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Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 967 OF 2005  

Rajeev Kumar                                                     ……  Appellant

Versus

State of Haryana                                              …..  Respondent

J U D G M E N T

A. K. PATNAIK, J.

This is an appeal by way of special leave under Article  

136  of  the  Constitution  against  the  judgment  dated  

16.09.2004 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Criminal  

Appeal No.337-SB of 1992.

Facts:

2. The  facts  very  briefly  are  that  on  26.02.1991  at  

11.20 P.M.,  the Assistant  Sub-Inspector  of  Police  of  Police

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Station-City  Dabwali,  District  Sirsa  in  Haryana,  Madan  Lal  

recorded a  statement  of  Vandana at  CHC Hospital,  Mandi  

Dabwali.   She  stated  that  about  two  years  ago,  she  was  

married to the appellant and the appellant used to taunt her  

on petty matters and earlier the appellant used to tease her  

for  dowry  and  on  being  fed  up  with  the  habits  of  the  

appellant, on 26.02.1991 between 7.00 and 7.30 P.M., she  

sprinkled  kerosene  on  her  and  set  herself  on  fire.   The  

statement  of  Vandana was  registered  as  First  Information  

Report (FIR) by the S.I. of P.S. Dabwali, Kuldeep Singh.  Soon  

thereafter on 26.02.1991, the Judicial Magistrate, First Class,  

R.S. Bagri, recorded a statement of Vandana under Section  

164  of  the  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure,  1973  (for  short  

‘Cr.P.C.’) in which Vandana reiterated her statement to the  

Police.   On 27.02.1991 at  2.20 A.M.,  Vandana died.   Post  

mortem was carried out on the body of Vandana (hereinafter  

referred to as ‘the deceased’) by Dr. S.S. Bansal.  The Police  

then took up the investigation and submitted a charge-sheet  

against the appellant.   

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3. On 28.08.1991, the Sessions Court framed a charge  

under Section 304B, IPC, against the appellant to which the  

appellant pleaded not guilty.   At the trial,  the prosecution  

examined Kedar  Nath,  who had prepared the  scaled  plan  

(Ext.  PA)  on  the  place  of  occurrence,  as  PW-1;  Dr.  R.C.  

Chaudhary,  Medical  Officer,  General  Hospital,  Mandi  

Dabwali,  who  had examined the  deceased  and found  the  

burn injuries on her body as PW-2; S.I. Kuldeep Singh of P.S.  

Dabwali, who had registered the FIR as PW-3; the landlord of  

the house in which the deceased lived with her husband as  

PW-4; Niranjan Ram Gupta, the father of the deceased, as  

PW-5; Bhupinder Kumar, the uncle of the deceased as PW-6;  

Dr. S.S. Bansal, who conducted the post mortem on the body  

of the deceased as PW-7; R.S. Bagri, the Judicial Magistrate,  

who recorded the statement of the deceased under Section  

164, Cr.P.C. as PW-8 and ASI Madan Lal,  the Investigating  

Officer,  as  PW-9.   The  statement  of  the  appellant  was  

recorded  under  Section  313,  Cr.P.C.   In  defence,  the  

appellant examined Ramesh Devra as DW-1; Jagdish Kumar  

as DW-2; Nihal Singh, Assistant Chief Medical Officer, Sirsa,  

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as  DW-3;  Dr.  Ajay  Kumar  Gupta,  Medical  Officer,  Civil  

Hospital, Sirsa, as DW-4 and Dr. J.L. Bhutani as DW-5.  After  

considering the evidence and the arguments on behalf of the  

parties, the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Sirsa, in his  

judgment dated 31.08.1992 held that  the prosecution has  

been able  to  prove  the  charge  against  the  appellant  and  

accordingly  convicted  him  under  Section  304B,  IPC.  

Thereafter, the learned Additional Sessions Judge heard the  

accused on the quantum of sentence and ordered that the  

appellant  be sentenced to  seven years  R.I.  with  a  fine of  

Rs.2,000/-  and  in  default  of  payment  of  fine,  to  undergo  

further imprisonment of six months.

