (1) Mh.L.J.  241.  

Herein also, the controversy before the High Court was similar to the  

one in hand.

“5. As already seen above, once it is not in dispute that the  acquisition is for the South Western Railways for the purpose of  construction  of  railway  line  and  cargo  handling  terminal  at  

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Shelvona, and the entire acquisition cost would be borne by the  respondent Nos. 2 and 5, it obviously means that the acquisition  is for the Union and, therefore, such acquisition has to be by the  Central  Government  who  is  the  appropriate  Government  for  initiating such action.

xxx xxx xxx

7. In  our  considered  opinion,  it  is  difficult  to  accept  the  contention sought to be raised on behalf of the respondent Nos. 1  and  4.  The  section  4  of  the  said  Act  clearly  requires  the  appropriate Government to take initiative for commencement of  acquisition  proceedings  and  section  3(ee)  specifies  as  to  who  would  be  the  appropriate  Government  bearing  in  mind  the  purpose for which the acquisition of land is contemplated. In the  case  in  hand,  as  already  seen  above,  the  acquisition  of  land  specified in the Schedule annexed to the notification is for  the  purpose  of  construction  of  railway  line  and  cargo  handling  terminal for South Western Railway. The arguments on behalf of  the respondent Nos. 1 and 4 relates to the benefits which may  arise to the local residents out of construction of such railway line  and the terminal  and not  to  the purpose for  which the land is  sought to be acquired. The resultant benefits which the residents  of the affected area in Goa may enjoy is not the purpose for which  a particular  land  is  sought  to  be acquired.  If  the argument  on  behalf  of the respondent Nos. 1 and 4 is to be accepted, then  even the land which is used for laying the railway line and which  undisputedly  belong  to  the  Union  of  India  would  fall  in  the  category of any other purpose. That is not the legislative intent  behind defining the term "appropriate Government" under section  3(ee).  

8. The  appropriate  Government  under  section  4  read  with  section 3(ee) is that Government which takes decision to acquire  the land for its purpose.  In the case in hand,  once it  is not  in  dispute that pursuant to the proposal by the State Government it  was the decision of the Union and its Department of Railways to  acquire  a  particular  land  for  construction  of  the terminal  to  be  constructed and maintained by the respondent Nos. 2 and 5, it  cannot, in the same breath, be said that the acquisition is also for  any other purpose. The purpose of acquisition is clearly specified  in the notification. Once a particular purpose is specified in the  said notification, it cannot be sought to be stated by way of an  affidavit that the real purpose is something different from the one  disclosed in  the  notification  nor  such additional  benefits  which  may accrue on account of acquisition of land to the residents of  the locality could be said to be the purpose for which the land is  sought to be acquired.  

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9. It is to be borne in mind that after issuance of notification  under section 4,  the interested parties are entitled to object  to  such notification and in that regard the Collector is enjoined to  hear  the  objections  and  make  a  report  to  the  appropriate  Government and after considering such reports, the appropriate  Government is required to take appropriate decision which should  culminate in the form of declaration under section 6. The sections  4, 5, 5A and 6 specifically refers to the appropriate Government  and its satisfaction for need to acquire the land. Once it is not in  dispute that the proposed acquisition of land is for the purpose of  railway terminal,  to be built by the respondent Nos. 2 and 5 at  their own cost and to be maintained by them, and such terminal is  to  be used for  the activities  in  relation  to  the railways i.e.,  for  unloading of ore transported by the railways from Kamataka to  Goa, it cannot be said that the land is sought to be acquired for  any other purpose. It is to be held that the land is being sought to  be acquired for the Union purpose.  

10. In spite of the fact that the land is sought to be acquired for  the Union, it is undisputed fact that the State Government claims  to be the appropriate Government  in respect  of  the acquisition  proceedings in question. Obviously, it is without any authority to  be  the  appropriate  Government  for  the  purpose  of  such  acquisition. Therefore, the notification and the declaration are to  be held as bad in law.  

xxx xxx xxx

12.  When the statutory  provisions  comprised  under  sections  4  and 6 read with section 3(ee) of the said Act clearly provide that  in cases of acquisition for the purpose of Union, the appropriate  Government would be the Central Government, the exercise of  executive  power  cannot  be  allowed  to  transgress  the  said  statutory provisions comprised under the said Act. The petitioners  are  justified  in  contending  that  the  executive  power  is  always  subservient  to  the  legislative  power.  It  is  always  subject  to  legislative  provision  and  has  to  yield  to  the  legislative  power.  Mere inclusion of the Entry No. 42 in the concurrent list, which  speaks of the principles on which compensation for the property  acquired and requisitioned for the purpose of the Union and the  State or for any other public purpose is to be determined and the  form and the manner in which such compensation is to be given,  by  that  itself  would  not  empower  the  executive  to  act  in  contravention of the provisions made in the Central Legislation. It  cannot  be disputed that  the said Act  was enacted prior  to the  independence of India. However, the same was adapted in terms  of the Adaptation Order of 1950 and, therefore, is a law made by  the Parliament within the meaning of the said expression under  the proviso to Article 162 of the Constitution of India.

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xxx xxx xxx

18. It is thus clear that in spite of the fact that the acquisition of  the land is for the Union's purpose and at the cost of the Central  Government, the process of acquisition was sought to be initiated  by publication of notification under section 4 of the said Act by the  State Government claiming to be the appropriate Government. As  the law stands, the acquisition for the Union's purpose cannot be  initiated  by  the  State  Government  unless  there  is  specific  delegation of power in that regard and in the case in hand there  has  been  no  such  delegation.  Hence,  as  rightly  submitted  on  behalf of the petitioners, the notification under section 4 and the  declaration under section 6 in relation to the land in question by  the State  Government  is  bad in  law and is  liable  to  be struck  down.”

(emphasis is ours)

It was submitted by learned counsel for the appellants, that the issue  

has been correctly adjudicated even by the Bombay High Court, and  

that, this Court should endorse the same, while adjudicating the present  

controversy.  

(iii) Reliance  was  also  placed  on  Messrs.  Tinsukia  Development   

Corporation  Ltd. v.  State  of  Assam  &  Anr.,  AIR  1961  Assam  133,  

wherein a Full Bench of the Assam High Court held as under :

“3. The submission made on behalf of the petitioner is that as  the land was needed for construction of the food-grains godown  by the Government  of  India the purpose was a Union purpose  and the Central Government was the appropriate Government. It  is not disputed that the two notifications under Sections 4 and 6  were issued on behalf of the State Government. From a perusal  of the notification under Section 6 it is also clear that it was the  State Government which was satisfied that the land was needed  for a public purpose before issuing a declaration under Section 6.

4. The contention on behalf of the State is two-fold in reply to  the argument of the counsel for the petitioner. Firstly it is urged  that merely because the land is needed for construction of a food- grains  godown  by  the  Central  Government,  it  does  not  necessarily  follow  that  the  purpose  is  a  Union  purpose.  The  maintenance of proper supply of food-grains to the inhabitants of  this State is as much the responsibility of the State Government  

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as  that  of  the  Central  Government.  The  benefit  by  the  construction  of  the  food-grains  godown  will  be  derived  by  the  public of this State and as such it is a public purpose and not a  purpose of the Union alone.”

It would be relevant to mention, that the submission advanced on behalf  

of  the  acquiring  Government,  was  akin  to  the  “third  alternative”  

expressed by the Constitution Bench of this Court in State of Bombay  

vs. Ali Gulshan (supra).  

(iv) Reliance  was  also  placed  by  the  learned  counsel  for  the  

appellants, on Sudhansu Sekhar Maity & Ors. vs. State of West Bengal  

& Ors.,  AIR 1972 Calcutta  320,  and our  attention  was drawn to the  

following:-

“9. In dealing with this point it should first be noted that after  the seventh amendment to the Constitution both entries 33 & 36  respectively of the Union list and the State list  have now been  deleted and entry 42 of the concurrent List has been appropriately  amended to cover "acquisition and requisitioning of property". On  this amendment acquisition is on the concurrent list and both the  Union and the State are equally  authorised to legislate on the  subject of acquisition irrespective of purpose of such acquisition  but  subject  to  the  usual  limitations  otherwise  imposed  by  the  Constitution.  Thus acquisition irrespective of whether it is for the  purpose  of  the  State  or  the  Union  being  within  the  legislative  competence  of  the  State  is  also  within  its  executive  powers.  According to Baneriee.  J.  in the case of  Gadadhar  v.  State of  West  Bengal,  (1963)  67  Cal  WN  460  at  p.  470,  after  such  amendment  it  is  wholly  inconsequential  as  to  whether  the  acquisition is made for a purpose of the Union or the State. To  quote his words:  

"the disclosure that acquisition of land was being made for  a purpose which was not the purpose of the Union, in the  notification and the declaration, was possibly made under  the time worn idea that since the State could legislate in the  matter of land acquisition, for its own purpose only, every  land  acquisition  by  the  State  must  be  justified  on  that  ground.  After  the  Constitution  Seventh  Amendment  Act,  1956 it was not necessary to make such a statement in the  notification  or  the  declaration,  even  if  it  was  at  all  so  necessary at a time when the Constitution had not been so  amended".  

