10 December 2019
Supreme Court
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RAJENDRA DIWAN Vs PRADEEP KUMAR RANIBALA

Judgment by: HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE INDIRA BANERJEE
Case number: C.A. No.-003613-003613 / 2016
Diary number: 3698 / 2016
Advocates: SHRIRAM P. PINGLE Vs


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  REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3613 OF 2016

Rajendra Diwan               …... Appellant

versus  

Pradeep Kumar Ranibala & Anr.                        ….Respondents

WITH  

CA. NO. 10214 OF 2016

AND  

C.A. NO. 3051 OF 2017

J U D G M E N T

Indira Banerjee, J.

This  appeal,  purportedly  under  Section  13(2)  of  the

Chhattisgarh Rent Control Act, 2011, hereinafter referred to as the

“Rent Control Act”, is against an order dated 1.12.2015 of the Rent

Control Tribunal at Raipur, confirming an order dated 14.09.2015

passed by the Rent Control Authority,  whereby an application filed

by  the  respondent-landlord  for  eviction  of  the  appellant  tenant

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under Section 12 of the Rent Control Act has been allowed.  

2. Section 13(2) of the Rent Control Act provides:-  

(1) Notwithstanding  anything  to  the  contrary contained in this Act, a landlord and/or tenant aggrieved by any order of the Rent Controller shall have the right to appeal  in  the  prescribed  manner  within  the  prescribed time to the Rent Control Tribunal.  

(2) Appeal  against  an  order  of  the  Rent  Control Tribunal shall lie with the Supreme Court.

3. By  an  order  dated  18.4.2016,  a  Bench  of  this  Court

expressed serious doubts about the maintainability of the appeal,

observing  that  the  State  of  Chhattishgarh  prima  facie lacked

legislative competence to enact law providing for statutory appeals

directly  to  the  Supreme  Court,  from  the  orders  of  a  Tribunal.

Notice  was,  accordingly,  directed  to  be  issued  to  the  Attorney

General  for  India  and  the  Advocate  General  for  the  State  of

Chhattisgarh.  

4. On 19.4.2017, another Bench of this Court heard amongst

others, the Advocate General for the State of Chhattisgarh.  The

Advocate  General,  inter  alia,  argued  that  the  Rent  Control  Act

having received the assent of the President of India, Section 13(2)

thereof was protected by Article 138(2) read with Article 200 of the

Constitution of India and was valid and enforceable.  

5. After hearing Counsel and the learned Advocate General for

the  State  of  Chhattisgarh,  the  Bench  was  of  the  view that  the

appeal  involved  a  substantial  question  of  law  as  to  the

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interpretation  of  the  Constitution,  and  accordingly  referred  the

appeal  to  the  Chief  Justice  of  India,  for  assignment  to  a

Constitution Bench of this Court, in terms of Article 145(3) of the

Constitution.  The  Chief  Justice  has  referred  the  appeal  to  this

Bench.  

6. The question which requires to be determined by this Bench

is, whether Section 13(2) of the Rent Control Act is ultra vires the

Constitution of India, by reason of  lack of legislative competence

of the Chhattisgarh State legislature to enact the provision.  

7. Before  dealing  with  the  arguments  advanced  before  this

Bench, the relevant provisions of the Constitution of India are set

out hereinbelow for convenience:-  

“124. Establishment and constitution of Supreme Court

(1) There shall be a Supreme Court of India consisting of a Chief Justice of India and, until Parliament by law prescribes a larger number, of not more than seven other Judges

…….

xxx xxx xxx

130. Seat of Supreme Court. - The Supreme Court shall sit in Delhi or in such other place or places, as the Chief Justice of India  may,  with  the approval  of  the President,  from time to time, appoint.

131: Original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court

Subject  to  the  provisions  of  this  Constitution,  the  Supreme Court shall, to the exclusion of any other court, have original jurisdiction in any dispute –

(a) between the Government of India and one or more States; or

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(b) between the Government of India and any State or States on one side and one or  more other  States on the other;  or (c) between two or more States, if and in so far as the dispute involves any question (whether of law or fact) on which the existence or extent of a legal right depends:

Provided that the said jurisdiction shall not extend to a dispute arising out of any treaty, agreement, covenant, engagement, sanad or other similar instrument which, having been entered into  or  executed  before  the  commencement  of  this Constitution,  continues  in  operation  after  such commencement,  or  which  provides  that  the said  jurisdiction shall not extend to such a dispute.

132: Appellate jurisdiction of Supreme Court in appeals from High Courts in certain cases.-

(1)  An  appeal  shall  lie  to  the  Supreme  Court  from  any

judgement, decree or final order of a High Court in the territory

of India, whether in a civil, criminal or other proceeding, if the

High Court certifies under article 134A that the case involves a

substantial  question  of  law  as  to  the  interpretation  of  this

Constitution.

(2) ……. omitted w.e.f. 1.8.1979

(3) Where such a certificate is given, any party in the case may

appeal  to  the  Supreme Court  on  the  ground  that  any  such

question  as  aforesaid  has  been  wrongly  decided.

Explanation.-  For  the  purpose  of  this  article,  the  expression

“final  order”  includes  an  order  deciding  an  issue  which,  if

decided in favour of the appellant, would be sufficient for the

final disposal of the case.

133: Appellate jurisdiction of Supreme Court in appeals from High Courts in regard to civil matters.-

(1)  An  appeal  shall  lie  to  the  Supreme  Court  from  any judgment, decree or final order in a civil proceeding of a High Court in the territory of India if the High Court certifies under under Article 134A

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(a)  that  the  case  involves  a  substantial  question  of  law  of general importance; and

(b)  that  in  the  opinion  of  the  High  Court  the  said  question needs to be decided by the Supreme Court.

(2)  Notwithstanding  anything  in  article  132,  any  party appealing to the Supreme Court under clause (1) may urge as one of the grounds in such appeal that a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of this Constitution has been wrongly decided.

(3)  Notwithstanding anything in this article,  no appeal  shall, unless  Parliament  by  law  otherwise  provides,  lie  to  the Supreme Court  from the judgement, decree or final  order of one Judge of a High Court.

134: Appellate jurisdiction of Supreme Court in regard to criminal matters.-

(1)  An  appeal  shall  lie  to  the  Supreme  Court  from  any judgement, final order or sentence in a criminal proceeding of a  High  Court  in  the  territory  of  India  if  the  High  Court  – (a) has on appeal reversed an order of acquittal of an accused person  and  sentenced  him  to  death;  or (b) has withdrawn for trial before itself any case from any court subordinate to its authority and has in such trial convicted the accused  person  and  sentenced  him  to  death;  or (c) certifies under article 134A that the case is a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court:

Provided that an appeal under sub-clause (c) shall lie subject to such provisions as may be made in that behalf under clause (1) of article 145 and to such conditions as the High Court may establish or require.

