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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.2548 OF 2009

RADHEY SHYAM & ANR.        …APPELLANTS

VERSUS

CHHABI NATH & ORS.                 …RESPONDENTS

WITH

SLP (C) NO.25828 OF 2013

JAGDISH PRASAD          …PETITIONER

VERSUS

IQBAL KAUR & ORS.                 …RESPONDENTS

J U D G M E N T

ADARSH KUMAR GOEL J.

1. This matter has been placed before the Bench of three  

Judges in pursuance of an order dated April 15, 2009 passed  

by  the  bench  of  two  Hon’ble  Judges  to  consider  the  

correctness of the law laid down by this Court in Surya Dev  

Rai  vs. Ram Chander Rai and others1 that an order of  

civil  court  was amenable to writ  jurisdiction under Article  

1  2003 (6) SCC 675

Page  of

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226  of  the  Constitution.   The  reference  order,  inter  alia,  

reads:-

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30. ………Therefore, this Court unfortunately is   in  disagreement  with  the  view which  has  been  expressed in Surya Dev Rai insofar as correction  of or any interference with judicial orders of civil   court by a writ of certiorari is concerned. 31.   Under Article 227 of the Constitution, the   High  Court  does  not  issue  a  writ  of  certiorari.   Article  227  of  the  Constitution  vests  the  High   Courts with a power of superintendence which is   to be very sparingly exercised to keep tribunals   and courts  within the bounds of  their  authority.   Under Article 227, orders of both civil and criminal   courts can be examined only in very exceptional   cases  when manifest  miscarriage  of  justice  has   been occasioned. Such power, however, is not to   be exercised to correct a mistake of fact and of   law. 32.  The essential distinctions in the exercise of   power  between  Articles  226  and  227  are  well   known and  pointed  out  in  Surya Dev Rai and  with that we have no disagreement. But we are   unable  to  agree  with  the  legal  proposition  laid   down  in  Surya  Dev  Rai that  judicial  orders  passed by a civil court can be examined and then  corrected/reversed by the writ court under Article   226  in  exercise  of  its  power  under  a  writ  of   certiorari. We are of the view that the aforesaid   proposition  laid  down  in  Surya  Dev  Rai,  is  contrary to the ratio in Mirajkar and the ratio in  Mirajkar has not been overruled in Rupa Ashok  Hurra [2002 (4) SCC 388]. 33. In view of our difference of opinion with the  views expressed in  Surya Dev Rai, matter may  be  placed  before  His  Lordship  the  Hon’ble  the  Chief  Justice  of  India  for  constituting  a  larger   Bench, to consider the correctness or otherwise of   the  law  laid  down  in  Surya  Dev  Rai on  the  question discussed above.”

2. Since this Bench has to decide the referred question, it  

is not necessary to mention the facts of the case in detail.  

Suffice it to say that assailing an interim order of civil court  

in  a  pending  suit,  the  defendant-respondent  filed  a  writ

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petition before the Allahabad High Court and the High Court  

having vacated the said interim order granted in favour of  

the  plaintiff-appellant,  the  appellant  moved  this  Court  by  

way of a special leave petition,  inter alia, contending that  

the  writ  petition  under  Article  226  was  not  maintainable  

against the order of the civil court and, thus, the impugned  

order could not be passed by the High Court.  On behalf of  

the respondent, reliance was placed on the decision of this  

Court in  Surya Dev Rai  laying down that a writ  petition  

under Article 226 was maintainable against the order of the  

civil  court  and thus it  was submitted that the High Court  

was justified in passing the impugned order.

3. As  already  mentioned,  the  Bench  of  two  Hon’ble  

Judges who heard the matter was not persuaded to follow  

the law laid down in Surya Dev Rai.  It was observed that  

the  judgment  in  Surya  Dev  Rai    did  not  correctly  

appreciate the ratio in the earlier Nine Judge judgment of  

this Court in  Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar and others  vs.  

State of Maharashtra2  wherein this  Court came to the  

conclusion  that  “Certiorari  does  not  lie  to  quash  the  

judgments of inferior courts of civil jurisdiction (para 63)”.  

With reference to the observations in  Surya Dev Rai  for  

2  AIR 1967 SC 1 = 1966 (3) SCR 744

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not  following  the  conclusion  in  Mirajkar,  the  referring  

Bench inter alia observed:

“25.    In our view the appreciation of the ratio in   Mirajkar by  the learned Judges,  in  Surya Dev  Rai,  with  great  respect,  was  possibly  a  little   erroneous and with that we cannot agree. 26.   The two-Judge Bench in Surya Dev Rai did  not, as obviously it could not overrule the ratio in   Mirajkar, a Constitution Bench decision of a nine- Judge Bench. But the learned Judges justified their   different view in Surya Dev Rai, inter alia on the  ground that the law relating to certiorari changed  both in England and in India. In support of  that   opinion,  the  learned  Judges  held  that  the  statement of law in Halsbury, on which the ratio in   Mirajkar is  based,  has  been  changed  and  in  support of that quoted paras 103 and 109 from  Halsbury’s  Laws of  England,  4th Edn.  (Reissue),   Vol. 1(1). Those paras are set out below:

“103.  The  prerogative  remedies  of  certiorari,  prohibition  and  mandamus:  historical  development.—Historically,  prohibition was a writ  whereby the royal   courts  of  common  law  prohibited  other   courts  from  entertaining  matters  falling  within  the  exclusive  jurisdiction  of  the  common law courts; certiorari was issued  to bring the record of an inferior court into   the King’s Bench for review or to remove  indictments  for  trial  in  that  court;   mandamus was directed to inferior courts   and  tribunals,  and to  public  officers  and  bodies,  to  order  the  performance  of  a   public  duty.  All  three  were  called  prerogative writs;…

                     * *   * 109.  The  nature  of  certiorari  and  prohibition.—Certiorari  lies  to  bring  decisions  of  an  inferior  court,  tribunal,   public  authority  or  any  other  body  of   persons before the High Court for review  so that the court may determine whether  they should be quashed, or to quash such  decisions.  The  order  of  prohibition  is  an  order  issuing  out  of  the  High  Court  and

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directed to an inferior court or tribunal or   public authority which forbids that court or   tribunal or authority to act in excess of its   jurisdiction  or  contrary  to  law.  Both   certiorari and prohibition are employed for   the control of inferior courts, tribunals and  public authorities.”

The aforesaid  paragraphs are based on general   principles  which  are  older  than  the  time  when   Mirajkar was  decided  are  still  good.  Those  principles nowhere indicate that judgments of an   inferior  civil  court  of  plenary  jurisdiction  are   amenable to correction by a writ of certiorari. In   any event, change of law in England cannot dilute   the binding nature of  the ratio in  Mirajkar and  which has not been overruled and is holding the   field for decades. 27.     It  is  clear  from  the  law  laid  down  in   Mirajkar in para 63 that a distinction has been  made between judicial orders of inferior courts of   civil jurisdiction and orders of inferior tribunals or   court which are not civil courts and which cannot   pass  judicial  orders.  Therefore,  judicial  orders   passed by civil courts of plenary jurisdiction stand  on  a  different  footing  in  view  of  the  law  pronounced in para 63 in  Mirajkar. The passage  in the subsequent edition of  Halsbury (4th Edn.)  which has been quoted in  Surya Dev Rai does  not show at all that there has been any change in   law on the points in issue pointed out above. 28.     The learned Judges  in  Surya Dev Rai  stated in SCC para 18, p. 687 of the Report that   the decision rendered in Mirajkar was considered  by the Constitution Bench in Rupa Ashok Hurra  v.  Ashok Hurra and wherein the learned Judges  took a different view and in support of that, the   following para from Rupa Ashok Hurra has been  quoted:  (Surya Dev Rai case, SCC pp. 687-88,   para 18)

“(i)  that it  is  a well-settled principle that   the  technicalities  associated  with  the  prerogative writs  in  English law have no   role  to  play  under  our  constitutional   scheme; (ii) that a writ of certiorari to call   for  records  and  examine  the  same  for  

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passing appropriate orders, is issued by a  superior  court  to  an inferior  court  which  certifies  its  records  for  examination;  and  (iii) that a High Court cannot issue a writ   to another High Court, nor can one Bench  of a High Court issue a writ to a different   Bench of  the High Court;  much less  can   the  writ  jurisdiction  of  a  High  Court  be  invoked  to  seek  issuance  of  a  writ  of   certiorari to the Supreme Court. The High  Courts  are  not  constituted  as  inferior   courts in our constitutional scheme.”

