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Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.4909 OF 2015 (@ SLP(C) NO. 14256 OF 2014)

Rahul Yadav & Anr. ... Appellants

Versus

M/s. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd.  and Others      ... Respondents

J U D G M E N T

Dipak Misra, J.

Leave granted.  

2. The  appellant  is  the  owner  in  possession  of  the

premises  being  land  measuring  2571  sq.  yards  on

Rewari-Palwal-Delhi  Road,  Rewari  and  Khewat  No.

1139/941, Khatauni no. 1380, Rectangle No. 117, Kila No.

2412/2 (2-0), Khewat No. 1125/930 mm, Khautani No. 136

mm, Rectangle No. 117, Kila No. 24/211 (1-9), Rectangle N.

150, 6/80 share Le. 6 maria out of Kila No. 411 (4-0) total

measuring  Kanal  5  marla  in  3  kittas  thereabouts.   The

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respondent no.1, namely, Indian Oil Corporation (for short,

the ‘Corporation’) issued an advertisement in the newspaper

on 6.10.2000 for retail outlet dealership in the state of Delhi

and  Haryana  for  which  the  appellant  applied  and  was

selected.   Letter  of  intent  was  issued  in  his  favour  on

6.7.2001.  It was stipulated in the said letter of intent that

the appellant was required to own a suitable plot of  land

and entered into a long-term lease with the Corporation at

the rate acceptable to the respondent.  To meet the mandate

of  the  letter  of  intent,  the  appellant  bought  the  land  in

question for  the purpose of  getting dealership agreement.

On 23.10.2001, the appellant executed a long-term lease of

30 years in accordance with the terms of the advertisement

and the letter of intent in favour of the Corporation at the

monthly  rent  of  Rs.10,000/-.   After  completion  of

formalities,  a  dealership  agreement  was  entered  into

between the appellant and the Corporation on 14.5.2002.

Be it noted, as per the letter of intent, the Corporation was

to provide certain facilities and develop the land as an outlet

with  an  office  building,  storage  tank  and  pump,  etc.  for

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operating the dealership and it was to charge the appellant

a licence fee for the said facilities.   

3. The allotment of such petrol pumps by the competent

authorities  became  a  front  page  news  item  in  Indian

Express  mentioning  that  there  had  been  grant  of  retail

outlets of petrol pumps to the near and dear ones of  the

political functionaries on account of political consideration.

Number of cases were filed in various courts and all of them

were transferred to this Court and a two-Judge Bench in

Onkar Lal Bajaj v. Union of India1, after referring to such

earlier  event  that  was  the  subject  matter  of  Common

Cause, a Registered Society v. Union of India2, wherein it

had  been  observed  that  for  these  kind  of  allotments,  a

transparent  and  objective  criteria/procedure  has  to  be

evolved based on reason,  fair  play and non-arbitrariness,

adverted to many a facet,  namely, the criteria evolved for

grant  of  dealership,  the  concept  of  probity  in  governance

and the concept of public interest, the role of the executive

and the right of the public to know the circumstance under

1  (2003) 2 SCC 673 2  (1996) 6 SCC 530

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which their  elected representatives get the outlets and/or

dealerships/distributorships, and directed as follows:-  

“In view of the aforesaid:

I. We appoint a committee comprising Mr Justice S.C. Agrawal, a retired Judge of this Court and Mr  Justice  P.K.  Bahri,  a  retired  Judge  of  the Delhi High Court, to examine the aforesaid 413 cases. We request the Committee to submit the report  to  this  Court  within  a  period  of  three months. II. The Committee would devise its own procedure for undertaking the examination of these cases. If considered  necessary,  the  Committee  may appoint any person to assist it. III.  We  direct  the  Ministry  of  Petroleum  and Natural Gas, Government of India and the four oil  companies  to  render  full,  complete  and meaningful  assistance  and  cooperation  to  the Committee. The relevant records are directed to be  produced  before  the  Committee  within  five days. IV.  We  direct  the  Ministry  to  appoint  a  nodal officer not below the rank of a Joint Secretary for effective working of the Committee. V.  The  Central  Government,  State Government/Union Territories and all others are directed  to  render  such  assistance  to  the Committee as may be directed by it. VI. The oil companies are directed to provide as per  the  Committee’s  directions,  the  requisite infrastructure,  staff,  transport  and  make necessary  arrangements,  whenever  so  directed, for travel, stay, payments and other facilities etc. VII. In respect of any case if the Committee, on preliminary examination of the facts and records, forms an opinion that the allotment was made on merits and not as a result of political connections or patronage or other extraneous considerations,

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it would be open to the Committee not to proceed with the probe in detail.”

