19 September 2012
Supreme Court
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PUDHU RAJA Vs STATE TR.INSP.OF POLICE

Bench: B.S. CHAUHAN,FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA
Case number: Crl.A. No.-001517-001517 / 2008
Diary number: 26610 / 2008
Advocates: SUMIT KUMAR Vs B. BALAJI


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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1517  OF 2008

Pudhu Raja & Anr.                   …Appellants

Versus

State, Rep. by Inspector of Police                                 …Respondent

O R D E R   

1.   This appeal has been preferred against the final judgment and  

order  dated  21.8.2008,  passed  by  the  High  Court  of  Judicature  at  

Madras in Criminal Appeal No.337 of 2005, by way of which, the  

High Court  has allowed the State  appeal  against  the judgment and  

order dated 22.12.2004 in Sessions Case No.618 of 2003 passed by  

the Additional District & Sessions Judge, (Fast Track Court No.1),  

Chengalpet,  Kachipuram  District,  by  which,  the  Trial  Court  had  

acquitted the appellants  of  the charges  under  Sections 302 r/w 34,  

304(b) and 201 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to  

as the ‘IPC’).

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2. The facts and circumstances giving rise to this appeal as per  

prosecution are as follows:

A. Padhu Raja (A-1), son of Smt. Angammal (A-2), got married to  

one Jayalakshmi (deceased), on 6.9.1998 at Gudalur.  At the time of  

marriage the appellant (A-1) demanded 50 Sovereigns of jewels and  

Rs.2  lacs  in  cash,  however  the  parents  of  the  deceased  gave  35  

sovereigns of jewels and cash to the tune of Rs.50,000/-.  Thereafter,  

there were persistent demand for dowry by the appellants from time to  

time,  particularly on festive occasions.   Those demands were even  

met.  Appellant (A-1) made a demand for a motor bike which was also  

met by the parents of the deceased in the presence of several villagers,  

including the village Head,  namely Bose,  (PW.6).   However,  even  

after this, the demands continued.  In July 2000, Jayalakshmi came to  

her parent’s house and told them that a demand had been made by the  

husband for 15 sovereigns of  jewels, without fulfilling which, she  

must not return.   

B. A Panchayat was convened and thereupon, the appellant (A-1),  

and  Jayalakshmi  (deceased),  started  living  separately  in  a  house  

belonging to Chandran (PW.2),  at  9,  C.N. Krishna Street,  Bharathi  

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Nagar, Perianatham.  Karthikeyan (PW.4) and his wife Mrs. Malliga  

(PW.3) were living in close proximity to the appellants.  Jayalakshmi  

had told Mrs. Malliga (PW.3) on certain occasions, that the appellants  

had been torturing her.

C. On 17.4.2001, at about 1 A.M., Mrs. Malliga (PW.3), noticed  

smoke  rising  up  from  the  ground  floor  where  the  appellants  and  

deceased  were  living.   She  immediately  informed  Karthikeyan  

(PW.4) and then also came out to ascertain the cause for the smoke  

alongwith her husband, Karthikeyan (PW.4).  Chandran  (PW.2) and  

his wife also came out of their house.  Chandran (PW.2) found the  

appellants standing outside the gate.  On being asked by Chandran  

(PW.2)  about the key of the house, as the same was locked from the  

outside,  the  appellant  (A-1),  replied  that  the  second  appellant  had  

thrown away the  key.   Chandran  (PW.2)  went  upstairs,  brought  a  

duplicate key and opened the door of their house.  Chandran (PW.2)  

found the room full of smoke and Jayalakshmi lying dead on the bed,  

with burn injuries.  The Fire Brigade was informed. Mr. Mahalingam,  

Station Officer,  Fire  Department  Chengalpet,  (PW.8) arrived at  the  

spot with his personnel, at 1.45 A.M. and extinguished the fire.  Mr.  

Ezhamparuthi (PW.1), a close relative of the deceased came to the  

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spot upon being informed, and  thereafter went to the Police  Station  

at 8.30 A.M. on 18.4.2001 and made a complaint to Mr. Kotteswaran  

(PW.12), on the basis of which, a case in Crime No.157 of 2001 was  

registered. The said FIR was handed over to Mr. Durairaj (PW.13),  

the Investigating Officer who then took up the investigation.   