29.     We are constrained to point out again that   in Rupa Ashok Hurra the Constitution Bench did  not take any view which is contrary to the views  expressed in  Mirajkar.  On  the  other  hand,  the  ratio in Mirajkar was referred to with respect and  was relied  on in  Rupa Ashok Hurra.  Mirajkar  was referred to in SCC para 8, p. 399 and again in   SCC para 11 on p. 402 and again in SCC para 59,   p. 418 and also in SCC para 60, p. 419 of  Rupa  Ashok Hurra.  Nowhere  even any whisper  of  a   divergence  from  the  ratio  in  Mirajkar was  expressed. Rather passages from Mirajkar have  been quoted with approval. 30.  In fact the question which was referred to the  Constitution  Bench  in  Rupa  Ashok  Hurra is  quoted in para 1 of the judgment and it is clear   from the perusal of the said paragraph that the  question for consideration in Rupa Ashok Hurra  was  totally  different.  Therefore,  this  Court   unfortunately  is  in  disagreement  with  the  view  which  has  been  expressed  in  Surya  Dev  Rai  insofar as correction of   or  any interference with judicial orders of civil court   by a writ of certiorari is concerned.”

4. Thus, the question to be decided is whether the view  

taken in Surya Dev Rai that a writ lies under Article 226 of  

the Constitution against the order of the civil court, which  

has been doubted in the reference order, is the correct view.

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5. We  have  heard  learned  counsel  for  the  parties.  

We have also heard learned counsel for the petitioner in  

SLP (C) No.25828 of 2013 as the said SLP was tagged to  

the present appeal and also the intervenor in person in  

I.A. No.2 of 2011.

6. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that  

the view taken in  the referring order  deserves to  be  

approved for the reasons given in the said order and  

contrary view in  Surya Dev Rai  may be overruled.  It is  

submitted that the bench of nine Judges in  Mirajkar  has  

categorically held that the order of the civil court was not  

amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 and the said  

view still holds the field.   The reasons for not following the  

said view in  Surya Dev Rai   are not sound in law.  This  

submission  is  supported  by  learned  counsel  for  the  

petitioner appearing in SLP (Civil) No.25828 of 2013 as also  

by the Intervenor in person.   

7. On  the  contrary,  learned  senior  counsel  for  the  

respondent supported the view taken in Surya Dev Rai  

which  is  based  on  decisions  of  this  Court  relied  upon  

therein.  According to him, the scope of writ jurisdiction was  

wide enough to extend to an order of the civil court.  There

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was  no  reason  to  exclude  the  civil  courts  from  the  

expression “any person or authority” in Article 226 of the  

Constitution.   Conceptually,  a  writ  of  certiorari  could  be  

issued  by  a  superior  court  to  an  inferior  court.   He  also  

pointed out that though  the judgment in Surya Dev Rai  is  

by a Bench of two judges,  the same has been referred  with  

approval  in  larger  bench  judgments  in  Shail  vs. Manoj  

Kumar3,  Mahendra  Saree  Emporium  (II)  vs. G.V.  

Srinivasa Murthy4 and Salem Advocate Bar Assn(II) vs.  

Union of India5 and on that ground correctness of the said  

view is not open to be considered by this Bench.

8. We  have  given  anxious  consideration  to  the  rival  

submissions.

9. It will be appropriate to refer to some of the leading  

judgments of this Court on the scope of writ jurisdiction in  

the present context,  including those referred to in  Surya  

Dev Rai and the referring order.

10. In  T.C.  Basappa  vs. T.  Nagappa6,  question  before  

this Court was as to the scope of jurisdiction under Article  

226 in dealing with a writ of certiorari against the order of  

the Election Tribunal.  This Court considered the question in  

3 2004 (4) SCC 785 4 2005 (1) SCC 481 5 2005 (6) SCC 344 6 AIR 1954 SC 440= (1955)  1 SCR 250

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the background of principles followed by superior courts in  

England which generally  formed the basis  of  decisions of  

Indian  Courts.   This  Court  held  that  while  broad  and  

fundamental  norms regulating exercise of  writ  jurisdiction  

had  to  be  kept  in  mind,  it  was  not  necessary  for  Indian  

Courts  to  look  back  to  the  early  history  or  procedural  

technicalities of the writ jurisdiction in England in view of  

express constitutional provisions.  Certiorari was meant to  

supervise  “judicial  acts”  which  included  quasi  judicial  

functions of administrative bodies.  The Court issuing such  

writ  quashed  patently  erroneous  and  without  jurisdiction  

order  but  the  Court  did  not  review  the  evidence  as  an  

appellate court  nor substituted its own finding for that of  

the inferior Tribunal.  Since the said judgment is followed in  

all leading judgments, relevant observations therein may be  

extracted :

“5. The  principles  upon  which  the  superior   courts  in  England  interfere  by  issuing  writs  of   certiorari  are  fairly  well  known and they have  generally  formed the basis  of  decisions  in  our   Indian  courts.  It  is  true  that  there  is  lack  of   uniformity  even  in  the  pronouncements  of   English Judges, with regard to the grounds upon  which a writ,  or,  as it  is now said, an order of   certiorari,  could  issue,  but  such  differences  of   opinion  are  unavoidable  in  Judge-made  law  which has developed through a long course of   years.  As  is  well  known,  the  issue  of  the   prerogative  writs,  within  which  certiorari  is   included,  had  their  origin  in  England  in  the  King's  prerogative  power  of  superintendence

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over the due observance of law by his officials   and tribunals. The writ of certiorari is so named  because in its original form it required that the   King should be “certified of” the proceedings to  be investigated and the object was to secure by   the  authority  of  a  superior  court,  that  the  jurisdiction  of  the  inferior  Tribunal  should  be  properly exercised [Vide Ryots of Garabandho v.   Zamindar  of  Parlakimedi  70IA  129.  These   principles  were  transplanted  to  other  parts  of   the King's dominions. In India, during the British  days,  the  three  chartered  High  Courts  of   Calcutta,  Bombay  and  Madras  were  alone   competent  to  issue  writs  and  that  too  within  specified  limits  and  the  power  was  not   exercisable by the other High Courts at all. “In   that situation” as this court observed in Election  Commission,  India v.  Saka Venkata Subba Rao  [(1953) SCR 1144]

“the makers of the Constitution having  decided  to  provide  for  certain  basic   safeguards for the people in the new set   up, which they called fundamental rights,   evidently thought it necessary to provide  also a quick and inexpensive remedy for   the  enforcement  of  such  rights  and,   finding that the prerogative writs, which  the courts in England had developed and  used  whenever  urgent  necessity  demanded  immediate  and  decisive  interposition,  were  peculiarly  suited  for  the  purpose,  they  conferred,  in  the  States' sphere, new and wide powers on  the  High  Courts  of  issuing  directions,   orders,  or  writs  primarily  for  the  enforcement of  fundamental  rights,  the  power to issue such directions  ‘for  any  other purpose' being also included with a  view  apparently  to  place  all  the  High  Courts  in  this  country in somewhat the  same  position  as  the  Court  of  King's   Bench in England.”

