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Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.169 OF 2014

(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No.1221 of 2012)

Perumal …Appellant

Versus

Janaki …Respondent

J U D G M E N T

Chelameswar, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. Aggrieved by an order in Crl. R.C. No.1119 of 2011 of  

the  High  Court  of  Madras,  the  unsuccessful  petitioner  

therein preferred the instant appeal.

3.   A  petition  in  C.M.P.  No.4561  of  2010  (private  

complaint)  under  section  200  of  the  Code  of  Criminal  

Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter for short referred to as “the  

Cr.P.C.”)  filed  by  the  appellant  herein  against  the  

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respondent  came  to  be  dismissed  by  the  Judicial  

Magistrate  No.2  at  Pollachi  by  his  judgment  dated  31st  

August 2010.  Challenging the same, the abovementioned  

Crl. R.C. was filed.  

4. The factual background of the case is as follows:

5. The respondent was working as a Sub-Inspector in an  

All-Women Police Station, Pollachi at the relevant point of  

time.   On  18th May  2008,  one  Nagal  reported  to  the  

respondent  that  the  appellant  herein  had  cheated  her.  

The respondent registered Crime No.18/08 under sections  

417 and 506(i) of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter for  

short  referred  to  as  “the  IPC”).    Eventually,  the  

respondent  filed a  charge-sheet,  the relevant portion of  

which reads as follows:

“On 26.12.07, that the accused called upon the de-facto  complainant for an outing and while going in the night  at  around  10.00  via  Vadugapalayam  Ittori  route  the  accused enticed the de-facto complainant of marrying  her  and  had  sexual  interaction  several  times  in  the  nearby  jungle  and  on  account  of  which  the  complainant became pregnant and when she asked  the  accused  to  marry  him  he  threatened  the  complainant  of  killing  her  if  she  disclosed  the  above  fact to anybody.  

Hence  the  accused  committed  an  offence  punishable  u/s. 417, 506 (i) of IPC.”

[emphasis supplied]

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6. The appellant was tried for the offences mentioned  

above  by  the  learned  Judicial  Magistrate  No.1,  Pollachi.  

The learned Judicial Magistrate by his judgment dated 15th  

March 2010 acquitted the appellant of both the charges.

7. It appears that the said judgment has become final.

8. In  the  light  of  the  acquittal,  the  appellant  filed  a  

complaint (C.M.P. No.4561 of 2010) under section 190 of  

the Cr.P.C. on the file of the Judicial  Magistrate No.2 at  

Pollachi  praying  that  the  respondent  be  tried  for  an  

offence under section 193 of the IPC.  The said complaint  

came to be dismissed by an order dated 31st August 2010  

on the ground that in view of sections 195 and 340 of the  

Cr.P.C.  the  complaint  of  the  appellant  herein  is  not  

maintainable.  

9. Aggrieved by the said dismissal, the appellant herein  

unsuccessfully  carried  the  matter  to  the  High  Court.  

Hence the present appeal.  

10. The case of the appellant herein in his complaint is  

that though Nagal alleged an offence of cheating against  

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the appellant which led to the pregnancy of Nagal, such an  

offence was not proved against him.  Upon the registration  

of  Crime  No.18/08,  Nagal  was  subjected  to  medical  

examination.  She  was  not  found  to  be  pregnant.   Dr.  

Geetha,  who examined  Nagal,  categorically  opined  that  

Nagal  was  not  found  to  be  pregnant  on  the  date  of  

examination  which  took  place  six  days  after  the  

registration of the  FIR.  In  spite  of the definite  medical  

opinion  that  Nagal  was  not  pregnant,  the  respondent  

chose to file a charge-sheet with an allegation that Nagal  

became pregnant.  Therefore, according to the appellant,  

the  charge-sheet  was  filed  with  a  deliberate  false  

statement  by  the  respondent  herein.   The  appellant,  

therefore, prayed in his complaint as follows;

“It  is,  therefore,  prayed  that  this  Hon’ble  Court  may be pleased to take this complaint on file, try  the accused U/s.  193 IPC for  deliberately  giving  false  evidence  in  the  Court  as  against  the  complainant,  and  punish  the  accused  and  pass  such further or other orders as this Hon’ble court  deems fit and proper.”

11. The learned Magistrate dismissed the complaint on  

the ground that section 195 of the Cr.P.C. bars criminal  

courts to take cognizance of an offence under section 193  

of the IPC except on the complaint in writing of that Court  

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or an officer of that Court in relation to any proceeding in  

the Court where the offence under section 193 is said to  

have been committed and a private complaint such as the  

one on hand is not maintainable.  

