Page 1

1

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL      APPEAL     NO.      5790          OF     2012   (Arising out of SLP(C) No. 1884 of 2007)

R.C. Chandel                            ……  Appellant

   Vs.

High Court of M.P. & Anr.                               ……  Respondents

JUDGMENT

R.M.     LODHA,     J  .  

Leave granted.

2. On 13.09.2004, the appellant, who was working on the post of District and  

Sessions Judge, Punna was compulsorily retired from the service in the public interest by  

the Government of Madhya Pradesh (for short, ‘the Government’)  on the request of the  

Madhya Pradesh High Court (for short, ‘High Court’). The order of compulsory  retirement  

was issued by the Government in exercise of its power under amended Rule 56(2)(a) of  

the Fundamental Rules, as made applicable in the State of Madhya Pradesh,  Rule 14 of  

the Madhya Pradesh Higher Judicial Service (Recruitment and Service Conditions) Rules,

Page 2

2

1994 (for short, ‘1994 Rules’), Rule 42(1)(b) of the Madhya Pradesh Civil Services  

(Pension) Rules, 1976 (for short, ‘1976 Rules’) and Rule 1-A of Madhya Pradesh District  

and Sessions Judges (Death-cum-Retirement Benefits) Rules, 1964 (for short, ‘1964  

Rules’). In lieu of notice of three months, it was directed in the order that the appellant shall  

be entitled to three months’  salary and allowances which he was receiving prior to his  

retirement.

3. The appellant challenged the above order of compulsory retirement by filing a  

writ petition before the High Court. The Single Judge of that Court  by his order dated  

20.04.2006, allowed the writ petition; quashed the order of compulsory retirement dated  

13.09.2004 and directed that he be reinstated with all consequential benefits.

4. The High Court on the administrative side challenged the order of Single  

Judge in writ appeal. The Division Bench of that Court on consideration of the entire matter  

held that the challenge to the order of compulsory retirement was ill-founded and,  

accordingly, set aside the order of the Single Judge vide its judgment dated 23.11.2006. It  

is from this order that the appellant has preferred this appeal by special leave.

5. The appellant was selected in the higher judicial service of Madhya Pradesh  

by direct recruitment. He joined the judicial service as an Additional District Judge on  

17.10.1979. On 26.06.1985, he was confirmed as a District Judge. The appellant was  

awarded lower selection grade on 07.09.1990 with effect from 24.03.1989.  He was  

awarded super time scale  in May, 1999 and above super time scale in 2002.   As noted  

above, by the order dated 13.09.2004, the appellant was compulsorily retired in public  

interest.

Page 3

3

6. We have heard Mr. Rohit Arya, learned senior counsel for the appellant and  

Mr. Ravindra Shrivastava, learned senior counsel for the High Court  on the administrative  

side.

7. Mr. Rohit Arya, learned senior counsel for the appellant vehemently  

contended that the Division Bench was not at all justified in setting aside the judgment and  

order of the Single Judge. The observations made by the Division Bench in the impugned  

order and the findings recorded therein are founded on incorrect and misleading facts. The  

service  record of the appellant speaks otherwise.The appellant has been largely assessed  

in his ACRs ‘Good’  or ‘Very Good’. He highlighted that the appellant was confirmed as  

District Judge in 1985, he was awarded lower selection grade in  1990, he was given  

super time scale in 1999 and above super time scale in 2002 on merits and, on the basis  

of his judicial work he was also recommended for elevation as a High Court Judge by the  

High Court  collegium in March, 2004.               

