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Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL No.958 OF 2010

Prem Nath Bali             ……Appellant(s)

VERSUS

Registrar, High Court of  Delhi & Anr. ……Respondent(s)

J U D G M E N T

Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.

1) This appeal is filed against the final judgment and

order dated 21.08.2008 of the High Court of Delhi at New

Delhi in Writ Petition(c)  No. 2046 of 2001 whereby the

High Court dismissed the petition filed by the appellant

herein.  

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2) In order to appreciate the issue involved in this

appeal, which lies in a narrow compass, it is necessary

to set out the relevant facts in brief infra.

3) On 01.10.1965, the appellant joined the office of

District  &  Sessions  Court,  Delhi  as  Lower  Division

Clerk.   He  was  confirmed  w.e.f.  06.07.1976.

Thereafter on 26.07.1986, he was promoted as Upper

Division Clerk (U.D.C.).  In May, 1989, he was posted

as U.D.C. as in-charge of copying agency criminal side

at Patiala House Court, New Delhi.  

4) While  working  as  U.D.C.  and  in-charge  of

Copying Agency (Criminal) at Patiala House Court, on

23.01.1990,  the  appellant  submitted  a  written

complaint  against  one  Window  Clerk,  namely,  Smt.

Brij  Bala,  to  the  officer  in-charge  of  the  Copying

Agency, Patiala House Courts stating therein that she

is not discharging her duty effectively and she often

used to close the counter of the Copying Agency before

the prescribed time and after lunch also she used to

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resume her duty after the prescribed time.  Therefore,

the litigants had occasion to make a complaint to the

appellant and he had to depute other official to attend

the work. The appellant requested for her transfer.

5) On the  same day,  Smt.  Brij  Bala  also  made a

statement to the superior officer that on 22.01.1990

after closing the application register at 1.00 p.m., she

came to know that some applications, which were not

even entered in the register on that day, were entered

in  CD2/Dak  register  subsequently  and  the  certified

copies were got prepared of those applications on the

same date.   She was also pressurized to deliver  the

copies  on  the  same  date  at  2.30  p.m.   When  she

refused  to  deliver  the  copy,  the  appellant  quarreled

with her and used unwanted words in the office, which

were uncalled for.  

6) The  office-in-charge  forwarded  the  aforesaid

statement of Smt. Brij Bala to the District Judge.  On

the basis of said complaint, a preliminary enquiry was

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made.   Thereafter  a  departmental  enquiry  was  also

held  against  the  appellant.   On  06.02.1990,  the

appellant was placed under suspension.

7) A memorandum dated 18.07.1990  was served

on  the  appellant  by  the  office  of  the  District  &

Sessions Judge, Delhi that the authority proposes to

hold  an  enquiry  against  him  under  Rule  14  of  the

Central  Civil  Services  (Classification,  Control  and

Appeal) Rules, 1965 (in short “the CCS Rules”) which

included the statement of articles of charges and other

relevant documents.  

8) The disciplinary proceedings, which commenced

on 18.07.1990, continued for more than nine years.

Pending disciplinary proceedings, the appellant sought

revocation  of  suspension  order  but  such

representation  made  by  the  appellant  was  not

considered.   Subsequently,  vide  order  dated

01.03.1999,  the  then  District  &  Sessions  Judge,

exercising  the  powers  conferred  under  Clause  C  of

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sub-rule 5 of Rule 10 of CCS Rules revoked the order

of  suspension  with  immediate  effect.   The  issue,

whether the period of suspension is to be reckoned as

period on duty,  was not  decided and directed to be

taken  up  after  conclusion  of  the  disciplinary

proceedings.

9) The District & Sessions Judge, Delhi passed two

orders dated 27.10.1999 and 28.10.1999 imposing a

major  penalty  of  compulsory  retirement  on  the

appellant.  It was also ordered that the appellant will

not  be  entitled  to  any  amount  more  than  the

allowances  already  paid  during  the  period  of

suspension.   

10) Challenging the said order, the appellant filed an

appeal  before  the  Administrative  Judge  of  the  High

Court  of  Delhi.   Vide  order  dated  21.08.2000,  the

Administrative Judge dismissed the appeal.   

11) Against  the  said  order,  the  appellant  filed

W.P.No.  2046  of  2001  before  the  High  Court.   The

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High Court, by impugned judgment dated 21.08.2008,

dismissed the petition.

12) Aggrieved by the said order,  the appellant  filed

this appeal by way of special leave before this Court.

13) The  appellant  appeared  in-person.  Mr.  Wasim

Qadari,  learned  counsel  appeared  for  respondents.