D. Durairaj  (PW.13)  recovered  the  dead  body  of  Jayalakshmi  

(deceased), after taking photographs of the place of occurrence and  

also of the dead body of the deceased, through the photographer Balaji  

(PW.11).  Durairaj  (PW.13)  also  recovered all  material  objects  and  

prepared the mahazar.   

E. As Jayalakshmi had died within 2-1/2 years of her marriage, the  

matter  was  reported  to  the  Sub-Collector,  Ms.  Pila  Rajesh,  IAS  

(PW.10) who came to the spot and conducted inquest  on the dead  

body  in the presence of witnesses and a panchnama was prepared.  

Ms. Pila Rajesh (PW.10) also recorded the statements of the witnesses  

after which, the dead body was sent for post-mortem.   

F. Prof. Muguesan (PW.9), who is attached to the Govt. Hospital  

Chengalpet, conducted the post-mortem and opined that the deceased  

had died of smothering and burn injuries.   

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G. The case was converted into one under Section 302  IPC and  

both the appellants were arrested and sent into judicial remand.  After  

completing the investigation, a charge sheet was filed.  Before the trial  

court, both the appellants pleaded not guilty and, therefore, claimed  

trial.   In  the  course  of  the  trial,  the  prosecution  examined  13  

witnesses, and relied upon 14 exhibits and 3 material objects.  The  

defence also examined one witness, and relied upon 4 documents for  

the purpose of their defence.  The Trial Court after the conclusion of  

the  trial,  upon  considering  the  material  on  record,  and  after  

appreciating the available evidence, acquitted both the appellants vide  

judgment and order dated 22.12.2004.

H. Aggrieved, the State preferred an appeal before the High Court  

and the High Court vide its impugned judgment and order, convicted  

and sentenced both the appellants, thereby reversing the judgment of  

the Trial Court, as referred to hereinabove.   

Hence, this appeal.

3. Dr.  A.  Francis  Jullian,  learned  Senior  counsel  appearing  on  

behalf of the appellants has submitted that the High Court committed  

an error by interfering with the order of acquittal as was recorded by  

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the Trial Court.   While reversing the judgment of acquittal, the High  

Court has not complied with the parameters laid down by this Court in  

such matters.  This is because there is no direct evidence on any issue,  

and the case is one of circumstantial evidence wherein, several links  

are missing in the chain of events. The Trial Court recorded acquittal,  

as it came to the conclusion that there were a large number of material  

inconsistencies  that  went  to  the  root  of  the  case.  There  is  also  

considerable  embellishment/improvement  in  the  depositions  of  the  

prosecution witnesses.  There was also an inordinate delay after the  

incident, in lodging the FIR.  The appellant (A-1), had been arrested  

immediately, however, such arrest was shown to have taken place at 9  

A.M. on 18.4.2001.  There could have been absolutely no motive on  

the part of the appellants, to commit the murder of the deceased. Thus,  

the present appeal deserves to be allowed.

4. Shri  Rakesh  Sharma  with  Shri  B.  Balaji,  learned  counsel  

appearing  on  behalf  of  the  respondent-State,  opposed  the  appeal  

contending that,  the High Court  had most certainly appreciated the  

evidence  as  a  whole   and  dealt  with  the  case  in   the  correct  

perspective.   The  deceased  had  died  in  the  house  where  only  the  

appellants were residing with her.  Despite this, they were unable to  

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furnish any reasonable explanation with respect to the circumstances  

