NOOR MOHAMMED Vs JETHA NAND
Case number: SLP(C) No.-025848-025848 / 2011
Diary number: 24448 / 2011
Advocates: SARAD KUMAR SINGHANIA Vs
Page 1
Page 2
Page 3
Page 4
Page 5
Page 6
Page 7
Page 8
Page 9
Page 10
Page 11
Page 12
Page 13
Page 14
Page 15
Page 16
Page 17
Page 18
Page 19
Page 20
Page 21
Page 22
Page 23
Page 24
Page 25
Page 26
Page 27
Page 28
Page 29
Page 1
Reportabl e
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Special Leave Petition (C) No. 25848 of 2011
Noor Mohammed ... Petitioner
Versus
Jethanand and another ...Respondents
J U D G M E N T
Dipak Misra, J.
In a democratic body polity which is governed by a
written Constitution and where Rule of Law is paramount,
judiciary is regarded as sentinel on the qui vive not only to
protect the Fundamental Rights of the citizens but also to
see that the democratic values as enshrined in the
Constitution are respected and the faith and hope of the
people in the constitutional system are not atrophied.
Page 2
Sacrosanctity of rule of law neither recognizes a master
and a slave nor does it conceive of a ruler and a subject
but, in quintessentiality, encapsules and sings in glory of
the values of liberty, equality and justice In accordance
with law requiring the present generation to have the
responsibility to sustain them with all fairness for the
posterity ostracising all affectations. To maintain the
sacredness of democracy, sacrifice in continuum by every
member of the collective is a categorical imperative. The
fundamental conception of democracy can only be
preserved as a colossal and priceless treasure where
virtue and values of justice rule supreme and intellectual
anaemia is kept at bay by constant patience, consistent
perseverance, and argus-eyed vigilance. The foundation
of justice, apart from other things, rests on the speedy
delineation of the lis pending in courts. It would not be an
exaggeration to state that it is the primary morality of
justice and ethical fulcrum of the judiciary. Its profundity
lies in not allowing anything to cripple the same or to do
any act which would freeze it or make it suffer from
impotency. Delayed delineation of a controversy in a
2
Page 3
court of law creates a dent in the normative dispensation
of justice and in the ultimate eventuate, the Bench and
the Bar gradually lose their reverence, for the sense of
divinity and nobility really flows from institutional
serviceability. Therefore, historically, emphasis has been
laid on individual institutionalism and collective
institutionalism of an adjudicator while administering
justice. It can be stated without any fear of contradiction
that the collective collegiality can never be regarded as an
alien concept to speedy dispensation of justice. That is
the hallmark of duty, and that is the real measure.
2. Presently to the factual matrix. The respondent
initiated civil action by instituting Civil Suit No. 42 of 1990
for injunction to restrain the defendant therein from selling
or otherwise transferring the suit land towards the
southern side of the house and further to permanently
injunct him to make any construction on the land in
dispute. After the written statement was filed, a counter
claim was put forth by the defendant. Thereafter, issues
were framed and the parties adduced evidence to
substantiate their respective stands. On 12.9.1997, the
3
Page 4
learned Civil Judge (Junior Division) Nohar, District
Hanumangarh, Rajasthan dismissed the suit and decreed
the counter claim filed by defendant-petitioner herein.
Being grieved by the aforesaid judgment and decree, the
first respondent preferred Civil First Appeal No. 59 of 1997
in the Court of the concerned Additional District Judge,
Nohar who, on 10.07.2001 dismissed the appeal. The
dismissal of appeal compelled the respondent to file a Civil
Second Appeal No. 207/2001 in the High Court of
Judicature of Rajasthan at Jodhpur.
3. Be it noted, we have not adverted to the factual
controversy and findings returned thereon because
advertence to the same is not necessary for our purpose.
4. The chequered history of the second appeal, a tragic
one, commenced on 27.7.2011, when memorandum of the
appeal was presented. The appeal was listed for
admission along with the stay application on 30.07.2001.
