REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL  APPEAL NO. 128 OF 2007

Oriental Bank of Commerce & Anr. …. Appellants

Versus

R.K. Uppal          ….Respondent

JUDGMENT

R.M. Lodha, J.  

Two questions presented for consideration in this appeal  

by special leave,  at the instance of the appellants—Oriental Bank of  

Commerce and its General Manager – are:  (one) whether in terms  

of regulation 17 of Oriental Bank of Commerce Officer Employees  

(Discipline  and  Appeal)  Regulations,  1982  (for  short,  ‘the  1982  

Regulations’),   the appellate authority is required to accord personal  

hearing  to  the  respondent  in  a  departmental  appeal;  and  (two)  

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whether  the  order  dated  June 4,  2004  passed by the  appellate  

authority in the appeal preferred by the respondent  under regulation  

17 suffers from infirmity for want of reasons.  

2. The brief facts leading to the above questions are these :  

the respondent—R.K. Uppal (hereinafter referred to as ‘delinquent’)  

faced  departmental  inquiry  under  regulation  6  of  the  1982  

Regulations for acts of omission and commission committed by him  

while  working  as  Senior  Manager/Incumbent  In-charge  at  19-D,  

Chandigarh  Branch.    The  article  of  charges  served  on  the  

delinquent contained four charges, namely : (I) between the period  

September 14,  1999  to  December 20, 1999,  while recommending  

sanction   of    credit    facilities and further enhancements in the  

account of M/s. Dunroll Industries Limited,  the  delinquent   failed  to  

ensure    that    the    proposal    has   been  properly  

appraised/processed   and   all   the  relevant information has  been  

recorded in the process note; (II)  the  delinquent   recommended  

release   of   working   capital   facilities   aggregating   to Rs. 64 lac  

in  the  account  of  M/s.  Dunroll  Industries  Limited   for    the  unit  

located  at Sikandarabad (UP) at a distance of approximately 300  

k.m.  from the  branch   although  the  monitoring  of  unit  at  such  a  

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distant  place was  not  possible;  (III)  the  delinquent  recommended  

enhancement  of  Rs.  175  lac  in  the  Bank  Guarantee  limit  on  

November  17,  2000    in  the  account  of  M/s.  Dunroll  Industries  

Limited  without  ensuring  satisfactory  conduct  of  the  account  and  

without  going into the details  of  the transactions and implications  

thereof  and  (IV)  the  delinquent   released  credit  facilities  in  the  

account of M/s. Dunroll Industries Limited without complying with the  

terms of sanction.

3. On March 17, 2003,  Shri M.K. Ghosh, Commissioner for  

Departmental  Inquiries,  Central  Vigilance  Commission,  was  

appointed  inquiring  authority  to  inquire  into  the  above  charges  

levelled against the delinquent.

4. The  delinquent  submitted  his  reply  and  denied  the  

charges.  The  inquiring  authority  after  recording  the  evidence  

submitted its report on November 11, 2003. Charge I and Charge II  

were held to be partly proved while Charge III and Charge IV were  

held to be proved.

5. The findings and report  of  the inquiring authority  were  

sent to the delinquent who in response  submitted his representation  

on December 15, 2003.  The disciplinary authority concurred with  

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the  findings  of  the  inquiring  authority  and  keeping  in  view  the  

seriousness  of  charges  and  gravity  of  the  proved  conduct,  it  

imposed  the  penalty  of  dismissal  vide  order  dated  February  14,  

2004.

6. The delinquent preferred  appeal under regulation 17 of  

the  1982  Regulations  assailing  his  dismissal  order  on   diverse  

grounds  and  also  requested  for  grant  of  personal  hearing.  The  

appellate authority rejected the  delinquent’s  request for personal  

hearing and dismissed his appeal vide its order dated June 4, 2004.  

7. The delinquent challenged the  order of  penalty dated  

February 14,  2004  and also the order  of  the appellate  authority  

before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana. The Division Bench of  

that  Court  vide  its  order  dated  January  23,  2006  allowed  the  

delinquent’s  writ  petition  partly  and  set  aside  the  order  of  the  

appellate authority and remitted the matter back to it with a direction  

to pass a reasoned order after giving an opportunity of hearing to the  

petitioner.   It is this order which is impugned in the present appeal.

