Page 1

1

Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION (C) No. 416 OF 2012     

Pramati Educational & Cultural  Trust ® & Ors.                                                 … Petitioners

Versus Union of India & Ors.                                    …  Respondents

WITH

WRIT PETITION (C) No. 152 OF 2013, WRIT PETITION (C) No.1081 OF 2013, WRIT PETITION (C)  No.  60 OF 2014, WRIT PETITION (C) No.   95 OF 2014, WRIT PETITION (C) No.106 OF 2014,  WRIT PETITION (C) No.128 OF 2014, WRIT PETITION (C) No.144 OF 2014, WRIT PETITION (C) No.145 OF 2014, WRIT PETITION (C) No.160 OF 2014,

AND  WRIT PETITION (C) No.136 OF 2014

J U D G M E N T

A. K. PATNAIK, J.

This is a reference made by a three-Judge Bench of  

this  Court  by  order  dated  06.09.2010  in  Society  for

Page 2

2

Unaided Private Schools of Rajasthan v. Union of India &   

Anr. [(2012) 6 SCC 102] to a Constitution Bench.  As per  

the aforesaid order dated 06.09.2010, we are called upon  

to decide on the validity of clause (5) of Article 15 of the  

Constitution  inserted  by  the  Constitution  (Ninety-third  

Amendment) Act, 2005 with effect from 20.01.2006 and  

on the validity of Article 21A of the Constitution inserted  

by the Constitution (Eighty-Sixth Amendment) Act,  2002  

with effect from 01.04.2010.

2. Clause (5) of Article 15 of the Constitution reads as  

follows:  

“Nothing in this article or in sub-clause (g)  of clause (1) of article 19 shall prevent the  State from making any special provision,  by  law,  for  the  advancement  of  any  socially  and  educationally  backward  classes  of  citizens  or  for  the  Scheduled  Castes or the Scheduled Tribes in so far as  such  special  provisions  relate  to  their  admission  to  educational  institutions  including private educational institutions,  whether  aided  or  unaided  by  the  State,  other  than  the  minority  educational  institutions  referred  to  in  clause  (1)  of  article 30.”

Clause  (5)  of  Article  15  of  the  Constitution,  therefore,  

enables the State to make a special provision, by law, for

Page 3

3

the advancement of socially and educationally backward  

classes  of  citizens  or  for  the  Scheduled  Castes  and  

Scheduled Tribes insofar as such special provisions relate  

to  their  admission  to  educational  institutions  including  

private educational institutions, whether aided or unaided  

by  the  State,  other  than  the  minority  educational  

institutions referred to in clause (1) of Article 30 of the  

Constitution.   The constitutional  validity of clause (5) of  

Article  15  of  the  Constitution  insofar  as  it  enables  the  

State to make special provisions relating to admission to  

educational  institutions  of  the  State  and  educational  

institutions  aided  by  the  State  was  considered  by  a  

Constitution Bench of this Court in Ashoka Kumar Thakur  

v.  Union  of  India  &  Ors.  [(2008)  6  SCC  1]  and  the  

Constitution Bench held in the aforesaid case that clause  

(5) of Article 15 is valid and does not violate the “basic  

structure” of the Constitution so far  as it  relates to the  

State-maintained  institutions  and  aided  educational  

institutions.  In  the  aforesaid  case,  however,  the  

Constitution Bench left open the question whether clause  

(5) of Article 15 was constitutionally valid or not so far as  

“private unaided” educational institutions are concerned,

Page 4

4

as  such  “private  unaided”  educational  institutions  were  

not before the Court.  This batch of writ petitions has been  

filed by private unaided educational  institutions and we  

are called upon to decide whether clause (5) of Article 15  

of the Constitution so far as it relates to “private unaided”  

educational institutions is valid and does not violate the  

basic structure of the Constitution.

3. Article 21A of the Constitution reads as follows:  

“21A. Right to education.--The State shall  provide free and compulsory education to all  children of the age of six to fourteen years in  such  manner  as  the  State  may,  by  law,  determine.".

Thus,  Article  21A  of  the  Constitution,  provides  that the  

State shall  provide free and compulsory education to all  

children of the age of six to fourteen years in such manner  

as the State may, by law, determine.  Parliament has made  

the law contemplated by Article 21A by enacting the Right  

of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act,  2009  

(for short ‘the 2009 Act’).  The constitutional validity of the  

2009 Act was considered by a three-Judge Bench of the  

Court in  Society for Unaided Private Schools of Rajasthan  

v. Union of India & Anr. [(2012) 6 SCC 1].  Two of the three

Page 5

5

Judges have held the 2009 Act to be constitutionally valid,  

but they have also held that the 2009 Act is not applicable  

to unaided minority schools protected under Article 30(1)  

of the Constitution.   In the aforesaid case, however,  the  

three-Judge Bench did  not  go into  the question whether  

clause (5) of Article 15 or Article 21A of the Constitution is  

valid  and  does  not  violate  the  basic  structure  of  the  

Constitution.   In  this  batch of  the writ  petitions  filed by  

private unaided institutions,  the  constitutional  validity  of  

clause (5) of Article 15 and of Article 21A has to be decided  

by this Constitution Bench.

4. Both  clause  (5)  of  Article  15  and  Article  21A  were  

inserted in the Constitution by Parliament by exercise of its  

power of amendment under Article 368 of the Constitution.  

A  Bench of  thirteen-Judges of  this  Court  in  His  Holiness  

Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru v. State of Kerala &   

Anr.  [(1973)  4  SCC  225]  considered  the  scope  of  the  

amending  power  of  Parliament  under  Article  368  of  the  

Constitution and the majority of the Judges held that Article  

368 does not enable Parliament to alter the basic structure  

or  framework of  the Constitution.   Hence,  we are called

Page 6

6

upon  to  decide  in  this  reference  the  following  two  

substantial questions of law:

(i) Whether by inserting clause (5) in Article 15 of the  

Constitution  by  the  Constitution  (Ninety-third  

Amendment) Act, 2005, Parliament has altered the  

basic structure or framework of the Constitution.

(ii) Whether by inserting Article 21A of the Constitution  

by the Constitution (Eighty-Sixth Amendment) Act,  

2002, Parliament has altered the basic structure or  

framework of the Constitution.  

Validity  of  clause  (5)  of  Article  15  of  the  Constitution

Contentions of learned counsel for the petitioners:     

5. Mr.  Mukul  Rohatgi,  learned  senior  counsel  for  the  

petitioners in Writ Petition (C) No.416 of 2012, submitted  

that in T.M.A. Pai Foundation & Ors v. State of Karnataka   

& Ors. [(2002) 8 SCC 481] the majority of the Judges of the  

eleven-Judge Bench speaking through Kirpal C.J. have held  

that  the  fundamental  right  to  carry  on  any  occupation  

under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution includes the right

Page 7

7

to  run  and  administer  a  private  unaided  educational  

institution.  He submitted that in Minerva Mills Ltd. & Ors.   

v. Union of India & Ors. [(1980) 3 SCC 625] Chandrachud,  

CJ., writing the judgment for the majority of the Judges of  

the Constitution Bench, has held that Articles 14, 19 and  

21 of the Constitution constitute the golden triangle which  

affords to the people of this country an assurance that the  

promise held forth by the Preamble will be performed by  

ushering  an  egalitarian  era  through  the  discipline  of  

fundamental  rights,  that is,  without emasculation of  the  

rights  to  liberty  and  equality  which  alone  can  help  

preserve the dignity of the individual.  He submitted that  

in  the  aforesaid  case,  the  Constitution  Bench held  that  

Section 4 of the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment)  

Act is beyond the amending power of Parliament and is  

void since it damages the basic or essential features of the  

Constitution  and  destroys  its  basic  structure  by  a  total  

exclusion of challenge to any law on the ground that it is  

inconsistent with,  or  takes away or abridges any of the  

rights  conferred  by  Article 14 or  Article 19 of  the  

Constitution.  Mr. Rohatgi submitted that Article 19(1)(g)  

of  the  Constitution  is,  therefore,  a  basic  feature  of  the

Page 8

8

Constitution  and  this  basic  feature  is  destroyed  by  

providing in clause (5) of Article 15 of the Constitution that  

nothing in Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution shall prevent  

the State from making any special provision, by law, for  

the  advancement  of  any  socially  and  educationally  

backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes  

or the Scheduled Tribes in so far as such special provisions  

relate  to  their  admission  to  educational  institutions  

including  private  educational  institutions.   Mr.  Rohatgi  

explained  that  a  nine-Judge  Bench  of  this  Court  in  I.R.  

Coelho (Dead) by LRs. v. State of T.N. [(2007) 2 SCC 1]  

relying on the aforesaid judgment in  Minerva Mills  case  

(supra) has similarly held that Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the  

Constitution stand on altogether  a different  footing and  

after  the  evolution  of  the  basic  structure  doctrine  in  

Kesavananda  Bharati (supra),  it  will  not  be  open  to  

immunize  legislation  made  by  Parliament  from  judicial  

scrutiny on the ground that these fundamental rights are  

not  part  of  the  basic  structure  of  the Constitution.   He  

submitted  that  in  the  aforesaid  judgment,  this  Court,  

therefore, has also held that the existence of the power of  

Parliament to amend the Constitution at will, with requisite

Page 9

9

voting  strength,  so  as  to  make  any  kind  of  laws  that  

excludes  Part  III  including  the  power  of  judicial  review  

under Article 32 is incompatible with the basic structure of  

the  Constitution  and,  therefore,  such  an  exercise,  if  

challenged, has to be tested on the touchstone of basic  

structure as reflected in Article 21 read with Article 14 and  

Article 19 of the Constitution.  Mr. Rohatgi submitted that  

Bhandari, J. has taken the view in Ashoka Kumar Thakur v.   

Union of India (supra) that the imposition of reservation on  

unaided institutions by the  Ninety-third Amendment has  

abrogated  Article 19(1)(g),  a  basic  feature  of  the  

Constitution and, therefore, the Ninety-third Amendment  

of the Constitution is ultra vires the Constitution.