(2) Parliament may by law confer on the Supreme Court any further  powers  to  entertain  and  hear  appeals  from  any judgment, final order or sentence in a criminal proceeding of a High Court in the territory of India subject to such conditions and limitations as may be specified in such law.

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134A: Certificate for appeal to the Supreme Court.-

Every High Court, passing or making a judgment, decree, final order, or sentence, referred to in clause (1) of article 132 or clause (1) of article 133, or clause (1) of article 134. –

(a)  may,  if  it  deems  fit  so  to  do,  on  its  own  motion;  and (b) shall, if an oral application is made, by or on behalf of the party aggrieved, immediately after the passing or making of such  judgment,  decree,  final  order  or  sentence, determine, as soon as may be after such passing or making, the question whether a certificate of the nature referred to in clause (1) of article 132, or clause (1) of article 133 or, as the case may be, sub-clause (c) of clause (1) of article 134, may be given in respect of that case.

135: Jurisdiction and powers of the Federal Court under existing law to be exercisable by the Supreme Court.-

Until Parliament by law otherwise provides, the Supreme Court shall  also  have  jurisdiction  and  powers  with  respect  to  any matter to which the provisions of article 133 or article 134 do not apply if jurisdiction and powers in relation to that matter were exercisable by the Federal Court immediately before the commencement of this Constitution under any existing law.

136: Special leave to appeal by the Supreme Court.-

(1)  Notwithstanding  anything  in  this  Chapter,  the  Supreme Court may, in its discretion, grant special leave to appeal from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any cause or matter passed or made by any court or tribunal in the territory of India.

(2)  Nothing  in  clause  (1)  shall  apply  to  any  judgment, determination, sentence or order passed or made by any court or  tribunal  constituted  by  or  under  any  law  relating  to  the Armed Forces.

137:  Review of  judgments  or  orders  by  the  Supreme Court.-

Subject to the provisions of any law made by Parliament or any rules made under article 145, the Supreme Court shall  have power to review any judgment pronounced or order made by it.

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138:  Enlargement  of  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Supreme Court.-

(1) The Supreme Court shall have such further jurisdiction and powers with respect to any of the matters in the Union List as Parliament may by law confer.

(2) The Supreme Court shall have such further jurisdiction and powers with respect to any matter as the Government of India and the Government of any State may by special  agreement confer, if Parliament by law provides for the exercise of such jurisdiction and powers by the Supreme Court.

139:  Conferment on the Supreme Court  of  powers to issue certain writs.-

Parliament may by law confer on the Supreme Court power to issue directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas  corpus,  mandamus,  prohibition,  quo  warranto  and certiorari, or any of them, for any purposes other than those mentioned in clause (2) of article 32.

139A: Transfer of certain cases.-

(1) Where cases involving the same or substantially the same questions of law are pending before the Supreme Court  and one or more High Courts or before two or more High Courts and the  Supreme Court  is  satisfied on  its  own  motion  or  on  an application made by the Attorney-General of India or by a party to any such case that such questions are substantial questions of general importance, the Supreme Court may withdraw the case or cases pending before the High Court or the High Courts and dispose of all the cases itself:

Provided that the Supreme Court  may after determining the said questions of law return any case so withdrawn together with  a  copy of  its  judgment  on  such  questions  to  the  High Court from which the case has been withdrawn, and the High Court shall on receipt thereof, proceed to dispose of the case in conformity with such judgment.

(2) The Supreme Court may, if it deems it expedient so to do for  the  ends  of  justice,  transfer  any  case,  appeal  or  other proceedings pending before any High Court to any other High Court.

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140: Ancillary powers of Supreme Court.-

Parliament may by law make provision for conferring upon the Supreme  Court  such  supplemental  powers  not  inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Constitution as may appear to be necessary or desirable for the purpose of enabling the court more effectively to exercise the jurisdiction conferred upon it by or under this Constitution.

141: Law declared by Supreme Court to be binding on all courts.-

The law declared by the Supreme Court  shall  be binding on all courts within the territory of India.

142:  Enforcement  of  decrees  and  orders  of  Supreme Court and orders as to discovery, etc.-

(1) The Supreme Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction may pass such decree or make such order as is necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or matter pending before it, and any decree so passed or order so made shall be enforceable throughout the territory of India in such manner as may be prescribed by or under any law made by Parliament and, until provision in that  behalf  is  so made, in  such manner as the President may by order prescribe.

(2) Subject to the provisions of any law made in this behalf by Parliament, the Supreme Court shall, as respects the whole of the territory of India, have all and every power to make any order  for  the  purpose  of  securing  the  attendance  of  any person, the discovery or production of any documents, or the investigation or punishment of any contempt of itself.

143: Power of President to consult Supreme Court.-

(1) If at any time it appears to the President that a question of law or fact has arisen, or is likely to arise, which is of such a nature and of such public importance that it  is expedient to obtain the opinion of the Supreme Court upon it, he may refer the question to that Court for consideration and the Court may, after such hearing as it thinks fit,  report to the President its opinion thereon.

(2) The President may, notwithstanding anything in the proviso to article 131, refer a dispute of the kind mentioned in the said

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proviso  to  the  Supreme Court  for  opinion  and the  Supreme Court  shall,  after  such hearing as it  thinks fit,  report  to  the President its opinion thereon.

144: Civil  and judicial  authorities to act in aid of the Supreme Court.-

All authorities, civil and judicial, in the territory of India shall act in aid of the Supreme Court.

145: Rules of Court, etc.-

(1) Subject to the provisions of any law made by Parliament, the Supreme Court may from time to time, with the approval of the President, make rules for regulating generally the practice and procedure of the Court….”

xxx xxx xxx

200. Assent to Bills. When a Bill  has been passed by the

Legislative  Assembly  of  a  State  or,  in  the  case  of  a  State

having a Legislative Council, has been passed by both Houses

of  the Legislature  of  the State,  it  shall  be presented to  the

Governor and the Governor shall declare either that he assents

to the Bill  or  that he withholds assent therefrom or  that  he

reserves the Bill for the consideration of the President:  

Provided that the Governor may, as soon as possible after the

presentation to him of the Bill for assent, return the Bill if it is

not a Money Bill together with a message requesting that the

House  or  Houses  will  reconsider  the  Bill  or  any  specified

provisions  thereof  and,  in  particular,  will  consider  the

desirability  of  introducing any such amendments as he may

recommend in his message and, when a Bill is so returned, the

House or Houses shall reconsider the Bill accordingly, and if the

Bill  is passed again by the House or Houses with or without

amendment  and  presented  to  the  Governor  for  assent,  the

Governor shall not withhold assent therefrom:  

Provided further that the Governor shall not assent to, but shall

reserve for the consideration of the President, any Bill which in

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the  opinion  of  the  Governor  would,  if  it  became  law,  so

derogate from the powers of the High Court as to endanger the

position which that Court is by this Constitution designed to fill.