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This  statement  of  the  principle  by  Banerjee,  J.  can  be  well  supported  so  long  --  as  is  usually  the  case  --  the  State  Governments are duly authorised on delegation of powers by the  Union Government to acquire lands for a purpose of the Union.  Because  in  the  absence  of  such  delegated  authority  on  the  statutory provisions of Sections   4   and   6   of the said Act read with    the  definition  of  the  term  'appropriate  Government'  in  Section  3(ee)  . the power of acquisition would otherwise be limited to the    State Or the Union Government respectively for purposes of the  State or the Union.

10. Now in the present case it appears from the affidavit filed  by the respondents Nos. 1 to 4 that by an appropriate notification  dated  May  14,  1955  issued  under  Article    258(1)   of  the    Constitution  the  State  Government  in  West  Bengal  was  duly  authorised  by  the  Central  Government  to  acquire  land  for  the  purposes of the Union. This factum of delegation is not disputed.  If that is so, even if I assume that the purpose of the disputed  acquisition is a purpose of the Union it would still be within the  powers of the State Government to acquire and the acquisition  cannot be struck down as beyond the competence of the State  Government. Mr.  Sinha,  however,  contends that  in the present  case neither the notifications under Section 4 nor the declarations  under  Section  6 invoke  the  delegated  powers  nor  are  the  notifications and declarations issued in appropriate forms. In my  view even if that be so, that would not vitiate the notifications or  declarations.  It  would  be  a  mere  irregularity  not  affecting  the  substance which would not vitiate the acquisition. If the authority  has the power for any action taken, the act is competent and non  recital  or wrong recital  of the authority for the action would not  make the act incompetent or without jurisdiction. Reference may  be made to the decision of  the Supreme Court  in  the case of  Lekhraj v. Dy. Custodian, Bombay, AIR 1966 SC 334.  

11. That  apart,  in  my  view  there  is  great  substance  in  the  contention of Mr. Bose that simply because the acquisition is for  the purpose of setting up a subsidiary port,  the purpose of the  acquisition does not necessarily become solely a purpose of the  Union. According to Mr. Bose it is a project which would not only  be highly beneficial to the general public in this State but would  serve public purposes in this State and as such the acquisition  would  be  well  supported  on  the  ground  that  it  is  for  a  public  purpose. It is clearly so when the acquisition is being made at the  expense  of  the  local  authority.  Mr.  Bose  rightly  relies  on  the  decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Bombay v.  Ali  Gulshan,  AIR 1955 SC 810,  in  contending that  there is no  merit in the contention that merely because the purpose involves  establishment of a port it serves no public purpose other than a  purpose of the Union. In my view the following observations of the  Supreme Court are clearly instructive, "that there is another way  

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of  looking  at  the  question  involved.  An undertaking  may  have  three different facets or aspects, and may serve the purpose of a  State, the purpose of the Union and a general  public purpose.  Even  if  one  may  regard  the  requisition  of  a  room  for  the  accommodation of a member of a consulate as one appertaining  to a Union purpose, it does not necessarily cease to be a State  purpose or a general public purpose". Similar also was the view  taken by this Court in the case of (1963) 67 Cal WN 460 (supra).  Therefore,  following  the  above  view  I  must  hold  that  when  establishment  of  a  subsidiary  port  or  a  dock  therein  would  undoubtedly serve at least the general public purpose even if it  otherwise involves a purpose of the Union, it would not be beyond  the authority of the State Government to acquire lands in exercise  of its own powers and irrespective of the powers delegated by the  Union Government  in this respect.  In either  view therefore this  objection of Mr. Sinha must be overruled.”

(emphasis is ours)

According to the learned counsel for the appellants, in the case in hand,  

the purpose of acquisition was purely relatable to the Railways.  And  

the Railways being exclusively a Union subject (falling under entry 22 in  

list  I,  of  the  Seventh  Schedule),  the  process  of  acquisition  must  be  

deemed  to  fall  in  the  exclusive  executive  domain  of  the  Union  

Government.

26. The  second  contention  advanced  at  the  hands  of  the  learned  

counsel  for  the  appellants  was  based  on  the  constitutional  right  

available  to  the appellants,  under  Article  300A of  the Constitution  of  

India (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Constitution’).  Article 300A is being  

extracted hereunder:-

“300A. Persons  not  to  be  deprived  of  property  save  by  authority  of  law – No person shall  be deprived of  his property  save by authority of law.”

Based  on  the  aforesaid  constitutional  provision,  it  was  emphatically  

asserted on behalf  of  the appellants,  that  an individual  could not  be  

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Based  on  the  judgments  cited  above,  it  was  asserted  by  learned  

counsel  representing the appellants,  that  in the facts of  this  case,  it  

stood established, that even though the prescribed procedure, vested  

the  authority  of  acquisition,  with  the  Union  Government,  it  had  

unauthorizedly been acquired by the State Government (of Rajasthan).  

28. Viewed dispassionately, we are satisfied, that even the second  

submission advanced by the learned counsel  for the appellants,  has  

trappings of the first contention.  To succeed on the basis of the second  

contention,  it  is  critical  for  the  appellants  to  succeed  on  the  first.  

Therefore, if the appellants succeed to establish, that acquisition in the  

present case, could only have been made by the Union Government,  

they  would  simultaneously  be  able  to  establish,  that  they  had been  

deprived of their property in violation of Article 300A of the Constitution,  

i.e., without following the procedure established by law.

29. The third contention advanced at the hands of the appellants was  

based on Article 73 of the Constitution.   It  was submitted, that since  

“Railways”  is  a  union  subject  (referable  to  entry  22  in  list  I,  of  the  

Seventh Schedule), only the Union Government, i.e., the Government of  

India had executive powers to acquire the land for establishing a zonal  

office complex and residential  quarters for Railway staff for the North  

Western Railway zone, at Jaipur, in the State of Rajasthan.  Article 73 of  

the Constitution is being extracted hereunder:-

“73. Extent of executive power of the Union - (1) Subject to the  provisions of this Constitution, the executive power of the Union  shall extend-

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(a)  To the matters  with respect  to which Parliament  has  power to make laws; and

(b) To the exercise of such rights, authority and jurisdiction  as are exercisable by the Government of India by virtue of  any treaty or agreement:  

Provided that the executive power referred to in sub-clause  (a) shall not, save as expressly provided in this Constitution  or in any law made by Parliament, extend in any State to  matters with respect to which the Legislature of the State  has also power to make laws.

(2) Until otherwise provided by Parliament, a State and any officer  or  authority  of  a  State  may,  notwithstanding  anything  in  this  article,  continue  to  exercise  in  matters  with  respect  to  which  Parliament has power to make laws for that State such executive  power  or  functions  as  the  State  or  officer  or  authority  thereof  could  exercise  immediately  before  the  commencement  of  this  Constitution.”

Based on Article 73 of  the Constitution,  it  was the contention of  the  

learned counsel for the appellants, that “Railways” is a Union subject  

(referable  to  entry  22  in  list  I,  of  the  Seventh  Schedule).   It  was  

accordingly  contended,  that  Parliament  has  the  exclusive  power  to  

make laws relatable to matters pertaining to the “Railways”.  As such,  

relying on Article 73, it was submitted, that only the Union Government  

(the Government  of India)  could exercise executive power in matters  

pertaining to the subject “Railways”.  Having made a reference to the  

notification dated 19.8.1997 (issued under Section 4 of the Acquisition  

Act), and the declaration dated 13.1.1999 (issued under Section 6 of the  

Acquisition Act) it was pointed out, that the land under reference was  

acquired “… in the public interest for the purpose of Zonal office, North  

Western Railway by Central Government (Railways Administration)…”.  

It  was  accordingly  submitted,  that  the  matter  under  reference  was  

relatable to a subject  with respect  to which, only the Parliament  had  

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power to make laws.  Therefore, the executive power relatable to the  

acquisition  under  reference,  under  the  mandate  of  Article  73  of  the  

Constitution,  could  only  have  been  exercised  by  the  Central  

Government.  In this behalf it was sought to be emphasized, that all the  

executive power in the instant process of acquisition, was exercised by  

the Government of Rajasthan.  It was accordingly submitted, that all the  

orders issued by the State Government, including the notification dated  

19.8.1997  and  the  declaration  dated  13.1.1999,  were  without  

jurisdiction,  and  as  such,  void  being  ultra  vires  of  Article  73  of  the  

Constitution of India.

30. It was also pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellants,  

that it is open to the President of India to delegate executive functions  

vested in the Central  Government  to the State Government.   In  this  

behalf, learned counsel for the appellants placed reliance on Article 258  

of the Constitution.  Article 258 of the Constitution, is being extracted  

hereunder :

“258.  Power  of  the  Union  to  confer  powers,  etc,  on  States  in  certain cases—(1) Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution,  the President may, with the consent of the Governor of a State,  entrust either conditionally or unconditionally to that Government  or to its officers functions in relation to any matter to which the  executive power of the Union extends  

(2) A law made by Parliament which applies in any State may,  notwithstanding that it  relates to a matter with respect to which  the Legislature of the State has no power to make laws, confer  powers and impose duties, or authorise the conferring of powers  and  the  imposition  of  duties,  upon  the  State  or  officers  and  authorities thereof  

(3) Where by virtue of this article powers and duties have been  conferred  or  imposed  upon  a  State  or  officers  or  authorities  thereof,  there shall  be paid by the Government  of  India to the  

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State such sum as may be agreed, or, in default of agreement, as  may  be  determined  by  an  arbitrator  appointed  by  the  Chief  Justice of India,  in respect of any extra costs of  administration  incurred  by the State  in connection  with  the  exercise  of  those  powers and duties.”  