6. Mr.  R.F.  Nariman,  learned  senior  counsel  for  the  

petitioners in Writ Petition (C ) No.128 of 2014, submitted  

that clause (5) of Article 15 of the Constitution is violative  

of  Article  14  of  the  Constitution  inasmuch  as  it  treats  

unequals as equals.  He argued that clause (5) of Article  

15 of the Constitution fails to make a distinction between  

aided and unaided educational institutions and treats both  

aided and unaided alike in the matter of making special

Page 10

10

provisions for advancement of socially and educationally  

backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes  

and  the  Scheduled  Tribes  insofar  as  such  special  

provisions  relate to  their  admission to  such educational  

institutions.   He referred to paragraph 55 of the majority  

judgment of this Court in T.M.A. Pai Foundation (supra) in  

which  the  difference  in  the  administration  of  private  

unaided  institutions  and  government-aided  institutions  

has been noticed.  He argued that clause (5) of Article 15  

of the Constitution as its very language indicates does not  

apply  to  minority  educational  institutions  referred  to  in  

clause (1) of Article 30 of the Constitution.  He submitted  

that Article 14 is,  thus,  violated because aided minority  

institutions  and  unaided  minority  institutions  cannot  be  

treated alike.  Clause (5) of Article 15 of the Constitution,  

therefore,  is  discriminatory and violative of  the equality  

clause in Article 14 of the Constitution, which is a basic  

feature of the Constitution.

7.  Mr. Nariman next submitted that clause (5) of Article  

15 of the Constitution is a clear violation of Article 19(1)(g)  

of  the  Constitution,  inasmuch  as  it  compels  private

Page 11

11

educational institutions to give up a share of the available  

seats  to  the  candidates  chosen  by  the  State  and  such  

appropriation of seats would not be a regulatory measure  

and not a reasonable restriction on the right under Article  

19(1)(g) of the Constitution within the meaning of Article  

19(6) of the Constitution.  He referred to the observations  

of  this  Court  in  P.A.  Inamdar  &  Ors.  v.  State  of   

Maharashtra & Ors. [(2005) 6 SCC 537] in paragraph 125  

at  page 601 that  private educational  institutions,  which  

intend to provide better professional education, cannot be  

forced by the State to make admissions available on the  

basis of reservation policy to less meritorious candidates  

and that unaided institutions, as they are not deriving any  

aid from State funds, should have their own admissions  

following a fair, transparent and non-exploitative method  

based  on  merit.   He  vehemently  submitted  that  when  

reservation  in  favour  of  the  Scheduled  Castes  and  the  

Scheduled  Tribes  and  other  socially  and  educationally  

backward  classes  of  citizens  is  made  in  admission  to  

private  educational  institutions  and  unaided  private  

educational  institutions  by  the  State,  such  private  

educational  institutions  will  no  longer  be  institutions  of

Page 12

12

excellence.   He submitted that in  T.M.A.  Pai  Foundation  

(supra), the majority of the Judges have held that private  

unaided educational institutions impart education and that  

the  State  cannot  take  away  the  choice  in  matters  of  

selection  of  students  for  admission  and  clause  (5)  of  

Article  15  of  the  Constitution  insofar  as  it  enables  the  

State to take away this choice for admission of students is  

violative  of  freedom  of  private  educational  institutions  

under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.   

8. Mr. Nariman next submitted that in Mohini Jain (Miss)   

v. State of Karnataka & Ors. [(1992) 3 SCC 666], this Court  

has  held  that  the  “right  to  life”  is  a  compendious  

expression  with  all  those  rights  which  the  Courts  must  

enforce because they are basic to the dignified enjoyment  

of  life  and  that  the  dignity  of  an  individual  cannot  be  

assured  unless  it  is  accompanied  by  the  right  to  

education.  He submitted that under Article 51A(j) of the  

Constitution, it is a duty of every citizen of India to strive  

towards  excellence  in  all  spheres  of  individual  and  

collective activity  so  that  the nation  constantly  rises  to  

higher levels of endeavour and achievement.  He argued

Page 13

13

that every citizen can strive towards excellence through  

education  by  studying  in  educational  institutions  of  

excellence.  He submitted that clause (5) of Article 15 of  

the Constitution in so far as it enables the State to make  

special  provisions  relating  to  admission  to  private  

educational  institutions  for  socially  and  educationally  

backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes  

and the Scheduled Tribes will affect also this right under  

Article 21 read with Article 51A(j) of the Constitution.

9. Mr. Nariman submitted that clause (5) of Article 15 of  

the Constitution has been brought in by an amendment to  

achieve the Directive Principles of State Policy in Part IV of  

the  Constitution  as  well  as  the  goals  of  social  and  

economic  justice  set  out  in  the  Preamble  of  the  

Constitution,  but  the  majority  of  the  Judges  speaking  

through Chandrachud, CJ., have held in Minerva Mills case  

(supra) that the goals set out in Part IV of the Constitution  

have to be achieved without the abrogation of the means  

provided for by Part III of the Constitution.  He submitted  

that in the aforesaid majority judgment in Minerva Mills  

case  (supra)  authored  by  Chandrachud,  CJ.,  it  has  also

Page 14

14

been observed that Parts III and IV together constitute the  

core of  our  Constitution and anything that  destroys the  

balance between the two parts will  ipso facto destroy an  

essential  element  of  the  basic  structure  of  our  

Constitution.  He submitted that clause (5) of Article 15 of  

the Constitution inasmuch as it is violative of Articles 14,  

19(1)(g)  and  21  of  the  Constitution  destroys  the  basic  

feature of the Constitution and is, therefore, beyond the  

amending power of Parliament.  

10. Dr. Rajeev Dhavan, learned senior counsel appearing  

for the petitioners in W.P.(C) No.152 of 2013, submitted  

that two tests have to be applied for determining whether  

a constitutional amendment is violative of basic structure  

in so far as it affects fundamental rights, and these two  

tests  are  the  ‘identity  test’  and  the  ‘width  test’.   He  

submitted that the Court has to see whether the identity  

of  a  fundamental  right  as  judicially  determined  is  not  

destroyed by the width of  the power introduced by the  

amendment  of  the Constitution and if  the  conclusion is  

that the width of the power of the State vested by the  

constitutional  amendment  is  such  as  to  destroy  the

Page 15

15

essence  of  the  right,  the  amendment  can  be  held  to  

destroy the basic structure of the Constitution.  In support  

of this proposition he relied on the judgment of this Court  

in  M. Nagaraj  and Others v.  Union  of  India  and Others  

[(2006) 8 SCC 212].

11. Mr. Dhavan submitted that in  T.M.A. Pai Foundation  

case (supra)  the majority  judgment has determined the  

content  of  the  right  of  a  private  educational  institution  

under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution and the content  

of this right comprises the (a) charity, (b) autonomy, (c)  

voluntariness, (d) non-sharing of seats between the State  

Governments and the private institutions, (e) co-optation  

and  (f)  reasonableness  principles.   He  submitted  that  

clause  (5)  of  Article  15  of  the  Constitution  inserted  by  

Parliament by way of amendment, however, provides that  

nothing in Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution shall prevent  

the State from making any special provision, by law, for  

admission  to  private  educational  institutions  of  persons  

belonging to socially and educationally backward classes  

of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes or the Scheduled  

Tribes.  He vehemently argued that by clause (5) of Article

Page 16

16

15 of the Constitution the power that is vested in the State  

is  such  that  it  can  destroy  the  essence  of  the  right  of  

private educational institution under Article 19(1)(g) of the  

Constitution  as  determined  by  this  Court  in  T.M.A.  Pai  

Foundation case (supra) and therefore the constitutional  

amendment  inserting  clause  (5)  in  Article  15  of  the  

Constitution  is  destructive  of  the  basic  structure  of  the  

Constitution.

12. Mr. Anil  B. Divan, learned senior counsel appearing  

for the petitioners in W.P.(C) No.60 of 2014 and W.P.(C)  

No.160 of 2014 submitted that in the case of  Edward A.  

Boyd and George H. Boyd v. Unites States (1884) 116 U.S.  

616 Bradley J., has observed that it will be the duty of the  

courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the  

citizens  and  against  any  stealthy  encroachments  into  

these rights.  He submitted that in Dwarkadas Shrinivas v.  

The Sholapur Spining & Weaving Co. Ltd. and Others (AIR  

1954 SC 119)  Mahajan J.,  has held that  in  dealing with  

constitutional  matters  it  is  always  well  to  bear  in  mind  

these observations of Bradley J.  He submitted that while  

deciding  on  validity  of  clause  (5)  of  Article  15  of  the

Page 17

17

Constitution,  we  should  bear  in  mind  the  aforesaid  

observations of Bradley J. He submitted that Chandrachud,  

CJ.  in  Minerva Mills Ltd. & Ors.  v.  Union of India & Ors.  

(supra) has referred to the observations of Brandies J. that  

the  need  to  protect  liberty  is  the  greatest  when  the  

government  purposes  are  beneficient  particularly  when  

political pressures exercised by numerically large groups  

can  tear  the  country  asunder  by  leaving  it  to  the  

legislature  to  pick  and  choose  favoured  areas  and  

favourite classes for preferential treatment.  He submitted  

that  clause  (5)  of  Article  15  of  the  Constitution  is  an  

amendment made by Parliament to appease socially and  

educationally  backward  classes  of  citizens  and  the  

Scheduled  Castes  or  the  Scheduled  Tribes  for  political  

gains and it is for the Court to protect the fundamental  

right of private educational institutions under Article 19(1)

(g)  of  the  Constitution  as  interpreted  by  this  Court  in  

T.M.A. Pai Foundation.

13. Mr. Divan next submitted that clause (5) of Article 15  

of the Constitution as its very language indicates, applies  

to non-minority private educational institutions but does

Page 18

18

not apply to minority educational institutions referred to in  

clause (1) of Article 30 of the Constitution.  He argued that  

there is absolutely no rationale for exempting the minority  

educational institutions from the purview of clause (5) of  

Article 15 of the Constitution and clause (5) of Article 15 of  

the Constitution really gives a favourable treatment to the  

minority  educational  institutions  and  is  violative  of  the  

equality clause in Article 14 of the Constitution.  He relied  

on  the  decision  of  this  Court  in  The  Ahmedabad  St.   