201.  Bill  reserved  for  consideration.- When  a  Bill  is

reserved by a Governor for the consideration of the President,

the President shall declare either that he assents to the Bill or

that he withholds assent therefrom:  

Provided that, where the Bill is not a Money Bill, the President

may direct the Governor to return the Bill to the House or, as

the case may be, the Houses of the Legislature of the State

together  with  such  a  message  as  it  mentioned  in  the  first

proviso to Article 200 and, when a Bill is so returned, the House

or Houses shall reconsider it accordingly within a period of six

months from the date of receipt of such message and, if it is

again  passed  by  the  House  or  Houses  with  or  without

amendment, it shall be presented again to the President for his

consideration.

xxx xxx xxx

245.  Extent  of  laws  made  by  Parliament  and  by  the

Legislatures of States.-

(1)  Subject  to  the  provisions  of  this  Constitution,  Parliament

may make laws for the whole or any part  of  the territory of

India,  and the Legislature of  a State may make laws for the

whole or any part of the State

(2) No law made by Parliament shall be deemed to be invalid on

the ground that it would have extra territorial operation.

246. Subject-matter of laws made by Parliament and by

the Legislatures of States.- (1) Notwithstanding anything in

clauses (2) and (3), Parliament has exclusive power to make

laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List I in

the Seventh Schedule (in this Constitution referred to as the

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“Union List”).

(2) Notwithstanding anything in clause (3), Parliament and,

subject to clause (1), the Legislature of any State also, have

power  to  make  laws  with  respect  to  any  of  the  matters

enumerated  in  List  III  in  the  Seventh  Schedule  (in  this

Constitution referred to as the “Concurrent List”).

(3)     Subject to clauses (1) and (2),  the Legislature of any

State has exclusive power to make laws for such State or any

part thereof with respect to any of the matters enumerated in

List II in the Seventh Schedule (in this Constitution referred to

as the “State List”).

(4) Parliament has power to make laws with respect to any

matter for any part of the territory of India not included in a

State  notwithstanding  that  such  matter  is  a  matter

enumerated in the State List.

247. Power  of  Parliament  to  provide  for  the

establishment of certain additional courts.-

Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter, Parliament may by

law provide for the establishment of any additional courts for

the better administration of laws made by Parliament or of any

existing laws with respect to a matter enumerated in the Union

List.

248. Residuary powers of legislation.-

(1)  Parliament  has  exclusive  power  to  make  any  law  with respect to any matter not enumerated in the Concurrent List or State List

(2)  Such  power  shall  include  the  power  of  making  any  law imposing a tax not mentioned in either of those Lists

262. Adjudication of disputes relating to waters of inter-

State rivers or river valleys.-  (1)  Parliament may by law

provide for the adjudication of any dispute or complaint with

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respect to the use, distribution or control of the waters of, or in,

any inter-State river or river valley.

(2) Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, Parliament

may by law provide that neither the Supreme Court nor any

other court  shall  exercise  jurisdiction in respect of  any such

dispute or complaint as is referred to in clause (1).

348. Language to be used in the Supreme Court and in the  High  Courts  and  for  Acts,  Bills,  etc.-  (1) Notwithstanding  anything  in  the  foregoing  provisions  of  this Part, until Parliament by law otherwise provides-

(a)  all  proceedings in the Supreme Court  and in every High Court,

(b) the authoritative texts-

(i)  of all Bills to be introduced or amendments thereto to be moved in either House of Parliament or in the House or either House of the Legislature of a State,

(ii) of all Acts passed by Parliament or the Legislature of a State and  of  all  Ordinances  promulgated  by  the  President  or  the Governor of a State, and

(iii) of all orders, rules, regulations and bye-laws issued under this Constitution or under any law made by Parliament or the Legislature of a State,

shall be in the English language.

(2) Notwithstanding anything in sub-clause (a)  of  clause (1), the Governor of a State may, with the previous consent of the President, authorise the use of the Hindi language, or any other language  used  for  any  official  purposes  of  the  State,  in proceedings in the High Court having its principal seat in that State:

Provided  that  nothing  in  this  clause  shall  apply  to  any judgment,  decree  or  order  passed  or  made  by  such  High Court.”

8. Learned  Counsel  appearing  on  behalf  of  the  appellant

submitted  that  the  Rent  Control  Act  has  been  enacted  by  the

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Chhattisgarh  State  Legislature,  in  exercise  of  legislative  power

conferred by Entry 18 of List II, that is, the State List in the Seventh

Schedule to the Constitution of India.   

9. Counsel argued that Entry 77 of List I, that is, the Union List,

confers exclusive power to the Union Legislature, to legislate with

regard to the constitution, organisation, jurisdiction and powers of

the  Supreme Court,  including  contempt  of  such  Court,  whereas

Entry 65 of the State List enables the State Legislature to legislate

in respect of the jurisdiction and power of all Courts, except the

Supreme Court.

10. Learned  Counsel  argued  that  Section  13(2)  of  the  Rent

Control  Act  does  not  confer  any  additional  jurisdiction  to  the

Supreme  Court,  which  the  Supreme  Court  did  not  otherwise

possess. Section 13(2) of the Rent Control Act confers appellate

jurisdiction  to  the  Supreme  Court  of  India,  which  the  Supreme

Court, in any case, always had and still has under Article 136 of

the Constitution.   

11. Learned Counsel  further argued that Entry 77 enables the

Union  Parliament  to  legislate  with  regard  to  the  constitution,

organization,  jurisdiction  and  powers  of  the  Supreme  Court  of

India.   According to Counsel,  the scope of  this  Entry cannot  be

widened to include the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.

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12. Counsel  emphatically  asserted that Article  138(1)  provides

that  the Supreme Court  shall  have such further jurisdiction and

powers with respect to any of the matters in the Union List,  as

Parliament may by law confer. This provision, according to Counsel,

can only be understood to include the original jurisdiction of the

Supreme Court.   

13. Counsel  argued  that  Article  138(2)  provides  that  the

Supreme Court shall have such further jurisdiction and powers with

respect  to  any  matter,  as  Government  of  India  and  the

Government of  any State may, by special  agreement,  confer,  if

Parliament by law provides for  exercise of  such jurisdiction and

powers by the Supreme Court.  

