REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 680­681 OF 2009  

Pattu Rajan .....Appellant

Versus

The State of Tamil Nadu                .....Respondent

WITH

Criminal Appeal Nos. 799­800 of 2009

Criminal Appeal No. 824 of 2009

Criminal Appeal Nos. 801­802 of 2009

Criminal Appeal Nos. 822­823 of 2009

J U D G M E N T

MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR, J.

The judgment  dated  19.03.2009 passed in  Criminal  Appeal

No. 637 and 748 of 2004 passed by the High Court of Judicature at

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Madras whereby the High Court convicted the accused appellants

for the abduction and murder of one Santhakumar, husband of the

complainant Jeevajothi (PW1), is called into question in these

appeals.  

2. The material facts leading to these appeals are as under:  

Accused No. 1 is the proprietor of a chain of hotels (Saravana

Bhavan). Either upon the advice of an astrologer or having become

besotted with PW1, Accused No.1 had evinced a keen desire to take

PW1 as his third wife, though she was already married to

Santhakumar (the deceased). In order to fulfil his desire, Accused

No.1 used to financially  help PW1, her family  members and her

husband. He used to talk to PW1 over the phone frequently, and

also gave her costly gifts such as jewellery and silk sarees and even

went to the extent of paying her medical bills. In a further bid to

gain PW1’s love and affection, he frequently interfered in her

personal  matters.  Once  when she was  ill,  under the  pretext  of

better treatment as advised by another doctor, Accused No. 1

forcefully shifted her to another hospital, where he advised her not

to have sexual relations with her husband and made her undergo a

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series of tests.  The deceased Santhakumar was instructed to get

himself tested for AIDS and other such diseases, which he refused

outright.   

3. On 01.10.2001, PW1 and her husband  were abducted by

Accused No.1 and his henchmen (including the appellants herein),

for which a separate complaint (Ext. P3) was lodged by PW1 and a

separate trial was conducted.   Some of the accused therein were

convicted.  Separate appeals were also filed against the judgment of

conviction for the incident of abduction. As they have been decided

separately,  we  do  not  propose to  discuss the said incident and

offence in detail in these appeals.

4. Accused No.1 took the help of the other appellants in order to

eliminate the husband of PW1, for securing PW1 as his third wife.

Subsequent to the incident  of  01.10.2001  relating to  abduction,

Accused No. 2 contacted PW1 and told her that he regretted the

previous events and suggested to PW1 to lodge a police complaint. A

few days prior to the murder, Accused No. 2 instructed PW1 to tell

her husband to come alone to a certain Sai Baba temple to meet a

press reporter  whom Accused  No.2  personally  knew in order to

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highlight  Accused  No.  1’s  wrongdoings. In  other  words,  Accused

No.2 posed himself as a well­wisher of PW1 and the deceased.

5. On 18.10.2001, PW1 as well as her husband went to the Sai

Baba temple as instructed by Accused No. 2. Soon after, two

Ambassador cars bearing Registration Nos. TN 09 T 3224 (M.O.1)

and TN 22 5202 (M.O.2), and a Tata Sumo vehicle bearing

Registration No. TN 09 Q 1310 (M.O.3) came and halted behind the

car in which PW1 and her husband were sitting. Accused Nos. 3

and 4, armed with knives, got out of one of the cars and forced PW1

and her husband to board the car of the accused in which Accused

No.5 was sitting, and took them to Chengalpattu.   At about 8.30

p.m. on the same night, a Mercedes Benz bearing Registration No.

TN 10 M 7755 (M.O.4) belonging to Accused No. 1 arrived with the

parents of PW1 along  with  Accused  No.1. Thereafter, PW2, the

mother of PW1, informed PW1 that Accused No.1 was in the said

Benz car, and wanted PW1 to leave her husband and meet Accused

No.1 in the car. As PW1 resisted, Accused Nos. 3 and 4 forcibly took

PW1 to the Benz car, and she was taken to Tiruchirappalli in the

said car.  

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6.   On 19.10.2001, PW1 was taken to PW9 by Accused Nos.5 and 8

at Parappadi village, to remove the alleged influence of witchcraft

(black magic) which was allegedly the cause of her being in  love

with  Santhakumar.  From  there,  she  was taken  to  Veppankulam

village to seek the advise of an astrologer (PW8). At the said place,

an employee  of  Accused No.1,  Janarthanam came and  informed

PW1 that her husband had escaped the clutches of the henchmen

of Accused No.1 and his whereabouts were unknown.

Subsequently, after spending the night at Hotel Ariyas at

Tirunelveli, PW1 and her family, along with Accused Nos. 1, 5, 6

and 8 returned to Chennai by train.  

7. After two days, Santhakumar spoke to PW1 over a phone call

and stated that Accused No. 2 had told him about being given Rs. 5

lakhs by Accused No.1 to kill him, but Accused No. 2 had let him go

unharmed out of sympathy, and had asked him to escape to

Mumbai and contact  him from there after fifteen days.  However,

Santhakumar returned to PW1 upon her request. Subsequently, on

21.10.2001,  both  of them approached Accused  No.1 to  seek  his

mercy, thus revealing that Santhakumar was still alive.   Later on

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the same day, when Accused No.2 told Accused No.1 a false story

about how he and the other accused had killed Santhakumar and

destroyed the evidence, on Accused No.1’s cue, Santhakumar and

PW1 entered the room, much to the shock of Accused No.2.

Disgraced  and feeling  betrayed,  Accused  No.2 started  assaulting

Santhakumar, and was joined by Accused Nos. 3 and 4. On

24.10.2001, they took the couple to the office of the Deputy

Commissioner of Police to withdraw the complaint relating to the

incident of abduction which had been lodged earlier that month,

and also made them sign a few blank papers. On the same day,

Accused  Nos. 5 and  6 took  Santhakumar, PW1  and  her family

members in a Tata Sumo bearing Registration No. TN 10 M 7755

belonging to Accused No. 1, again to remove the influence of black

magic on PW1, after which they reached Tirunelveli.  

8. On 26.10.2001, at about 6.30 a.m., Accused No. 5 came to the

room in which PW1 and her family  members were staying in

Tirunelveli  and  informed them that Accused No.1 had  instructed

Santhakumar to be brought to him. Unwilling to send him alone,

PW1 also went along with Santhakumar and Accused No.5.