The petitioner herein had entered caveat and was present
on the date of admission and on the basis of the prayer
made by both the parties, the court called for the lower
courts’ records. Subsequently, the matter was listed on
4
Page 5
8.11.2001, 5.12.2001 and 18.1.2002 but due to non-
appearance of counsel for the parties, no order was
passed. On 18.2.2002, though none was present on
behalf of the appellant therein, yet the court adjourned
the appeal. Similarly, adjournments were granted in the
absence of counsel on 20.01.2003 and 4.2.2003. It is
interesting to note that when the appeal was listed on
4.2.2003, the court directed issuance of notice to the
appellant for making appropriate arrangements for his
representation. It is apposite to note that the counsel for
the respondent therein was present on that day.
Thereafter, the matter was adjourned on many an
occasion awaiting for service of notice on the appellant.
After completion of service of notice, the matter was listed
on 23.9.2003 and, as usual, none was present for the
appellant. Similar was the situation on 7.10.2003. On
10.11.2003, when none was present for the appellant, the
appeal was dismissed for non-prosecution in the presence
of the counsel for the respondent.
5. After the appeal was dismissed for want of
prosecution, the appellant before the High Court woke up
5
Page 6
from slumber and filed an application for restoration in
2004 which was eventually allowed vide order dated
9.1.2006. As the order sheet would reflect, time got
comatosed for more than six years and eventually,
ministerial order of restoration was recorded on
11.5.2010. After the formality of restoration was over
breaking the artificial arrest of time, when the file moved
like a large python, the appeal was listed before the court
for admission on 25.10.2010 on which day the learned
counsel for the appellant commenced the argument and
ultimately sought adjournment. The matter stood
adjourned to 10.11.2010. Thereafter, an application under
Section 100 (5) read with Order 41, Rule 2 Code of Civil
Procedure was filed by the appellant and opportunity was
granted to the counsel for the respondent, the plaintiff
therein, to file reply to the same and the matter was
directed to be listed after two weeks. As the order sheet
would further uncurtain the appeal was listed again on
29.11.2010 and in the meantime, the respondent had filed
an application under Order 41 Rule 27 read with Section
151 of CPC.
6
Page 7
6. On 24.2.2011, when the matter was listed for
admission, the Court directed that the matter shall be
listed for admission and all the applications would be
considered on that date. On 7.3.2011, it was directed by
the court to list the matter after one week as adjournment
was sought for. Similar prayer for adjournment was made
on 16.3.2011 and the matter was again directed to be
listed after two weeks as prayed for. On 27.04.2011, the
learned Single Judge passed the following order:
“None for the appellant.
I have perused the record. This second appeal was filed as back as in the year 2001 and it is now more than 10 years that it is not yet either admitted for final hearing with a view to find out whether it involves any substantial question of law within the meaning of Section 100. It has undoubtedly caused serious concern to my conscience that this appeal has taken ten years to decide whether it involves any substantial question of law.
The matter is being adjourned almost on every occasions in the last ten years to accommodate the counsel regardless of the sufficient cause and only on mere request.
Even today the counsel is engaged for the appellant has not appeared. Another counsel got up and said that the counsel
7
Page 8
engaged is not well and, therefore, the case be adjourned.
I could have dismissed the appeal for want of prosecution but I prefer not to do so because it does not serve anybody’s purpose. With extreme reluctance and against my conscience and with a view to do substantial justice to the appellant to give right of audience, I am constrained to adjourn the case to accommodate the counsel (though I am not supposed to) and list the appeal for admission in the next week.”
7. At last, on 9.5.2011, the learned counsel for both the
sides appeared and the matter was admitted on two
substantial questions of law and there was direction for
stay of operation of the impugned judgment and decree
passed by the courts below.
8. Mr. H.D. Thanvi, learned counsel for the petitioner,
has contended that there was no substantial question of
law involved and the High Court had no reason to
entertain the second appeal only on the factual score.
9. When the matter was listed on 21.9.2012 before us,
the following order was passed: -
“Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that Second Appeal preferred by Respondent No. 1 in 2001 was dismissed
8
Page 9
for non-prosecution on 10.11.2003, but later restored to file in January, 2006 and after almost 10 years of filing of the second appeal, the judgment and decree of both the courts below have been stayed by the High Court by its impugned order dated 9.5.2011.