8. We have heard Mr.  K.N.  Bhatt,  senior  counsel  for  the  

appellants and Mr. Ram Lal Roy, counsel for the respondent.

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Re :  Question (one)  

9. Regulation 17 of the 1982 Regulations reads as follows:-  

“17. Appeals :

(i) An officer  employee  may  appeal  against  an  order  imposing upon him any of the penalties specified in  regulation  4  or  against  the  order  of  suspension  referred to in regulation 12. The appeal shall  lie to  the Appellate Authority.

(ii) An appeal shall be preferred within 45 days from the  date of  receipt  of  the order appealed against.  The  appeal shall be addressed to the Appellate Authority  and  submitted  to  the  authority  whose  order  is  appealed  against.  The  authority  whose  order  is  appealed against shall  forward the appeal together  with its comments and the records of the case to the  Appellate  Authority.  The  Appellate  Authority  shall  consider whether the findings are justified or whether  the  penalty  is  excessive  or  inadequate  and  pass  appropriate  orders.  The  Appellate  Authority  may  pass  an  order  confirming,  enhancing,  reducing  or  setting aside the penalty or remitting the case to the  authority which imposed the penalty or to any other  authority with such direction as it may deem fit in the  circumstances of the case…..”              

10. The High Court has taken a view that regulation 17 of  

the 1982 Regulations impliedly requires that a delinquent who has  

preferred appeal is afforded an opportunity of personal hearing by  

the appellate  authority.    While  taking such view, the High Court  

relied on a decision of this Court in Ram Chander v. Union of India &  

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Ors.1 and a Full Bench decision of that Court in Ram Niwas Bansal  

v. State Bank of Patiala & Anr.2 .  

11. We shall refer to the above  two decisions first. In Ram  

Chander’s case1  before this Court, the appellant who was employed  

as Shunter,  Grade ‘B’ in the Railways was removed from service  

after holding disciplinary inquiry wherein his guilt of misconduct was  

held to be proved. The inquiry officer proceeded ex-parte against the  

delinquent  as  he  did  not  appear  and  recorded  a  finding  that  

misconduct  was  proved.  The  disciplinary  authority  (General  

Manager) concurred with the view of the inquiry officer;  formed a  

provisional view that penalty of removal should be imposed on him  

and issued a show cause notice to the delinquent  in this regard.  

This time, the delinquent did respond to the show cause notice and  

submitted  his  explanation.   The  disciplinary  authority  was  not  

satisfied with the delinquent’s response and imposed the penalty of  

removal. The delinquent preferred a departmental appeal before the  

Railway Board under the relevant Rules. His appeal was dismissed  

by  the  appellate  authority.  The  delinquent  then  challenged  the  

orders of the appellate authority and disciplinary authority before the  

1 (1986) 3 SCC 103 2 (1998) (4) SLR 711

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High Court in a writ petition. The writ petition was dismissed and so  

also the Letters Patent Appeal preferred by him. The matter then  

reached  this  Court  in  an  appeal  by  special  leave.  Inter  alia,  the  

contention  of  the  delinquent  before  this  Court  was  that  it  was  

incumbent  upon  the  appellate  authority  to  afford  him  personal  

hearing  before  his  appeal  was  decided.  Construing  the  relevant  

Rules,  namely,  Rule  18(ii)  of  the  Railway  Servants  (Discipline  &  

Appeal) Rules, 1968 and Rule 22(2) of the said Rules, this Court  

held (at pages 117-118)  as under :  

“25. ……….Such being the legal  position,  it  is  of  utmost  importance  after  the  Forty-Second  Amendment  as  interpreted by the majority in Tulsiram Patel [(1985) 3 SCC  398] case that the appellate authority must not only give a  hearing  to  the  government  servant  concerned  but  also  pass a reasoned order dealing with the contentions raised  by him in the appeal. We wish to emphasize that reasoned  decisions by tribunals, such as the Railway Board in the  present  case,  will  promote  public  confidence  in  the  administrative  process.  An  objective  consideration  is  possible only if the delinquent servant is heard and given a  chance to satisfy the authority  regarding the final  orders  that may be passed on his appeal. Considerations of fair  play and justice also require that such a personal hearing  should be given.