4. Aggrieved,  the  appellant  filed  Criminal  Appeal  

No.337-SB of 1992 before the High Court. After hearing the  

appeal, the High Court in the impugned judgment held that  

the  deceased  had  indicated  in  her  dying  declarations  

(Exts.PG  and  PN)  before  ASI  Madan  Lal  and  the  Judicial  

Magistrate R.S.  Bagri  that she was being harassed by her  

husband with demands of dowry on account of which she  

had  sprinkled  kerosene  on  herself  before  setting  herself  

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ablaze. The High Court further held that the statement of the  

deceased in these two dying declarations (Exts. PG and PN)  

that she was being harassed for dowry stood corroborated  

by the evidence of the father of the deceased (PW-5) and  

uncle of the deceased (PW-6).  The High Court rejected the  

contention  raised  on  behalf  of  the  appellant  that  the  

deceased  was  not  in  the  medical  condition  to  speak  

inasmuch as her larynx and tracheae had been charred by  

burns, relying on the testimony of the medical experts Dr.  

R.C. Chaudhary (PW-2) and Dr. J.L. Bhutani   (DW-5) as well  

as the testimony of the ASI Madan Lal (PW-9) and the Judicial  

Magistrate R.S.  Bagri  (PW-8),  who had recorded the dying  

declarations of the deceased.  The High Court accordingly  

held that there was no ground to interfere with the orders of  

conviction  and  sentence  passed  by  the  trial  court  and  

dismissed the criminal appeal of the appellant.   

Contentions of the learned counsel for the parties:  

5. Mr. S.B. Upadhyay, learned counsel for the appellant,  

submitted that the finding in the impugned judgment that  

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the appellant was harassing the deceased for dowry is not  

correct inasmuch as PW-4, the landlord of the house in which  

the deceased and her husband were living, has stated in his  

evidence that  he  did  not  hear  any  sort  of  disharmony or  

fighting between the appellant and the deceased and that  

they used to live and lead a normal married life and both of  

them were blessed with a daughter, who was aged about six  

to  seven  months.   He  further  submitted  that  when  the  

Judicial  Magistrate  (PW-8)  recorded  the  statement  of  the  

deceased  under  Section  164,  Cr.P.C.,  Dr.  R.C.  Chaudhary  

(PW-2) was not present, as will be evident from the evidence  

of PW-8.  He submitted that PW-2, on the other hand, was  

the doctor who issued the fitness certificate to the Judicial  

Magistrate that the deceased was in a fit state to give the  

statement.  He referred to the opinion of Dr. S.S. Bansal (PW-

7)  to  submit  that  the  larynx and tracheae is  a  voice box  

containing vocal cords through which a man speaks and if  

they were charred by heat and burns, a person will not be  

able to speak.  He submitted that DW-2 was present in the  

hospital  for  the whole night on 26.02.1991 and DW-2 has  

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stated  that  the  deceased  was  not  in  a  position  to  speak  

when the alleged dying declarations are said to have been  

made.  He submitted that the trial court and the High Court,  

therefore,  were  not  correct  in  relying  on  the  dying  

declarations of the deceased recorded by the ASI Madan Lal  

and  the  Judicial  Magistrate  R.S.  Bagri  for  holding  the  

appellant guilty.

6. Mr.  Upadhyay next submitted that on a reading of  

the entire evidence of PW-5 (the father of the deceased), it  

will be clear that the appellant and the deceased were happy  

with each other and this will also be evident from the letters  

exchanged  between  the  family  members  between  March  

1989 and January 1991 (Exts. DE/2, DE/6, DE/7, DE/9, DE/12,  

DE/15,  DE/17,  DE/18,  DE/19,  DE/20,  DE/21,  DE/22  and  

DE/23).   He  submitted  that  this  is,  therefore,  not  a  case  

where the appellant had made any demand of dowry on the  

deceased and had subjected the deceased to any cruelty or  

harassment in connection with the demand of dowry soon  

before her death and hence the ingredients of the offence  

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under  Section  304B,  IPC,  are  missing  in  this  case  and,  

therefore,  the  appellant  could  not  have  been  held  guilty  

under Section 304B, IPC.