Xavier’s College Society and Another v.  State of Gujarat  

and Another [(1974) 1 SCC 717] to submit that the whole  

object of conferring the right on the minority under Article  

30 of the Constitution is to ensure that there will be an  

equality  between  the  majority  and  the  minority.   He  

submitted  that  H.R.  Khanna  J.  in  his  judgment  in  the  

aforesaid case has clarified that the idea of giving some  

special rights to the minorities is not to have a kind of a  

privileged or pampered section of the population but to  

give to the minorities a sense of security and a feeling of  

confidence.   He  submitted  that  Kirpal  C.J.  speaking  for  

majority in T.M.A. Pai Foundation (supra) has similarly held  

that the essence of Article 30(1) of the Constitution is to

Page 19

19

ensure  equal  treatment  between  the  majority  and  the  

minority  institutions  that  laws  of  the  land  must  apply  

equally  to  majority  institutions  as  well  as  to  minority  

institutions and minority institutions must be allowed to do  

what the non-minority institutions are permitted to do. Mr.  

Divan  submitted  that  clause  (5)  of  Article  15  of  the  

Constitution  insofar  as  it  excludes  minority  institutions  

referred  to  in  Article  30(1)  of  the  Constitution  is  also  

violative  of  secularism  which  is  a  basic  feature  of  the  

Constitution.  He referred to the judgment in Dr. M. Ismail   

Faruqui and Others v. Union of India and Others [(1994) 6  

SCC 360] in which this Court has held that the concept of  

secularism is one facet of right to equality woven as the  

central golden thread in the fabric depicting the pattern of  

the scheme in our Constitution.  

Contentions  of  learned  counsel  for  the  Union  of  India:

14. Mr.  Mohan  Parasaran,  learned  Solicitor  General,  

submitted that this Court has held in  Ashoka Kumar  

Thakur  v.  Union of  India (supra)  that  clause (5)  of  

Article  15  of  the  Constitution  is  only  an  enabling  

provision  empowering  the  State to  make a  special

Page 20

20

provision,  by  law,  for  the  advancement  of  socially  

and educationally backward classes of citizens or for  

the  Scheduled  Castes  and  the  Scheduled  Tribes  

insofar  as  such  special  provisions  relate  to  their  

admission  to  educational  institutions  including  

private educational institutions.  He submitted that it  

will  be  clear  from  paragraphs  53  and  68  of  the  

judgment of the eleven Judge Bench of this Court in  

T.M.A. Pai Foundation (supra) that reserving a small  

percentage  of  seats  in  private  educational  

institutions, aided or unaided, for weaker, poorer and  

backward  sections  of  society  did  not  in  any  way  

affect  the  right  of  private  educational  institutions  

under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.  He argued  

that  after  the judgment of  this  Court  in  T.M.A.  Pai  

Foundation (supra) a five-Judge Bench of this Court in  

Islamic  Academy  of  Education  &  Anr.  v.  State  of   

Karnataka & Ors. [(2003) 6 SCC 697 was of the view  

that  as  per  the judgment  in  T.M.A.  Pai  Foundation  

(supra) in case of non-minority professional colleges  

a  percentage  of  seats  could  be  reserved  by  the  

Government for poorer and backward sections.  He

Page 21

21

submitted  that  this  view  taken  by  the  five-Judge  

Bench of this Court in Islamic Academy of Education  

& Anr. v. State of Karnataka & Ors. (supra), however,  

did not find favour with a seven-Judge Bench of this  

Court in P.A. Inamdar (supra) which held that there is  

nothing in the judgment of this Court in  T.M.A. Pai  

Foundation (supra) allowing the State to regulate or  

control  admissions  in  the  unaided  professional  

educational institutions so as to compel them to give  

up a share of the available seats to the candidates  

chosen by the State or for enforcing the reservation  

policy  of  the  State.   He  submitted  that,  therefore,  

Parliament introduced clause (5) in Article 15 of the  

Constitution  by  the  Constitution  (Ninety-Third  

Amendment) Act, 2005 providing that the State may  

make  a  special  provision,  by  law,  for  the  

advancement of socially and educationally backward  

classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes and  

the  Scheduled  Tribes  insofar  as  such  special  

provisions  relate  to  their  admission  to  educational  

institutions including private educational institutions,  

whether  aided  or  unaided  by  the  State.   He

Page 22

22

vehemently  argued  that  clause  (5)  of  Article  15  

introduced  by  the  constitutional  amendment  is  

consistent with the right to establish and administer  

the  private  educational  institutions  under  Article  

19(1)(g) of the Constitution as interpreted by T.M.A.  

Pai  Foundation (supra)  and,  therefore,  does  not  

violate  the  right  under  Article  19(1)(g)  of  the  

Constitution.

15. Mr.  Parasaran  next  submitted  that  minority  

institutions  referred  to  in  Article  30  of  the  

Constitution have been excluded from the purview of  

clause (5) of Article 15 of the Constitution because  

the  Constitution  has  given  a  special  status  to  

minority institutions.  He submitted that in the case  

of  Ashoka Kumar Thakur  v.  Union of  India (supra),  

this  Court  has  held  that  exclusion  of  minority  

educational institutions from clause (5) of Article 15  

of the Constitution is not violative of Article 14 of the  

Constitution as the minority educational institutions,  

by themselves, are a separate class and their rights  

are protected by other constitutional provisions.  He

Page 23

23

submitted that the argument that clause (5) of Article  

15 of the Constitution is violative of equality clause in  

Article  14  of  the  Constitution  is  therefore  

misconceived.       

Opinion of the Court on the validity of clause (5) of  Article 15 of the Constitution:

16.  We  have  considered  the  submissions  of  learned  

counsel  for  the  parties  and  we  find  that  the  object  of  

clause (5) of Article 15 is to enable the State to give equal  

opportunity to socially and educationally backward classes  

of citizens or to the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled  

Tribes to study in all  educational  institutions other than  

minority educational institutions referred in clause (1) of  

Article 30 of the Constitution.  This will be clear from the  

Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Bill, which after  

enactment  became  the  Constitution  (Ninety-Third  

Amendment) Act, 2005 extracted hereinbelow:

“Greater  access  to  higher  education  including  professional  education  to  a larger number  of  students  belonging  to  the  socially  and  educationally  backward  classes  of  citizens  or  for  the  Scheduled  Castes  and  Scheduled  Tribes  has  been  a  matter  of  major  concern.  At  present,  the

Page 24

24

number of seats available in aided or State  maintained  institutions,  particularly  in  respect of professional education, is limited  in comparison to those in private unaided  institutions.

2. It is laid down in article 46, as a directive  principle of State policy, that the State shall  promote with special  care the educational  and  economic  interests  of  the  weaker  sections  of  the  people  and  protect  them  from  social  injustice.  To  promote  the  educational  advancement  of  the  socially  and  educationally  backward  classes  of  citizens  or  of  the  Scheduled  Castes  and  Scheduled Tribes in matters of admission of  students  belonging  to  these  categories  in  unaided educational institutions, other than  the  minority  educational  institutions  referred to in clause (1) of article 30 of the  Constitution,  it  is  proposed  to  amplify  article 15.

3.  The  Bill  seeks  to  achieve  the  above  objects.”

Clause (1) of Article 15 of the Constitution provides that  

the  State  shall  not  discriminate  against  any  citizen  on  

grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or  

any of them and clause (2) of Article 15 of the Constitution  

provides that no citizen shall, on grounds of religion, race,  

caste, sex, place of birth or any of them, be subject to any  

disability, liability,  restriction or condition with regard to  

(a) access to shops, public restaurants, hotels and places

Page 25

25

of  public  entertainment;  or  (b)  the  use  of  wells,  tanks,  

bathing  ghats,  roads  and  places  of  public  resort  

maintained  wholly  or  partly  out  of  State  funds  or  

dedicated to the use of general public.  These provisions  

were made to ensure that every citizen irrespective of his  

religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them, is  

given the equal treatment by the State and he has equal  

access to public places.  Despite these provisions in Article  

15 of the Constitution as originally adopted, some classes  

of citizens, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes have  

remained socially  and educationally  backward and have  

also not been able to access educational institutions for  

the purpose of advancement.  To amplify the provisions of  

Article 15 of the Constitution as originally adopted and to  

provide  equal  opportunity  in  educational  institutions,  

clause  (5)  has  been  inserted  in  Article  15  by  the  

constitutional amendment made by the Parliament by the  

Ninety-Third  Amendment  Act,  2005.   As  the  object  of  

clause (5) of Article 15 of the Constitution is to provide  

equal opportunity to a large number of students belonging  

to  the  socially  and  educationally  backward  classes  of  

citizens or  for  the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled

Page 26

26

Tribes to study in educational institutions and equality of  

opportunity  is  also  the  object  of  clauses  (1)and  (2)  of  

Article 15 of the Constitution, we cannot hold that clause  

(5) of Article 15 of the Constitution is an exception or a  

proviso overriding Article 15 of  the Constitution,  but  an  

enabling  provision  to  make  equality  of  opportunity  

promised in the Preamble in the Constitution a reality.

17.    For  this  view,  we  are  supported  by  the  majority  

judgment of this Court in  State of Kerala & Anr. v. N.M.   

Thomas & Ors. [(1976) 2 SCC 310] in which this Court has  

held that clause (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution which  

has opening words similar to the opening words in clause  

(5) of Article 15 is not an exception or a proviso to Article  

16,  but  is  a  provision  intended  to  give  equality  of  

opportunity to backward classes of citizens in matters of  

public employment.  Similarly, in Indra Sawhney & Ors. v.   

Union of India & Ors. [1992 Supp (3) SCC 217], this Court  

following the majority  judgment  in  the case of  State of  

Kerala  &  Anr.  v.  N.M.  Thomas & Ors. (supra)  held  that  

clause (4) of Article 16 was not an exception to clause (1)  

of Article 16, but is an enabling provision to give effect to

Page 27

27

te  equality  of  opportunity  in  matters  of  public  

employment. These two authorities have also been cited  

by  K.G.  Balakrishnan,  CJ.,  in  his  judgment  in  Ashoka  

Kumar Thakur v. Union of India (supra) to hold that clause  

(5) of Article 15 of the Constitution is not an exception to  

clause (1) of Article 15, but may be taken as an enabling  

provision  to  carry  out  the  constitutional  mandate  of  

equality of opportunity.

