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         REPORTABLE  

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA  CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION  

 Criminal Appeal No.  1013 of 2019  

(@SLP (Crl.) No. 4169 of 2018)        

P  Ramesh                                            …Appellant                                     Versus      State Rep by Inspector of Police          …Respondent        

J U D G M E N T      

Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, J    

 1 Leave granted.  

 2 This appeal arises from a judgment dated 27 March 2018 of the High Court of  

Judicature at Madras at its Madurai Bench.      

 3 The appellant was tried for the murder of his wife. Besides the offence under  

Section 302, he was also tried for the commission of an offence under Section 498A of  

the Indian Penal Code 1 . On 24 June 2016, the appellant was convicted by the Sessions  

 1  ―IPC‖

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Judge, Fast Track Mahila Court, Virudhunagar District at Srivilliputtur for offences under  

Section 302 and Section 498A. He was sentenced to life imprisonment for the offence  

punishable under Section 302 and to imprisonment for three years for the offence under  

Section 498A.   

 4 During the course of the trial, the prosecution sought to adduce the evidence of  

PW-3 ‗S‘ and PW-4 ‗H‘, the children of the appellant and the deceased 2 .  On 19 May  

2015 when their evidence was to be recorded, PW-3 was eight-years-old while PW-4  

was six-years-old. The trial judge posed certain initial queries to both the witnesses to  

assess whether they were capable of deposing in evidence. One of the questions which  

was posed was whether they were aware of the person before whom they were  

standing. Both the witnesses stated that they were unaware of the person before whom  

they were standing in the court. At the same time, the child witnesses had stated that  

they had come to depose in evidence about the circumstances leading to the death of  

their mother.    

 5 The trial judge came to the conclusion that the testimony of PW-3 could not be  

recorded as PW-3 as a witness did not know the judge and the lawyers. Similarly, in  

regard to PW-4 the trial judge observed that he was unable to state who the judge was.   

As a result, he was considered to be incapable to depose in evidence.  No evidence of  

PW-3 and PW-4 was recorded.  

6 The exchange between the learned trial judge and PW-3 and PW-4, respectively  

is extracted below:  

―Name: ‗S‘   Father‘s Name : Ramesh     Village : Virudhunagar  Taluk : Virudhunagar    

 2  The identity of the children, who are minors is withheld in this judgment.

3  

Cast : BC   Calling :    Religion : Hindu  Age : 8    Solemnly affirmed in accordance with provisions of Act X of 1873 on the  day of : 19.05.2015    Question : What is your name?    Answer  : ‗S‘    Question : What is your age?    Answer  : 08-15    Question:  What is your father‘s name?    Answer   : Ramesh    Question :  What is your village name?    Answer  :  Chinna Perali    Question : What are you doing?    Answer : I am studying.    Question : Do you know where have you come?    Answer : Court     Question : Do you know why you are being brought?    Answer : To give evidence    Question : Do you know before whom you are standing?    Answer : Do not know    Even though the witness answered all the questions, I asked her why  have you come to depose evidence and she replied I have come to  depose about my mother‘s death. Further replied that I do not know who  is standing in front of me in court and the persons besides me. The  court considers that the witness testimony is unacceptable as the  witness does not know the judge and lawyers.‖ (sic)       And    ―Name: ‗H‘   Father‘s Name : Ramesh   Village : Virudhunagar  Taluk : Virudhunagar    Cast: BC    Calling :     Religion : Hindu   Age : 6  Solemnly affirmed in accordance with provisions of Act X of 1873 on the  date of : 19.05.2015    Question: What is your Name?    Answer : ‗H‘    Question: What is your age?    Answer: 06-15    Question: What is your father‘s Name?    Answer: Ramesh   

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Question:  What is your Village Name?    Answer:  Perali    Question:  What are you doing?    Answer:  I am studying in 1

st  standard  

 Question:  Did you know where have you come?    Answer:  I do not know where I stand    Question:  Did you know what have you been brought for?    Answer: I have come to tell about my mother‘s killing     Question: Do you know who are you standing in front of?    Answer:  He stated that he has come to depose evidence before you. I  asked him, who I am, he replied that I do not know who you are.    The court did not allow him to depose evidence because he was  considered as incapable to depose evidence.‖ (sic)  

7 The trial judge came to the conclusion that there was sufficient evidence on the  

record to sustain the charge under Section 302 as well as that under Section 498A and  

that the prosecution had brought home the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable  

doubt. Aggrieved by the judgment of conviction, the accused appealed before the High  

Court.  