26. In the result, the appeal must succeed and is allowed.  The judgment and order of a learned Single Judge of the  Delhi  High Court  dated August 16, 1983 and that of  the  Division Bench dismissing the letters patent appeal filed by  the appellant in limine by its order dated February 15, 1984  are  both  set  aside,  so  also  the  impugned  order  of  the  

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Railway  Board  dated  March  11,  1972.  We  direct  the  Railway  Board  to  hear  and  dispose  of  the  appeal  after  affording a personal hearing to the appellant on merits by a  reasoned order in conformity with the requirements of Rule  22(2)  of  the  Railway  Servants  (Discipline  and  Appeal)  Rules,  1968,  as  expeditiously  as  possible,  and  in  any  event, not later than four months from today.”

In our opinion, in Ram Chander’s case1,  this Court has not laid down  

as an absolute  proposition  that  in  matters  of  departmental  appeal  

against the punishment order of a disciplinary authority, the appellate  

authority must invariably afford personal hearing to a delinquent.  

12. Insofar as,  Punjab and Haryana High Court is concerned,  

it  is  true that  in  Ram Niwas Bansal2  while  dealing with  a similar  

regulation, i.e. regulation 70 of the State Bank of Patiala (Officers)  

Service Regulations, 1979, the Full Bench of that Court has read into  

such rule a provision of right of personal hearing to a delinquent  but  

we  find  it  difficult  to  approve  that  view.   As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  

judgment  of  this  Court  in  the  case  of  State  Bank  of  Patiala  Vs.   

Mahendra Kumar Singhal3 was not brought to the notice of that Court  

nor that judgment was adverted to which lays down in clear terms  

that the rule of natural justice does not necessarily in all cases confer  

3 (1994) Supp (2) SCC 463

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a right of audience at appellate stage.  This is what this Court said (at  

page 464)  in Mahendra Kumar Singhal3 :  

“2. Heard  counsel  on  both  sides.  The  respondent  was  visited with the punishment of dismissal from service. He  filed a departmental appeal which came to be dismissed,  whereupon  he  moved  the  High  Court  by  way  of  a  writ  petition. The High Court quashed the order of the appellate  authority on the ground that no personal hearing was given  before  the  appeal  was  dismissed.  The  matter  was,  therefore, remitted to the appellate authority to dispose of  the  appeal  after  hearing  the  delinquent  personally.  It  is  against the said order that the present appeal is filed.

3. No rule has been brought to our attention which requires  the appellate authority to grant a personal hearing. The rule  of natural justice does not necessarily in all cases confer a  right of audience at the appellate stage. That is what this  Court  observed  in  F.N.  Roy v.  Collector  of  Customs,   Calcutta  [1957  SCR  1151  =  AIR  1957  SC  648].  We,  therefore, think that the impugned order is not valid. Our  attention was, however, drawn to the decision in Mohinder  Singh  Gill v.  Chief  Election  Commissioner,  New  Delhi   [(1978) 1 SCC 405] wherein observation is made in regard  to  the  right  of  hearing.  But  that  was  not  a  case  of  a  departmental  inquiry,  it  was  one  emanating  from  Article  324  of  the  Constitution.  In  our  view,  therefore,  those  observations are not pertinent to the facts of this case.”