8. Learned senior counsel for the appellant submitted that compulsory retirement  

of the appellant on the basis of an adverse entry recorded in  1989 and two subsequent  

adverse entries  for 1993 and 1994 was wholly unjustified. As regards 1989 adverse entry,  

learned senior counsel submitted that the appellant was awarded lower selection grade in  

1990 and, therefore, the said entry had lost its efficacy.  In respect of entries recorded in  

1993 and 1994, learned senior counsel submitted that the said entries also lost their  

significance since the appellant was awarded super time scale in 1999 and above super  

time scale in 2002. In between in 2001, he was allowed to continue in service. Moreover,  

learned senior counsel would submit that the adverse remarks recorded in 1993 and 1994  

were challenged by the appellant on the judicial side of the High Court. The Single Judge

Page 4

4

of that Court accepted the appellant’s challenge and expunged these remarks. The High  

Court on administrative side challenged the order of the Single Judge in writ appeal. The  

Division Bench of the High Court although set aside the order of the Single Judge but  

observed that 1993 and 1994 entries shall not be read adverse to the appellant for all  

times to come.

9.     Learned senior counsel referred to the guidelines dated 22.08.2000 issued by the  

Government and submitted that in view thereof no order of compulsory retirement could be  

passed on the basis of incapacity if the officer was promoted within the last five years and  

during that period his performance remained satisfactory.  He submitted that throughout his  

work, the appellant achieved the norms for disposal of cases fixed by the High Court and  

his reputation and  integrity as well as the judicial performance was found to be good and it  

is because of that that he got lower selection grade and super time scale from time to time.  

Learned senior counsel, thus, submitted that the Single Judge of the High Court was fully  

justified in interfering with the order of compulsory retirement after dealing with each and  

every complaint made against the appellant and none of these complaints was found  

meritorious justifying compulsory retirement of the appellant. Learned senior counsel for  

the appellant, in support of his arguments, heavily relied  upon a recent decision of this  

Court in Nand Kumar Verma v. State of Jharkhand and others1.     

10. On the other hand, Mr. Ravindra Shrivastava, learned senior counsel for the  

High Court on administrative side (respondent no.1) stoutly defended the impugned  

judgment. He submitted that the High Court recommended the compulsory retirement of  

the appellant to the Government as he was not found fit for continuation in judicial service  

1  (2012) 3 SCC 580

Page 5

5

in public interest. While making such recommendation the Full Court considered the entire  

service record of the appellant. Mr. Ravindra Shrivastava, learned senior counsel referred  

to ACRs of the appellant recorded for the years 1982, 1989, 1993, 1994, 1997 and 1998  

and submitted that the  decision of the Full Court  to compulsorily  retire the appellant  

cannot be said to be unjustified.   

11. Learned senior counsel for the respondent no. 1 placed reliance upon a  

decision of this Court in Rajendra Singh Verma (Dead) Through LRs. and others v.  

Lieutenant Governor (NCT of Delhi) and others2.  

12. Rule 56(2) of the Fundamental Rules  provides that a government servant  

(read judicial officer) may, in the public interest, be retired at any time after he has  

completed 20 years’ qualifying service, or on his attaining  the age of 50 years, whichever  

is earlier without assigning any reason by giving him a notice in writing. The  notice period  

is three months.  However,  he may be retired forthwith and on such retirement he is  

entitled to claim a sum equivalent to the amount of his pay plus allowances for the period  

of notice at the same rates at which he was drawing them immediately before retirement  

or, as the case may be, for the period by which such notice falls short of three months.  

Sub-rule 1-A  added to 1964 Rules provides  that with regard to age of compulsory  

retirement,  the permanent District and Sessions Judge shall be governed by the  

provisions of Fundamental Rule 56.   Rule 42(1)(b) of the 1976 Rules  provides that the  

appointing authority may in the public interest require a government servant (read judicial  

officer) to retire from service at any time after he has completed 20 years’  qualifying  

service or on his attaining  the age of 50 years whichever is earlier by giving three months’  

2  (2011) 10 SCC 1

Page 6

6

notice in Form 29 provided that he  may be retired forthwith and on such retirement  he  

shall  be entitled to claim a sum equivalent to the amount of his pay plus allowances for the  

period of the notice at the same rate at which he was drawing immediately before his  

retirement or, for the period by which such notice falls short of three months, as the case  

may be.  Rule 14(1)  of the 1994 Rules  provides that the age of superannuation of a  

member of the Madhya Pradesh Higher Judicial Service shall ordinarily be 60 years,  

provided he is found fit and suitable to continue after 58 years in service of the High Court.  