18. We may now consider whether clause (5) of Article  

15  of  the  Constitution  has  destroyed  the  right  under  

Article  19(1)(g)  of  the  Constitution  to  establish  and  

administer  private educational  institutions.   It  is  for  the  

first  time  that  this  Court  held  in  T.M.A.  Pai  Foundation  

(supra)  that  the  establishment  and  running  of  an  

educational institution “is occupation” within the meaning  

of Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.   In paragraph 20 of  

the  majority  judgment,  while  dealing  with  the  four  

components of the rights under Articles 19 and 26(a) of  

the Constitution in respect of private unaided non-minority  

educational institutions, Kirpal, CJ. has held that education  

is  per  se regarded  as  an  activity  that  is  charitable  in

Page 28

28

nature.  Kirpal, CJ. has further held in paragraphs 53 and  

68:

“53. With regard to the core components  of the rights under Articles 19 and 26(a), it  must be held that while the State has the  right to prescribe qualifications necessary  for  admission,  private  unaided  colleges  have the right to admit  students of  their  choice, subject to an objective and rational  procedure of selection and the compliance  with conditions, if any, requiring admission  of  a  small  percentage  of  students  belonging to weaker sections of the society  by granting them freeships or scholarships,  if  not  granted  by  the  Government…………………..”

“68. It would be unfair to apply the same  rules and regulations regulating admission  to  both  aided  and  unaided  professional  institutions. It must be borne in mind that  unaided  professional  institutions  are  entitled  to  autonomy  in  their  administration  while,  at  the  same  time,  they do not forego or discard the principle  of merit. It would, therefore, be permissible  for  the  university  or  the  Government,  at  the time of granting recognition, to require  a private unaided institution to provide for  merit-based  selection  while,  at  the  same  time,  giving  the  management  sufficient  discretion in admitting students.  This can  be  done  through  various  methods.  For  instance, a certain percentage of the seats  can  be  reserved  for  admission  by  the  management  out  of  those  students  who  have  passed  the  common  entrance  test  held by itself or by the State/university and  have applied to the college concerned for  admission, while the rest of the seats may

Page 29

29

be filled up on the basis of counselling by  the State agency. This will incidentally take  care  of  poorer  and  backward  sections  of  the society. The prescription of percentage  for  this  purpose  has  to  be  done  by  the  Government according to the local needs  and different percentages can be fixed for  minority unaided and non-minority unaided  and  professional  colleges. The  same  principles  may  be  applied  to  other  non- professional  but  unaided  educational  institutions  viz.  graduation  and  postgraduation  non-professional  colleges  or institutes.

19. Thus, the content of the right under Article 19(1)(g) of  

the  Constitution  to  establish  and  administer  private  

educational  institutions,  as  per  the  judgment  of  this  

Court  in  T.M.A.  Pai  Foundation (supra),  includes  the  

right to admit students of their choice and autonomy of  

administration,  but  this  Court  has  made  it  clear  in  

T.M.A.  Pai  Foundation (supra)  that  this  right  and  

autonomy will not be affected if a small percentage of  

students belonging to weaker and backward sections  

of the society were granted freeships or scholarships, if  

not  granted  by  the  Government.   This  was  the  

charitable  element  of  the  right  to  establish  and  

administer  private  educational  institutions  under

Page 30

30

Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.  Hence, the identity  

of  the  right  of  private  educational  institutions  under  

Article  19(1)(g)  of  the Constitution as interpreted by  

this Court, was not to be destroyed by admissions from  

amongst educationally  and socially backward classes  

of  citizens  as  well  as  the  Scheduled Castes  and the  

Scheduled Tribes.  

20. In  P.A. Inamdar  (supra), this Court speaking through  

Lahoti,  CJ.,  was,  however,  of  the  view  that  the  

judgment  in  T.M.A.  Pai  Foundation (supra)  held  that  

there was no power vested on the State under clause  

(6) of Article 19 to regulate or control admissions in the  

unaided educational institutions so as to compel them  

to give up a share of the available seats to the State or  

to enforce reservation policy of the State on available  

seats in unaided professional institutions.  This will be  

clear  from  paragraph  125  of  the  judgment  in  P.A.  

Inamdar (supra), which is extracted hereinbelow:

“125. As per our understanding, neither in  the judgment of  Pai Foundation nor in the  Constitution  Bench  decision  in  Kerala  Education Bill which was approved by  Pai

Page 31

31

Foundation is there anything which would  allow  the  State  to  regulate  or  control  admissions  in  the  unaided  professional  educational  institutions  so  as  to  compel  them to give up a share of the available  seats  to  the  candidates  chosen  by  the  State, as if it was filling the seats available  to  be  filled  up  at  its  discretion  in  such  private institutions. This would amount to  nationalisation  of  seats  which  has  been  specifically disapproved in  Pai Foundation.  Such imposition of quota of State seats or  enforcing reservation policy of the State on  available  seats  in  unaided  professional  institutions  are  acts  constituting  serious  encroachment on the right and autonomy  of  private  professional  educational  institutions.  Such  appropriation  of  seats  can  also  not  be  held  to  be  a  regulatory  measure  in  the  interest  of  the  minority  within  the  meaning  of  Article  30(1)  or  a  reasonable restriction within the meaning  of Article 19(6) of the Constitution. Merely  because  the  resources  of  the  State  in  providing  professional  education  are  limited,  private  educational  institutions,  which intend to provide better professional  education, cannot be forced by the State  to make admissions available on the basis  of  reservation  policy  to  less  meritorious  candidates.  Unaided  institutions,  as  they  are not deriving any aid from State funds,  can  have  their  own  admissions  if  fair,  transparent, non-exploitative and based on  merit.

21.The reasoning adopted by this Court in  P.A. Inamdar  

(supra), therefore, is that the appropriation of seats by  

the State for enforcing a reservation policy was not a

Page 32

32

regulatory  measure  and  not  reasonable  restriction  

within the meaning of clause (6) of Article 19 of the  

Constitution.   As  there  was  no  provision  other  than  

clause (6) of Article 19 of the Constitution under which  

the State could in  any way restrict  the fundamental  

right  under  Article  19(1)(g)  of  the  Constitution,  

Parliament  made  the  Constitution  (Ninety-third  

Amendment) Act, 2005 to insert clause (5) in Article 15  

of  the Constitution to provide that  nothing in  Article  

19(1)(g)  of  the  Constitution  shall  prevent  the  State  

from  making  any  special  provision,  by  law,  for  the  

advancement  of  any  socially  and  educationally  

backward  classes  of  citizens  or  for  the  Scheduled  

Castes or the Scheduled Tribes in so far as such special  

provisions  relate  to  their  admission  to  educational  

institutions  including  private  educational  institutions,  

whether aided or unaided by the State.  Clause (5) in  

Article 15 of the Constitution, thus, vests a power on  

the  State,  independent  of  and  different  from,  the  

regulatory power under clause (6) of Article 19, and we  

have to examine whether this new power vested in the  

State which enables the State to force the charitable

Page 33

33

element on a private educational institution destroys  

the right under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.      

22.  According  to  Dr.  Dhavan,  the  right  of  a  private  

educational  institution  under  Article  19(1)(g)  of  the  

Constitution as laid down by this Court in  T.M.A. Pai  

Foundation (supra) has a voluntary element.  In fact,  

this  Court  in  P.A.  Inamdar  (supra) has  held  in  

paragraph 126  at  page  601  of  the  SCC  that  the  

observations in paragraph 68 of the judgment in T.M.A.  

Pai Foundation (supra) merely permit unaided private  

institutions  to  maintain  merit  as  the  criterion  of  

admission by voluntarily agreeing for seat-sharing with  

the  State  or  adopting  selection  based  on  common  

entrance  test  of  the  State  and  that  there  are  also  

observations  in  T.M.A.  Pai  Foundation (supra)  to say  

that they may frame their own policy to give freeships  

and scholarships  to  the  needy and poor  students  or  

adopt a policy in line with the reservation policy of the  

State to cater to the educational needs of the weaker  

and poorer  sections  of  the society.   In  our  view,  all  

freedoms under which Article 19(1) of the Constitution,

Page 34

34

including the freedom under Article 19(1)(g),  have a  

voluntary  element  but  this  voluntariness  in  all  the  

freedoms in  Article  19(1)  of  the Constitution  can  be  

subjected  to  reasonable  restrictions  imposed  by  the  

State by law under clauses (2) to (6) of Article 19 of the  

Constitution.  Hence, the voluntary nature of the right  

under  Article  19(1)(g)  of  the  Constitution  can  be  

subjected  to  reasonable  restrictions  imposed  by  the  

State  by  law  under  clause  (6)  of  Article  19  of  the  

Constitution.   As  this  Court  has  held  in  T.M.A.  Pai  

Foundation (supra) and P.A. Inamdar (supra) the State  

can  under  clause  (6)  of  Article  19  make  regulatory  

provisions  to  ensure  the  maintenance  of  proper  

academic  standards,  atmosphere  and  infrastructure  

(including  qualified  staff)  and  the  prevention  of  

maladministration  by  those  in  charge  of  the  

management.   However,  as  this  Court  held  in  the  

aforesaid two judgments that nominating students for  

admissions  would  be  an  unacceptable  restriction  in  

clause (6) of Article 19 of the Constitution, Parliament  

has stepped in and in exercise of its amending power  

under Article 368 of the Constitution inserted clause

Page 35

35

(5)  in  Article  15 to  enable the State to  make a  law  

making special provisions for admission of socially and  

educationally  backward classes of  citizens or  for  the  

Scheduled  Castes  and  Scheduled  Tribes  for  their  

advancement and to a very limited extent affected the  

voluntary element of this right under Article 19(1)(g) of  

the Constituion.  We, therefore, do not find any merit in  

the submission of learned counsel for the petitioners  

that  the  identity  of  the  right  of  unaided  private  

educational  institutions  under  Article  19(1)(g)  of  the  

Constitution has been destroyed by clause (5) of Article  

15 of the Constitution.  