12. The High Court declined to interfere with the matter  

in  exercise  of  its  revisional  jurisdiction.   The  operative  

portion of the order under challenge reads as follows:

“3. …  This  court  is  in  agreement  with  the  conclusion  of  the  court  below  in  dismissing  the  complaint.   The  complaint  provided  very  little  to  take  action  upon,  particularly,  where  this  court  finds that the respondent had not in any manner  tampered with the medical record so as to mulct  the petitioner with criminal liability.  The wording in  the  final  report  informing  of  the  de  facto  complainant having been pregnant can in the facts  and circumstances of the case, be seen only as a  mistake.

4. In  the  result,  the  criminal  revision  stands  dismissed.”

13. We regret to place on record that at every stage of  

this matter the inquiry was misdirected.   

14. The facts relevant for the issue on hand are that:-  

(1) The  appellant  was  prosecuted  for  the  

offences  under  sections  417  and  506  (i)  IPC.  

(The  factual  allegations  forming  the  basis  of  

such a prosecution are already noted earlier).

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(2) The respondent  filed a  charge-sheet  with  

an assertion that the appellant was responsible  

for pregnancy of Nagal.   

(3) Even before the filing of the charge-sheet,  

a definite medical opinion was available to the  

respondent  (secured  during  the  course  of  the  

investigation of the offence alleged against the  

appellant)  to  the  effect  that  Nagal  was  not  

pregnant.

 (4) Still the respondent chose to assert in the  

charge-sheet that Nagal was pregnant.   

(5) The prosecution against the appellant ended  

in acquittal.

15. The  abovementioned  indisputable  facts,  in  our  

opinion,  prima facie may not constitute an offence under  

section  193  IPC  but  may  constitute  an  offence  under  

section 211 IPC.  We say  prima facie only for the reason  

this aspect has not been examined at any stage in the  

case nor any submission is made before us on either side  

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but we cannot help taking notice of the basic facts and the  

legal position.

16. The offence under section 1931 IPC is an act of giving  

false evidence or fabricating false evidence in a judicial  

proceeding.  The act of giving false evidence is defined  

under section 191 IPC as follows:

“191.  Giving  false  evidence.—  Whoever,  being  legally  bound by an oath  or  by  an express  provision  of  law to  state  the  truth,  or  being  bound  by  law  to  make  a  declaration upon any subject, makes any statement which  is false, and which he either knows or believes to be false  or  does  not  believe  to  be  true,  is  said  to  give  false  evidence.

Explanation 1.—A statement is within the meaning of  this section, whether it is made verbally or otherwise.

Explanation 2.—A false statement as to the belief of  the person attesting is within the meaning of this section,  and a person may be guilty  of  giving false evidence by  stating that he believes a thing which he does not believe,  as well as by stating that he knows a thing which he does  not know.”

It can be seen from the definition that to constitute an act  

of giving false evidence, a person must make a statement  1 Section  193. Punishment for false evidence.—Whoever intentionally gives false  evidence in any stage of a judicial proceeding, or fabricates false evidence for  the  purpose  of  being  used  in  any  stage  of  a  judicial  proceeding,  shall  be  punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extended  to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine,

and whoever intentionally gives or fabricates false evidence in any other  case, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which   may extended to three years, and shall also be liable to fine.

Explanation 1.—A trial before a Court-martial; is a judicial proceeding.

Explanation  2.—An  investigation  directed  by  law  preliminary  to  a  proceeding before a Court of Justice, is a stage of a judicial proceeding, though  that investigation may not take place before a Court of Justice.

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which  is  either  false  to  the  knowledge  or  belief  of  the  

maker or which the maker does not believe to be true.  

Further, it  requires that such a statement is made by a  

person  (1)  who is  legally  bound  by  an  oath;  (2)  by  an  

express provision of law to state the truth;  or (3)  being  

bound by law to make a declaration upon any subject.   

17. A police officer filing a charge-sheet does not make  

any  statement  on  oath  nor  is  bound  by  any  express  

provision of law to state the truth though in our opinion  

being  a  public  servant  is  obliged  to  act  in  good  faith.  

Whether  the  statement  made by the  police officer  in  a  

charge-sheet amounts to a declaration upon any subject  

within the meaning of the clause “being bound by law to  

make  a  declaration  upon  any  subject”  occurring  under  

section 191 of the IPC is a question which requires further  

examination.