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Accused No. 1 made PW1 and her husband get into his Tata Sumo

(Registration  No. TN  10  M 7755). This vehicle, being driven  by

Accused No. 9, with Accused Nos. 5 and 8, PW1 and Santhakumar

seated within, was followed by another Tata Sumo (M.O.3). Upon

reaching the Karai Illupu culvert, and upon a signal by Accused No.

5, the other vehicle stopped, and Accused Nos. 2 to 4 and 6 alighted

therefrom. Accused No.1 got out and grabbed Santhakumar by the

collar, dragging him out. He pushed Santhakumar down and

handed him over to Accused Nos. 2 to 4 and 6 and ordered them to

“finish him off”. The Tata Sumo (M.O. 3) driven by Accused No. 7

took Santhakumar along with the said accused towards Dindigul.

Accused No.  1 and the other accused took PW1 back,  and  later

brought her and her family back to Chennai.  

9. While PW1 was staying at her mother’s house at Velachery,

Accused Nos.  5,  8 and other  henchmen of  Accused No.1 kept a

constant vigil over the movements of PW1 and her family.

Thereafter,  at the instance of Accused No.1, PW1 and her family

members were taken to an astrologer by the name of Ravi (PW4),

and later, she was made to undergo certain rituals, conducted by

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one Raghunatha Iyer, in the presence of the second wife of Accused

No.1 at K.K. Nagar. Later, much to her shock, PW1 learnt that these

rituals were traditionally conducted by the wife after the death of

her husband. Therefore, upon growing gravely suspicious, she

lodged the first information  on  20.11.2001 stating that  Accused

No.1 and his henchmen had murdered her husband, and the same

was registered as Crime No.1047 of 2001.

10. The motive put forth by the prosecution for the commission of

the offence is that Accused No.1 wanted to take PW1 as his third

wife despite knowing that she was already married to the deceased

Santhakumar.  Accused No.1 made several failed attempts with the

help of the other accused to sever the relationship between PW1

and her husband. Ultimately, Accused No.1 committed the offence

in question in order to eliminate the deceased so as to be able to

marry PW1 without any obstruction.

11. In the meanwhile, i.e. on 31.10.2001, prior to the lodging of

the FIR, one forester by name Raman and Forest Guard Murugusen

(PW26 and 27 respectively) of the Kodaikanal Range discovered the

dead body of a male near the Tiger­Chola forest area. On seeing the

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dead body, PW27 lodged the first information, Ext. P42, at

Kodaikanal Police Station, which was registered as C.R. No. 559 of

2001, recording the finding of an unidentified body and its

unnatural death. The post­mortem was conducted on 01.11.2001

by PW35 and thereafter, as the body remained unidentified, it was

buried in the Hindu burial ground of the Kodaikanal Municipality

by PW33, Anithalai, in the presence of PW32,  Head  Constable

Sebastian. Meanwhile, the accused had surrendered and confessed

to  the commission of  Santhakumar’s murder.  Based on Accused

No. 2’s  confession that he and the other accused had killed the

victim and thrown the dead body in the forest area of Tiger­Chola

near a curve on the road, the investigation team proceeded to that

place, and it was eventually determined that the dead body found

by the forest officials  was that of  Santhakumar. The  pre­burial

photographs of the dead  body clicked  by the  Kodaikanal Police

(M.O. 11, 12, 13, 14) as well as the apparel found on the body of the

deceased (M.O. 5,  6 and 8) were  identified as Santhakumar’s by

PW1 and her family, as well as by some of the accused. The dead

body was exhumed by PW33 and two others, and was sent for a

second post­mortem, which was conducted by PW38. During the 9

course of investigation, the procedure of superimposition of the face

of the deceased was done by PW34, Dr. Jayaprakash, after which

the dead body was concluded to be that of  Santhakumar.   After

exhumation, the body was also identified by PWs 1 and 2 through a

scar mark still visible on the waist.

Charges were framed under various provisions of the Indian

Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as “the IPC”) including Sections

302, 364 and 201, and the trial was conducted.

12. The Trial  Court,  upon evaluation of the material  on record,

convicted the accused appellants for the offences punishable under

Sections 364, 304 Part I and 201 of the IPC. The accused appellants

as well as the State appealed before the High Court, wherein the

High Court  while  confirming  the finding  of  guilt  of the  accused,

modified the conviction  for  the offence punishable under Section

304 Part I to Section 302 of the IPC. The Trial Court as well as the

High Court concluded that the evidence of the prosecution

witnesses, particularly that of PWs 1 and 2, along with the other

supporting evidence, was believable and trustworthy; the motive for

commission of the offence had been proved; the last seen

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circumstance had been proved by the prosecution beyond

reasonable doubt; and that the recovery of the dead body based on

the statement of Daniel (Accused No.2) had also been proved. Both

the Courts tested the evidence of PW1 on the touchstone of

consistency with the tenor of the case. The Trial Court, which had

the opportunity to observe the demeanor of PWs 1 and 2, held that

the discrepancies and contradictions, if any, were minor in nature,

and did not affect the credibility and consistency of the evidence of

PWs 1 and 2.  

13. The Courts, relying on the evidence of the doctors PWs 35 and

38, who conducted the two post­mortem examinations, concluded

that the death was homicidal in nature, as the cause of death was

found to be asphyxia due to throttling.   

14. Shri Sushil Kumar, learned senior counsel for the appellants

took us through the entire material on record and submitted that

the circumstances relied upon by the prosecution have not been

proved in accordance with law. He argued that the High Court and

the Trial Court have merely proceeded on assumptions and

conjectures, and the motive for commission of the offence has not

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been proved, in addition to the fact that the evidence relating to the

recovery  of the  dead body  is  shaky.  He  laid  more  stress  on the

argument that the first  information in the present case (Ext.  P1)

registered on  20.11.2001 could  not  have  been registered at all,

inasmuch as there cannot be a second FIR relating to the same

incident. According to him, the incident as found in the first

information report dated 20.11.2001 is merely a continuation of the

earlier offence of abduction which had taken place on 01.10.2001,

which had generated proceedings pursuant to the first information

lodged on 12.10.2001. Thus, according to him, the FIR in the

present case would only assume the character of a statement

recorded  under Section  161 of the  Code of  Criminal Procedure

(hereinafter “the Cr.P.C”), and the proceedings in this matter would

stand vitiated. He further submitted that the first information of the

abduction case dated 12.10.2001 had been marked and relied upon

in the present matter as Ext. P3 and its use as a substantive piece

of evidence was illegal. It was also argued that the evidence relating

to the last seen circumstance as deposed by PW1 was not put to the

accused while  examining them under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C,

and therefore, such portion of evidence could not be made use of by 12

the prosecution against the accused. Learned counsel also

submitted that the identification of the body merely on the basis of

a superimposition test was improper, in the absence of a DNA test.