4. It  is  necessary to state  here that  certain transferred

cases were finally disposed of and certain transferred cases

were directed to be listed after receipt of the report.  After

reports were received, certain interim applications were filed

by  the  persons  who  were  aggrieved  by  the  report  of  the

committee appointed by this Court.  In  Mukund Swarup

Mishra v. Union of India3, the Court referred to Onkar Lal

Bajaj (supra)  and while dealing with the plea of promissory

estoppel opined thus:-

“We are also not impressed by the argument of the petitioners that the doctrine of promissory or equitable estoppel would apply. May be that the petitioners  have  spent  some amount.  But  once the  allotment  itself  was  found  to  be  vitiated, obviously  they  cannot  claim  any  benefit  as allotment  was  contrary  to  law.  Moreover,  such allotment  has  been  made  in  remote  past  and even though an order  of  cancellation  had been passed by the Central Government as early as in August  2002, the allottees have been protected by interim order passed by this Court. Even after the decision in  Onkar Lal  Bajaj1, interim order was  continued.  In  the  circumstances,  for  more than  four  years  interim  order  is  in  favour  of allottees even though the allotment was found to be  illegal  or  contrary  to  law.  In  our  opinion, therefore,  it  is  not  open to  the  allottees  whose

3  (2007)  2 SCC 536

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allotments have been found to be vitiated to plead equity.”

After so stating, the Court proceeded to delve into the

justifiability of the report and in that regard observed that:-

“In  our  opinion,  the  learned  amicus  curiae  is right that the Committee had considered in detail individual cases and submitted the report. This Court,  therefore,  would consider a complaint of an allottee who can successfully put forward his complaint and may satisfy this Court that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the finding of the Committee that the allotment was not on merits  was  not  correct.  But  only  in  those individual cases, the Court would consider and may grant relief to such applicants. It, however, cannot be said that the report of the Committee was  without  power,  authority  or  jurisdiction  or was uncalled for and liable to be ignored.”

5. It  is  apt  to  note  here  that  the  Court  proceeded  to

scrutinize  the  report  State-wise  where  grants  were  made

and  as  far  as  the  States  of  Punjab  and  Haryana  are

concerned, it has been held thus:-

“State of Punjab 36. In  respect  of  the  State  of  Punjab,  the Committee considered thirty-seven cases referred to it. It found that seven allotments were on merit and  twenty-nine  allotments  were  not  in consonance  with  the  guidelines.  Out  of  them, twenty-six have filed applications. We have been taken  through  the  reasoning  recorded  by  the Committee.  So  far  as  cases  of  Shri  Surinder Singh,  Chander  Kant  Bhatia,  Gurpreet  Singh,

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Smt  Kavita  Rani,  Smt  Suman  Lata,  Ms  Ruby Sekhri, Mr Manmohan Singh, Mr Rajesh Madan and  Mr  Tejinder  Singh  are  concerned,  they appear to be borderline cases. In our view, it may not  be  appropriate  to  cancel  the  allotment  in favour of these nine persons. Their applications are  allowed.  Rest  of  the  cases  do  not  call  for interference  and  the  applications  are  rejected. There are six applications by non-allottees. They are also rejected as we are not  concerned with non-allottees.

State of Haryana 37. In  regard  to  the  State  of  Haryana,  the Committee considered twenty-one cases referred to it. It found no irregularity in allotment in seven cases.  It  disapproved  allotments  in  fourteen cases. Out of them, twelve have filed applications. We find no infirmity in the conclusions arrived at or  reasons  recorded  by  the  Committee  and  no interference is called for. The other applications are rejected.”

6. There  is  no  cavil  over  the  fact  that  the  grant  of

dealership in favour of the appellant was cancelled by the

Committee and that received the stamp of approval of this

Court.   After  the  decision  of  this  Court,  the  Corporation

terminated the  dealership  and intended to  take back the

possession from the dealer with a view to appoint another

dealer as specifically permitted in the lease deed as well as

in the dealership agreement.  The appellant built a wall to

stop the functioning of the retail outlet and refused to hand

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over the possession which constrained the Corporation to

initiate a proceeding for eviction under the Public Premises

(Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (for short,

“the 1971 Act”) as a valid lease deed existed between the

appellant and the respondent, a public sector undertaking.