Registrar General of the Rajasthan High Court is directed to file the details of the progress of S. B. Civil Second Appeal No. 207 of 2001, from 2001 to 2011, within two weeks.”
10. In pursuance of the aforesaid order, the Registrar
General has sent a report to this Court on the basis of
which we have referred to the proceedings before the
High Court. At this juncture, we may clearly state that
we had not issued notice to the contesting respondent
as we are not inclined to interfere with the order. But,
a pregnant one, the manner in which the proceedings
in the second appeal continued, being disturbing,
compels us to say something on the said score. Not
that this Court is saying it for the first time but a
reminder serves as a propeller for keen introspection
and paves the path of needed rectification.
11. The proceedings in the second appeal before the
High Court, if we allow ourselves to say so, epitomizes
9
Page 10
the corrosive effect that adjournments can have on a
litigation and how a lis can get entangled in the
tentacles of an octopus. The philosophy of justice, the
role of a lawyer and the court, the obligation of a
litigant and all legislative commands, the nobility of the
Bench and the Bar, the ability and efficiency of all
concerned and ultimately the divinity of law are likely
to make way for apathy and indifference when delay of
the present nature takes place, for procrastination on
the part of anyone destroys the values of life and
creates a catastrophic turbulence in the sanctity of law.
The virtues of adjudication cannot be allowed to be
paralyzed by adjournments and non-demonstration of
due diligence to deal with the matter. One cannot be
oblivious to the feeling necessities of the time. No one
can afford to sit in an ivory tower. Neither a Judge nor
a lawyer can ignore “the total push and pressure of the
cosmos”. It is devastating to expect infinite patience.
Change of attitude is the warrant and command of the
day. We may recall with profit what Justice Cardozo
had said:
1
Page 11
“It is true, I think, today in every department of law that the social value of a rule has become a test of growing power and importance”.
12. It has to be kept in mind that the time of leisure has
to be given a decent burial. The sooner it takes place,
the better it is. It is the obligation of the present
generation to march with the time and remind oneself
every moment that rule of law is the centripodal
concern and delay in delineation and disposal of cases
injects an artificial virus and becomes a vitiating
element. The unfortunate characteristics of endemic
delays have to be avoided at any cost. One has to bear
in mind that this is the day, this is the hour and this is
the moment, when all soldiers of law fight from the
path. One has to remind oneself of the great saying,
“Awake, Arise, ‘O’ Partha”.
13. As advised, at present, we are disposed to refer to
certain pronouncements of this Court. A three-Judge
Bench in Kailash v. Nanhku and others1, while
dealing with the issue whether Order 8 Rule 1 of Code
of Civil Procedure is mandatory or directory, referred to
1 (2005) 4 SCC 480
1
Page 12
the observations in Sushil Kumar Sen v. State of
Bihar2 which we may profitably reproduce: -
“The mortality of justice at the hands of law troubles a judge's conscience and points an angry interrogation at the law reformer.
The processual law so dominates in certain systems as to overpower substantive rights and substantial justice. The humanist rule that procedure should be the handmaid, not the mistress, of legal justice compels consideration of vesting a residuary power in judges to act ex debito justitiae where the tragic sequel otherwise would be wholly inequitable. … Justice is the goal of jurisprudence — processual, as much as substantive.”
The Bench further referred to the pronouncement in
State of Punjab v. Shamlal Murari3 to emphasise the
approach relating to the process of adjective law. It has
been stated in the said case: -
“Processual law is not to be a tyrant but a servant, not an obstruction but an aid to justice. Procedural prescriptions are the handmaid and not the mistress, a lubricant, not a resistant in the administration of justice.”
14. We may note with profit that the Court had further
opined that the procedure is directory but emphasis was
laid on the concept of desirability and for the aforesaid 2 (1975) 1 SCC 774 3 (1976) 1 SCC 719
1
Page 13
purpose, reference was made to Topline Shoes Ltd. v.
Corpn. Bank4. Analysing the purpose behind it, the
three-Judge-Bench, referring to Topline Shoes Ltd.