under which Jayalakshmi had died.  The conduct of the appellants,  

therefore, points only towards their guilt.  At the relevant time when  

the deceased was burning, both the appellants were found standing  

outside  their  house.   The gate  was  locked from the  outside.   The  

appellants did not even produce the key of the house upon being asked  

to do so. It was Mr. Chandran (PW.2), who brought a duplicate key  

from his house and opened the door to the said house.  The appellants  

did not inform the police, or the fire brigade when the deceased was  

burning.  No attempt  was made by either of them, to extinguish the  

said fire and they made no efforts to  inform the family members of  

the  deceased.   Had  the  prosecution  witnesses  not  come  out  after  

noticing the  smoke coming from the  house  of  the  appellants,  they  

would have walked away scot  free, as they had already locked the  

house,  from  the  outside.  The  appellants  had  further,  also  been  

demanding dowry and harassing the deceased in this context. Thus,  

they  most  definitely  had  a  very  strong  motive  to  get  rid  of  the  

deceased.  The inconsistencies on the basis of which, the trial Court  

had accorded acquittal to the appellants, were all trivial in nature and  

none of them could be so material, that it could be termed to go to the  

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root  of  the  case.   The  impugned  judgment  of  the  High  Court,  

therefore,  does  not  warrant  any  interference  and  thus,  the  present  

appeal is liable to be dismissed.

5. We  have  considered  the  rival  submissions  made  by  learned  

counsel for the parties and perused the record.

6. The  following  injuries  were  found  on  the  person  of  the  

deceased:

Scratches:

1. An injury on the right side of the upper lip measuring 1 x  

0.5 c.m.

2. An injury on the central part of the upper lip measuring 1  

x 0.5 c.m. The cells below these injuries were with clots  

and there was also swelling.

Clotted injuries:

1. A clotted injury on the centre part of the lower lip and its  

surrounding, measuring 2 x 1 x 0.5 c.m.

2. A clotted injury on the right cheek, on the upper part of  

the right jaw, measuring 3 x 2 x 0.5 c.m.

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3. A clotted injury on the left cheek, on the upper part of the  

left jaw, measuring 2 x 1 x 0.5 c.m.

4. A clotted injury on the central part to the upper part of  

the breast, measuring 6 x 5 x 0.5 c.m.

5. A clotted injury on the front side and the outer part of the  

left leg 3 c.m. above the left heel, measuring 6 x 4 x 0.5  

c.m.

Injuries by fire:

The upper skin, inner skin and two types of fire injuries.  

The body skin was burnt and the fat and cells under the skin  

appeared to be red and heated. All over the body, including the  

upper side of the neck, the lower side of the neck, the upper part  

of both hands, palms, both legs in entirety, the back  portion of  

the breast,  the entire front and back portions of the stomach,  

and the female organ bore injuries by fire. All these injuries by  

fire, were suffered by her while she was alive.   

7. The law on the issue of interference with an order of acquittal is  

to the effect that only in exceptional cases where there are compelling  

circumstances and the judgment in appeal is found to be perverse, the  

appellate  court  can  interfere  with  the  order  of  the  acquittal.  The  

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appellate court should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of  

the  accused  and  further  that  the  trial  court's  acquittal  bolsters  the  

presumption of innocence. Interference in a routine manner where the  

other  view  is  possible  should  be  avoided,  unless  there  are  good  

reasons for interference.

8. In  a  case  of  circumstantial  evidence,  the  prosecution  must  

establish  each  instance  of  incriminating  circumstance,  by  way  of  

reliable and clinching evidence, and the circumstances so proved, must  

form a complete chain of events, on the basis of which, no conclusion  

other than one of guilt of the accused can be reached.  Undoubtedly,  

suspicion,  however  grave  it  may  be,  can  never  be  treated  as  a  

substitute  for  proof.   While  dealing  with  a  case  of  circumstantial  

evidence,  the  court  must  take  utmost  precaution  whilst  finding  an  

accused guilty, solely on the basis of the circumstances proved before  

it.  

9. Furthermore, in such a case, motive assumes great significance  

and importance, as the absence of motive puts the court on its guard  

and causes  it  to scrutinize each piece of   evidence very closely in  

order to ensure that suspicion, emotion  or conjecture do not take the  

place of proof.   The evidence regarding existence of motive which  

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operates in the minds of assailants is very often, not known to any  

other  person.   The motive  may not  even  be  known,  under  certain  

circumstances, to the victim of the crime.  It may be known only to  

the accused and to none other.  It is therefore, only the perpetrator of  

the crime alone, who knows as to what circumstances prompted him  

to adopt a certain course of action, leading to the commission of the  

crime.  