23.We  may  now  examine  whether  the  Ninety-Third  

Amendment satisfies the width test.  A plain reading of  

clause (5) of Article 15 would show that the power of a  

State to make a law can only be exercised where it is  

necessary  for  advancement  of  socially  and  

educationally  backward classes of  citizens or  for  the  

Scheduled  Castes  and  Scheduled  Tribes  and  not  for  

any other purpose.  Thus, if a law is made by the State  

only to appease a class of citizen which is not socially

Page 36

36

or educationally backward or which is not a Scheduled  

Caste or Scheduled Tribe, such a law will  be beyond  

the powers of the State under clause (5) of Article 15  

of the Constitution.   A plain reading of clause (5) of  

Article  15  of  the  Constitution  will  further  show  that  

such  law  has  to  be  limited  to  making  a  special  

provision relating to admission to private educational  

institutions,  whether  aided or  unaided,  by the State.  

Hence, if the State makes a law which is not related to  

admission  in  educational  institutions  and  relates  to  

some other aspects affecting the autonomy and rights  

of  private educational  institutions  as  defined by  this  

Court in T.M.A. Pai Foundation, such a law would not be  

within the power of the State under clause (5) of Article  

15 of the Constitution.  In other words, power in clause  

(5) of Article 15 of the Constitution is a guided power  

to be exercised for the limited purposes stated in the  

clause and as and when a law is made by the State in  

purported exercise of  the power under  clause (5)  of  

Article 15 of the Constitution,  the Court will  have to  

examine and find out whether it is for the purposes of  

advancement  of  any  socially  and  educationally

Page 37

37

backward  classes  of  citizens  or  for  the  Scheduled  

Castes and the Scheduled Tribes and whether the law  

is  confined  to  admission  of  such  socially  and  

educationally  backward classes of  citizens or  for  the  

Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes to private  

educational institutions, whether aided or unaided, and  

if  the  Court  finds  that  the  power  has  not  been  

exercised for the purposes mentioned in clause (5) of  

Article 15 of the Constitution,  the Court will  have to  

declare the law as  ultra vires Article  19(1)(g)  of  the  

Constitution.  In our opinion, therefore, the width of the  

power vested on the State under clause (5) of Article  

15  of  the  Constitution  by  the  constitutional  

amendment is not such as to destroy the right under  

Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.

24.We may now examine the contention of Mr. Nariman  

that clause (5) of Article 15 of the Constitution fails to  

make  a  distinction  between  aided  and  unaided  

educational  institutions  and  treats  both  aided  and  

unaided  alike  in  the  matter  of  making  special  

provisions for admission of socially and educationally

Page 38

38

backward  classes  of  citizens  or  for  the  Scheduled  

Castes and Scheduled Tribes.  The distinction between  

a  private aided educational  institution and a  private  

unaided  educational  institution  is  that  private  

educational  institutions  receive  aid  from  the  State,  

whereas  private  unaided  educational  institutions  do  

not receive aid from the State.  As and when a law is  

made by the State under clause (5) of Article 15 of the  

Constitution, such a law would have to be examined  

whether it has taken into account the fact that private  

unaided educational institutions are not aided by the  

State and has made provisions in the law to ensure  

that  private  unaided  educational  institutions  are  

compensated for the admissions made in such private  

unaided educational institutions from amongst socially  

and educationally backward classes of citizens or the  

Scheduled Castes  and the Scheduled Tribes.   In  our  

view, therefore, a law made under clause (5) of Article  

15 of the Constitution by the State on the ground that  

it  treats  private  aided  educational  institutions  and  

private  unaided  educational  institutions  alike  is  not  

immune  from  a  challenge  under  Article  14  of  the

Page 39

39

Constitution.   Clause  (5)  of  Article  15  of  the  

Constitution only states that nothing in  Article 15 or  

Article 19(1)(g) will prevent the State to make a special  

provision,  by  law,  for  admission  of  socially  and  

educationally  backward classes of  citizens or  for  the  

Scheduled  Castes  and  the  Scheduled  Tribes  to  

educational  institutions  including  private  educational  

institutions,  whether  aided  or  unaided  by  the  State.  

Clause (5) of Article 15 of the Constitution does not say  

that  such  a  law  will  not  comply  with  the  other  

requirements of equality as provided in Article 14 of  

the Constitution.  Hence, we do not find any merit in  

the submission of the Mr. Nariman that clause (5) of  

Article 15 of the Constitution that insofar as it treats  

unaided  private  educational  institutions  and  aided  

private educational  institutions alike it  is  violative of  

Article 14 of the Constitution.

25.  We may now deal with the contention of Mr. Divan  

that  clause  (5)  of  Article  15  of  the  Constitution  is  

violative of Article 14 of the Constitution as it excludes  

from its purview the minority institutions referred to in

Page 40

40

clause  (1)  of  Article  30  of  the  Constitution  and  the  

contention of Mr. Nariman that clause (5) of Article 15  

excludes both unaided minority institutions and aided  

minority institutions alike and is thus violative of Article  

14 of the Constitution.  Articles 29(2) 30(1) and 30(2)  

of  the  Constitution,  which  are  relevant,  for  deciding  

these contentions, are quoted hereinbelow:

“29.  Protection  of  interests  of  minorities-(1) ………………………………….

(2) No citizen shall be denied admission  into  any  educational  institution  maintained by the State or receiving aid  out  of  State  funds  on  grounds  only  of  religion, race, caste, language or any of  them.

30. Right of minorities to establish  and  administer  educational  institutions-(1) All  minorities,  whether  based  on  religion  or  language,  shall  have  the  right  to  establish  and  administer  educational  institutions  of  their choice.

(1A) ………………………………………………

(2) The state shall not, in granting aid to  educational  institutions,  discriminate  against  any  educational  institution  on  the  ground  that  it  is  under  the  management  of  a  minority,  whether  based on religion or language.”

Page 44

44

Scheduled  Tribes.   Such  admissions  of  socially  and  

educationally  backward classes of  citizens or  for  the  

Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes who may  

belong  to  communities  other  than  the  minority  

community which has established the institution, may  

affect the right of the minority educational institutions  

referred  to  in  clause  (1)  of  Article  30  of  the  

Constitution.  In other words, the minority character of  

the  minority  educational  institutions  referred  to  in  

clause (1)  of  Article  30 of  the  Constitution,  whether  

aided or unaided,  may be affected by admissions of  

socially and educationally backward classes of citizens  

or the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes and  

it is for this reason that minority institutions, aided or  

unaided,  are kept outside the enabling power of the  

State  under  clause  (5)  of  Article  15  with  a  view  to  

protect the minority institutions from a law made by  

the  majority.   As  has been held  by the Constitution  

Bench of this Court in Ashoka Kumar Thakur v. Union  

of India (supra), the minority educational institutions,  

by themselves,  are a separate class and their  rights  

are protected under Article 30 of the Constitution, and,

Page 45

45

therefore,  the  exclusion  of  minority  educational  

institutions from Article 15(5) is not violative of Article  

14 of the Constitution.

27.  We may now consider the contention of Mr.  Divan  

that  clause  (5)  of  Article  15  of  the  Constitution  is  

violative of secularism insofar as it excludes religious  

minority institutions referred to in Article 30(1) of the  

Constitution from the purview of clause (5) of Article 15  

of the Constitution.  In Dr. M. Ismail Faruqui and Others  

v.  Union of  India  and Others  (supra),  this  Court  has  

held  that  the  Preamble  of  the  Constitution  read  in  

particular with Articles 15 to 28 emphasis this aspect  

and indicates that the concept of secularism embodied  

in the constitutional scheme is a creed adopted by the  

Indian people.  Hence, secularism is no doubt a basic  

feature of the Constitution,  but we fail  to appreciate  

how clause (5) of Article 15 of the Constitution which  

excludes religious minority institutions in clause (1) of  

Article 30 of the Constitution is in any way violative of  

the  concept  of  secularism.   On the  other  hand,  this  

Court has held in T.M.A. Pai Foundation (supra) that the

Page 46

46

essence of secularism in India is the recognition and  

preservation  of  the  different  types  of  people,  with  

diverse languages and different beliefs and Articles 29  

and 30 seek to preserve such differences and at the  

same time unite the people of India to form one strong  

nation. (see paragraph 161 of the majority judgment of  

Kirpal, C.J., in T.M.A. Pai Foundation at page 587 of the  

SCC).   In  our  considered  opinion,  therefore,  by  

excluding the minority institutions referred to in clause  

(1)  of  Article  30  of  the  Constitution,  the  secular  

character of India is maintained and not destroyed.

28. We may now come to the submission of Mr. Nariman  

that the fundamental right under Article 21 read with  

Article 51A(j) of the Constitution is violated by clause  

(5) of Article 15 of the Constitution.  According to Mr.  

Nariman, every person has a right under Article 21 and  

a duty under Article 51A(j) to strive towards excellence  

in all spheres of individual and collective activity, but  

this  will  not  be  possible  if  private  educational  

institutions in which a person studies for the purpose of  

achieving excellence are made to admit students from

Page 47

47

amongst  backward  classes  of  citizens  and  from the  

Scheduled  Castes  and  the  Scheduled  Tribes.   This  

contention, in our considered opinion, is not founded  

on the experience of educational institutions in India.  

Educational  institutions  in  India  such  as  Kendriya  

Vidyalayas,  Indian  Institute  of  Technology,  All  India  

Institute of Medical Sciences and Government Medical  

Colleges admit students in seats reserved for backward  

classes of citizens and for the Scheduled Castes and  

the  Scheduled  Tribes  and  yet  these  Government  

institutions  have  produced  excellent  students  who  

have  grown  up  to  be  good  administrators,  

academicians,  scientists,  engineers,  doctors  and  the  

like.  Moreover, the contention that excellence will be  

compromised  by  admission  from  amongst  the  

backward classes of citizens and the Scheduled Castes  

and  the  Scheduled  Tribes  in  private  educational  

institutions  is  contrary  to  the  Preamble  of  the  

Constitution  which promises  to  secure  to  all  citizens  

“fraternity  assuring the dignity  of  the  individual  and  

the unity and integrity of  the nation”.   The goals of  

fraternity, unity and integrity of the nation cannot be

Page 48

48

achieved unless the backward classes of citizens and  

the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes, who  

for historical factors, have not advanced are integrated  

into the main stream of the nation.   We, therefore,  

find no merit  in  the submission of  Mr.  Nariman that  

clause (5) of Article 15 of the Constitution violates the  

right under Article 21 of the Constitution.   

