PUKHREM SHARATCHANDRA SINGH Vs MAIREMBAM PRITHVIRAJ @ PRITHIBIRAJ SINGH
Bench: DIPAK MISRA,PRAFULLA C. PANT
Case number: C.A. No.-008063-008063 / 2015
Diary number: 16023 / 2015
Advocates: S. GOWTHAMAN Vs
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Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.8063 of 2015 (@ SLP(C) NO. 15813 OF 2015)
Pukhrem Sharatchandra Singh ... Appellant
Versus
Mairembam Prithviraj @ Prithibiraj Singh ... Respondent
J U D G M E N T
Dipak Misra, J.
What ordinarily would have entailed dismissal of the
special leave petition treating it with loathe, regard being
had to the nature of the order passed by the learned Single
Judge in Misc. Case (E.P) No. 1 of 2012 in Election Petition
No. 1 of 2012 as he had only adjourned the matter, but the
chronology of events, the ultimate consequence that would
emerge by efflux of time, the command of the provision
contained in Section 86(7) of the Representation of the
People Act, 1951 (for brevity, “the Act”), every conceivable
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stand adopted in a dexterous manner by the respondent,
the elected candidate, harbouring the notion that he
singularly has the intellectual imperialism, which has the
effect potentiality to frustrate and defeat the election trial,
for the High Court has not even been able to frame issues
lest proceed with the trial, has impelled us to interfere and
write a verdict. It needs no special emphasis to state that
causation of delay in the conclusion of the trial of an
election petition leaves an impression that the elected
candidate has the skilfulness to enjoy his full term without
being concerned or bothered about the challenge to his
election. As it appears, he does not perceive the pendency
as hanging of the sword of Damocles or even if it is so, he
believes that by his hypnotic power he can make it hang in
the air so that the threat becomes totally non-existent.
Either way, it depicts a sad state of things.
2. The necessary facts. The appellant, a resident of
Phairembam Leikai, Morang located within the 27-Moirang
Assembly Constituency of Bishnupur District, Manipur, was
a candidate in the 10th Manipur Legislative Assembly
Election from he said Constituency. The election for the
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Manipur Legislative Assembly was held on 28.01.2012 and
the appellant contested as a candidate from the
aforementioned constituency being nominated by the
Nationalist Congress Party (“NCP” for short). The
respondent became successful in the election and was
declared as a member of the Manipur Legislative Assembly.
It is apt to note here that at the time of scrutiny, the
appellant had objected to the nomination of the respondent
as per Section 36(2) of the Act on the ground that he had
failed to file the proper affidavit as prescribed under Article
173 of the Constitution and further the affidavit was a
forged one inasmuch as he had falsely stated at paragraph 9
of the affidavit dated 06.01.2012 that his highest
educational qualification is MBA, and he had passed out
from the Mysore University and that apart the said affidavit
also contained certain other facts which were incorrect and
he had also not subscribed to the oath before the Returning
Officer or any competent authority as prescribed by the
Election Commission of India. The Returning Officer, after
affording an opportunity of hearing, declined to reject the
nomination. After the election was over, the counting of
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votes took place and the respondent was declared as the
elected candidate.
3. The appellant challenged the election before the High
Court of Manipur at Imphal in Election Petition No. 1 of
2012. As the factual narration would unveil, the
respondent filed the written statement after two years to the
main election petition and during the pendency of the
election petition, the returned candidate filed number of
miscellaneous applications. It is pertinent to refer to the
said applications, as Mr. N. Kumarjit, learned senior
counsel for the appellant has laid immense emphasis them.
We think it appropriate, for the sake of completeness, to
reproduce the same:-
“1. Misc. Case (EP) No.1 of 2012 as preliminary objection on the ground of maintainability of Election Petition No. 1 of 2012 – filed on 27-06-2012 and the same is pending.
2. Misc. Case (EP) No. 4 of 2012 for amend- ment of his application in Misc. Case (EP) No. 1 of 2012. The same is partly allowed on 06-02-2013.