Sub-rule (2) makes a provision that without prejudice to the provisions contained in Rule  

56(3)   of the Fundamental Rules and Rule 42(1)(b) of the 1976 Rules,  a member of the  

service not found fit and suitable shall be compulsorily retired on his attaining the age of 58  

years.  

13. Article 235 of the Constitution vests in the High Court the control over the  

subordinate judiciary within the State. It reads as follows :

“Control over subordinate courts.—The control over district   courts and courts  subordinate thereto including the posting and promotion of, and the grant of leave  to, persons belonging to the judicial service of a State and holding any post inferior  to the post of district judge shall be vested in the High Court, but nothing in this  article shall be construed as taking away from any such person any right of appeal  which he may have under the law regulating the conditions of his service or as  authorizing the High Court to deal with him otherwise than in accordance with the  conditions of his service prescribed under such law.”  

14. In Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab and another3, a seven-Judge Bench of  

this Court considered the ambit and scope of the word “control” and while elaborating  the  

powers included in the High Courts with regard to control over subordinate judiciary within  

3  (1974) 2 SCC 831

Page 7

7

its respective state, inter alia, exposited the position that such power included pre-mature  

or compulsory retirement of Judges of the district courts and of subordinate courts.

15. In Chandra Singh and others v. State of Rajasthan and another4, the above  

position laid down by this Court in Samsher Singh 3 has been reiterated.

16. The above position laid down by this Court in the cases of Samsher Singh3  

and Chandra Singh4  has been reiterated in a recent decision of this Court in Rajendra  

Singh Verma2 . In paragraph 82 (Pg.  43) of the Report, this Court in Rajendra Singh  

Verma2  stated as follows :

“82. As explained by this Court in Chandra Singh v. State of Rajasthan [(2003) 6  SCC 545], the power of compulsory retirement can be exercised at any time and  that the power under Article 235 in this regard is not in any manner  circumscribed by any rule or order. What is explained in the said decision by this  Court is that Article 235 of the Constitution of India enables the High Court to  assess the performance of any judicial officer at any time with a view to discipline  the black sheep or weed out the dead wood, and this constitutional power of the  High Court cannot be circumscribed by any rule or order.”

17. Following a decision of this Court in High Court of Judicature at Bombay  

Through Its Registrar v. Shirishkumar Rangrao Patil  and another5 , this Court in Rajendra  

Singh Verma2  reiterated that the High Court had to maintain constant vigil on its  

subordinate judiciary.

18. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in All India Judges’  Association (2) and  

others v. Union of India and others6 has emphasized that the benefit of increase of  

retirement  age to 60 years shall not be available automatically to all judicial officers  

irrespective of their past record of service and evidence of their continued utility to the  

4  (2003) 6 SCC 545 5 (1997) 6 SCC 339 6  (1993) 4 SCC 288

Page 8

8

judicial system. The benefit is available to only those who, in the opinion of the respective  

High Courts, have a potential for continued useful service. The Bench said, “It is not  

intended as a windfall for the indolent, the infirm and those of doubtful integrity, reputation  

and utility”.  

19. That power of the High Court to recommend to the  Government  to  

compulsorily retire a judicial officer on attaining the required length of service or requisite  

age and consequent action by the Government on such recommendation are beyond any  

doubt.  

20. The appellant, as noted above, was selected in Madhya Pradesh Higher  

Judicial Service in 1979 by way of direct recruitment. At the time of issuance of the order  

of compulsory retirement on 13.09.2004 he had completed 25 years or so in judicial  

service. The available  materials show  that for the period from 01.04.1981 to 31.03.1982,  

the appellant was given grade ‘D’ (Average).  