Per contra, Shri Balaji Srinivasan, the learned Additional

Advocate General appearing on behalf of the State, argued in

support of the judgments of the Courts below.

15. We  do  not find  any force in the  arguments  of the learned

Senior Advocate for the appellants that the incident of murder in

the case in hand is merely a continuation of an earlier offence, i.e.

Crime No. 1030 of 2001 relating to the abduction of PW1 and the

deceased Santhakumar, which occurred on 01.10.2001.

 Undoubtedly, factors such as proximity of time or place, unity

of  purpose  and  design  and  continuity  of action, in respect  of  a

series of acts, have to be considered in order to determine whether

such acts form part of the same transaction or not (See  State of

A.P. v.  Cheemalapati  Ganeswara  Rao, (1964) 3  SCR  297). A

quick overview of the sequence of unfolding of the incident of

murder in question and the prior incident of abduction would show

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that the above factors cannot be said to be satisfied in this case.

Even  when the two FIRs  Ext. P1 and P3 are read together, it

becomes clear that the first incident of abduction began and ended

on 01.10.2001. The crime of abduction commenced when the

victims (PW1 and the deceased) were forced into captivity on the

said date, and was completed on the same day immediately after

the victims were released. In respect of the said incident, the first

information came to be lodged on 12.10.2001 by PW1. During the

investigation of the said case, on 24.10.2001, the accused brought

the deceased, PW1 and  her family  members to Tirunelveli. The

present crime came to be committed on 26.10.2001, whereby PW1

and her husband, Santhakumar were taken away in a car, and on

the direction of Accused No.1, Accused Nos. 2 to 4, 6 and 7 forcibly

took away Santhakumar by separating him from his wife,

committed his murder and threw away his body at the Tiger­Chola

forest area within the jurisdiction of Kodaikanal Police Station.  

Evidently, the time and place of occurrence of the two

incidents are different. Even the number of accused involved in the

incidents is different. No continuity of action can be gathered from

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the sequence of events either. It may be noted that the motive for

commission of both the offences may be the same,  inasmuch as

they were committed to enable Accused No. 1 to marry PW1, but

merely because of their common motive, the second offence cannot

be said to be in continuation of the first incident, in light of there

being distinct intentions behind the two offences. The first offence

was committed with the intention to abduct the deceased and PW1,

the purpose for which was merely to threaten and pressurize them.

In contrast, the intention behind the second offence was to murder

the deceased with a view to permanently get rid of him. Therefore, it

is evident that unity of purpose and design between the two

offences is also absent.  Thus, it is amply clear that the incident of

murder is entirely separate and distinct from the earlier incident of

abduction.

16. Undisputedly, the first information pertaining to the incident

of abduction, after passing through various stages and various

police officers, ultimately came to be registered as an FIR on

09.11.2001  in the jurisdictional  Police  Station.  Nevertheless, the

fact remains that the offence of abduction was completed on

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01.10.2001 itself  and the first  information came to be  lodged on

12.10.2001.  

17. There cannot be any dispute that a second FIR in respect of an

offence or different offences committed in the course of the same

transaction is not only impermissible but also violates Article 21 of

the Constitution. In T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala, (2001) 6 SCC

181, this  Court  has categorically  held that the registration  of  a

second FIR (which is not a counter case) is violative of Article 21 of

the Constitution. It is relevant to note paragraphs 19, 20 and 27 of

the said decision in that regard:

“19.  The scheme of  CrPC is that an  officer in charge of a police station has to commence investigation as provided in Section 156 or 157 CrPC on the basis of entry of the first information report, on coming to know of the commission of a cognizable  offence.  On  completion  of investigation and on the basis of the evidence collected, he has to form an opinion under Section 169 or 170 CrPC, as the case  may be, and forward his report to the Magistrate concerned  under  Section  173(2)  CrPC. However, even after filing such a report, if he comes into possession of  further  information or material, he need not register a fresh FIR; he is empowered to make further investigation, normally with the leave of the court, and where during further investigation

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he collects further evidence, oral or documentary, he is  obliged to forward the same  with  one  or  more further reports; this is the import of sub­section (8) of Section 173 CrPC.

20. From the above discussion it follows that under the scheme of the provisions of Sections 154, 155, 156, 157, 162, 169, 170 and 173 CrPC only the earliest or the first information in regard to the commission of a cognizable offence satisfies the requirements of Section 154 CrPC. Thus there can be no second FIR and consequently there can be no fresh  investigation on receipt  of  every  subsequent information in respect of the same cognizable offence  or the  same occurrence  or incident  giving rise to one or more cognizable offences. On receipt of information about a cognizable offence or an incident giving rise to a cognizable offence or offences and on entering the FIR in the station house diary, the officer in charge of a police station has to investigate not merely the cognizable offence reported in the FIR but also other connected offences found to have been committed in the course of the same transaction or the same occurrence and file one or more reports as provided in Section 173 CrPC.

x x x x x x x x x x

27. A just balance between the fundamental rights of the citizens under Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution and the expansive power of the police to investigate a cognizable offence has to be struck by the court. There cannot be any controversy that sub­section (8) of Section 173 CrPC empowers the police to make further investigation, obtain further evidence (both oral and documentary) and forward a

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further report or reports to the Magistrate. In Narang case [Ram Lal Narang v. State (Delhi Admn.), (1979) 2 SCC 322 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 479] it was, however, observed that it would be appropriate to conduct further investigation with the permission of the court. However, the sweeping power of investigation does not warrant subjecting a citizen each time to fresh investigation by the police in respect of the same incident, giving rise to one or more cognizable offences, consequent upon filing of successive  FIRs  whether  before  or  after filing the final report under Section 173(2)  CrPC. It  would clearly be beyond the purview of Sections 154 and 156  CrPC,  nay, a case of abuse  of the statutory power of investigation in a given case. In our view a case of fresh investigation based on the second or successive FIRs, not being a counter­case,  filed in connection with the same or connected cognizable offence alleged to have been committed in the course  of the same  transaction  and  in respect of which pursuant to the first FIR either investigation is  under way or final  report under Section 173(2) has been forwarded to the Magistrate, may be a fit case for exercise of power under Section 482 CrPC or under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution.”

