07 February 2017
Supreme Court
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NIDHI Vs RAM KRIPAL SHARMA (D) THR. LRS.

Bench: DIPAK MISRA,R. BANUMATHI
Case number: C.A. No.-001008-001008 / 2017
Diary number: 12895 / 2013
Advocates: MAYURI RAGHUVANSHI Vs


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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1008 OF 2017 [ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) NO.19117 OF 2013]

NIDHI         …..   Appellant Versus

RAM KRIPAL SHARMA (D) THROUGH LRs.                …..   Respondents

J U D G M E N T

R. BANUMATHI, J.

This appeal by way of special leave is preferred against the order

dated 23.01.2013 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in

Writ Appeal No.19835 of 2003, wherein the High Court affirmed the order

passed  by  Additional  District  Judge,  Moradabad,  thereby  setting  aside

release order dated 29.10.1991 passed by the Prescribed Authority.

2. Brief facts of the present case are that the appellant is the owner

and  landlord  of  the  premises  in  question,  which  is  a  non-residential

accommodation.  Allegedly, the premises was let out by ancestors of the

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appellant’s family when they did not require the premises for personal use

as the previous owner of the accommodation Smt. Krishna Devi wife of

Kunwar Mahendra Pratap Singh had adequate place to reside in.  After the

demise of  Smt.  Krishna Devi,  appellant Nidhi  became the owner of  the

premises in question and continued to receive rent from the respondent.

The appellant filed a release application being PCS No.97 of 1987, under

Section 21(1)(a) of Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting,

Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as U.P. Act  XIII of

1972), seeking possession of the suit premises on the ground of her bona

fide personal requirement.  The appellant alleged that she is in need of the

premises as the appellant wants to accommodate her grandparents in the

demised house who live in village and are in need of care and medical

treatment.  Moreover, the appellant alleged that she and her younger sister

required  separate  room for  study.  It  was  alleged  that  the  respondent

carries out the said hotel business for namesake only and is being carried

out by the servant of the respondent. It was further alleged by the appellant

that the respondent’s main business is that of a sweet shop and he has

sufficient means to take some other place on rent to run his hotel business.

3. Respondent-tenant admitted the tenancy in the property in dispute

and resisted the application for release of accommodation, claiming that

the appellant and her sister live in a big house called  Kath Mahal which

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has  sufficient  space  comprising  of  large  rooms and large  halls.  It  was

averred that  the grandparents  of  the  appellant  are  big  landlords  in  the

village and live in a palatial house there and they are unable to climb stairs

in the suit premises.  Also, the alleged business of sweet shop is run by his

son  and  the  entire  family  is  dependent  upon  the  income  from  hotel

business.

4. Upon  consideration  of  evidence  and  on  hearing  the  parties,  the

Prescribed Authority held that the balance of convenience lies in favour of

the appellant and taking into consideration the social status of family and

that the grandparents of the appellant want to live with her parents, found

that the appellant  bona fide requires the premises and  vide  order dated

29.10.1991  allowed  the  application  for  release  of  suit  premises.  The

Prescribed  Authority  directed  the  appellant-landlord  to  compensate  the

respondent by giving him a sum equivalent to two years of  rent before

taking possession.

5. Respondent-tenant challenged the aforesaid order by way of Rent

Control Appeal No.72 of 1991 under Section 22 of U.P. Act XIII of 1972,

before the Additional District Judge at Moradabad, who  vide order dated

04.02.2003,  allowed the appeal  and set  aside the order passed by the

Prescribed Authority holding that the appellant’s need for the suit premises

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is not based on bona fide requirement and her need for accommodation is

not immediate or pressing.   

6. Aggrieved by the said order of the appellate court, the appellant filed

Writ  Appeal  No.19835  of  2003  before  the  High  Court  of  Judicature  at

Allahabad. The High Court upon consideration of the facts and materials

placed on record before it and after hearing the contentions of the parties

before it dismissed the writ appeal holding that the relief claimed originally

has,  by  reason  of  subsequent  development  in  circumstances,  become

inappropriate. The High Court found that when the statement of appellant

was recorded, she was a student of B.Sc. and was of marriageable age

and  as  the  matter  went  before  the  appellate  authority,  the  situation

changed  as  the  Court  noticed  that  the  appellant  was  married  on

23.01.1996 and her husband was a member of Indian Revenue Service

who was, at that time, posted at Delhi and subsequently in Mumbai.  The

High Court also observed that the sisters of the appellant also got married

and were living with their husbands, elsewhere and that the alleged need

had disappeared long back.  The High Court relied on the judgments of

this Court in Hasmat Rai vs. Raghunath Prasad (1981) 3 SCC 103 and

Kedar Nath Agrawal and Anr. vs. Dhanraji Devi and Anr.  2004 (4) AWC

3709 (SC), to take the cognizance of subsequent events.