21. In 1988-89, the appellant was assessed “D”.  ACR for that year also records  

that he never enjoyed clean reputation although no such complaint was received in writing.  

It also records that his quality of judgments and orders was  not satisfactory.

22. For the period ending 31.03.1991, the appellant was graded  “C” (Good) but it  

records, “the descriptive report of the then Chief Justice dated 28.06.1991 is that no  

inspection of Betul District Judge was made, however, the appellant was reported to be an  

average judicial officer”.

23. For the period ending 31.03.1992, the appellant has been given grade “D”  

(Average).

Page 9

9

24. For the period ending 31.03.1993,  the appellant has been graded “E”  (Poor).  

Inter alia, the remarks read, “Inspection note shows that the quality of his performance is  

poor.  His disposals were below average, his reputation was not good”.

25. For the period ending 31.03.1994,  the appellant has been graded “E” (Poor).  

The entry reads, “His performance qualitatively and quantitatively has been poor. The  

officer does not enjoy good reputation”.

26. The questions that fall for consideration are: whether the recommendation  

made by the High Court on the basis of unanimous opinion to the Government for  

compulsory retirement of the appellant and the order of compulsory retirement issued by  

the Government  suffer from any legal flaw? Is the order of compulsory retirement so  

arbitrary or irrational that justifies interference in judicial review? Is the view of the Division  

Bench upholding the order of appellant’s compulsory retirement so erroneous warranting  

interference by this Court in an appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India?

27. In Rajendra Singh Verma2 , this Court restated  what has been stated in earlier  

decisions that compulsory retirement from service is neither dismissal nor removal; it  

differs from both of them, in that it is not a form of punishment prescribed by the rules and  

involves no penal consequences inasmuch as the person retired is entitled to pension and  

other retiral benefits proportionate to the period of service standing to his credit. An order  

of compulsory retirement being not an order of adverse consequence, principles of natural  

justice have no application.  This Court  took into consideration a long line of cases  

including State of U.P. and another v. Bihari Lal7, Union of India v. V.P. Seth and another8,  

Baikuntha Nath Das and another v. Chief District Medical Officer, Baripada and  7  1994 (Suppl) 3 SCC 593 8  (1994) SCC (L&S) 1052

Page 10

10

another9, Baidyanath Mahapatra v. State of Orissa and another10, Union of India v. Col.  

J.N. Sinha and another11, All  India  Judges’  Association (1) v.  

Union of India and others12 and All India Judges’ Association (2)6  and culled out the legal  

position in paragraph 183 (Pg. no. 75)  of the Report as follows :

“183. It is well settled by a catena of decisions of this Court that while considering  the case of an officer as to whether he should be continued in service or  compulsorily retired, his entire service record up to that date on which  consideration is made has to be taken into account. What weight should be  attached to earlier entries as compared to recent entries is a matter of evaluation,  but there is no manner of doubt that consideration has to be of the entire service  record. The fact that an officer, after an earlier adverse entry, was promoted does  not wipe out earlier adverse entry at all. It would be wrong to contend that merely  for the reason that after an earlier adverse entry an officer was promoted that by  itself would preclude the authority from considering the earlier adverse entry.  When the law says that the entire service record has to be taken into  consideration, the earlier adverse entry, which forms a part of the service record,  would also be relevant irrespective of the fact whether the officer concerned was  promoted to higher position or whether he was granted certain benefits like  increments, etc.”