13. In Union of India and Anr. v. Jesus Sales Corporation4,  this  

Court  was concerned with  an appeal  that  was filed against  the  

judgment of the Full Bench of the Delhi High Court holding that an  

oral hearing has to be given by appellate authority before taking a  

decision under 3rd proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 4-M of the  

4 (1996) 4 SCC 69

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Imports  and  Exports  (Control)  Act,  1947.  The  Court  noticed  

Section  4-M of  that  Act  and in  paragraph 3 at  page 73 of  the  

Report  framed  the  question  as  to  whether  the  requirement  of  

hearing to the appellants has to be read as an implicit condition  

while  construing  the  scope  of  3rd proviso  to  sub-section  (1)  of  

Section 4-M.  This Court held (at pages 74-75)  as under :

“5. The High Court has primarily considered the question  as to whether denying an opportunity to the appellant to be  heard before his prayer to dispense with the deposit of the  penalty is rejected, violates and contravenes the principles  of natural justice. In that connection, several judgments of  this Court have been referred to. It need not be pointed out  that  under  different  situations  and  conditions  the  requirement of compliance of the principle of natural justice  vary. The courts cannot insist that under all circumstances  and under different statutory provisions personal hearings  have  to  be  afforded  to  the  persons  concerned.  If  this  principle  of  affording  personal  hearing  is  extended  whenever statutory authorities are vested with the power to  exercise discretion in connection with statutory appeals, it  shall  lead  to  chaotic  conditions.  Many  statutory  appeals  and  applications  are  disposed  of  by  the  competent  authorities who have been vested with powers to dispose  of the same. Such authorities which shall be deemed to be  quasi-judicial authorities are expected to apply their judicial  mind  over  the  grievances  made  by  the  appellants  or  applicants  concerned,  but  it  cannot  be  held  that  before  dismissing such appeals or applications in all  events the  quasi-judicial  authorities  must  hear  the  appellants  or  the  applicants, as the case may be. When principles of natural  justice  require  an  opportunity  to  be  heard  before  an  adverse order is passed on any appeal  or application, it  does not  in  all  circumstances mean a personal  hearing.  The  requirement  is  complied  with  by  affording  an  opportunity  to the person concerned to present his  case  before  such  quasi-judicial  authority  who  is  expected  to  

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apply his judicial mind to the issues involved. Of course, if  in  his  own  discretion  if  he  requires  the  appellant  or  the  applicant  to  be  heard  because  of  special  facts  and  circumstances of the case, then certainly it is always open  to such authority to decide the appeal or the application  only  after  affording  a  personal  hearing.  But  any  order  passed after taking into consideration the points raised in  the appeal or the application shall not be held to be invalid  merely on the ground that no personal hearing had been  afforded. This is all  the more important in the context of  taxation  and  revenue  matters.  When  an  authority  has  determined a tax liability or has imposed a penalty,  then  the requirement that before the appeal is heard such tax or  penalty  should  be  deposited  cannot  be  held  to  be  unreasonable as already pointed out above. In the case of  Shyam Kishore v. Municipal Corpn. of Delhi [(1993) 1 SCC  22] it  has been held by this Court that such requirement  cannot be held to be harsh or violative of Article 14 of the  Constitution so as to declare the requirement of pre-deposit  itself as unconstitutional. In this background, it can be said  that normal rule is that before filing the appeal or before the  appeal is heard, the person concerned should deposit the  amount which he has been directed to deposit as a tax or  penalty.  The  non-deposit  of  such  amount  itself  is  an  exception which has been incorporated in different statutes  including the one with  which we are concerned.  Second  proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 4-M says in clear and  unambiguous  words  that  an  appeal  against  an  order  imposing  a  penalty  shall  not  be  entertained  unless  the  amount of the penalty has been deposited by the appellant.  Thereafter  the  third  proviso  vests  a  discretion  in  such  appellate  authority  to  dispense  with  such  deposit  unconditionally  or  subject  to  such  conditions  as  it  may  impose in its discretion taking into consideration the undue  hardship which it is likely to cause to the appellant. As such  it can be said that the statutory requirement is that before  an appeal is entertained, the amount of penalty has to be  deposited by the appellant; an order dispensing with such  deposit  shall  amount  to  an  exception  to  the  said  requirement of deposit. In this background, it is difficult to  hold that if the appellate authority has rejected the prayer  of  the  appellant  to  dispense  with  the  deposit  unconditionally or has dispensed with such deposit subject  

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to  some  conditions  without  hearing  the  appellant,  on  perusal of the petition filed on behalf of the appellant for the  said purpose, the order itself is vitiated and is liable to be  quashed being violative of the principles of natural justice.