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7. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the first appellate

court and the High Court have erroneously denied the relief sought by the

appellant in the release application only because during the pendency of

the appeal filed by the respondent, the appellant got married which is a

subsequent  development  which  would  naturally  take  place  and  the

appellant cannot be made to suffer on account of delay in adjudication.  It

was further contended that only because the husband of the appellant has

been allotted a government accommodation, the need of the appellant did

not disappear as the appellant required the scheduled premises for her

own use and occupation as well  as  for  the use and occupation of  her

family and the appellant requires the scheduled premises for herself  as

well as for her parents and grandparents and her  bona fide requirement

has not been properly considered by the High Court.   

8. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that this

Court has in numerous cases held that in case of eviction on the ground of

bona fide  need and comparative hardship,  the court  must  consider the

subsequent changes in events to decide the bona fide requirement of the

landlord.   It  was  further  submitted  that  in  her  release  application,  the

appellant had set up her bona fide need but failed to substantiate her stand

and hence the first appellate court and the High Court rightly dismissed the

release application.

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9. We have considered the rival contentions of learned counsel for the

parties and perused the impugned order and other materials on record.

10. The point  falling for  consideration is  whether  the marriage of  the

appellant/landlady  as  subsequent  event  can  extinguish  the  bona  fide

requirement of  a landlady and disentitle  her for  the relief  sought in the

release application filed prior to her marriage.

11. Before  proceeding  further, it  is  apposite  to  have a  look  over  the

related  provision  under  Section  21(1)  of  the  U.P. Act  which  deals  with

proceedings for release of building under occupation of tenant, clause (a)

of sub-Section (1) of Section 21 of the Act alone is germane in the present

proceedings and the said clause reads as under:-

“21. Proceedings for release of building under occupation of tenant.- (1) The Prescribed Authority may, on an application of the landlord in that behalf, order the eviction of a tenant from the building under tenancy or any specified part thereof if it is satisfied that any of the following grounds exists namely-

(a) that  the  building  is  bona  fide  required  either  in  its existing form or after demolition and new construction by  the  landlord  for  occupation  by  himself  or  any member of his family, or any person for whose benefit it is  held  by him,  either  for  residential  purposes or  for purposes of any profession, trade or calling, or where the landlord is the trustee of a public charitable trust, for the objects of the trust;

………..”

An analysis of the above provision would show that the landlord of rented

property is entitled to the vacant possession of his rented premises in the

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event  of  his  bona  fide  requirement  of  the  said  premises  for  his  own

residential or professional requirements or for any person related to him.  

12. In the facts of present case, the appellant-landlady herein was living

in a small  house with her family comprising four members and was not

able  to  accommodate  her  ailing  grandparents  who  used  to  visit  them

frequently for medication purposes and were willing to reside with them

permanently as they were living alone in their village where nobody was

there  to  look  after  them.  Appellant  in  order  to  accommodate  her

grandparents with them and in the light of growing needs of her and her

younger  sister  (who  were  then  studying)  filed  the  release  application

before the prescribed authority and the release order was granted by the

prescribed  authority  in  favour  of  the  appellant/landlady  directing

respondent-tenant to handover vacant possession of suit premises to the

appellant. As noticed earlier, during the pendency of appeal, preferred by

the  respondent-tenant,  the  appellant  got  married  and  settled  with  her

husband. The first appellate court as well as the High Court took note of

this as subsequent development and held that the requirement no longer

subsists  and  the  claim  of  personal  requirement  has  disappeared.   Of

course, during the pendency of lis between the parties, situation underwent

a change and the appellant  got  married to an Indian Revenue Service

Officer and started residing with him in Delhi and Mumbai etc. Though the

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appellant  is  married  and  settled  with  her  husband,  her  bona  fide

requirement cannot be said to have ended as she wanted the premises not

just for herself but to accommodate her parents and grandparents in the

suit premises so that they can live together. The family of the appellant is

still said to be residing in rented premises in Moradabad, despite having

their  own suit  premises to  reside in.   In  the facts of  present  case,  the

change in subsequent events is not such that would deprive the appellant

of her right to vacant possession of suit premises as it is a natural event

that  the  daughter  of  the  house  would  get  married  and  settle  with  her

husband.  Though the appellant has got married and shifted to different

accommodation  with  her  husband,  the  actual  bona fide requirement  of

premises is still  the same, since her parents and grandparents are still

residing separately from each other with no one to look after them.  More

so, the appellant got married but the family stays where it is and the bona

fide requirement of premises for accommodation of parents remains the

same.  Being married and shifting to other place does not automatically

result in extinguishing of  bona fide requirement of the appellant as being

the owner of property, she alone is to decide what she wants to do with her

property.   

13. The legislations made for dealing with such landlord-tenant disputes

were pro-tenant as the court tends to bend towards the tenant in order to

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do justice with the tenant; but in the process of doing justice the Court

cannot be over zealous and forget its duty towards the landlord also as

ultimately,  it  is  the  landlord  who  owns  the  property  and  is  entitled  to

possession of the same when he proves his bona fide beyond reasonable

doubt as it is in the case before this Court.  