14. Learned Counsel next argued that Section 13(2) of the Rent

Control Act is in consonance with Article 138, read with Article 200

of the Constitution of India, which enables the State Legislature to

enact law curtailing the jurisdiction of the High Court, subject to

the assent of the President of India.   

15. Counsel  further  argued  that  if,  in  the  opinion  of  the

Governor, any Bill, if it becomes law, would so derogate from the

powers of the High Court, as to endanger the position which the

High Court is by the Constitution, designed to fill, the Governor is

not to assent to the bill, but reserve the same for the consideration

of the President.

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16. Counsel submitted that a law which curtails powers of the

High Court  may be validated by Presidential  assent.   The State

Legislature can restrict the appellate power of the High Court by

providing for direct appeals to the Supreme Court.

17. Counsel argued that a comparative reading of Articles 138(2)

and Article 200 show that the State can make a law conferring

appellate jurisdiction on the Supreme Court in the following two

conditions:

(i) When Government of India and Government of any State agree  to  confer  jurisdiction  and  power  on  the Supreme Court [Article 138(2)];

(ii) When the President assents to the Bill forwarded by the Governor of  the State [second proviso to Article 200]

18. Learned Counsel submitted that in this case, the conditions

of Article 138(2) and the Second proviso to Article 200 have both

been  complied  with.  The  President  has,  on  reference  by  the

Governor,  assented  to  the  Bill,  which  has  resulted  in  a  new

enactment.  

19. Learned  Counsel  argued  that,  as  per  Article  74  of  the

Constitution, the President is to act as per the aid and advice of

the  Council  of  Ministers.   To  strengthen  his  argument  that  the

President cannot act independently, but can only act on the aid

and advice of  his Council  of Ministers,  Counsel cited  Samsher

Singh vs. the State of Punjab and Anr. reported in AIR 1974

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SC 2192: (1974) 2 SCC 831.  

20. According to Counsel, assent by the President, on the aid and

advice of the Council of Ministers, tantamounts to compliance with

the conditions in Article 138(2) of the Constitution, as Presidential

assent on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers, means

agreement between the State Government and the Government of

India to confer  appellate jurisdiction and power to the Supreme

Court in relation to orders of the Rent Control Tribunal.  

21. Counsel also emphasized on the difference in the language

of Article 138 (1) and Article 138(2) and in particular the use of the

expression, ‘Government of India’ in Article 138(2) as against the

expression  ‘Parliament’  in  Article  138(1),  to  argue  that  the

Government of  India  and the Government of  any State may by

special  agreement  confer  further  jurisdiction  and powers  to  the

Supreme Court, for which no statutory enactment of Parliament is

necessary.  The advice of the Council of Ministers to the President

of  India,  to assent to a State enactment evinces an agreement

between the Government of  India and the State Government in

that regard.

22.  Counsel has also cited Puthiyadath Jayamathy Avva and

Ors. vs. K.J. Naga Kumar and Ors. reported in AIR 2001 KER

38.  The part of the judgment cited is extracted hereinbelow:-   

“...if the President assents to a State law which has been

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reserved for consideration under Article 200, it will prevail notwithstanding its repugnancy to an earlier law of the Union.  Thus, even if there is repugnancy, the law made by  the  Legislature  of  the  State,  if  it  was  reserved  for consideration  of  the  President  and  has  received  his assent, will prevail in the State. Thus, from the Act XXX of 1976,  it  can  be  seen  that  it  was  reserved  for  the consideration of the President and the President has given his assent on 10-8-1976.  Therefore, the argument of the learned  Counsel  for  the  appellants  that  the  State enactment cannot override the Central enactment cannot be accepted as correct...”

23. Counsel finally argued that it was settled law that in case of

any inconsistency between the provisions of the Constitution and

the provisions of any statutory enactment, the various articles of

the  Constitution  and  the  various  provisions  of  the  statutory

enactments should be harmoniously construed.   

24. Elaborating on his argument, Counsel pointed out that the

expression  “derogate  from the  powers  of  the  High  Court  as  to

endanger  the  position  which  that  Court  by  this  Constitution,  is

designed to fill” in the last part of the second proviso to Article 200

alludes  to  derogation  of  the  inherent  powers  of  the  High Court

under Articles 226 and Article 227 of the Constitution of India.  The

Rent Control Act does not touch the power of the High Courts, of

judicial review under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of

India.  Section 13(2) of the Rent Control Act only confers appellate

jurisdiction on the Supreme Court of India, which is not prohibited

or barred under the Constitution.

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25. Counsel emphatically reiterated his argument that the Rent

Control  Act  has  not  conferred  any  jurisdiction  on  the  Supreme

Court,  which  it  did  not  earlier  possess.  Article  136 provides for

appeal  to  the  Supreme  Court  against  any  order  of  any   

Court or Tribunal.  Section 13(2) of the Rent Control Act is only in

consonance with  or  may be an extension  of  the  powers  of  the

Supreme Court under Article 136.   

26. The learned Attorney General for India, on the other hand,

submitted  that  Section  13(2)  of  the  Rent  Control  Act  which

provides for direct appeal to the Supreme Court of India, from any

order passed by the Rent Control Tribunal, set up under the Rent

Control  Act,  is  unconstitutional,  the  same  being  beyond  the

legislative competence of the State Legislature of Chhattisgarh.

27. The  learned  Attorney  General  submitted  that  lack  of

legislative  competence of  the  Chhattisgarh  State  Legislature,  to

enact Section 13(2) of the Rent Control Act, is evident from a mere

reading  of  three  entries  in  the  Seventh  Schedule  of  the

Constitution of India, that is, Entry 77 of List 1 (Union List), Entry

65 of List II (State List) and Entry 46 of List III (Concurrent List).

28. The  learned  Attorney  General  submitted  that  it  would  be

seen  that  Entry  77  of  List  I,  read  with  Article  146(1)  of  the

Constitution,  confers  on  Parliament  the  exclusive  jurisdiction  to

legislate with regard to the jurisdiction and powers of the Supreme

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Court of India. Furthermore, Entry 65 of List II, as well as Entry 46

of List III, prohibit a State Legislature from legislating in regard to

the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of India.

29. The  learned  Attorney  General  further  submitted  that  the

clear scheme and architecture of  these entries is  buttressed by

other  provisions  in  the  Constitution,  which  confer  only  on

Parliament the competence to legislate in regard to the Supreme

Court  of  India.  These provisions  include Articles  124(1),  125(1),

125(2),  133(3),  134(2),  135(1),  137,  138(1),  138(2),  139,  140,

145(1), 262 and 348(1).

