ORIENTAL BANK OF COMMERCE Vs S.S. SHEOKAND
Bench: H.L. GOKHALE,J. CHELAMESWAR
Case number: C.A. No.-003081-003081 / 2006
Diary number: 17347 / 2004
Advocates: RAJIV NANDA Vs
S. JANANI
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REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3081 OF 2006
Oriental Bank of Commerce & Ors. … Appellant (s)
Versus S.S. Sheokand & Anr. … Respondent (s)
J U D G E M E N T
H.L. Gokhale J.
This Civil Appeal seeks to challenge the judgment
and order dated 16.3.2004 rendered by a Division Bench of
Punjab and Haryana High Court in Civil Writ Petition
No.18847 of 2001, allowing the said Writ Petition filed by the
respondent, a Senior Manager in the appellant-bank. That
judgment and order quashed the disciplinary order passed by
the appellant-bank reducing him in two stages in pay scale
with cumulative effect and also directed that he be
considered for further promotion.
The facts leading to this appeal are this wise:-
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2. The respondent at the relevant time was working
as the Senior Manager in a branch of the appellant-bank at
Narwana, Bahadurgarh. It was noticed by the bank that he
had purchased third party cheques/drafts of huge amounts
beyond the discretionary powers of lending. This was done
without completing the pre-sanction formalities. The
appellant-bank, therefore, served a show cause notice to the
respondent on 26.2.1997 for committing these unauthorised
acts. The respondent filed a detailed reply dated 12.4.1997.
Therein the respondent admitted committing of the alleged
acts. He, however, stated that this was done with the
intention of increasing the profits of the bank. He also
contended that the bank had not suffered any loss in these
transactions.
3. The appellant-bank, thereafter, charge-sheeted the
respondent on 1.12.1997 for two specific irregularities, they
were as follows:-
“Charge No.1 – Respondent had unauthorisedly purchased 3rd party cheques/drafts of huge amount aggregating to Rs.45.23 crores for a number of parties much beyond his discretionary powers of lending without completing pre-sanction
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formalities in violation of head office guidelines. Thus he violated Regulation 3(i) of Oriental Bank of Commerce Officer Employees (Conduct) Regulation, 1982.
Charge No.2 – Respondent had released advance under the Prime Minister Rojgar Yojna, and unauthorisedly insisted such borrowers to provide collateral securities in the shape of immovable property and guarantee in violation of the above scheme.”
4. The charge-sheet was followed by an inquiry. The
inquiry officer gave a report dated 26.2.1999 which was
forwarded by the respondent on 17.4.1999 to make a
representation on the findings. In paragraph 4 of the report,
the inquiry officer dealt with statement of SW-1 (State Witness
No.1) which stated that as per the head office circular, the
discretionary powers of the Branch Manager at the relevant
time were up to Rs.30 lacs for purchasing bank drafts and
government cheques, and up to Rs.1.5 lacs for third party
cheques. As against this provision, the respondent had
purchased cheques/drafts aggregating to Rs.45.23 crores as
per the details produced in the inquiry report. This was done
without any authorization, and particularly when the authority
of the respondent in this behalf was placed under abeyance.
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The respondent raised various technical objections with
respect to the production of the documents, but essentially
contended that his acts, which went beyond discretionary
powers, were ratified and confirmed by the higher authorities.
He submitted that these instruments were received from the
respectable parties to increase the profit of the branch. With
respect to the instructions issued to him by the Regional
Manager to stop purchasing these cheques and drafts, he
submitted that he had not violated these instructions.