Based on Article 258 of the Constitution, it was the submission of the  

learned counsel  for  the appellants,  that  the President  of  India in the  

facts and circumstances of the instant case, cannot be stated to have  

ever delegated the aforesaid executive functions of the Union, to the  

Government of Rajasthan.  The simple submission was, that no such  

stance had been adopted either by the Union, or by the acquiring State  

Government.  Insofar as the instant aspect of the matter is concerned,  

learned counsel for the appellants, placed reliance on Section 3(8)(b) of  

the  General  Clauses  Act,  1897.   Section  3(8)(b)  aforementioned  is  

extracted hereunder :

“3.  Definitions.— In   this  Act,  and  in  all  Central  Acts  and  Regulations made after  the commencement  of  this  Act,  unless  there is anything repugnant in the subject or context,-

(1) to (7) ...

(8) "Central Government" shall,--

(a) ...

(b)  in  relation  to  anything  done  or  to  be  done  after  the  commencement  of  the  Constitution,  mean  the  President;  and  shall include,--

(i)  in  relation  to  functions  entrusted  under  clause  (1)  of  article  258  of  the  Constitution,  to  the  Government  of  a  State, the State Government acting within the scope of the  authority given to it under that clause;  

(ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State before  the  commencement  of  the  Constitution  (Seventh  Amendment)  Act,  1956,  the  Chief  Commissioner  or  the  Lieutenant-Governor or the Government of a neighbouring  

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State  or  other  authority  acting  within  the  scope  of  the  authority given to him or it under article 239 or article 243 of  the Constitution, as the case may be; and

(iii) in relation to the administration of a Union territory, the  administrator  thereof  acting  within  the  scope  of  the  authority given to him under article 239 of the Constitution.”

It was the submission of the learned counsel for the appellants, that the  

onus rested on the Railways, and alternatively on the Government of  

Rajasthan, to establish that the delegation of power for acquiring the  

land under  reference had actually  been ordered by the  President  of  

India.  It was the submission of the learned counsel for the appellants,  

that  since  no  such delegation  is  shown to  have  been  made  by  the  

President of India, to the functionaries of the Government of Rajasthan,  

it was natural to infer, that no such delegation was ever ordered.  Since  

as submitted  by learned  counsel,  the  instant  executive  function  was  

solely vested in the Central Government,  therefore,  it  could not have  

been executed on behalf of the Central Government by the Government  

of Rajasthan.  In the instant view of the matter, it was submitted, that the  

concerned  acquisition,  by  the  State  Government,  was  without  any  

authority/sanction of law.

31. In our considered view, even the third submission advanced by  

the  learned  counsel  for  the  appellants  raises  the  same foundational  

plea,  as  the  first  two contentions.   In  order  to  succeed on the  third  

contention it would be vital (as for the earlier two contentions) for the  

appellants to establish, that the process of acquisition in this case, could  

only have been carried out by the Union executive (i.e., the Government  

of India), whereas, it had unauthorizedly been undertaken by the State  

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Government (i.e.,  the Government of Rajasthan).   In view of the first  

three  submissions,  therefore,  we  shall  first  of  all  endeavour  to  

determine, whether the instant acquisition of land, accomplished by the  

State Government, is sustainable in law.

32. Having  given  our  thoughtful  consideration  to  the  matter  under  

consideration, we are of the view, that reliance on entry 33 (of list I of  

the  Seventh  Schedule),  and  on  entry  36  (of  list  II  of  the  Seventh  

Schedule), and finally on entry 42 (of list III of the Seventh Schedule), is  

only  for  the  purpose  of  avoiding  and getting  around,  the real  issue.  

Entries  in  list  I,  bring  the  listed  subjects  within  the  legislative  

competence  of  the  Parliament.   Entries  in  list  II  demarcate  subjects  

falling  within  the  legislative  competence  of  the  State  Legislatures.  

Entries in list III pertain to subjects on which joint legislative competence  

is vested with the Parliament, as also, the State Legislatures.  Needless  

to mention, that the Constitution vests superiority in enactments made  

by the Parliament,  on subjects enumerated in list  III,  of  the Seventh  

Schedule (in case of conflict between the legislations enacted by the  

Parliament and the State Legislatures).  Statutory provisions enacted in  

the manner expressed above, regulate, not only the substance of the  

legislation, but also modulate the procedure to administer the substance  

of the legislation.  

33. Article  73 of  the Constitution  vests in the  Central  Government  

executive  power,  the  jurisdiction  whereof  is  exactly  the  same  as  

jurisdiction vested in the Parliament to make laws.  The executive power  

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of  the  Union,  therefore,  extends  over  the  subjects  on  which  the  

Parliament  has  the  power  to  legislate.   Arising  out  of  the  executive  

power  referred  to  hereinabove,  emerges  one  fundamental  and  

unambiguous  understanding,  namely,  executive  power  vested  in  the  

Central  Government  cannot  be  exercised  in  violation  of  the  

constitutional provisions referred to above, or as may be ordained by  

some  express  legislative  enactment.   The  latter  aspect  (express  

legislative enactment), emerges from the proviso under Article 73(1) of  

the  Constitution  of  India.   Therefore,  on  a  subject  regulated  by  

legislation, executive power has to be exercised in consonance with the  

enacted legislation.

34. It  is  in  the  background  of  the  conclusions  recorded  in  the  

aforegoing  two  paragraphs,  that  we  must  understand  the  scope  of  

executive authority vested in the Central Government under Article 73 of  

the  Constitution.   There  is  no  dispute  whatsoever,  that  the  subject  

matter under consideration is regulated by the Acquisition Act.  As such,  

the freedom of executive power vested in the Central Government must  

be deemed to have been curtailed, so as to be exercised in consonance  

with the provisions of the Acquisition Act.  The preceding proposition is  

the natural  consequence of  giving effect  to the proviso under  Article  

73(1) of the Constitution of India.  Since the vires of the provisions of the  

Acquisition Act relied upon by the learned counsel  for the appellants  

have not been assailed, we are inclined to unhesitatingly hold that the  

procedure  contemplated  under  the  Acquisition  Act,  is  liable  to  be  

followed in matters pertaining to governmental acquisitions, of private  

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land.  In absence of compliance therewith, the process of acquisition  

made thereunder, would be liable to be set aside.  We are of the view,  

that Sections 4 and 6 lay down mandatory procedural provisions, which  

require  to  be  followed  in  letter  and  spirit,  in  matters  pertaining  to  

acquisition of private lands.

35. For the reasons recorded in the foregoing paragraphs, we are of  

the view, that reliance on different entries in different lists of the Seventh  

Schedule, at the behest of the learned counsel for the appellants, may  

turn  out  to  be  wholly  inconsequential,  in  so  far  as  the  present  

controversy is concerned.  It needs emphasis, that entries in different  

lists, have been relied upon only to demarcate the executive domain.  

To impress upon us, that the jurisdiction to acquire land in the facts of  

the  present  case,  fell  within  the  exclusive  domain  of  the  Central  

Government,  in  a  very  subtle  manner,  the  submission  has  clearly  

changed over to a wrong track.  Herein the substance of law, as also,  

the procedure regulating acquisition,  flows out of the Acquisition Act.  

The vires of the Acquisition Act is not under challenge.  Therefore, the  

Acquisition Act, which demarcates the jurisdictional areas between the  

Union and the States will provide an answer to the issue of jurisdiction  

canvassed, and not the entries in different lists of the Seventh Schedule  

of the Constitution of India.  More so, because the subject of acquisition  

is now placed in list III of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of  

India  (in  entry  42),  and  as  such,  the  Parliament  as  also  the  State  

Legislatures, have concurrent jurisdiction in respect thereof.  As such, it  

would  be  fully  justified  for  Parliament  (as  it  has  done  through  the  

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Acquisition Act), to demonstrate the areas of jurisdiction.  All the same,  

we shall endeavour to record the submissions advanced on behalf of  

the appellants.

36. While bringing to our notice entry 33 in list I, entry 36 in list II and  

entry 42 in list III of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution, it was  

vehemently pointed out, by learned counsel for the appellants, that the  

first two of the aforesaid entries came to be omitted by the Constitution  

(Seventh  Amendment)  Act,  1956.   Simultaneously,  by  the  same  

amendment,  entry 42 was added to List III  of the Seventh Schedule.  

Learned counsel for the appellants therefore submitted, that the earlier  

entry 33 of list I and entry 36 of list II of the Seventh Schedule must be  

deemed to have been merged into entry 42 of list  III  of the Seventh  

Schedule.  It was accordingly the vehement contention of the learned  

counsel  for  the  appellants,  that  while  determining  legislative  

competence (and the resultant executive jurisdiction) consequent upon  

the  merger  of  the  aforesaid  two  entries  into  the  freshly  

amended/substituted entry 42 of list III, it was imperative to keep in mind  

what the Parliament did away with, and the resultant effect emerging  

from a collective interpretation of the above three entries, prior to the  

Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956.  For the instant reason, it  

was also sought to be suggested, that the judgment rendered by this  

Court in State of Bombay v. Ali Gulshan (supra) would not constitute a  

valid  basis  for  determination  of  the  present  controversy.   Learned  

counsel,  in  this  behalf  also  pointed  out,  that  the  judgment  in  the  

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aforesaid  matter  was rendered in 1955,  i.e.  before the Constitutional  

Amendment in 1956.   

