RAJASTHAN STATE ROADWAYS TRANSPORT CORPORATION Vs PARAMJEET SINGH
Bench: HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE D.Y. CHANDRACHUD, HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HEMANT GUPTA
Judgment by: HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE D.Y. CHANDRACHUD
Case number: C.A. No.-004593-004593 / 2019
Diary number: 7216 / 2017
Advocates: EQUITY LEX ASSOCIATES Vs
1
Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Civil Appeal No 4593 of 2019 (Arising out of SLP(C) No 10907 of 2017)
Rajasthan State Roadways Transport Corporation .... Appellant(s)
Versus
Paramjeet Singh ....Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, J
1 Leave granted.
2 The respondent was appointed as a conductor on a contractual basis
on 21 January 2006 by the appellant. The contractual appointment was for
a period of one year or until the shortage of drivers was met, whichever
was earlier. The agreement (described as the contract letter) which was
entered into between the appellant and the respondent stipulated as
follows:
“11. While working as a conductor if on inspection of vehicle en-route if any passenger is found without a ticket then in such a situation the second party would be removed from the temporary employment and to fulfill the loss, he would also be liable to pay the amount as determined by the Head Quarter. Apart from this the first party would be at liberty to proceed against the second party under the prevention of without ticket travel act.”
2
3 Clause 16 of the agreement stipulated that:
“16. The first party will have the right to terminate the temporary appointment of the first party at any time without any notice.”
4 The services of the respondent were dispensed with on 21 March
2007.
5 Challenging the order of termination, the respondent filed a writ
petition, which was allowed by a learned Single Judge of the Rajasthan
High Court on 6 April 2016. The writ appeal was dismissed on 19
September 2016 by a Division Bench of the High Court.
6 The respondent has been served, but has not entered appearance.
7 The sole ground on which the writ petition was allowed was that there
was a breach of the principle of natural justice.
8 Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant submits that
the High Court was in error, having regard to the fact that the nature of the
appointment was purely contractual for a period of one year or until the
shortage of drivers was met, whichever was earlier. Moreover, the contract
stipulates that the services of the respondent could be dispensed with
without any notice.
9 We find merit in the submission. The terms of the appointment
indicate that the respondent was on a purely contractual appointment and
that the services could be dispensed with without notice at any stage.
3
10 The learned Single Judge of the High Court relied upon a decision of
this Court in Hari Ram Maurya v Union of India and others1. That case
is, however, distinguishable since it was found by this Court that the
removal was on the ground that the employee, though he was engaged on
a temporary basis, was guilty of a charge of bribery.
11 Having regard to the terms of the contractual engagement, we are of
the view that the action of the appellant cannot be faulted. We accordingly
allow the appeal and set aside the impugned judgment and order of the
High Court. In consequence, the writ petition filed by the respondent shall
stand dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.
…………...…...….......………………........J. [Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud]
…..…..…....…........……………….…........J. [Hemant Gupta]
New Delhi; May 03, 2019
1 (2006) 9 SCC 167