14. Thus, in  Jesus Sales Corporation4,  it  was held by this  

Court  that  under  the  relevant  rule,  it  was  not  obligatory  upon the  

appellate authority to  hear the appellant.  

15. In  Ganesh Santa Ram Sirur v.  State Bank of India and  

Anr.5,  the  appellate  authority  proposed  to  enhance  the  penalty  

imposed  upon  the  delinquent  by  the  punishing  authority.  The  

disciplinary  authority  recommended  to  the  punishing  authority  the  

punishment  of  reduction  in  substantive  salary  at  one  stage.  The  

punishing authority accepted the recommendation of the disciplinary  

authority  and  imposed  the  punishment  accordingly.  The  appellate  

authority proposed to enhance the penalty to an order of removal. In  

this context, inter alia, one of the contentions raised before this Court  

was that the order of removal from service could not be sustained as  

no  personal  hearing  was  given  to  the  delinquent  before  the  

enhancement  of  punishment  even  though  personal  interview  was  

specifically asked for. The  Court noticed various judgments of this  

Court  including  the  Constitution  Bench  judgment  in  Managing  5 (2005) 1 SCC 13

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Director, ECIL, Hyderabad and others v.  B. Karunakar and Ors.6  and  

also the judgment of  the Punjab and Haryana High Court  in  Ram  

Niwas Bansal2. In paragraph 31 at page 29 of the Report,  it was held  

that the approach and test adopted in B. Karunakar6  should govern  

all cases where the complaint is not that there was no hearing, no  

notice and no opportunity  but one of not affording the proper hearing  

that is adequate or a full hearing or violation of a procedural rule or  

requirement governing that inquiry. We have not been able to discern  

anything  in  Ganesh  Santa  Ram Sirur5 that  lays  down  that  the  

appellate authority must, in all cases of departmental appeal, afford  

personal hearing to the delinquent.  

16. Be it noted that  the principal question for consideration  

in  B.  Karunakar6  was  whether  the  report  of  the  inquiry  

officer/authority who/which is appointed by the disciplinary authority  

to hold an inquiry  into the charges against the delinquent employee  

is required to be furnished to the employee to enable him to make  

proper  representation  to  the  disciplinary  authority  before  such  

authority arrives at its own finding with regard to guilt or otherwise of  

the  employee  and  the  punishment,  if  any,  to  be  awarded to  him.  

While  dealing with  this  question and its diverse facets,  the  Court  6  (1993) 4 SCC 727

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exhaustively considered the principles of natural justice in the context  

of furnishing the report of the inquiry officer/authority to the delinquent  

employee.  B. Karunakar6 does not deal with the question of necessity  

of  affording  a  personal  hearing  to  a  delinquent  by  the  appellate  

authority.

17. Mr. K.N. Bhatt, learned senior counsel for the appellants  

cited a Single Bench decision of  Andhra Pradesh High Court in  Y.  

Malleswara  Rao v.  Chief  General  Manager,  State  Bank  of  India,   

Hyderabad & Ors.7. In that case the delinquent was visited with the  

penalty of removal from service. The concerned delinquent preferred  

appeal  before  the  appellate  authority  and  one  of  the  contentions  

raised before the High Court was that the appellate authority failed to  

afford a personal hearing to the delinquent and, therefore, the order  

of the appellate authority suffered from transgression of an essential  

principle  of  natural  justice.  The  Single  Judge  of  the  High  Court  

referred  to  decisions  of  this  Court  in  Mahendra  Kumar  Singhal3,  

Jesus Sales Corporation4 and  Ganesh Santa Ram Sirur5 and also the  

decision of Full  Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court  in  Ram  

Niwas Bansal2.  The Single Judge also referred to few decisions of  

other High Courts  and followed the proposition propounded by this  7 2006 LAB. I.C. 1384

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Court in  Mahendra Kumar Singhal3  viz; that in the absence of the  

specific  requirement  by  the  relevant  rules,  there  is  no  right  to  a  

personal  hearing  at  the  appellate  stage  and  the  rules  of  natural  

justice do not require that in all cases a right of audience should be  

provided at the appellate stage.  