37. We  shall  now  endeavour  to  determine  the  effect  of  the  

submissions advanced at the hands of the learned counsel.  Through  

entry 33 (in list I of the Seventh Schedule), the subject of acquisition of  

property  “...  for  the  purposes  of  the  Union...”  was  vested  in  the  

legislative domain of the Parliament.  And through entry 36 (in list II of  

the Seventh Schedule), the subject of acquisition of property “... except  

for the purposes of the Union...” was vested in the State Legislatures.  

Having done away with the aforesaid entries from Lists I and II of the  

Seventh Schedule, by the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956  

(with effect from 1.11.1956), the legislative competence on the subject  

of acquisition was jointly vested in the Parliament, as well as, the State  

Legislature through entry 42 (in list III of the Seventh Schedule).  Within  

the scope of entry 42 (in list III of the Seventh Schedule), it was open to  

the Parliament, as also, the State Legislature to enact legislation on the  

subject  of  acquisition.   It  is,  therefore  apparent  that  the  exclusive  

jurisdiction vested in the State Legislature to enact legislation on the  

subject  of  acquisition “...except for the purposes of the Union...”  was  

clearly taken away from the exclusive jurisdiction of the State legislation  

by the aforestated amendment to the Constitution.  In other words, prior  

to  the  above  amendment,  State  Legislature  had  the  exclusive  

jurisdiction to enact law for acquisition of private lands, falling within the  

territorial jurisdiction of the concerned State.  The said jurisdiction was  

now concurrently shared with the Parliament.  The said jurisdiction was  

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invoked  by  the  Parliament  when  it  enacted  the  Acquisition  Act.  

Therefore,  in  the  ultimate  analysis  the  submission  advanced  by  the  

learned counsel, would not serve the purpose of the appellants herein,  

inasmuch as, it is not possible for us to read into entry 42 of list III of the  

Seventh Schedule, the cumulative effect of entries 31 and 36 (of lists I  

and  II  respectively  of  the  Seventh  Schedule).   Hithertobefore,  the  

jurisdiction  of  Parliament  (and consequently  of  the Union  executive),  

would extend only to acquisition of land/properties for purposes of the  

Union.  We are satisfied to hold, that consequent upon the Constitution  

(Seventh  Amendment)  Act,  1956,  the  jurisdictional  limitations  on  the  

subject of acquisition would emerge from a valid legislation made under  

entry 42 (in list III of the Seventh Schedule).  Since the validity of the  

Acquisition Act has not been assailed by the appellants, we shall accept  

the same to be a valid legislation enacted under entry 42 (in list III of the  

Seventh Schedule).  We must, therefore, now endeavour to determine  

the legitimacy of the submissions advanced at the hands of the learned  

counsel for the appellants, on the jurisdictional question, purely on the  

basis of the Acquisition Act.

38. In order to determine the validity of the submission advanced at  

the hands of the learned counsel for the appellants, namely, that the  

acquisition in the facts and circumstances of the present case, could  

have been made only by the Central Government, and consequently,  

the  acquisition  made  by  the  Government  of  Rajasthan,  was  totally  

without jurisdiction,  would depend on the interpretation of  Sections 4  

and 6 of  the Acquisition Act (read along with other provisions of  the  

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Acquisition Act, relied upon by the learned counsel for the parties).  In  

this behalf, the submissions advanced on behalf of the appellants, have  

already been recorded in paragraph 21 above.

39. From the deliberations recorded above, there is no room for any  

dispute,  that  the  interpretation  of  the  term “appropriate  Government”  

referred to in Sections 4 and 6 of the Acquisition Act would lead to the  

correct  determination  of  the  executive  Government  competent  to  

acquire the land under reference.  Indubitably, the answer to the issue  

would emerge from the definition of the term ‘appropriate Government’  

in  Section  3(ee)  of  the  Acquisition  Act,  wherein,  the  expression  

‘appropriate Government’ has been linked to the purpose of acquisition.  

In such a contingency, the answer to the query, as to which of the two  

Governments  (Central  Government,  or  the  concerned  State  

Government) would satisfy the test of “appropriate Government”,  one  

will  necessarily  have  to  carefully  view  the  real  effect  of  the  words  

engaged to define the said term in Section 3(ee) of the Acquisition Act.  

Section 3(ee) aforementioned is being extracted hereunder:

“3(ee) the expression "appropriate Government" means in relation  to acquisition of land for the purposes of the Union, the Central  Government, and, in relation to acquisition of land for any other  purposes, the State Government;”

A perusal of Section 3(ee) of the Acquisition Act, leaves no room for any  

doubt, that the authority to acquire land has been divided between the  

Central  executive  and  the  State  executive.   In  situations  where  an  

acquisition is entirely “…for the purposes of the Union…”.  Section 3(ee)  

aforementioned clearly postulates, that the Union executive would have  

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the exclusive jurisdiction to acquire the land.  The terminology engaged  

in  Section  3(ee)  of  the  Acquisition  Act,  for  expressing  the  area  of  

jurisdiction of the State executive (in the matter of acquisition of land), is  

not analogous or comparable with that engaged while spelling out the  

jurisdiction of the Union executive.  Section 3(ee), it may be noted, does  

not  express,  that  in  matters  of  acquisition  which  are  entirely  for  

purposes of a State, the jurisdiction would vest with the concerned State  

executive.  Noticeably, the words engaged to express the jurisdiction of  

the  State  executive,  are  extremely  wide,  so  as  to  accommodate  all  

acquisitions which are not entirely  “for  purposes of  the Union”.   This  

intention of the legislature has been recorded by using the words “…in  

relation to acquisition of land for any other purposes…” (i.e., other than  

“… for the purpose of the Union…”), “…the State Government”.   

40. Having had the benefit of understanding the different purposes for  

which land may be acquired, from the Constitution Bench judgment of  

this  Court  in  State  of  Bombay  vs.  Ali  Gulshan  (supra),  we  would  

unhesitatingly  conclude,  that  the  contemplated  purposes  would  

definitely be “…three in number, namely, Union purpose, State purpose,  

and “…a general public purpose…”.  Our instant determination is based  

on the fact,  that  an acquisition  may not  be exclusively  for  purposes  

relatable to the Union, or entirely for purposes relatable to a State. The  

complex and multifarious public  activities which the executive has to  

cater to may not fall in the exclusive domain of either the Union or the  

State.  In our view, causes with duality of purpose, would also fall in the  

realm of the third purpose expressed by the Constitution Bench referred  

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to above as “…a general public purpose …”.  Whenever the exclusive  

Union or State barrier is transgressed, the purpose could be described  

(as in State of Bombay vs. Ali Gulshan (supra)) as “…a general public  

purpose…”.   In  case  of  the  first  contemplated  purpose  referred  to  

above,  the  Union  executive  would  have  the  absolute  and  

unencumbered  jurisdiction,  as  per  the  definition  of  the  expression  

“appropriate Government” in Section 3(ee) of the Acquisition Act.  For  

the  remaining  two  purposes,  the  State  executive  would  have  

jurisdiction.     Therefore, to determine the issue of jurisdiction in the  

instant case, the first step essentially would be to determine the precise  

purpose for which the instant acquisition was made.  Based on such  

conclusion,  it  would  be  easy  to  determine  the  vesting  of  executive  

jurisdiction, for acquisition of the land under reference.

41. The instant issue can be examined from another perspective as  

well.  When examined closely, Section 3(ee) of the Acquisition Act, in  

fact  and  in  substance,  incorporates  the  erstwhile  entries  33  and  36  

(from Lists I and II respectively, of the Seventh Schedule).  For, it may  

be recalled, that entry 33 (in List I of the Seventh Schedule), had vested  

the subject of acquisition of property “... for the purposes of the Union...”  

in the Parliament.  Therefore, the executive domain thereof fell in the  

realm of the Union/Central Government.  Exactly in the same manner,  

under  Section  2(ee)  of  the  Acquisition  Act,  for  situations  where  

acquisition is exclusively “… for the purposes of the Union…” the Union  

executive has been vested with absolute jurisdiction to acquire the land.  

Likewise,  jurisdiction  for  acquisition  of  land  was  vested  in  the  State  

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legislature  vide  entry  36  (in  List  II  of  the  Seventh  Schedule).   The  

authority of the concerned State legislature extended to acquisitions of  

land other than “...  for the purposes of  the Union...”.   Therefore,  the  

executive domain of all acquisitions other than those for purposes of the  

Union, fell in the realm of the concerned State Government.  In exactly  

the  same  manner  Section  3(ee)  of  the  Acquisition  Act,  for  all  the  

residuary  acquisitions,  i.e.  situations other  than exclusively  “…for the  

purpose  of  the  Union…”,  have  been  vested  in  the  realm  of  the  

concerned State Government.  This is exactly the same position which  

was contemplated by the erstwhile entries 33 and 36 (from Lists I and II  

respectively,  of the Seventh Schedule).   The scope and effect  of the  

erstwhile entries 33 and 36 was determined by a Constitution Bench of  

this  Court  in  State  of  Bombay  vs.  Ali  Gulshan  (supra),  wherein  this  

Court concluded that the acquisition may serve three purposes i.e., the  

purpose of the Union, the purpose of a State, and thirdly, “…a general  

public  purpose...”.   Therefore,  the  logic,  the  course  of  thought,  the  

conclusions  and  the  deductions  made  in  the  Constitution  Bench  

judgment  aforementioned  would  completely  and  unqualifiedly  be  

applicable, while interpreting Section 3(ee) of the Acquisition Act.  This  

is  for  the  simple  reason,  that  the  cause  and  effect  of  the  aforesaid  

entries (33 of List I, and 36 of List II)  have been juxtaposed into the  

definition of the term “appropriate Government” in Section 3(ee) of the  

Acquisition Act.  Therefore, it is only for the first of the three purposes  

referred  to  hereinabove,  wherein  the  term  ‘appropriate  Government’  

would  mean  the  Central  Government.   For  the  other  two  

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exigencies/situations,  the term ‘appropriate  Government’  would mean  

the concerned State Government.