6. The language used in Articles 32 and 226 of   our Constitution is very wide and the powers of   the  Supreme Court  as  well  as  of  all  the  High  Courts in India extend to issuing of orders, writs   or  directions  including  writs  in  the  nature  of  

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habeas  corpus,  mandamus,  quo  warranto,   prohibition and certiorari as may be considered  necessary for  enforcement of  the fundamental   rights  and in  the  case  of  the  High Courts,  for   other purposes as well.  In view of the express   provisions in our Constitution we need not now  look back to the early history or the procedural   technicalities of these writs in English law, nor   feel  oppressed by any difference or change of   opinion expressed in particular cases by English   Judges. We can make an order or issue a writ in   the nature of certiorari in all appropriate cases   and in appropriate manner, so long as we keep   to  the  broad  and  fundamental  principles  that  regulate  the  exercise  of  jurisdiction  in  the  matter of granting such writs in English law.

7. One of the fundamental principles in regard   to the issuing of a writ of certiorari, is, that the   writ  can  be  availed  of  only  to  remove  or   adjudicate  on  the  validity  of  judicial  acts.  The   expression “judicial acts” includes the exercise   of  quasi-judicial  functions  by  administrative   bodies or other authorities or persons obliged to  exercise such functions and is used in contrast   with what are purely ministerial acts. Atkin, L.J.   thus summed up the law on this point in Rex v.  Electricity Commissioners (1924) 1 KB 171]:

“Whenever  anybody  or  persons  having  legal  authority  to  determine  questions   affecting  the  rights  of  subjects  and  having  the  duty  to  act  judicially  act  in   excess of their legal authority, they are  subject  to the controlling jurisdiction of   the  King's  Bench  Division  exercised  in   these writs.”

The  second  essential  feature  of  a  writ  of   certiorari is that the control which is exercised  through it over judicial or quasi-judicial tribunals   or bodies is not in an appellate but supervisory   capacity.  In  granting  a  writ  of  certiorari  the  superior court does not exercise the powers of   an  appellate  tribunal.  It  does  not  review  or   reweigh  the  evidence  upon  which  the  determination of the inferior tribunal purports to   be  based.  It  demolishes  the  order  which  it   considers to be without jurisdiction or palpably

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erroneous but does not substitute its own views  for those of the inferior tribunal. The offending  order or proceeding so to say is put out of the  way  as  one  which  should  not  be  used  to  the   detriment of any person [Vide Per Lord Cairns in   walshall’s  Overseers  vs.  London  and  North   Western Railway Co. 4 AC 30, 39].

8. The  supervision  of  the  superior  court   exercised through writs of certiorari goes on two  points, as has been expressed by Lord Summer  in  King v.  Nat Bell Liquors Limited [(1922) 2 AC  128, 156]. One is the area of inferior jurisdiction   and  the  qualifications  and  conditions  of  its   exercise; the other is the observance of law in   the  course  of  its  exercise.  These  two  heads   normally cover all the grounds on which a writ of   certiorari  could  be  demanded.  In  fact  there  is   little  difficulty  in  the  enunciation  of  the  principles; the difficulty really arises in applying  the principles to the facts of a particular case.

9. Certiorari  may  lie  and  is  generally  granted  when a court has acted without or in excess of   its jurisdiction. The want of jurisdiction may arise   from  the  nature  of  the  subject-matter  of  the  proceeding  or  from  the  absence  of  some  preliminary proceeding or  the court  itself  may  not be legally constituted or suffer from certain   disability by reason of extraneous circumstances   [Vide  Halsbury,  2  Edn.  Vol  IX].  When  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court  depends  upon  the  existence  of  some  collateral  fact,  it  is  well   settled  that  the  court  cannot  by  a  wrong  decision of the fact give it jurisdiction which it   would not otherwise possess [Vide Banbury vs.   Fuller,  9  Exch  111;  R.  v.  Income  Tax  Special   Purposes Commissioners, 21 QBD 313].

10. A tribunal may be competent to enter upon   an enquiry but in making the enquiry it may act   in flagrant disregard of the rules of procedure or   where no particular procedure is  prescribed, it   may violate the principles of  natural  justice.  A   writ of certiorari may be available in such cases.   An error in the decision or determination itself   may also be amenable to a writ of certiorari but   it must be a manifest error apparent on the face   of  the  proceedings,  e.g.  when  it  is  based  on  

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clear ignorance or disregard of the provisions of   law. In other words, it is a patent error which can   be corrected by certiorari but not a mere wrong  decision.  The essential  features of  the remedy  by  way  of  certiorari  have  been  stated  with   remarkable brevity and clearness by Morris, L.J.   in  the  recent  case  of  Rex v.  Northumberland  Compensation Appellate Tribunal [ (1952) 1 KB  338]. The Lord Justice says:

“It is plain that certiorari will not issue as   the cloak of an appeal in disguise. It does   not lie in order to bring up an order or   decision for re-hearing of the issue raised  in  the  proceedings.  It  exists  to  correct   error of law when revealed on the face of   an  order  or  decision  or  irregularity  or   absence of or excess of jurisdiction when  shown.”

11. In dealing with the powers of the High Court   under Article 226 of the Constitution, this Court   has  expressed  itself  in  almost  similar  terms  [  Vide Veerappa Pillai  v.  Raman & Raman Ltd.   (1952) SCR 583]  and said:

“Such writs as are referred to in Article   226 are obviously intended to enable the  High Court to issue them in grave cases  where  the  subordinate  tribunals  or   bodies  or  officers  act  wholly  without   jurisdiction,  or  in  excess  of  it,  or  in   violation  of  the  principles  of  natural   justice,  or  refuse  to  exercise  a   jurisdiction vested in them, or there is an   error apparent on the face of the record,   and such act, omission, error or excess   has  resulted  in  manifest  injustice.   However  extensive the jurisdiction  may  be, it seems to us that it is not so wide or   large  as  to  enable  the  High  Court  to   convert itself into a court of appeal and  examine for itself the correctness of the   decision  impugned  and  decide  what  is   the proper view to be taken or the order   to be made.”

These passages indicate with sufficient fullness   the general principles that govern the exercise

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of jurisdiction in the matter of granting writs of   certiorari under Article 226 of the Constitution”.

11. It is necessary to clarify that expression “judicial acts”  

is not meant to refer to judicial orders of civil courts as the  

matter before this Court arose out of the order of Election  

Tribunal and no direct decision of this Court, except Surya  

Devi  Rai, has  been brought  to  our  notice  where  writ  of  

certiorari  may  have  been  issued  against  an  order  of  a  

judicial  court.   In  fact,  when the question as to  scope of  

jurisdiction arose in subsequent decisions,  it  was clarified  

that orders of judicial courts stood on different footing from  

the quasi judicial orders of authorities or Tribunals.