(supra), observed thus: -
“36. The Court further held that the provision is more by way of procedure to achieve the object of speedy disposal of such disputes. The strong terms in which the provision is couched are an expression of “desirability” but do not create any kind of substantive right in favour of the complainant by reason of delay so as to debar the respondent from placing his version in defence in any circumstances whatsoever.”
15. In Shiv Cotex v. Tirgun Auto Plast Private
Limited and others5 this Court was dealing with a
judgment passed by the High Court in a second appeal
wherein the High Court had not formulated any substantial
question of law and further allowed the second appeal
preferred by the plaintiff solely on the ground that the
stakes were high and the plaintiff should have been non-
suited on the basis of no evidence. This Court took note of
the fact that after issues were framed and the matter was
fixed for production of the evidence of the plaintiff on
4 (2002) 6 SCC 33 5 (2011) 9 SCC 678
1
Page 14
three occasions, the plaintiff chose not to adduce the
evidence. The question posed by the Court was to the
following effect: -
“Is the court obliged to give adjournment after adjournment merely because the stakes are high in the dispute? Should the court be silent spectator and leave control of the case to a party to the case who has decided not to take the case forward?”
Thereafter, the Court proceeded to answer thus: -
“15. It is sad, but true, that the litigants seek - and the courts grant - adjournments at the drop of the hat. In the cases where the Judges are little proactive and refuse to accede to the requests of unnecessary adjournments, the litigants deploy all sorts of methods in protracting the litigation. It is not surprising that civil disputes drag on and on. The misplaced sympathy and indulgence by the appellate and revisional courts compound the malady further. The case in hand is a case of such misplaced sympathy. It is high time that courts become sensitive to delays in justice delivery system and realise that adjournments do dent the efficacy of the judicial process and if this menace is not controlled adequately, the litigant public may lose faith in the system sooner than later. The courts, particularly trial courts, must ensure that on every date of hearing, effective progress takes place in the suit.
16. No litigant has a right to abuse the procedure provided in CPC. Adjournments have grown like cancer corroding the entire body of justice delivery system.”
1
Page 15
After so stating, the Bench observed as follows: -
“A party to the suit is not at liberty to proceed with the trial at its leisure and pleasure and has no right to determine when the evidence would be let in by it or the matter should be heard. The parties to a suit — whether the plaintiff or the defendant — must cooperate with the court in ensuring the effective work on the date of hearing for which the matter has been fixed. If they don’t, they do so at their own peril.”
16. In Ramon Services Pvt. Ltd. v. Subhash Kapoor
and others6, after referring to a passage from Mahabir
Prasad Singh v. Jacks Aviation Pvt. Ltd.7, the Court
cautioned thus: -
“Nonetheless we put the profession to notice that in future the advocate would also be answerable for the consequence suffered by the party if the non- appearance was solely on the ground of a strike call. It is unjust and inequitable to cause the party alone to suffer for the self imposed dereliction of his advocate. We may further add that the litigant who suffers entirely on account of his advocate’s non-appearance in Court, he has also the remedy to sue the advocate for damages but that remedy would remain unaffected by the course adopted in this case. Even so, in situations like this, when the Court mulcts the party with costs for the failure of his advocate to appear, we make it clear that the same Court has power to permit the party to realize the
6 AIR 2001 SC 207 7 AIR 1999 SC 287
1
Page 16
costs from the advocate concerned. However, such direction can be passed only after affording an opportunity to the advocate. If he has any justifiable cause the Court can certainly absolve him from such a liability.”
17. Be it noted, though the said passage was stated in
the context of strike by the lawyers, yet it has its
accent on non-appearance by a counsel in the court.
18. In this context, we may refer to the pronouncement
in Pandurang Dattatraya Khandekar v. Bar
Council of Maharashtra, Bombay and others8,
wherein the Court observed that an advocate stands in
a loco parentis towards the litigants and it, therefore,
follows that the client is entitled to receive
disinterested, sincere and honest treatment especially
where the client approaches the advocates for succour
in times of need.