14. First appellate court as well as the High Court observed that during

the pendency  of  the  appeal,  the  appellant  got  married,  her  husband a

member of  Indian Revenue Service (IRS) posted at  Delhi,  Mumbai and

other  places  and  this  subsequent  event  has  extinguished the  personal

requirement of the appellant.  In the impugned judgment, the High Court

referred  to  number  of  judgments  Hasmat  Rai  and  Another  vs.

Raghunath Prasad (1981) 3 SCC 103; Ramesh Kumar vs. Kesho Ram

(1992) Suppl. (2) SCC 623 and other judgments.

15. Ordinarily,  rights  of  the  parties  stand  crystallised  on  the  date  of

institution of the suit.  However, the court has power to take note of the

subsequent events and mould the relief accordingly.  Power of the court to

take note of subsequent events came up for consideration in a number of

decisions.  In Om Prakash Gupta vs. Ranbir B. Goyal (2002) 2 SCC 256,

this Court held as under:-  

“11. The ordinary rule of civil law is that the rights of the parties stand crystallised on the date of the institution of the suit  and, therefore, the

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decree in a suit should accord with the rights of the parties as they stood at the commencement of the lis. However, the Court has power to take note of subsequent events and mould the relief accordingly subject to the following conditions being satisfied: (i) that the relief, as claimed originally has, by reason of subsequent events, become inappropriate or cannot be granted;  (ii)  that  taking  note  of  such  subsequent  event  or  changed circumstances would shorten litigation and enable complete justice being done to the parties; and (iii) that such subsequent event is brought to the notice  of  the  court  promptly  and  in  accordance  with  the  rules  of procedural  law so that  the opposite  party  is  not  taken by  surprise.  In Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. Motor & General Traders (1975) 1 SCC 770 this Court held that a fact arising after the lis, coming to the notice of the court and having a fundamental impact on the right to relief or the manner of moulding it and brought diligently to the notice of the court cannot be blinked at. The court may in such cases bend the rules of procedure if no specific provision of law or rule of fair play is violated for it would promote substantial  justice  provided  that  there  is  absence  of  other  disentitling factors or just circumstances. The Court speaking through Krishna Iyer, J. affirmed the proposition that the court can, so long as the litigation pends, take note of updated facts to promote substantial justice. However, the Court cautioned: (i) the event should be one as would stultify or render inept  the  decretal  remedy,  (ii)  rules  of  procedure  may  be  bent  if  no specific  provision or  fair  play is  violated and there is  no other special circumstance repelling resort  to that  course in  law or justice,  (iii)  such cognizance of subsequent events and developments should be cautious, and (iv) the rules of fairness to both sides should be scrupulously obeyed.

Om Prakash Gupta’s case  was referred with approval in  Ram Kumar

Barnwal vs. Ram Lakhan (Dead) (2007) 5 SCC 660.

16. Though the  court  has  the  power  to  take note  of  the subsequent

events, court has to consider the effect of subsequent development on the

bona  fide need  of  the  landlord.   For  the  purpose  of  coming  to  the

conclusion on bona fide  need of the landlord, comparative hardship to the

parties will have to be taken into consideration.  As discussed above, in the

present case, the appellant got married during the pendency of the appeal

and settled with her husband; still  her requirement to accommodate her

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parents and grandparents continued. Appellant has established her  bona

fide requirement for accommodating her parents and grandparents in the

suit  premises  merely  because  the  appellant  got  married  amidst  the

proceedings does not extinguish her claim for the relief of possession of

the suit premises.  In our view, the subsequent event, namely, marriage of

appellant does not extinguish her requirement considering the comparative

hardship,  it  is  to  be  pointed  out  that  the  respondents  have  another

business of sweet shop and thus, is not going to suffer if ordered to vacate

the suit premises as they can shift the place of business to some other

place without suffering any loss of occupation, whereas the parents of the

appellant would be subjected to hardship as she has no other premises to

accommodate her grandparents as well as her parents.  While taking note

of  the  subsequent  events,  the  High  Court  has  not  considered  the

comparative hardship to the appellant and erred in declining the relief to

the appellant.

17. In the result, the appeal is allowed, the impugned order of the High

Court is set aside and the order passed by the prescribed authority i.e.

Court  of  Second  Upper  Civil  Judge,  Moradabad  dated  29.10.1991  is

restored.  The  appellant  shall  deposit  the  compensation  before  the

prescribed  authority  payable  to  the  respondent  within  four  weeks  from

today. The respondent shall handover the possession of the suit premises

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within one month from the date of deposit of the amount, failing which the

respondent-tenant shall be liable for committing contempt of this Court.  No

costs.

...……………………….J.       [DIPAK MISRA]  

                            .………………………..J.    [R. BANUMATHI]

New Delhi; February  07, 2017

 

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