12. In Ujjam Bai vs. State of U.P.nd, matter was referred  

to a Bench of seven Judges on the scope of writ of certiorari  

against  an  order  of  assessment  under  the  provisions  of  

Sales Tax law passed in  violation of  a  fundamental  right.  

Majority of six judges took the view that except an order  

under a void law or an ‘ultra vires’ or  ‘without jurisdiction’  

order, there could be no violation of fundamental right by a  

quasi judicial order or a statutory authority and such order  

could not be challenged under Article 32.  A writ of certiorari  

could however, lie against a patently erroneous order under  

nd  AIR 1962 SC 1621 = (1963) 1 SCR 778

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Article 226.  It was observed that judicial orders of Courts  

stood on different footing.  Ayyangar, J. observed :

“Before concluding it is necessary to advert to  one  matter  which  was  just  touched  on  in  the   course of the arguments as one which might be   reserved  for  consideration  when  it  actually   arose, and this related to the question whether  the decision or order of a regular ordinary Court   of law as distinguished from a tribunal or quasi- judicial  authority  constituted  or  created  under   particular  statutes  could  be  complained  of  as  violating a fundamental  right.   It  is  a salutary   principle  that  this  Court  should  not  pronounce  on  points  which  are  not  involved  in  the  questions raised before it and that is the reason   why I am not dealing with it in any fullness and  am certainly not expressing any decided opinion  on it.  Without doing either however, I consider it   proper to make these observations.  There is not   any substantial identity between a Court of law  adjudicating on the rights  of  parties  in  the lis   before it and designed as the High Courts and  this Court are to investigate inter alia whether   any fundamental rights are infringed and vested  with  power  to  protect  them, and quasi-judicial   authorities  which  are  created  under  particular   statutes  and  with  a  view  to  implement  and  administer their provisions.  I shall be content to   leave the topic at this.”

13. In  Mirajkar,  a nine Judge Bench judgment, a judicial  

order  of  High  Court  was  challenged as  being violative  of  

fundamental  right.   This  Court  by  majority  held  that  a  

judicial  order  of  a  competent  court  could  not  violate  a  

fundamental right.  Even if there was incidental violation, it  

could  not  be  held  to  be  violative  of  fundamental  right.  

Gajendragaddkar, CJ, observed :

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“37. ……….The  argument  that  the  impugned order affects the fundamental rights   of the petitioners under Article 19(1),  is  based   on  a  complete  misconception  about  the  true  nature and character of judicial process and of   judicial  decisions.  When  a  Judge  deals  with   matters brought before him for his adjudication,   he first decides questions of fact on which the  parties  are  at  issue,  and  then  applies  the  relevant  law  to  the  said  facts.  Whether  the   findings of fact recorded by the Judge are right   or  wrong,  and  whether  the  conclusion  of  law  drawn by him suffers from any infirmity, can be  considered and decided if  the party aggrieved  by the decision of the Judge takes the matter up  before  the  appellate  court.  But  it  is  singularly   inappropriate to assume that a judicial decision  pronounced by a Judge of competent jurisdiction   in or in relation to a matter brought before him  for  adjudication  can  affect  the  fundamental   rights of the citizens under Article 19(1). What   the judicial decision purports to do is to decide   the  controversy  between  the  parties  brought   before the court and nothing more. If this basic   and  essential  aspect  of  the  judicial  process  is   borne in mind, it would be plain that the judicial   verdict pronounced by court in or in relation to a   matter brought before it for its decision cannot   be  said  to  affect  the  fundamental  rights  of   citizens under Article 19(1).

38. ………. Just as an order passed by the court   on  the  merits  of  the  dispute  before  it  can be  challenged only in appeal and cannot be said to   contravene  the  fundamental  rights  of  the   litigants  before  the  Court,  so  could  the  impugned order be challenged in appeal under   Article 136 of the Constitution, but it cannot be  said  to  affect  the  fundamental  rights  of  the  petitioners.  The character  of  the judicial  order   remains  the  same  whether  it  is  passed  in  a   matter directly in issue between the parties, or   is passed incidentally to make the adjudication  of  the  dispute  between  the  parties  fair  and  effective. On this view of the matter, it seems to  us that the whole attack against the impugned  order based on the assumption that it infringes  the petitioners' fundamental rights under Article   19(1), must fail.

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41.    It is true that the opinion thus expressed  by Kania, C.J., in the case of A.K Gopalan [1950  SCR 88] had not received the concurrence of the   other learned Judges who heard the said case.   Subsequently, however, in Ram Singh v. State of  Delhi  [1951  SCR  451],  the  said  observations  were cited with approval by the Full Court. The   same principle has been accepted by this Court   in Express Newspapers (Private) Ltd., v. Union of  India  [1959  SCR  12],  and  by  the  majority  judgment  in  Atiabari  Tea  Co.,  Ltd. v.  State  of  Assam [1961 (1) SCR 809.”

Explaining  observations  in  earlier  judgments  in  

Budhan Choudhary  vs.  State of  Bihar7 and Parbhani  

Tranport  Coop.  Society  Ltd.  vs. Regional  Transport  

Authority8 that a judicial order could be violative of Article  

14, it was observed :

“45. Naturally,  the  principal  contention  which  was urged on their behalf before this Court was  that Section 30 CrPC, infringed the fundamental   right  guaranteed  by  Article  14,  and  was,   therefore, invalid. This contention was repelled   by this Court. Then, alternatively, the appellants   argued that though the section itself may not be   discriminatory,  it  may  lend  itself  to  abuse  bringing about a discrimination between persons   accused of  offences of  the same kind,  for  the   police  may  send  up  a  person  accused  of  an   offence  under  Section  366  to  a  Section  30  Magistrate  and  the  police  may  send  another  person accused of  an offence under the same  section  to  a  Magistrate  who  can  commit  the  accused to the Court of Session. This alternative   contention  was  examined  and  it  was  also   rejected. That incidentally raised the question as  to whether the judicial  decision could itself  be  said to offend Article 14. S.R. Das, J., as he then   was,  who  spoke  for  the  Court  considered  this   contention,  referred  with  approval  to  the  

7 AIR 1955 SC 191 = (1955) 1 SCR 1045 8 AIR (1960) SC 801 = (1960) 3 SCR 177

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observations made by Frankfurter, J., and Stone,   C.J., of the Supreme Court of the United States in  Snowden v.  Hughes  [  (1944)  321  US1] and  observed  that  the  judicial  decision  must  of   necessity  depend  on  the  facts  and  circumstances of each particular case and what  may  superficially  appear  to  be  an  unequal   application  of  the  law  may  not  necessarily   amount to  a  denial  of  equal  protection  of  law  unless  there  is  shown  to  be  present  in  it  an  element  of  intentional  and  purposeful   discrimination.  Having  made  this  observation  which  at  best  may  be  said  to  assume that  a   judicial  decision  may  conceivably  contravene  Article 14, the learned Judge took the precaution   of adding that the discretion of judicial officers is   not arbitrary and the law provides for revision by   superior  courts  of  orders  passed  by  the   subordinate Courts. In such circumstances, there  is  hardly  any  ground  for  apprehending  any  capricious discrimination by judicial tribunals. 46. It is thus clear that though the observations   made  by  Frankfurter,  J.  and  Stone,  C.J.  in   Snowden v.  Hughes had  been  cited  with  approval, the question as to whether a judicial   order  can attract  the  jurisdiction  of  this  Court   under Article 32(1) and (2) was not argued and   did not fall to be considered at all. That question   became  only  incidentally  relevant  in  deciding  whether the validity of the conviction which was   impugned  by  the  appellants  in  the  case  of   Budhan Choudhry could be successfully assailed  on the ground that  the judicial  decision under  Section  30  CrPC,  was  capriciously  rendered  against  the  appellants.  The  scope  of  the  jurisdiction  of  this  Court  in  exercising  its  writ   jurisdiction in relation to orders passed by the  High  Court  was  not  and  could  not  have  been  examined, because the matter had come to this   Court  in  appeal  under  Article  132(1);  and  whether or not judicial decision can be said to   affect any fundamental right merely because it   incidentally  and  indirectly  may  encroach  upon  such  right,  did  not  therefore  call  for   consideration or  decision in  that  case.  In  fact,   the closing observations made in the judgment   themselves indicate that this Court was of the   view that if any judicial order was sought to be   attacked on the ground that it was inconsistent  

