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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.8643 OF 2011 (Arising from SLP(C) No.27254/2008)

R.Indira Saratchandra ...Appellant

versus

State of Tamil Nadu & others ...Respondents

J U D G M E N T

G.S. Singhvi, J. 1. The question which arises for consideration in  

this  appeal  is  whether  the  acquisition  of  the  

appellant's land lapsed on account of non-passing of  

an award within the period specified in Section 11A of  

the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short, 'the Act').

2.The  appellant's  land  was  acquired  by  the  State  

Government for and on behalf of Tamil Nadu Housing  

Board.  Notification under Section 4(1) of the Act was  

issued on 01.11.1982 and was published in the Official

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Gazette on 24.11.1982.  The declaration under Section  

6 was issued on 2.2.1985.  The same was published in  

the Official Gazette dated 20.02.1985 and in the local  

newspapers on 22.5.1985.

3.The writ petition filed by the appellant and others  

questioning the acquisition of land, which came to be  

registered  as  Writ  Petition  No.3646  of  1987  was  

allowed by the learned Single Judge vide order dated  

24.10.1991. That order was set aside by the Division  

Bench  in  Writ  Appeal  No.406  of  1994  filed  by  

respondent  Nos.1  to  3.  Thereafter,  the  Special  

Tahsildar  (Land  Acquisition),  Neighbourhood  Scheme,  

Ayyan Thirumaligam Road, Salem passed an award dated  

10.12.1996.

4.Immediately thereafter, the appellant and proforma  

respondent Nos. 4 to 7, whose name were deleted vide  

order dated 25.01.2010, filed Writ Petition No.19284  

of  1996  for  grant  of  a  declaration  that  the  

acquisition  of  their  land  will  be  deemed  to  have  

lapsed because the award was not passed within two  

years.   Respondent  Nos.1  to  3  contested  the  writ  

petition by asserting that the award was passed within

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two years from the date of receipt of the copy of the  

Division Bench judgment dated 29.8.1996.

5.The learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition  

and  declared  that  the  acquisition  of  the  writ  

petitioners'  land  will  be  deemed  to  have  lapsed  

because the award was passed after more than two years  

counted  from  the  date  of  last  publication  of  the  

declaration issued under Section 6 of the Act.

6.The Division Bench of the High Court allowed the  

appeal preferred by respondent Nos. 1 to 3 and set  

aside the order of the learned Single Judge by relying  

upon the judgments of this Court in Narasimhaiah v.  

State  of  Karnataka,  (1996)  3  SCC  88;   State  of  

Tamilnadu v. L. Krishnan, (1996) 1 SCC 250;  Executive  

Engineer, Jal Nigam Central Stores Division v. Suresha  

Nand Juyal (1997) 9 SCC 224; Municipal Corporation of  

Greater  Bombay  v.  Industrial  Development  Investment  

Co. (P) Ltd., (1996) 11 SCC 501; Municipal council,  

Ahmednagar v. Shah Hyder Beig, (2000) 2 SCC 48; Tej  

Kaur v. State of Punjab, (2003) 4 SCC 485; and Padma  

Sundara Rao (Dead) & Others v. State of Tamilnadu &  

Others, (2002) 3 SCC 533. In  the  opinion  of  the

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Division Bench, the law laid down by the Constitution  

Bench of this Court in Padma Sundara Rao v. State of  

Tamil Nadu(supra) cannot be applied to the cases in  

which the acquisition proceedings had become final.  

The Division Bench was also of the view that the writ  

petition  filed  by  the  appellant  herein  and  the  

proforma respondents was highly belated.

7.Learned counsel for the appellant argued that the  

impugned judgment is liable to be set aside because  

the view taken by the Division Bench of the High Court  

on the interpretation of Section 11A of the Act is  

contrary to its plain language and the judgment of the  

Constitution Bench in Padma Sundara Rao v. State of  

Tamil Nadu (supra).   Learned counsel submitted that  

the observations made in the last paragraph of the  

Constitution Bench judgment suggesting that the law  

laid down by it will not apply to the cases in which  

the acquisition had become final has no application to  

the  present  case  because  the  land  owners  had  

questioned the acquisition and at the time of decision  

of the Constitution Bench, the writ petition filed by  

them was pending consideration.