5. The paragraph 4.3 of the Enquiry report contains
the assessment of evidence on charge No.1. It reads as
follows:-
“4.3 Assessment of Evidence:-
Ex. S.27 and S.28 are head office circulars which lay down the discretionary powers of the branch incumbent. SW1 confirmed that during the material time the powers of the BM (Branch Manager) was 30 lacs for purchase of bank draft and Rs. 1.5 lacs for third party cheques. SW1 also confirmed that the CO(Charged Officer) had purchased cheques/drafts beyond his discretionary powers. He deposed that 77 cheques/drafts amounting to 40 crores and 153 cheques/drafts amounting to 14.63 crores were purchased through clearing adjustment
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account. It was confirmed that discounting of cheques/drafts through clearing adjustment account was not permitted as per HO guidelines. SW1 confirmed that Ex. S2 was HO (Head Office) Circular dated 11.12.95 which had placed in abeyance the discretionary powers of the BM and Regional Heads in respect of loans and advances except in the priority sector. SW1 confirmed that s-15 was HO circular dated 23.10.96 releasing the aforesaid restrictions. It is, therefore, evident that the powers of the BM and the Regional Heads had been kept in abeyance between 11.12.95 to 23.10.96. On examining Ex. S.3, S4 and S.17, SW1 confirmed that the CO had unauthorisedly purchased cheques/drafts during the period. Furthermore, SW1 confirmed that the cheques purchased through clearing adjustment account are that of sister and allied concerns. Ex. S.27 and 28 would evidence that this power was vested with the GM (General Manager) and higher officers only. SW1 also confirmed that since the parties in question were also enjoying certain credit facilities sanctioned by RO/HO (Regional Office/Head Office), the branch should not have purchased cheques/drafts of the parties under its own powers. Ex. S-6, S.7, S.8 and S.9 are correspondence which proved that the higher formation of the bank had raised serious objections to the CO’s purchase of cheques/drafts. Ex. S.10 and S.12 are letters/replies of the CO where in he had admitted his mistakes. SW1 also confirmed that Ex.S.13 and S.14 are letters from the GM Personnel giving details of the unauthorised purchase of cheques and drafts by the CO, which were beyond his discretionary powers and made at a time
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when his powers were placed under abeyance. His non-reporting in the matter to RO has also been questioned. Ex. S14 is a letter from the CO accepting the aforesaid matter with an assurance to not to repeat the same in future. In view of the aforesaid evidence the contention of the CO to treat the matter as that of the priority sector is naturally not tenable. However, the CO has stated that there was no loss to the bank. The PO (Prosecuting Officer) has not disputed this. Therefore, the act of omission and commission of the CO can essentially be treated as procedural lapses. The charge of the lack of integrity has not been substantiated.
Charge-1 is held as partly proved.” Thus, the inquiry officer had held that the acts of omission
and commission on the part of the respondent were
essentially in the nature of procedural lapses. He held that
the charge of lack of integrity had not been substantiated.
Thus, charge No.1 mentioned above was, partly proved.
6. As far as charge No.2 is concerned, it was alleged
therein that the respondent had released advances under the
Prime Minister Rojgar Yojna, and for that insisted on the
borrowers to provide collateral securities/guarantees of third
party. The inquiry officer, however, noted that the
prosecution had not placed on record any single primary
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document of the collateral securities/guarantees of third party
to prove that part. He, therefore, held that charge No.2 was
not proved.
7. After receiving the inquiry report the respondent
made his representation dated 4.5.1999, and pleaded that he
deserved to be exonerated. The bank, thereafter, submitted
all these papers to the Chief Vigilance Officer of the Bank to
forward the same to the Chief Vigilance Commissioner (CVC).
The respondent at that stage wrote to the appellant-bank on
28.6.1999 seeking this correspondence with the CVC. In that
he stated as follows:-
“Now, after giving representation dated 4.5.99 on the findings of inquiry officer dated 26.2.99, the stage has come where second stage advice has to be remitted to the CVC through Chief Vigilance Officer of Oriental Bank of Commerce and I also understand that the case has been remitted or the same is in the process of remitting to the Chief Vigilance Officer alongwith recommendations of action proposed for onward submission to the Chief Vigilance Commissioner (CVC). In the light of above facts, you are requested to kindly supply me the copies of all such recommendations meant for second stage advice and the advice so received or likely to be received from the CVC for my representation on these recommendations prior to the stage of final disposal under
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Regulation ‘7’ of Discipline & Appeal Regulations, 1982 so that the interest of my defence is not jeopardized.”