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with Article 14, the proper remedy to challenge  such an order would be an appeal or revision as   may be provided by law. We are, therefore, not   prepared  to  accept  Mr  Setalvad's  assumption   that the observations on which he bases himself   support  the  proposition  that  according  to  this   Court,  judicial  decisions  rendered by  courts  of   competent  jurisdiction  in  or  in  relation  to  matters brought before them can be assailed on  the ground that they violate Article 14. It may  incidentally be pointed out that the decision of   the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  in  Snowden v.  Hughes was  itself  not  concerned  with the validity of any judicial decision at all. 47. On  the  other  hand,  in  Parbhani  Transport  Cooperative  Society  Ltd. v.  Regional  Transport  Authority, Aurangabad Sarkar, J. speaking for the  Court,  has  observed  that  the  decision  of  the  Regional  Transport  Authority  which  was  challenged  before  the  Court  may  have  been  right or wrong, but that they were unable to see  how that decision could offend Article 14 or any   other  fundamental  right  of  the  petitioner.  The  learned  Judge  further  observed  that  the  Regional  Transport  Authority  was  acting  as  a  quasi-judicial  body  and  if  it  has  made  any  mistake  in  its  decision  there  are  appropriate  remedies  available  to  the  petitioner  for   obtaining relief. It cannot complain of a breach  of Article 14. It is true that in this case also the  larger issue as to whether the orders passed by   quasi  judicial  tribunals  can  be  said  to  affect   Article 14, does not appear to have been fully   argued. It is clear that the observations made by  this  Court  in  this  case unambiguously  indicate  that  it  would be inappropriate to suggest that   the decision rendered by a judicial tribunal can  be  described  as  offending  Article  14  at  all.  It   may be a right or wrong decision, and if it is a   wrong decision it can be corrected by appeal or   revision  as  may  be  permitted  by  law,  but  it   cannot be said per se to contravene Article 14. It   is significant that these observations have been  made while dealing with a writ petition filed by   the  petitioner,  the  Parbhani  Transport   Cooperative Society Ltd.  under Article  32;  and  insofar  as  the  point  has  been  considered  and  decided  the  decision  is  against  Mr  Setalvad's   contention.”

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Decision  of  this  Court  in  Prem  Chand  Garg  vs.  

Excise Commnr9,  setting aside rule of this Court requiring  

deposit  of  security  for  filing  a  writ  petition,  was  also  

explained as not  holding  that  a  judicial  order  resulted  in  

violation of fundamental right :

“49. It  would  thus  be  seen  that  the  main   controversy  in  the  case  of  Prem  Chand  Garg  centered round the question as to whether Article   145  conferred  powers  on  this  Court  to  make  Rules, though they may be inconsistent with the  constitutional  provisions  prescribed  by  Part  III  .   Once it  was held  that  the  powers  under  Article   142  had  to  be  read  subject  not  only  to  the  fundamental rights, but to other binding statutory   provisions,  it  became clear  that  the Rule  which   authorised the making of the impugned order was  invalid. It was in that context that the validity of   the  order  had to  be  incidentally  examined.  The  petition was made not to challenge the order as   such,  but  to  challenge  the  validity  of  the  Rule   under which the order was made. Once the Rule  was  struck  down  as  being  invalid,  the  order  passed under the said Rule had to be vacated. It   is difficult to see how this decision can be pressed  into  service  by  Mr  Setalvad  in  support  of  the  argument  that  a  judicial  order  passed  by  this   Court  was  held  to  be  subject  to  the  writ   jurisdiction of this Court itself. What was held by   this  Court  was  that  Rule  made  by  it  under  its   powers  conferred  by  Article  145  which  are  legislative  in  character,  was  invalid;  but  that  is   quite another matter. 50. It is plain that if a party desires to challenge   any of the Rules framed by this Court in exercise   of its powers under Article 145 on the ground that   they are invalid, because they illegally contravene  his  fundamental  rights,  it  would be open to the   party to move this Court under Article 32. Such a   challenge is not against any decision of this Court,   but against a Rule made by it in pursuance of its   rule-making power. If the Rule is struck down as it   

9 AIR 1963 SC 996 = (1963) Supp. 1 SCR 885

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was in the case of  Prem Chand Garg, this Court  can review or  recall  its  order passed under the  said Rule. Cases in which initial orders of security   passed by the Court are later reviewed and the   amount  of  security  initially  directed  is  reduced,   frequently arise in this Court; but they show the   exercise of this Court's powers under Article 137   and not under Article 32. Therefore, we are not   satisfied  that  Mr  Setalvad  is  fortified  by  any  judicial  decision  of  this  Court  in  raising  the   contention  that  a  judicial  order  passed  by  the  High Court in or in relation to proceedings brought  before  it  for  its  adjudication,  can  become  the  subject-matter  of  writ  jurisdiction  of  this  Court   under  Article  32(2).  In  fact,  no  precedent  has   been  cited  before  us  which  would  support  Mr  Setalvad's claim that a judicial order of the kind   with  which  we  are  concerned  in  the  present   proceedings  has  ever  been  attempted  to  be  challenged or has been set aside under Article 32  of the Constitution.”

This Court then dealt with the legal position in England  

on  the  question  of  scope  of  writ  of  certiorari  against  a  

judicial  order.   Noting  that  writ  of  certiorari  did  not  lie  

against a judicial order, it was observed :

“62. Whilst we are dealing with this aspect of   the  matter,  we  may  incidentally  refer  to  the  relevant observations made by Halsbury on this   point.  “In  the  case  of  judgments  of  inferior   courts of civil jurisdiction,” says Halsbury in the   footnote, “it has been suggested that certiorari   might  be  granted  to  quash  them for  want  of   jurisdiction [Kemp v.  Balne (1844), 1 Dow. & L.   885, at p. 887], inasmuch as an error did not lie   upon that ground. But there appears to be no  reported case in which the judgment of an  inferior court of civil jurisdiction has been  quashed  on certiorari,  either  for  want  of  jurisdiction  or  on  any  other  ground  [Halsbury Laws of England Vol.I 1, p.129]”.   The ultimate proposition is set out in the  terms: “Certiorari does not lie to quash the  judgments  of  inferior  courts  of  civil  