18. It is now fairly well settled that the requirements of natural  

justice must depend on the circumstances of the case, the nature of  

the inquiry, the rules under which the tribunal is acting, the subject  

matter  that  is  being  dealt  with  and  so  forth.   In  the  words  of  

Ramaswami, J. (Union of India & Anr.  v. P.K. Roy & Ors.8) the extent  

and application of the doctrine of natural justice cannot be imprisoned  

within  the  straitjacket  of  a  rigid  formula.   The  application  of  the  

doctrine  depends  upon the  nature  of  jurisdiction  conferred  on  the  

administrative  authority,  upon  the  character  of  the  rights  of  the  

persons  affected,  the  scheme and  policy  of  the  statute  and  other  

relevant circumstances disclosed in the particular case.  

19. A right of  appeal is not an inherent right.   None of the  

facets of natural justice requires that there should be right of appeal  

from any decision. The extent of power of an appellate forum and the  

mode  and  manner  of  its  exercise  can  always  be  provided  in  the  8 AIR 1968 SC 850  

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provision that creates such right.  Insofar as provision of appeal in  

regulation 17 of the 1982 Regulations is concerned, it must be stated  

that the said provision affords to an employee  right of appeal against  

an  order  imposing  upon  him  any  of  the  penalties  specified  in  

regulation  4  or  against  the  order  of  suspension  referred  to  in  

regulation 12.   It provides for limitation within which the appeal  is to  

be  preferred.   As  per  the  said  provision,  the  appeal  must  be  

addressed to the  appellate authority and submitted to the authority  

whose  order  is  appealed  against.   The  authority  whose  order  is  

appealed against is required to forward the appeal together with its  

comments and also the record of the case to the appellate authority.  

The appellate authority then proceeds with the consideration  of the  

appeal and considers  whether the findings are justified; whether the  

penalty  is  excessive  or  inadequate  and  passes  appropriate  order  

confirming,  enhancing,  reducing  or  setting  aside  the  penalty  or  

remitting the case to the authority that imposed the penalty or to any  

other  authority  with  such  direction  as  it  may  deem  fit  in  the  

circumstances of the case.  The appeal provision in regulation 17 of  

the 1982 Regulations does not expressly provide for personal hearing  

to  the appellant.   Is  the right  of  personal  hearing to the appellant  

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implicit in the provision?  We think not.  In our considered view,  in the  

absence of personal  hearing to the appellant, it cannot be said  that  

the  very  right  of  appeal  is  defeated.   One  situation  is,  however,  

different.  Where  the  appellate  authority  proposes  to  enhance  the  

penalty,  obviously, the  appellate authority must issue  notice to the  

delinquent  asking him to show cause  why  penalty that has been  

awarded  to  him  must  not  be  enhanced  and    give  him  personal  

hearing.  It is so because the appellate authority seeks to inflict such  

punishment  for  the  first  time  which  was  not  given  by  the  

disciplinary/punishing authority.  Although there are no positive words  

in regulation 17,  requiring that  the appellant shall  be heard before  

enhancement of the penalty, the fairness and natural justice require  

him to be heard.   

20. It is true that in Ganesh Santa Ram Sirur5,  this Court did  

not accept the contention of the delinquent relating to non-grant of  

personal  hearing  to  him  by  the  appellate  authority  before  the  

enhancement of the punishment.  But it was so in the peculiar fact-

situation of  the case.   First,  this Court  observed that  Charge 5 of  

granting  loan to  the spouse under  SEEUY Scheme in violation  of  

Rule  34(3)  of  the  State  Bank  of  India  (Supervising  Staff)  Service  

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Rules was found by the appellate authority more serious and grave in  

nature.    Secondly  and  more  importantly,  the  Court  noticed  that  

delinquent in his appeal before the appellate authority admitted that  

he had committed misconduct of disbursing the loan to his wife in a  

Scheme which was meant for educated unemployed youth.  To our  

mind, thus, there is no inconsistency in the judgment of this Court in  

Ganesh Santa Ram Sirur5 and our statement above that where the  

appellate authority proposes to enhance the penalty,  the appellate  

authority must issue notice to the delinquent and give him personal  

hearing.  