The  appellant  participated  in  the  proceeding  and  after

hearing commenced, he sought to go for arbitration, but the

said prayer was not accepted by the Estate Officer on the

ground  that  the  same  was  not  permissible  under  the

provisions of the 1971 Act.   After six years of participation

in  the  said  proceeding,  he  initiated  a  civil  suit  alleging

illegality  in  termination  of  the  lease  and prayed  that  the

proceedings  under  the  1971  Act  to  be  kept  in  abeyance

which was not accepted.  The competent authority, that is,

the Estate Officer passed an order of eviction in exercise of

powers conferred on him under sub-section 1 of Section 5 of

the 1971 Act, after rejecting all the contentions raised by

the appellant.   

7. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the appellant

preferred  Civil  Appeal  No.  92  of  2013 before  the  learned

District Judge, Rewari under Section 9 of the 1971 Act.   It

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was  contended  before  the  learned  District  Judge  by  the

appellant that the order passed by the Estate Officer was

passed on surmises and conjectures; that the Estate Officer

had  failed  to  appreciate  that  the  lease  deed  and  the

dealership agreement were interlinked and hence, the lease

deed could not survive after the cancellation of dealership

agreement; that the 1971 Act was not applicable to him as

he was not in unauthorized occupation, but is the owner of

the  premises;  that  the  competent  authority  had  directed

order of  eviction to  circumvent the eventual  result  of  the

pending  suit;  and  that  there  had  been  violation  of  the

principles of natural justice.   

8. The  learned  appellate  Judge,  on  the  basis  of  the

material  brought  on  record,  came  to  hold  that  the

respondent  is  a  government  company  and  the  premises

were taken on lease by it and hence, the premises fell within

the  meaning  and  ambit  of  “public  premises”,  as  defined

under Section 2(e) of the 1971 Act; that the submission that

the  lease  was  contingent  upon  the  appointment  of  the

appellant as a dealer and upon his ceasing to be such the

lease agreement became extinct was sans substance, for the

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document granting dealership and the lease agreement were

different documents and they were neither interlinked nor

interdependent; that the fact that the dealership agreement

and  the  lease  agreement  had  been  executed  separately

would leave no room for doubt that they were independent

and it could not be inferred from any one of the covenants

agreed to between the parties that  one agreement was to

come to an end on the termination of the other; that it could

not be construed that once the dealership stood terminated

pursuant  to  the  order  passed  by  this  Court,  the  lease

agreement also stood terminated; that the submission to the

effect  that  the  proceeding  under  the  1971  Act  had  been

initiated to circumvent the suit instituted by the appellant

was too spacious to be accepted.   Being of this view, the

learned appellate Judge recorded the conclusion thus:-

“As an upshot of the discussion foregoing, it can be  safely  concluded  that  the  appellant  was running a retail outlet only on a leave and licence basis and the moment his dealership licence was terminated, he was bound to vacate the premises which,  for  all  intents  and purposes,  are  public premises.  Needless to say that by virtue of lease agreement the respondent is at liberty to run the outlet/petrol  pump  even  through  third  and outside  party  without  any  restriction  and objection from the appellant.  So long as the lease agreement is intact and the civil court does not

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order eviction, the respondent has right not only to  remain  in  possession  but  to  oust  any licencee/trespasser.   The appellant  may be  the owner of the premises, but by virtue of the lease deed, it is the respondent who has the right to occupy premises.”  

9. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order passed by the

appellate court, the appellant preferred CWP No. 26287 of

2013 in the High Court  of  Punjab and Haryana and the

learned  Single  Judge,  after  referring  to  the  authority  in

Mukund Swarup Mishra (supra),  came to  hold  that  the

Committee had considered 21 cases and it had disapproved

allotments  in  14  cases  and  the  dealership  of  the  writ

petitioner was one of them and, therefore, proceeding under

the 1971 Act was a sequitur of the conclusions arrived at by

the judgment of this Court, and hence, the orders passed by

the forums below did not warrant any interference.  Being of

this  view,  the writ  petition was dismissed by the learned

Single Judge.   

10. The  non-success  in  the  writ  petition  compelled  the

appellant to prefer LPA No. 665 of 2014 and the Division

Bench concurred with  the  view expressed by the  learned

Single Judge and declined to interfere in intra-court appeal.  