8 The High Court came to the conclusion that the grounds which weighed with the  

trial judge in declining to allow the recording of the evidence of PW-3 and PW-4 after  

initial questions were put to them were erroneous. The High Court also observed that  

while on one hand, the Trial Court had adverted to the statements of the two child  

witnesses which were recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure  

1973 3 , yet the trial judge had refused to allow the evidence of the child witnesses to be  

recorded on the ground that they were unable to identify the person before whom they  

were deposing. The High Court set aside the judgment of the Trial Court and remanded  

the case to the Trial Court with a direction to examine PW-3 and PW-4 after objectively  

 3 ―CrPC‖

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ascertaining their capacity to depose. The High Court has also directed that the Trial  

Court shall thereafter; furnish an opportunity to lead evidence in rebuttal to the accused.  

9 Mr A Selvin Raja, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant submitted  

that:  

(i) After the incident took place on 18 January 2014, the appellant surrendered on  

20 January 2014;  

 (ii) Though between 19 January 2014 and 21 January 2014, the investigating officer  

recorded 21 statements, the statement of the child witnesses under Section 164  

of the CrPC were recorded by the Chief Judicial Magistrate belatedly on 10  

March 2014;  

 (iii) After the trial judge on 19 May 2015 held that the two child witnesses were  

incompetent to depose, no revision was filed by the prosecution; and  

 (iv) Over five years have elapsed since the date of the incident and the direction to  

record the evidence of the two witnesses will cause serious prejudice to the  

accused-appellant particularly since the children have been in the custody of  

their maternal grandmother in the meantime.  

On the above grounds, it was submitted that there was no justification on the part of the  

High Court to issue an order of remand. Hence, it was urged that it would be  

appropriate and proper if the High Court is directed to evaluate the appeal filed by the  

accused-appellant on the basis of the evidence available on the record. Learned  

counsel submitted that if he has the opportunity of doing so before the High Court, the  

appellant would be able to establish that the chain of circumstances is not complete and

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that having regard to the well settled principles governing the appreciation of  

circumstantial evidence, the appellant would be entitled to press for acquittal before the  

High Court.  

10 On the other hand, while supporting the decision of the High Court, Mr M Yogesh  

Kanna, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State submitted that the submission  

on part of the appellant is based on a hypothesis that the child witnesses, if they are  

permitted to depose at this stage, could advance an account which would cause  

prejudice to the appellant. The statements of PW-3 and PW-4 were recorded under  

Section 164 of CrPC by the Judicial Magistrate. Moreover, the appellant would be  

entitled to cross-examine the witnesses. Learned counsel submitted that the order  

passed by the High Court should be affirmed in order to prevent a miscarriage of justice  

since the reasons which weighed with the Trial Court in declining to allow the recording  

of the testimonies of PW-3 and PW-4 were manifestly erroneous. As a consequence of  

the exclusion of their evidence, the prosecution has been disabled from adducing the  

evidence of the two children who were natural witnesses to the crime.  

11 In assessing the rival submissions, we must at the outset advert to the grounds  

which weighed with the trial judge in coming to the conclusion that PW-3 and PW-4  

were not competent witnesses and their testimonies ought not to be recorded. PW-3,  

the daughter of the accused and the deceased, was eight years of age while PW-4,  

their son, was six-years-old. The trial judge addressed certain preliminary questions to  

the witnesses. The question which weighed with the Trial Court in coming to the  

conclusion that both of them were incapable of deposing was whether the children  

knew the person they were standing before. To these questions, PW-3 and PW-4  

stated that they were unaware of that person. The trial judge, purely on this basis, found

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that the testimonies of the child witnesses would be unacceptable on the ground that  

the witnesses did not know the judge and the lawyers.    

 12 We are in agreement with the view of the High Court that the reason which  

weighed with the trial judge in preventing the evidence of PW-3 and PW-4 from being  

recorded was manifestly erroneous and would result in a miscarriage of justice.  