3. Misc. Case (EP) No.1 of 2013 for impleading the Returning Officer of the election and the same is rejected on15-04-2014.
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4. Misc. Case (EP) No. 5 of 2014 filed by the re- spondent for amendment of application in Misc. Case (EP) No. 4 of 2014 was also allowed on 14-05-2014.
5. Misc. Case (EP) No. 4 of 2014 filed by the re- spondent for condoning the delay in filing the written statement was allowed on 02-06-2014.
6. On 02-06-2014 filed another misc. applica- tion i.e. Misc. Case (EP) No. 6 of 2014 for dis- missing the Election Petition taking the ground that the Challan Copy for depositing cost under section 117 of the RP Act, 1951 is not signed by the petitioner. The same is pending.
7. Misc. Case (EP) No. 8 of 2014 filed for con- donation of delay in filing the misc. application again for amendment of the misc. application in Misc. Case (EP) No. 1 of 2012 was allowed on 09-09-2014.
8. Misc. Case (EP) No. 9 of 2014 filed for amendment of the Misc. Application third time in Misc. Case (EP) No. 1 of 2012 was allowed on 09-09-2014.
9. Misc. Case (EP) No. 10 of 2014 filed for dismissal of the election petition on the ground that election petition is incomplete was withdrawn on 05-11-2014.
10. On 14-01-2015 filed another misc. application i.e. Misc. Case (EP) No. 1 of 2015 for dismissal of the election petition stating that no cause of action is disclosed. The same is pending.”
4. At this juncture, it is relevant to mention that the High
Court while dealing with M.C. No. 4 of 2012 whereby the
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respondent had sought amendment to his preliminary
objection pertaining to the maintainability of the election
petition had allowed the amendment except the proposed
amendment in respect of paragraph 5(F). Against the said
order, the respondent preferred an appeal by special leave
i.e. Civil Appeal No. 10599 of 2013. This Court recorded the
original stand and the amended one and came to hold as
follows:-
“We have considered the entire issue. In our opinion, the aforesaid amendment would in no manner change the nature of the plea taken by the appellant. Reading of the entire paragraph 5 of the MC (PE) 1 of 2012 clearly shows that the appellant has claimed that the Election Petition is not signed by the election petitioner/respondent herein. We, therefore, find merit in the submission made by Mr. Jaideep Gupta that the aforesaid amendment also has to be allowed in the interest of justice.
Consequently, the appeal is allowed. The order of the High Court is modified to the effect that paragraph ‘F’ can also be amended, as proposed by the appellant.”
5. The said order was passed on 19.11.2013. It is
asserted in the memorandum of appeal that the respondent
filed Misc. Case E.P. No. 1 of 2013 for impleading the
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Returning Officer as respondent no.2 and the said
application has not been disposed of and the matter was
adjourned on many an occasion. This situation compelled
the election petitioner to file Misc. Case E.P. No. 2 of 2013
dated 11.12.2013 to hear the case on day to day basis.
Eventually on 3.4.2014, the respondent filed the written
statement.
6. As the case was not being taken up, as averred, the
appellant filed an application forming the subject matter of
Misc. Case E.P. No. 7 of 2014 to dispose of the election
petition on a preliminary issue on the foundation that the
respondent had filed a false affidavit while submitting his
nomination papers which was evincible from the admission
made in the written statement. The matter was adjourned
from time to time. Hence, the present appeal, by special
leave, has been filed challenging the manner in which it is
conducted and the dilatory tactics ingeniously adopted by
the respondent to procrastinate the hearing of the election
petition.
7. When the matter was listed on the first occasion, we
had issued notice fixing a returnable date. Despite service
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of notice, no one has entered appearance on behalf of the
respondent.
8. It is interesting to note that the election petition was
taken up by the High Court on 24.8.2015. The learned
Single Judge on that date has passed the following order:-
“When the matter has been put up for hearing today, it has been submitted by Mr. Iswarlal, learned counsel for the respondent that the respondents have filed an SLP before the Hon’ble Supreme Court being S.L.P. No. 15813/2015 and the Hon’ble Supreme Court has fixed on 23.09.2015 for hearing and prays that the matters be taken up after disposal of the said SLP.