8. The appellant declined that request of furnishing
the correspondence of papers exchanged with the CVC. The
Chief Vigilance Officer thereafter sent a letter to the
disciplinary authority that the Central Vigilance Commission
had advised to impose a major penalty of reduction of two
stages in pay scale, and thereupon the order came to be
passed on 27.10.1999 imposing the punishment of reduction
of two stages in pay scale. The respondent filed a
departmental appeal, and the appeal came to be rejected.
The review thereof was also rejected by the Board of
Directors. The appellate order dated 26.5.2000 passed by the
General Manager (Personnel) who was the disciplinary
authority at the end of it stated as follows:-
“……In this connection it is submitted that awarding of punishment with cumulative effect falls within Regulation 4(f) and the Disciplinary Authority has independently applied its mind while awarding the punishment. It is further submitted that the advice of the CVC is not binding on the Disciplinary Authority. Since the CVC is rendering advice to the Disciplinary authority the correspondence exchanged is not
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required to be provided to the charge sheeted employee. The punishment has been awarded keeping in view the gravity of the misconduct committed by the officer employee alongwith the submissions made by the employee. Submitted for orders please. SD/- General Manager (Per.) Disciplinary Authority.”
The Chairman & Managing Director, who was the appellate
authority, passed his orders into following words:-
“I don’t wish to entertain” Sd/-
2.6.2000”
9. Being aggrieved by the imposition of this
punishment, the respondent filed one Writ Petition earlier
bearing No.4116 of 2001 to the Punjab and Haryana High
Court on which an order came to be passed that the reviewing
authority may consider the review application of the
respondent. Time to take the decision was also extended on
one occasion, and the High Court was informed that the Bank
was considering commutation of the major penalty. The Chief
Vigilance Officer of the bank wrote to the Chief Vigilance
Commission on 18.8.2001 that the penalty imposed deserved
to be modified to a minor penalty. It, however, appears that
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the request was not accepted and, the appellant-bank
informed the respondent that the review petition was
rejected. This led the respondent to file Civil Writ Petition
No.18847 of 2001. Apart from the prayer to quash the order
of punishment, the respondent also sought a direction that he
be considered for further promotion from the post which he
was then holding viz. that of MMGS-III to SMGS-VI. It was his
contention that his turn had come up for consideration for
promotion, and it was declined because of this departmental
action. The High Court allowed the Writ Petition by the
impugned judgment and order.
10. The High Court essentially relied upon the judgment
and order rendered by this Court in the case of Nagaraj
Shivarao Karjagi vs. Syndicate Bank Head Office,
Manipal reported in AIR 1991 SC 1507. In that matter also
the bank had acted as per the advice of the Central Vigilance
Commission. The punishment was interfered by this Court. In
paragraph 19 of its judgment, this Court observed as follows:-
“19………..The punishment to be imposed whether minor or major depends upon the nature of every case and the gravity of the misconduct proved. The authorities have to
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exercise their judicial discretion having regard to the facts and circumstances of each case. They cannot act under the dictation of the Central Vigilance Commission or of the Central Government. No third party like the Central Vigilance Commission or the Central Government could dictate the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority as to how they should exercise their power and what punishment they should impose on the delinquent officer. (See. De Smith’s Judicial Review of Administrative Action, Fourth Edition, p. 309). The impugned directive of the Ministry of Finance is, therefore, wholly without jurisdiction and plainly contrary to the statutory Regulations governing disciplinary matters.”
11. The High Court relied upon another judgment of this
Court in the case of State Bank of India vs. D.C. Aggarwal
reported in AIR 1993 SC 1197. In that matter also, the High
Court had quashed the punishment imposed on the
respondent, since the CVC report had not been furnished to
him. In paragraph 5 of the judgment this Court observed as
follows:-
“5…… May be that the Disciplinary Authority has recorded its own findings and it may be coincidental that reasoning and basis of returning the finding of guilt are same as in the CVC report but it being a material obtained behind back of the respondent
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without his knowledge or supplying of any copy to him the High Court in our opinion did not commit any error in quashing the order.”