21. However,  personal hearing may not be required  where  

the appellate authority, on consideration of the entire material placed  

before  it,   confirms,  reduces  or   sets  aside  the  order  appealed  

against.   Regulation 17 of the 1982 Regulations does not require that  

in all situations  personal hearing must be afforded to the delinquent  

by  the  appellate  authority.  The  view  taken  by  the  Full  Bench  of  

Punjab and Haryana High Court  in the case of Ram Niwas Bansal2   

is  too expansive and wide and cannot  be held to  be laying down  

correct  law  particularly  in  light  of   the  judgment  of  this  Court  in  

Mahendra Kumar Singhal3 .  We answer this question accordingly.  

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Re : Question (two)

22. The  High  Court  has  faulted  the  order  of  the  appellate  

authority also on the ground of it being a non-speaking order.  Is it  

so? We have carefully perused the order of the appellate authority  

and we find that the order dated June 4, 2004 cannot be labelled as a  

non-speaking order.  The order does not suffer from the vice of non-

application of mind. The appellate authority has addressed the points  

raised in the appeal and critical to the decision, albeit briefly. It is true  

that the appellate authority must record reasons in support of its order  

to indicate that it has applied its mind to the grounds raised but it is  

not  the  requirement  of  law  that  an  order  of  affirmance  by  the  

appellate authority  must be elaborate and extensive. Brief  reasons  

which indicate due application of mind in decision making process  

may suffice. Each ground raised in the appeal has been dealt with  

briefly as would be apparent  from the following consideration of the  

matter by the appellate authority:

“The  contention  of  the  appellant  that  no  departmental  action  can  be  taken  against  him  during  pendency  of  criminal proceedings before the Court is not tenable;  as  departmental  enquiry  is  independent  of  criminal  proceedings and as such there is no bar to pass the order  

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of  punishment  by  the  Disciplinary  Authority  during  the  pendency of criminal proceedings.

The appellant has alleged that Inquiring Authority has erred  in holding the imputation 2 & 3 under Article of Charge No.  1 as proved. On carefully perusing the evidence brought on  record of the enquiry and other related record, I find that  Disciplinary  Authority  has  fully  considered  evidence/submissions made by the appellant and based on  that the article of charge no. 1 is held partly proved against  the  appellant.  This  does  not,  however,  mean  that  the  Disciplinary  Authority  has  in  anyway  exonerated  the  appellant  of  this  charge.  Hence,  I  do  not  find  any  force/substance in the allegation of the appellant. I find that  on the basis of evidence adduced in the inquiry, article of  charge no. 1 has been rightly held as partly proved against  the appellant.

The  appellant  has  further  contended  that  PO  had  not  furnished  any  proof  of  his  having  recommended  the  proposal  to  the  Regional  Office.  I  have  perused  the  relevant  record  and evidence adduced in  respect  of  the  charge. It is evident from Ex. MEX 10/6 (which is admitted  document in the enquiry) that the appellant had sent letter  dated  24-10-2000  based  on  which  Regional  Office  permitted the party to avail facility for unit at Sikandrabad  which was 300 kms away from Chandigarh and in this way,  it  was  not  possible for  the branch to monitor  the unit  at  such  a  distant  place.  Although  the  appellant  has  not  disputed reference of letter dated 24-10-2000 in Ex. MEX  10/6, yet due to its non-production by the PO, the IA has  held this charge as partly proved. On the basis of evidence  brought  on  record  of  enquiry  and  after  considering  submission of  appellant,  I  find that  Disciplinary  Authority  has rightly held article of charge no. 2 as partly proved and  contention of the appellant that this charge should be set  aside is devoid of any merit.