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jurisdiction.”  These  observations  would  indicate that in England the judicial orders  passed  by  civil  courts  of  plenary  jurisdiction  in  or  in  relation  to  matters  brought  before  them are  not  held  to  be  amenable to the jurisdiction to issue writs  of certiorari. 63. In  Rex. v.  Chancellor  of  St.  Edmundsburry  and Ipswich Diocese Ex parte White [(1945)  1   KBD 195] the question which arose was whether   certiorari  would  lie  from  the  Court  of  King's   Bench to an ecclesiastical Court; and the answer   rendered by the court was that certiorari would   not lie against the decision of an ecclesiastical   court. In dealing with this question, Wrottesley,   L.J. has elaborately considered the history of the   writ jurisdiction and has dealt with the question  about  the  meaning  of  the  word  ‘inferior'  as   applied to courts of law in England in discussing   the problem as to the issue of the writ in regard   to  decisions  of  certain  courts.  “The  more  this   matter was investigated,” says Wrottesley, L.J.,   “the clearer it became that the word “inferior”   as applied to courts of law in England had been  used with at least two very different meanings.   If, as some assert, the question of inferiority is   determined by ascertaining whether the court in   question  can  be  stopped  from  exceeding  its   jurisdiction by a writ of prohibition issuing from  the King's Bench, then not only the ecclesiastical   courts,  but  also  palatine  courts  and  admiralty   courts are inferior courts. But there is another   test,  well  recognised  by  lawyers,  by  which  to   distinguish  a  superior  from  an  inferior  court,   namely,  whether  in  its  proceedings,  and  in   particular in its judgments, it must appear that   the court was acting within its jurisdiction. This   is the characteristic of an inferior court, whereas   in the proceedings of a superior court it will be   presumed  that  it  acted  within  its  jurisdiction   unless the contrary should appear either on the  face  of  the  proceedings  or  aliunde.”  Mr  Sen  relied upon this decision to show that even the   High  Court  of  Bombay  can  be  said  to  be  an   inferior  court  for  the  purpose  of  exercising   jurisdiction by this Court under Article 32(2) to  issue  a  writ  of  certiorari  in  respect  of  the   impugned order passed by it. We are unable to  

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see  how  this  decision  can  support  Mr  Sen's   contentions.”   

                     (emphasis  added).

14. In  Rupa Ashok Hurra (supra)  it was held that final  

order of this Court cannot be challenged under Article 32 as  

violative of  fundamental  right.   Judgment of  this  Court in  

Triveniben  vs. State  of  Gujarat10 was  referred  to  with  

approval to the effect that a judicial order could not violate  

a fundamental right.  It was observed :

“11. In Triveniben v. State of Gujarat speaking  for himself and other three learned Judges of the   Constitution Bench, Oza, J.,  reiterating the same  principle, observed: (SCC p. 697, para 22)

“It is well settled now that a judgment  of  court  can  never  be  challenged  under Articles 14 or 21 and therefore  the  judgment  of  the  court  awarding  the sentence of death is not open to  challenge  as  violating  Article  14  or  Article 21 as has been laid down by  this  Court  in  Naresh  Shridhar  Mirajkar v.  State of  Maharashtra  and  also  in  A.R.  Antulay v.  R.S.  Nayak [1988 (2) SCC 602], the only  jurisdiction which could be sought to   be  exercised  by  a  prisoner  for   infringement  of  his  rights  can  be  to  challenge the subsequent events after   the final judicial verdict is pronounced  and it  is because of this that on the   ground of long or inordinate delay a  condemned  prisoner  could  approach  this  Court  and  that  is  what  has   consistently been held by this Court.   But it will not be open to this Court in   exercise  of  jurisdiction  under  Article   32  to  go  behind  or  to  examine  the  

10 (1989) 1 SCC 678

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final verdict reached by a competent   court  convicting  and  sentencing  the  condemned  prisoner  and  even  while   considering  the  circumstances  in  order  to  reach  a  conclusion  as  to   whether the inordinate delay coupled  with subsequent circumstances could  be held to be sufficient for coming to  a  conclusion  that  execution  of  the  sentence of death will not be just and  proper.”

12. We consider it  inappropriate to burden this   judgment with discussion of the decisions in other   cases taking the same view. Suffice it to mention   that various Benches of this Court reiterated the  same  principle  in  the  following  cases:  A.R.  Antulay v.  R.S.  Nayak, Krishna  Swami v.  Union  of  India  [1992  (4)  SCC  605],  Mohd.  Aslam v.  Union of  India  [1996 (2)  SCC 749],  Khoday Distilleries Ltd. v. Registrar General,  Supreme Court  of  India [1996  (3)  SCC 114],  Gurbachan Singh v.  Union of India [1996 (3)  SCC 117], Babu Singh Bains v. Union of India  [1996 (6) SCC 565] and P. Ashokan v. Union of  India [1998 (3) SCC 56. 13. It is, however, true that in Supreme Court Bar  Assn. v.  Union  of  India  [1998  (4)  SCC  409 a  Constitution Bench and in M.S. Ahlawat v. State  of  Haryana  [2000  (1)  SCC  278] a  three-Judge  Bench,  and  in  other  cases  different  Benches   quashed  the  earlier  judgments/orders  of  this   Court  in an application filed under Article 32 of   the Constitution. But in those cases no one joined  issue with regard to the maintainability of the writ   petition  under  Article  32  of  the  Constitution.   Therefore,  those  cases  cannot  be  read  as   authority  for  the  proposition  that  a  writ  of   certiorari under Article 32 would lie to challenge   an earlier final judgment of this Court.

14. On the analysis of the ratio laid down in the  aforementioned cases, we reaffirm our considered  view that a final  judgment/order passed by this   Court cannot be assailed in an application under   Article  32  of  the  Constitution  of  India  by  an   aggrieved person, whether he was a party to the  case or not.

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15. In  fairness  to  the  learned  counsel  for  the  parties, we record that all of them at the close of   the  hearing  of  these  cases  conceded  that  the  jurisdiction of  this  Court under Article 32 of  the  Constitution cannot be invoked to challenge the   validity of a final judgment/order passed by this   Court  after  exhausting  the  remedy  of  review  under  Article  137  of  the  Constitution  read  with  Order  XL  Rule  1  of  the  Supreme  Court  Rules,   1966.”

15. While  the  above  judgments  dealt  with  the  question  

whether judicial order could violate a fundamental right, it  

was clearly laid down that challenge to judicial orders could  

lie by way of appeal or revision or under Article 227 and not  

by way of a writ under Article 226 and 32.

16. Another Bench of three judges in  Sadhana Lodh vs.  

National  Insurance  Co.  Ltd.11 considered  the  question  

whether remedy of writ  will  be available when remedy of  

appeal was on limited grounds.  This Court held :

“6. The right of  appeal is  a statutory right and  where  the  law  provides  remedy  by  filing  an   appeal  on  limited  grounds,  the  grounds  of   challenge cannot be enlarged by filing a petition  under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution on the  premise  that  the  insurer  has  limited  grounds  available for challenging the award given by the   Tribunal.  Section  149(2)  of  the  Act  limits  the  insurer  to  file  an  appeal  on  those  enumerated   grounds and the appeal  being a product  of  the   statute it  is  not open to an insurer to take any   plea  other  than  those  provided  under  Section   149(2) of the Act (see National Insurance Co. Ltd.  v.  Nicolletta  Rohtagi  (2002  (7)  SCC  456).  This  being the legal position, the petition filed under   Article 227 of the Constitution by the insurer was   wholly misconceived. Where a statutory right to   

11 2003 (3) SCC 524

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file an appeal has been provided for, it is not open   to  the  High  Court  to  entertain  a  petition  under  Article  227 of  the Constitution.  Even if  where a  remedy  by  way  of  an  appeal  has  not  been  provided for against the order and judgment of a   District  Judge,  the  remedy  available  to  the  aggrieved person is to file a revision before the  High Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil   Procedure. Where remedy for filing a revision  before  the  High  Court  under  Section  115  CPC has been expressly barred by a State  enactment,  only  in  such  case  a  petition  under Article 227 of the Constitution would  lie  and  not  under  Article  226  of  the  Constitution.  As  a  matter  of  illustration,   where a trial court in a civil suit refused to  grant  temporary  injunction  and  an  appeal  against refusal to grant injunction has been  rejected, and a State enactment has barred  the remedy of filing revision under Section  115 CPC, in such a situation a writ petition  under Article 227 would lie and not under  Article 226 of the Constitution. Thus, where  the State Legislature has barred a remedy  of filing a revision petition before the High  Court  under  Section  115  CPC,  no  petition  under Article 226 of the Constitution would  lie  for  the  reason  that  a  mere  wrong  decision  without  anything  more  is  not  enough  to  attract  jurisdiction  of  the  High  Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.”  