Significantly, both PW-3 and PW-4 were aware of the reason for their presence in the  

court. They stated before the trial judge that they were in court to tender evidence in  

regard to the circumstances pertaining to the death of their mother. What the trial judge  

was required to determine was whether the children were in a fit and competent state of  

mind to depose and were able to understand the purpose for being present on the  

occasion. Prior to the recording of evidence of a child witness, the Trial Court must  

undertake the exercise of posing relevant questions to determine the capacity of the  

child witness to provide rational answers. This exercise would allow the court to  

determine whether the child has the intellectual and cognitive skills to recollect and  

narrate the incidents of the crime.   

13 Section 118 4  of the Evidence Act 1872 deals with the competence of a person to  

testify before the court. Section 4 5  of the Oaths Act 1969 requires all witnesses to take  

                4  Section 118. Who may testify.—  

All persons shall be competent to testify unless the Court considers that they are prevented from understanding the  question put to them, or from giving rational answers to those questions, by tender years, extreme old age, disease,  whether of body or mind, or any other cause of the same kind.   Explanation – A lunatic is not incompetent to testify, unless he is prevented by his lunacy from understanding the  

questions put to him and giving rational answers to them.    5 Section 4. Oaths or affirmations to be made by witnesses, interpreter and jurors.—  

(1) Oaths or affirmations shall be made by the following persons, namely:— (a) all witnesses, that is to say, all persons  who may lawfully be examined, or give, or be required to give, evidence by or before any court or person having by law or  consent of parties authority to examine such persons or to receive evidence; (b) interpreters of questions put to, and  evidence given by, witnesses; and (c) jurors: Provided that where the witness is a child under twelve years of age, and the  court or person having authority to examine such witness is of opinion that, though the witness understands the duty of  speaking the truth, he does not understand the nature of an oath or affirmation, the foregoing provisions of this section  and the provisions of section 5 shall not apply to such witness; but in any such case the absence of an oath or affirmation  shall not render inadmissible any evidence given by such witness nor affect the obligation of the witness to state the truth.  (2) Nothing in this section shall render it lawful to administer, in a criminal proceeding, an oath or affirmation to the

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oath or affirmation, with an exception for child witnesses under the age of twelve years.  

Therefore, if the court is satisfied that the child witness below the age of twelve years is  

a competent witness, such a witness can be examined without oath or affirmation. The  

rule was stated in Dattu Ramrao Sakhare v State of Maharashtra 6 , where this Court,  

in relation to child witnesses, held thus:  

 ―5. … A child witness if found competent to depose to the  

facts and reliable one such evidence could be the basis of  

conviction. In other words even in the absence of oath the  

evidence of a child witness can be considered under Section  

118 of the Evidence Act provided that such witness is able to  

understand the questions and able to give rational answers  

thereof. The evidence of a child witness and credibility thereof  

would depend upon the circumstances of each case. The only  

precaution which the court should bear in mind while  

assessing the evidence of a child witness is that the witness  

must be a reliable one and his/her demeanour must be like  

any other competent witness and there is no likelihood of  

being tutored.‖   

 14 A child has to be a competent witness first, only then is her/his statement  

admissible. The rule was laid down in a decision of the US Supreme Court in Wheeler v  

United States 7 , wherein it was held thus:  

―… While no one would think of calling as a witness an infant  

only two or three years old, there is no precise age which  

determines the question of competency. This depends on  

the capacity and intelligence of the child, his  

appreciation of the difference between truth and  

falsehood, as well as of his duty to tell the former. The  

decision of this question rests primarily with the trial  

judge, who sees the proposed witness, notices his  

manner, his apparent possession or lack of intelligence,  

and may resort to any examination which- will tend to  

disclose his capacity and intelligence as well as his  

understanding of the obligations of an oath. As many of  

these matters cannot be photographed into the record the  

                                                                                                                                                                    accused person, unless he is examined as a witness for the defence, or necessary to administer to the official interpreter  of any court, after he has entered on the execution of the duties of his office, an oath or affirmation that he will faithfully  discharge those duties.  6 (1997) 5 SCC 341  

7 159 U.S. 523 (1895)

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decision of the trial judge will not be disturbed on review  

unless from that which is preserved it is clear that it was  

erroneous…‖          (emphasis supplied)  

 In Ratansinh Dalsukhbhai Nayak v State of Gujarat

8 , this Court held thus:  