42. We  are  of  the  view,  that  the  determination  on  the  first  issue  

canvassed at the hands of the learned counsel, would inevitably depend  

on the purpose for which the land in question came to be acquired.  If  

the  purpose  of  acquisition  is  exclusively  for  the  Union,  then  the  

Union/Central Government will have the exclusive jurisdiction to acquire  

the land.  If the purpose of acquisition is exclusively for a State, then the  

concerned  State  Government  will  have  the  exclusive  jurisdiction  to  

acquire the land.  And if the purpose of acquisition is, “a general public  

purpose” (i.e.,  a purpose which is neither  exclusively relatable to the  

Central Government and/or fully relatable to the State Government), yet  

again,  the  concerned  State  Government  will  have  the  exclusive  

jurisdiction to acquire the land.

43. We  have  already  referred  to  a  series  of  communications  

exchanged  between  the  Union  Government,  as  also,  the  State  

Government  on  the  subject  of  the  land  required  for  establishing  the  

zonal office complex and residential quarters for Railway staff (for the  

North-Western Railway Zone),  at Jaipur.   From the tenor thereof,  we  

shall  venture  to  determine  whether  the  land  in  question  was  being  

acquired exclusively for the purposes of the Union, or exclusively for the  

purpose  of  the  State  and/or  for  the  third  purpose  identified  above,  

namely, to serve “…a general public purpose…”.  For this, we shall first  

refer to the letters exchanged between the concerned parties.  The first  

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available communication on the record of the case dated 15.11.1996,  

was addressed by the Officer on Special Duty, North-Western Railway,  

to the Commissioner, Jaipur Development Authority, Jaipur, indicating  

the availability of 26 bighas of Government land in front of the Getor  

Jagatpura Railway Station.  Even though the aforesaid letter mentions,  

that  the land in  question  had already  been  allotted  to  the Scouts  &  

Guides  Organization,  yet  it  was  pointed  out,  that  the  same  could  

effectively be put to use for setting up the required infrastructure for the  

North-Western Railway Zone.   It  was accordingly  requested,  that  the  

said land may be transferred to the Railways, at an early date.  The  

aforesaid  letter  leaves  no  room for  any  doubt,  that  what  was  being  

sought through the communication dated 15.11.1996 was the transfer of  

State Government land, to the Railways.  The aforesaid position came  

to  be  reiterated  in  another  letter  dated  15.11.1996.   These  two  

communications  were  then  followed  by  a  letter  dated  30.12.1996,  

addressed  by  Mr.  Ram  Vilas  Paswan,  the  then  Union  Minister  for  

Railways, to Mr. Bhairon Singh Shekhawat, the then Chief Minister of  

the State of Rajasthan, indicating the Union Government’s desire to set  

up the North-Western Railway Zone Complex, at Jaipur.  Interestingly,  

in the aforesaid letter the Railway’s request to the State Government  

was to provide land “free of cost”.  The basis of seeking the land free of  

cost, also emerges from the said letter dated 30.12.1996, wherein it was  

emphasized,  that  setting  up  of  the Zonal  Office would  improve  train  

services  to  and  within  the  State  of  Rajasthan,  and  would  meet  the  

expectations  of  public  and  private  entities  in  that  area.   In  fact,  the  

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emphasis in the aforesaid letter was, that such a gesture of the State  

Government  (to  provide  land  free  of  cost)  would  go  a  long  way  in  

enabling the Railways to make the Zonal Office functional, at an early  

date.   The instant emphasis makes out, that the State of Rajasthan (on  

account  of  transportation  facilities,  which  would  become available  to  

public and private entities, having a nexus to the State) would benefit  

therefrom.   Consequent  upon  the  receipt  of  the  aforesaid  

communication,  the  Commissioner,  Jaipur  Development  Authority,  

wrote  a  letter  dated  28.2.1997  to  the  Secretary,  Department  of  

Transport,  Government  of  Rajasthan,  for  initiating  acquisition  

proceedings in respect of the land identified in villages Bindayaka and  

Todi  Ramjanipura  in  tehsil  Sanganer  of  district  Jaipur.   The  Deputy  

Secretary,  Department  of  Transport,  Government  of  Rajasthan,  

responded to the same vide a letter dated 29.3.1997, addressed to the  

District  Collector,  Jaipur,  for  effectuating  the  desire  expressed.  

Pursuant to the aforesaid correspondence between the Railways and  

the  functionaries  of  the  Government  of  Rajasthan,  the  State  

Government issued a notification dated 19.8.1997 under Section 4 of  

the Acquisition Act, depicting its intention to acquire land measuring 4-

39  hectares  in  the  revenue  estate  of  village  Bindyaka,  and  9-91  

hectares in village Todi Ramjanipura, tehsil Sanganer, district Jaipur, to  

establish the North-Western Railway Zone Complex.   

44. The correspondence between the Railways and the Government  

of  Rajasthan  preceding  the  notification  under  Section  4  of  the  

Acquisition Act, is the material correspondence on the basis whereof a  

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finding will have to be recorded, on the issue in hand, one way or the  

other.   The  desire  for  transfer  of  land  belonging  to  the  State  

Government, and thereafter, the desire to furnish land consequent upon  

its acquisition “free of  cost”  to the Railways, leaves no room for any  

doubt,  that the Railways desired the State of Rajasthan to contribute  

land,  for  the proposed project.   Ordinarily  this would be unthinkable,  

except when the project would directly or indirectly benefit the State as  

well.   Ordinarily,  the setting up of  a Zonal  Office would mean better  

administration  for  the  Railways  establishment.   It  is  difficult  to  

understand how, for the purpose of its own administration, the Railways  

could  repeatedly  implore  the  Government  of  Rajasthan,  in  the  first  

instance to transfer land under State ownership to the Railways, and  

thereafter, make an alternative request to the Government of Rajasthan,  

to acquire land and to transfer the same to the Railways free of cost.  

The  only  reason  which  one  can  infer  for  such  an  adjuration,  

ascertainable from the letters referred to above is, that the residents of  

the State of Rajasthan would also benefit from the establishment of the  

said Zonal Office.  This issue was impressed upon by the Railways, by  

asserting that better transportation facilities would become available to  

the  public  and  private  entities  having  a  nexus  to  the  State.   And  

therefore,  the Railways considered it  appropriate to involve the State  

Government’s  participation  in  the  project,  in  the  manner  indicated  

above.  The letter addressed by the Union Minister of Railways dated  

30.12.1996 is a clear pointer to the above inference.  In the said letter,  

the Union Minister for Railways particularly highlighted the fact that the  

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setting up of the North-Western Railways Zone Complex would improve  

train services in Rajasthan,  which in turn,  would benefit  the State of  

Rajasthan.   It  is,  therefore,  that  in  the  first  instance,  transfer  of  

Government  land  was  sought  by  the  Railways.   When  that  did  not  

materialize, the Government was asked to acquire land, and provide it  

free of cost to the Railways.  From the above deliberations, we may  

record  our  conclusions  as  follows.   Setting  up  the  North-Western  

Railway Zonal Complex at Jaipur, would lead to better administration for  

the Railways, and in that sense it would serve the purpose of the Union.  

Additionally,  it  would  improve  train  services  in  Rajasthan  and  would  

accordingly meet the expectations of public and private entities of the  

area.  This would serve the purpose of the State.  We would therefore  

unhesitatingly record, that the situation in hand can be described as one  

wherein the public purpose is “… a general public purpose…” which is  

neither  exclusively  relatable  to  the  Central  Government  and/or  fully  

relatable to the State Government.

45. In State of Bombay vs. Ali Gulshan (supra) accommodation was  

required, for housing a staff member of a foreign Consulate in Bombay.  