30. The learned Attorney General submitted that, the fact that

the  Rent  Control  Act  had  been  reserved  for  the  assent  of  the

President of India, under Article 200 of the Constitution, and had

received the assent of the President in terms of Article 201, would

not in any manner alter the extent of legislative competence of the

State Legislature.  This is for the reason that, neither the Governor

of  any  State,  nor  the  President  of  India,  may  confer  legislative

competence  on  any  legislative  body,   whether  Parliament  or  a

State Legislature, contrary to the provisions of the Constitution.   

31. The learned Attorney General argued that the distribution of

legislative powers between Parliament and the State Legislatures

is governed by Chapter I of Part XI of the Constitution, including

Articles 246 and 248, along with the three Lists contained in the

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Seventh Schedule to the Constitution.  Any question of legislative

competence  would  have  to  be  decided  finally  by  this  Court,  in

accordance with these provisions of the Constitution.

32. The learned Attorney General referred to the decision of this

Court  in  K.K.  Poonacha  vs.  State  of  Karnataka  and  Ors.

reported in (2010) 9 SCC 671, which interprets, inter alia, Article

31(3) of the Constitution, as it stood prior to its repeal.  Article 31

pertained to the compulsory acquisition of property, and Clause (3)

thereof stated that “No such law as stated in Clause (2) made by

the Legislature of a State shall have effect unless such law, having

been reserved for the consideration of the President, has received

his assent”.  In K.K. Poonacha (supra), this Court opined:-

“What was implicit in the language of Article 31(3) was that  the  particular  law  was  within  the  legislative competence of the State and such law did not violate the provisions contained in Part III or any other provision of the Constitution.   The assent given by the President in terms of Article 31(3) of the Constitution to a law enacted by  the  legislature  of  a  State  did  not  mean  that  the particular  enactment acquired immunity  from challenge even  though  the  same  was  not  within  the  legislative competence of the State or was otherwise violative of any constitutional provision.”

33. The learned Attorney General submitted, and rightly, that the

observations  of  this  Court  in  K.K.  Poonacha (supra) squarely

apply to the grant of assent by the President of India under Article

201 of the Constitution.

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34. The  learned  Attorney  General  submitted  that  it  is  worth

noting that  the  Governor  of  a  State  may reserve a  Bill  for  the

consideration  of  the  President  of  India  for  various  reasons,

including inconsistency with a parliamentary statute, impact of the

statute on relations with other states, etc.  In certain situations,

the Governor is bound to reserve a Bill for the consideration of the

President,  including  matters  covered  by  the  second  proviso  to

Article 200, i.e. a Bill, which in the opinion of the Governor would

“so derogate from the powers of the High Court as to endanger the

position which that Court is by this Constitution designed to fill”.

This is consistent with the role and duty of the Governor of a State,

and the President of India, who, like the King of England will still

have the right “to be consulted, to encourage and to warn”, as

explained in  Shamsher Singh (supra).   However,  the  grant  of

assent  by  the  Governor,  or  by  the  President,  would  not  in  any

manner affect or control the issue of legislative competence of the

legislature of the State.

35. The  learned  Attorney  General  also  referred  to  a  recent

judgment of a Division Bench of this Court rendered on 15.10.2019

in  Civil  Appeal  No.5153 of  2019 (H.S.  Yadav vs.  Shakuntala

Devi Parakh) striking down Section 13(2) of the Rent Control Act

as ultra vires  the Constitution and beyond the scope of the powers

of the State Legislature.

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36. Parliament and the State Legislatures derive their power to

make laws from Article 245(1) of the Constitution of India and such

power  is  subject  to  and/or  limited  by  the  provisions  of  the

Constitution.   While Parliament can make law for the whole or any

part of the territory of India, the State Legislature can only make

laws  for the State or any part thereof, subject to the restrictions in

the Constitution of India.  

37. Article 246, which distributes legislative powers between the

Union  Legislature  and  the  State  Legislature,  confers  exclusive

power  to  Parliament  to  make  laws  in  respect  of  the  matters

specified in List I in the Seventh Schedule, that is, the Union List.

The Union Parliament also has, subject to Clause (3) of  Article 246,

the  power  to  make  laws  with  respect  to  any  of  the   matters

enumerated  in  List  III  in  the  Seventh  Schedule,  that  is,  the

Concurrent List.

38. While Parliament has exclusive power under Article 246(1) of

the  Constitution  to  make  laws  with  respect  to  the  matters

enumerated in the Union List, the State Legislature has exclusive

power to make laws with respect to matters enumerated in the

State List,  subject to Clauses (1) and (2) of Article 246.  Along with

the Union Legislature, the State Legislature is also competent to

enact laws in respect of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent

List, subject to the provisions of Article 246(1).

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39. The entries in the three lists, relevant to the issues referred

to this Bench, that is, Entry 77 of the Union List,  Entries 18 and 65

of the State List and Entry 46 of the Concurrent List are set out

hereinbelow for convenience:-

“List I- Union List  

“77. Constitution, organisation, jurisdiction and powers of the Supreme Court (including contempt of such Court), and the fees taken therein; persons entitled to practise before the Supreme Court.”  

List II – State List  

“18.  Land,  that  is  to  say,  rights  in  or  over  land,  land tenures including the relation of landlord and tenant, and the  collection  of  rents;  transfer  and  alienation  of agricultural  land;  land  improvement  and  agricultural loans; colonization.

xxx xxx xxx

65.  Jurisdiction  and  powers  of  all  courts,  except  the Supreme Court, with respect to any of the matters in this List.”

List III - Concurrent List  

46.  Jurisdiction  and  powers  of  all  courts,  except  the Supreme Court, with respect to any of the matters in this List.”

40. The Supreme Court has been established under Article 124

of the Constitution of India and derives its jurisdiction and powers

from Articles 131 to 145 thereof.    There is  no provision in  the

Constitution  which  provides  for  direct  appeal  to  the  Supreme

Court,  from  an  order  of  a  Tribunal  constituted  under  any  law

enacted by a State Legislature.

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41. Article  262(2)  of  the  Indian  Constitution  which  enables

Parliament  to  enact  law  abrogating  the  power  of  the  Supreme

Court to adjudicate the disputes referred to in Article 262(1), and

Article 348 of the Constitution of India in respect of parliamentary

enactments relating to the language of the Supreme Court and the

High Courts, referred to by the Learned Attorney General for India,

are not really of relevance to the issue referred to this Bench for

determination, except to demonstrate that all matters pertaining

to the Supreme Court are exclusively within the legislative domain

of Union Parliament.