29.We  accordingly  hold  that  none  of  the  rights  under  

Articles 14, 19(1)(g) and 21 of the Constitution have  

been  abrogated  by  clause  (5)  of  Article  15  of  the  

Constitution  and  the  view  taken  by  Bhandari,  J.  in  

Ashoka Kumar Thakur v. Union of India (supra) that the  

imposition of reservation on unaided institutions by the  

Ninety-third  Amendment  has  abrogated  Article 19(1)

(g), a basic feature of the Constitution is not correct.  

Instead,  we  hold  that  the  (Ninety-third  Amendment)  

Act,  2005  of  the  Constitution  inserting  clause  (5)  of  

Article 15 of the Constitution is valid.

Validity of Article 21A of the Constitution

Contention  of  the  learned  counsel  for  the  

petitioners:

Page 49

49

30.The second substantial question of law which we are  

called upon to decide is  whether by inserting Article  

21A by the Constitution (Eighty-Sixth Amendment) Act,  

2002, the Parliament has altered the basic structure or  

framework of the Constitution.  Before we refer to the  

contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioners,  

we  must  reiterate  some  facts.   Article  21A  is  titled  

‘Right to Education’ and it provides that the State shall  

provide free and compulsory education to all children  

of the age of six to fourteen years in such manner as  

the State may,  by law,  determine.   Accordingly,  the  

2009 Act was enacted by Parliament to provide free  

and compulsory education to all children of the age of  

six to fourteen years.  The validity of the 2009 Act was  

challenged  and  considered  in  Society  for Unaided  

Private Schools of Rajasthan v. Union of India & Anr.  

(supra)  by  a  three-Judge  Bench  of  this  Court.   Two  

learned Judges S.H. Kapadia C.J. and Swatanter Kumar  

J. held that the 2009 Act is constitutionally valid and  

shall apply to the following:

Page 50

50

(i)  a  school  established,  owned  or  controlled  by  the  appropriate  Government or a local authority;

(ii)  an  aided  school  including  aided  minority  school(s)  receiving  aid  or  grants  to  meet  whole  or  part  of  its  expenses  from  the  appropriate  Government or the local authority;

(iii)  a  school  belonging  to  specified  category; and

(iv) an unaided non-minority school not  receiving  any  kind  of  aid  or  grants  to  meet its expenses from the appropriate  Government or the local authority.

The two learned Judges, however, held that the 2009 Act,  

in particular Sections 12(1)(c) and Section 18(3), infringe  

the  fundamental  rights  guaranteed  to  unaided  minority  

schools  under  Article  30(1)  of  the  Constitution  and  

therefore the 2009 Act  shall  not  apply to  such unaided  

minority  schools.   Differing  from  the  majority  opinion  

expressed  by  the  two  learned  Judges,  Radhakrishnan  J.  

held that Article 21A casts an obligation on the State and  

not on unaided non-minority and unaided minority schools  

to provide free and compulsory education to children of  

the  age  of  six  to  fourteen  years.   After  the  aforesaid  

judgment  of  this  Court  in  Society  for Unaided  Private

Page 51

51

Schools of Rajasthan v. Union of India & Anr. (supra), the  

2009 Act was amended by the  Right of Children to Free  

And  Compulsory  Education  Act,  2009  (Amendment  Act,  

2012)  and  by  the  amendment,  it  was  provided  in  sub-

section (4) of Section 1 of the 2009 Act that subject to the  

provisions of Articles 29 and 30 of the Constitution, the  

provisions of the 2009 Act shall  apply to conferment of  

rights on children to free and compulsory education.

31.Mr. Rohatgi, learned senior counsel for the petitioners  

in  Writ  Petition  (C)  No.416  of  2012,  submitted  that  

Article 21A of the Constitution creates obligation only  

upon the State and its instrumentalities as defined in  

Article 12 of the Constitution and does not cast any  

obligation on a private unaided educational institution.  

He  submitted  that  the  minority  opinion  of  

Radhakrishnan J. in Society for Unaided Private Schools  

of  Rajasthan  v.  Union  of  India  &  Anr.  (supra)  is,  

therefore, a correct interpretation of Article 21A.  He  

submitted that if Article 21A is interpreted to include  

the private unaided educational institutions within its  

sweep then it would abrogate the right under Article

Page 52

52

19(1)(g) of the Constitution to establish and administer  

private educational institutions which is a basic feature  

of the Constitution.  

32.Mr. Nariman, learned senior counsel for the petitioners  

in  Writ  Petition  (C)  No.128  of  2014,  submitted  that  

word “State”  used in  Article  21A of  the Constitution  

would mean the State as defined in Article 12 of the  

Constitution  and  therefore  would  include  the  

Government  and  Parliament  of  India  and  the  

Government and the Legislature of each of the States  

and all local or other authorities within the territory of  

India or under the control of the Government of India.  

He  submitted  that  this  Court  has  held  in  P.D.  

Shamdasani v. The Central Bank of India Ltd. (AIR 1952  

SC 1952) that the language and structure of Article 19  

and  its  setting  in  Part  III  of  the  Constitution  clearly  

show that  the  Article  was intended to  protect  those  

freedoms against State action only and hence violation  

of  rights of  property by individuals  is  not  within  the  

purview of Article 19 of the Constitution.  He submitted  

that this Court has also held in Smt. Vidya Verma v. Dr.

Page 53

53

Shiv  Narain  Verma (AIR  1956  SC  108)  that  the  

fundamental right of personal liberty under Article 21  

of the Constitution is available against only the State  

and not against private individuals.  He submitted that,  

therefore,  the  word  “State”  in  Article  21A  of  the  

Constitution  would  not  include  private  unaided  

educational institutions or private individuals.   

33.Mr.  Nariman  submitted  that  before  the  Constitution  

(Eighty-Sixth  Amendment)  Act,  2002,  Article  45  

provided  that  the  State  shall  endeavour  to  provide,  

within a period of ten years from the commencement  

of  the  Constitution,  “for”  free  and  compulsory  

education for all children until they complete the age  

of fourteen years.  He submitted that what Article 45  

therefore  meant  was  that  the  State  alone  shall  

endeavour  to  provide  “for”  free  and  compulsory  

education  to  all  children  upto  the  age  of  fourteen  

years.  He submitted that by the Constitution (Eighty-

Sixth Amendment) Act,  2002,  Article 45 was deleted  

and  in  its  place  Article  21A  was  inserted  in  the  

Constitution.  He submitted that in Article 21A of the

Page 54

54

Constitution, the word “for” is missing but this does not  

mean that the obligation of the State to fund free and  

compulsory education to all children upto the age of 14  

years  could  be  passed  on  by  the  State  to  private  

unaided  educational  institutions.   He  submitted  that  

Article 21A, if construed to mean that the State could  

by  law  pass  on  its  obligation  under  Article  21A  to  

provide free and compulsory education to all children  

upto  the  age  of  fourteen  years  to  private  unaided  

schools, Article 21A of the Constitution would abrogate  

the right of private educational schools under Article  

19(1)(g) of the Constitution as interpreted by this Court  

in T.M.A. Pai Foundation (supra).

34.Mr. Nariman submitted that the Objects and Reasons  

of the Bill which became the 2009 Act explicitly stated  

that  the  2009  Act  is  pursuant  to  Article  21A  of  the  

Constitution but did not make any reference to clause  

(5) of Article 15 of the Constitution.  He submitted that  

the  validity  of  the  provisions  of  the  2009  Act  will,  

therefore,  have  to  be  tested  only  by  reference  to  

Article 21A of the Constitution and not by reference to

Page 55

55

clause (5) of Article 15 of the Constitution.  According  

to both Mr. Rohatgi and Mr. Nariman, Section 12(1(c)  

of the 2009 Act insofar as it  provides that a private  

unaided school shall admit in Class I to the extent of at  

least 25% of the total strength of the class, children  

belonging to weaker sections and disadvantaged group  

in the neighborhood and provide free and compulsory  

education till its completion is violative of the right of  

private unaided schools under Article 19(1)(g) of the  

Constitution as interpreted by this Court in  T.M.A. Pai  

Foundation  (supra)  and  P.A.  Inamdar (supra).   They  

submitted that the majority opinion of the three-Judge  

Bench  in  Society  for Unaided  Private  Schools  of   

Rajasthan v. Union of India & Anr. (supra) is, therefore,  

not correct.

35. Mr. Ajmal Khan, learned senior counsel appearing for  

the  petitioners  in  Writ  Petition  (C)  No.1081  of  2013  

(Muslim Minority  Schools  Managers’  Association)  and  

Mr.  T.R.  Andhyarujina,  learned  senior  counsel  

appearing for intervener in Writ Petition (C) No.60 of  

2014 (La Martineire Schools) that under Article 30(1) of

Page 56

56

the  Constitution  all  minorities,  whether  based  on  

religion or language, shall have the right to establish  

and administer educational institutions of their choice.  

They submitted that the State while making the law to  

provide  free and compulsory education to all children  

of the age of six to fourteen years cannot be allowed to  

encroach on this right of the minority institutions under  

Article 30(1) of the Constitution.  They referred to the  

decisions  of  this  Court  right  from  the  Kerala  

Educational Bill case to the T.M.A. Pai case (supra) to  

argue that admitting children other than those of the  

minority community which establish the school cannot  

be forced upon the minority institutions, whether aided  

or  unaided.   They submitted that  2009 Act,  if  made  

applicable to minority schools,  aided or unaided, will  

be  ultra vires Article 30(1) of the Constitution.  They  

submitted that the majority judgment of this Court in  

Society  for Unaided  Private  Schools  of  Rajasthan  v.   

Union of India & Anr. (supra), has taken a view that the  

2009 Act will not apply to unaided minority schools but  

will apply to aided minority schools.   They submitted  

that  accordingly  sub-section  (4)  of  Section  1  of  the

Page 57

57

2009  Act  provides  that  subject  to  the  provisions  of  

articles 29 and 30 of the Constitution, the provisions of  

the Act shall apply to conferment of rights on children  

to  free  and  compulsory  education.   They  submitted  

that this sub-section (4) of Section 1 of the 2009 Act  

should be declared as  ultra vires Article 30(1) of the  

Constitution.