12. Therefore, in the present case, the High Court set
aside the punishment imposed on the respondent. It also
issued a Mandamus to the appellant-bank to consider the
respondent for promotion, which he had sought. Being
aggrieved by that judgment and order, this appeal has been
filed. Mr. K.N. Bhatt, learned senior counsel appeared for the
appellants and Mr. Nidhesh Gupta, learned senior counsel
appeared for the respondent.
Submissions on behalf of the parties:-
13. It was submitted on behalf of the appellants that
the High Court had erred in interfering with the punishment,
and in any case, directing consideration of the respondent for
promotion. Mr. Bhatt, learned senior counsel for the appellant
submitted that the bank was required to refer the matter to
the CVC which is constituted under the Central Vigilance
Commission Act, 2003. Regulation 19 of 1982 Regulations
framed thereunder makes it obligatory whenever there is a
vigilance angle involved. This regulation reads as follows:-
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“19. Consultation with the Central Vigilance Commission: The Bank shall consult the Central Vigilance Commission wherever necessary, in respect of all disciplinary cases having a vigilance angle.”
14. That apart, he submitted that the bank had arrived
at its decision on its own, and not because of any dictate by
the CVC. Charge No.1 was a serious charge. It was already
proved in the Departmental Enquiry, and although it is true
that at some stage the bank management thought that a
lenient view may be taken, it specifically arrived at its own
decision as can be seen from the appellate order. In his
submission, there was no prejudice caused to the respondent
by not making the report of the CVC available to him.
Conduct of this type required a stringent action to be taken.
He relied upon the judgment of this Court in the case of
Disciplinary Authority-Cum-Regional Manager vs.
Nikunja Bihari Patnaik reported in 1996 (9) SCC 69. This
Court has held in that matter that when the bank officer acts
beyond his authority, it is a misconduct, and a proof of any
loss to the bank is not necessary. That was a case where
also a senior officer of the Central Bank of India had allowed
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over-drafts and passed cheques involving substantial
amounts beyond his authority, and the respondent had been
dismissed from his service. Mr. Bhatt, submitted that in the
instant case, the appellant-bank had, in fact, been lenient in
imposing the punishment of merely reducing the respondent
by two grades.
15. It was then submitted by Mr. Bhatt, that in any
case the direction to consider the respondent for the
promotion could not be sustained. He pointed out to us that
the respondent had been punished earlier for similar conduct
on 27.10.1999. He was considered for promotion in the year
2002, and subsequent to the impugned judgment in the year
2005 also but was not found fit. The learned counsel for the
appellant-bank submitted that the question of promotion to
such a senior post had to be decided on merits and suitability
of the candidate. Mr. Bhatt, further submitted that even if
the punishment was to be interfered with, there was no case
for direction for promotion.
16. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent on
the other hand, that there was no loss suffered by the bank,
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and at the highest it was a technical lapse. The bank
management had also decided that a minor punishment was
required, and it was only because of the dictate of the CVC
that the disputed punishment had been imposed. Firstly,
there was mo reason to refer the issue to the CVC since there
was no vigilance angle involved therein. That apart, the
report of CVC was not made available to the respondent, and
it clearly amounted to denial of fair opportunity to defend.
Mr. Gupta submitted that the denial of promotion was
essentially because of this punishment, or else the
respondent would have been promoted. He, therefore,
submitted that there was no occasion to interfere with the
impugned judgment and order. Mr. Gupta submitted that the
two judgments relied upon by the High Court in the case of
Nagaraj Shivarao (supra) and State Bank of India
(supra) squarely applied to the present case, and there was
no occasion for this Court to take a different view or to
interfere with any part of the judgment.