19. In Lt. Col. S.J. Chaudhary v. State (Delhi
Administration)9, a three-Judge Bench, while dealing
with the role of an advocate in a criminal trial, has
observed as follows: -
8 (1984) 2 SCC 556 9 AIR 1984 SC 618
1
Page 17
“We are unable to appreciate the difficulty said to be experienced by the petitioner. It is stated that his Advocate is finding it difficult to attend the court from day-to- day. It is the duty of every Advocate, who accepts the brief in a criminal case to attend the trial from day-to-day. We cannot over-stress the duty of the Advocate to attend to the trial from day-to- day. Having accepted the brief, he will be committing a breach of his professional duty, if he so fails to attend.”
20. In Mahabir Prasad Singh (supra), the Bench, laying
emphasis on the obligation of a lawyer in his duty towards
the Court and the duty of the Court to the Bar, has ruled
as under: -
“A lawyer is under obligation to do nothing that shall detract from the dignity of the Court of which he is himself a sworn officer and assistant. He should at all times pay deferential respect to the judge, and scrupulously observe the decorum of the Court room. (Warevelle’s Legal Ethics at p.182)
Of course, it is not a unilateral affair. There is a reciprocal duty for the Court also to be courteous to the members of the Bar and to make every endeavour for maintaining and protecting the respect which members of the Bar are entitled to have from their clients as well as from the litigant public. Both the Bench and the Bar are the two inextricable wings of the judicial forum and therefore the aforesaid mutual respect is sine qua non for the efficient functioning of the solemn work carried on in Courts of law. But that does
1
Page 18
not mean that any advocate or group of them can boycott the courts or any particular Court and ask the Court to desist from discharging judicial function. At any rate, no advocate can ask the Court to avoid a case on the ground that he does not want to appear in that Court.”
21. While recapitulating the duties of a lawyer towards
the Court and the society, being a member of the legal
profession, this Court in O.P. Sharma and others v.
High Court of Punjab and Haryana10 has observed
that the role and status of lawyers at the beginning of
sovereign and democratic India is accounted as
extremely vital in deciding that the nation’s
administration was to be governed by the Rule of Law.
The Bench emphasized on the role of eminent lawyers
in the framing of the Constitution. Emphasis was also
laid on the concept that lawyers are the Officers of the
Court in the administration of justice.
22. In R.K. Garg, Advocate v. State of Himachal
Pradesh11, Chandrachud, C.J., speaking for the Court
pertaining to the relationship between the Bench and
the Bar, opined thus: -
10 (2011) 6 SCC 86 11 (1981) 3 SCC 166
1
Page 19
“....the Bar and the Bench are an integral part of the same mechanism which administers justice to the people. Many members of the Bench are drawn from the Bar and their past association is a source of inspiration and pride to them. It ought to be a matter of equal pride to the Bar. It is unquestionably true that courtesy breeds courtesy and just as charity has to begin at home, courtesy must begin with the Judge. A discourteous Judge is like an ill-tuned instrument in the setting of a court room. But members of the Bar will do well to remember that such flagrant violations of professional ethics and cultured conduct will only result in the ultimate destruction of a system without which no democracy can survive.”
23. We have referred to the aforesaid judgments solely
for the purpose that this Court, in different contexts, had
dealt with the malady of adjournment and expressed its
agony and anguish. Whatever may be the nature of
litigation, speedy and appropriate delineation is
fundamental to judicial duty. Commenting on the delay in
the justice delivery system, although in respect of criminal
trial, Krishna Iyer, J. had stated thus: -
“Our justice system, even in grave cases, suffers from slow motion syndrome which is lethal to “fair trial”, whatever the ultimate decision. Speedy justice is a component of social justice since the community, as a whole, is concerned in the criminal being condignly and finally
1
Page 20
punished within a reasonable time and the innocent being absolved from the inordinate ordeal of criminal proceedings.”
24. In criminal jurisprudence, speedy trial has become
an indivisible component of Article 21 of the
Constitution and it has been held by this Court that it is
the constitutional obligation on the part of the State to
provide the infrastructure for speedy trial (see
Hussainara Khatoon v. Home Secretary, State of
Bihar12, Hussainara Khatoon (IV) and others v.
Home Secretary, State of Bihar, Patna13).