18. On the other hand, section 211 of the IPC deals with  

an offence of instituting or causing to be instituted any  

criminal  proceeding  or  falsely  charging  any  person  of  

having committed an offence even when there is no just or  

lawful ground for such proceeding to the knowledge of the  

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person instituting or causing the institution of the criminal  

proceedings.

19. Irrespective of the fact whether the offence disclosed  

by  the  complaint  of  the  appellant  herein  is  an  offence  

falling either under section 193 or 211 of the IPC, section  

195  of  the  Cr.P.C.  declares  that  no  Court  shall  take  

cognizance of either of the abovementioned two offences  

except in the manner specified under section 195 of the  

Cr.P.C.:

“195.  Prosecution  for  contempt  of  lawful  authority  of  public servants, for offences against public justice and for  offences  relating  to  documents  given  in  evidence.—(1)  No Court shall take cognizance—

x x x x x

(b) (i) of  any  offence  punishable  under  any  of  the  following sections of the Indian Penal Code (45 of  1860),  namely,  sections  193  to  196  (both  inclusive),  199,  200,  205  to  211  (both  inclusive)  and  228,  when  such  offence  is  alleged  to  have  been  committed  in,  or  in  relation  to,  any  proceeding in any Court, or

except  on the complaint  in writing  of  that  Court  or  by  such officer of the Court as that Court may authorise in  writing in this behalf,  or  of  some other  Court  to which  that court is subordinate.”

20. In the light of the language of section 195 Cr.P.C. we  

do  not  find  fault  with  the  conclusion  of  the  learned  

Magistrate  in  dismissing  the  complaint  of  the  appellant  

herein for the reason that the complaint is not filed by the  

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person contemplated under section 195 Cr.P.C.  It may be  

mentioned here that as a matter of fact the Court before  

which the instant complaint was lodged is not the same  

Court before which the appellant herein was prosecuted  

by the respondent.  

21. Under section 340(1)  of the Cr.P.C., it  is  stipulated  

that  whenever  it  appears  that  any  one of  the  offences  

mentioned in clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 195  

appears  to  have  been  committed  in  or  in  relation to  a  

proceeding  before  a  Court,  that  Court  either  on  an  

application made to it  or otherwise make a complaint  

thereof  in  writing  to  the  competent  Magistrate  after  

following the procedure mentioned under section 340 of  

the Cr.P.C.2 2 Section 340. Procedure in cases mentioned in section 195.—(1) When upon an  application made to it in this behalf or otherwise, any Court is of opinion that it is  expedient  in the interests of  justice that an  inquiry  should  be  made  into  any  offence referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 195, which appears  to have been committed in or in relation to a proceeding in that Court or, as the   case  may  be,  in  respect  of  a  document  produced  or  given  in  evidence  in  a  proceeding in that court, such Court may, after such preliminary inquiry, if any,   as it thinks necessary,-

(a) record a finding to that effect; (b) make a complaint thereof in writing; (c) send it to a Magistrate of the first class having jurisdiction; (d) take sufficient security for the appearance for the accused before  such Magistrate, or if the alleged offence is non-bailable and the Court  thinks  it  necessary  so  to  do,  send  the  accused  in  custody  to  such  Magistrate; and (e) bind  over  any  person  to appear  and  give  evidence  before  such  

Magistrate.

(2) The  power  conferred  on  a  Court  by  sub-section  (1)  in  respect of an offence may, in any case where that Court has neither made a  complaint  under  sub-section  (1)  in  respect  of  that  offence  nor  rejected  an  

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22. Admittedly,  the  appellant  herein  did  not  make  an  

application to the judicial magistrate No.1, Pollachi under  

section 340 to ‘make a complaint’ against the respondent  

herein  nor  the  said  magistrate  suo  moto made  a  

complaint.  Therefore, the learned judicial magistrate No.2  

before  whom  the  private  complaint  is  made  by  the  

appellant had no option but to dismiss the complaint.

23. But  the  High  Court,  in  our  view,  is  not  justified  in  

confining itself  to the examination of the correctness of  

the  order  of  the  magistrate  dismissing  the  said  private  

complaint.  Both Section 195(1) and Section 340(2) Cr.P.C.  

authorise  the  exercise  of  the  power  conferred  under  

Section 195(1) by any other court to which the court in  

respect of which the offence is committed is subordinate  

application for the making of such complaint, be exercised by the Court to which  such former Court is subordinate within the meaning of sub-section (4) of section   195.

(3) A complaint made under this section shall be signed.—

(a) where the Court making the complaint is a High Court, by  such officer of the Court as the Court may appoint;

(b) in any other case, by the presiding officer of the Court or by  such officer of the Court as the Court may authorise in writing in  this behalf.

