Page 1

PANCHMAHAL VADODARA GRAMIN BANK & ORS. v.

D.M. PARMAR (Civil Appeal No. 2093 of 2007)

SEPTEMBER 21, 2011 [A.K. Patnaik and H.L. Gokhale, JJ.]

[2011] 12 SCR 690

The following order of the Court was delivered

O R D E R

1. These are two appeals filed by way of special leave under Article 136 of the  

Constitution of India against the common order dated 5.8.2005 in Letters Patent Appeals No.  

1736/2004 and 1869/2004 passed by the Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court.

2. The facts briefly are that D.M. Parmar was appointed in Panchmahal Vadodara Gramin  

Bank, ‘the Bank’  for short, as an officer by order dated 16.4.1988. He joined the bank on  

25.4.1988 and was confirmed in service on 9.5.1991. He worked as a Manager at Chundadi  

branch of the bank during 25.3.1996 to 21.6.1997 and during this period he had granted  

advances, renewed various loan accounts and extended more finance to the borrowers under  

Crop Loan Scheme. A show cause notice dated 15/20.5.1999 was issued to him to show  

cause why disciplinary action should not be initiated against him for various acts of omission  

and commission committed during his posting as a Manager of Chundadi branch of the bank  

during the period 25.3.1996 to 21.6.1997. He replied saying that he was not fully experienced  

in handling a big branch and in discharging duties as a Branch Manager and the acts of  

omission and commission were on account of his inexperience. The reply furnished by him  

was not accepted by the bank and a charge-sheet dated 20.26.4.1999 was issued to him  

alleging various acts of misconduct committed by him. He submitted his reply dated 2.5.2009  

and denied the charges. An Enquiry Officer was appointed to conduct the enquiry and the  

Enquiry Officer submitted his findings in his report dated 30.10.2000 holding that D.M. Parmar  

is guilty of most of the charges. The disciplinary authority thereafter gave an opportunity to  

D.M Parmar to make a representation against the findings of the Enquiry Officer and he  

submitted his representation. The disciplinary authority granted a personal hearing to him to  

show cause as to why the proposed punishment of dismissal should not be imposed on him.  

He appeared before the disciplinary authority and prayed that leniency be showed to him. The  

disciplinary authority, however, passed an order of dismissal dated 6.12.2000.

Page 2

3. D.M. Parmar then carried an appeal against the order of disciplinary authority. The  

appeal was dismissed by the appellate authority by order dated 17.2.2001. Aggrieved, he filed  

a writ petition registered as Special Civil Application No.6260/2001 before the Gujarat High  

Court. The writ petition was, however, withdrawn on 2.7.2002 by D.M. Parmar to enable him to  

make a representation to the concerned authority of the bank. He made a representation to  

the bank against the order of dismissal but the representation was rejected by order dated  

6.8.2002.

4. D.M. Parmar then filed a fresh writ petition No.6260/2001 before the High Court. A  

learned single Judge of the High Court heard the writ petition and passed the judgment dated  

13.8.2004. In the judgment, the learned single Judge observed that he had heard learned  

counsel for the respective parties extensively and gone through the entire records of the  

Enquiry Office and he was of the opinion that the Enquiry Officer has fully and properly  

scrutinised the relevant material before him before recording the findings on the charges  

levelled against D.M. Parmar and that reasonable opportunity had been given to him during  

the course of enquiry. The learned single Judge, however, held in the judgment that no reason  

had been mentioned in the order of dismissal as to why the disciplinary authority selected the  

penalty of dismissal although in the rules there were other minor and major penalties  

mentioned. The learned single Judge also found in his judgment that there was almost total  

non-application of mind with regard to the quantum of punishment. The learned single Judge  

was of the view that the disciplinary authority was required to consider the fact that there was  

no finding that there was dishonest intention or dishonest act on the part of D.M. Parmar. The  

learned single Judge further observed in his judgment that in the absence of any adverse past  

record, he could not have been lightly dismissed from service on the charges. The learned  

single Judge has, therefore, quashed the order of dismissal and directed reinstatement of D.M.  

Parmar but further directed that he should not get any backwages since he had not done any  

work since he was dismissed from service. The learned single Judge remanded the matter to  

the disciplinary authority for passing appropriate order with regard to quantum of punishment  

with the observation that the disciplinary authority may impose any penalty except the penalty  

of dismissal, removal or termination from service.

5. Aggrieved by the judgment of the learned single Judge, the bank filed Letters Patent  

Appeal No.1736/2005 and D.M. Parmar filed Letters Patent Appeal No.1869/2005. The  

Division Bench of the High Court, after hearing learned counsel for the parties, however,  

sustained the judgment of the learned single Judge and dismissed both the appeals. The bank  

has, therefore, filed C.A. No.2093/2007 and D.M. Parmar has filed C.A. No.2094/2007 before  

this Court.