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8.Learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 1 to 3 made  

half-hearted attempt to support the impugned judgment  

by asserting that the period of two years prescribed  

under Section 11A of the Act should be counted not  

from the date of the judgment of the Division Bench  

but from the date, on which copy thereof was supplied  

to  the  concerned  authority,  i.e.,  1.11.1996.   He  

further  argued  that  the  ratio  of  the  Constitution  

Bench judgment in Padma Sundara Rao v. State of Tamil  

Nadu  (supra)  cannot  be  invoked  by  the  appellants  

because once the Division Bench set aside the order of  

the learned Single Judge, the acquisition proceedings  

became final.       

9. We have considered the respective submissions.  

Section  11A  of  the  Act,  which  has  bearing  on  the  

disposal of this appeal reads as under:

“11A. Period  within  which  an  award  shall  be  made  -  The  Collector  shall  make  an  award  under section 11 within a period  of two years from the date of the  publication  of  the  declaration  and  if  no  award  is  made  within  that  period,  the  entire  proceedings  for  the  acquisition  of the land shall lapse.

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Provided that in a case where the  said  declaration  has  been  published before the commencement  of  the  Land  Acquisition  (Amendment) Act, 1984, the award  shall be made within a period of  two years from such commencement.

Explanation-  In  computing  the  period of two years referred to  in  this  section,  the  period  during  which  any  action  or  proceeding  to  be  taken  in  pursuance of the said declaration  is stayed by an order of a Court  shall be excluded.”

10.A  reading  of  the  plain  language  of  the  above  

reproduced section makes it clear that the Collector  

is obliged to make an award under section 11 within a  

period of two years from the date of the publication  

of the declaration.  If no award is made within that  

period,  the  acquisition  proceedings  automatically  

lapses.   By  virtue  of  the  explanation,  the  period  

during  which  any  action  or  proceeding  to  be  taken  

pursuant to the declaration is stayed by an order of a  

Court is to be excluded in computing the period of two  

years.  This means that if any action or proceeding  

required to be taken after the issue of declaration  

under  Section  6  is  stayed  by  a  Court,  the  entire

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period of stay will get excluded in calculating the  

period of two years within which an award is required  

to be made by the Collector. As a corollary to this,  

it must be held that once the stay order passed by a  

Court is vacated or ceases to operate, the clog put on  

the  running  of  the  period  specified  in  the  main  

section is removed.  

11.There is nothing in the Section 11A from which it  

can be inferred that the stay order passed by the  

Court remains operative till the delivery of copy of  

the order. Ordinarily, the rules framed by the High  

Court do not provide for supply of copy of judgment or  

order to the parties free of cost.  The parties to the  

litigation  can  apply  for  certified  copy  which  is  

required  to  be  supplied  on  fulfillment  of  the  

conditions specified in the relevant rules. However,  

no  period  has  been  prescribed  for  making  of  an  

application  for  certified  copy  of  the  judgment  or  

order or preparation and delivery thereof. Of course,  

once  an  application  is  made  within  the  prescribed  

period  of  limitation,  the  time  spent  in  the  

preparation  and  supply  of  the  copy  is  excluded  in

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computing  the  period  of  limitation  prescribed  for  

filing an appeal or revision.

12.In  the  present  case,  we  find  that  the  Division  

Bench of the High Court had allowed Writ Appeal No.406  

of 1994 vide judgment dated 29.8.1996. In the counter  

affidavit filed on behalf of respondent Nos. 1 to 3 to  

the writ petition of the appellant and the proforma  

respondent, the date of supply of copy of the judgment  

of the Division Bench was mentioned as 1.11.1996 but  

the date on which the application was made for supply  

of copy was not disclosed. In any case, the fortuitous  

factor i.e. the time taken in supply of copy of the  

judgment  cannot  extend  the  period  of  two  years  

specified in Section 11A.