Since the appellant  had no legal  assistance,  he was

appearing  in  person.   We  requested  Mr.  Sreegesh,

learned counsel, who was present in Court, to appear

for the appellant to enable us to decide the appeal.

14) Heard  Mr.  Sreegesh,  learned  counsel  for  the

appellant and Mr. Wasim A. Qadri, learned counsel for

the respondents.   

15) We  record  our  appreciation  for  Mr.  Sreegesh,

learned counsel, who on our request argued the case

ably with fairness for the appellant and rendered his

valuable assistance on every date of hearing.

16) Submissions of  Mr. Sreegesh were three-fold. In

the first place, he contended that no case whatsoever

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is  made  out  against  the  appellant  for  imposing  the

punishment of compulsory retirement. He also made

attempt  to  find  fault  in  departmental  inquiry

proceedings and contended that the manner in which

the  proceedings  were  held  would  indicate  that  the

appellant  did  not  get  fair  opportunity  to  meet  the

charges and, therefore, the departmental proceedings

are  rendered  bad  in  law  having  been  conducted  in

violation of principle of natural justice.   

17) In the second place, learned counsel contended

that  in  any  event  the  punishment  of  compulsory

retirement  imposed  on  the  appellant  was  not

commensurate  with the  gravity  of  charge  and being

wholly disproportionate to the nature of charges, this

Court should interfere in the quantum of punishment

and  reduce  it  to  make  the  same  in  tune  with  the

gravity of the charges.  

18) In  the  third  place,  learned  counsel  contended

that  the appellant  was kept under suspension for  a

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long  period  of  9  years  and  26  days  (06.02.1990  to

01.03.1999) without any justifiable cause on the part

of the respondents and yet the respondents excluded

this period while calculating the appellant's pension,

which  according  to  him  was  not  justified  and,

therefore, a direction be issued to the respondents to

count  the  period  of  suspension  for  determining  the

appellant’s pension and other retiral benefits.

19) In  reply,  learned  counsel  for  the  respondents

supported  the  impugned  order.  As  regards  the  last

submission of the learned counsel for the appellant,

his reply was that since the departmental proceedings

were delayed due to the appellant’s seeking frequent

adjournments from time to time and hence he is not

entitled to claim the benefit of period of suspension for

fixing his pension which, according to him, was rightly

fixed after excluding the suspension period.

20) Having heard the learned counsel for the parties

and on perusal of the record of the case, we find force

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only in the third submission of the appellant's counsel

whereas the first two submissions are concerned, we

find no substance.  

21) We have perused the record of the departmental

proceedings  and  find  that  the  inquiry  officer  fully

observed principle of natural justice while conducting

the departmental proceedings. It is not in dispute that

the  appellant  was served with detailed charge sheet

along with the documents referred to therein. He filed

reply to the charge sheet. The parties were then given

full  opportunity  to  adduce evidence  and which they

availed of by examining witnesses in their support and

by cross-examining each of them. What more, in our

opinion,  is  then  required  in  any  departmental

proceedings?  The  writ  court  examined  this  issue  in

detail and rightly recorded the finding that the inquiry

officer observed the principle of natural justice in the

departmental  proceedings and found no fault  in the

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proceedings so as to entitle the court to interfere in

writ jurisdiction.

22) We find no good ground to take a different view

on this issue and reject this submission being devoid

of any merit.

23) This takes us to the next question as to whether

the punishment of compulsory retirement inflicted on

the  appellant  was  justified  or  not.  It  was  the

submission of learned counsel for the appellant that

the  punishment  of  compulsory  retirement  was  not

justified.  However, in our view, it was rightly inflicted.

24) It  is  a  settled  principle  of  law  that  once  the

charges leveled  against  the  delinquent  employee are

proved then it is for the appointing authority to decide

as  to  what  punishment  should  be  imposed  on  the

delinquent employee as per the Rules. The appointing

authority,  keeping in view the nature and gravity of

the  charges,  findings  of  the  inquiry  officer,  entire

service  record  of  the  delinquent  employee  and  all

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relevant  factors relating to the  delinquent,  exercised

its  discretion  and then  imposed  the  punishment  as

provided in the Rules.  

25) Once  such  discretion  is  exercised  by  the

appointing  authority  in  inflicting  the  punishment

(whether minor or major) then the Courts are slow to

interfere in the quantum of punishment and only in

rare and appropriate case substitutes the punishment.