―7. … The decision on the question whether the child  

witness has sufficient intelligence primarily rests with the  

trial Judge who notices his manners, his apparent  

possession or lack of intelligence, and the said Judge  

may resort to any examination which will tend to disclose  

his capacity and intelligence as well as his  

understanding of the obligation of an oath. The decision  

of the trial court may, however, be disturbed by the  

higher court if from what is preserved in the records, it is  

clear that his conclusion was erroneous. This precaution  

is necessary because child witnesses are amenable to  

tutoring and often live in a world of make-believe. Though it is  

an established principle that child witnesses are dangerous  

witnesses as they are pliable and liable to be influenced  

easily, shaped and moulded, but it is also an accepted norm  

that if after careful scrutiny of their evidence the court comes  

to the conclusion that there is an impress of truth in it, there is  

no obstacle in the way of accepting the evidence of a child  

witness.‖           (emphasis supplied)  

 15 In order to determine the competency of a child witness, the judge has to form her  

or his opinion. The judge is at the liberty to test the capacity of a child witness and no  

precise rule can be laid down regarding the degree of intelligence and knowledge which  

will render the child a competent witness. The competency of a child witness can be  

ascertained by questioning her/him to find out the capability to understand the  

occurrence witnessed and to speak the truth before the court. In criminal proceedings, a  

person of any age is competent to give evidence if she/he is able to (i) understand  

questions put as a witness; and (ii) give such answers to the questions that can be  

understood. A child of tender age can be allowed to testify if she/he has the intellectual  

 8  (2004) 1 SCC 64. Subsequently, relied upon in Nivrutti Pandurang Kokate v State of Maharashtra (2008) 12 SCC 565

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capacity to understand questions and give rational answers thereto. 9  A child becomes  

incompetent only in case the court considers that the child was unable to understand the  

questions and answer them in a coherent and comprehensible manner. 10

If the child  

understands the questions put to her/him and gives rational answers to those questions,  

it can be taken that she/he is a competent witness to be examined.   

16 We are satisfied that the grounds which weighed with the learned trial judge were  

erroneous. In the circumstances, the High Court was in our view, justified in coming to  

the conclusion that the non-recording of the testimonies of PW-3 and PW-4 was on  

account of a palpably erroneous approach on the part of the learned trial judge.  

   17 We are mindful of the fact that the decision of the High Court was in an appeal  

preferred by the accused. In such a situation it is necessary to discuss the scope of the  

High Court‘s powers in an appeal filed against conviction. Section 374 11

of the CrPC  

provides for appeals against convictions and allows any person convicted by a  

Sessions Judge or an Additional Sessions Judge to appeal before the High Court.  

                9  Dalsukhbhai Nayak v State of Gujarat (2004) 1 SCC 64  

10  Sarkar, ―Law of Evidence‖ 19

th  Edition, Volume 2, Lexis Nexis, p. 2678 citing DPP v M (1977) 2 All ER 749 (QBD)  

11  Section 374.— Appeals from convictions   

(1) Any person convicted on a trial held by a High Court in its extraordinary original criminal jurisdiction may appeal to the  Supreme Court.   (2) Any person convicted on a trial held by a Sessions Judge or an Additional Sessions Judge or on a trial held by any  other Court in which a sentence of imprisonment for more than seven years has been passed against him or against any  other person convicted at the same trial; may appeal to the High Court.   (3) Save as otherwise provided in sub-section (2), any person,-   (a) convicted on a trial held by a Metropolitan Magistrate or Assistant Sessions Judge or Magistrate of the first class or of  the second class, or   (b) sentenced under section 325, or   (c) in respect of whom an order has been made or a sentence has been passed under section 360 by any Magistrate,  may appeal to the Court of Session.   (4) When an appeal has been filed against a sentence passed under section 376, section 376A, section 376AB, section  376B, section 376C, section 376D, section 376DA, section 376DB or section 376E of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860),  the appeal shall be disposed of within a period of six months from the date of filing of such appeal.  

11  

Section 386 of the CrPC 12

defines the powers of the Appellate Court while disposing of  

an appeal against an order of conviction or acquittal. The power under this section is  

not unlimited. The provision is to be taken as giving the power to do only that which the  

lower court could and should have done in a criminal case.  