The appellant  has contended that  he had recommended  the  proposal  keeping  in  view  the  General  Manager’s  instructions.  The  appellant  had  neither  produced  any  document  nor  adduced  any  evidence  in  his  defence  to  substantiate this fact. However, during general examination  

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by the Inquiring Authority, he has admitted that he had no  exposure  of  processing  of  the  guarantees  and  proposal  was  analysed  at  Regional  Office  and  he  had  just  recommended  it.  This  clearly  shows  that  the  appellant  recommended  enhancement  of  bank  guarantee  limit  of  Rs. 175 lacs in the account of M/s. Dunroll Industries Ltd.  without  ensuring satisfactory conduct of  the account and  without  going  into  details  of  transaction  and implications  thereof.  After  carefully  analyzing  the  evidence  adduced  during the enquiry,  I  find that the article of charge no. 3  against the appellant is rightly held proved by Disciplinary  Authority.  I  therefore,  do  not  find  any  merit/force  in  the  allegations of the appellant.

The  Appellant  has  contended  that  common  seal  on  all  documents  had been affixed  and  all  the  documents  are  valid. On careful perusal of documents ME-23/1/2 and after  evaluating evidence of PW-1 during regular hearing held  on 20-9-2003, I observe that article of charge no. 4 against  the appellant in respect of releasing credit facilities in the  account of M/s.  Dunroll  Industries Ltd. without  complying  with  terms  of  sanction  is  rightly  held  proved  by  the  Disciplinary Authority. Hence I do not find any force/merit in  contention of the appellant that article of charge no. 4 has  been wrongly upheld by the Inquiring Authority.

The appellant has also referred to some pending enquiry  proceedings against him in respect of charge sheet dated  12-8-2003 in  the matter  of  Bankarpur  Cold  Storage and  has contended that it is against principles of natural justice  to take into account past service record without valid legal  grounds. After perusing relevant enquiry record, I find that  Disciplinary Authority  in  his order has referred to certain  lapses/irregularities  attributable  to  the  appellant  for  the  misconduct  committed  by  him  while  posted  as  Sr.  Manager/Incumbent  In-charge,  B/O  19-D,  Chandigarh.  Having  regard  to  imposition/inflictment  of  penalty  of  dismissal  on  the  appellant  w.e.f.  14-2-2004  by  the  Disciplinary  Authority  under  Regulation  4(j)  of  Oriental  Bank  of  Commerce  Officer  Employees  (Discipline  &  Appeal) Regulations, 1982 it was not open to the bank to  pursue pending charge sheet dated 12-8-2003 against the  appellant  as  referred  to  in  the  appeal.  Disciplinary  

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Authority,  therefore,  has rightly  stated in  his  order dated  14-2-2004 that  “no action is required to be taken at this  stage” in relation to this charge sheet. Hence, I do not find  any  force/merit  in  the  allegations  of  the  appellant  that  Disciplinary Authority has taken into account the matter of  pending inquiries in respect of  charge sheet dated 12-8- 2003. As such, there is no violation of principles of natural  justice as alleged.”       

Having discussed the matter as above, the appellate authority held  

that  on  consideration  of  the  inquiry  record  and  facts  and  

circumstances of the case,  the findings and the order dated February  

14,  2004  passed  by  disciplinary  authority  are  based  on  evidence  

brought on record of inquiry and not founded on past record or any  

other matter not connected with inquiry as alleged by the delinquent  

in the appeal. Consequently, the appellate authority concurred with  

the  view of  the  disciplinary  authority  and  found  no  justification  to  

interfere with the penalty awarded by the disciplinary authority.

23. The  order  of  the  appellate  authority,  by  no  stretch  of  

imagination can be said to suffer from vice of lack of reasons.   We  

answer question no. (two) in the negative.

24. In our view, the High Court was clearly in error in setting  

aside and quashing the order  dated  June 4,  2004 passed by the  

appellate authority and in directing the appellate authority to pass a  

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reasoned order after giving an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner  

(respondent herein).

25. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed and the judgment and  

order dated January 23, 2006 passed by the High Court of Punjab  

and Haryana is set aside. The parties shall bear their own costs.  

  …………………….J.            (Aftab Alam)

   .………………….. J.           (R.M. Lodha)  

NEW DELHI. AUGUST 11, 2011.

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