In the challenge raised,  the primary contention was, that the subject  

under  reference  was  a  Union  purpose,  and  accordingly,  the  Union  

Government alone had the jurisdiction in the matter.  This submission  

would  naturally  emerge  from  entry  11  (in  List  I,  of  the  Seventh  

Schedule),  which  reads,  “Diplomatic,  Consular  and  trade  

representation”.  The Bombay High Court, while accepting the challenge  

had concluded, that there were only two categories for determining the  

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executive Government which had the jurisdiction to acquire land i.e., for  

a Union purpose the Union/Central Government, and for the purpose of  

the  State,  the  concerned  State  Government.   The  High  Court  had  

interpreted  the  words  “any  other  purpose”  by  applying  the  rule  of  

ejusdem  generis,  as  flowing  out  of  the  purpose  of  the  State.   The  

Constitution Bench of this Court while determining the controversy, did  

not accept the view of the High Court.  This Court held, that categories  

for the purpose of acquisition were three, namely, Union purpose, State  

purpose, and “…a general public purpose…”.  This was sought to be  

explained by observing, that a State purpose or a Union purpose would  

have a nexus to the duties and obligations cast on the State or the  

Union, to do particular things for the benefit of the public or a section of  

the  public.   Naturally  these  obligations  would  be  determined  on  the  

basis of the scheme of distribution of subjects between the Union and  

the States in the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India.  The  

Union  purpose,  would  constitute  the  first  category.   The  second  

category would be, for fulfilling a State purpose.  Besides the aforesaid  

clear demarcation, constituting the first two categories, situations where  

a State  acquires  or  requisitions property  to  facilitate  the coming into  

existence  of  allied  objects  having  public  welfare  at  heart,  such  like  

situations would fall within the third category.  The third category was  

described as one which contemplated “…a general public purpose…”,  

i.e.,  where the purpose is neither  exclusively  relatable to the Central  

Government and/or fully relatable to the State Government.  In State of  

Bombay  vs.  Ali  Gulshan  (supra)  it  came  to  be  held,  that  the  

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acquisition/requisition under reference therein, fell in the third category.  

The consideration and logic leading to the aforesaid determination was,  

that  trade  and  commerce  is  the  primary  cause  of  the  State  which  

appoints  foreign  Consulate  staff,  to  the State  (in  the cited case,  the  

State  of  Bombay)  where  he  is  appointed.   The  purpose  for  

acquisition/requisition, was accepted as trade and commerce.  As such,  

it  was  concluded,  that  the  State  Government  had  the  jurisdiction  to  

acquire/requisition  the  land.   In  the  aforesaid  understanding  of  the  

matter,  it  is evident that the situation in hand is one akin to the one  

referred to above where the purpose of acquisition partly falls in the first  

category i.e., for the benefit of the Union, and partly, falls in the third  

category i.e., “…a general public purpose.  Just like in State of Bombay  

vs. Ali Gulshan (supra), and for exactly the same reasons, we have no  

hesitation in concluding, that in the present case as well, the purpose of  

acquisition would benefit  the State generally,  as better  transportation  

facilities  would  meet  the  expectations  of  public  and  private  entities  

having  a  nexus  with  the  State  of  Rajasthan.   The  purpose  of  the  

acquisition in hand not being an exclusive Union purpose, and further  

because, the purpose for acquisition can certainly be described as “…a  

general public purpose…”, the State executive would definitely have the  

jurisdiction to acquire the land under reference.

46. The submission advanced on behalf of the appellants, against the  

conclusion drawn above was, that the judgment rendered in State of  

Bombay  vs.  Ali  Gulshan  (supra)  could  not  be  applied  after  the  

Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956.  It was contended that,  

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the basis on which the above judgment was rendered no longer exists,  

and as such,  the same has lost  all  its  relevance.   We have already  

examined this aspect of the matter.  We have concluded that Section  

2(ee)  of  the Acquisition Act,  reintroduces the three categories  under  

which jurisdiction for acquiring land has to be determined.  The same  

three categories of public purpose, which were deduced from entries 33  

and 36 (in lists I and II, respectively of the Seventh Schedule) in State of  

Bombay vs.  Ali  Gulshan  (supra),  also  emerge  out  of  an  analysis  of  

Section 2(ee) of the Acquisition Act.  It is therefore not possible for us to  

accept, that the Constitution Bench judgment in State of Bombay vs. Ali  

Gulshan has lost its relevance.  Accordingly,  we find no merit  in the  

instant  objection  raised  on  behalf  of  the  appellants.   For  the  above  

reason, it is not possible for us to accept the first contention advanced  

at  the hands  of  the learned counsel  for  the appellants.   We hereby  

affirm, that the State Government had the jurisdiction to acquire the land  

under reference, because it duly satisfied the requirement of the term  

‘appropriate  Government’  referred  to  in  Sections  4  and  6  of  the  

Acquisition Act.

47. The  second  contention  advanced  at  the  hands  of  the  learned  

counsel  for  the  appellants  was  based  on  the  Constitutional  right  

available to the appellants under Article 300A of the Constitution.  The  

contention  advanced  at  the  hands  of  the  learned  counsel  for  the  

appellants in this behalf was, that the Government of Rajasthan had no  

jurisdiction  to  acquire  the  land  in  question.   Consequently  it  was  

contended, that the procedure prescribed by law had not been adhered  

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to.   It  was  asserted  that  the  Central  Government  alone  could  have  

acquired  the  land  in  question,  since  the  same  was  acquired  for  a  

purpose which falls in the domain of the Union (the Railways).

48. It was not the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants  

before  this  Court,  that  there  had  been  any  other  procedural  lapse  

besides the one indicated above.  It was not the case of the appellants,  

that the notifications and declaration contemplated under the provisions  

of the Acquisition Act were not duly issued.  It was also not the case of  

the appellants, that the land losers were not afforded an opportunity to  

file objections.  Nor was it the case of the appellants, that the objections  

were not duly considered.  No lapse whatsoever had been pointed out  

depicting any irregularity at the hands of the appropriate authority, either  

in  terms  of  taking  possession  of  the  acquired  land,  or  in  terms  of  

determination of the compensation payable.  It is, therefore, apparent  

that in the process of acquisition, no procedural lapse has been pointed  

out.  The only illegality pleaded and canvassed for the annulment of the  

acquisition  proceedings  was,  that  the  term ‘appropriate  Government’  

used in Sections 4 and 6 of the Acquisition Act was wrongly assumed,  

as the Government of Rajasthan.  It was submitted, that it ought to have  

been the Union/Central Government.  In the determination rendered by  

us,  in  respect  of  the  first  contention  canvassed  on  behalf  of  the  

appellants,  we  have  already  concluded,  that  in  the  facts  and  

circumstances  of  this  case,  reference  to  the  term  ‘appropriate  

Government’  in Sections 4 and 6 of the Acquisition Act was rightfully  

relatable  to  the  Government  of  Rajasthan.   Based  on  the  above  

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conclusion drawn by us, there can be no further room for the appellants  

to contend, that the instant acquisition process, was not in accordance  

with law.  In the aforesaid view of the matter, we have no hesitation in  

affirming that while acquiring the land of the appellants, the Government  

of  Rajasthan,  has  proceeded  in  due  course  of  law.   As  such,  the  

appellants  cannot  be  stated  to  have  been  deprived  of  their  

lands/property,  without  the  authority  of  law.   Accordingly,  it  is  not  

possible for us to accept even the second contention advanced at the  

hands  of  the  learned  counsel  for  the  appellants,  namely,  that  the  

acquisition  of  the  appellants’  land  has  violated  the  appellants’  

Constitutional right under Article 300A of the Constitution of India.

49. We  shall  now  advert  to  the  third  contention  advanced  at  the  

hands of  the learned counsel  for  the appellants.   It  was the pointed  

submission of the learned counsel for the appellants, that the Central  

Government alone had jurisdiction in the matter of acquisition of land for  

the Railways.  Undoubtedly, the acquisition of the land in the facts and  

circumstances  of  the  present  case  was  for  establishing  the  North-

Western  Railway  Zone  Complex.   Despite  the  aforesaid,  we  have  

already concluded hereinabove, that on the subject of acquisition, the  

only  relevant  entry  in  the Seventh  Schedule  of  the Constitution  was  

entry 42 in list III, i.e., the Concurrent List.  Besides the aforesaid, no  

other entry can legitimately be referred to,  wherein the acquisition of  

land  (even  though  for  the  Railways)  is  the  pointed  subject  of  

consideration.  There was no challenge to any of the provisions of the  

Acquisition Act.  We have already drawn our conclusions on the basis of  

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the provisions of the Acquisition Act, framed by the Parliament under  

entry 42 (in list III, of the Seventh Schedule).  We have interpreted the  

relevant provisions of the Acquisition Act, and on the basis thereof have  

been persuaded to conclude, that the Government of Rajasthan was the  

competent  authority  for  acquiring  the land under  reference.   In such  

view of the matter, reliance on Articles 73 or 258 of the Constitution of  

India,  by  the  learned  counsel  for  the  appellants,  was  clearly  

misconceived.   The answer  to  the third  contention,  therefore,  clearly  

emerges  from the conclusions drawn by us on the basis  of  the first  

contention  advanced  at  the  hands  of  the  learned  counsel  for  the  

appellants.  For the above reasons, we find no merit even in the third  

contention advanced on behalf of the appellants.

50. We shall now deal with the fourth issue canvassed at the hands  

of  the  learned  counsel  for  the  appellants.   The  instant  issue  is  

unconnected  with  the  previous  issues.   From the  sequence  of  facts  

narrated hereinabove, it is apparent that the instant acquisition of land  

was at the behest of the Railways, i.e., the Union Government.  It was  

pointed  out,  that  on  all  administrative  issues,  the  functioning  of  the  

Central Government is regulated by Rules of Business.  In this behalf,  

our  attention  was  invited  to  the  Government  of  India  (Allocation  of  

Business)  Rules,  1961 and the Government  of  India  (Transaction  of  

Business) Rules, 1961.  It was the contention of the learned counsel for  

the appellants,  that the aforestated Rules of Business (framed under  

Article 77 of the Constitution of India) have a binding and mandatory  

effect.   Breach  of  the  Rules  of  Business,  according  to  the  learned  

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counsel for the appellants, would result in vitiation of the entire action.  