25. In Diwan Naubat Rai and others v. State
through Delhi Administration14, it has been opined
that right to speedy trial encompasses all stages of
trial, namely, investigation, enquiry, trial, appeal and
revision.
26. In Surinder Singh v. State of Punjab15, it has
been reiterated that speedy trial is implicit in the broad
sweep and content of Article 21 of the Constitution of
India. Thus, it has been put at the zenith and that
12 AIR 1979 SC 1360 13 (1980) 1 SCC 98 14 AIR 1989 SC 542 15 (2005) 7 SCC 387
2
Page 21
makes the responsibility of everyone Everestine which
has to be performed with Olympian calmness.
27. The anguish expressed in the past and the role
ascribed to the Judges, lawyers and the litigants is a
matter of perpetual concern and the same has to be
reflected upon every moment. An attitude of
indifference can neither be appreciated nor tolerated.
Therefore, the serviceability of the institution gains
significance. That is the command of the Majesty of
Law and none should make any maladroit effort to
create a concavity in the same. Procrastination,
whether at the individual or institutional level, is a
systemic disorder. Its corrosive effect and impact is
like a disorderly state of the physical frame of a man
suffering from an incurable and fast progressive
malignancy. Delay either by the functionaries of the
court or the members of the Bar significantly exhibits
indolence and one can aphoristically say, borrowing a
line from Southwell “Creeping snails have the weakest
force”. Slightly more than five decades back, talking
2
Page 22
about the responsibility of the lawyers, Nizer Louis16
had put thus: -
“I consider it a lawyer’s task to bring calm and confidence to the distressed client. Almost everyone who comes to a law office is emotionally affected by a problem. It is only a matter of degree and of the client’s inner resources to withstand the pressure.”
28. A few lines from illustrious Frankfurter is fruitful to
recapitulate:
“I think a person who throughout his life is nothing but a practicing lawyer fulfils a very great and essential function in the life of society. Think of the responsibilities on the one hand and the satisfaction on the other, to be a lawyer in the true sense.”
29. In a democratic set up, intrinsic and embedded faith
in the adjudicatory system is of seminal and pivotal
concern. Delay gradually declines the citizenry faith in
the system. It is the faith and faith alone that keeps
the system alive. It provides oxygen constantly.
Fragmentation of faith has the effect-potentiality to
bring in a state of cataclysm where justice may become
a casuality. A litigant expects a reasoned verdict from
a temperate Judge but does not intend to and, rightly
16 My life in Court (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1961) p.213
2
Page 23
so, to guillotine much of time at the altar of reasons.
Timely delivery of justice keeps the faith ingrained and
establishes the sustained stability. Access to speedy
justice is regarded as a human right which is deeply
rooted in the foundational concept of democracy and
such a right is not only the creation of law but also a
natural right. This right can be fully ripened by the
requisite commitment of all concerned with the system.
It cannot be regarded as a facet of Utopianism because
such a thought is likely to make the right a mirage
losing the centrality of purpose. Therefore, whoever
has a role to play in the justice dispensation system
cannot be allowed to remotely conceive of a casual
approach.
30. In this context, it is apt to refer to a passage from
Ramdeo Chauhan Alias Raj Nath v. State of
Assam17: -
“22. ... The judicial system cannot be allowed to be taken to ransom by having resort to imaginative and concocted grounds by taking advantage of loose
17 (2001) 5 SCC 714
2
Page 24
sentences appearing in the evidence of some of the witnesses, particularly at the stage of special leave petition. The law insists on finality of judgments and is more concerned with the strengthening of the judicial system. The courts are enjoined upon to perform their duties with the object of strengthening the confidence of the common man in the institution entrusted with the administration of justice. Any effort which weakens the system and shakens the faith of the common man in the justice dispensation system has to be discouraged.”
31. In Zahira Habibulla H. Sheikh and another
v. State of Gujarat and others18, emphasizing on
the duty of Court to maintain public confidence in
the administration of justice, this Court has
poignantly held as follows: -
“35. ...Courts have always been considered to have an overriding duty to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice – often referred to as the duty to vindicate and uphold
18 (2004) 4 SCC 158
2
Page 25
the “majesty of the law”. Due administration of justice has always been viewed as a continuous process, not confined to determination of the particular case, protecting its ability to function as a court of law in the future as in the case before it.”