18. However, the aforementioned principles of law  may  not be

applicable to the facts of the incident on hand, as the crimes

underlying the two FIRs are distinct and different. The offence

punishable under Section 302, in the present case, was committed

during the course of investigation of the case in the first FIR, i.e. 18

relating to the crime of abduction. We are of the considered opinion

that the allegations and offences under this present FIR relating to

the  murder of the deceased are substantially distinct from the

information lodged in Crime No. 1030 of 2001 relating to abduction.

We are unable to accept the argument of Shri Sushil Kumar that at

the most, further investigation could have been made by the police

in the earlier crime registered relating to abduction since the

murder has allegedly taken place during the subsistence of

investigation of  the crime of abduction. As mentioned supra, the

facts and circumstances of the  matter clearly indicate that the

offence of abduction committed by the appellants and the offence of

murder were two different and distinct offences, and therefore,

there is no question of further investigation to be made in the crime

of abduction by the investigating agency relating to the offence of

murder which was committed during the subsistence of the

investigation relating to abduction.   Further investigation, as

envisaged under Sub­section 8 of Section 173 of the Cr.P.C,

connotes investigation of the case in continuation of an earlier

investigation  with respect to  which the chargesheet  has  already

been filed. In case a fresh offence is committed during the course of 19

the earlier investigation,  which  is distinct  from the offence being

investigated, such fresh offence cannot be investigated as part of

the pending case, and should instead be investigated afresh. It is

pertinent to note that the facts on hand are similar to the facts in

the case of Awadesh Kumar Jha v. State of Bihar, (2016) 3 SCC

8, wherein this Court held that the case arising out of a second FIR,

if relating to a separate transaction, cannot be investigated along

with a previous FIR under the clause ‘further investigation’ as

contemplated under Sub­section 8 to Section 173 of the Cr.P.C.

19. In  Rameshchandra Nandlal  Parikh  v.  State of  Gujarat,

(2006) 1 SCC 732, earlier judgments of this Court including  T.T.

Antony  (supra) were considered, and it was held that in case the

FIRs are not in respect of the same cognizable offence or the same

occurrence giving rise to one or more cognizable offences, and have

not been alleged to have been committed in the course of the same

transaction or the same occurrence as the ones alleged in the first

FIR, there is no prohibition on accepting the second FIR. In this

respect, in the case of Nirmal Singh Kahlon v. State of Punjab,

(2009) 1 SCC 441, this Court observed thus:  

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“67.  The second FIR, in our opinion, would be maintainable  not  only  because  there  were  different versions but when new discovery is made on factual foundations. Discoveries may be made by the police authorities at a subsequent stage. Discovery about a larger conspiracy can also surface in another proceeding, as for example, in a case of this nature. If the police authorities did not make a fair investigation  and left out conspiracy  aspect of the matter from the purview of its investigation, in our opinion, as and when the same surfaced, it was open to the State and/or the High Court to direct investigation in respect of an offence which is distinct and  separate from  the  one for  which  the  FIR  had already been lodged.”

20. We may also refer to the following observations made by this

Court in the case of Babubhai v. State of Gujarat, (2010) 12 SCC

254, while considering a similar question:  

“20. Thus, in view of the above, the law on the subject emerges to the effect that an FIR under Section 154 CrPC is a very important document. It is the first information of a cognizable offence recorded by the officer in charge of the police station. It sets the machinery of criminal law in motion and marks the commencement of the  investigation which ends with the formation of an opinion under Section 169 or 170 CrPC, as the case may be, and forwarding of a police report  under  Section  173  CrPC.  Thus, it is quite possible that more than one piece of information be given to the police officer in charge of

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the police station in respect of the same incident involving one or more than one cognizable offences. In such a case, he need  not enter each piece of information in the diary. All other information given orally or  in writing after  the commencement of  the investigation into the facts  mentioned in the first information  report  will  be  statements falling  under Section 162 CrPC.  

21. In such a case the court has to examine the facts and circumstances giving rise to both the FIRs and the test of sameness is to be applied to find out whether both the FIRs relate to the same incident in respect of the same occurrence or are in regard to the incidents which are two or more parts of the same transaction. If  the answer is  in the affirmative, the second FIR is liable to be quashed.  However, in case, the contrary is proved, where the version in the second FIR is different and they are in respect of the two different incidents/crimes, the second FIR is permissible. In case in respect of the same  incident the  accused  in the first  FIR comes forward with a different version or counterclaim, investigation on both the FIRs has to be conducted.”

(emphasis supplied)

In light of the aforementioned settled legal proposition,  we

have  no hesitation  in holding  that the separate first information

lodged in this case is just, legal and proper.

21. Furthermore, it is  no  doubt true that the first information

relating to the crime of abduction dated 12.10.2001 was marked in

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the case on hand relating to murder. However, we cannot accept the

contention that the same has been used as a substantive piece of

evidence  in  this  matter.  This is  because  the  said document was

practically used only as supportive material to show the motive for

the accused to commit the crime.  

22. Coming to the merits of the matter, it is pertinent to note that

the prosecution mainly relied upon three circumstances to prove

the guilt of the accused, i.e. motive, the last seen circumstance and

the recovery of the dead body at the instance of the accused.   An

additional link in the chain of circumstances is the non­explanation

by the accused about the last seen circumstance in their statement

recorded  under  Section  313 of the  Cr.P.C.  Clearly, there is  no

direct evidence in this matter and the whole case rests on

circumstantial evidence.  

Before we undertake a consideration of the evidence

supporting such circumstances, we would like to note that the law

relating to circumstantial evidence is well settled. The Judge while

deciding matters resting on circumstantial evidence should always

tread cautiously so as to not allow conjectures or suspicion,

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however strong, to take the place of proof. If the alleged

circumstances are conclusively proved before the Court by leading

cogent and reliable evidence, the Court need not look any further

before affirming the guilt of the accused. Moreover, human agency

may be faulty in expressing the picturisation of the actual incident,

but circumstances cannot fail or be ignored. As aptly put in this oft­

quoted phrase: “Men may lie, but circumstances do not”.  