Mr. N. Kumarjit, learned senior counsel for the petitioner submits that since no stay order has been passed there is no impediment on the part of this Court to proceed with the Election Petition. However, Mr. Kumarjit, learned senior counsel seeks some time to take necessary instruction in this regard. List these matters on 09.09.2015 as prayed by the parties.”
9. We have reproduced the said order only to indicate
that the adjournment was sought by the respondent and
not by the election petitioner. The adroit effort to cause
delay is absolutely manifest. It is submitted by Mr. N.
Kumarjit, learned senior counsel for the appellant that
despite the statutory provision contained in Section 86(7) of
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the Act that every election petition shall be tried as
expeditiously as possible and endeavour shall be made to
conclude the trial within six months from the date on which
the election petition is presented to the High Court for trial,
the same has not been kept in view and the respondent has
been successful in getting the matter adjourned on
numerous occasions by filing variety of applications.
Learned senior counsel would further submit that the
respondent chose not to file the written statement for two
years and the intention is to see that the term is over. He
has also apprised this Court that issues have not been
framed.
10. Section 86(7) of the Act reads as follows:-
“86. Trial of election petitions – (1-6) xxxxx
(7) Every election petition shall be tried as expeditiously as possible and endeavour shall be made to conclude the trial within six months from the date of which the election petition is presented to the High Court for trial.”
11. While dealing with the role of Election Tribunal and
the conception of disposal of a challenge to election, a
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three-Judge Bench in Satya Narain v. Dhuja Ram1 has
observed that:-
“Keeping in the forefront the proper functioning of democracy, the principal object of the Act is purity of elections. When, therefore, an election of a returned candidate is challenged under the Act, expeditious trial of the election dispute is sought to be enforced by the Legislature making all safe- guards against delay. Trial has to be necessarily expedited to rid the candidate as well as the con- stituency interested in the result of the election, of any taint or suspicion of corrupt practices which are again clearly enumerated in the Act. To take, therefore, another important object of the Act viz. expeditious disposal of an election peti- tion, by Section 86(b) “the trial of an election peti- tion shall, so far as is practicable consistently with the interests of justice in respect of the trial, be continued from day to day until its conclusion, unless the High Court finds the adjournment of the trial beyond the following day to be necessary for reasons to be recorded”. Again under Section 86(7), “every election petition shall be tried as ex- peditiously as possible and endeavour shall be made to conclude the trial within six months from the date on which the election petition is presented to the High Court for trial”. Further Section 87(1) introduces the Civil Procedure Code only subject to the provisions of the Act and of any rules made thereunder. Section 87(2) makes a deeming provision for application of the Evi- dence Act only subject to the Acts. Therefore, there is no scope for free play in the application of the provisions of those two Acts. The very ob- ject of expeditious trial will be defeated if the pre- sentation of the election petition should be treated casually and lightly permitting all kinds of devices to delay the ultimate trial. The purpose
1 (1974) 4 SCC 237
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of enclosing the copies of the election petition for all the respondents is to enable quick despatch of the notice with the contents of the allegations for service on the respondent or respondents so that there is no delay in the trial at this very initial stage when the election petition is presented. If there is any halt or arrest in progress of the case, the object of the Act will be completely frustrated. We are, therefore, clearly of opinion that the first part of Section 81(3) with which we are mainly concerned in this appeal is a peremptory provi- sion and total non-compliance with the same will entail dismissal of the election petition under Section 86 of the Act.”
[Emphasis supplied]
12. In P. Nalla Thampy Thera v. B.L. Shanker2, this
Court while dealing with the justification of granting one
adjournment opined as follows:-
“The High Court was justified in giving only one adjournment as a last chance and fixing the trial on 9-3-1981, in view of the statutory mandate that an election petition shall be disposed of as far as practicable within six months from the date of presentation of the election petition as re- quired by Section 86(7) of the Act.”