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11. We have heard Mr. Kapil Sibal, learned senior counsel

for the appellant and Ms. Meenakshi Arora, learned senior

counsel for the Corporation, the first respondent herein.   

12. The  controversy,  as  we  perceive,  raises  two  issues

though  an  attempt  had  been  made  by  the  appellant  to

create an imbroglio before the appellate court wherein the

order of the Estate Officer was in assail.  The thrust of the

matter is whether the interpretation of the clauses of  the

agreement would anyway suggest any kind of inextricable

connection to place a construction on them to the effect that

once the dealership is cancelled, the land owner who had

parted with the land by way of a long-term lease for a period

of thirty years, can be allowed to retain possession over the

land; and only the super structure which had been affixed

on the land by the Corporation, can only be removed.   

13. Mr. Sibal, learned senior counsel for the appellant has

taken us through the advertisement issued on 6.10.2000.  It

is  urged  by  him  that  the  appellant  was  compelled  to

purchase the land as it was the basic requirement to meet

the eligibility criteria to get the allotment of dealership.  It is

his proponement that there has to be a conjoint reading of

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the  advertisement  issued by the respondent,  the letter  of

intent and the lease deed and that would clearly establish

that the appellant was to make available a suitable plot of

land  and  transfer  the  land  on  a  long-term  lease  to  the

Corporation for the sole and exclusive purpose of running a

retail  outlet  dealership  of  respondent-Corporation  and

hence, the said lease deed cannot be looked at as a singular

or  solitary  document,  more  so,  when  the  appellant  had

agreed to give such highly valuable land to the Corporation

on a nominal  monthly  rent of  Rs.10,000/-.   Emphasis is

laid  on  the  intention  of  creating  the  documents.   To

appreciate the said submission, we have carefully perused

the advertisement and other documents.  Relevant part of

the advertisement reads as follows:  

“For  locations  for  Retail  Outlet  Dealership  and LPG  Distributorship.   The  applicant  should furnish,  along  with  the  application,  details  of land/land for  godown which he/she may make available  for  the  dealership/distributorship considering  the  location  of  the  land  from  the point of view of commercial and applicants willing to transfer the land on ownership/long lease to the Oil Company at the rates acceptable to the Oil  Company  would  be  given  preference  if  an applicant, after selection, is unable to provide the land indicated by him/her earlier, within a period of  2  months  the  allotment  of  the

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dealership/distributorship  made  to  him/her would be cancelled.”  

14. In  this  context,  we  have  to  scrutinize  the  letter  of

intent dated 6.7.2001.  The relevant paragraphs of letter of

intent read as follows:-

1.1 For enabling you to operate the dealership said above, we will  develop the Retail  Outlet at Rewari, and provide the same to you with certain facilities  such  as  suitable  plot  of  land  duly developed  as  an  outlet  with  an  office  building, storage  tank and pump etc.  for  operating  your dealership.  

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1.7 This letter is merely a letter of intent and is not to be constructed as a firm offer of dealership to  you.    The  dealership  to  you  will,  on  your complying  with  the  condition  spelt  out  herein above,  be  confirmed/formalised  by  an Appointment Letter followed by the signing of our standard dealership Agreement.  

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2. You  have  stated  in  your  application form/during the interview that you are willing to transfer the land on ownership/long lease to the Indian  Oil  corporation  Ltd.  at  the  rates acceptable  to  Indian  Oil  Corporation  Ltd. Accordingly,  you will  make available  a  suitable plot of land as indicated by you within a period of TWO months  from the  date  of  this  letter,  after getting suitable clearance from us in writing for the particular plot of land.  You are required to transfer the land on ownership/long lease for a minimum period  of  15  years  with  one  renewal

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option  for  next  5  years  under  such  term  and conditions as may be agreed upon between you and Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. In case you fail to  make  available  the  suitable  land  within  2 months,  this  offer  is  liable  to  be  withdrawn. However, there is no commitment from India Oil Corporation  Ltd.  for  taking  the  said  land  from you.”  

15. Keeping  in  view  the  aforesaid  documents,  it  is

necessary to look at the lease agreement dated 23.10.2001.