As  mentioned  supra, the  circumstances relied  upon by the

prosecution should be of a conclusive nature and they should be

such as to  exclude every  other  hypothesis  except the  one  to  be

proved by the prosecution regarding the guilt of the accused. There

must be a chain of evidence proving the circumstances so complete

so as to not leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion of

innocence of the  accused.  Although it is  not  necessary for this

Court to refer to  decisions concerning this legal  proposition,  we

prefer to quote the following observations made in  Sharad

Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116

(SCC p. 185 para 153­154):

24

“153. A close analysis of this decision would show that the following conditions must be fulfilled before a case against an accused can be said to be fully established:

(1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established.

It may be noted here that this Court  indicated that the circumstances concerned “must or should” and not “may be”  established.  There is  not  only  a  grammatical  but  a legal distinction between “may be proved” and “must be or should be proved” as was held by this Court  in  Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade  v.  State of Maharashtra  1973 CriLJ 1783 where the following observations were made:

“Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused  must  be and  not  merely  may  be guilty before a Court can convict and the mental distance between ‘may be’ and ‘must be’ is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions.”

(2) the facts  so  established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on  any  other  hypothesis except that the accused is guilty,

(3) the circumstances should  be  of a conclusive nature and tendency,

(4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and

(5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent  with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human

25

probability the  act  must  have  been done  by the accused.

154. These five golden principles, if we  may say so, constitute the panchsheel of the proof of a case based on circumstantial evidence.”

23. In order to satisfy our conscience, we have independently

considered the evidence  on record in its entirety in  view of the

aforementioned principles.   However, as we do not wish to burden

this judgment by reiterating the depositions of all the witnesses on

record in detail, we deem it fit to discuss only the important aspects

highlighted by some of the prosecution witnesses in their testimony.

24. It would be appropriate to begin with the testimony of PW1,

the  wife of the deceased. She  has  deposed in  detail as to  how

Accused No.1 wanted to marry her and how he often tried to lure

her through undue favours. She has deposed that as Accused No.1

wished to take her as his third wife, he wanted to separate her from

her husband. Whenever PW1 or her family were in need of money,

Accused No.1 would generously help them. He even used to talk to

PW1 over the phone regularly, and used to interfere in her personal

matters unwarrantedly. She has narrated elaborately about the

26

prior incident of abduction as well. As far as the matter on hand is

concerned, she has deposed that on 24.10.2001, PW1, her parents

and the deceased were taken by Accused No.1 and the other

accused to different places and they ultimately reached Tirunelveli.

In the early hours of 26.10.2001, Accused No.5 asked the deceased

to meet Accused No.1. PW1, being reluctant to send the deceased

alone with Accused No. 5, went along with her husband to meet

Accused No. 1, who made PW1 and the deceased get into the vehicle

bearing Registration No. TN 10 M 7755 (driven by Accused No. 9)

along with himself and Accused Nos. 5 and 8.   On the way, upon

the signal of Accused No. 5, Accused Nos. 2, 4 and 6 got down from

a vehicle (M.O. 3) which had been following behind, and took away

the deceased. Accused No. 1 further  instructed these accused to

“finish  him off”,  definitely intending to instruct them  to  kill the

deceased. Thereafter, PW1 was forcibly taken back by Accused No.1

and later was made to undergo different rituals, which made her

suspect the murder of her husband and led her to lodge a

complaint regarding the same.  

27

PW1 has also deposed about the identification of the clothes

worn by the deceased at the time of leaving her company, on which

basis she identified the clothes on the discovered dead body to be

those of Santhakumar’s. She also identified his personal belongings

that were recovered from Accused No.6. She has deposed about the

exhumation of the  dead body and her identification of the  dead

body based on the scar on the left side of her husband’s waist. She

has meticulously deposed about the role of each of the appellants in

the  crime. In the  cross­examination,  she  has  also  explained the

delay in lodging the first information by deposing that she could not

file the complaint before 20.11.2001 though her husband was

abducted on 26.10.2001 because she was under the constant

surveillance of Accused No. 1 and his henchmen and could only

free herself after 06.11.2011. Also, importantly, in the first incident

(being the incident of abduction, i.e. Crime No. 1030 of 2001), her

husband had been spared by Accused No. 1, and on a subsequent

occasion also, he had been spared by Accused No. 2.   Thus, she

was hopeful that her husband would escape on this occasion as

well. She also admitted in the cross­examination that her mother

28

had informed her that if she married Accused No.1, he would set up

a business for their family and also pay them Rs. 10 Lakhs.

Though PW1 was cross­examined at length, the defence could

not discredit her evidence on material particulars.  Minor variations

pointed out by the defence, as such neither affect the prosecution

version nor PW1’s evidence in its entirety.

25. In effect, PW1 has deposed about the aspect of motive, the last

seen circumstance as  well as the identification of the personal

belongings of the deceased and his dead body. She is the witness

who saw the deceased in the company of the accused for the last

time before his death. While the date on which she saw the

deceased  with the  accused  was  26.10.2001, the  dead  body  was

found on 31.10.2001, i.e. within five days of the incident, and as

per the post­mortem report given by PW35, Dr. A. Sivakumar, the

victim appeared to have died 3­5 days prior  to  the examination,

which was conducted on 02.11.2001. This fact is well corroborated

by the examination­in­chief of PW35 as well.

26. The evidence of PW1 is fully supported by the evidence of PW2,

the  mother of PW1.   PW2 has deposed about the conduct of 29

Accused No.1 towards her family members, as well as the

dishonourable motive of Accused No.1 to marry PW1 and make her

his third  wife. She has fully corroborated the evidence of PW1

regarding the events of the day of the incident as  well as the

preceding  days.  She  has testified to the fact that  Accused  No.5

came to their room  in Tirunelveli  and asked  the deceased to go

along with Accused No.1. However, PW1 also went along with them,

but she returned to the room alone, crying, and revealed that the

accused had beaten the deceased and taken him away. She has

also deposed about Accused No.1 taking PW1 to an astrologer, and

for removing the influence of black magic, etc.; and that she was

present during the exhumation of the body and had identified the

dead body of her son­in­law by the scar mark on his waist. She had

also identified the belongings of the deceased. In her cross­

examination, she denied the suggestion made to her by the defence

that PW1 had falsely lodged the complaint to extract money from

Accused No.1.   She has also explained the delay in filing the FIR,

stating that her house was being monitored by Accused No.1 and

his aides and that she was hoping that the deceased would return

30

safely, as he had previously. The evidence of PW2 fully corroborates

the evidence of PW1.  

