15 September 1970
Supreme Court
Download

PRAKASH CHAND AGARWAL & ORS. Vs M/S. HINDUSTAN STEEL LTD.


1

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 2  

PETITIONER: PRAKASH CHAND AGARWAL & ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: M/S.  HINDUSTAN STEEL LTD.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 15/09/1970

BENCH: HIDAYATULLAH, M. (CJ) BENCH: HIDAYATULLAH, M. (CJ) MITTER, G.K. RAY, A.N.

CITATION:  1971 AIR 2319            1971 SCR  (2) 405

ACT: Constitution of India.  Art. 133-Grant of certificate, in  a live suit-Whether competent.

HEADNOTE: The  High Court granted certificate for leave to  appeal  to this Court in a case where it set aside the ex-parte  decree in  the  suit and restored the suit to the Me of  the  trial court. HELD:  The  certificate  granted  by  the  High  Court   was premature and was not competent. As a result of the setting aside of the decree the suit  was very  much  alive, and it could not be treated  as  a  final adjudication   of   the  suit   itself.   The   Constitution contemplates  the  filing of an appeal by  certificate  only against a judgment, decree of final order of the High Court. It  does not contemplate bringing an appeal in a suit  which is still a live suit and in which further proceedings are to be taken. [405 H] Ramesh  &  Anr.  v. Gendalal Motilal Ratni  &  Ors.   A.I.R. [1966] S.C. 1445, V. M. Abdul Rahman & Ors. v. D. K.  Cassim JUDGMENT: Sons  v.  The State of Uttar Pradesh, [1961] 3  S.C.R.  754, referred to.

& CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: C.M.P. No. 2351 of 1970. (Application for stay by notice of motion) and Civil  Appeal No. 1196 of 1970. Appeal from the judgment and order dated October 29, 1969 of the Orissa High Court in Misc.  Appeal No. 28 of 1967. R. K. Agarwal, for the appellants. Santosh Chatterjee and G. S. Chatterjee, for the respondent. The Order-of the Court was delivered by Hidayatullah, CJ.  The appellants before us who come by  way of certificate from the High Court seek stay of a suit which has  been restored to file by the High Court.  At  the  very start we put to the counsel how certificate could have  been

2

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 2  

granted in this case when the judgment and order of the High Court  were not final.  The counsel brought to  our  notice the case of Ramesh and another v. Gendalal Motilal Ratni and others(1) and says that his, case is covered by this ruling. This was a case in which the only question to be  considered was  whether Art. 133 of the Constitution was applicable  in the  two case-, decided when the claim in the original  suit or  appeal  to  this Court was  above  Rs.  20,000/-.   This particular  question  was  not  before  the  court  at  all. Indeed,  them  Constitution contemplates the  filing  of  an appeal by certificate only (1)  A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1445. 406 against  a judgment decree or final order of the High  Court it does not contemplate bringing an appeal in a suit  which is still a live suit and in which further proceedings are to be  taken.   This has been the consistent view not  only  of this Court but also of the Privy Council.  ’Me leading  case from  the Privy Council is V. M. Abdul Rahman and others  v. V. D. K. Cassim and Sons and another(1).  There is a  catena of cases in the High Courts and also in this Court that  the judgment,  decree or order from which appeal is  brought  to this  Court  must put an end to the litigation  between  the parties.  This was reaffirmed in M/s.  Jethanand and Sons v. The  State of Uttar Pradesh (2 ) approving the view  of  the Privy  Council referred to.  Indeed, we could cite  on  this aspect  of the case quite a large number of precedents  from various  courts in India.  In the present matter,  the  suit was  decreed in the absence of the defendant who applied  to have  the  decree set aside and gave reasons  for  it.   The trial court did not accede to the prayer but the High  Court held  that the matter was governed by O. 9 r. 9 of the  Code of  Civil  Procedure and that there were valid  reasons  for setting  aside  the  ex-parte decree.  As a  result  of  the setting  aside  of the decree the suit is very  much-  alive today and this cannot be treated as a final adjudication  of the suit itself.  The certificate granted by the High  Court in  such circumstances was premature and was not  competent. We  accordingly  set aside the certificate and  dismiss  the appeal.  There shall be no order as to costs. Y.P.                        Appeal dismissed. (1) (1933) L. R. 60 I.A. 76. (2) (1961) 3 S. C. R. 754. 40 7