Insofar as the instant case is concerned, it was sought to be canvassed,  

that the Union of India had breached the Rules of Business.  And the  

said breach,  would vitiate the impugned acquisition  proceedings.   In  

order to make good the aforesaid submission, learned counsel for the  

appellants, invited our attention to Rules 3 and 4 of the Government of  

India  (Transaction  of  Business)  Rules,  1961.   Rules  3  and  4  

aforementioned are being extracted hereunder :

“3. Disposal  of  Business by Ministries.-  Subject  to the provisions of  these  Rules  in  regard  to  consultation  with  other  departments  and  submission of cases to the Prime Minister, the Cabinet and its Committees  and  the  President,  all  business  allotted  to  a  department  under  the  Government of  India  (Allocation of  Business) Rules, 1961,  shall be  disposed  of by, or under the general or special  directions of, the  Minister-in-charge.

4. Inter-Departmental Consultations.- (1) When the subject of a case  concerns  more than  one department, no  decision be  taken or order  issued  until  all  such  departments  have  concurred,  or,  failing  such  concurrence, a decision thereon  has  been  taken  by  or  under  the  authority of the Cabinet.  

Explanation- Every case in which a decision, if taken in one Department,  is  likely  to affect  the transaction of  business allotted  to  another department, shall be deemed to be a case the  subject of which concerns more than one department.

(2) Unless the  case is  fully covered  by  powers to sanction  expenditure  or  to  appropriate  or  re-appropriate  funds,  conferred by  any general  or  special orders  made  by the  Ministry  of  Finance,  no  department  shall,  without  the  previous concurrence of the Ministry of Finance, issue any  orders which may-

(a) involve  any abandonment  of revenue or involve any  expenditure for  which no provision has been made in  the appropriation act;

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(b)  involve any grant of land or assignment of revenue or  concession, grant, lease or licence of mineral or forest  rights or a right to water power or any easement or  privilege in respect of such concession;

(c) relate to the number or grade of posts, or to the strength  of a service, or to the pay or allowances of Government  servants  or  to  any  other  conditions  of  their  service  having financial implications; or

(d) otherwise have a financial  bearing whether  involving  expenditure or not;

Provided that no  orders of the nature specified  in clause  (c) shall  be  issued  in  respect  of  the  Ministry  of  Finance  without  the  previous  concurrence of the Department of Personnel and Training.

(3) The Ministry of Law shall be consulted on-

(a) proposals for legislation;

(b) the making of rules and orders of a general character in  the  exercise  of  a  statutory  power  conferred  on  the  Government; and

(c) the preparation of important contracts to be entered into  by the Government.

(4) Unless the case is fully covered by a decision or advice  previously  given  by  the  Department  of  Personnel  and  Training  that  Department  shall  be  consulted  on  all  matters involving-

(a) the determination  of  the methods of  recruitment  and  conditions  of  service  of  general  application  to  Government servants in civil employment; and

(b) the  interpretation  of  the  existing  orders  of  general  application relating to such recruitment or conditions of  service.

(5) Unless the case is fully covered by the instructions issued or  advice given by that Ministry, the Ministry of External  Affairs  shall  be  consulted  on  all  matters  affecting  India's external relations.”

It was pointed out on the basis of the aforesaid Rules, that if the subject  

under consideration pertained to business of a singular department, the  

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determination  thereof  would  be  rendered  “...  under  the  general  or  

special directions of the Minister in-charge...”.  As against the aforesaid,  

it  was  pointed  out,  that  in  situations  where  the  subject  concerned  

related to more than one department, no final decision could be taken,  

and  no  final  order  could  be  passed,  unless  all  the  concerned  

departments  were  agreeable  to  the  contemplated  action.   It  was,  

however,  pointed out,  that  in case of  non-concurrence of  one or  the  

other department, a final decision could still be taken, and a final order  

could still be passed, but only in consonance with the determination of  

the Cabinet.   

51. Insofar  as  the  present  controversy  is  concerned,  it  was  the  

vehement contention of the learned counsel for the appellants, that the  

administrative ministry relevant for the setting up of the North-Western  

Railway  Zonal  Headquarter  at  Jaipur  was  the  Ministry  of  Railways,  

whereas,  the  Department  of  Land  Resources  was  the  concerned  

department to deal with the matters pertaining to acquisition of land for  

purposes of the Union.  Insofar as the instant aspect of the matter is  

concerned,  learned  counsel  invited  our  attention  to  the  Second  

Schedule under the Government of India (Allocation of Business) Rules,  

1961.  Therein, under the Head ‘B’, the Department of Land Resources  

has been vested with the subject of administration of the provisions of  

the  Acquisition  Act,  and  matters  relating  to  acquisition  of  land  for  

purposes of the Union.  It was the pointed submission of the learned  

counsel for the appellants, that there was no material on the record of  

the  case  to  indicate,  that  in  the  instant  acquisition  proceedings,  the  

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concurrence of the Department of Land Resources was obtained.  As  

such,  it  was  submitted,  that  the  instant  acquisition  of  land  for  the  

Railways was liable to be set aside.   

52. In order to further his contention that the Rules of Business have  

a binding and mandatory character, learned counsel for the appellants  

placed reliance on a decision rendered by this Court in MRF Limited etc.  

vs. Manohar Parrikar & Ors., (2010) 11 SCC 374.  Our attention was  

invited to the following observations recorded therein :

“107. Thus from the foregoing, it is clear that a decision to be the  decision of the Government must satisfy the requirements of the  Business  Rules  framed  by  the  State  Government  under  the  provisions of Article 166(3) of the Constitution of India. In the case  on hand, as have been noticed by us and the High Court,  the  decisions  leading  to  the  notifications  do  not  comply  with  the  requirements  of  Business  Rules framed by the Government  of  Goa under the provisions of Article 166(3) of the Constitution and  the Notifications are the result of the decision taken by the Power  Minister at his level. The decision of the individual Minister cannot  be  treated  as  the  decision  of  the  State  Government  and  the  Notifications issued as a result  of the decision of the individual  Minister which are in violation of the Business Rules are void ab  initio and all actions consequent thereto are null and void.

108.  The  appellants  contended  before  this  Court  that  another  Division  Bench  of  the  High  Court  in  its  earlier  judgment  of  21.1.1999  had  held  that  the  Notification  dated  1.8.1996  was  clarificatory and that it did not create any extra financial liability on  the  State  Government  requiring  approval  of  the  Cabinet  in  compliance with the Business Rules before it  was brought  into  force. In our opinion the said Notification cannot  be treated as  mere c1arificatory. It is a notification issued purportedly in terms  of a Government decision. It was a decision finalized at the level  of the Minister of Power alone and was taken in violation of the  Rules of Business framed under Article 166(3) of the Constitution  of India. The decision cannot be called a government decision as  understood under Article 154 of the Constitution, though it may  

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satisfy  the  requirements  of  authentication.  Nevertheless  mere  authentication as required under Article 166(2) of the Constitution  did not make it a government decision in law nor would it validate  a decision which is void ab initio. The validity of the notification  will  have  to  be  tested  with  reference  to  the  constitutional  provisions and Business rules and not by their form or substance.  therefore, this contention of the appellants is liable to be rejected.”

No doubt, this Court in MRF Limited’s case (supra) has made a passing  

reference to the effect, that violation of Rules of Business would render  

all actions taken as void ab initio.  In other words, breach of the Rules of  

Business would render the entire action null and void.   

53. We have duly considered the fourth submission advanced by the  

learned counsel for the appellant.  The aforesaid determination in MRF  

Limited’s case (supra), has been rendered without examining the said  

proposition with reference to Article 77 of the Constitution, as also, any  

other legislative enactment.  We would, therefore, refrain from pointedly  

examining the issue (in a manner as would constitute our conclusion a  

ratio decidendi on the said subject) since we are of the view, that the  

same does not arise for consideration in the facts and circumstances of  

this case.  The acquisition in the present controversy was made by the  

Government  of  Rajasthan,  and  therefore,  there  was  hardly  any  

justification for the consultation of the Department of Land Resources of  

the Government of India.  It is only if the acquisition had been made by  

the Railways, the question of consultation with the Department of Land  

Resources would have arisen.  In our view, reliance on the provisions of  

the Government of India (Allocation of Business) Rules, 1961 and/or the  

Government of India (Transaction of Business) Rules, 1961 in order to  

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assail  the  acquisition  made  in  the  facts  and  circumstances  of  the  

present case by the Government of Rajasthan, is wholly misconceived.

54. The next contention, serially the fifth contention advanced at the  

behest of the appellants was, that the choice of the appellants’ land for  

acquisition  was vitiated  by  fraud,  and as such,  was liable  to  be  set  

aside.   In  this  behalf,  the  contention  advanced  at  the  hands  of  the  

learned counsel  for the appellants was, that  the action of  acquisition  

would  have  been  legitimate,  if  the  Government  of  Rajasthan  had  

acquired one block of land for setting up of the North-Western Railway  

Zone Complex.  It was submitted, that the acquisition in question for the  

purpose of  establishing the Zonal  Headquarter  and staff  quarters  for  

North-Western Railways is in two blocks.  In this behalf, it is pointed out,  

that there was motive and extraneous consideration in leaving out of  

acquisition, the land between the two blocks.  It was submitted, that the  

left out land (between the two blocks acquired) was owned by highly  

placed bureaucrats and police officers.  It was also submitted, that the  

action of acquiring the appellants’ land by consciously leaving out land  

in the ownership of highly placed influential persons would also be hit by  

Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution of India.  According to the learned  

counsel,  the  impugned  acquisition  process  was  also  liable  to  be  

described as arbitrary and discriminatory.   