 18 A three judge Bench decision of this Court in Mohd Hussain v State (Govt of  

NCT of Delhi) 13

while dealing with the powers of the Appellate Court to order a retrial  

under Section 386(b) of the CrPC, held thus:  

―41. The appellate court hearing a criminal appeal from a  

judgment of conviction has power to order the retrial of the  

accused under Section 386 of the Code. That is clear from the  

bare language of Section 386(b). Though such power exists, it  

should not be exercised in a routine manner. A de novo trial or  

retrial of the accused should be ordered by the appellate court  

in exceptional and rare cases and only when in the opinion of  

the appellate court such course becomes indispensable to  

avert failure of justice. Surely this power cannot be used to  

allow the prosecution to improve upon its case or fill up the  

lacuna. A retrial is not the second trial; it is continuation of the  

same trial and same prosecution. The guiding factor for retrial  

must always be demand of justice. Obviously, the exercise of  

power of retrial under Section 386(b) of the Code, will depend  

                    12

Section 386.— Powers of the Appellate Court  After perusing such record and hearing the appellant or his pleader, if he appears, and the Public Prosecutor, if he  appears, and in case of an appeal under section 377 or section 378, the accused, if he appears, the Appellate Court may,  if it considers that there is no sufficient ground for interfering, dismiss the appeal, or may—  (a) in an appeal from an order of acquittal, reverse such order and direct that further inquiry be made, or that the accused  be re-tried or committed for trial, as the case may be, or find him guilty and pass sentence on him according to law;  (b) in an appeal from a conviction—  (i) reverse the finding and sentence and acquit or discharge the accused, or order him to be re-tried by a Court of  competent jurisdiction subordinate to such Appellate Court or committed for trial, or  (ii) alter the finding, maintaining the sentence, or  (iii) with or without altering the finding, alter the nature or the extent, or the nature and extent, of the sentence, but not so  as to enhance the same;  (c) in an appeal for enhancement of sentence—  (i) reverse the finding and sentence and acquit or discharge the accused or order him to be re-tried by a Court competent  to try the offence, or  (ii) alter the finding maintaining the sentence, or  (iii) with or without altering the finding, alter the nature or the extent, or the nature and extent, of the sentence, so as to  enhance or reduce the same;  (d) in an appeal from any other order, alter or reverse such order;  (e) make any amendment or any consequential or incidental order that may be just or proper;  Provided that the sentence shall not be enhanced unless the accused has had an opportunity of showing cause against  such enhancement:  Provided further that the Appellate Court shall not inflict greater punishment for the offence which in its opinion the  accused has committed, than might have been inflicted for that offence by the Court passing the order or sentence under  appeal.  13

(2012) 9 SCC 408

12  

on the facts and circumstances of each case for which no  

straitjacket formula can be formulated but the appeal court  

must closely keep in view that while protecting the right of an  

accused to fair trial and due process, the people who seek  

protection of law do not lose hope in legal system and the  

interests of the society are not altogether overlooked.‖  

A similar position was adopted by this Court in Ajay Kumar Ghoshal v State of  

Bihar 14

, where it was held thus:  

―11. Though the word ―retrial‖ is used under Section 386(b)(i)  

CrPC, the powers conferred by this clause is to be exercised  

only in exceptional cases, where the appellate court is  

satisfied that the omission or irregularity has occasioned in  

failure of justice. The circumstances that should exist for  

warranting a retrial must be such that where the trial was  

undertaken by the court having no jurisdiction, or trial was  

vitiated by serious illegality or irregularity on account of the  

misconception of nature of proceedings. An order for retrial  

may be passed in cases where the original trial has not  

been satisfactory for some particular reasons such as  

wrong admission or wrong rejection of evidences or the  

court refused to hear certain witnesses who were  

supposed to be heard.‖        (emphasis supplied)  

19 The power of an Appellate Court to order a retrial on the limited point of re-

recording statements of witnesses was recently discussed in Atma Ram and Ors v  

State of Rajasthan 15

, where the Trial Court had convicted the accused persons of  

offences under Section 302, 307, 452, 447, 323, 147, 148 and 149 IPC and sentenced  

them to death. During the trial, the court had recorded the evidence of twelve witnesses  

in absence of the accused persons. In an appeal against conviction preferred by the  

accused persons, the High Court exercised its powers under Section 386(b) of CrPC to  

quash and set aside the judgment of the Trial Court and remanded the matter back to  