Thus, from the aforesaid, it is clear as day that
everyone involved in the system of dispensation of justice
has to inspire the confidence of the common man in the
effectiveness of the judicial system. Sustenance of faith
has to be treated as spinal sans sympathy or indulgence.
If someone considers the task to be herculean, the same
has to be performed with solemnity, for faith is the ‘elan
vital’ of our system.
32. Coming to the proceedings before the High Court
from the date of presentation of the second appeal till
the date of admission, the manner in which it has
progressed is not only perplexing but also shocking.
We are inclined to think that the Court should not have
shown indulgence of such magnitude by adjourning the
matter when the counsel for the appellant was not
2
Page 26
present. It is difficult to envision why the Court
directed fresh notice to the appellant when there was
nothing suggestive for passing of such an order. The
matter should have been dealt with taking a recourse
to the provisions in the Code of Civil Procedure. It is
also astonishing that the lawyers sought adjournments
in a routine manner and the court also acceded to such
prayers. When the matter stood dismissed, though an
application for restoration was filed, yet it was listed
after a long lapse of time. Adding to the misery, the
concerned official took his own time to put the file in
order. From the Registrar General’s communication it
is perceptible that some disciplinary action has been
initiated against the erring official. That is another
matter and we do not intend to say anything in that
regard. But the fact that cannot be brushed aside is
that there is enormous delay in dealing with the case.
Had timely effort been made and due concern
bestowed, it could have been avoided. There may be
cases where delay may be unavoidable. We do not
intend to give illustrations, for facts in the said cases
2
Page 27
shall speak for themselves. In the case at hand, as we
perceive, the learned counsel sought adjournment after
adjournment in a nonchalant manner and the same
were granted in a routine fashion. It is the duty of the
counsel as the officer of the court to assist the court in
a properly prepared manner and not to seek
unnecessary adjournments. Getting an adjournment is
neither an art nor science. It has never been
appreciated by the courts. All who are involved in the
justice dispensation system, which includes the Judges,
the lawyers, the judicial officers who work in courts, the
law officers of the State, the Registry and the litigants,
have to show dedicated diligence so that a controversy
is put to rest. Shifting the blame is not the cure.
Acceptance of responsibility and dealing with it like a
captain in the frontier is the necessity of the time. It is
worthy to state that diligence brings satisfaction.
There has to be strong resolve in the mind to carry out
the responsibility with devotion. A time has come
when all concerned are required to abandon idleness
and arouse oneself and see to it that the syndrome of
2
Page 28
delay does not erode the concept of dispensation of
expeditious justice which is the constitutional
command. Sagacious acceptance of the deviation and
necessitous steps taken for the redressal of the same
would be a bright lamp which would gradually become
a laser beam. This is the expectation of the collective,
and the said expectation has to become a reality.
Expectations are not to remain at the stage of hope.
They have to be metamorphosed to actuality. Long
back, Francis Bacon, in his aphoristic style, had said,
“Hope is good breakfast, but it is bad supper”. We say
no more on this score.
33. Though we have dwelled upon the issue, yet we
restrain from issuing any directions, for the High Court
as a constitutional Court has to carry the burden and
live up to the requisite expectations of the litigants. It
is also expected from the lawyers’ community to see
that delay is avoided. A concerted effort is bound to
give results. Therefore, we request the learned Chief
Justice of the High Court of Rajasthan as well as the
other learned Chief Justices to conceive and adopt a
2
Page 29
mechanism, regard being had to the priority of cases,
to avoid such inordinate delays in matters which can
really be dealt with in an expeditious manner. Putting
a step forward is a step towards the destination. A
sensible individual inspiration and a committed
collective endeavour would indubitably help in this
regard. Neither less, nor more.
34. The Special Leave Petition is, accordingly, disposed
of.
……………………………….J. [K. S. Radhakrishnan]
……………………………….J. [Dipak Misra]
New Delhi; January 29, 2013
2