Submissions  of  learned  counsel  for  the  Union  of  

India:

36.In  reply,  Mr.  K.V.  Vishwanathan,  learned  Additional  

Solicitor  General,  submitted  that  the  Statement  of  

Objects and Reasons of the Bill, which was enacted as  

the Constitution (Eighty-Sixth Amendment) Act, 2002,  

stated  that  the  goal  set  out  in  Article  45  of  the  

Constitution  of  providing  free  and  compulsory  

education for children upto the age of 14 years could  

not be achieved even after 50 years of adoption of the  

provision and in order to fulfill this goal, it was felt that  

a new provision in the Constitution should be inserted  

as Article 21A providing that  the State shall  provide  

free and compulsory education to all  children of  the

Page 58

58

age of  six  to  fourteen years  in  such manner  as  the  

State may, by law, determine.  He submitted that in  

accordance  with  Article  21A  of  the  Constitution,  the  

2009 Act has been enacted which provides the manner  

in  which  such  free  and  compulsory  education  for  

children upto the age of 14 years shall be provided by  

the  State  and  it  provides  in  Section  12(1)(c)  that  

private  unaided  schools  shall  admit  in  Class  I  from  

amongst  weaker  sections  of  society  and  from  

disadvantaged groups at least twenty-five per cent of  

the  strength  of  the  class  and  provide  free  and  

compulsory education.

37. Mr. Vishwanathan submitted that private educational  

institutions cannot have any grievance in this regard  

because  they  are  performing  a  function  akin  to  the  

function of the State.  He submitted that applying the  

functional test private educational institutions are also  

State  within  the  meaning  of  Article  12  of  the  

Constitution  and,  therefore,  the  argument  of  Mr.  

Nariman  that  the  obligation  of  providing  free  and  

compulsory education to all children of the age of six

Page 59

59

to fourteen years cannot be passed on by the State to  

private educational institutions has no substance.  Mr.  

Vishwanathan submitted that in paragraph 53 of the  

judgment in  T.M.A.  Pai  Foundation (supra)  this Court  

has  held  that  while  private  unaided  educational  

institutions have the right to admit students of their  

choice,  admission of  a  small  percentage of  students  

belonging to weaker sections of the society by granting  

them freeships or scholarships, if not granted by the  

Government should also be done.  He submitted that in  

paragraph  68  of  T.M.A.  Pai  Foundation (supra),  this  

Court has also held that a small percentage of seats  

may  also  be  filled  up  to  take  care  of  poorer  and  

backward sections of the society.  He submitted that  

the 2009 Act, therefore, has provided in Section 12(1)

(c) that an unaided private school shall admit in Class I,  

to the extent of  at  least twenty-five per  cent of the  

strength  of  that  class,  children  belonging  to  weaker  

section and disadvantaged group in the neighbourhood  

and  provide  free  and  compulsory  elementary  

education till  its completion and this provision of the

Page 60

60

2009 Act, therefore, is not ultra vires Article 19(1)(g) of  

the Constitution.

38.Regarding  minority  institutions,  Mr.  Vishwanathan  

submitted that under Article 3)(1) of the Constitution  

they have equal status and accordingly this Court has  

held  in  Society  for Unaided  Private  Schools  of   

Rajasthan v. Union of India & Anr. (supra) the 2009 Act  

will not apply to unaided minority schools but will apply  

to  aided  minority  schools.   He  submitted  that  

accordingly the 2009 Act was amended by the Right of  

Children  to  Free  And  Compulsory  Education  

(Amendment)  Act,  2012,  so  as  to  provide  in  sub-

section (4) of Section 1 of the 2009 Act that subject to  

the provisions of Articles 29 and 30 of the Constitution,  

the  provisions  of  the  2009  Act  shall  apply  to  

conferment  of  rights  on  children  to  free  and  

compulsory education.

Opinion  of  the  Court  on  Article  21A  of  the  Constitution and on the validity of 2009 Act:

39. We  have  considered  the  submissions  of  learned  

counsel for the parties and we find that this is what it is

Page 61

61

stated in  the  Statement  of  Objects  and Reasons of  the  

Constitution  (Eighty-Third  Amendment)  Bill,  1997,  which  

ultimately was enacted as the Constitution (Eighty-Sixth  

Amendment) Act, 2002:

“The Constitution of India in a Directive  Principle  contained  in  article  45,  has  'made  a  provision  for  free  and  compulsory education for all children up  to the age of fourteen years within ten  years  of  promulgation  of  the  Constitution. We could not achieve this  goal even after 50 years of adoption of  this  provision.  The  task  of  providing  education  to  all  children  in  this  age  group  gained  momentum  after  the  National  Policy of  Education (NPE)  was  announced in 1986. The Government of  India,  in  partnership  with  the  State  Governments,  has  made  strenuous  efforts to fulfil this mandate and, though  significant  improvements  were  seen  in  various  educational  indicators,  the  ultimate goal of providing universal and  quality  education  still  remains  unfulfilled. In order to fulfil this goal, it is  felt that an explicit provision should be  made  in  the  Part  relating  to  Fundamental  Rights  of  the  Constitution.            2.  With a view to making right to free  and  compulsory  education  a  fundamental  right,  the  Constitution  (Eighty-third Amendment) Bill, 1997 was  introduced in Parliament to insert a new  article,  namely,  article 21 A conferring  on all children in the age group of 6 to  14  years  the  right  to  free  and

Page 62

62

compulsory education. The said Bill was  scrutinised  by  the  Parliamentary  Standing  Committee  on  Human  Resource Development and the subject  was also dealt with in its 165th Report  by the Law Commission of India.   3.  After  taking  into  consideration  the  report  of  the Law Commission of  India  and  the  recommendations  of  the  Standing Committee of  Parliament,  the  proposed amendments in Part III, Part IV  and  Part  IVA  of  the  Constitution  are  being made which are as follows:-   (a)  to  provide for  free and compulsory  education to children in the age group of  6  to  14  years  and  for  this  purpose,  a  legislation  would  be  introduced  in  Parliament  after  the  Constitution  (Ninety-third  Amendment)  Bill,  200l  is  enacted;   (b)  to  provide  in  article  45  of  the  Constitution  that  the  State  shall  endeavour  to  provide  early  childhood  care  and  education  to  children  below  the age of six years; and          

        (c)  to  amend  article  5lA  of  the  Constitution  with  a  view  to  providing  that  it  shall  be  the  obligation  of  the  parents  to  provide  opportunities  for  education to their children.                                               4.  The Bill  seeks to achieve the above  objects.     

       MURLI MANOHAR JOSHI.

NEW DELHI; The 16th November, 2001.”

Page 63

63

It will, thus, be clear from the Statement of Objects and  

Reasons  extracted  above  that  although  the  Directive  

Principle  in  Article  45  contemplated  that  the  State  will  

provide free and compulsory education for all children up  

to  the  age  of  fourteen  years  within  ten  years  of  

promulgation of the Constitution,  this goal  could not be  

achieved  even  after  50  years  and,  therefore,  a  

constitutional amendment was proposed to insert Article  

21A in Part III  of the Constitution.  Bearing in mind this  

object  of  the  Constitution  (Eight-Sixth  Amendment)  Act,  

2002 inserting Article 21A of the Constitution, we may now  

proceed to consider the submissions of learned counsel for  

the parties.

40. Article 21A of the Constitution, as we have noticed,  

states that  the State shall  provide free and compulsory  

education to all children of the age of six to fourteen years  

in such manner as the State may, by law, determine.  The  

word ‘State’ in Article 21A can only mean the ‘State’ which  

can make the law.  Hence, Mr. Rohatgi and Mr. Nariman  

are  right  in  their  submission  that  the  constitutional  

obligation under Article 21A of the Constitution is on the

Page 64

64

State  to  provide  free  and  compulsory  education  to  all  

children of the age of 6 to 14 years and not on private  

unaided  educational  institutions.   Article  21A,  however,  

states that the State shall by law determine the “manner”  

in which it will discharge its constitutional obligation under  

Article 21A.  Thus, a new power was vested in the State to  

enable the State to discharge this constitutional obligation  

by  making  a  law.   However,  Article  21A  has  to  be  

harmoniously construed with Article 19(1)(g) and Article  

30(1) of the Constitution. As has been held by this Court in  

Venkataramana Devaru v. State of Mysore (AIR 1958 SC  

255):

“The rule of construction is well settled  that  when  there  are  in  an  enactment  two  provisions  which  cannot  be  reconciled with each other, they should  be so interpreted that, if possible, effect  could be given to both.  This is what is  known  as  the  rule  of  harmonious  construction.”   

We do not find anything in Article 21A which conflicts with  

either the right of private unaided schools under Article  

19(1)(g)  or  the  right  of  minority  schools  under  Article  

30(1) of the Constitution, but the law made under Article

Page 65

65

21A may affect these rights under Articles 19(1)(g) and  

30(1).   The law made by the State to provide free and  

compulsory education to the children of the age of 6 to 14  

years should not, therefore, be such as to abrogate the  

right of unaided private educational schools under Article  

19(1)(g) of  the Constitution or the right  of the minority  

schools,  aided  or  unaided,  under  Article  30(1)  of  the  

Constitution.   

41.  While discussing the validity of clause (5) of Article  

15 of  the Constitution,  we have already noticed that  in  

paragraphs  53  and  68  of  the  judgment  in  T.M.A.  Pai  

Foundation (supra), this Court has held that admission of a  

small percentage of students belonging to weaker sections  

of the society by granting them freeships or scholarships,  

if  not granted by the Government and the admission to  

some of the  seats to take care of poorer and backward  

sections of the society may be permissible and would not  

be inconsistent with the rights under Articles 19(1)(g) of  

the Constitution.  In  P.A. Inamdar (supra),  however,  this  

Court  explained  that  there  was  nothing  in  this  Court’s  

judgment in T.M.A. Pai Foundation (supra) to say that such

Page 66

66

admission  of  students  from amongst  weaker,  backward  

and  poorer  sections  of  the  society  in  private  unaided  

institutions can be done by the State because the power  

vested  on  the  State  in  clause  (6)  of  Article  19  of  the  

Constitution is to make only regulatory provisions and this  

power could not be used by the State to force admissions  

from amongst weaker,  backward and poorer sections of  

the  society  on  private  unaided  educational  institutions.  