The relevant clauses of the lease deed are extracted below:-

“..the Lessor/s do and each of them doth hereby demise unto the Lessee All that the said land and premises  situated  at  Rewari,  Tehsil  &  District Rewari in the Registration Sub District of Rewari District  and  more  particularly  described  in  the Schedule  hereunder  written  TOGETHER  WITH structure that may hereafter be erected thereon by  the  Lessee  to  hold  the  premises  hereby demised hereafter for brevity’s sake referred to as “the demised premises” unto the lessee for a term of 30 years commencing from the date of  lease signed,  renewable  and  determinable  as hereinafter provided yielding and paying therefore during  the  said  term  the  monthly  and  the proportionately for any part of the month the rent of Rs.10,000/- per month (Rupees Ten Thousand only) to be paid on or before the 5th day of each and  every  calendar  month,  the  first  of  such monthly  rent  to  be  paid  from  the  date  of commencement of lease deed proportionately and the subsequent rent to be paid on or before the 5th day of every succeeding month regularly (with increase in rent by 10% after every three year).  

xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx

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(d) The  Lessee  shall  be  free  to  use  and  the Lessor shall permit the use of demised premises by the Lessee for itself and for all its associated concerns.   The Lessee shall also be entitled to use the demised premises by their agents, sales representatives, distributors, local dealers, other licensees  or  representatives,  customers  and  all other authorised persons.  (e) The  Lessee  shall  be  entitled  to  assign, transfer,  sublet,  under  let,  or  part  with possession of the demised premises or any part thereof to any person abovenamed whomsoever it chooses without the consent of the Lessor.  

(f) The Lessee shall be entitled to appoint remove, re-appoint  change  and  substitute  any  dealers, agents,  licensees  and  other  authorised representatives on and in respect of the demised premises without the consent of the Lessor.  

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(i) The Lessee shall be entitled to excavate, dig or break open the surface of any part of the demised premises  at  any  time,  during  or  after  the expiration  of  the  term  hereby  granted  and  to remove  any  stone,  sand,  gravel,  clay,  earth  or other  material  therefrom  for  the  purpose  of erecting,  laying,  maintaining  and/or  removing storage tanks, containers, receptacles and other erections or installations for the purpose of the business of the Lessee or any other person.  

(j) The  Lessee  for  the  purpose  of  the construction  and  erection  mentioned  in  any  of the  preceding  sub-clause  shall  be  entitled  to allow any, sub lessee, dealer, sub dealer, agent, person  or  other  authorised  representative  or person to enter upon the demised premises and to  build  and  erect  according  to  the  Lessee’s specifications  requisite  items  herein  mentioned without any let hindrance or obstruction from the

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Lessor/s  or  any  other  person  claiming  by, through or under him/her/them.”  

16. We have referred to the clauses in extenso to highlight

that the lessee had entered into an agreement of lease with

the appellant with immense liberty and the lease deed does

lay  down that  the  lessee  has  the  freedom to  sublet  and

appoint another dealer.  The lease would remain in force till

the dealership of  the appellant  continued and the licence

remained  in  vogue.   At  this  juncture,  it  is  pertinent  to

reproduce  certain  clauses  of  the  dealership  agreement

which would clearly spell out the purpose.  They read as

follows:-

“2. The  Corporation  do  hereby  grant  to  the Dealer leave and licence and permission for the duration of this Agreement to enter on the said premises and to use the premises and outfit for the sole and exclusive purpose of storing, selling and  handling  the  products  purchased  by  the Dealer from the Corporation, Save as aforesaid, the Dealer shall have no right, title or interest in the  said  premises  or  outfit  and  shall  not  be entitled to claim the right of  lessee, sub-lessee, tenant or any other interest in the premises or outfit, is being specifically agreed and declared in particular that the Dealer shall not be deemed to be in exclusive possession of the premises.  

3. This Agreement shall remain in force for five years from 14th day of May, 2002 and continue thereafter for successive periods of one year each

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until determined by either party by giving three months  notice  in  writing  to  the  other  of  its intention to terminate this Agreement, and upon the expiration of any such notice this Agreement and the Licence granted as aforesaid shall stand cancelled and revoked but without  prejudice to the  rights  of  either  party  against  the  other  in respect of any matter or thing antecedent to such termination  provided  that  nothing  contained  in this  clause  shall  prejudice  the  rights  of  the corporation  to  terminate  this  Agreement  earlier on  the  happening  of  the  events  mentioned  in clause 56 of this Agreement.  

xxx xxx xxx

7. Nothing  contained in this  Agreement  shall be  construed  to  prohibit  the  Corporation  from making direct and/or indirect sales to any person whomsoever or from appointing other dealers for the  purpose  of  direct  or  indirect  sales  at  such places  as  the  Corporation  may  think  fit.   The dealer  shall  not  be  entitled  to  any  claim  or allowance for such direct or indirect sales.”  