7. Mr.  Upadhyay  cited  the  decisions  of  this  Court  in  

Sanjiv Kumar v. State of Punjab [(2009) 16 SCC 487], Durga  

Prasad & Anr. v. State of Madhya Pradesh [(2010) 9 SCC 73],  

Gurdeep Singh v. State of Punjab & Ors. [(2011) 12 SCC 408]  

and  Devinder  alias  Kala  Ram & Ors.  v.  State  of  Haryana  

[2012) 10 SCC 763] in support of his submission that the  

offence under Section 304B, IPC, is not made out against the  

appellant.  He submitted that at the worst the appellant can  

be held  guilty  under  Section 306,  IPC,  for  having abetted  

suicide  by  the  deceased if  the  dying  declaration  is  to  be  

accepted.   He  argued  that  the  appellant  has  already  

undergone two years imprisonment and is now on bail and  

also has a young daughter to take care of and, therefore, the  

appellant should not be subjected to further imprisonment  

for the offence under Section 306, IPC.

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8. Mr. Vikas Sharma, learned counsel appearing for the  

State of Haryana, on the other hand, submitted that the two  

dying  declarations  (Ext.  PG  and  PN)  of  the  deceased  are  

clear  that  the  appellant  used  to  harass  the  deceased  for  

dowry and being fed up with the habits of the appellant, the  

deceased sprinkled kerosene oil  on herself and set herself  

ablaze.  He submitted that the evidence of Dr. S.S. Bansal  

(PW-7)  is  clear  that  one  can  speak  when  the  larynx  and  

tracheae are in the process of being charred.  He submitted  

that  even  DW-5,  the  medical  expert  produced  by  the  

accused in his defence, has admitted in cross-examination  

that in case of charring of vocal chords, the patient may be  

able to speak and the trial court has relied on this admission  

made by DW-5.  He submitted that Dr. R.C. Chaudhary has  

also  deposed  that  the  deceased  was  fit  to  make  the  

statement.   He submitted that  both these witnesses were  

medical experts and were rightly relied on by the trial court  

and the High Court to reject the contention of the appellant  

that  the  deceased  was  not  in  a  fit  condition  to  give  the  

statements to ASI Madan Lal and the Judicial Magistrate R.S.  

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Bagri.  Mr. Sharma also relied on the evidence of PW-5 that  

the  appellant  used to  give  beatings  to  the  deceased and  

demand more and more dowry.  He submitted that the trial  

court and the High Court were therefore right in holding the  

appellant guilty of the offence under Section 304B IPC.   

9. Mr. Sharma cited the decision of this Court in  Bansi  

Lal v. State of Haryana [(2011) 11 SCC 359] in which it has  

been held that while considering a case under Section 304B,  

IPC, cruelty in connection with demand of dowry has to be  

proved in close proximity to the time of death because of the  

expression “soon before her death” in Section 304B IPC, and  

the Court has to analyse the facts and circumstances of each  

case leading to the death of the victim and decide if there is  

such  proximate  connection  between  the  act  of  cruelty  in  

connection with demand of dowry and death of the woman.  

He also cited the decision of this Court in  Smt. Shanti and  

Another  v.  State  of  Haryana  [AIR  1991  SC  1226]  for  the  

proposition that once the death of a woman is found to be  

unnatural,  either  homicidal  or  suicidal,  Section  304B,  IPC,  

has to be attracted.  