        (emphasis  added)

17. This  Court  in  judgment  dated  6  December,  1989 in  

Civil Appeal No.815 of 1989 Qamruddin vs. Rasul Baksh  

&  Anr. which  has  been  quoted  in  Allahabad  High  Court  

Judgment in Ganga Saran vs. Civil Judgeth considered the  

issue  of  writ  of  certiorari  and  mandamus  against  interim  

order of civil court and held :

th  AIR 1991 All 114

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“If  the  order  of  injunction  is  passed  by  a   competent  court  having  jurisdiction  in  the  matter, it is not permissible for the High Court   under Article 226 of the Constitution to quash  the same by issuing a writ of certiorari.  In the   instant case the learned Single Judge of the High   Court  further  failed  to  realise  that  a  writ  of   mandamus could not be issued in this case.  A  writ of mandamus cannot be issued to a private   individual unless he is under a statutory duty to   perform a public duty.  The dispute involved in   the  instant  case  was   entirely  between  two  private  parties,  which  could  not  be  a  subject   matter of writ of mandamus under Article 226 of   the  Constitution.   The  learned  Single  Judge   ignored  this  basic  principle  of  writ  jurisdiction  conferred on the High Court under Article 226 of   the  Constitution.   There  was  no  occasion  or   justification  for  issue  of  a  writ  of  certiorari  or   mandamus.  The High Court committed serious   error of jurisdiction in interfering with the order   of the District Judge.”

18. Thus, it has been clearly laid down by this Court that  

an Order of civil court could be challenged under Article 227  

and  not  under   

Article 226.

19. We may now come to  the judgment  in  Surya Dev  

Rai.   Therein,  the  appellant  was  aggrieved  by  denial  of  

interim injunction  in  a  pending  suit  and  preferred  a  writ  

petition in the High court stating that after CPC amendment  

by Act 46 of 1999 w.e.f.  1 July,  2002, remedy of revision  

under Section 115 was no longer available.  The High Court  

dismissed the petition following its Full Bench Judgment in  

Ganga Saran to the effect that a writ was not maintainable

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as  no  mandamus  could  issue  to  a  private  person.   The  

Bench  considered  the  question  of  the  impact  of  CPC  

amendment on power and jurisdiction of the High Court to  

entertain a writ of certiorari under Article 226 or a petition  

under Article 227 to involve power of superintendence.  The  

Bench noted the legal position that after CPC amendment  

revisional jurisdiction of the High Court against interlocutory  

order was curtailed.  The Bench then referred to the history  

of writ of certiorari and its scope and concluded thus :

“18. Naresh  Shridhar  Mirajkar  case was  cited  before  the  Constitution  Bench  in  Rupa  Ashok  Hurra case and considered. It has been clearly   held: (i) that it is a well-settled principle that the  technicalities  associated  with  the  prerogative  writs in English law have no role to play under   our  constitutional  scheme;  (ii)  that  a  writ  of  certiorari  to  call  for  records  and  examine  the  same for  passing appropriate orders,  is  issued  by  a  superior  court  to  an inferior  court  which  certifies  its  records  for  examination;  and  (iii)   that a High Court cannot issue a writ to another   High Court, nor can one Bench of a High Court   issue  a  writ  to  a  different  Bench  of  the  High  Court;  much less can the writ  jurisdiction of  a   High Court be invoked to seek issuance of a writ   of  certiorari  to  the  Supreme  Court.  The  High  Courts are not constituted as inferior courts in   our constitutional scheme. 19. Thus, there is no manner of doubt that the   orders  and  proceedings  of  a  judicial  court   subordinate to the High Court are amenable to   writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article   226 of the Constitution. xxxx 24. The  difference  between  Articles  226  and  227 of the Constitution was well brought out in   Umaji  Keshao  Meshram v.  Radhikabai  [1986  Supp. SCC 401]. Proceedings under Article 226

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are in exercise of the original jurisdiction of the   High Court while proceedings under Article 227   of  the  Constitution  are  not  original  but  only   supervisory. Article 227 substantially reproduces   the provisions of Section 107 of the Government   of India Act, 1915 excepting that the power of   superintendence  has  been  extended  by  this   article to tribunals as well. Though the power is   akin to that of an ordinary court of appeal, yet   the power under Article 227 is intended to be  used sparingly and only in appropriate cases for   the purpose of  keeping the subordinate courts   and  tribunals  within  the  bounds  of  their   authority and not for correcting mere errors. The  power  may be  exercised  in  cases  occasioning  grave injustice or failure of justice such as when   (i)  the  court  or  tribunal  has  assumed  a  jurisdiction which it does not have, (ii) has failed  to  exercise  a  jurisdiction  which  it  does  have,   such failure occasioning a failure of justice, and  (iii)  the  jurisdiction  though  available  is  being   exercised  in  a  manner  which  tantamounts  to  overstepping the limits of jurisdiction. 25. Upon  a  review  of  decided  cases  and  a  survey of the occasions, wherein the High Courts   have exercised jurisdiction to command a writ of   certiorari or to exercise supervisory jurisdiction   under  Article  227  in  the  given  facts  and  circumstances  in  a  variety  of  cases,  it  seems  that the distinction between the two jurisdictions   stands almost obliterated in  practice. Probably,  this is the reason why it has become customary  with the lawyers labelling their petitions as one  common  under  Articles  226  and  227  of  the  Constitution,  though  such  practice  has  been  deprecated  in  some  judicial  pronouncement.   Without entering into niceties and technicality of   the  subject,  we  venture  to  state  the  broad  general difference between the two jurisdictions.   Firstly, the writ of certiorari is an exercise of its   original jurisdiction by the High Court; exercise   of  supervisory  jurisdiction  is  not  an  original   jurisdiction  and  in  this  sense  it  is  akin  to   appellate,  revisional  or  corrective  jurisdiction.   Secondly, in a writ of certiorari, the record of the  proceedings having been certified and sent up  by  the  inferior  court  or  tribunal  to  the  High   Court, the High Court if inclined to exercise its   jurisdiction,  may  simply  annul  or  quash  the

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proceedings and then do no more. In exercise of   supervisory jurisdiction, the High Court may not   only  quash  or  set  aside  the  impugned  proceedings, judgment or order but it may also   make  such  directions  as  the  facts  and  circumstances of the case may warrant, maybe,   by way of guiding the inferior court or tribunal   as to the manner in which it would now proceed  further or afresh as commended to or guided by   the  High Court.  In  appropriate  cases  the  High  Court,  while exercising supervisory jurisdiction,   may  substitute  such  a  decision  of  its  own  in   place of the impugned decision, as the inferior   court or tribunal should have made. Lastly, the   jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution  is capable of being exercised on a prayer made   by  or  on  behalf  of  the  party  aggrieved;  the   supervisory  jurisdiction  is  capable  of  being  exercised suo motu as well.