Trial Court to the extent of recording statements of the twelve witnesses afresh after  

 14

(2017) 12 SCC 699  15

2019 SCC OnLine SC 523 : Crl. Appeal No. 656-657 of 2019

13  

securing presence of the accused in the court. The High Court held in the following  

terms:  

―In view of the discussion made hereinabove and looking to  

the glaring facts of the case at hand, we feel that in order to  

do complete justice to the accused as well as to the victims,  

the entire case cannot be thrown out by holding the  

proceedings to be vitiated on account of the mistakes  

committed by the trial Judge or the prison authorities  

concerned. A fresh trial/de-novo has to be ordered by  

directing the trial court to lawfully re-record statements of the  

witnesses indicated above whose evidence was recorded in  

the first round without ensuring presence of the accused in  

the court.‖ 16

 The accused persons preferred a Special Leave Petition before this Court, challenging  

the High Court‘s order of a de-novo trial for re-recording of statements of witnesses.  

Affirming the view taken by the High Court, this Court held thus:  

 ―22. … Section 386 then enumerates powers of the Appellate  

Court which inter alia includes the power to ―reverse the  

finding and sentence and acquit or discharge the accused, or  

order him to be re-tried by a Court of competent jurisdiction  

subordinate to such Appellate Court or committed for trial‖.  

The powers of Appellate Court are equally wide. The High  

Court in the present case was exercising powers both under  

Chapters XXVIII and XXIX of the Code. If the power can go  

to the extent of ordering a complete re-trial, the exercise  

of power to a lesser extent namely ordering de novo  

examination of twelve witnesses with further directions as  

the High Court has imposed in the present matter, was  

certainly within the powers of the High Court. There is,  

thus, no infraction or jurisdictional error on the part of the High  

Court.‖   

―25. ... If there was an infraction, which otherwise does not  

vitiate the trial by itself, the attempt must be to remedy the  

situation to the extent possible, so that the interests of the  

accused as well as societal interest are adequately  

safeguarded. The very same witnesses were directed to be  

de novo examined which would ensure that the interest of  

the prosecution is subserved and at the same time the  

accused will have every right and opportunity to watch  

 16

D.B. Criminal Appeal No. 33/2018

14  

the witnesses deposing against them, watch their  

demeanor and instruct their counsel properly so that said  

witnesses can be effectively cross-examined. In the  

process, the interest of the accused would also stand  

protected. On the other hand, if we were to accept the  

submission that the proceedings stood vitiated and, therefore,  

the High Court was powerless to order de novo examination of  

the concerned witnesses, it would result in great miscarriage  

of justice. The persons who are accused of committing four  

murders would not effectively be tried. The evidence against  

them would not be read for a technical infraction resulting in  

great miscarriage. Viewed thus, the order and directions  

passed by the High Court completely ensure that a fair  

procedure is adopted and the depositions of the witnesses,  

after due distillation from their cross-examination can be read  

in evidence.‖               (emphasis supplied)  

 20 In the present case, the High Court in the considered exercise of its appellate  

jurisdiction has remanded the proceedings back to the Trial Court to assess objectively  

the capacity of the two child witnesses and if the evidence is recorded, to furnish an  

opportunity to the accused to offer evidence in rebuttal. The accused will also be  

entitled to cross examine them. We have taken due note of the submissions which have  

been made on the part of the appellant in regard to the fact that there has been some  

lapse of time.  As on date, though a little over four years have elapsed since the  

exclusion of their evidence by the trial judge, both the witnesses continue to be minors.   

Hence, the High Court has issued necessary directions to the learned trial judge to  

assess objectively the capacity of the two child witnesses before recording their  

evidence.  

21 Consistent with the law which has been laid down by this Court in State of  

Maharashtra v Bandu alias Daulat 17

, it would be appropriate for the learned trial judge  

to ensure that the evidence of PW-3 and PW-4 is recorded in a child friendly  

 17

(2018) 11 SCC 163

15  

environment.  

22 The appellant would undoubtedly have a right to cross-examine the witnesses  

once their evidence is recorded by the trial judge.     

23 For the above reasons, we find no merit in the appeal. The appeal is accordingly  

dismissed. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.  

       …..…………..........................................J.  

            [Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud]           

……..…………………………...............J.                                                                                [Indira Banerjee]      New Delhi;  July 9, 2019.