28. Few other features based on service record of the appellant highlighted in  the  

counter filed by the respondent no. 1 in opposition to the writ petition as well as in  

response to the special leave petition before this Court may be noticed. The appellant was  

informed of his having been assessed in grade “D” for the period 01.04.1981 to 31.03.1982  

by communication dated 15.09.1982. The said adverse grading was not assailed by the  

appellant and it remained on the record as it is. The appellant was also intimated on  

06.11.1989 about the adverse remarks recorded in his ACR for the period 1988-89 that he  

never enjoyed clean reputation and that his quality of judgments and orders was not  

9  (1992) 2 SCC 299 10  (1989) 4 SCC 664 11  (1970) 2 SCC 458 12  (1992) 1 SCC 119

Page 11

11

satisfactory. The appellant made representation against the above remarks but the same  

was rejected and they hold the field as it is.  For the period ending 31.03.1992, the  

appellant was graded “D” and that grading remains as it is.

29. The adverse remarks recorded in the ACR for the period ending on  

31.03.1993 and 31.03.1994, were communicated to the appellant. He made two separate  

representations for expunging the adverse remarks recorded for these years.  His  

representations were rejected by the then Chief Justice on 27.08.1994 and the appellant  

was informed of the said rejection on 30.08.1994. Despite rejection of the two  

representations made by the appellant, he again made two representations to the Chief  

Justice for expunction of these adverse remarks.   These representations were also  

rejected and the appellant was communicated of the same on 05.01.1995. The  

representations made by the appellant having been rejected twice by the Chief Justice, the  

appellant yet again made representation on 02.08.1995 for expunction of these remarks.  

This representation also came to be rejected by the Chief Justice on 21.08.1995 by  

observing that the remarks in the ACR for the above period do not call for any modification.  

The appellant sought administrative review of the decision taken by the Chief Justice  and  

the  administrative review was also rejected by the Chief Justice on 06.01.1996. The  

appellant then filed a writ petition (No. 413 of 1996) on the judicial side of the High Court.  

The Single Judge of that Court allowed the appellant’s writ petition vide his judgment and  

order dated 18.10.1996 and quashed the adverse remarks in the appellant’s ACR for the  

years ending on 31.03.1993 and 31.03.1994. The High Court on administrative side filed  

LPA against the judgment and order dated 18.10.1996. The Division Bench of that Court

Page 12

12

allowed the LPA and set aside the judgment and order of the Single Judge dated  

18.10.1996.  While doing so the Division Bench in its judgment and order dated  

25.02.1997 observed in para 69 as follows :

“69.Before parting with this case in all fairness, we consider it necessary to  observe that the adverse remarks on the reputation of respondent conveyed to  him in the relevant years should not haunt him all through his judicial career and  hamper his prospects for all times. The above remarks cannot be read to his  prejudice in future if he shows improvement in his work and performance and is  able to achieve the requisite grade for being admitted to higher Selection Grade.  The very purpose of communicating adverse remarks is not to condemn an  officer but to caution him at the right time so as to give chance of improvement.”

30. Against the judgment and order dated 25.02.1997 passed by the Division  

Bench, the appellant filed a special leave petition before this Court but that was dismissed  

on 28.04.1997.   Thus, advance remarks  for the period ending 31.03.1993 and 31.03.1994  

remain as it is.  

31. From the counter affidavit filed by the respondent no. 1 it also transpires that  

the benefit of super time scale was not given to the appellant as soon as it became due.  

Rather, the administrative committee in its meeting held on 25.03.1995, on consideration  

of the case of the appellant for grant of benefit of super time scale, deferred his case with  

remarks, “his work performance and conduct will be kept under watch”. The view of the  

administrative committee was accepted by the Full Court in its meeting held on  

29.04.1995. The appellant’s case for grant of super time scale was again considered by  

the Full Court in the subsequent year 1996 and the Full Court in its meeting held on  

20/21.04.1996 found that the appellant was not suitable for grant of super time scale. It

Page 13

13

was only in 1999 that the appellant was given super time scale and 2002 that he was  

granted above super time scale.

32. In 2002, the appellant was warned for claiming false units. His explanation  

that there was typing mistake was not found to be credible.