Page 3

6. Mr. C.U. Singh, learned senior counsel appearing for the bank, the appellant in C.A.  

No.2093/2007, submitted that the findings of the Enquiry Officer would show that D.M. Parmar  

was guilty of very serious charges and was required to be dismissed from service on account  

of acts of integrity and dishonesty and lack of probity on the part of D.M Parmar. He referred to  

the order of disciplinary authority dated 6.12.2000 to show that disciplinary authority after  

careful consideration of findings of the Enquiry Officer and the entire records of enquiry had  

come to the conclusion that grave lapses in sanction/disbursement in many loan accoutns had  

been established against him and the magnitude of irregularities and blatant disregard of set  

procedures and norms for sanction/disbursement were of a serious nature. He submitted that  

the disciplinary authority after considering the nature of irregularities had come to the  

conclusion that the acts of misconduct committed by D.M. Parmar could not be viewed  

leniently and that he had abused his position and power which was detrimental to the interest  

of the bank. He was of the opinion that ends of justice would be met if the punishment of  

dismissal was imposed on him. Mr. Singh vehemently submitted that the finding of the learned  

single Judge which has been sustained by the Division Bench that the disciplinary authority did  

not apply his mind before deciding to impose the penalty of dismissal on D.M Parmar was,  

therefore, factually not correct. He submitted that considering the serious nature of misconduct  

committed by D.M. Parmar, this is a fit case in which the order of dismissal should have been  

passed by the disciplinary authority and the High Court should not have interfered with the  

order of dismissal. In support of his submissions, he relied on the decisions of this Court in  

Disciplinary Authority-cum-Regional Manager Vs. Nikunja Bihari Patnaik (1996) 9 SCC 69 and  

in Chairman & M.D., United Commercial Bank Vs. P.C. Kakkad, (2005) 4 SCC 364 in which  

this Court has taken a view that officers/employees of the bank should be seriously dealt with  

for charges of misconduct in the interest of discipline of the bank and such officers are  

required to discharge their duties with utmost integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence and  

should not do anything which is unbecoming of a bank officer. He also relied on a recent  

decision of this Court in General Manager(P), Punjab & Sind Bank & Ors. Vs. Daya Singh,  

(2010) 11 SCC 233 in which this Court has taken a view that conclusions arrived at by the  

Enquiry Officer on the basis of evidence should not be interfered with by the High Court lightly.

7. Mr. Nachiketa Joshi, learned counsel appearing for D.M. Parmar, the appellant in C.A.  

No. 2094/2007, on the other hand, submitted that there has been gross violation of principles  

of natural justice in as much as D.M. Parmar had filed a petition dated 3.11.1999 before the  

Enquiry Officer making a prayer that he should be furnished some papers, namely,  

chargesheet served on his predecessor in office, one L.K. Parmar, information in regard to  

working and functioning of L.K Parmar in Chundadi branch at the relevant time, copies of  

inspection report, completion report and rectification certificate issued by the Head Office of

Page 4

the bank during his tenure as the branch manager of Chundadi branch, statement of loans  

disbursed, crop loan schedules, extracts of land holding, renewal forms and Ikrarnama issued  

by him, P.S.S. Statement of loan accounts during his tenure and copies of letters written by  

him requesting the authority to post a second officer in the branch. He submitted that the  

prayer was not granted by the Enquiry Officer and instead the prayer was opposed by the  

Presenting Officer on behalf of the bank. He vehemently argued that these documents  

mentioned in his application dated 3.11.1999 before the Enquiry Officer were relevant for the  

defence of D.M. Parmar and as these have not been furnished to him, there was violation of  

principles of natural justice. Mr. Joshi cited the decision of this Court in Narinder Mohan Arya  

Vs. United India Insurance Co.Ltd. & Ors, (2006) 4 SCC 713 and Union of India & Ors. Vs.  

Prakash Kumar Tandon, (2009) 2 SCC 541, in which this Court has held that principles of  

natural justice and fair play have to be observed by the Enquiry Officer in a disciplinary  

enquiry. He submitted that in the latter case of Union of India & Ors. Vs. Prakash Kumar  

Tandon (supra), this Court also held that when an application was filed for summoning the  

witnesses by delinquent officer, it was obligatory on the part of the enquiry officer to pas an  

order on such an application. Relying on this observation in the aforesaid case, he submitted  

that in the present case, although an application was filed for furnishing the documents by  

D.M. Parmar, no order was passed by the enquiry officer and, therefore, this is case where  

principles of natural justice have been violated.