13. In F.A. Sapa v. Singora3, another three-Judge Bench,
in a different context stated that if the vexatious
applications are entertained, it would defeat the very object
of expeditious disposal of election petition as envisaged in
Section 86(7) of the Act.
2 (1984) Supp. SCC 631 3 (1991) 3 SCC 375
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14. From the aforesaid authorities, it is quite clear that an
election petition has to be decided in quite promptitude as
there is an obligation cast upon the Court to dispose of the
same within a period of six months. Engrafting a provision
in the nature of Section 86(7) of the Act, the legislative
intendment is clear that the Court has to endeavour to
dispose of an election petition as expeditiously as possible
and not to allow the parties to take resort to unnecessary
adjournments or file vexatious applications.
15. In the case at hand, as we have stated, the elected
candidate has been taking time at his own pleasure and
leisure and filing applications as he desired giving vent to
his whim and fancy and the Court has granted adjournment
in an extremely liberal manner. All the aspects can be
taken exception to and they really run counter to the
conception of expeditious disposal
16. At this juncture, we may state without any hesitation
that the fundamental purpose for expeditious disposal of an
election petition is to sustain the purity of parliamentary
democracy. The concept of purity of democracy has been
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emphatically stated in Rameshwar Prasad and others v.
Union of India and another4.
17. Recently, in Manoj Narula v. Union of India5,
majority view in the Constitution Bench is to the following
effect:-
“Democracy, which has been best defined as the government of the people, by the people and for the people, expects prevalence of genuine orderli- ness, positive propriety, dedicated discipline and sanguine sanctity by constant affirmance of con- stitutional morality which is the pillar stone of good governance. While dealing with the concept of democracy, the majority in Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain6, stated that “democracy” as an essential feature of the Constitution is unas- sailable. The said principle was reiterated in T.N. Seshan, CEC of India v. Union of India7 and Kuldip Nayar v. Union of India8. It was pro- nounced with asseveration that democracy is the basic and fundamental structure of the Constitu- tion. There is no shadow of doubt that democracy in India is a product of the rule of law and as- pires to establish an egalitarian social order. It is not only a political philosophy but also an em- bodiment of constitutional philosophy.”
18. In Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election
Commissioner9, while laying emphasis on fundamental
values of democracy which includes holding of free and fair
4 (2006) 2 SCC 1 5 (2014) 9 SCC 1 6 1975 Supp SCC 1 7 (1995) 4 SCC 611 8 (2006) 7 SCC 1 9 (1978) 1 SCC 405
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election by adult franchise in a periodical manner, Krishna
Iyer, J. quoted the statement of Sir Winston Churchill which
is to the following effect:-
“2. … ‘At the bottom of all tributes paid to democ- racy is the little man, walking into a little booth, with a little pencil, making a little cross on a little bit of paper—no amount of rhetoric or volumi- nous discussion can possibly diminish the over- whelming importance of the point.’”
19. A voter casts his vote as a responsible citizen to choose
the masters for governing the country. That being the trust
of the electorate in an elected candidate, when he faces an
assail to his election, it should be his sanguine effort to
become free from the assail in the election petition and work
with attainment and not take shelter seeking adjournments
with the elated hope that he can be triumphant in the
contest by passage of time. This kind of attitude has to be
curbed from all angles because law does not countenance it.
20. We are absolutely conscious that in this case the
election petitioner has also filed an application for early
determination of the preliminary objection. The respondent,
the elected candidate, has filed series of applications. We
are of the convinced opinion that the election petition
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pending before the High Court has to be decided with
extreme alertness and in quite promptitude. As the court
has not framed issues, it shall proceed to frame issues.
Thereafter, the evidence shall commence and the court
shall, regard being had to the statutory command and the
norms in a democratic polity, dispose of the election petition
by end of February 2016. All the miscellaneous
applications shall be decided at the time of final hearing so
that the procrastination is totally ostracised.
21. With the aforesaid observations and directions, the
appeal stands disposed of. There shall be no order as to
costs.
.............................J. [Dipak Misra]
..........................., J. [Prafulla C. Pant]
New Delhi October 01, 2015
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