33. From the  above, it is clear that the appellant did not have unblemished  

service record all along. He has been graded “Average”  on  quite a few occasions.  He  

was assessed   “Poor”  in  1993 and 1994. His quality of judgments and orders was not  

found satisfactory on more than one occasion. His reputation was observed  to be tainted  

on few occasions and his integrity was not always found to be above board. In 1988-89,  

the remark reads, “never enjoyed clean reputation”. In 1993, the  remark “his reputation  

was not good”  and in 1994 the remark “officer does not enjoy good reputation”, were  

recorded. His representations for expunction of these remarks failed. The challenge to  

these remarks on judicial side was unsuccessful right upto this Court. In 1993, it was also  

recorded that quality of performance of the appellant was poor and his disposals were  

below average. In 1994, the remark in the service record states that the performance of the  

appellant qualitatively and quantitatively has been poor. With this service record, can it be  

said that there existed no material for an order of compulsory retirement of the appellant  

from service?   We think not.  The above material amply shows that the material germane  

for  taking decision by the Full Court whether  the appellant could be continued in judicial  

service or deserved to be retired compulsorily did  exist. It is not the scope of  judicial  

review to go into adequacy or sufficiency of such materials.  

34. It is true that the appellant was confirmed as District Judge in 1985; he got  

lower selection grade with effect from 24.03.1989; he was awarded super time scale in

Page 14

14

May, 1999 and he was also given above super time scale in 2002 but the confirmation as  

District Judge and grant of selection grade and super time scale do not wipe out the earlier  

adverse entries which have remained on record and continued to hold the field. The  

criterion for  promotion or grant of increment or higher scale is different  from an exercise  

which is undertaken by the High Court to assess a judicial officer’s  continued utility to the  

judicial system.  In assessing potential for continued useful service of a judicial officer in  

the system, the High Court is required to take into account the entire service record.  

Overall profile of a judicial officer is the guiding factor. Those of doubtful integrity,  

questionable reputation and wanting in utility are not entitled to benefit of service after  

attaining  the requisite length of service or age.    

35. That the appellant’s challenge to 1993 and 1994 entries was unsuccessful  

right upto this Court is not in dispute.   However, learned senior counsel for the appellant  

has placed heavy reliance upon the observations made by the Division Bench in its  

judgment and order dated 25.02.1997, particularly, paragraph 69 thereof wherein the  

Division Bench held that adverse remarks on the reputation in the relevant years should  

not haunt him all through his judicial career and hamper his prospects for all times. We are  

afraid the above observations by the Division Bench while upholding the remarks in no  

manner restricted the power of the Full Court in taking into consideration these adverse  

remarks in its exercise to find out whether or not the appellant should be retained in  

service after he has attained the required length of service. The consideration of the  

appellant’s case for grant of selection grade and super time scale stood on different  

footing.  The entire service record and overall profile of a judicial officer guide the High  

Court in reaching its satisfaction about the continuance or otherwise after the judicial

Page 15

15

officer has attained the required length of service or age.  When the entire service record  

of a judicial officer is under consideration, obviously the High Court is alive to such judicial  

officer’s having got promotion/s, increments, etc. during the service.  

36. It was argued by the learned senior counsel for the appellant that the  

administrative committee-1 had recommended the appellant’s continuation in service and  

there was no justification for the Full Court to take a contrary view. The view of the  

administrative committee is not final.  It is recommendatory in nature.  It is open to the Full  

Court to accept the committee’s report or take a different view. In the present case, the Full  

Court on the basis of the entire service record of the appellant formed  a unanimous  

opinion that the appellant must be compulsorily retired and recommended to the  

Government, accordingly.  On the basis of the material which existed and which we have  

referred to above, it can hardly be said that the recommendation by the Full Court to the  

Government for compulsory retirement of the appellant was arbitrary or based on material  

not germane for such recommendation.