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Findings of the Court:

10.  The first question that we have to decide is whether  

the  deceased  was  in  a  condition  to  make  the  dying  

declarations (Exts.PG and PN) before ASI Madan Lal and the  

Judicial Magistrate R.S. Bagri when her larynx and tracheae  

had been affected by burns.  PW-2, Dr. R.C. Chaudhary, has  

stated in his evidence that on 26.02.1991, on the application  

of the Police (Ext.PD), he gave his opinion in Ext.PD/1 to the  

effect that the patient was fit to give her statement and this  

opinion was given at 10.30 P.M.  PW-9, ASI Madan Lal, has  

deposed  in  his  evidence  that  the  doctor  vide his  

endorsement  (Ext.PD/1)  declared  that  Vandana  was  fit  to  

give her statement and then he recorded the statement of  

Vandana (Ext.PG) correctly and after Vandana admitted the  

contents of the statement to be correct, she gave her thumb  

impression in Ext.PG in token of its correctness.  PW-9 has  

further  stated  that  at  that  time  Vandana  was  living  and  

taking long sigh and she remained conscious at the time of  

giving her statement (Ext. PG).  PW-9 has also stated that he  

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then went to the Judicial Magistrate R.S. Bagri (PW-8) whose  

residence was near the hospital and R.S.Bagri accompanied  

him to the hospital and recorded the statement of Vandana.  

The Judicial Magistrate R.S. Bagri  has accordingly deposed  

that  ASI  Madan Lal  had approached him in  person  at  his  

residence at 10.40 P.M. along with application (Ext.PM) and  

he came to the hospital and moved an application (Ext.PM/1)  

to the Medical Officer concerned and thereafter he recorded  

her statement and at the time of recording the statement,  

Dr.  R.C.  Chaudhary  was  not  present  but  he  had  given  a  

certificate  (Ext.PM/2)  on  the  application  (Ext.PM/1)  that  

Vandana was in  a fit  state to make a statement  and she  

continued to be so during the making of the statement.  It is  

thus  clear  from  the  evidence  of  the  aforesaid  three  

witnesses  PW-2,  PW-8  and  PW-9  that  at  the  time  the  

statements of Vandana were recorded by ASI Madan Lal (PW-

9) and the Judicial Magistrate R.S. Bagri (PW-8), she was in a  

fit  condition to make the statement.   When, however,  the  

post  mortem  was  carried  out  on  27.02.1991  by  Dr.S.S.  

Bansal  (PW-7)  at  4.00 P.M.  he  found  that  the  larynx  and  

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tracheae  of  the  deceased  were  charred  by  heat.   On  

questions being put to him whether a person will be able to  

speak when her larynx and tracheae were charred by heat,  

PW-7 has clarified that  when the larynx and tracheae are  

charred, the person cannot speak, but when the larynx and  

tracheae are in the process of being charred, the person can  

speak.  Dr. J.L. Bhutani, DW-5, has given his opinion that if  

the vocal  chord of larynx is  charred,  such person may be  

able  to  speak,  but  not  clearly,  and  it  will  be  difficult  to  

understand.   The  opinions  of  the  two  medical  experts,  

therefore, are not in variance of the ocular evidence of PW-2,  

PW-8 and PW-9  that  Vandana was  in  a  position  to  speak  

when her dying declarations were recorded on the night of  

26.02.1991.  Hence, the two dying declarations (Ext.PG and  

Ext.PN) can be relied on by the Court.  

11. The  next  question  which  we  have  to  decide  is  

whether  the  prosecution  has  been  able  to  prove  beyond  

reasonable  doubt  that  the  appellant  has  committed  the  

offence of  dowry death under Section 304B,  IPC.  The two  

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dying  declarations  are  similarly  worded.   We,  therefore,  

extract  hereinbelow only  the dying  declaration which  was  

recorded by the Judicial Magistrate (Ext. PN):  

“Statement of Vandana, w/o Rajiv Singla,  age 23 years, occupation house wife, R/o  Dabwali, u/s 164 Cr.P.C.

I was married to Dr. Rajiv Singla 2 years  back.  My husband used to get upset on petty  issues.  My in-laws lived separately.  They are  living after the 6 months of my marriage.  My  daughter  is  of  2  months.   Today about 7.30  p.m., in evening I was fed up with activities of  my husband and put on kerosene oil and burn  myself.  Earlier my husband used to taunt me  for dowry.  Action should be taken against my  husband.