It is evident from the above discussion that the evidence of

PWs 1 and 2  with regard to the  motive for commission of the

offence, the last seen  circumstance  and  recovery  as  well as the

identification of the dead body is consistent with the case of the

prosecution.   We do not find any artificiality in their evidence. On

the other hand, their evidence remains natural, consistent, cogent

and probable, and thus we do not find any reason to disagree with

the findings arrived at in that regard by the Trial Court as well as

by the High Court.  

27. The testimony of PW7, the Village Administrative Officer

working in the office of the Tehsildar, is also relevant and

significant. As per the requisition of the Assistant Commissioner of

Police,  PW7 went to the  Chennai  Kotturpuram Police  Station on

30.11.2001.   In his presence, Accused No.2 confessed to the

Inspector of  Police,  PW42, that  if taken to Kodaikanal,  he would

show the spot at Tiger­Chola where the dead body of Santhakumar

was thrown. Accordingly, Accused No.2 was taken to the said place

31

on 01.12.2001 and he pointed out the place of disposal of the body,

and also identified the dead body of the deceased from the

photographs available  with  the police.  PW7 further  deposed  that

PWs 1 and 2,  who came the next  day, i.e.,  on 02.12.2001,  also

identified the dead body shown in the photographs, and the body

was exhumed after 2 days, after completing the formalities. He also

deposed that on 13.12.2001, Accused No.6 confessed that if taken

to his colony at Saligramam Road, he would identify and produce

the wallet (M.O.7) and gold chain (M.O.9) of the deceased, and the

same were recovered at the instance of Accused No. 6.   PW7 has

also deposed about the recovery of  one lungi  (M.O. 15)  from the

Tata Sumo in which the deceased was last seen. Nothing material

worth considering in favour of the defence has been extracted from

the cross­examination of PW7.  

It was argued by Shri Sushil Kumar that the confession made

by Accused No.2 before PW7 was not admissible in evidence. There

cannot be any dispute that a confession made by the accused in

police custody is an inadmissible confession. The confession herein

cannot even be called an extra­judicial confession because of the

32

presence of the police.  Be that as it may, if a confession is made by

the accused before the police and a portion of the confession leads

to the recovery of any incriminating material, such portion alone is

admissible under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act.  Since only

such portion of  the confession relating to the recovery of certain

material objects was admitted in evidence and relied upon, such

reliance was in accordance with law.

28. The testimony of PWs 26, 27, 29, 32 and 33 pertains to the

vital  aspect  of the recovery of the body of the  deceased.  PW26

Raman, the forester, has deposed that while he was working with

Forest Guard Murugesan (PW27) on 31.10.2001, they found a dead

body lying at Tiger­Chola in an abyss in the forest. The body had a

blue­coloured checked full­sleeved shirt and sandal­coloured pant

with a black­coloured belt. After seeing the dead body, PW26 and

PW27 went to the Kodaikanal Police Station and lodged the first

information (Ext. P42) with regard to the discovery of the

unidentified dead  body. Thereafter, the police came to the spot

along with a camera and took photographs of the dead body. PW27

33

has reaffirmed what has been stated by PW26 and has deposed that

the dead body was taken to the hospital by the police for autopsy.

 PW29, the Sub­Inspector of Police of  Kodaikanal Police

Station, has deposed that on 31.10.2001, PWs 26 and 27 lodged the

complaint which came to be registered on the same day. Thereafter,

PW29 along with other  personnel  went  to the concerned spot  at

Tiger­Chola, and saw the dead body of a male aged about 30 years

wearing the aforementioned clothes. He took the photographs of the

dead body from all angles and prepared the observation mahazar

(Ext. P45) and panchnama of the dead body (Ext. P46). Thereafter,

the dead body was sent to the government hospital for post­mortem

examination. Since the body was unidentified and no relatives could

be found, he asked Head Constable Sebastian (PW32) to bury the

body in the municipality burial ground. He also told PW32 to mark

the place where the dead body was buried. In the cross­

examination, he has denied the suggestion that the pictures

mentioned  were  merely  photographs  of the original photographs

taken on the spot of  discovery. Further, he has deposed that he

conducted  an inquest  of the  dead  body  and  prepared the  same

34

under the light of a Petromax. Although he saw a scar on the dead

body, he did not mention the same in the observation mahazar. The

colour of the shirt was seen as brown in the light of the Petromax,

but on re­checking it in morning, he realized that it was actually

blue,  and thus struck  it  out  and corrected  it  accordingly in the

mahazar.

PW32, the  Head Constable, has reiterated what has been

deposed by PW29. He was present during the burial of the dead

body by PW33 Anithalai, and instructed him to place an identifier

on the spot of burial. PW32 exhumed the dead body in the presence

of the Tehsildar, upon whose direction, he kept the dead body at a

place that  was elevated.  He also deposed that PW1, Jeevajothi,

identified the dead body to be that of her husband and had left the

place crying. PW32’s version as to the burial was corroborated by

PW33,  who has deposed that he buried the body and put the

identification mark of a blue metal stone near the head to identify

the place.

29. We may also briefly discuss the testimony of PWs 35 and 38

(the doctors  who conducted the post­mortems of the deceased).

35

PW35 conducted the first post­mortem examination. He has stated

in his examination­in­chief that  the hyoid bone  in the neck was

found broken and the brain was found decomposed. He opined that

the person could have died 3 to 5 days prior to the post­mortem

examination. The hyoid bone in the neck could have been broken

due to strangulation of the said person by using materials like a

lungi. PW38, who conducted the second post­mortem examination

upon exhumation of the dead body, was also present at the spot of

exhumation. PW38 deposed that while the body was being

exhumed,  he had noticed that  a  wooden stick had been put up

along with a small stone on the southern part of the place. He also

deposed that there was an old injury scar on the right lower

abdomen of the dead body, the hyoid bone was broken, and that the

fracture found in the hyoid bone  was ante­mortem,  which  was

confirmed through a Bensidine test.   He opined that the cause of

death appeared to be compression of the neck.

30. It is also relevant to note the testimony of PW36, the

handwriting expert. During the course of investigation, the records

of the various hotels in which the accused had stayed along with

36

the deceased, PW1 and her family were collected. PW36 compared

the handwritings in the hotel records with the handwritings of the

accused and opined the former to belong to Accused Nos. 4, 5, 6

and 8.  This supports the conclusion that the accused in fact took

PW1 and her family members to various places as deposed by them.

31.   Shri Sushil Kumar also argued that a DNA test should have

been conducted in order to identify the dead body, and

identification merely on the basis of a superimposition test, which is

not a tangible piece of evidence, may not be proper.  