Consideration of the submissions:-
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17. We have considered the submissions of both the
counsel. When we come to the question of imposition of
punishment on the respondent, what we find is that
undoubtedly, there was a serious allegation against him, and
as it has been held in the case of Disciplinary Authority-
Cum-Regional Manager (supra), such acts could not be
condoned. At the same time, we have also to note that the
bank management itself had taken the view in the initial
stage that the action did not require a major penalty. It is
also relevant to note that the High Court was also informed
at the stage of review that the Bank was considering
imposition of a minor penalty. It is quite possible to say that
the bank management did arrive at its decision to maintain a
major penalty at a later stage on its own, and not because of
the dictate of the CVC, but at the same time it has got to be
noted that the CVC report had been sought by the
management of the bank, and thereafter the punishment had
been imposed. As observed in the case of State Bank of
India (supra), may be that the Disciplinary Authority had
recorded its own findings, and had arrived at its own
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decision, but when this advise from CVC was sought, it could
not be said that this additional material was not a part of the
decision making process. When this report was not made
available to the respondent, it is difficult to rule out the
apprehension about the decision having been taken under
pressure. Any material, which goes into the decision making
process against an employee, cannot be denied to him. In
view of the judgment in the case of Disciplinary Authority-
cum- Regional Manager (supra), the decision of the Bank
could have been approved on merits, however, the two
judgments in the cases of Nagaraj Shivaraj Karajgi
(supra) and State Bank of India (supra) lay down the
requisite procedure in such matters, and in the facts of this
case, it will not be appropriate to depart from the dicta
therein. On this yardstick alone, a part of the judgment of the
High Court interfering with the punishment will have to be
sustained.
18. Then, we come to the issue of direction of the High
Court to consider the respondent for promotion. The
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respondent was already in a post of a Senior Manager. He
was seeking a promotion to a still higher position. Promotion
as such, and in any case, to a higher post cannot be insisted
as a matter of right. In the instant case, it has been brought
to our notice that the respondent was considered for
promotion in 2002 and was not found fit. It was pointed out
by Mr. Bhatt that this was not merely on the basis of the
punishment that was imposed on the respondent. He had
previous adverse entry also in his record in the year 1999.
Besides, even if we look to the charge independently,
purchasing third party cheques and drafts of huge amounts
beyond his authority of lending has been held to be proved
against the respondent, and that finding has not been
seriously contested and dislodged. Whether he deserved a
major punishment or not, or whether a lenient view of the
allegations should be taken by considering his conduct as a
procedural lapse is another aspect. In the instant case, the
decision to impose a major punishment had to be interfered
with because of the manner in which the decision was taken.
It has also been submitted that the High Court should have
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referred the matter back to the appropriate authority for
reconsideration and imposition atleast of a minor penalty. It
is apparent that it was not a case for complete exoneration,
however, it will not be desirable to give such direction after
so many years, particularly, when the respondent has since
retired. That being so, the order quashing the punishment
will remain. That, however, would not mean that the
direction of the High Court to the appellant to consider the
respondent for promotion should be sustained.
19. We have also been informed that the respondent
was considered for promotion once again in the year 2005,
and not found fit for the promotion. Thus, the bank had
considered the respondent after the impugned judgment
which was in favour of the respondent. We are not concerned
as such with this subsequent consideration, but this is only to
point out that the bank had not declined to consider him. We
are of course concerned with the direction in the impugned
judgment to consider him once again, on the basis of the
material prior to the judgment. Inasmuch as the record of
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the respondent was not satisfactory, in our view, there was
no occasion for the High Court to give any such direction on
the footing that the respondent was denied the consideration
only because he had suffered a punishment. That inference
was not called for.
20. In the circumstances, we allow this appeal only in
part. Whereas the judgment and order of the High Court
setting aside the punishment will remain, the direction to
consider him for promotion, and give him benefits on that
footing will have to be set aside, which we hereby direct.
The respondent will however get the monetary benefits on
the footing that the said punishment is quashed.
21. Appeal is, therefore, allowed in part as above.
Parties will bear their own costs.
…………..…………………..J. [ H.L. Gokhale ]
……………………………… J.
[ J. Chelameswar ] New Delhi
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Dated : February 26, 2014
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