17. It is appropriate to mention here that clause 56 of the

said agreement stipulates that notwithstanding anything to

the  contrary  containing  before  the  said  clause,  the

Corporation would be at liberty to terminate the agreement

forthwith upon any time after happening of certain events.

The  conditions  are  manifold.   We  may,  for  the  sake  of

completeness, reproduce two conditions:-

“(h) If  the  Dealer  does  not  adhere  to  the instructions  issued  from  time  to  time  by  the

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Corporation in connection with safe practices to be followed by him in the supply/storage of the Corporation’s products or otherwise.

(i) If the Dealer shall deliberately contaminate of  temper  with  the  quality  of  any  of  the Corporation’s products.”

18. On a plain reading  of  the  aforesaid agreement,  it  is

clear as noon day that it has no connection whatsoever with

the lease agreement.  Both the agreements are independent

of each other.  The appellant was a dealer under the lessee,

that  is,  the  Corporation.   The  dealership  is  liable  to  be

cancelled on many a ground.  In case there is a termination,

dealership is bound to be cancelled and at that juncture, if

the lease deed is treated to have been terminated along with

the dealership, it will lead to a situation which does not flow

from the interpretation of the instruments.  The dealership

agreement  has  been  terminated  because  of  the  decision

rendered by this Court in Mukund Swarup Mishra (supra).

The  consequence  of  cancellation  of  the  dealership  is  a

sequitur  of  the  judgment.   The inevitable  consequence of

that  is  the appellant  has to vacate the premises and the

Corporation has the liberty to operate either independently

or through another dealer.  The appellant cannot be allowed

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to  cause  obstruction  or  create  an  impediment.   The

submission  that  the  appellant  entered  into  the  lease

agreement at a monthly rent of Rs.10,000/- as it was given

the dealership is a mercurial plea, only to be noted to be

rejected.  The dealership was availed of as has been held by

this Court in an inapposite manner.  In such a situation,

consequences are to be faced by the appellant.  

19. The second issue which has been feebly raised by the

learned senior counsel for the appellant that the 1971 Act

would not be applicable has really no force.  Admittedly, the

respondent is a public sector undertaking.  The appellant

whose  dealership  has  been  cancelled,  cannot  claim

possession to retain possession on the basis of ownership of

the land as the lease is in continuance.  Therefore, he is a

trespasser.  Thus, the provisions of the 1971 Act apply on

all fours and accordingly we repel the said submission.   

20. We will be failing in our duty if we do not take note of

another  submission  which  has  been  alternatively  and

assiduously canvassed by Mr. Sibal, learned senior counsel

for the appellant.  It is urged by him as the termination was

directed by the Corporation by virtue of the judgment of this

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Court  and  not  because  of  any  wrong  committed  by  the

appellant and hence, his case should be reconsidered for

grant of dealership under the new policy.  Ms. Meenakshi

Arora, learned senior counsel for the Corporation has filed

the prevalent policy.  We do not intend to allude to the same

and issue any direction.   Once there is a policy and any

candidate  fits  in,  needless  to  say,  when  there  is  an

advertisement; he is at liberty to apply.  We are not disposed

to advert to the policy at this juncture.  If the policy permits,

as  we  have  said,  the  appellant  is  at  liberty  to  apply.

However, we must clarify that our grant of liberty does not

mean that the appellant shall create an impediment for the

Corporation to enter into and take possession and run the

petrol pump on its own or appoint a dealer.   

21. In view of the aforesaid analysis, it is directed that the

appellant  shall  hand  over  the  peaceful  possession  of  the

land and the structure and other fixtures standing thereon

to the Corporation after  demolishing the wall  on his own

within four weeks hence, failing which he shall be liable for

contempt of this Court.  

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22. In view of  the  aforesaid  premises,  the  appeal,  being

sans  substratum,  stands  dismissed  with  the  directions

recorded in the preceding paragraph.  Ordinarily, we would

have thought of imposing costs but we have refrained from

doing so as we have directed the appellant  to vacate  the

premises  within  four  weeks  so  the  first

respondent-Corporation  can  operate  either  on  its  own  or

through any agent or dealer.  

.............................J. [Dipak Misra]

..........................., J. [Uday Umesh Lalit]

New Delhi July 1, 2015

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