10.   It is obligatory on the part of the accused while being examined  

under Section 313 Cr.P.C., to furnish some explanation with respect to  

the incriminating circumstances  associated  with him,  and the Court  

must take note of such explanation even in a case of circumstantial  

evidence,  in  order  to  decide,  as  to  whether  or  not,  the  chain  of  

circumstances  is  complete.   When  the  attention  of  the  accused  is  

drawn  to  circumstances  that  inculpate  him  in  relation  to  the  

commission  of  the  crime,  and  he  fails  to  offer  an  appropriate  

explanation, or gives a false answer with respect to the same, the said  

act  may be counted as providing a missing link for  completing the  

chain of circumstances.  (See :  The Transport Commissioner, A.P.,  

Hyderabad & Anr. v. S. Sardar Ali & Ors., AIR 1983 SC 1225;  

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State of Maharashtra v. Suresh, (2000) 1 SCC 471;  and  Musheer  

Khan v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2010) 2 SCC 748).

11. While  appreciating  the  evidence,  the  court  has  to  take  into  

consideration  whether  the  contradictions/omissions  were  of  such  

magnitude so as to materially affect  the trial.  Minor contradictions,  

inconsistencies, embellishments or improvements in relation to trivial  

matters, which do not effect the core of the case of the prosecution,  

must not be made a ground for rejection of evidence, in its entirety.  

The trial court, after going through the entire evidence available, must  

form  an  opinion  about  the  credibility  of  the  witnesses,  and  the  

appellate court in the normal course of action, would not be justified in  

reviewing the same again, without providing justifiable reasons for the  

same. (Vide: State v. Saravanan, AIR 2009 SC 152).

12.  Where the omission(s) amount to a contradiction, creating a  

serious doubt regarding the truthfulness of a witness,  and the other  

witness also makes material improvements before the court, in order  

to make the evidence acceptable, it would not be safe to rely upon  

such evidence.  The discrepancies in the evidence of eyewitnesses, if  

found not to be minor in nature, may be a ground for disbelieving and  

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discrediting their evidence. In such circumstances, the witnesses may  

not inspire confidence and if their evidence is found to be in conflict  

and contradiction with other evidence available or with a statement  

that has already recorded, then, in such a case it cannot be held that  

the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt.  

13.  The present case requires to be examined in light of the aforesaid  

settled legal propositions.

The trial Court decided in favour of the accused, and acquitted  

them on ground of material  contradictions in the deposition of  the  

eye-witnesses, as Karthikeyan (PW.4) had deposed that he had gone  

along with Mr. Chandran (PW.2) to inform the police and also the fire  

service station. On the contrary, Mr. Chandran (PW.2), deposed that  

at the time of occurrence he did not accompany Karthikeyan (PW.4),  

to  the  police  station.  According  to  the  deposition  of  Karthikeyan  

(PW.4),  regarding  the  opening  of  the  door  of  the  house  of  the  

deceased, the statements of Mr. Chandran (PW.2), and Karthikeyan  

(PW.4),  were  found  to  be  contrary  to  the  statement  of  Mr.  

Mahalingam (PW.8), Fire Service Officer as he stated that, he reached  

the place of occurrence at about 1.45 A.M. and found the house to be  

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locked. Mr. Chandran (PW.2), brought the key, opened the door and it  

was  then  that  the  fire  was  put  out.   Mr.  Mahalingam (PW.8)  has  

further deposed that the body of the deceased was on the cot and the  

fire had burnt the said cot also. However, the photographs taken by  

the  police  proved  to  be  contrary  to  the  said  deposition.  The  

photograph revealed that the body was lying on the floor while the  

cot  was  lying upside down. The trial  court  further  relied upon the  

statement  of  Devaraj  (DW.1)  who  deposed,  that  after  the  said  

incident,  Kodirasu,  father  of  the  deceased  Jayalakshmi,  had  

fraudulently taken away land from the father of the appellant (A-1) by  

filing Suit No. 14/2002 in the Civil Court and further that Jayalakshmi  

had been in love with one Selvam and further that, her marriage to the  

appellant (A-1), was against her wishes and was the reason for her  

committing suicide. More so, the trial court doubted the time taken for  

recording  FIR,  and found the explanation  furnished for  the  delay  

regarding  the  same,  totally  unacceptable.   The  explanation  so  

furnished  by  the  prosecution  was  that,  Ezhamparuthi  (PW.1),  was  

informed  by  the  incident  and,  thereafter,  he  went  to  the  place  of  

occurrence and upon  seeing the place,  he then went to the police  

station and lodged the said FIR.   