(4) In this section, “Court” has the same meaning as in section  195.”

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to. (hereinafter referred to for the sake of convenience as  

‘the original court’)

24. It can be seen from the language of Section 195(4),  

Cr.P.C. that it creates a legal fiction whereby it is declared  

that the original court is subordinate to that court to which  

appeals ordinarily lie from the judgments or orders of the  

original  court.  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  ‘the  appellate  

court’)  In our view, such a fiction must be understood in  

the context of Article 2273 of the Constitution of India and  

Section 10(1) and 15(1) of Cr.P.C4. Article 227 confers the  

power of superintendence on a High Court over all courts  

and tribunals functioning within the territories in relation  

to which a High Court exercises jurisdiction. Section 10(1)  

3  227.  Power of superintendence over all courts by the High Court – (1) Every High Court shall  have superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it  exercises jurisdiction;

(2)  Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing provisions, the High Court may-       (a)  call for returns from such courts;      (b)  make and issue general rules and prescribe forms for regulating the practice and  

proceedings of such courts; and        (c)  prescribe forms in which books, entries and accounts shall be kept by the officers of  

any such courts. (3)  The High Court may also settle tables of fees to be allowed to the sheriff and all clerks  

and officers of such courts and to attorneys, advocates and pleaders practicing therein;        Provided that any rules made, forms prescribed or tables settled under clause (2) or  

clause (3) shall not be inconsistent with the provision of any law for the time being in force, and shall   require the previous approval of the Governor.

(4)  Nothing in this article shall be deemed to confer on a High Court powers of  superintendence over any court or tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the Armed  Forces.

4  10.  Subordinate of Assistant Sessions Judges—(1) All Assistant Sessions Judges shall be  subordinate to the Sessions Jduge in whose Court they exercise jurisdiction.

15. Subordination of Judicial Magistrates- (1) Every Chief Judicial Magistrate shall be  subordinate to the Sessions Judge and every other Judicial Magistrate shall, subject to the general  control of the Sessions Judge, be subordinate to the Chief Judicial Magistrate.  

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and 15(1)  of Cr.P.C. declare that  the Assistant  Sessions  

Judges and Chief Judicial  Magistrates are subordinate to  

the  Session  Judge  and  other  Judicial  Magistrates  to  be  

subordinate to the Chief Judicial Magistrate subject to the  

control of the Session Judge. It may be remembered that  

Section  195(4)  deals  with  the  authority  of  the  superior  

courts  in  the  context  of  taking  cognizance  of  various  

offences mentioned in Section 195(1). Such offences are  

relatable to civil, criminal and revenue courts etc.5 Each  

one  of  the  streams  of  these  courts  may  have  their  

administrative hierarchy depending upon under the law by  

which such courts are brought into existence.  It  is also  

well known that certain courts have appellate jurisdiction  

while  certain  courts  only  have  original  jurisdiction.  

Appellate  jurisdiction  is  the  creature  of  statute  and  

depending upon the scheme of a  particular  statute,  the  

forum of appeal varies. Generally, the appellate for a are  

created on the basis of either subject matter of dispute or  

economic implications or nature of crime etc.  

5  195 (3) – In clause (b) of sub-section (1), the term ‘Court’ means a Civil, Revenue or Criminal  Court, and includes a tribunal constituted by or under a Central, Provincial or State Act, if declared  by that Act to be a Court for the purposes of this section.

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25. Therefore, all that sub-section (4) of Section 195 says  

is that irrespective of the fact whether a particular court is  

subordinate to another  court in the hierarchy of judicial  

administration,  for  the  purpose  of  exercise  of  powers  

under Section 195(1), every appellate court competent to  

entertain  the  appeals  either  from  decrees  or  sentence  

passed  by  the  original  court  is  treated  to  be  a  court  

concurrently competent to exercise the jurisdiction under  

Section 195(1).   High Courts  being constitutional  courts  

invested  with  the  powers  of  superintendence  over  all  

courts  within  the  territory  over  which  the  High  Court  

exercises its jurisdiction, in our view, is certainly a Court  

which can exercise the jurisdiction under Section 195(1).  

In the absence of any specific constitutional limitation of  

prescription  on  the  exercise  of  such  powers,  the  High  

Courts may exercise such power either on an application  

made to it or  suo moto whenever the interests of justice  

demand.