37. Judicial service is not an ordinary government service and the Judges are not  

employees as such. Judges hold the  public office;  their function is one of the essential  

functions of the State.  In discharge of their functions and duties, the Judges represent the  

State. The office that a Judge holds is an office of public trust.  A Judge must be a person  

of impeccable integrity  and unimpeachable independence.  He must be honest to the core  

with high moral values. When a litigant enters the  courtroom,  he must feel secured  that  

the Judge before whom his matter has come, would deliver  justice impartially and  

uninfluenced by any consideration. The standard of conduct expected of a Judge is much

Page 16

16

higher than an ordinary man.  This is no excuse that since the standards in the society  

have fallen, the Judges who are  drawn from the society cannot be expected to have high  

standards and ethical firmness required of a Judge.  A Judge, like Caesar’s wife, must be  

above suspicion.  The credibility of the judicial system is dependent upon the Judges who  

man it.   For a democracy to thrive and rule of law to survive, justice system and the  

judicial process have to be strong and every Judge must  discharge his judicial functions  

with integrity, impartiality and  intellectual honesty.  

38. The most shocking and unbecoming conduct of the appellant highlighted by  

the respondent no. 1 before the High Court in opposition to the writ petition and in  

response to the present appeal is his act to overreach  the administrative decision on the  

review petition filed by him before the Chief Justice after his representations for expunction  

of adverse remarks for the period ending on 31.03.1993 and 31.03.1994 had been thrice  

earlier rejected. The appellant approached Shri R. K. Malaviya, Member of Parliament and  

Chairman, House Committee (Rajya Sabha) for his grievance concerning rejection of his  

representations for expunction of remarks for 1993 and 1994.   Though the appellant has  

denied that he ever approached Shri R.K. Malaviya   but to falsify his claim, the learned  

senior counsel for the respondent no. 1 placed before us xerox copy of the letter dated  

14.02.1996 written by Shri R.K. Malaviya to Shri H.R. Bhardwaj,  Minister of State for Law,  

Justice and Company Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi and the copy of the letter  

dated 08.03.1996 sent by the Ministry of Law, Justice and Company Affairs (Department of  

Justice), Government of India addressed to the Chief Secretary to the Government of  

Madhya Pradesh, Bhopal and the Registrar, High Court. The letter dated 14.02.1996

Page 17

17

addressed by Shri R.K. Malaviya to Shri H.R. Bhardwaj, the then Minister of State for Law,  

Justice and Company Affairs reads as follows :

“R.K. Malaviya Off. : 66, PARLIAMENT HOUSE MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT NEW DELHI – 110001.              CHAIRMAN TEL.: 3017048, 3034699 HOUSE COMMITTEE      (RAJYA SABHA) RES.: 30, CANNING LANE

KASTURBA GANDHI MARG NEW DELHI -110001

TEL. : 3782895 RES. : 19, TILAK NAGAR, MAIN ROAD

INDORE (M.P.) TEL. : 492412, 492588, 495054 14 February 1996

Dear Shri Bhardwaj Ji Enclosed is a representation of Shri R.C. Chandel, District & Sessions Judge, Rewa  

[MP], which is self-explanatory. I shall be grateful if you kindly get it examined and do the needful.

Yours sincerely,

[R.K. MALVIYA] Shri H.R. Bhardwaj, Minister of State for Law, Justice &  Company Affairs, Government of India, NEW DELHI.”

39. The forwarding letter sent by the Government of India, Ministry of Law, Justice  

and Company Affairs (Department of Justice) dated 8.3.1996 reads as follows :

“No. L-19015/3/96-Jus Government of India

Ministry of Law, Justice and C.A. (Department of Justice)

Jaisalmer House, Mansingh Road New Delhi, the 8/3/96.

1) The Chief Secretary to the Government of  Madhya Pradesh, BHOPAL.

Page 18

18

2) The Registrar, Madhya Pradesh High Court, JABALPUR.

Subject : Reference from Sh. R.K. Malaviya, Member of Parliament and  Chairman, House Committee, Rajya Sabha on representation of Sh.  R.C. Chandel District and Sessions Judge, Rewa (M.P.)