26) Such power  is  exercised  when the  Court  finds

that the delinquent employee is able to prove that the

punishment inflicted on him is wholly unreasonable,

arbitrary  and  disproportionate  to  the  gravity  of  the

proved charges thereby shocking the conscious of the

Court or when it is found to be in contravention of the

Rules. The Court may, in such cases, remit the case to

the  appointing  authority  for  imposing  any  other

punishment as against what was originally awarded to

the delinquent employee by the appointing authority

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as per the Rules or may substitute the punishment by

itself instead of remitting to the appointing authority.

27) Learned  counsel  for  the  appellant  was  not,

however, able to show us with reference to the facts of

the case that the case of the appellant satisfies any of

the aforementioned grounds so as to entitle this Court

to interfere in the quantum of punishment and hence,

in our considered view, the punishment of compulsory

retirement  inflicted  upon  the  appellant  by  the

appointing  authority  having  regard  to  the  nature  of

proved charges appears to be just and proper and does

not call for any interference.

28) This takes us to the last submission of learned

counsel  for  the  appellant,  which  in  our  considered

view,   deserves serious consideration.

29) One  cannot  dispute  in  this  case  that  the

suspension period was unduly long. We also find that

the  delay  in  completion  of  the  departmental

proceedings  was  not  wholly  attributable  to  the

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appellant  but  it  was  equally  attributable  to  the

respondents as well. Due to such unreasonable delay,

the appellant naturally suffered a lot because he and

his  family  had  to  survive  only  on  suspension

allowance for a long period of 9 years.  

30) We  are  constrained  to  observe  as  to  why  the

departmental  proceeding,  which  involved  only  one

charge and that too uncomplicated, have taken more

than 9 years to conclude the departmental inquiry. No

justification  was  forthcoming  from  the  respondents’

side to explain the undue delay in completion of the

departmental  inquiry  except  to  throw blame  on  the

appellant's  conduct  which  we  feel,  was  not  fully

justified.

31) Time and again, this Court has emphasized that

it  is  the  duty  of  the  employer  to  ensure  that  the

departmental inquiry initiated against the delinquent

employee  is  concluded  within  the  shortest  possible

time by taking priority measures. In cases where the

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delinquent  is  placed  under  suspension  during  the

pendency of such inquiry then it becomes all the more

imperative for the employer to ensure that the inquiry

is concluded in the shortest possible time to avoid any

inconvenience, loss and prejudice to the rights of the

delinquent employee.

32) As a matter of  experience, we often notice that

after  completion  of  the  inquiry,  the  issue  involved

therein  does  not  come  to  an  end  because  if  the

findings of the inquiry proceedings have gone against

the  delinquent  employee,  he  invariably  pursues  the

issue in Court to ventilate his grievance, which again

consumes time for its final conclusion.  

33) Keeping  these  factors  in  mind,  we  are  of  the

considered opinion that every employer (whether State

or private)  must make sincere endeavor to conclude

the  departmental  inquiry  proceedings  once  initiated

against the delinquent employee within a reasonable

time by giving priority to such proceedings and as far

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as possible it should be concluded within six months

as  an  outer  limit.  Where  it  is  not  possible  for  the

employer  to  conclude  due  to  certain  unavoidable

causes  arising  in  the  proceedings  within  the  time

frame then efforts should be made to conclude within

reasonably extended period depending upon the cause

and the nature of inquiry but not more than a year.      

34) Now coming to the facts of the case in hand, we

find  that  the  respondent  has  fixed  the  appellant's

pension  after  excluding  the  period  of  suspension  (9

years and 26 days). In other words, the respondents

while calculating the qualifying service of the appellant

for determining his pension did not take into account

the  period  of  suspension  from  06.02.1990  to

01.03.1999.

35) Having regard to the totality of the facts and the

circumstances, which are taken note of supra, we are

of the view that the period of suspension should have

been  taken  into  account  by  the  respondents  for

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determining  the  appellant's  pension  and  we

accordingly do so.

36) In  view  of  foregoing  discussion,  the  appeal

succeeds  and  is  allowed  in  part  only  to  the  extent

indicated  above  in  relation  to  fixation  of  appellant's

pension. The respondents are accordingly directed to

re-determine  the  appellant’s  pension  by  taking  into

account  the  period  of  suspension  (06.02.1990  to

01.03.1999) and then pay to the appellant arrears of

the difference amount from the date he became eligible

to  claim  pension  and  then  to  continue  to  pay  the

appellant re-determined pension regularly in future as

per Rules.   It is to be done within three months from

the date of receipt of this order.  No costs.

                                    .……...................................J.                     [J. CHELAMESWAR]

                                     ………..................................J.                      [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]

New Delhi, December 16, 2015.

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