While discussing the validity of clause (5) of Article 15, we  

have also held that there is an element of voluntariness of  

all  the freedoms under Article 19(1) of the Constitution,  

but the voluntariness in these freedoms can be subjected  

to law made under the powers available to the State under  

clause (2) to (6) of Article 19 of the Constitution.

42. In  our  considered  opinion,  therefore,  by  the  

Constitution (Eighty-Sixth Amendment) Act, a new power  

was made available to the State under Article 21A of the  

Constitution  to  make  a  law  determining  the  manner  in  

which it will provide free and compulsory education to the  

children of the age of six to fourteen years as this goal  

contemplated  in  the  Directive  Principles  in  Article  45

Page 67

67

before  this  constitutional  amendment  could  not  be  

achieved for fifty years.  This additional power vested by  

the  Constitution  (Eighty-Sixth  Amendment)  Act,  2002 in  

the State is independent and different from the power of  

the State under clause (6) of Article 19 of the Constitution  

and  has  affected  the  voluntariness  of  the  right  under  

Article  19(1)(g)  of  the  Constitution.   By  exercising  this  

additional power, the State can by law impose admissions  

on private unaided schools and so long as the law made  

by the State in exercise of this power under Article 21A of  

the Constitution is for the purpose of providing free and  

compulsory education to the children of the age of 6 to 14  

years and so long as such law forces admission of children  

of poorer, weaker and backward sections of the society to  

a  small  percentage  of  the  seats  in  private  educational  

institutions to achieve the constitutional goals of equality  

of opportunity and social justice set out in the Preamble of  

the Constitution, such a law would not be destructive of  

the right  of  the private unaided educational  institutions  

under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.

Page 68

68

43. To give an idea of the goals Parliament intended to  

achieve by enacting the 2009 Act, we extract paragraphs  

4, 5 and 6 of the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the  

Bill which was enacted as the 2009 Act hereinbelow:

“4. The proposed legislation is anchored  in the belief that the values of equality,  social  justice  and  democracy  and  the  creation  of  a  just  and humane society  can be achieved only through provision  of inclusive elementary education to all.  Provision  of  free  and  compulsory  education  of  satisfactory  quality  to  children  from  disadvantaged  and  weaker  sections  is,  therefore,  not  merely the responsibility of schools run  or  supported  by  the  appropriate  Governments, but also of schools which  are  not  dependent  on  Government  funds.

5.  It  is,  therefore,  expedient  and  necessary to enact a suitable legislation  as  envisaged  in  Article  21A  of  the  Constitution.

6.  The  Bill  seeks  to  achieve  this  objective.”

It will be clear from the aforesaid extract that the 2009 Act  

intended to achieve the constitutional goal of equality of  

opportunity through inclusive elementary education to all  

and  also  intended  that  private  schools  which  did  not  

receive government aid should also take the responsibility

Page 69

69

of providing free and compulsory education of satisfactory  

quality  to  children  from  disadvantaged  and  weaker  

sections.

44. When we examine the 2009 Act, we find that under  

Section 12(1)(c) read with Section 2(n)(iv) of the Act, an  

unaided school not receiving any kind of aid or grants to  

meet  its  expenses from the appropriate Government or  

the local authority is required to admit in class I, to the  

extent of at least twenty-five per cent of the strength of  

that  class,  children  belonging  to  weaker  section  and  

disadvantaged group in  the  neighbourhood and provide  

free  and  compulsory  elementary  education  till  its  

completion.   We further find that under Section 12(2) of  

the  2009  Act  such  a  school  shall  be  reimbursed  

expenditure so incurred by it  to the extent of per-child-

expenditure incurred by the State, or the actual amount  

charged from the child, whichever is less, in such manner  

as  may be prescribed.   Thus,  ultimately  it  is  the  State  

which  is  funding  the  expenses  of  free  and  compulsory  

education  of  the  children  belonging  to  weaker  sections  

and  several  groups  in  the  neighbourhood,  which  are

Page 70

70

admitted to a private unaided school.  These provisions of  

the 2009 Act, in our view, are for the purpose of providing  

free and compulsory  education to children between the  

age group of 6 to 14 years and are consistent with the  

right  under  Article  19(1)(g)  of  the  Constitution,  as  

interpreted by this Court in T.M.A. Pai Foundation (supra)  

and  are  meant  to  achieve  the  constitutional  goals  of  

equality  of  opportunity  in  elementary  education  to  

children of weaker sections and disadvantaged groups in  

our society.  We, therefore, do not find any merit in the  

submissions made on behalf  of the non-minority private  

schools that Article 21A of the Constitution and the 2009  

Act  violate  their  right  under  Article  19(1)(g)  of  the  

Constitution.

45. Under Article 30(1) of the Constitution, all minorities,  

whether  based  on  religion  or  language,  shall  have  the  

right to establish and administer educational institutions  

of  their  choice.   Religious  and  linguistic  minorities,  

therefore, have a special constitutional right to establish  

and administer educational schools of their choice and this  

Court has repeatedly held that the State has no power to

Page 71

71

interfere  with  the  administration  of  minority  institutions  

and can make only regulatory measures and has no power  

to force admission of students from amongst non-minority  

communities,  particularly  in  minority  schools,  so  as  to  

affect the minority character of the institutions.  Moreover,  

in Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru v. State of Kerala   

& Anr.  (supra) Sikri, CJ., has even gone to the extent of  

saying that Parliament cannot in exercise of its amending  

power  abrogate  the  rights  of  minorities.   To  quote  the  

observations  of  Sikri,  CJ.  in  Kesavananda  Bharati   

Sripadagalvaru v. State of Kerala & Anr. (supra):

“178. The  above  brief  summary  of  the  work of  the Advisory  Committee and the  Minorities  Sub-committee  shows  that  no  one  ever  contemplated  that  fundamental  rights appertaining to the minorities would  be  liable  to  be  abrogated  by  an  amendment of the Constitution. The same  is  true  about  the  proceedings  in  the  Constituent  Assembly.  There  is  no  hint  anywhere  that  abrogation  of  minorities’  rights was ever in the contemplation of the  important  members  of  the  Constituent  Assembly.  It  seems  to  me  that  in  the  context of the British plan, the setting up  of Minorities Sub-committee, the Advisory  Committee  and the proceedings of  these  Committees, as well as the proceedings in  the  Constituent  Assembly  mentioned  above,  it  is  impossible  to  read  the  expression  “Amendment  of  the

Page 72

72

Constitution” as empowering Parliament to  abrogate the rights of minorities.”

Thus,  the  power  under  Article  21A  of  the  Constitution  

vesting  in  the  State  cannot  extend  to  making  any  law  

which will abrogate the right of the minorities to establish  

and administer schools of their choice.   

46. When we look at the 2009 Act, we find that Section  

12(1)(b) read with Section 2(n) (iii) provides that an aided  

school  receiving  aid  and  grants,  whole  or  part,  of  its  

expenses from the appropriate Government or the local  

authority has to provide free and compulsory education to  

such proportion of children admitted therein as its annual  

recurring  aid  or  grants  so  received  bears  to  its  annual  

recurring expenses, subject to a minimum of twenty-five  

per cent.   Thus,  a minority aided school  is  put under a  

legal  obligation  to  provide  free  and  compulsory  

elementary  education  to  children  who  need  not  be  

children of members of the minority community which has  

established the school.  We also find that under Section  

12(1)(c)  read with Section 2(n)(iv), an unaided school has  

to admit into twenty-five per cent of the strength of class I

Page 73

73

children belonging to weaker sections and disadvantaged  

groups in  the neighbourhood.   Hence,  unaided minority  

schools  will  have  a  legal  obligation  to  admit  children  

belonging to weaker sections and disadvantaged groups in  

the  neighbourhood  who  need  not  be  children  of  the  

members  of  the  minority  community  which  has  

established the school.   While discussing the validity  of  

clause (5) of Article 15 of the Constitution, we have held  

that  members  of  communities  other  than  the  minority  

community  which  has  established the  school  cannot  be  

forced  upon  a  minority  institution  because  that  may  

destroy the minority character of the school. In our view, if  

the 2009 Act is made applicable to minority schools, aided  

or unaided, the right of the minorities under Article 30(1)  

of the Constitution will be abrogated. Therefore, the 2009  

Act  insofar  it  is  made  applicable  to  minority  schools  

referred in clause (1) of Article 30 of the Constitution is  

ultra vires the Constitution.  We are thus of the view that  

the majority judgment of this Court in Society for Unaided  

Private  Schools  of  Rajasthan  v.  Union  of  India  &  Anr.  

(supra) insofar as it holds that the 2009 Act is applicable  

to aided minority schools is not correct.

Page 74

74

47. In the result, we hold that the Constitution (Ninety-

third Amendment) Act, 2005 inserting clause (5) of Article  

15 of the Constitution and the Constitution (Eighty-Sixth  

Amendment)  Act,  2002  inserting  Article  21A  of  the  

Constitution do not alter the basic structure or framework  

of the Constitution and are constitutionally valid.  We also  

hold that the 2009 Act is not ultra vires Article 19(1)(g) of  

the  Constitution.  We,  however,  hold  that  the  2009  Act  

insofar as it applies to minority schools, aided or unaided,  

covered under clause (1) of Article 30 of the Constitution  

is  ultra vires the Constitution.  Accordingly, Writ Petition  

(C)  No.1081 of  2013  filed  on  behalf  of  Muslim Minority  

Schools Managers’ Association is allowed and Writ Petition  

(C) Nos.416 of 2012, 152 of 2013, 60 of 2014, 95 of 2014,  

106 of 2014, 128 of 2014, 144 of 2014, 145 of 2014, 160  

of 2014 and 136 of 2014 filed on behalf of non-minority  

private unaided educational institutions are dismissed.  All  

I.As. stand disposed of.  The parties, however, shall bear  

their own costs.

                                     .....……………..……………………CJI.                                  (R.M. Lodha)

Page 75

75

                              .....……………..……………………….J.                                  (A. K. Patnaik)

                              .....……………..……………………….J.                                  (Sudhansu Jyoti Mukhopadhaya)

                                          .....……………..……………………….J.

                                (Dipak Misra)                                                   …....…………..

………………………..J.                          (Fakkir Mohamed Ibrahim Kalifulla) New Delhi, May 06, 2014.