Sir, I am directed to forward herewith a copy of letter dated 14.2.1996  

alongwith its enclosure, received from Shri R.K. Malaviya, Member of  Parliament and Chairman House Committee, Rajya Saba on the above  subject for taking such action as may be considered appropriate.

Yours faithfully, (P.N. SINGH)

                Under Secretary to the Government of India”

40. The conduct of the appellant in involving an M.P. and the Ministry of Law,  

Justice and Company Affairs, in a matter of the High Court concerning an administrative  

review petition filed by him  for expunging adverse remarks in ACRs of 1993 and 1994 is  

most reprehensible  and  highly unbecoming of a judicial officer. His conduct has tarnished  

the image of the judiciary and  he disentitled himself from continuation in judicial service on  

that count alone.  A Judge is expected not to be influenced by any external pressure  and  

he is also supposed  not to exert any  influence  on others in any administrative or judicial  

matter. Secondly and still worst, the appellant had an audacity to  set up a plea in the  

rejoinder that he never made any representation to Shri R.K. Malaviya, M.P. for any  

purpose whatsoever.  But for the appellant’s approaching Shri R.K. Malaviya and his  

request for help, Shri R.K. Malaviya would have never written the letter quoted above to  

the then Minister of State for Law, Justice and Company Affairs. On this ground also his  

writ petition was liable to be dismissed.

41. The learned Single Judge examined the administrative decision of the Full  

Court to recommend to the Government to compulsory retire the appellant as if he was

Page 19

19

sitting as an  appellate authority to consider the correctness of such recommendation by  

going into sufficiency and  adequacy of the materials which led  the Full Court in reaching  

its satisfaction.  The whole approach of the Single Judge in consideration of the matter  

was flawed and not legally proper.   The learned Single Judge proceeded to examine the  

materials by observing, “The entire record pertaining to complaints against the petitioner  

has also been produced before me during the course of argument by learned senior  

counsel for respondent no. 1.  Thus, I am dealing each and every complaint one by one”.  

We are afraid, the learned Single Judge did not keep the scope of judicial review in view  

while examining the validity of the order of compulsory retirement. The Division Bench of  

the High Court in the intra-court appeal was, thus, fully justified in setting aside the  

impugned order.

42. Learned senior counsel for the appellant placed heavy reliance on a decision  

of this Court in Nand Kumar Verma1. Having carefully considered Nand Kumar Verma1, we  

find that the decision of this Court in Nand Kumar Verma1 has no application on the facts of  

the present case. This is clear from para 36 (Pg. 591) of the Report which reads as  

follows:

“36. The material on which the decision of the compulsory retirement was  based, as extracted by the High Court in the impugned judgment, and  material furnished by the appellant would reflect that totality of relevant  materials were not considered or completely ignored by the High Court.  This leads to only one conclusion that the subjective satisfaction of the High  Court was not based on the sufficient or relevant material. In this view of the  matter, we cannot say that the service record of the appellant was  unsatisfactory which would warrant premature retirement from service.  Therefore, there was no justification to retire the appellant compulsorily  from service.”   

       Nand Kumar Verma1 , thus, turned on its own facts.

Page 20

20

43. In view of the above, we are satisfied that the recommendation made by the  

High Court to the Government for compulsory retirement of the appellant and the order  of  

compulsory retirement issued by the Government do not suffer from any legal flaw. The  

order of compulsory retirement is neither arbitrary nor irrational justifying any interference  

in judicial review. The impugned judgment of the Division Bench is not legally  

unsustainable warranting any interference by this Court in an appeal under Article 136 of  

the Constitution of India.

44. Civil Appeal is, accordingly, dismissed with no order as to costs.

     …………………….. J.                                     (R.M. Lodha)

                                                ………………………J.                (Anil R. Dave)   

NEW DELHI. AUGUST 8, 2012.