13.In  Padma  Sundara  Rao  v.  State  of  Tamil  Nadu  

(supra),  the  Constitution  Bench  referred  to  the  

earlier  judgments  including  the  judgment  of  three  

Judge Bench in N. Narasimhaiah and Ors. v. State of  

Karnataka  and  Ors  etc.  (1996  (3)  SCC  88)  and  

observed :

“3. The controversy involved lies  within a very narrow compass, that  is,  whether  after  quashing  of

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notification  under  Section  6  of  the  Land  Acquisiton  Act,  1894  (hereinafter referred to as “the  Act”) fresh period of one year is  available to the State Government  to  issue  another  notification  under Section 6.  In the case at  hand  such  a  notification  issued  under  Section  6  was  questioned  before the Madras High Court which  relied on the decision of a three- Judge Bench in N. Narasimhaiah v.  State of Karnataka and held that  the same was validly issued.

4.Learned  counsel  for  the  appellants placed reliance on an  unreported decision of this Court  in  A.S.  Naidu  v.  State  of  T.N.  wherein  a  Bench  of  three  Judges  held that once a declaration under  Section  6  of  the  Act  has  been  quashed,  fresh  declaration  under  Section 6 cannot be issued beyond  the  prescribed  period  of  the  notification under sub-Section (1)  of Section 4 of the Act.  It has  to be noted that there is another  judgment of two learned Judges in  Oxford English School v. Govt. of  T.N. which takes a view similar to  that expressed in A.S. Naidu case.  However, in State of Karnataka v.  D.C.  Nanjudaiah  view  in  Narasimhaiah case was followed and  it was held that the limitation of  3  years  for  publication  of  declaration  would  start  running  from the date of receipt of the  order of the High Court and not  from  the  date  on  which  the  original publication under Section  4(1) came to be made.

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 10. What appears to have weighed  with  the  three-Judge  Bench  in  Narasimhaiah's case (supra) is set  out  in  paragraph  12  of  the  judgment, which reads as under:

 "Having  considered  the  

respective  contentions,  we  are  of the considered view that if  the  construction as  put up  by  the  learned  counsel  for  the  appellants  is  given  acceptance  i.e.,  it should  be within  one  year from the last of the dates  of  publication  under  Section  4(1), the public purpose would  always be frustrated. It may be  illustrated  thus:  In  a  given  case  where  the  notification  under  Section  4(1)  was  published,  dispensing  with  the  enquiry  under  Section  5-A  and  declaration was published within  one month and as the urgency in  the  opinion  of  the  Government  was such that it did not brook  the  delay  of  30  days  and  immediate  possession  was  necessary,  but  possession  was  not  taken  due  to  dilatory  tactics of the interested person  and the court ultimately finds  after  two  years  that  the  exercise  of  urgency  power  was  not  warranted  and  so  it  was  neither  valid  nor  proper  and  directed the Government to give  an opportunity to the interested  person and the State to conduct  an  enquiry  under  Section  5-A,  then the exercise of the power

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pursuant to the direction of the  court  will be  fruitless as  it  would take time to conduct the  enquiry.  If  the  enquiry  is  dragged  for  obvious  reasons,  declaration  under  Section  6(1)  cannot be published within the  limitation  from  the  original  date of the publication of the  notification under Section 4(1).  A  valid  notification  under  Section 4(1) become invalid. On  the other hand, after conducting  enquiry as per court order and,  if the declaration under Section  6 is published within one year  from the date of the receipt of  the  order  passed  by  the  High  Court,  the  notification  under  Section 4(1) becomes valid since  the action was done pursuant to  the  orders  of  the  court  and  compliance  with  the  limitation  prescribed  in  clauses  (i)  and  (ii)  of  the  first  proviso  to  sub-section (1) of the Act would  be made."