Sd/- R.C. Bangri RO & AC JMIC

Dabwali, 26-2-91 RTI of Vandana Identified Sd/-  Madan Lal, ASI P.C. City Dabwali, Dated: 26-2-91”

It  will  be clear from the contents of the dying declaration  

(Ext. PN) that the deceased was fed up with the activities of  

her  husband and she  poured kerosene  oil  on  herself  and  

burnt herself.   What those activities of the appellant were  

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which prompted her to commit suicide have not been clearly  

stated,  but  she has  stated  that  her  husband used to  get  

upset on petty issues and earlier her husband used to taunt  

her for dowry.   

12. When,  however,  we scrutinize  the  evidence of  PW-5,  

the  father  of  the deceased,  we find  that  soon before the  

death  of  the  deceased,  the  appellant  had  subjected  the  

deceased to cruelty which was not  in  any way connected  

with  the  demand  of  dowry.   The  relevant  part  of  the  

evidence of PW-5 is quoted hereinbelow:  

“Smt. Vandhana deceased was my daughter.  I  had married my daughter  Vandhana with  Rajiv  Kumar,  accused  now  present  in  the  Court  on  28.01.1989 at  Kartarpur.   Out  of  her  wed lock  with the accused Rajiv Kumar, a female child was  born on 2.7.90.   Vandhana deceased and Rajiv  Kumar accused, her husband used to reside/live  in  Mandi  Dabwali.   After  marriage,  whenever  Vandhana used to come to tell us, she used to  tell me that her husband Rajiv Kumar gives her  beating and demands more and more dowry.  We  used to fulfill the demand of Rajiv Kumar accused  in the shape of dowry put forward before us by  my daughter  and used  to  send her  back  after  advising her that she is to live with her husband  and should try to adjust with him.  On 19.2.91  Vandhana came to me at Kartarpur and told me  that  two  days  prior  to  19.2.91,  Rajiv  Kumar  

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accused her husband gave her merciless beating.  She narrated this to me in the presence of my  wife Smt. Pushpa Rani and Bhupinder Singh my  brother in fact, he is my friend.  On the night of  24.2.91,  I  had  received  anonymous  telephone  call  on the telephone no. 242 that Rajiv Kumar  has fled away leaving his minor daughter alone.  On  hearing  this,  my  daughter  Vandhana  got  perturbed and wanted us to leave her at Mandi  Dabwali immediately.  On 25.02.91 (25.2.91) we  left  Vandhana  at  Mandi  Dabwali.   I  was  accompanied  by  my  wife  Pushpa  Rani  and  Bhupinder  Kumar.   On reaching at  Dabwali  we  found Rajiv Kumar present in his clinic and later  on he came to the house.  We told Rajiv Kumar  that  he  should  not  repeatedly  give  beating  to  Vandhana.  We told him that it was not proper for  him  to  do  so.   We  also  advised  our  daughter  Vandhana  to  adjust  with  her  husband  and  to  remain  calm and  quiet  and  not  to  speak.   On  25.2.91  itself  after  advising  Rajiv  Kumar  and  Vandhana  we  came  back  to  Kartarpur  after  staying  at  night  at  Bhatinda.   On  27.2.91,  I  received  a  telephonic  message  that  Vandhana  after sprinkling kerosene oil on her body has put  herself fire and that she is dead and no longer  alive.”