42. Entry 18 of the State List enables the State Legislature to

enact law with respect to land, including rights in and over land,

land  tenures  including  relation  of  landlord  and  tenant  and  the

collection of rent.   The State Legislature being clothed with power

to enact law in respect of land tenures, including the relation of

landlord and tenant and the collection of rent,  it  had legislative

competence to enact the Rent Control Act, in so far as the same

regulates the relationship of landlord and tenant and the collection

of rent.

43. Article 323B inserted in the Constitution of India, with effect

from  3rd January,  1977,  by  the  Constitution  (Forty  Second

Amendment)  Act  1976  empowers  the  appropriate  legislature  to

enact law providing for adjudication and/or trial  by Tribunals,  of

any disputes, offences or complaints with respect to all or any of

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the matters in Clause (2) of the said Article.

44. Clause (2) of Article 323B was amended by the Constitution

(Seventy fifth Amendment) Act, with effect from 15th May, 1994 to

inter  alia insert  clause  (h),  thereby  enabling  the  appropriate

legislature  to  make  law,  providing  for  adjudication  or  trial  by

Tribunals  of  any  disputes,  complaints  or  offences,  in  respect  of

issues  relating  to  tenancy  and  rent,  including  regulation  and

control of rent.

45. The  Explanation  appended  to  Section  323B  of  the

Constitution explains “appropriate legislature” in Article  323B to

mean  Parliament,  or  as  the  case  may  be,  a  State  Legislature,

competent to make laws with respect to the matter in accordance

with the provisions of Part XI of the Constitution of India, which

includes Articles 245 and 246.

46. On a conjoint reading of Article 323B and Articles 245 and

246 of the Constitution of India with Entry 18 of the State List in

the  Seventh  Schedule,  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  State

Legislature was competent to enact law to provide for adjudication

and  trial  of  all  disputes,  complaints  and  offences  relating  to

tenancy and rent, by a Tribunal.

47. The Chhattisgarh State Legislature was thus competent  to

enact the Rent Control Act, to the extent that it provides for the

adjudication of original disputes relating to tenancy and rent by the

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Rent  Controller,  and  creates  a  Tribunal  to  decide  appeals  from

orders  of  the  Rent  Controller,  but  subject  to  the  exception,  as

discussed hereafter.  

48. When the question of vires of any enactment is considered, it

is to be seen, whether looking at the legislation as a whole, it can

be said to be a legislation, substantially with respect to any of the

matters,  with  regard  to  which  the  Legislature  is  competent  to

legislate, under any specific Article of the Constitution, or any of

the Entries in the relevant List in the Seventh Schedule thereto.

Once it is held that it is so, the legislative power conferred by that

Entry is to extend to all  ancillary matters, which may fairly and

reasonably be said to be comprehended in that arena, as held by

the  Federal  Court  in  United  Provinces  vs.  Atika  Begum

reported in AIR 1941 FC 16 (25) and reiterated by this Court in

numerous judgments.    

49. Section 13(2)  of  the Rent  Control  Act,  providing for  direct

appeal  to  the  Supreme  Court  from  orders  passed  by  the  Rent

Control Tribunal, is not ancillary or incidental to the power of the

Chhattisgarh State Legislature to enact a Rent Control Act, which

provides for appellate adjudication of appeals relating to tenancy

and rent  by  a  Tribunal.   In  enacting  Section  13(2)  of  the  Rent

Control  Act,  the  Chhattisgarh  State  Legislature  has  overtly

transgressed the limits of its legislative power, as reiterated and

discussed hereinafter.

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50. While the widest amplitude should be given to the language

used in one entry, every attempt has to be made to harmonize its

contents with those of other Entries, so that the latter may not be

rendered nugatory.    

51. As observed above, both the Union legislature and the State

Legislature derive their power to legislate from Article 245 of the

Constitution of India.  It is axiomatic that the legislature of a State

may only make laws for the whole or any part of the State, while

Parliament  may  make  laws  for  the  whole  or  any  part  of  the

territory of India.  There is no provision in the Constitution which

saves State laws with extra-territorial operation, similar to Article

245(2)  which  expressly  saves  Union  laws  with  extra-territorial

operation,  enacted  by  Parliament.   The  Chhattisgarh  State

Legislature,  thus,  patently  lacks  competence  to  enact  any  law

which affects the jurisdiction of  the Supreme Court,  outside the

State of Chhattisgarh.

52. Entry 18 of the State List only enables the State Legislature

to legislate with regard to landlord tenant relationship, collection of

rents  etc.   This  Entry  does  not  enable  the  State  Legislature  to

circumvent  Entry 64 of the State List or Entry 46 of the Concurrent

List which enable the State Legislature to enact laws with respect

to  the  jurisdiction  and  powers  of  Courts,  except  the  Supreme

Court,  or  to  render  otiose,   Entry  77  of  the  Union  List,  which

expressly confers law making power in respect of the jurisdiction of

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the Supreme Court, exclusively to Parliament.  

53. Entry  18 of  the  State  List,   which  only  enables  the  State

Legislature to legislate with regard to land, land tenures, landlord

tenant  relationship,  collection  of  rents  etc.  does  not  enable  the

State Legislature to enact law conferring appellate jurisdiction to

the Supreme Court in respect of  orders passed by an Appellate

Rent Control Tribunal,  constituted under a state law.  

54.  In view of Entry 77 of the Union List, only Parliament has the

legislative competence to legislate with respect to the constitution,

organization, jurisdiction or powers of the Supreme Court.  Entry

64 of the State List and Entry 46 of the Concurrent List enable the

State Legislature to enact law with respect to the jurisdiction and

powers of Courts except the Supreme Court.   In other words, the

said Entries expressly debar the State Legislature from legislating

with respect to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.

55. Article 323B (3)(d) provides that a law made under Article

323B  (1)  may  exclude  the  jurisdiction  of  all  courts  except  the

jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 136, with respect to

all or any of the matters falling within the jurisdiction of the said

tribunals.   Article  323B  does  not  enable  a  State  Legislature  to

expand  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Supreme  Court  by  enacting  a

provision for further statutory appeal to the Supreme Court from

an order of an Appellate Tribunal.

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56. The  contention  of  Counsel  for  the  appellant  that  Section

13(2)  of  the  Rent  Control  Act  does  not  confer  on  the  Supreme

Court, jurisdiction it did not already possess, but is only incidental

to  and/or  extension  of  its  power  under  Article  136,  is  not

sustainable in law.  