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14. The High Court noted that it is an admitted fact that, at the time  

of occurrence of the incident, the appellants were in the said house.  

Mr. Chandran (PW-2), saw them both standing outside the house of  

the deceased. Appellant (A-2) even tried to explain the situation by  

stating that, they were watching TV in an adjoining room and came  

out to find fumes coming from the next room, and also further stated  

that the deceased had committed suicide.  

The High Court did not accept the story of suicide, saying that  

the same was not plausible, in the given situation.  It stated that as the  

appellants were present at the place of occurrence, they should have  

been able to give a reasonable answer regarding the manner in which  

the deceased died, but failed to do so. Instead, they all attempted to  

screen the offence.  

15. The  trial  court  did  not  take  note  of  the  fact  that  there  was  

sufficient  evidence  on  record,  to  indicate  the  possibility  and  the  

likelihood of dowry harassment and death, caused due to failure to  

give dowry, as demanded.

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16. The trial court did not consider that, if the deceased had in fact  

committed suicide, the natural reaction of the co-accused would not  

have been to rush out of the house, after locking her inside, but to  

make an attempt to rescue her.  Further, when Mr. Chandran (PW-2)  

asked for the house key, the same was not provided, stating that the  

appellant  (A-2) had thrown it  away. Mr.  Chandran (PW-2), had to  

then fetch a duplicate key to enter the house. This is a clear indication  

of the fact that the accused were trying to lock up the house and leave.  

17. The theory of suicide can further be negated by the fact that the  

doctor  who  conducted  the  post-mortem,  did  not  mention  the  

possibility of suicide at all.  

18. All  the  circumstances,  therefore,  clearly  indicate  that  the  

deceased did not die a natural death, nor was she the victim of an  

accident and neither did she commit suicide. She was therefore killed  

and no one except the accused could have committed the said offence.  

19. A delay  in  the  registration  of  the case  would not  materially  

affect  the  case  of  the  prosecution  in  any  way,  as  PW-1  was  first  

summoned, then he went to the spot of the incident, after which he  

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went to the police station. Such a delay was therefore, natural and  

acceptable.  

20. So far as the discrepancies and contradictions pointed out by  

the trial court are concerned, the same are not material and none of  

them can be held to go to the root of the case.   Further, even if there  

has  been  a  transfer  of  property  in  favour  of  Kodirasu,  father  of  

Jayalakshmi, the deceased, from the father of the appellant (A-1), as  

the same is a transaction, subsequent to the incident, it can have no  

bearing on the case.  The trial court unnecessarily gave advantage to  

the appellants in this regard, even though the vendor himself was not  

examined. Thus, no motive can be attributed to the complainant on  

this count. Furthermore, had Jayalakshmi been in love with Selvam,  

the same  could not have been a ground for her to commit suicide 2 ½  

years  from  the  date  of  her  marriage,  as  she  would  have  in  all  

likelihood, attempted the said act, either at the time of her marriage, or  

immediately thereafter.  

21. In  view  of  the  above,  we  do  not  see  any  cogent  reason  to  

interfere with the impugned judgment of the High Court.  The appeal  

has no merit and is, therefore, accordingly dismissed.  

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The appellant no.2 is on bail.   Her bail  bonds are cancelled.  

She is directed to surrender within a period of four weeks from today  

before the Chief Judicial Magistrate. In case she does not surrender,  

we direct the Chief Judicial Magistrate to take her into custody and  

send her to jail to serve out the remaining sentence.   

A  copy  of  the  order  may  be  sent  to  the  Chief  Judicial  

Magistrate, Chengalpet, Tamil Nadu, by the Registry of this Court for  

compliance.  

          ……..………………………J.

(Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN)

                                  ....…..…………………….….………………………J.

     (FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA)

New Delhi,  

September 19, 2012

     

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