From the aforesaid  evidence  of  PW-5,  it  is  clear  that  the  

marriage  between  the  appellant  and  the  deceased  took  

place  on  28.01.1989  and  the  demand  of  dowry  by  the  

appellant  and the  beatings for  more  dowry  was after  the  

marriage.   PW-5  has  also  stated  that  on  19.02.1991  the  

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deceased came to him at Kartarpur and told him that two  

days prior to 19.02.1991, the appellant gave her merciless  

beating.   PW-5 has,  however,  not  stated that  the beating  

that the appellant gave to the deceased on 19.02.1991 was  

in connection with demand of dowry.  One of the essential  

ingredients  of  the  offence  of  dowry  death  under  Section  

304B, IPC is that the accused must have subjected a woman  

to cruelty in connection with demand of dowry soon before  

her  death  and  this  ingredient  has  to  be  proved  by  the  

prosecution  beyond  reasonable  doubt  and  only  then  the  

Court  will  presume  that  the  accused  has  committed  the  

offence of  dowry death  under  Section 113B of  the Indian  

Evidence Act.  As this ingredient of Section 304B, IPC, has  

not been established by the prosecution, the trial court and  

the  High  Court  were  not  correct  in  holding  the  appellant  

guilty of the offence of dowry death under Section 304B, IPC.  

13.  We have perused the decision of this Court in  Smt.  

Shanti and Another v. State of Haryana (supra) cited by Mr.  

Sharma and we find that in the aforesaid case the facts were  

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that  Smt.  Shanti  was  mother-in-law  of  the  deceased  and  

Smt. Krishna was another inmate in the matrimonial home in  

which the deceased was living and it was alleged that both  

Smt. Shanti and Smt. Krishna were harassing the deceased  

all  the while after the marriage for not bringing a scooter  

and television  as  part  of  the  dowry  and  she  was  treated  

cruelly.  On 26.04.1988 at about 11.00 P.M., the father of the  

deceased  came  to  know  that  the  deceased  had  been  

murdered and was cremated by two ladies and he filed a  

report accordingly before the police.  Both the courts below  

held that the two ladies did not send the deceased to her  

parents house and drove out the brother and father of the  

deceased complaining that a scooter and a television has not  

been given as dowry.  The evidence of the father, mother  

and brother of the deceased was that they were not even  

informed  soon  after  the  death  of  the  deceased  and  the  

appellants had hurriedly cremated the dead body.  In these  

circumstances, this Court held that the presumption under  

Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act that the two ladies  

have committed the offence under Section 304B, IPC, was  

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attracted.  This was, therefore, a case where the evidence  

clearly disclosed that the deceased had been subjected to  

harassment  or  cruelty  committed  by  the  appellants  soon  

before her death.

14. We have also examined the decision of this Court in  

Bansi Lal v. State of Haryana (supra), cited by Mr. Sharma,  

and  we  find  that  the  facts  in  that  case  were  that  the  

appellant Bansi Lal was married to Sarla on 04.04.1988.  She  

was subjected to cruelty, harassment and demand of dowry  

and on 25.06.1991 she died.  After investigation of the case,  

prosecution filed a charge-sheet against Bansi  Lal  and his  

mother Smt. Shanti Devi and charges were framed against  

them under  Sections  498A,  304B  and  306,  IPC,  and  they  

were convicted for the said charges by the trial court.  The  

High  Court,  however,  acquitted  Smt.  Shanti  Devi,  but  

convicted Bansi Lal because of demand of dowry and cruelty  

in connection with demand of dowry to which the deceased  

was subjected to by him.  Bansi Lal had made a statement  

under Section 313, Cr.P.C. that Sarla was in love with some  

other person but she was forced to marry Bansi Lal against  

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her  will  due  to  which  she  felt  suffocated  and  committed  

suicide, leaving a suicide note to that effect.  On these facts,  

this Court held that once it is shown that soon before her  

death  the  deceased  has  been  subjected  to  cruelty  or  

harassment for or in connection with the demand for dowry,  

the Court shall  presume that such person has caused the  

dowry death under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act, and if  

the  case  of  the  Bansi  Lal  was  that  Sarla  has  committed  

suicide,  the onus was on him to establish his  defence by  

leading sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption that he  

has not caused the dowry death, but Bansi Lal has failed to  

discharge that onus.  