 11. It may be pointed out that the  stipulation regarding the urgency  in terms of Section 5-A of the Act  has  no  role  to  play  when  the  period of limitation under Section  6  is  reckoned.  The  purpose  for  providing the period of limitation  seems  to  be  avoidance  of  inconvenience  to  a  person  whose  land  is  sought  to  be  acquired.  Compensation gets pegged from the  date of Notification under Section  4(1). Section 11 provides that the  valuation  of  the  land  has  to  be  done on the date of publication of

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Notification  under  Section  4(1).  Section 23 deals with matters to  be  considered  in  determining  the  compensation. It provides that the  market value of the land is to be  fixed with reference to the date  of publication of the Notification  under Section 4(1) of the Act. The  prescription of time limit in that  background  is,  therefore,  peremptory in nature. In Ram Chand  and  Ors.  Vs.  Union  of  India  and  Ors.  (1994  (1)  SCC  44),  it  was  held by this Court that though no  period  was  prescribed,  action  within  a  reasonable  time  was  warranted.  The  said  case  related  to  a  dispute  which  arose  before  prescription of specific periods.  After the quashing of declaration,  the  same  became  non-est  and  was  effaced. It is fairly conceded by  learned  counsel  for  the  respondents that there is no bar  on  issuing  a  fresh  declaration  after following the due procedure.  It is, however, contended that in  case a fresh notification is to be  issued, the market value has to be  determined  on  the  basis  of  the  fresh  Notification  under  Section  4(1) of the Act and it may be a  costly affair for the State. Even  if it is so, the interest of the  person whose land is sought to be  acquired, cannot be lost sight of.  He  is  to  be  compensated  for  acquisition  of  his  land.  If  the  acquisition sought to be made is  done in an illogical, illegal or  irregular  manner,  he  cannot  be  made to suffer on that count.

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16. The  plea  relating  to  applicability of the stare decisis  principles  is  clearly  unacceptable.  The  decision  in  K.  Chinnathambi  Gounder  (supra)  was  rendered  on  22.6.1979  i.e.  much  prior to the amendment by the 1984  Act.  If  the  Legislature  intended  to  give  a  new  lease  of  life  in  those cases where the declaration  under Section 6 is quashed, there  is no reason why it could not have  done so by specifically providing  for it. The fact that legislature  specifically  provided  for  periods  covered  by  orders  of  stay  or  injunction  clearly  shows  that  no  other  period  was  intended  to  be  excluded  and  that  there  is  no  scope  for  providing  any  other  period  of  limitation.  The  maxim  'actus  curia  neminem  gravabit'  highlighted by the Full Bench of  the  Madras  High  Court  has  no  application to the fact situation  of this case.  

17. The  view  expressed  in  Narasimhaiah's  case  (supra)  and  Nanjudaiah's case (supra), is not  correct  and  is  over-ruled  while  that expressed in A.S. Naidu's case  (supra) and Oxford's case (supra)  is affirmed.    18. There  is,  however,  substance  in  the  plea  that  those  matters  which have obtained finality should  not  be  re-opened.  The  present  judgment  shall  operate  prospectively  to  the  extent  that  cases where awards have been made  and  the  compensations  have  been

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paid,  shall  not  be  reopened,  by  applying the ratio of the present  judgment.  The  appeals  are  accordingly  disposed  of  and  the  subsequent notifications containing  declaration under Section 6 of the  Act are quashed.”

  (emphasis supplied)

14.In  our  view,  the  last  paragraph  of  the  aforesaid  

judgment has no bearing on this case because at the time  

of pronouncement of Constitution Bench judgment, the writ  

petition  filed  by  the  appellant  and  the  proforma  

respondents  for  grant  of  a  declaration  that  the  

acquisition will be deemed to have lapsed due to non-

making of award for two years was pending before the High  

Court.

15.Although, the Division Bench has referred to a large  

number of judgments which lay down the proposition that  

the High Court would not entertain belated challenge to  

the  land  acquisition  proceedings  but  the  impugned  

judgment does not contain any discussion on this issue.  

That apart, we find that the appellant and the proforma  

respondent had moved the High Court without any delay.  

Rather, they had filed writ petition immediately after  

pronouncement  of  the  award.  Therefore,  they  could  not

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have been non-suited by the Division Bench of the High  

Court by invoking the rule of laches.

16.In the result, the appeal is allowed, the impugned  

judgment is set aside and the order passed by the  

learned Single Judge is restored.

...........................J. (G.S. SIGHVI)

                     ..........................J. (SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA)

October 14, 2011. New Delhi.

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