One cannot lose sight of the fact that DNA evidence is also in

the nature of opinion evidence as envisaged in Section 45 of the

Indian Evidence Act. Undoubtedly, an expert giving evidence before

the Court plays a crucial role, especially since the entire purpose

and object of  opinion evidence is to aid the Court  in forming its

opinion on questions concerning foreign law, science, art, etc., on

which the Court might not have the technical expertise to form an

opinion on its own. In criminal cases, such questions may pertain

to aspects such as ballistics, fingerprint  matching, handwriting

37

comparison, and even DNA testing or superimposition techniques,

as seen in the instant case.

32.  The role of an expert witness rendering opinion evidence before

the Court may be explained by referring to the following

observations of this Court in  Ramesh Chandra Agrawal  v.

Regency Hospital Limited & Ors., (2009) 9 SCC 709:

“16. The law of evidence is designed to ensure that the court considers only that evidence which will enable it to reach a reliable conclusion. The first and foremost requirement  for  an expert evidence to be admissible  is that it is necessary to hear the expert evidence. The test is that the matter is outside the knowledge and experience of the  lay person.  Thus,  there  is  a need to hear an expert opinion where there is a medical issue to be settled. The scientific question involved is assumed to be not within the court's knowledge.  Thus cases where the science involved, is highly specialized and perhaps even esoteric, the central role of an expert cannot be disputed…”

    (emphasis supplied)

Undoubtedly,  it is the duty of an expert witness to assist the

Court effectively by furnishing it with the relevant report based on

his expertise along with his reasons, so that the Court may form its

independent judgment  by  assessing such  materials and reasons

furnished by the expert for coming to an appropriate conclusion. Be

38

that as it  may, it cannot be forgotten that opinion evidence is

advisory in nature, and the Court is not bound by the evidence of

the experts. (See  The State (Delhi Adminstration)  v.  Pali Ram,

(1979) 2 SCC 158; State of H.P. v. Jai Lal & Ors., (1999) 7 SCC

280;  Baso Prasad & Ors.  v. State of Bihar, (2006) 13 SCC 65;

Ramesh  Chandra  Agrawal  v.  Regency  Hospital  Ltd.  &  Ors.

(supra);  Malay Kumar Ganguly  v.  Dr. Sukumar Mukherjee &

Ors., (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 299).

33.  Like all other opinion evidence, the probative value accorded to

DNA evidence also varies from case to case, depending on facts and

circumstances and the weight accorded to other evidence on record,

whether contrary or corroborative. This is all the more important to

remember, given that even though the accuracy of DNA evidence

may be increasing with the advancement of science and technology

with every passing day, thereby making it more and more reliable,

we have not  yet  reached a  juncture where  it  may be said  to be

infallible. Thus, it cannot be said that the absence of DNA evidence

would lead to an adverse inference against a party, especially in the

39

presence of other cogent and reliable evidence on record in favour of

such party.  

34.   This leads us to the question of the propriety of relying upon

the superimposition test conducted in the instant case for

identifying the deceased. As noted supra, the learned counsel for

the appellants has argued that evidence pertaining to the use of the

superimposition technique is not a tangible piece of evidence. We

find ourselves unable to agree with this view. There cannot be any

dispute that evidence on superimposition is also based on experts’

opinion.  We would like to note that the use of the superimposition

technique in Indian investigations for identification purposes is not

a new phenomenon. Notably, it has been employed in the

investigations pertaining to the Nithari murders, the Russian

murder incident in Goa in 2008, and even before that in the Morni

Hill murder case and the Paharganj bomb blast case as far back as

in 1996,  and the Udhampur murder case  in 2005  (See Modi,  A

Textbook of Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology, 26th  edn., 2018,

pp. 267­271). This Court itself has placed reliance on identification

of the deceased through superimposition on several occasions (see

40

Shankar  & Ors.  v.  State  of  Tamil  Nadu, (1994)  4  SCC 478;

Swamy Shraddananda  v.  State of Karnataka,  (2007) 12 SCC

288;  Inspector of Police, Tamil Nadu  v.  John David, (2011) 5

SCC 509;  Mahesh  Dhanaji  Shinde  v.  State  of  Maharashtra,

(2014) 4 SCC 292), clearly indicating that it is an acceptable piece

of opinion evidence.

35.  It is relevant to note that all of the decisions of this Court cited

in the above paragraph  were based on circumstantial evidence,

involving aspects such as the last seen circumstance, motive,

recovery of  personal  belongings of the deceased, and so on, and

therefore in none of the cases was the superimposition technique

the sole incriminating factor relied upon to reach a conclusion of

guilt of the accused. Indeed, in  Mahesh Dhanaji Shinde  (supra),

the Court also had the advantage of referring to a DNA test, and in

John David  (supra), of referring to a DNA test as well as dental

examination of the deceased, to determine the identity of the victim.

This is in line with the settled practice of the Courts, which

generally do not rely upon opinion evidence as the sole

incriminating circumstance, given its fallibility. This is particularly 41

true for the superimposition technique, which cannot be regarded

as infallible.

36.   In view of the above discussion, we hold that the High Court

was  justified in  observing  that  a  superimposition  test  cannot  be

taken as  a  conclusive  one  for the identification of  a  dead body,

because by itself it  may not  conclusively  establish  identification.

However, the High Court rightly accepted the expert testimony on

this aspect since in the instant case, the superimposition test was

merely one  piece of evidence relied  upon  by the  prosecution to

corroborate the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 in order to strengthen its

case.  

37.   Moreover, it is evident from the testimony of PW34, Dr.

Jayaprakash, who conducted the superimposition test, that the test

was conducted by using three different methods, i.e. video

superimposition, visual observation, and dental trait

superimposition, and in spite of challenges to the reliability of such

evidence, the Courts, after carefully assessing the  methodology

adopted, accepted the finding reached by PW34 regarding the

42

identification of the body, and we see no error in such conclusion

reached by the Courts.  

38.  Therefore, we are of the opinion that the scientific evidence of

PW34 was rightly believed by the Trial Court as well as by the High

Court, and strengthens the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 regarding the

identification of the body. Though a DNA test would have helped the

Courts immensely in determining the reliability of the identification

of the body of the deceased, in the presence of other reliable

evidence  on record in favour  of the  prosecution  version  on this

aspect, we reject the contention that the non­conducting of a DNA

test and the reliance on evidence regarding identification through

superimposition is improper.  This is  all the  more true since  no

material is forthcoming to the effect that the parents of the

deceased were alive during the relevant period, so as to conduct

comparative DNA tests.  