15.    On the evidence on record, though the appellant is  

not  guilty  of  the  offence  under  Section  304B,  IPC,  he  is  

certainly  guilty  of  offences  of  abetment  of  suicide  and  

cruelty.  Section 113-A of the Indian Evidence Act states as  

follows:  

“113A.  Presumption  as  to  abetment  of  suicide  by  a  married  woman.-When  the  question is whether the commission of suicide by  a woman had been abetted by her husband or  

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any relative of her husband and it is shown that  she  had  committed  suicide  within  a  period  of  seven years from the date of her marriage and  that her husband or such relative of her husband  had  subjected  her  to  cruelty,  the  court  may  presume,  having  regard  to  all  the  other  circumstances of the case, that such suicide had  been abetted by her husband or by such relative  of her husband.  

Explanation.--For  the  purposes  of  this  section,  "cruelty"  shall  have  the  same  meaning  as  in  section 498A of the Indian Penal Code”

The language of Section 113-A of the Indian Evidence Act  

makes it clear that if a woman has committed suicide within  

a period of seven years from the date of her marriage and  

that her husband had subjected her to cruelty, the court may  

presume, having regard to all the other circumstances of the  

case, that such suicide had been abetted by her husband.  

The Explanation to Section 113-A of the Indian Evidence Act  

states that for the purpose of Section 113-A “cruelty” shall  

have  the  same  meaning  as  in  Section  498A,  IPC.   The  

Explanation to  Section  498A,  IPC,  defines  ‘cruelty’  and  

Clause (a) of the Explanation states that cruelty means any  

willful conduct which is of such nature as likely to drive a  

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woman  to  commit  suicide.   The  dying  declaration  of  the  

deceased (Ext. PN) as well as the evidence of PW-5 extracted  

above are sufficient to establish that the appellant used to  

fight  on  petty  issues  and  give  beatings  to  the  deceased,  

which  drove  the  deceased  to  commit  suicide.   This  is,  

therefore, a clear case where the appellant had committed  

offences under Sections 498A and 306, IPC.  

16.   In K. Prema S. Rao and Another, etc. v. Yadla Srinivasa   

Rao  and  Others,  etc.  [(2003)  1  SCC  217],  this  Court  on  

similar facts has held that to attract the provisions of Section  

304B, IPC, one of the main ingredients of the offence, which  

is required to be established, is that “soon before her death”  

she was subjected to cruelty and harassment “in connection  

with  the  demand  for  dowry”  and  this  ingredient  of  the  

offence was not there in that case. This Court, however, held  

that it  was not  necessary to remit the matter to  the trial  

court for framing a charge under Section 306, IPC, and the  

accused  also  cannot  complain  for  want  of  opportunity  to  

defend the charge under Section 306, IPC, if the facts found  

in  evidence  justify  the  conviction  of  the  appellant  under  

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Sections 498A and 306,  IPC instead of  the graver offence  

under  Section  304B,  IPC.    In  that  case,  the  three-Judge  

Bench of this Court held the appellant guilty of the offences  

under  Sections  498A  and  306,  IPC  instead  of  the  graver  

offence under Section 304B, IPC.    

17.    In  this  case also,  we hold the appellant  guilty  of  

offences under Sections 498A and 306, IPC.  Considering the  

particular  conduct  of  the  appellant  which  drove  the  

deceased to commit suicide, we impose a sentence of one  

year  imprisonment  and  fine  of  Rs.1,000/-  for  the  offence  

under  Section  498A,  IPC  and impose  a  sentence  of  three  

years imprisonment and fine of  Rs.2,000/-  for  the offence  

under Section 306, IPC, and direct that in case of failure to  

pay the fine for either of the two offences, the appellant shall  

undergo a further imprisonment for a period of six months.  

We make it clear that the sentences of imprisonment for the  

two  offences  will  run  concurrently.   If  the  appellant  has  

already  undergone  the  punishment  imposed  by  this  

judgment, his bail bonds shall stand discharged.

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18. The appeal is allowed to that extent.   

.……………………….J.                                                                (A. K. Patnaik)

………………………..J.                                                                (Gyan Sudha Misra) New Delhi, October 31, 2013.    

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