8. Mr. Joshi further submitted that this Court has held in Kailash Nath Gupta Vs. Enquiry  

Officer, (R.K. Rai), Allahabad Bank & Ors., (2003) 9 SCC 480 that where the quantum of  

punishment is disproportionate to the gravity of charge, the Court will interfere with the  

quantum of punishment. He pointed out that in the aforesaid case, the Court, after going  

through the charge against the delinquent officer, held that the charge was only in respect of  

some procedural irregularities which did not warrant the extreme punishment of dismissal from  

service. He submitted that in this case also the charges, if held to be proved, are only acts of  

irregularities and no charge of misappropriation has been established against D.M. Parmar.  

He also relied on the decision of this Court in Administrator, Union Territory of Dadra and  

Nagar Haveli Vs. Gulabhia M. Lad, (2010) 5 SCC 775 wherein it has been held that exercise  

of discretion in imposition of punishment is dependent on host of factors such as gravity of  

misconduct, past conduct, the nature of duties assigned to the delinquent, responsibility of the  

position that the delinquent holds, previous penalty, if any, and the discipline required to be  

maintained in the department or establishment he works. He submitted that all these factors  

have not been taken into consideration by the disciplinary authority by imposing the  

punishment of dismissal from service.

Page 5

9. We have considered the submissions of learned counsel for the parties and we find  

that in the enquiry report, the Enquiry Officer has dealt with the request of D.M. Parmar with  

regard to the documents he had asked for and he has held that the documents were asked for  

in connection with the irregularities of L.K. Parmar but these irregularities committed by the  

earlier officer have no connection with the serious irregularities committed by D.M. Parmar.  

The Enquiry Officer has further held that if any irregularities were committed by the earlier  

officer L.K. Parmar, the same have not to be included in the chargesheet issued to D.M.  

Parmar. Thus, the Enquiry Officer has taken a view, and we think it is a right view, that the  

documents to show the irregularities committed during the time of the previous manager of the  

bank L.K. Parmar had no relevance to the charges against D.M. Parmar. As has been held by  

this Court in Narinder Mohan Arya Vs. United India Insurance Co.Ltd. (supra) cited by Mr.  

Joshi, it is not possible to lay down any rigid rules of principles of natural justice which  

depends on the facts and circumstances of each case but the concept of fair play in action is  

the basis. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we find that the documents called for by  

D.M. Parmar during the enquiry have been found by the Enquiry Officer as not to be relevant  

for the charges against D.M. Parmar and we are of the considered view that if the said  

documents were not allowed to be inspected by D.M. Parmar as delinquent officer, there has  

been no violation of principles of natural justice.

10. On an examination of the enquiry report, we find that there were as many as ten  

charges against D.M. Parmar and the charges were of serious nature and out of these  

charges, only one charge was not fully proved, one charge was partly proved and one charge  

was deleted and rest of the charges were proved. In the conclusion, the enquiry officer has  

recorded the following findings:

“FINDINGS

(1) He did not take all possible steps to ensure and protect the interest of the Bank. In fact  

he took such steps and did such acts of omission and commission, which were  

derogatory, detrimental, prejudicial and injurious to the interest of the Bank. .....  

Proved.

(2) He showed gross negligence and indifference in discharge of his duties. .....  

Proved.

(3) He did not discharge his duties with utmost integrity and honesty but in fact did such  

acts of lack of probity on his part. .... Proved.

(4) He did not maintain discipline in all transactions and in discharging his duties s a  

Manager. In fct, he misused and abused his position as a Manager of the branch.

...... Proved

Page 6

(5) He did not perform his duties with devotion and diligence and violated and flouted the  

rules of the Bank. ..... Proved.

(6) He committed acts of breach of trust. .....Proved.

(7) By his acts of misdeeds, he tarnished the image of the bank. ..... Proved.

(8) He did acts of unbecoming of a Bank Officer.

....Proved.”

These findings are all based on adequate material referred to in the inquiry report and  

these materials are mainly bank records. As has been held by this Court in the recent  

decision in General Manager(P), Punjab & Sind Bank & Ors. Vs. Daya Singh, (2010) 11  

SCC 233, in which one of us (H.L. Gokhale, J.) was a party, as long as there are  

materials and evidence in support of the findings, the High Court cannot interfere with  

such findings in exercise of powers of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution  

of India. The learned single Judge of the High Court and the Division Bench of the High  

Court have, therefore, rightly not interfered with the findings. Once the findings of the  

Enquiry Officer, which have been quoted above, are not interfered with, we fail to see how  

the delinquent officer can avoid the punishment of dismissal from service. The findings  

include not only serious acts of negligence but also acts of dishonesty and lack of probity.  

The Court cannot probably take a view that punishment of dismissal was shockingly or  

strikingly disproportionate to the gravity of charges proved against D.M. Parmar.

11. In the result, the impugned judgment of the Division Bench and the learned single  

Judge are set aside and the writ petition filed by D.M. Parmar is dismissed. Accordingly,  

C.A. No.2093/2007 is allowed and C.A. NO.2094/2007 is dismissed. There shall be no  

order as to costs.