39. It is noteworthy to emphasise that based on the confession of

Accused  No.6, recoveries  of  a  wallet containing  a  photograph of

PW1, gold chain etc. were effected from his house, which, as

43

mentioned supra, also stand positively identified by PW1 and her

family as belonging to the deceased.

40.  From the evidence of the witnesses discussed supra, it is amply

clear that the dead body recovered from Tiger­Chola was identified

by PW1 and her family members as Santhakumar’s, and the same

body was exhumed from the burial grounds. It is evident from the

depositions that the recovery of the dead body was made from the

Tiger­Chola forest area, which is the same place to which Accused

No.  2 led the investigation team based  on  his confession  about

disposal of the dead body. It is relevant to note at this juncture that

merely because the actual recovery of the body happened before the

accused lead the police to the scene, it does not, in the facts and

circumstances of this case, negate the validity of the recovery based

on a confession, in terms of Section 27 of the Evidence Act.

In our considered view, the recovery of the body of the

deceased at the instance of Accused No. 2 and the identification of

the body as that of Santhakumar by PW1, her family as well as by

the accused, on the basis of photographs, the clothes and

44

belongings of the deceased, and his scar, stand proved beyond all

reasonable doubt.

41. As mentioned supra, the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 proves the

circumstance relating to the last seen evidence beyond reasonable

doubt, apart from other circumstances. Both of them in their

evidence  (especially  PW1),  as mentioned supra,  have consistently

and cogently deposed that the deceased was last seen along with

the accused, who took the deceased away upon the orders of

Accused No. 1. No explanation, much less any plausible

explanation has come from the accused in their statements under

Section  313  of the  Cr.P.C rebutting the strong  evidence  against

them.  Though the burden had shifted onto the accused to explain

the  said  circumstance  as to  when  they left the  company  of the

deceased, no explanation was adduced in that regard by the

accused herein. Hence, an adverse inference has to be drawn

against the accused. It may be noted that such non­explanation by

the accused provides an additional link in the chain of

circumstances.   

45

Furthermore, although it was argued by Shri  Sushil  Kumar

that the evidence relating to the last seen circumstance as deposed

by PW1 was not put to the accused while recording their statement

under Section 313, such an argument cannot be accepted, since

Question  No. 22 and  Question  No. 30 specifically relate to the

evidence of the last seen circumstance, and were put to Accused

No.1. Same is the case with the other appellants. A perusal of the

statements of the accused recorded under Section 313 also reveals

that the relevant questions pertaining to taking Santhakumar along

with PW1 in the car on 26.10.2001, detection of the decomposed

dead body and the post­mortem thereof were all put to the accused

so as to fully enable them to explain all the incriminating

circumstances appearing against them in the evidence adduced by

the prosecution.  It is needless to observe that it has been

established through a catena of judgments of this Court that the

doctrine of last seen, if proved, shifts the burden of proof onto the

accused, placing on  him the onus to explain how the incident

occurred and what happened to the victim who was last seen with

him. Failure on part of the accused to furnish any explanation in

this regard, as in the case in hand, or furnishing false explanation 46

would give rise to a strong presumption against him, and in favour

of his guilt, and would provide an additional link in the chain of

circumstances. (See Rohtash Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2013)

14 SCC 434; Trimukh Maroti Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra,

(2006) 10 SCC 681).

42. It is also relevant to note that the bill book and cash book of a

petrol  pump at  Palani (Ext.  P32),  where the  Tata  Sumo bearing

Registration No.  TN 09 Q 1310  (M.O.3)  was refuelled,  were  also

seized. This is very crucial evidence to show that the Tata Sumo in

which the accused were travelling along with the deceased had in

fact gone towards Kodaikanal, as is evident from the fact that fuel

was filled from a petrol pump enroute to Kodaikanal at Palani on

the relevant date.  

43. In our considered opinion, the overwhelming, consistent,

cogent  and  reliable testimonies  of  PWs 1 and 2,  along  with the

aforementioned corroborative evidence, conclusively prove the

prosecution case. We reiterate that PWs 1 and 2 were steadfast in

their testimony about the motive, the last seen circumstance,

recovery of the dead body based on the confession of Accused No.2,

47

and about the identification of the dead body. We do not find any

embellishment or exaggeration in the evidence of these witnesses.

Moreover, the evidence of the other prosecution witnesses

(especially PWs 7, 26, 27, 29, 32 and 33) is homogeneous,

consistent and reliable, and corroborates the testimony of PWs 1

and 2, which leads us to conclude that the chain of circumstances

is complete and points solely at the guilt of the accused.   In our

considered opinion, the prosecution has proved the complicity of all

the appellants in  murdering  Santhakumar  by strangulating  him

and thereafter throwing the dead body at Tiger­Chola.   It is worth

recalling  that  while it is  necessary  that  proof  beyond reasonable

doubt should be adduced in all criminal cases, it is not necessary

that such proof should be perfect, and someone  who is guilty

cannot get away with impunity only because the truth may develop

some infirmity  when projected through human processes.   The

traditional dogmatic hypertechnical approach has to be replaced by

a rational, realistic and genuine approach for administering justice

in a criminal trial.   Justice cannot be made sterile by exaggerated

adherence to the rule of proof,  inasmuch as the benefit of doubt

48

must always be reasonable and not fanciful. (See  Inder Singh  v.

State (Delhi Administration), (1978) 4 SCC 161; State of H.P. v.

Lekh Raj & Anr., (2000) 1 SCC 247; Takhaji Hiraji v. Thakore

Kubersing Chamansing & Ors., (2001) 6 SCC 145;  Chaman &

Anr. v. State of Uttarakhand, (2016) 12 SCC 76).

44. Having regard to the entire material on record and the totality

of the facts and circumstances, we find that the evidence on record

fully proves the case of the prosecution and that the Trial Court as

well as the  High  Court evaluated the  material on record in its

proper  prospective  while coming to their conclusion.  Thus, the

judgment of the Trial Court as modified by the High Court need not

be interfered with. Hence these appeals fail and stand dismissed.  

...........................................J. (N.V. Ramana)

............................................J. (Mohan M. Shantanagoudar)

……………………………………..J. (Indira Banerjee)

New Delhi; March 29, 2019.  

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