26. The  High  Courts  not  only  have  the  authority  to  

exercise such jurisdiction but also an obligation to exercise  

such power in appropriate cases.  Such obligation, in our  

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opinion, flows from two factors – (1) the embargo created  

by Section 195 restricting the liberty of aggrieved persons  

to initiate  criminal  proceedings with respect  to offences  

prescribed under Section 195; (2) such offences pertain to  

either the contempt of lawful authorities of public servants  

or offences against public justice.

27. A  constitution Bench  of  this  Court  in  Iqbal  Singh  

Marwah & Anr. v. Meenakshi Marwah & Anr., (2005) 4  

SCC 370, while interpreting Section 195 Cr.P.C., although  

in a different context,  held that any interpretation which  

leads to a situation where a victim of crime is rendered  

remediless,  has  to  be  discarded6.  The  power  of  6  23. In  view of the language used in  Section 340 Cr.P.C.  the Court  is  not   bound to make a   complaint  regarding  commission of an offence referred to  in Section 195(1)(b), as the Section  is   conditioned by the words "Court is of  opinion that  it is expedient in the interest of justice."  This  shows that such a  course will be adopted only if the interest of justice requires and not in every case.   Before filing of the complaint, the Court may hold a preliminary enquiry and record a finding to the  effect that  it  is  expedient  in  the interests  of justice that  enquiry should be made into any of the  offences referred to in  Section 195(i)(b).  This expediency will normally be judged by the Court by  weighing  not  the magnitude  of injury suffered by the  person  affected by  such  forgery or  forged  document,  but  having  regard  to  the  effect  or  impact,   such  commission  of  offence  has  upon  administration  of justice.   It  is possible  that  such  forged document  or  forgery may cause a  very  serious or substantial   injury to a person in  the sense that  it  may deprive him of a very valuable   property or status or the like, but such document may be just a piece of  evidence produced or given in   evidence in Court, where voluminous  evidence may have been adduced and the effect of such piece of  evidence on  the broad concept of administration of justice may be minimal.  In such  circumstances,   the Court may not consider it expedient in the interest of  justice to make a complaint.   The broad  view of clause (b)(ii), as canvassed  by learned counsel for the appellants, would render the victim of  such  forgery or forged document remedyless.  Any interpretation which leads to a  situation where a   victim of a crime is rendered remedyless, has to be  discarded.

25.  An enlarged interpretation to Section 195(1)(b)(ii), whereby the bar  created by the said  provision  would  also  operate  where  after  commission  of   an  act  of  forgery  the  document  is  subsequently produced in Court, is capable  of great misuse.  As pointed out in Sachida Nand Singh,   after preparing a  forged document or committing an act of forgery, a person may manage to  get a   proceeding instituted in any civil, criminal or revenue court, either by  himself or through someone  set up by him and simply file the document in  the said proceeding.  He would thus be protected from  prosecution,  either  at   the  instance  of a  private  party  or  the  police  until  the  Court,  where  the   document has been filed, itself chooses to file a complaint.  The litigation  may be a prolonged one   due to which the actual trial of such a person may  be delayed indefinitely.  Such an interpretation   

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superintendence like any other power impliedly carries an  

obligation to exercise powers in  an appropriate  case to  

maintain the majesty of the judicial process and the purity  

of  the  legal  system.  Such  an  obligation  becomes  more  

profound  when  these  allegations  of  commission  of  

offences pertain to public justice.

28. In the case on hand, when the appellant alleges that  

he had been prosecuted on the basis of a palpably false  

statement  coupled  with  the  further  allegation  in  his  

complaint  that  the  respondent  did  so  for  extraneous  

considerations,  we  are  of  the  opinion  that  it  is  an  

appropriate  case  where  the  High  Court  ought  to  have  

exercised the jurisdiction under Section 195 Cr.P.C..  The  

allegation  such  as  the  one  made  by  the  complainant  

against the respondent is not uncommon. As was pointed  

earlier by this Court in a different context “there is no rule  

of law that common sense should be put in cold storage”7.  

Our  Constitution is designed on the theory of checks and  

balances. A theory which is the product of the belief that  

all power corrupts - such belief is based on experience.

would he highly detrimental  to the interest of society at large.   

7  Para 63 of Prakash Chandra Mehta v. Commissioner and Secretary, Government of Kerala &  Ors., 1985 (Supp.) SCC 144.

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29. The  appeal  is,  therefore,  allowed.   The  matter  is  

remitted to the High Court for further appropriate course  

of action to initiate proceedings against the respondent on  

the basis of the complaint of the appellant in accordance  

with law.

………………………………………..CJI                                          (P. Sathasivam)

…………………………………..……J.                                          (J. Chelameswar)

New Delhi; January 20, 2014.

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