57. Under  Article  136  of  the  Constitution,  the  Supreme Court

does  not  act  as  a  regular  court  of  appeal.   The  power  of  the

Supreme Court under Article 136 is not to be confused with the

appellate  power  ordinarily  exercised  by  appellate  courts  and

Tribunals under specific statutes.

58. Article 136 does not confer a right of appeal on any party,

but  confers  a  discretionary  power  on  the  Supreme  Court  to

interfere  in  appropriate  cases.   This  power  can be exercised  in

spite of other provisions for appeal contained in the Constitution,

or any other law, as  held in N. Natarajan vs. B. K. Subba Rao

reported in (2003) 2 SCC 76.   

59. Conclusiveness or finality given by a statute to decision of a

Court or Tribunal, cannot deter the Supreme Court from exercising

this jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution as held by a

Constitution  Bench  of  this  Court,  inter  alia,  in  Dhakeshwari

Cotton  Mills  Ltd.  vs.  Commissioner  of  Income Tax,  West

Bengal reported in AIR 1955 SC 65 and reiterated in numerous

other  decisions.  appellate  jurisdiction  is  not  exercised  when  a

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statute gives finality to a decision of the Court or Tribunal.   

60. Under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, the Supreme

Court  entertains  appeals  by  special  leave,  where  substantial

questions of law or questions of public importance are involved.

Where there is any uncertainty in the law, the Supreme Court, in

its  discretion,  settles  the  law.   The  Supreme  Court  does  not

ordinarily interfere with concurrent findings of  fact under Article

136.   If  the  concurrent  findings  are  based  on  accepted  oral  or

documentary evidence, there is no interference under Article 136

of the Constitution.

61. While exercising power under Article 136 of the Constitution,

the  Supreme  Court  does  not  re-appreciate  evidence  which  has

been appreciated by the Trial Court and the High Courts, unless

extraordinary circumstances exist.  It is only where the High Court

has completely missed the real point requiring adjudication or has

missed or ignored the relevant material, would the Supreme Court

be justified in getting into evidence for the purpose of preventing

grave injustice to a party.   

62. An  appeal,  on  the  other  hand,  is  a  continuation  of  the

original proceedings.  Where there is a statutory appeal from an

appellate order of the Tribunal,  the appellate court is  obliged to

rehear  the case,   re-appreciate and re-analyze the evidence on

record,  adjudicate  the  correctness  of  the  order  impugned  and

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correct errors both of fact and of law, that the Tribunal may have

made.  

63.  Article 200 of the Constitution relating to the passage of Bills

except  money  Bills,  requires  Bills  passed  by  the  Legislative

Assembly of  a State,  or  in  case of  a State having a Legislative

Council, a bill passed by both the houses of the Legislature of the

State,  to  be  presented  to  the  Governor  for  assent.  Such  Bills

become law on receipt of assent of the Governor.

64. The  second  proviso  to  Article  200  of  the  Constitution

mandates  the  Governor  not  to  assent,  but  reserve  for  the

consideration of the President, any Bill, which in the    opinion    of

the   Governor   would,   if  it became law, so derogate from the

powers of the High Court, as to endanger the position which that

Court is, by the Constitution, designed to fill.

65. Presidential assent is imperative in the case of law enacted

by a State Legislature, which would derogate from the powers of

the High Court, as to endanger the position which that Court is, by

the Constitution, designed to fill.  

66. Entry  65  of  the  State  List  read  with  Entry  46  of  the

Concurrent List, as stated above, enables the State Legislature to

enact law with respect to the jurisdiction and powers of all Courts,

except the Supreme Court with respect to any of the matters in

those lists. The State Legislature may, therefore, be competent to

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enact law which affects the jurisdiction and powers of  the High

Court, except   the jurisdiction and powers of the High Court under

Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution,  held by a Constitution

Bench  of   this  Court,  to  be  an  inviolable  basic  feature  of  the

Constitution  in  L  Chandra  Kumar  vs.  Union  of  India  and

others reported in AIR 1997 SC 1125.

67. Counsel for the appellant is right in arguing that  L Chandra

Kumar  (supra)  pertains  to  the  power  of  the  High  Court  under

Articles  226  and  227  of  the  Constitution  of  India.   The  State

Legislature has the power to enact law which abridges the powers

of  the  High  Court,  except  those  powers,  which  constitute  an

inviolable basic feature of the Constitution, such as the powers of

the High Court under Articles 226 and 227.  

68. The  second  proviso  to  Article  200,  of  the  Constitution

prohibits  the  Governor  from  assenting  to  a  Bill,  which  in  the

opinion of the Governor would, if it became law, so derogate from

the powers of the High Court, as to endanger the position which

the High Court is, by the Constitution of India, design to fill.  The

Governor is obliged to reserve such bill for the consideration of the

President.  

69. The second proviso to Article 200 is not attracted in the case

of Section 13(2) of the Rent Control Act, since it does not derogate

from any power of the High Court.  It is well settled that there is no

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inherent right of appeal.  Right of appeal is conferred by Statute. A

Statute is not invalid only because it has no provision of appeal to

the High Court.   

70. For the purpose of this reference, it is not necessary for us to

go into the question of which curtailments of the power of the High

Court would threaten the position which the High Court is required

by the Constitution to fill.

71. The  amplitude  of  power  conferred  by  Clauses  1  and  2  of

Article  246,  makes  the  Parliament  competent  to  make  a  law

enlarging the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court with respect to any

of  the  matters  enumerated  in  List  I  and  III,  even  though  such

enlargement may not be contemplated  by the various Articles of

Chapter IV of Part V of the Constitution.    

72. By  virtue  of  the  power  conferred  by  Article  248  of  the

Constitution of India, the Parliament has, subject to Article 246 A of

the Constitution, exclusive power to make any law  with respect to

any matter not enumerated in the Concurrent List or State List.

The residuary power of legislation thus rests with Parliament.  

73.  Suffice it to note that in view of Entry 65 of the State List

and Entry 46 of  the Concurrent  List,   the State Legislature can

enact law which affects the jurisdiction of all Courts, except  the

Supreme Court.  In other words it can enact law which affects the

jurisdiction of the High Court, except under Articles 226 and 227,

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but  it  cannot  enact  law  which  touches  the  jurisdiction  of  the

Supreme Court. The Rent Control Tribunal having been established

under  Article  323B of  the  Constitution,  as  observed  above,  the

diminution,  if  any,  of  the  jurisdiction  of  the  High  Court,  except

under Article 226 and 227, would be saved by Article 323B(3)(d) of

the Constitution, but not the provision for statutory appeal to the

Supreme Court.  