(i) On the issue of  mala fides and fraud,  learned counsel  for  the  

appellants placed reliance on the decision rendered in Pratap Singh vs.  

State of Punjab, (1964) 4 SCR 733 wherein this Court held as under :

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“8.  Doubtless,  he who seeks to invalidate or  nullify  any act  or  order  must  establish  the  charge  of  bad  faith,  an  abuse  or  a  misuse by Government of its powers. While the indirect motive or  purpose,  or  bad  faith  or  personal  ill-will  is  not  to  be  held  established except on clear proof thereof, it is obviously difficult to  establish the state of a man's mind, for that it what the appellant  has to establish in this case, though this may sometimes be done  (See Edgington v. Fitzmaurice [1855] 29 C.D. 459.. The difficulty  is not lessened when one has to establish that a person in the  position of a minister apparently acting on the legitimate exercise  of  power  has,  in  fact,  been  acting  mala  fide  in  the  sense  of  pursuing  an illegitimate  aim.  We must,  however,  demur  to  the  suggestion that mala fide in the sense of improper motive should  be  established  only  by  direct  evidence  that  is  that  it  must  be  discernible from the order impugned or must be shown from the  notings in the file which preceded the order.  If  bad faith would  vitiate the order, the same can, in our opinion, be deduced as a  reasonable and inescapable inference from proved facts.”  

(ii) On the subject of classification and equality, learned counsel for  

the  appellants  placed  reliance  on  Col.  A.S.  Iyer  vs.  V.  

Balasubramanyam, (1980) 1 SCC 634, and invited our attention to the  

following conclusions drawn therein :

“57. Sri Govindan Nair, with assertive argument, gave us anxious  moments  when  he  pleaded  for  minimum justice  to  the  civilian  elements. He said that the impugned rules were so designed, or  did so result in the working, that all civilians, recruit or promotee,  who came in with equal expectations like his military analogue,  would be so outwitted at all higher levels that promotions, even in  long official  careers  would be hopes  that  sour  into  dupes and  promises that wither away as teasing illusions. In effect, even if  not in intent, if a rule produces indefensible disparities, whatever  the specious reasons for engrafting service weightage of the army  recruits,  we  may  have  had  to  diagnose  the  malady  of  such  frustrating inequality. After all, civilian entrants are not expendable  commodities,  especially  when  considerable  civil  developmental  undertakings  sustain  the  size  of  the  service.  And  their  contentment  through  promotional  avenues  is  a  relevant  factor.  The Survey of  India  is  not  a  civil  service 'sold'  to  the military,  stampeded by war psychosis. Nor does the philosophy of Article  14 or Article 16 con-, template de jure classification and de facto  easteification in public services based on some meretricious or  

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plausible  differentiation,  'Constitutional  legalistics  can  never  drown the  fundamental  theses  that,  as  the  thrust  of  Thomas's  case State of Kerala v. N.M. (1976) I LLJ 376 SC and the tail- piece of Triloki Nath Khosa's case State of J & K v. Triloki Nath  khoa  (1974)  I  LLJ  121  SC  bring  out,  equality  clauses  in  our  constitutional ethic have an equalising message and egalitarian  meaning which cannot be subverted' by discovering classification  between groups and perpetuating the inferior-superior complex by  a neo-doctrine. Judges may interpret, even make viable, but not  whittle down or undo the essence of the Article. This tendency, in  an elitist society with a dischard casts mentality, is a disservice to  our founding faith, even if judicially sanctified. Subba Rao J. hit  the nail on the head when he cautioned in Lachhman Das v. State  of Punjab [1963] 2 SCR 353 :

‘The  doctrine  of  classification  is  only  a  subsidiary  rule  evolved by courts  to give a practical  content  to the said  doctrine. Overemphasis on the doctrine of classification or  an anxious and sustained attempt to discover some basic  for classification may gradually and imperceptibly deprive  the  Article  of  its  glorious  content.  That  process  would  inevitably end in substituting the doctrine of  classification  for the doctrine of equality; the fundamental right to equality  before the law and the equal protection of the laws may be  replaced by the doctrine of classification.’

The quintessence of the constitutional code of equality is brought  out also by Bose, J. in Bidi Supply Co. case Bidi Supply Co. v.  The Union of India and Ors. [1956] 29 ITR 717 (SC) .

The truth is that it is impossible to be precise, for we are dealing,  with intangibles and though the results are clear it is impossible to  pin the thought down to any precise analysis. Article 14 sets out,  to  my mind,  an  attitude  of  mind,  -a  way  of  life,  rather  than a  precise  rule  of  law.  It  embodies  a  general  awareness  in  the  consciousness of  the people at  large of.  something that  exists  and which is very real but which cannot be pinned down to any  precise analysis of fact save to say in a given case that it falls this  side of the line or that, and because of that decisions on the same  point will vary as conditions vary, one conclusion in one part of  the country and another somewhere else; one decision today and  another tomorrow when the basis of society has altered and the  structure of current social thinking is different. It is not the law that  alters  but  the  changing  conditions  of  the  times  and  Article  14  narrows down to a question of fact which must be (determined by  the highest Judges in the land as each case arises.”

(iii) In  continuation  of  the  aforesaid,  learned  counsel  also  placed  

reliance on E.P. Royappa vs. State of Tamil  Nadu, (1974) 4 SCC 3;  

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Menaka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248; Ramana Dayaram  

Shetty vs. International  Airport  Authority of  India,  (1979) 3 SCC 489;  

and Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi, (1981) 1 SCC 722.

55. We have examined the last contention advanced at the hands of  

the learned counsel for the appellants.  The instant contention is based  

on  a  factual  assertions,  namely,  that  the  Government  of  Rajasthan  

acted  arbitrarily  and  in  a  discriminatory  fashion,  by  deliberately  and  

intentionally  leaving out  of  the acquisition process,  land belonging to  

highly  placed  influential  persons.   Before  venturing  to  examine  the  

instant  contention  advanced  at  the  behest  of  the  appellants,  it  is  

necessary  to  determine,  whether  the  factual  position,  at  the  time of  

acquisition was, as is being alleged by the appellants.  Unfortunately,  

our determination on the instant aspect of the matter is contrary to the  

assertions  advanced at  the hands  of  the appellants.   Insofar  as  the  

instant aspect of the matter is concerned, reference may be made to  

paragraph  11  of  the  counter  affidavit  filed  on  behalf  of  the  State  of  

Rajasthan, wherein, it was asserted as under :

“It would be relevant to mention that the argument raised about  certain  lands of  IAS & IPA officials  being selectively  left-out  is  without any substance.  This argument would only suffice if the  land  belonging  to  the  IAS/IPS  officials  on  the  date  on  of  acquisition.  This is apart from the fact that certain lands would be  left out in acquisition proceedings.  It is relevant to mention that  no land belongs to any IAS/IPS official on the date of acquisition  and any subsequent purchase would not invalidate the acquisition  proceedings.   Thus,  the finding on this  aspect  does not  suffer  from any legal infirmity.”

The aforesaid  factual  position has not  been denied on behalf  of  the  

appellants before this Court.  Thus viewed, it is apparent that the land  

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which  was  left  out,  and  which  falls  between  the  two  blocks  of  land  

acquired,  cannot  be  stated  to  have  been  owned  by  influential  

bureaucrats  or  police  officers,  at  the  time  when  the  acquisition  in  

question  was  made.   In  the  aforesaid  view  of  the  matter,  it  is  not  

possible for us to conclude, that the leaving out the land between the  

two blocks of acquired land, and further that, the choice of acquisition of  

the appellants’ land to the exclusion of the land left out of acquisition,  

was  vitiated  for  reasons  of  fraud,  mala  fides,  arbitrariness  or  

discrimination.  For the reasons recorded hereinabove, we find no merit  

even  in  the  last  contention  advanced  at  the  hands  of  the  learned  

counsel for the appellants.

56. It is necessary to record herein that the challenge raised at the  

behest  of  the  appellants,  to  the  acquisition  of  land  made  by  the  

Government of Rajasthan, for the Railways, was vehemently opposed  

by the official respondents for a variety of reasons.  More particularly on  

the grounds of delay and latches, as also, locus standi of the appellants  

to assail the acquisition proceedings.  Had we dealt with the objections  

raised by the respondents and found merit therewith, it may not have  

been necessary for us to examine the merits of the claim raised by the  

appellants before us.  We may acknowledge, that at the first blush, the  

objections raised by the official respondents did not seem to be bereft of  

merit.   Yet,  since the issues canvassed at  the hands of  the learned  

counsel for the appellants raised important issues of law, we considered  

it  just  and appropriate  to  deal  with  them in  order  to  settle  the  legal  

proposition canvassed.  Having recorded our conclusions on the issues  

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canvassed before us, we are of the view, that it is no longer necessary  

for us to deal with the objections/submissions canvassed on behalf of  

the official respondents.

57. For the reasons recorded hereinabove, we find no merit in these  

appeals.  The same are accordingly dismissed.

………………………….J. (P. Sathasivam)

………………………….J. (Jagdish Singh Khehar)

New Delhi; July 1, 2013.

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