20. It  is  the  above  holding,  correctness  of  which  was  

doubted in the referring order already mentioned above.

21. It  is  true  that  this  Court  has  laid  down  that  

technicalities  associated  with  the  prerogative  writs  in  

England  have  no  role  to  play  under  our  constitutional  

scheme.  There is no parallel system of King’s Court in India  

and of all other courts having limited jurisdiction subject to  

supervision of King’s Court.   Courts are set up under the  

Constitution or the laws.  All courts in the jurisdiction of a  

High Court are subordinate to it and subject to its control  

and  supervision  under  Article  227.   Writ  jurisdiction  is  

constitutionally  conferred  on  all  High  Courts.   Broad  

principles  of  writ  jurisdiction  followed  in  England  are  

applicable  to  India  and  a  writ  of  certiorari  lies  against

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patently erroneous or without jurisdiction orders of Tribunals  

or authorities or courts other than judicial courts.   There are  

no  precedents  in  India  for  High  Courts  to  issue  writs  to  

subordinate  courts.   Control  of  working  of  subordinate  

courts in dealing with their judicial orders is exercised by  

way  of  appellate  or  revisional  powers  or  power  of  

superintendence  under  Article  227.   Orders  of  civil  court  

stand on different footing from the orders of authorities or  

Tribunals  or  courts  other  than  judicial/civil  courts.  While  

appellate or revisional jurisdiction is regulated by statutes,  

power  of  superintendence  under  Article  227  is  

constitutional.   The  expression  “inferior  court”  is  not  

referable  to  judicial  courts,  as  rightly  observed  in  the  

referring  order  in  paras  26  and  27   

quoted above.

22. The Bench in Surya Dev Rai also observed in para 25  

of  its  judgment that  distinction between Articles 226 and  

227stood  almost  obliterated.   In  para  24  of  the  said  

judgment distinction in the two articles has been noted.  In  

view thereof, observation that scope of Article 226 and 227  

was obliterated was not correct as rightly observed by the  

referring Bench in Para 32 quoted above.  We make it clear  

that though despite the curtailment of revisional jurisdiction

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under Section 115 CPC by Act 46 of 1999, jurisdiction of the  

High  Court  under  Article  227  remains  unaffected,  it  has  

been  wrongly  assumed  in  certain  quarters  that  the  said  

jurisdiction has been expanded.  Scope of Article 227 has  

been  explained  in  several  decisions  including  Waryam  

Singh  and  another  vs. Amarnath  and  anotherst,  

Ouseph Mathai  vs. M. Abdul Khadir12, Shalini Shyam  

Shetty  vs. Rajendra  Shankar  Patil13 and  Sameer  

Suresh Gupta  vs. Rahul  Kumar Agarwal14. In  Shalini  

Shyam Shetty, this Court observed :

“64. However, this Court unfortunately discerns  that  of  late  there  is  a growing trend amongst   several High Courts to entertain writ petition in   cases  of  pure  property  disputes.  Disputes  relating  to  partition  suits,  matters  relating  to  execution  of  a  decree,  in  cases  of  dispute  between landlord and tenant and also in a case  of  money  decree  and  in  various  other  cases   where  disputed  questions  of  property  are   involved,  writ  courts  are  entertaining  such  disputes.  In  some cases the High Courts,  in  a   routine manner, entertain petitions under Article   227 over such disputes and such petitions are   treated as writ petitions. 65. We would like to make it clear that in view   of the law referred to above in cases of property   rights  and  in  disputes  between  private  individuals writ court should not interfere unless   there  is  any infraction  of  statute  or  it  can be   shown  that  a  private  individual  is  acting  in   collusion with a statutory authority. 66. We  may  also  observe  that  in  some  High   Courts  there  is  a  tendency  of  entertaining  

st  AIR 1954 SC 215=1954 SCR 565 12 2002 (1) SCC 319 13 2010 (8) SCC 329 14 2013 (9) SCC 374

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petitions under Article 227 of the Constitution by   terming them as writ petitions. This is sought to   be justified on an erroneous appreciation of the   ratio  in  Surya  Dev and  in  view  of  the  recent  amendment  to  Section  115  of  the  Civil   Procedure  Code  by  the  Civil  Procedure  Code  (Amendment)  Act,  1999.  It  is  urged  that  as  a   result of the amendment, scope of Section 115  CPC has been curtailed.  In our view, even if  the scope of Section 115 CPC is curtailed  that  has  not  resulted  in  expanding  the  High Court’s power of superintendence. It   is  too  well  known  to  be  reiterated  that  in   exercising its jurisdiction, High Court must follow  the regime of law. 67. As a result of frequent interference by the  Hon’ble High Court either under Article 226 or   227 of the Constitution with pending civil and at   times criminal  cases,  the disposal  of  cases by   the  civil  and  criminal  courts  gets  further   impeded and thus causing serious problems in   the administration of  justice.  This  Court  hopes   and  trusts  that  in  exercising  its  power  either   under Article 226 or 227, the Hon’ble High Court   will  follow  the  time  honoured  principles   discussed  above.  Those  principles  have  been  formulated by this Court for ends of justice and   the High Courts as the highest courts of justice   within  their  jurisdiction  will  adhere  to  them  strictly.”                                    (emphasis added)

23. Thus, we are of the view that judicial  orders of civil  

courts are not amenable to a writ of certiorari under Article  

226.   We  are  also  in  agreement  with  the  view  of  the  

referring  Bench  that  a  writ  of  mandamus  does  not  lie  

against  a private person not  discharging any public  duty.  

Scope of Article 227 is different from Article 226.

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24. We may also deal with the submission made on behalf  

of the respondent that the view in  Surya Dev Rai  stands  

approved  by  larger  Benches  in  Shail,  Mahendra Saree  

Emporium and Salem Advocate Bar Assn  and on that  

ground correctness of the said view cannot be gone into by  

this Bench.  In  Shail, though reference has been made to  

Surya Dev Rai, the same is only for the purpose of scope  

of power under Article 227 as is clear from para 3 of the  

said  judgment.   There  is  no  discussion  on  the  issue  of  

maintainability  of  a  petition  under  Article  226.   In  

Mahendra Saree Emporium, reference to Surya Dev Rai  

is made in para 9 of the judgment only for the proposition  

that  no  subordinate  legislation  can  whittle  down  the  

jurisdiction  conferred  by  the  Constitution.   Similarly,  in  

Salem Bar Assn. in para 40, reference to Surya Dev Rai  

is for the same purpose.  We are, thus, unable to accept the  

submission of learned counsel for the respondent.   

25. Accordingly,  we  answer  the  question  referred  as  

follows :

“(i) Judicial  orders  of  civil  court  are  not   amenable to writ jurisdiction  under  Article  226 of the Constitution;

(ii)   Jurisdiction  under  Article  227  is   distinct from jurisdiction  from  jurisdiction  under Article 226.

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Contrary view in Surya Dev Rai is overruled.”

26. The matters may now be listed before the appropriate  

Bench for further orders.

    .…..…………………………….CJI. [H.L. DATTU]

..……..…………………………….J.                         [A.K. SIKRI]

.…...………………………………..J.            [ ADARSH KUMAR  

GOEL ]

NEW DELHI FEBRUARY 26, 2015