74. The  argument  of  Learned  Counsel  for  the  appellant  that

Article 138(1) and/or Entry 77 of the Union List only takes within its

ambit, the Original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, and not its

appellate jurisdiction, is fallacious and without basis.  There is no

reason to restrict the scope of Article 138(1) or of Entry 77 of the

Union List in the Schedule to the Constitution artificially.  Entry 77

of the Union List, going by its plain meaning, as also Article 138(1)

should  include  both  Original  and  appellate  jurisdiction  of  the

Supreme Court.    

75. The proposition urged by Counsel for the appellant that when

a State Law gets  the assent  of  the President  of  India,  that  law

prevails in the States, notwithstanding repugnancy with an earlier

Union law, is unexceptionable.   

76. However, Presidential assent makes no difference in case of

legislative incompetence.  Presidential assent cannot and does not

validate an enactment in excess of the legislative powers of the

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State Legislature, nor validate a statutory provision, which would

render express provisions of  the Constitution otiose.  Presidential

assent cures repugnancy with an earlier Central Statute, provided

the State Legislature is otherwise competent to enact the Statute.

77. In  view  of  our  finding  that  Presidential  assent  would  not

validate  a  statutory  provision  which  the  legislature  was

incompetent  to  enact,   we  need  not  go  into  the  question  of

whether the President had occasion to consider the repugnancy of

Section 13(2) of  the Rent Control  Act with the provisions of  the

Constitution, including in particular, Entry 65 of the State List and

Entry 46 of the Concurrent List, which expressly exclude from the

State  Legislature,  the  competence  and/or  power  to  enact  law

affecting the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.   

78. A law made under Article 323B (1) of the Constitution may

exclude the jurisdiction of all Courts except the jurisdiction of the

Supreme  Court  under  Article  136  with  respect  to  the  matters

falling within the jurisdiction of  the said Tribunals.  However, as

observed above, Article 323B (2) (d) or any other provision of the

Constitution  does not  enable the State Legislature to enact  law

which provides for statutory appeals to the Supreme Court.

79. Section 13(2) of  the Rent Control Act purports to confer a

right of statutory Second Appeal  to the Supreme Court. Even in

case of concurrent findings of the Rent Controller and Rent Control

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Tribunal,  where  no  serious  question  of  law  were  involved,  an

appeal  would  have  to  be  entertained  and  decided.   Such  a

provision  which  mandates  the  Supreme  Court  to  consider  an

appeal is clearly beyond the legislative competence of the State

Legislature, as argued by the learned Attorney General. Article 200

as observed above does not  and cannot  validate an  ultra  vires

enactment, which the concerned Legislature lacked competence to

enact.

80. Article 138 (2) of the Constitution provides that the Supreme

Court shall have such further jurisdiction and powers with respect

to any matter as the Government of India and the Government of

any State may by special agreement confer, if Parliament by law

provides for the exercise of such jurisdiction and powers by the

Supreme Court.

81. It is difficult to accept the submission of Counsel appearing

on behalf of the appellant, that reservation of a Bill for Presidential

assent and consequential grant of Presidential assent, tantamounts

to special agreement between the Government of India and the

State  Government,  because  the  President  acts  on  the  aid  and

advice of the Council of Ministers.

82. A  special  agreement,  in  our  considered  view  means,  an

independent  agreement  arrived  at  between  the  Government  of

India  and the Government of  a State through deliberations  and

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negotiations  and  not  just  an  approval  of  legislation  by  the

President on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers.    

83. In  any  case,  the  Supreme  Court  may  exercise  further

jurisdiction  pursuant  to  a  special  agreement  between  the

Government of India and the State Government on any particular

issue, provided Parliament by law provides for the exercise of such

jurisdiction  and powers by the Supreme Court.   Parliament has

not enacted any such law enabling the Supreme Court to exercise

jurisdiction in respect of a subject matter agreed upon between the

Government of India and the State Government. Article 138(2) is

not attracted.

84. We are in full agreement with the judgment of this Court in

H. S. Yadav (supra)  declaring Section 13(2) of the Rent Control

Act ultra vires  the Constitution and beyond the scope of the power

of the State legislature.  

85. It is true, that in L. Chandra Kumar  (supra) this Court held

that  Tribunals  constituted  under  Articles  323A  and  323B of  the

Constitution were subject to the writ jurisdiction of the High Courts,

within whose jurisdiction they were located, as noted by this Court

in H.S Yadav (supra).    

86. The power of superintendence conferred by Article 227 is,

however, supervisory and not appellate. It is settled law that this

power of judicial superintendence must be exercised sparingly,  to

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keep subordinate  courts  and  tribunals  within  the  limits  of  their

authority.   When a Tribunal has acted within its jurisdiction, the

High Court does not interfere in exercise of its extraordinary writ

jurisdiction unless there is  grave miscarriage of justice or flagrant

violation of law.  Jurisdiction under Article 227 cannot be exercised

“in the cloak of an appeal in disguise”.   

87. In  exercise  of  its  extraordinary  power  of  superintendence

and/or judicial review under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution

of India, the High Courts restrict interference to cases of patent

error  of  law  which  go  to  the  root  of  the  decision;  perversity;

arbitrariness  and/or  unreasonableness;  violation  of  principles  of

natural justice, lack of jurisdiction and usurpation of powers.  The

High Court does not re-assess or re-analyze the evidence and/or

materials on record.  Whether the High Court would exercise its

writ  jurisdiction  to  test  a  decision  of  the  Rent  Control  Tribunal

would depend on the facts and circumstances of the case. The writ

jurisdiction  of  the  High  Court  cannot  be  converted  into  an

alternative  appellate  forum,  just  because  there  is  no  other

provision of appeal in the eye of law.   

88. In  L Chandrakumar  (supra)  the  Supreme Court  in  effect

held that the power of the High Court under Article 226/227 of the

Constitution, being an inviolable basic feature of the Constitution

such power cannot  be abrogated by statutory enactment or  for

that matter even by constitutional amendment. L Chandrakumar

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(supra) cannot be construed to enlarge the jurisdiction of the High

Court under Article 226 and 227, to enable it to exercise appellate

powers.  

89. For  the  reasons  discussed  above,  we  hold  that  the  State

Legislature lacked legislative competence to enact Section 13(2) of

the Rent Control Act.   We, therefore, declare Section 13(2) of the

Rent Control Act ultra vires the Constitution of India,  null and void

and of no effect.

……………………………..J [ARUN MISHRA]

  ....…............................J. [INDIRA BANERJEE]

…..………………………...J  [VINEET SARAN]

…………...………………..J. [M.R. SHAH]

……..……………………...J. [S. RAVINDRA BHAT]

NEW DELHI; DECEMBER 10, 2019